Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

This paper assesses whether regional trade integration under the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) can mitigate the economic and distributional impacts of climate-induced
agricultural productivity losses in Ethiopia. A recursive dynamic Computable General Equilibrium(CGE) model is applied, incorporating crop-specific yield projections under RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 climate scenarios alongside tariff reductions and trade facilitation reforms. Results show that AfCFTA generates modest but sustained gains: real GDP increases by 0.21-0.55 percent by 2035, with gains of over 5 percent relative to the initial level over the 2021-2035 projection period, while private consumption rises by 0.42-0.75 percent and imports expand by 1.80 percent. Sectoral outcomes indicate a climate-constrained structural transformation, with manufacturing and services expanding while the agriculture sector contracts, as the sector hardest hit by climate change. Trade liberalization accelerates labor reallocation toward less climate-sensitive sectors, boosting employment among unskilled and semi-skilled workers and progressively affecting welfare, with the poorest rural households experiencing the largest gains in consumption. Despite these benefits, AfCFTA only partially offsets climate impacts. Our findings highlight that trade integration can support resilience, food security, and structural change when complemented by targeted climate adaptation and industrial policies.

This paper assesses whether regional trade integration under the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) can mitigate the economic and distributional impacts of climate-induced
agricultural productivity losses in Ethiopia. A recursive dynamic Computable General Equilibrium(CGE) model is applied, incorporating crop-specific yield projections under RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 climate scenarios alongside tariff reductions and trade facilitation reforms. Results show that AfCFTA generates modest but sustained gains: real GDP increases by 0.21-0.55 percent by 2035, with gains of over 5 percent relative to the initial level over the 2021-2035 projection period, while private consumption rises by 0.42-0.75 percent and imports expand by 1.80 percent. Sectoral outcomes indicate a climate-constrained structural transformation, with manufacturing and services expanding while the agriculture sector contracts, as the sector hardest hit by climate change. Trade liberalization accelerates labor reallocation toward less climate-sensitive sectors, boosting employment among unskilled and semi-skilled workers and progressively affecting welfare, with the poorest rural households experiencing the largest gains in consumption. Despite these benefits, AfCFTA only partially offsets climate impacts. Our findings highlight that trade integration can support resilience, food security, and structural change when complemented by targeted climate adaptation and industrial policies.

This paper assesses whether regional trade integration under the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) can mitigate the economic and distributional impacts of climate-induced
agricultural productivity losses in Ethiopia. A recursive dynamic Computable General Equilibrium(CGE) model is applied, incorporating crop-specific yield projections under RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 climate scenarios alongside tariff reductions and trade facilitation reforms. Results show that AfCFTA generates modest but sustained gains: real GDP increases by 0.21-0.55 percent by 2035, with gains of over 5 percent relative to the initial level over the 2021-2035 projection period, while private consumption rises by 0.42-0.75 percent and imports expand by 1.80 percent. Sectoral outcomes indicate a climate-constrained structural transformation, with manufacturing and services expanding while the agriculture sector contracts, as the sector hardest hit by climate change. Trade liberalization accelerates labor reallocation toward less climate-sensitive sectors, boosting employment among unskilled and semi-skilled workers and progressively affecting welfare, with the poorest rural households experiencing the largest gains in consumption. Despite these benefits, AfCFTA only partially offsets climate impacts. Our findings highlight that trade integration can support resilience, food security, and structural change when complemented by targeted climate adaptation and industrial policies.

Le Japon opère aujourd’hui un tournant sécuritaire dans un contexte de préoccupations croissantes quant à la fiabilité des garanties de sécurité offertes par Washington. Depuis la fin de la Seconde guerre mondiale, le Japon avait renoncé à se doter de capacités offensives, au profit d’une doctrine de pacifisme, qui reposait en grande partie sur ces garanties états-uniennes.

Cette politique est peu à peu remise en cause face à ce que Tokyo perçoit comme une intensification des menaces dans sa sphère régionale. Le pays s’inquiète de la montée en puissance de la Chine et de ses velléités sur Taïwan. La guerre en Ukraine conduit également le Japon à considérer la Russie comme une menace potentielle, notamment en raison de son contrôle de plusieurs îles revendiquées par Tokyo. La Corée du Nord constitue par ailleurs toujours une menace latente. Face à ces enjeux et face à un allié états-unien peu fiable aux yeux de Tokyo, le Japon cherche donc à élargir ses partenariats et développer ses propres capacités militaires.

Comment le Japon s’adapte-t-il à l’imprévisibilité des États-Unis depuis le retour de Donald Trump ? Peut-il encore compter sur la protection militaire de Washington ? Comment Tokyo se positionne-t-il dans les tensions sino-taïwanaises ? Le débat sur l’acquisition de l’arme nucléaire est-il relancé ? L’Europe a-t-elle une visibilité auprès le Japon ? Vers quelles régions le Japon cherche-t-il à étendre son influence ?

Autant d’enjeux abordés avec Robert Dujarric, universitaire au Japon et co-directeur de l’Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies (ICAS) de Temple University à Tokyo.

L’article Le Japon face au défi Trump. Avec Robert Dujarric est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

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Une nation, deux États : c’est ainsi que les dirigeants de la Turquie et de l’Azerbaïdjan définissent traditionnellement leur relation. Il faut dire que malgré la faible longueur de leur frontière commune – à peine quelques kilomètres – les deux pays affichent une amitié ouverte, aussi bien au niveau des gouvernements que des populations. Leurs langues sont très similaires, au point d’être mutuellement intelligibles, et l’islam (majoritairement chiite en Azerbaïdjan, sunnite en Turquie) est la religion principale au sein des deux pays. Pourtant, ces derniers jours, des tensions importantes semblent avoir perturbé l’idylle géopolitique qui unissait jusqu’alors le président turc Recep Tayyip Erdoğan et son homologue azerbaïdjanais Ilham Aliyev. Comment est-on arrivé à cette situation, et jusqu’où cette crise diplomatique peut-elle aller ?

L’article Turquie-Azerbaïdjan : crise diplomatique entre alliés est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

Emotions are widely invoked to motivate climate action, yet how different forms of emotional activation translate into costly, real-world pro-environmental behaviour (PEB) remains unclear. This study examines whether positive emotions triggered by (i) recalling past PEB and (ii) engaging with environmental social media content increase subsequent donations to an environmental NGO. We implemented incentivised 2×2 between-subjects experiments among middle-class respondents in Ghana (N = 789) and the Philippines (N = 972) between April and May 2022, comparing the individual and combined effects of these two interventions on real donation decisions, and testing the mediating role of self-reported positive emotion. In the Philippines, both recall and engagement significantly increased donation amounts, with recall showing a robust effect across model specifications and indicative evidence of a small, partial mediation via positive emotions. The combined treatment, however, did not yield an interaction effect, suggesting additive rather than synergistic impacts. In Ghana, neither intervention nor emotional responses predicted donations; instead, beliefs about donation effectiveness and sociodemographic characteristics were the main predictors of environmental donations. These cross-country differences suggest that emotional drivers of climate engagement may be culturally and contextually contingent rather than universal. By experimentally contrasting recalled and experienced emotions and linking them to incentive-compatible PEB, the study advances behavioural and communication research on climate emotions. It highlights the need for emotionally intelligent, context-sensitive climate communication strategies that are personally meaningful and are tailored to local socio-economic environments.

Emotions are widely invoked to motivate climate action, yet how different forms of emotional activation translate into costly, real-world pro-environmental behaviour (PEB) remains unclear. This study examines whether positive emotions triggered by (i) recalling past PEB and (ii) engaging with environmental social media content increase subsequent donations to an environmental NGO. We implemented incentivised 2×2 between-subjects experiments among middle-class respondents in Ghana (N = 789) and the Philippines (N = 972) between April and May 2022, comparing the individual and combined effects of these two interventions on real donation decisions, and testing the mediating role of self-reported positive emotion. In the Philippines, both recall and engagement significantly increased donation amounts, with recall showing a robust effect across model specifications and indicative evidence of a small, partial mediation via positive emotions. The combined treatment, however, did not yield an interaction effect, suggesting additive rather than synergistic impacts. In Ghana, neither intervention nor emotional responses predicted donations; instead, beliefs about donation effectiveness and sociodemographic characteristics were the main predictors of environmental donations. These cross-country differences suggest that emotional drivers of climate engagement may be culturally and contextually contingent rather than universal. By experimentally contrasting recalled and experienced emotions and linking them to incentive-compatible PEB, the study advances behavioural and communication research on climate emotions. It highlights the need for emotionally intelligent, context-sensitive climate communication strategies that are personally meaningful and are tailored to local socio-economic environments.