This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.
This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.
This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.
Mit dem »Sicherheitsschild der Amerikas« (Shield of the Americas) haben die USA eine Initiative auf den Weg gebracht, die Maßnahmen zur Drogenbekämpfung, zur militärischen Zusammenarbeit und zur Veränderung des geopolitischen Wettbewerbs in einem einzigen Rahmen verbindet. Die Trump-Administration verfolgt damit ein hemisphärisches Ordnungskonzept unter eigener Führung, das zugleich auf die ideologische Verbundenheit der Partner setzt, um die Kooperation im multilateralen Rahmen zu vertiefen und Lieferketten sowie die Rohstoffversorgung zu sichern. Es bleiben jedoch viele Fragezeichen hinsichtlich der Verbindlichkeit der Vereinbarung und der Effektivität der Kooperation, da kein Aktionsplan entwickelt wurde und auch keine nachfolgenden Implementierungsschritte festgelegt worden sind. Außenpolitisch binden sich Lateinamerika und die Karibik damit zwar stärker an Washington, doch werden wichtige Staaten der Region auch weiterhin Europa als Diversifizierungspartner wirtschaftlich und politisch in den Blick nehmen.
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Over the past two decades, energy subsidy reforms have increasingly gained importance as mitigation measures to fight climate change. Still, many countries subsidize fossil energy consumption, and reforms are often short-lived. This paper presents harmonized cross-country data on the design of energy subsidy reforms, obtained from a structured literature review of both implemented and failed consumption subsidy reforms between 1978 and 2021. This standardized data enables the identification and validation of key design characteristics, including the motivation for reform, the use of gradual approaches, communication strategies, pricing mechanisms, and social protection measures, as well as their use in implementing reforms. The data highlight significant regional heterogeneity and emphasize the importance of context-specificity in shaping reform designs. The study also demonstrates the connection between key aspects of reform design and reform implementation, as well as associations with subsidy levels. It offers lessons for middle-income countries, especially those planning to implement carbon pricing policies. Lastly, this paper lays the groundwork for future research to explore these factors in greater detail; one avenue is to link design characteristics and political economy factors.
Over the past two decades, energy subsidy reforms have increasingly gained importance as mitigation measures to fight climate change. Still, many countries subsidize fossil energy consumption, and reforms are often short-lived. This paper presents harmonized cross-country data on the design of energy subsidy reforms, obtained from a structured literature review of both implemented and failed consumption subsidy reforms between 1978 and 2021. This standardized data enables the identification and validation of key design characteristics, including the motivation for reform, the use of gradual approaches, communication strategies, pricing mechanisms, and social protection measures, as well as their use in implementing reforms. The data highlight significant regional heterogeneity and emphasize the importance of context-specificity in shaping reform designs. The study also demonstrates the connection between key aspects of reform design and reform implementation, as well as associations with subsidy levels. It offers lessons for middle-income countries, especially those planning to implement carbon pricing policies. Lastly, this paper lays the groundwork for future research to explore these factors in greater detail; one avenue is to link design characteristics and political economy factors.
Over the past two decades, energy subsidy reforms have increasingly gained importance as mitigation measures to fight climate change. Still, many countries subsidize fossil energy consumption, and reforms are often short-lived. This paper presents harmonized cross-country data on the design of energy subsidy reforms, obtained from a structured literature review of both implemented and failed consumption subsidy reforms between 1978 and 2021. This standardized data enables the identification and validation of key design characteristics, including the motivation for reform, the use of gradual approaches, communication strategies, pricing mechanisms, and social protection measures, as well as their use in implementing reforms. The data highlight significant regional heterogeneity and emphasize the importance of context-specificity in shaping reform designs. The study also demonstrates the connection between key aspects of reform design and reform implementation, as well as associations with subsidy levels. It offers lessons for middle-income countries, especially those planning to implement carbon pricing policies. Lastly, this paper lays the groundwork for future research to explore these factors in greater detail; one avenue is to link design characteristics and political economy factors.
The transition to a new United Nations (UN) Secretary-General (SG) comes at a challenging moment, both for the organisation and its member states. It raises questions about how the next SG can guide the UN through volatile times and what they should prioritise amid mounting agendas and tightening budgets. It also gives member states an opportunity to reassess what they need from the UN and how they engage with it. Drawing on dis¬cussions at a convening of thinkers from across Europe, part of the Guidance and Regional Intelli¬gence for the Transition of UN Leadership project, this brief identifies key trends in Europe’s engage¬ment with the UN and lays out how the next SG can set priorities that matter to Europe and use the tools of their office to keep Europe engaged.
The challenge:
• Despite Europe’s significant financial contribu-tion, there is a perception that its influence at the UN is declining as global power shifts. Ear-marked funding still gives it consi¬der¬able say over the UN system, but its influence in formal settings is weakened by its own inconsistencies and by limited outreach to other regions.
• Europe’s interest in the UN may also be fading. Domestic pressures and competing crises push the organisation down the political agenda, as priori¬ties shift towards security, defence and competitiveness.
Priorities for the next SG, as seen from Europe:
• Among numerous agendas, two criteria for prioritisation emerged: (i) relevance to member states’ concerns; (ii) whether the UN can play a distinctive and valuable role.
• For Europe, this points to three areas: (i) peace and security, with the UN contributing to a future peace process and post-war reconstruction in Ukraine; (ii) migration, for which the UN offers a multilateral framework to tackle root causes such as conflict, climate change and global inequality over the long term; (iii) AI governance, where the UN can bring fragmented initiatives together and ensure they complement rather than compete with or duplicate one another.
Recommendations:
• Delivering on these priorities depends not on new mandates or processes – these should be avoided – but on the SG making better use of existing tools, such as their good offices function, their convening power and agenda-setting and their willingness to take political risks. It also depends on adequate financing by member states and on their political support.
• For Europe, the SG should lead with a strategy linked to issues salient to European audiences, act as a bridge-builder between Europe and other regions, and work with Europe’s interests at the UN, including demonstrating how sharing power and supporting a more equitable UN could serve both Europe and other regions in the long term.
The transition to a new United Nations (UN) Secretary-General (SG) comes at a challenging moment, both for the organisation and its member states. It raises questions about how the next SG can guide the UN through volatile times and what they should prioritise amid mounting agendas and tightening budgets. It also gives member states an opportunity to reassess what they need from the UN and how they engage with it. Drawing on dis¬cussions at a convening of thinkers from across Europe, part of the Guidance and Regional Intelli¬gence for the Transition of UN Leadership project, this brief identifies key trends in Europe’s engage¬ment with the UN and lays out how the next SG can set priorities that matter to Europe and use the tools of their office to keep Europe engaged.
The challenge:
• Despite Europe’s significant financial contribu-tion, there is a perception that its influence at the UN is declining as global power shifts. Ear-marked funding still gives it consi¬der¬able say over the UN system, but its influence in formal settings is weakened by its own inconsistencies and by limited outreach to other regions.
• Europe’s interest in the UN may also be fading. Domestic pressures and competing crises push the organisation down the political agenda, as priori¬ties shift towards security, defence and competitiveness.
Priorities for the next SG, as seen from Europe:
• Among numerous agendas, two criteria for prioritisation emerged: (i) relevance to member states’ concerns; (ii) whether the UN can play a distinctive and valuable role.
• For Europe, this points to three areas: (i) peace and security, with the UN contributing to a future peace process and post-war reconstruction in Ukraine; (ii) migration, for which the UN offers a multilateral framework to tackle root causes such as conflict, climate change and global inequality over the long term; (iii) AI governance, where the UN can bring fragmented initiatives together and ensure they complement rather than compete with or duplicate one another.
Recommendations:
• Delivering on these priorities depends not on new mandates or processes – these should be avoided – but on the SG making better use of existing tools, such as their good offices function, their convening power and agenda-setting and their willingness to take political risks. It also depends on adequate financing by member states and on their political support.
• For Europe, the SG should lead with a strategy linked to issues salient to European audiences, act as a bridge-builder between Europe and other regions, and work with Europe’s interests at the UN, including demonstrating how sharing power and supporting a more equitable UN could serve both Europe and other regions in the long term.
The transition to a new United Nations (UN) Secretary-General (SG) comes at a challenging moment, both for the organisation and its member states. It raises questions about how the next SG can guide the UN through volatile times and what they should prioritise amid mounting agendas and tightening budgets. It also gives member states an opportunity to reassess what they need from the UN and how they engage with it. Drawing on dis¬cussions at a convening of thinkers from across Europe, part of the Guidance and Regional Intelli¬gence for the Transition of UN Leadership project, this brief identifies key trends in Europe’s engage¬ment with the UN and lays out how the next SG can set priorities that matter to Europe and use the tools of their office to keep Europe engaged.
The challenge:
• Despite Europe’s significant financial contribu-tion, there is a perception that its influence at the UN is declining as global power shifts. Ear-marked funding still gives it consi¬der¬able say over the UN system, but its influence in formal settings is weakened by its own inconsistencies and by limited outreach to other regions.
• Europe’s interest in the UN may also be fading. Domestic pressures and competing crises push the organisation down the political agenda, as priori¬ties shift towards security, defence and competitiveness.
Priorities for the next SG, as seen from Europe:
• Among numerous agendas, two criteria for prioritisation emerged: (i) relevance to member states’ concerns; (ii) whether the UN can play a distinctive and valuable role.
• For Europe, this points to three areas: (i) peace and security, with the UN contributing to a future peace process and post-war reconstruction in Ukraine; (ii) migration, for which the UN offers a multilateral framework to tackle root causes such as conflict, climate change and global inequality over the long term; (iii) AI governance, where the UN can bring fragmented initiatives together and ensure they complement rather than compete with or duplicate one another.
Recommendations:
• Delivering on these priorities depends not on new mandates or processes – these should be avoided – but on the SG making better use of existing tools, such as their good offices function, their convening power and agenda-setting and their willingness to take political risks. It also depends on adequate financing by member states and on their political support.
• For Europe, the SG should lead with a strategy linked to issues salient to European audiences, act as a bridge-builder between Europe and other regions, and work with Europe’s interests at the UN, including demonstrating how sharing power and supporting a more equitable UN could serve both Europe and other regions in the long term.