Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Das Postgraduierten-Programm (PGP) des German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS, vormals Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, DIE) ist ein renommiertes, neunmonatiges Ausbildungsprogramm für Hochschulabsolvent:innen, das seit 1965 jährlich durchgeführt wird. Ziel ist die gezielte Vorbereitung auf Fach- und Führungsaufgaben in der internationalen Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Die Verbleibstudie wurde anlässlich des 60-jährigen Programmjubiläums 2025 durchgeführt, um erstmals systematisch die Berufswege und den Nutzen des Programms für die bislang fast 1.000 Absolvent:innen zu analysieren. Die Studie basiert auf einer Online-Befragung aller Absolvent:innen der Jahrgänge 1965–2023. Es wurden rund 800 ehemalige Teilnehmer:innen erreicht, von denen sich 366 an der Befragung beteiligten (Rücklaufquote: 46 %). Die Auswertung erfolgte Kohorten vergleichend (10-Jahres-Gruppen), um Hinweise auf über die Zeit erfolgte Veränderungen zu gewinnen. Das PGP des IDOS/DIE hat sich in den Augen der Alumni und Alumnae des Programms als wirkungsvolles Sprungbrett in den Arbeitsbereich der internationalen Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit erwiesen. Es bietet nach ihren Einschätzungen gute Möglichkeiten für Kompetenzaufbau, Netzwerkbildung und persönliche Entwicklung. Die ehemaligen Absolvent:innen empfehlen das Programm überwiegend weiter, sehen aber auch Potenzial für mehr Praxisnähe, Diversität und gezielte Vernetzung. Ihre Aussagen decken sich mit Aussagen, die bereits in den letzten Jahren in Rückmeldungen von den jeweiligen Kursteilnehmenden geäußert wurden. Sie bestätigen damit die Stoßrichtung grundlegender Reformen des Programms im Jahr 2024. Die Ergebnisse dieser Verbleibstudie liefern weitere Hinweise für die Entwicklung des Programms, um es an die sich wandelnden Anforderungen des Arbeitsmarktes und an die Bedürfnisse künftiger Teilnehmender anzupassen. 

 

Das Postgraduierten-Programm (PGP) des German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS, vormals Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, DIE) ist ein renommiertes, neunmonatiges Ausbildungsprogramm für Hochschulabsolvent:innen, das seit 1965 jährlich durchgeführt wird. Ziel ist die gezielte Vorbereitung auf Fach- und Führungsaufgaben in der internationalen Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Die Verbleibstudie wurde anlässlich des 60-jährigen Programmjubiläums 2025 durchgeführt, um erstmals systematisch die Berufswege und den Nutzen des Programms für die bislang fast 1.000 Absolvent:innen zu analysieren. Die Studie basiert auf einer Online-Befragung aller Absolvent:innen der Jahrgänge 1965–2023. Es wurden rund 800 ehemalige Teilnehmer:innen erreicht, von denen sich 366 an der Befragung beteiligten (Rücklaufquote: 46 %). Die Auswertung erfolgte Kohorten vergleichend (10-Jahres-Gruppen), um Hinweise auf über die Zeit erfolgte Veränderungen zu gewinnen. Das PGP des IDOS/DIE hat sich in den Augen der Alumni und Alumnae des Programms als wirkungsvolles Sprungbrett in den Arbeitsbereich der internationalen Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit erwiesen. Es bietet nach ihren Einschätzungen gute Möglichkeiten für Kompetenzaufbau, Netzwerkbildung und persönliche Entwicklung. Die ehemaligen Absolvent:innen empfehlen das Programm überwiegend weiter, sehen aber auch Potenzial für mehr Praxisnähe, Diversität und gezielte Vernetzung. Ihre Aussagen decken sich mit Aussagen, die bereits in den letzten Jahren in Rückmeldungen von den jeweiligen Kursteilnehmenden geäußert wurden. Sie bestätigen damit die Stoßrichtung grundlegender Reformen des Programms im Jahr 2024. Die Ergebnisse dieser Verbleibstudie liefern weitere Hinweise für die Entwicklung des Programms, um es an die sich wandelnden Anforderungen des Arbeitsmarktes und an die Bedürfnisse künftiger Teilnehmender anzupassen. 

 

This paper examines how citizens in a large middle-income country evaluate the design of cash transfer programmes, and whether these preferences shift when vulnerability is framed as climate-induced. Using a pre-registered online survey in Brazil, we combined a multi-attribute conjoint experiment with a climate information treatment. Respondents evaluated programmes varying in benefit level, eligibility, conditionalities, implementing actor, payment schedule and financing.
Support depends strongly on perceived fairness and financing choices. Expanding eligibility from extreme poverty to poverty substantially increases approval, while further expansion yields no additional gains. Conditionalities (in particular, empowering ones, such as financial training or health check-ups) raise support, whereas work requirements have heterogeneous effects across different social groups. Financing through personal income tax or cuts to existing programmes enjoys lower levels of approval, while corporate taxation and subsidy reductions are more acceptable. Climate information modestly increases solidaristic attitudes but does not eliminate underlying ideological divides. This study highlights how citizens update not only the extent but also the preferred form of redistribution under climate stress.

 

This paper examines how citizens in a large middle-income country evaluate the design of cash transfer programmes, and whether these preferences shift when vulnerability is framed as climate-induced. Using a pre-registered online survey in Brazil, we combined a multi-attribute conjoint experiment with a climate information treatment. Respondents evaluated programmes varying in benefit level, eligibility, conditionalities, implementing actor, payment schedule and financing.
Support depends strongly on perceived fairness and financing choices. Expanding eligibility from extreme poverty to poverty substantially increases approval, while further expansion yields no additional gains. Conditionalities (in particular, empowering ones, such as financial training or health check-ups) raise support, whereas work requirements have heterogeneous effects across different social groups. Financing through personal income tax or cuts to existing programmes enjoys lower levels of approval, while corporate taxation and subsidy reductions are more acceptable. Climate information modestly increases solidaristic attitudes but does not eliminate underlying ideological divides. This study highlights how citizens update not only the extent but also the preferred form of redistribution under climate stress.

 

This paper examines how citizens in a large middle-income country evaluate the design of cash transfer programmes, and whether these preferences shift when vulnerability is framed as climate-induced. Using a pre-registered online survey in Brazil, we combined a multi-attribute conjoint experiment with a climate information treatment. Respondents evaluated programmes varying in benefit level, eligibility, conditionalities, implementing actor, payment schedule and financing.
Support depends strongly on perceived fairness and financing choices. Expanding eligibility from extreme poverty to poverty substantially increases approval, while further expansion yields no additional gains. Conditionalities (in particular, empowering ones, such as financial training or health check-ups) raise support, whereas work requirements have heterogeneous effects across different social groups. Financing through personal income tax or cuts to existing programmes enjoys lower levels of approval, while corporate taxation and subsidy reductions are more acceptable. Climate information modestly increases solidaristic attitudes but does not eliminate underlying ideological divides. This study highlights how citizens update not only the extent but also the preferred form of redistribution under climate stress.

 

Europe’s push to shift asylum procedures to third countries risks outsourcing not only refugees, but also its moral and political responsibility.

By Judith Kohlenberger
VIENNA, Austria, Dec 16 2025 (IPS)

The debate on reforming the European asylum system has gained significant momentum following the agreement reached by EU interior ministers last week. Alongside questions of solidarity and distribution, the possibility of establishing ‘return hubs’ outside the EU was at the heart of the meeting.

Outsourcing asylum procedures – or at least those concerning rejected asylum seekers – has long been a desire of many heads of state and government, and the European Commission now aims to make this possible by creating the necessary legal foundations, for example by scrapping the so-called connection criterion. In future, rejected asylum seekers would therefore no longer need to demonstrate a personal link to the third country to which they are transferred.

Previously, such links included earlier stays or family members living there. Yet the EU remains a long way from concrete implementation.

One reason is the high cost of such outsourcing projects. According to the UK’s National Audit Office, the British Rwanda deal cost the equivalent of more than €800 million, with limited effect: only four asylum seekers were relocated over two years.

Under Prime Minister Keir Starmer, the plan was shelved for good due to excessive costs and minimal benefit. And despite the heated migration debate in the United Kingdom, a revival appears unlikely. Denmark faced a similar situation with its own Rwanda plans, which the country put on hold in 2023 due to unfeasibility. And then there is the much-cited Italy–Albania agreement, whose original idea – conducting asylum procedures under Italian law on Albanian soil – was never implemented.

Practical implementation remains doubtful

What third countries gain from allowing such outsourcing on their territory is obvious: money, and even more importantly, political capital. Speaking on a panel at the ‘Time to Decide Europe’ conference organised by the Vienna-based ERSTE Foundation, Albania’s Prime Minister and Socialist Edi Rama stated openly that his small country of just under three million people must join any alliance willing to take it in.

This includes – and above all – the EU. For Albania, which is an EU candidate country, it therefore makes sense to appear accommodating to a not insignificant member state with which it is also historically closely connected, and to help solve its unpopular ‘migration question’, at least to the extent that refugees arriving in Italy do receive protection, but, in practice, ‘not in my backyard’.

So far, however, this principle has not been put into action due to objections raised by Italian courts. That is also why – and to put the costly asylum camps built in the Albanian towns of Shëngjin and Gjadër (construction and operations are believed to have already cost hundreds of millions of euros) to some use – the European Commission created the option of return hubs, which were formally adopted last week at the meeting of EU ministers.

Italy can therefore repurpose the facilities originally intended for asylum procedures as deportation centres for asylum seekers who were already on Italian territory and whose applications have been legally rejected. Here too, the number of cases remains limited, and it is unclear on what legal basis those transferred there could be held for extended periods to prevent them from re-entering the EU via Montenegro and Bosnia. De facto detention, however, would present yet another legal complication, even if the connection criterion and other EU-law barriers are removed.

Anyone striving for ‘fair burden-sharing’ would have to redistribute towards Europe, not away from it.

There is, therefore, still a long way to go before any concrete return hubs become reality. Not only because, in the usual trilogue process, the European Parliament must also give its approval — and some MEPs, including Birgit Sippel of the Socialists and Democrats group, have already announced their opposition.

But even if a parliamentary majority can be secured, the practical implementation remains doubtful: where are the trustworthy and willing third countries; how can infrastructure be built there; how can respect for human rights standards be monitored and enforced from Europe (which proves difficult even within an EU member state such as Hungary); and how should looming legal disputes be handled?

Among the countries mentioned so far are several that themselves regularly appear among the places of origin of refugees arriving in Europe. Alongside Rwanda, the East African state of Uganda is frequently cited; it already hosts the largest number of refugees from other parts of Africa, especially from Sudan, South Sudan, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Like Rwanda, it lies directly next to regional conflict zones; the protection rate for Ugandan nationals in European host countries stands at around 60 per cent.

The country is considered authoritarian — and precisely for that reason, it has an interest in striking an outsourcing deal with EU member states, such as the one it has already concluded with the Netherlands. Such an agreement implicitly acknowledges and legitimises the Ugandan government.

The notorious EU–Turkey Statement of 2016 demonstrated how refugees accommodated in third countries can repeatedly be used as leverage in foreign policy disputes, for example when Prime Minister Erdoğan had them bussed to the Greek border to put pressure on the EU. EU strategists may euphemistically call this ‘migration diplomacy’, but for the layperson, it is simply blackmail.

The example of Uganda illustrates not only how Europe, through deals with third countries, outsources not just refugees but also bargaining power and control; it also reflects the fundamental imbalance in a one-sided debate on externalisation.

Already today, 71 per cent of all refugees find protection in developing and emerging countries, with 66 per cent hosted in neighbouring countries in the Global South or the Middle East and North Africa. Anyone striving for ‘fair burden-sharing’ would therefore have to redistribute towards Europe, not away from it.

Europe’s answer cannot, under any circumstances, be to emulate the Trump administration by resorting to ever-tougher asylum policies.

This leads to the fundamental questions that EU policymakers appear increasingly unwilling to ask, let alone answer: How does Europe want to position itself in future with regard to global refugee protection? How will people in need of protection from persecution – whose numbers are rising in an ever more unstable world – gain access to that protection?

How can the liberal post-war order be preserved, including and especially the Geneva Conventions, which were created in response to the lessons of the two World Wars and the Shoah? How should Europe position itself vis-à-vis an increasingly illiberal, in parts authoritarian United States, which now tends to view Europe more as an adversary than a partner?

A confident response to the new US national security strategy – which claims that migration threatens Europe with ‘civilisational erasure’ – must lie in emphasising Europe’s civilisational achievements since 1945. These include, above all, the prohibition of torture enshrined in Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights: it applies absolutely, and therefore also to asylum seekers who are obliged to leave and who may not be deported to countries where they risk inhuman treatment. This is precisely where the line between civilisation and barbarism lies.

Furthermore, a united Europe that wants to stand its ground against attacks from former allies must recognise societal diversity as one of its strengths, and acknowledge the indispensable contribution that migrants – from guest workers and refugees to highly skilled expats – have made to Europe’s reconstruction and prosperity.

Europe’s answer cannot, under any circumstances, be to emulate the Trump administration by resorting to ever-tougher asylum policies that effectively validate the American assessment.

For that would indeed amount to an obliteration — an obliteration of the founding idea of a united, open and liberal Europe which, let us not forget, received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 and stands for a rules-based order that has ensured decades of peace as well as economic prosperity. In short: for the very life that we are fortunate enough to enjoy day after day, in diversity, security and freedom.

Dr Judith Kohlenberger heads the FORM research institute at WU Vienna and is affiliated with the Austrian Institute for International Affairs, the Jacques Delors Centre Berlin and the Einstein Centre Digital Future. Her book Das Fluchtparadox (The Flight Paradox) was named Austrian Science Book of the Year in 2023 and nominated for the German Non-Fiction Prize. Her most recent publication is Migrationspanik (Migration Panic) (2025).

Source: International Politics and Society (IPS), Brussels, Belgium

IPS UN Bureau

 

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By Jomo Kwame Sundaram and Kuhaneetha Bai Kalaicelvan
KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia, Dec 16 2025 (IPS)

The new US National Security Strategy (NSS) repositions the superpower’s role in the world. Hence, foreign policy will be mainly driven by considerations of ‘making America great again’ (MAGA).

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Changing course
The new NSS no longer presumes US world leadership and alliances based on values. It breaks with earlier post-Cold War foreign policy, upsetting those committed to its sovereigntist unipolar world.

Quietly released on December 4, it is certainly not an easily forgettable update of long-established positions, cloaked in obscure bureaucratic and diplomatic parlance.

Mainly drafted under the leadership of ‘neo-con’ Secretary of State and National Security Adviser Marco Rubio, it is already seen as the most significant document of Trump 2.0.

It asserts, “The days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over.” Instead, foreign policy should now prioritise advancing US interests.

New priorities
The NSS implies the US will no longer be the world’s policeman. Instead, it will exercise power selectively, prioritising transactional rather than strategic considerations.

It emphasises economic strength as key to national security, rebuilding industrial capacity, securing supply chains and ensuring the US never relies on others for critical materials.

K Kuhaneetha Bai

Even if the Supreme Court overrules the President’s tariffs, the US has already secured many concessions from governments fearful of their likely adverse impacts.

The NSS is ostensibly based on MAGA considerations involving immigration control, hemispheric dominance, and cultural ethno-chauvinism.

Mainstream commentators complain it lacks the supposedly enlightened values underlying foreign policy in the US-dominated world order after the Second World War.

They complain the new NSS is narrow in focus, redefining interests, and sharing power. Its stance and tone are said to be more 19th-century than 21st-century.

Besides pragmatic imperatives, mixed messages may be due to unsatisfactory compromises among rival factions in Trump’s administration.

MAGA foreign policy
Long-term observers see the NSS as unprecedented and blatantly ideological.

White supremacist ideology influences not only national cultural politics but also foreign policy. The NSS unapologetically promotes Judaeo-Christian chauvinism despite the constitutional separation of church from state.

MAGA’s ‘America First’ priority is evident throughout. Border security is crucial as immigration is deemed the primary national security concern.

For Samuel Huntington, immigration threatens the US by making it less WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant).

The NSS blames social and economic breakdown on immigration. Inflows into the Western Hemisphere, not just the US, must be urgently stopped by all available means.

Ironically, the US has long been a nation of immigrants, with relatively more immigrants than any European country. Its non-white numbers are almost equal to whites.

Trump’s neocolonial interpretation of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine emphasises the Americas as the new foreign policy priority.

Foreign rivals must not be allowed to acquire strategic assets, ports, mines, or infrastructure in Latin America and the Caribbean, mainly to keep China out.

Trump’s NSS prioritises the Western Hemisphere, with Asia second. Africa receives three paragraphs, primarily for its minerals.

Europe is downgraded to third, due to its ostensible immigration-induced civilizational decline. Surprisingly, the NSS urges halting North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) expansion.

China near peer!
The NSS policy on China is widely viewed as unexpectedly restrained. China remains a priority, but is no longer its primary antagonist; it is now a peer competitor.

Now, the US must rebalance its economic relationship with China based on mutually beneficial reciprocity, fairness, and the resurgence of US manufacturing.

The US will continue to work with allies to limit China’s growth and technological progress. However, China is allowed to develop green technologies due to US disinterest.

Meanwhile, US hawks have ensured a military ‘overmatch’ for Taiwan. The NSS emphasises Taiwan’s centrality to Indo-Pacific security and world chip production.

The NSS warns China would gain access to the Second Island Chain if it captured Taiwan, reshaping regional power and threatening vital US trade routes.

With allied support, the US military will seek to contain China within the First Island Chain. However, Taiwan fears US support will wane after TSMC chip production moves to the US.

The NSS expects the ‘Quad’ of the US, Australia, Japan and India to enhance Indo-Pacific security. For Washington, only India can balance China in Asia, and is hence crucial to contain China in the long term.

Regional reordering
The NSS also downgrades the Middle East (ME). Conditions that once made the region important have changed.

The ME’s importance stemmed from its petroleum and Western guilt over Israel. Now, the US has become a significant oil and gas exporter.

Critically, the US strike on Iran in mid-2025 is believed to have set back Tehran’s nuclear programme.

The ME seems unlikely to continue to drive US strategic planning as it has over the last half-century. For the US, the region is now expected to be a major investor.

As US foreign policy is redefined, the world worries. The ME has been downgraded as Latin America has become the new frontline region.

Much has happened in less than a year of Trump 2.0, with little clear or consistent pattern of continuity or change from his first term. But policies have also been quickly reversed or revised.

While the NSS is undoubtedly important and indicative, it would be presumptuous to think it will actually determine policy over the next three years, or even in the very near future.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Die Arktis und der arktisch-nordatlantische Raum gewinnen aufgrund der besseren Zugänglichkeit arktischer Seewege und Ressourcen an geopolitischer Relevanz. Deutschland sollte sich in diesem Raum stärker politisch, militärisch und wirtschaftlich einbringen. Erforderlich für eine erfolgreiche deutsche Arktispolitik sind eine engere Zusammenarbeit mit Arktisstaaten und Partnern in der EU und der Nato, eine stärkere sicherheitspolitische Einbindung Deutschlands und eine bessere Verzahnung von zivilen und militärischen Kapazitäten. Der arktisch-nordatlantische Raum ist als Einheit zu begreifen und im Kontext der Sicherheit Europas zu betrachten. Für Deutschland folgt daraus, dass es sich aktiv an der Stabilisierung dieses Raums beteiligen und zur Bewahrung der fragilen Balance in der Arktis beitragen sollte. Eine deutsche Arktisstrategie sollte Prinzipien wie eine regelbasierte Ordnung und Multilateralismus nicht nur bekräftigen, sondern sie auch mit klar definierten politischen, wirtschaftlichen und sicherheits­politischen Instrumenten zu schützen versuchen. Langfristig sollte eine deutsche Arktisstrategie über die Leitlinien von 2024 hinausgehen und konkrete Schritte zur Wahrung deutscher Inter­essen in der Region festlegen. Deutschland muss eine Strategie ent­wickeln, die klare Prioritäten setzt, politische und sicherheitspolitische Maßnahmen definiert, Ressourcen mobilisiert und insgesamt Handlungsfähigkeit generiert und ausstrahlt. Deutschland sollte seine neue Arktispolitik konsequenter in eine euro­päische Gesamtpolitik einbinden. Durch enge Abstimmung mit der EU‑Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik und eine aktive Mitgestaltung der EU‑Arktisstrategie kann Deutschland seine Interessen wirksamer vertreten und zugleich zur Handlungsfähigkeit Europas in der Region beitragen.

The European security order is dysfunctional and particularly affected by the crisis of multilateralism. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), founded as a forum for promoting co-operative security and standards-based co-opera­tion, today is an expression of the weakness of traditional multilateral institu­tions. The reporting system in the politico-military dimension of the OSCE is a seis­mograph for the change in norms and dynamics among participating States. How­ever, it also shows that despite the changes at the political-strategic level and the po­liticization of the official agenda, the implementation of agreements at the technical-military level of the OSCE continues quite smoothly. This presents opportunities but also risks that the 57 participating States should be aware of.

Bundesarbeitsministerin Bärbel Bas will das Renteneintrittsalter an die Beitragsjahre koppeln. Doch zu einer klugen Reform gehören ganz andere Schritte., Bundesarbeitsministerin Bärbel Bas regt für die geplante Rentenreform an, das Renteneintrittsalter an die Dauer der sozialversicherungspflichtigen Beschäftigung zu koppeln. Einige Ökonomen und Politikerinnen begrüßen den Vorschlag. Was auf den ersten Blick als fair erscheinen mag, entpuppt sich ...

Die Friedensmissionen der Vereinten Nationen (UN) stehen politisch und finanziell unter Druck. In seinem Schreiben vom 10. Oktober 2025 hat UN-Generalsekretär António Guterres neun Missionen aufgefordert, Notfallpläne für Ausgabenkürzungen von bis zu 25 Prozent vorzubereiten. Die bereits 1964 geschaffene Friedensmission in Zypern (UNFICYP) zeigt, warum Europa ein fundamentales Interesse daran hat, dass die UN weiter engagiert bleiben.

Der Konflikt zwischen der Republik Zypern im griechischsprachigen Süden und der nur von Ankara anerkannten Türkischen Republik Nordzypern, dem türkischsprachigen Teil, ist seit der de facto Teilung der Insel weitgehend eingefroren. Daran hat UNFICYP einen konkreten Anteil. Seit dem Waffenstillstand von 1974 kontrolliert die Mission die sogenannte »Green Line«, einen 180 Kilometer langen Streifen, der die beiden Teile voneinander trennt und direkte Konfrontationen verhindern soll. 

Dennoch verzeichnet die Mission weiter zahlreiche militärische und zivile Verstöße in und entlang der Pufferzone. Sie verhindert also immer noch, »dass solche Funken in Flammen aufgehen«, wie Colin Stewart, bis August 2025 der Leiter von UNFICYP, es ausdrückte. Denn bis heute gibt es keinen direkten militärischen Kontaktpunkt zwischen den Konfliktparteien. Zuletzt hat die Bedrohungswahrnehmung auf beiden Seiten sogar wieder zugenommen.

Neuer Anlauf für Friedensbemühungen 

An einer weiteren Reduzierung oder gar einem Abzug der Mission können die Europäische Union und ihre Mitgliedstaaten schon deshalb kein Interesse haben. Gerade läuft der politische Prozess zaghaft wieder an. María Angela Holguín Cuéllar wurde im Mai 2025 erneut zur Persönlichen Gesandten des Generalsekretärs ernannt. Sie soll Möglichkeiten für die Aufnahme formaler Verhandlungen ausloten und die festgefahrene Situation in Bewegung bringen.  

Das ist ein schwieriges Unterfangen. Während der UN-Sicherheitsrat weiterhin eine föderale Lösung verfolgt, pochen Nordzypern und die Türkei seit Jahren auf eine Zweistaatenlösung. Die Wahl des nordzypriotischen Präsidenten Tufan Erhürman im Oktober hat jedoch die Hoffnung geweckt, dass sich die Tür für echte Verhandlungen unter UN-Ägide wieder öffnen könnte. Gerade gab es das erste Dreiertreffen zwischen ihm, dem Präsidenten der Republik Zypern und Holguín. Doch eine Annäherung dürfte Zeit brauchen. So bleiben vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen und die Absicherung des Friedens durch die UN essentiell.

Rolle der UN unverzichtbar 

Da die Republik Zypern Mitglied der EU ist, kann die Union selbst kaum als unparteiische Vermittlerin agieren. Sie unterstützt daher vorrangig den UN-geführten politischen Prozess. Auch sicherheitspolitisch hat die EU wenig Spielraum. Eine eigene EU-Mission, wie sie im Libanon aufgrund des Abzugs von UNIFIL angedacht ist, wäre unrealistisch – schon allein ob des angespannten Verhältnisses zwischen Griechenland und der Türkei, die beide neben Großbritannien Garantiemächte Zyperns sind. 

Daher bleibt die stabilisierende Funktion der UN-Mission absehbar unerlässlich. Sie schafft auch den Rahmen für praktische Annäherungsinitiativen wie die Projekte der Technischen Komitees. Diese fördern unter gemeinsamer griechisch-zypriotischer und türkisch-zypriotischer Leitung und unter Schirmherrschaft der UN die Verständigung zwischen den beiden Gemeinschaften. Die Finanzierung erfolgt zu einem großen Teil durch die EU. 

UNFICYP steht finanziell besser da als viele größere UN-Einsätze, da Griechenland und die Republik Zypern etwa die Hälfte des Budgets tragen. Doch werden personelle und operative Einsparungen notwendig sein. Gleichzeitig wird die Existenzberechtigung der seit Jahrzehnten laufenden Mission immer mal wieder infrage gestellt. Ende Januar 2026 steht erneut eine Verlängerung des Mandats an. Die Haltung des UN-Sicherheitsrates ist trotz aller Kritik der türkischen und der früheren nordzypriotischen Führungen bislang unverändert geblieben. 

Um die festgefahrenen Positionen für Verhandlungen aufzubrechen, wird es jedoch mehr wirtschaftliches Engagement von europäischer Seite brauchen, das die Lage im Norden verbessert. Kurzfristig aber sollten die Mitgliedstaaten der EU keinen Zweifel daran lassen, dass nicht nur UNFICYP, sondern das Instrument der UN-Friedensmissionen insgesamt unentbehrlich ist. 

Since the 1990s, the G7 has increasingly addressed gender equality in its political declarations. Treating gender equality initially as a challenge to be tackled mainly abroad, the group later acknowledged the need for change in its member countries too. In addition, over the years the G7 shifted from focusing on economic inclusion of women as a means to increase economic growth to considering gender equality as a goal in itself, to be addressed in other policy fields also. To what extent this changing approach to gender equality in the G7's declarations has influenced policy changes within G7 countries and abroad is hard to assess. In principle, the G7 has the potential to exercise two functions with respect to gender equality. First, the G7 might coordinate group members’ national policies and the activities of international organisations in this area. However, given the democratic deficits of the G7, it is questionable whether it is desirable for the group to exercise this function, especially since it does not seem necessary for the effectiveness of gender equality policies that these policies are internationally coordinated. Second, the G7 could serve as a forum for the transnational exchange of experiences and ideas.

Since the 1990s, the G7 has increasingly addressed gender equality in its political declarations. Treating gender equality initially as a challenge to be tackled mainly abroad, the group later acknowledged the need for change in its member countries too. In addition, over the years the G7 shifted from focusing on economic inclusion of women as a means to increase economic growth to considering gender equality as a goal in itself, to be addressed in other policy fields also. To what extent this changing approach to gender equality in the G7's declarations has influenced policy changes within G7 countries and abroad is hard to assess. In principle, the G7 has the potential to exercise two functions with respect to gender equality. First, the G7 might coordinate group members’ national policies and the activities of international organisations in this area. However, given the democratic deficits of the G7, it is questionable whether it is desirable for the group to exercise this function, especially since it does not seem necessary for the effectiveness of gender equality policies that these policies are internationally coordinated. Second, the G7 could serve as a forum for the transnational exchange of experiences and ideas.

Since the 1990s, the G7 has increasingly addressed gender equality in its political declarations. Treating gender equality initially as a challenge to be tackled mainly abroad, the group later acknowledged the need for change in its member countries too. In addition, over the years the G7 shifted from focusing on economic inclusion of women as a means to increase economic growth to considering gender equality as a goal in itself, to be addressed in other policy fields also. To what extent this changing approach to gender equality in the G7's declarations has influenced policy changes within G7 countries and abroad is hard to assess. In principle, the G7 has the potential to exercise two functions with respect to gender equality. First, the G7 might coordinate group members’ national policies and the activities of international organisations in this area. However, given the democratic deficits of the G7, it is questionable whether it is desirable for the group to exercise this function, especially since it does not seem necessary for the effectiveness of gender equality policies that these policies are internationally coordinated. Second, the G7 could serve as a forum for the transnational exchange of experiences and ideas.

Die im DIW Berlin angesiedelte forschungsbasierte Infrastruktureinrichtung Sozio-oekonomisches Panel (SOEP) ist eine der größten und am längsten laufenden multidisziplinären Panelstudien weltweit, für die derzeit jährlich etwa 30.000 Menschen in knapp 15.000 Haushalten befragt werden. Das SOEP hat den Anspruch den gesellschaftlichen Wandel zu erfassen und steht immer neuen vielfältigen Themen- und Aufgabenfeldern gegenüber. Zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt suchen wir eine studentische Hilfskraft (w/m/div) für 12 Wochenstunden.

Sie wirken am Projekt "RDCnet" mit, das den Zugang zu sensiblen Forschungsdaten, wie den Daten des SOEP, für Forschende erleichtern soll. Dafür sollen Datenzugangspunkte direkt an Universitäten und bei anderen Kooperationspartnern bereitgestellt werden. Zur Umsetzung soll eine groß angelegte Bedarfsumfrage durchgeführt werden, die den Fokus Ihrer Tätigkeit darstellt.

The 2023 Tax Expenditures Report, published by the Ministry of Finance and National Planning, estimates that Zambia forfeited revenue equivalent to 1.5 percent of GDP, representing 7.5 percent of total taxes and levies collected in the year. It is important to note that this figure excludes Value Added Tax (VAT)-related tax expenditures, which, according to the Global Tax Expenditures Database (GTED), are a substantial source of revenue forgone. Tax expenditures in Zambia are delivered through a variety of mechanisms, including reduced rates, exemptions, and suspensions, applied across both domestic and trade-based taxes.
Transparency: Zambia published its first tax expenditure report, covering fiscal years 2022 and 2023, in December 2024, a milestone toward improving fiscal transparency. To build on this progress, while reinforcing the legal requirement for timely disclosure under the Public Finance Management Act of 2018, Zambia should institutionalise mandatory annual reporting on the cost and effectiveness of tax expenditures, thereby strengthening continuity and public accountability and ensuring this is not a once-off effort.
Complex landscape: Over the years, Zambia has adopted a range of tax incentives through rate adjustments, exemptions, and deferrals—to encourage investment, promote industrial growth, and stimulate trade. These policy tools reflect the government’s broader commitment to using the tax system as a lever for achieving inclusive and sustainable development. However, while these measures serve noble goals, they also add complexity by introducing different rates, exemptions, and rules that make the system harder for taxpayers to navigate.
Evaluation challenges: The absence of a comprehensive evaluation framework requiring regular assessments limits systematic review of TEs. With only one tax expenditure report produced to date, limited historical data also restricts possible evaluations of the economic and fiscal impact of tax incentives. This undermines the ability to determine whether current tax expenditures are achieving their intended policy objectives.
Fiscal sustainability: The fiscal cost of tax expenditures, coupled with Zambia’s mounting debt obligations, pose risks to fiscal sustainability. Without careful monitoring and rationalisation, tax expenditures could erode the domestic revenue base, compromising the country’s ability to meet its development goals.
Policy recommendations:
• Mandate and institutionalise the annual publication of a comprehensive Tax Expenditure Report as part of the National Budget process to support evidence-based policy and fiscal accountability.
• Publish comprehensive reports by December 31 each year, in time to inform the national budget.
• Include detailed disclosures on the scope, legal basis, objectives, and outcomes of each tax expenditure to enable performance evaluation and policy refinement.
• Establish an inter-agency working group (including Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA), MoFNP, and Zambia Development Agency (ZDA)) to coordinate the identification, recording, and review of TEs.
• Subject major tax expenditure provisions to periodic cost-benefit analysis to assess their effectiveness and fiscal trade-offs.