Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

This discussion paper advances a new vision for the United Nations (UN)’s development function at a moment when the organisation is facing profound pressures and persistent scepticism about its relevance. Although a consensus exists that reform is overdue, past initiatives have been too incremental, focusing on coordination and efficiency without addressing deeper institutional and political pathologies. The result is a UN development system that has grown financially large but is losing political significance. It is increasingly shaped by donor earmarking, entrenched patronage and a project delivery model that bears little resemblance to how national development actually occurs.
Our vision marks a significant departure from the UN’s historical role as an aid channel predicated on the North-South divide. Instead, the UN’s future relevance lies in leveraging its universal legitimacy, normative authority and convening power.
We argue for a UN development system that:
1. Acts as a trusted knowledge facilitator: providing high-level and technical advice, supporting peer exchange and helping governments navigate complex policy trade-offs in ways that are independent, politically informed and normatively grounded.
2. Engages in public advocacy that matters: elevating norms, correcting misinformation and shaping national debates in line with globally agreed standards, with sensitivity to national contexts.
3. Applies universality in practice: moving beyond the outdated distinction between donor and recipient to engage with all member states – including middle- and high-income countries – through global monitoring and peer accountability.
4. Serves as an actor of last resort in fragile settings: providing operational support only where national governments cannot or will not act, with strict sunset clauses and safeguards against unintentional harm.
This reconceptualisation is not primarily about money. It implies a financially smaller but politically stronger UN development system that is less dependent on donors and more relevant to today’s multipolar world. The real benchmark for success is not the volume of aid provided but the quality of advice, advocacy and resulting cooperation.
Reaching this vision will be difficult. The UN’s development apparatus is shaped by vested interests, path dependency and political inertia. Yet, opportunities for change exist. The collapse of traditional aid financing, the insistence of middle-income countries on equitable partnerships and fatigue with the current project-heavy model all point towards the need for a new approach. The Secretary-General’s UN80 Initiative offers a platform for bold ideas, but only if the debate moves beyond technical fixes and acknowledges the political trade-offs inherent in transformation.

Stephen Browne is a visiting lecturer at universities in the UK, Switzerland and India. He spent more than 30 years in the UN development system and has published many books and articles on the UN and foreign assistance.
Frederik Matthys is Senior Advisor at Tomorrow Is Possible with a focus on sustainable development, international cooperation and multilateral reform.
Detlef Palm worked for UNICEF for 30 years in country offices and at headquarters. He served as the focal point for programme policy, an auditor and a representative.

This discussion paper advances a new vision for the United Nations (UN)’s development function at a moment when the organisation is facing profound pressures and persistent scepticism about its relevance. Although a consensus exists that reform is overdue, past initiatives have been too incremental, focusing on coordination and efficiency without addressing deeper institutional and political pathologies. The result is a UN development system that has grown financially large but is losing political significance. It is increasingly shaped by donor earmarking, entrenched patronage and a project delivery model that bears little resemblance to how national development actually occurs.
Our vision marks a significant departure from the UN’s historical role as an aid channel predicated on the North-South divide. Instead, the UN’s future relevance lies in leveraging its universal legitimacy, normative authority and convening power.
We argue for a UN development system that:
1. Acts as a trusted knowledge facilitator: providing high-level and technical advice, supporting peer exchange and helping governments navigate complex policy trade-offs in ways that are independent, politically informed and normatively grounded.
2. Engages in public advocacy that matters: elevating norms, correcting misinformation and shaping national debates in line with globally agreed standards, with sensitivity to national contexts.
3. Applies universality in practice: moving beyond the outdated distinction between donor and recipient to engage with all member states – including middle- and high-income countries – through global monitoring and peer accountability.
4. Serves as an actor of last resort in fragile settings: providing operational support only where national governments cannot or will not act, with strict sunset clauses and safeguards against unintentional harm.
This reconceptualisation is not primarily about money. It implies a financially smaller but politically stronger UN development system that is less dependent on donors and more relevant to today’s multipolar world. The real benchmark for success is not the volume of aid provided but the quality of advice, advocacy and resulting cooperation.
Reaching this vision will be difficult. The UN’s development apparatus is shaped by vested interests, path dependency and political inertia. Yet, opportunities for change exist. The collapse of traditional aid financing, the insistence of middle-income countries on equitable partnerships and fatigue with the current project-heavy model all point towards the need for a new approach. The Secretary-General’s UN80 Initiative offers a platform for bold ideas, but only if the debate moves beyond technical fixes and acknowledges the political trade-offs inherent in transformation.

Stephen Browne is a visiting lecturer at universities in the UK, Switzerland and India. He spent more than 30 years in the UN development system and has published many books and articles on the UN and foreign assistance.
Frederik Matthys is Senior Advisor at Tomorrow Is Possible with a focus on sustainable development, international cooperation and multilateral reform.
Detlef Palm worked for UNICEF for 30 years in country offices and at headquarters. He served as the focal point for programme policy, an auditor and a representative.

This discussion paper advances a new vision for the United Nations (UN)’s development function at a moment when the organisation is facing profound pressures and persistent scepticism about its relevance. Although a consensus exists that reform is overdue, past initiatives have been too incremental, focusing on coordination and efficiency without addressing deeper institutional and political pathologies. The result is a UN development system that has grown financially large but is losing political significance. It is increasingly shaped by donor earmarking, entrenched patronage and a project delivery model that bears little resemblance to how national development actually occurs.
Our vision marks a significant departure from the UN’s historical role as an aid channel predicated on the North-South divide. Instead, the UN’s future relevance lies in leveraging its universal legitimacy, normative authority and convening power.
We argue for a UN development system that:
1. Acts as a trusted knowledge facilitator: providing high-level and technical advice, supporting peer exchange and helping governments navigate complex policy trade-offs in ways that are independent, politically informed and normatively grounded.
2. Engages in public advocacy that matters: elevating norms, correcting misinformation and shaping national debates in line with globally agreed standards, with sensitivity to national contexts.
3. Applies universality in practice: moving beyond the outdated distinction between donor and recipient to engage with all member states – including middle- and high-income countries – through global monitoring and peer accountability.
4. Serves as an actor of last resort in fragile settings: providing operational support only where national governments cannot or will not act, with strict sunset clauses and safeguards against unintentional harm.
This reconceptualisation is not primarily about money. It implies a financially smaller but politically stronger UN development system that is less dependent on donors and more relevant to today’s multipolar world. The real benchmark for success is not the volume of aid provided but the quality of advice, advocacy and resulting cooperation.
Reaching this vision will be difficult. The UN’s development apparatus is shaped by vested interests, path dependency and political inertia. Yet, opportunities for change exist. The collapse of traditional aid financing, the insistence of middle-income countries on equitable partnerships and fatigue with the current project-heavy model all point towards the need for a new approach. The Secretary-General’s UN80 Initiative offers a platform for bold ideas, but only if the debate moves beyond technical fixes and acknowledges the political trade-offs inherent in transformation.

Stephen Browne is a visiting lecturer at universities in the UK, Switzerland and India. He spent more than 30 years in the UN development system and has published many books and articles on the UN and foreign assistance.
Frederik Matthys is Senior Advisor at Tomorrow Is Possible with a focus on sustainable development, international cooperation and multilateral reform.
Detlef Palm worked for UNICEF for 30 years in country offices and at headquarters. He served as the focal point for programme policy, an auditor and a representative.

A HorizontPéntek10 webinársorozat az NKFIH Horizont Európa NCP csapat heti rendezvénye, melyen a Horizont Európa keretprogram érdekes témáiról, aktuális felhívásairól nyújtunk áttekintést, gyakorlati ismereteket minden héten.

Cuts and reductions in international humanitarian aid, driven by shifting political priorities in major donor countries and an increasing number of displacements, are leaving hundreds of thousands of communities in the Global South at risk. The Somali Regional State in Ethiopia exemplifies the severe impact of these funding cuts, as vulnerable communities are now confronted with shrinking external support for basic needs. In this context, diaspora groups and networks are a key source of support to their communities. Their contributions extend beyond individual remittances, encompassing collective emergency relief, and development support such as education, water and health for displaced and other crisis-affected people. This policy brief elaborates on the role of diaspora networks in leveraging home and host country community networks to fill the gaps in areas where aid and government services fall short. However, despite their impact, diaspora groups face barriers to maximising their potential. Among these are a lack of enabling policy and institutional frameworks, complex state–diaspora relations, and a lack of formal structures among the diaspora networks. All this can limit the scope, effectiveness and capacities of diaspora support to communities back home. As a result, the following policy recommendations for the Ethiopian federal government and the government of the Somali Regional State, along with their development partners, are put forward in this brief to enhance the potential of the Ethiopian-Somali diaspora:
• Create enabling policy and institutional frameworks at regional and local levels that recognise and support the collective engagement of the diaspora with crisis response and recovery of vulnerable communities. This includes one-stop liaison units at the regional and local levels to minimise the bureaucracy and streamline diaspora contributions, incentivising diaspora-funded initiatives and ensuring inclusive consultations with the diaspora to ensure the effectiveness of these institutional and policy frameworks.
• Establish an umbrella association that represents the interests of the diaspora in the Somali Region and provides a range of supportive services to the diaspora that will enhance their engagements in emergency response, recovery and development.
• Facilitate exchange, partnerships and collaborations between diaspora-led and diaspora-supported associations and networks, national and local authorities, and international actors to maximise the reach and effectiveness of diaspora-led initiatives.
• Expand the evidence base on the various forms of collective support of the diaspora networks and associations to better understand the scale, impact and best practices for informing planning and programming to enhance diaspora support.

Abdirahman A Muhumad is associated researcher with IDOS and PhD candidate at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Ruhr University Bochum (RUB). He is also a researcher at the Institute of Migration Studies at Jigjiga University, Ethiopia.

Cuts and reductions in international humanitarian aid, driven by shifting political priorities in major donor countries and an increasing number of displacements, are leaving hundreds of thousands of communities in the Global South at risk. The Somali Regional State in Ethiopia exemplifies the severe impact of these funding cuts, as vulnerable communities are now confronted with shrinking external support for basic needs. In this context, diaspora groups and networks are a key source of support to their communities. Their contributions extend beyond individual remittances, encompassing collective emergency relief, and development support such as education, water and health for displaced and other crisis-affected people. This policy brief elaborates on the role of diaspora networks in leveraging home and host country community networks to fill the gaps in areas where aid and government services fall short. However, despite their impact, diaspora groups face barriers to maximising their potential. Among these are a lack of enabling policy and institutional frameworks, complex state–diaspora relations, and a lack of formal structures among the diaspora networks. All this can limit the scope, effectiveness and capacities of diaspora support to communities back home. As a result, the following policy recommendations for the Ethiopian federal government and the government of the Somali Regional State, along with their development partners, are put forward in this brief to enhance the potential of the Ethiopian-Somali diaspora:
• Create enabling policy and institutional frameworks at regional and local levels that recognise and support the collective engagement of the diaspora with crisis response and recovery of vulnerable communities. This includes one-stop liaison units at the regional and local levels to minimise the bureaucracy and streamline diaspora contributions, incentivising diaspora-funded initiatives and ensuring inclusive consultations with the diaspora to ensure the effectiveness of these institutional and policy frameworks.
• Establish an umbrella association that represents the interests of the diaspora in the Somali Region and provides a range of supportive services to the diaspora that will enhance their engagements in emergency response, recovery and development.
• Facilitate exchange, partnerships and collaborations between diaspora-led and diaspora-supported associations and networks, national and local authorities, and international actors to maximise the reach and effectiveness of diaspora-led initiatives.
• Expand the evidence base on the various forms of collective support of the diaspora networks and associations to better understand the scale, impact and best practices for informing planning and programming to enhance diaspora support.

Abdirahman A Muhumad is associated researcher with IDOS and PhD candidate at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Ruhr University Bochum (RUB). He is also a researcher at the Institute of Migration Studies at Jigjiga University, Ethiopia.

Cuts and reductions in international humanitarian aid, driven by shifting political priorities in major donor countries and an increasing number of displacements, are leaving hundreds of thousands of communities in the Global South at risk. The Somali Regional State in Ethiopia exemplifies the severe impact of these funding cuts, as vulnerable communities are now confronted with shrinking external support for basic needs. In this context, diaspora groups and networks are a key source of support to their communities. Their contributions extend beyond individual remittances, encompassing collective emergency relief, and development support such as education, water and health for displaced and other crisis-affected people. This policy brief elaborates on the role of diaspora networks in leveraging home and host country community networks to fill the gaps in areas where aid and government services fall short. However, despite their impact, diaspora groups face barriers to maximising their potential. Among these are a lack of enabling policy and institutional frameworks, complex state–diaspora relations, and a lack of formal structures among the diaspora networks. All this can limit the scope, effectiveness and capacities of diaspora support to communities back home. As a result, the following policy recommendations for the Ethiopian federal government and the government of the Somali Regional State, along with their development partners, are put forward in this brief to enhance the potential of the Ethiopian-Somali diaspora:
• Create enabling policy and institutional frameworks at regional and local levels that recognise and support the collective engagement of the diaspora with crisis response and recovery of vulnerable communities. This includes one-stop liaison units at the regional and local levels to minimise the bureaucracy and streamline diaspora contributions, incentivising diaspora-funded initiatives and ensuring inclusive consultations with the diaspora to ensure the effectiveness of these institutional and policy frameworks.
• Establish an umbrella association that represents the interests of the diaspora in the Somali Region and provides a range of supportive services to the diaspora that will enhance their engagements in emergency response, recovery and development.
• Facilitate exchange, partnerships and collaborations between diaspora-led and diaspora-supported associations and networks, national and local authorities, and international actors to maximise the reach and effectiveness of diaspora-led initiatives.
• Expand the evidence base on the various forms of collective support of the diaspora networks and associations to better understand the scale, impact and best practices for informing planning and programming to enhance diaspora support.

Abdirahman A Muhumad is associated researcher with IDOS and PhD candidate at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Ruhr University Bochum (RUB). He is also a researcher at the Institute of Migration Studies at Jigjiga University, Ethiopia.

The Transatlantic Periscope is an interactive, multimedia tool that brings together expert commentary, high-quality media coverage, official policy documents, quantitative data, social media posts, and gray literature. It will provide on a monthly basis a summary of the most important news concerning the Greek-US relations, as reflected in the media. Below you will find an overview for September 2025.

On September 11, 2025, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis met with the United States Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum, at Maximos Mansion. During the meeting, the two confirmed that Greek-American relations remain at an excellent level. Particular emphasis was given to further strengthening cooperation in the energy sector. Prime Minister Mitsotakis stressed the strategic nature of Greek-American relations and defense and energy cooperation between Greece and the US. He also pointed out that Greece, with the initiatives it has undertaken and the infrastructure it is developing, is becoming an energy hub in the Eastern Mediterranean and Southeast Europe, an energy exporter and a provider of energy security for the entire region. He also emphasized the strategic importance of electrical and digital interconnections, making special reference to the Great Sea Interconnector project (GSI) between Greece, Cyprus, and Israel, as well as Greece-Egypt power interconnection initiative (GREGY). He also expressed to Secretary Burgum the critical importance of a route connecting Alexandroupolis with Odessa, following a proposal he had made during his visit to Odessa in June. During the meeting, the role of Greek shipping in transportation of liquefied natural gas (LNG) was also discussed.

Congresswoman Nicole Malliotakis (NY-11) applauded the inclusion of her bipartisan legislation, H.R. 2510, ‘The American-Hellenic-Israeli Eastern Mediterranean Counterterrorism and Maritime Security Partnership Act of 2025’, in the State Department Reauthorization bill advanced by the House Foreign Affairs Committee on September 18. The measure, introduced with Congressman Thomas Kean (NJ-07), Congressman Josh Gottheimer (NJ-05), and Congressman Dan Goldman (NY-10), establishes a security-focused “3+1” framework among the United States, Israel, Greece, and the Republic of Cyprus to enhance counterterrorism and maritime security. The provisions strengthen this partnership by creating new parliamentary and executive-level cooperation groups; launching two security training programs, CERBERUS, focused on counterterrorism at the Cyprus Center for Land, Open Seas, and Port Security (CYCLOPS), and TRIREME, a maritime security program at the Greek Souda Bay Naval Base; and modernizing the decades-old U.S. arms embargo on Cyprus by temporarily lifting restrictions on defense exports, reexports, and training cooperation, contingent on Cyprus meeting U.S. security and regulatory conditions. This allows for targeted capacity-building that enhances the island’s ability to conduct regional security operations.

On September 18, the United States Senate confirmed Kimberly Guilfoyle as US Ambassador to the Hellenic Republic, marking the culmination of a months-long process that had attracted considerable political attention. In her statement following the vote, Guilfoyle underlined both the professional and symbolic weight of her appointment, stressing the honor of serving as the first female US Ambassador to Greece. On September 29, Guilfoyle was officially sworn in as the next U.S. Ambassador to Greece at the State Department in Washington, D.C. According to diplomatic sources, Guilfoyle is expected to arrive in Athens in late October, where she will officially assume her new duties.

Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis met with Kimberly Guilfoyle, during a diplomatic event in New York, on September 25. Both Mitsotakis and Guilfoyle were attending an event hosted by the Atlantic Council focused on strengthening ties between the European Union and the Gulf states. On the same day, Greek Minister of Environment and Energy, Stavros Papastavrou, also held a meeting in New York with Guilfoyle.

More at: https://transatlanticperiscope.org/relationship/GR#

Ein Drittel des Jobabbaus in der Industrie geht auf andere Trends zurück – Tätigkeiten verlagern sich zunehmend in dienstleistungsnahe Bereiche – Höhere Qualifikationen gewinnen an Bedeutung   Die Veränderungen der vergangenen Jahrzehnte am Arbeitsmarkt lassen sich immer weniger allein durch den ...

The inflation surge in recent years has produced profound social, economic, and political consequences. Food price changes, being part of inflation, affect low-income segments particularly strongly. This is important to consider because macro-economic and central banks’ attention is mainly on core inflation, which excludes food. What makes this period so unusual is the breadth of price pressures that involve both developing and rich countries, meaning that inflation has been getting more synchronized across borders. This study examines the driving factors behind global food price hikes and their rates of change. Our analysis reveals that a complex mix of causes has led to the soaring food prices in 2021-2022. The spread of COVID-19 produced disruptions in the world’s supply chains, pushing the cost of producing and transporting food upward. The increase in fertilizer and energy prices has further exacerbated production costs for agricultural products. Adverse climatic phenomena (La Niña), generating droughts in parts of Africa, Asia, and the Americas, caused damage to harvests and fueled inflation. The war in Ukraine and the trade blockade of grain exports made things worse. Additional culprits were speculative activities in financial markets that were already underway before the Russia-Ukraine war. Soaring inflation is increasing inequality and making vulnerable countries hungrier and poorer. At the same time, since global factors contribute to food price movements, implying that a crucial component of price inflation is exogenous to individual countries, the effectiveness of national monetary and fiscal policies could be limited. Instead, enhanced cooperation among nations with coordinated policy responses could be important to avoid the exacerbation of prices.

The inflation surge in recent years has produced profound social, economic, and political consequences. Food price changes, being part of inflation, affect low-income segments particularly strongly. This is important to consider because macro-economic and central banks’ attention is mainly on core inflation, which excludes food. What makes this period so unusual is the breadth of price pressures that involve both developing and rich countries, meaning that inflation has been getting more synchronized across borders. This study examines the driving factors behind global food price hikes and their rates of change. Our analysis reveals that a complex mix of causes has led to the soaring food prices in 2021-2022. The spread of COVID-19 produced disruptions in the world’s supply chains, pushing the cost of producing and transporting food upward. The increase in fertilizer and energy prices has further exacerbated production costs for agricultural products. Adverse climatic phenomena (La Niña), generating droughts in parts of Africa, Asia, and the Americas, caused damage to harvests and fueled inflation. The war in Ukraine and the trade blockade of grain exports made things worse. Additional culprits were speculative activities in financial markets that were already underway before the Russia-Ukraine war. Soaring inflation is increasing inequality and making vulnerable countries hungrier and poorer. At the same time, since global factors contribute to food price movements, implying that a crucial component of price inflation is exogenous to individual countries, the effectiveness of national monetary and fiscal policies could be limited. Instead, enhanced cooperation among nations with coordinated policy responses could be important to avoid the exacerbation of prices.

The inflation surge in recent years has produced profound social, economic, and political consequences. Food price changes, being part of inflation, affect low-income segments particularly strongly. This is important to consider because macro-economic and central banks’ attention is mainly on core inflation, which excludes food. What makes this period so unusual is the breadth of price pressures that involve both developing and rich countries, meaning that inflation has been getting more synchronized across borders. This study examines the driving factors behind global food price hikes and their rates of change. Our analysis reveals that a complex mix of causes has led to the soaring food prices in 2021-2022. The spread of COVID-19 produced disruptions in the world’s supply chains, pushing the cost of producing and transporting food upward. The increase in fertilizer and energy prices has further exacerbated production costs for agricultural products. Adverse climatic phenomena (La Niña), generating droughts in parts of Africa, Asia, and the Americas, caused damage to harvests and fueled inflation. The war in Ukraine and the trade blockade of grain exports made things worse. Additional culprits were speculative activities in financial markets that were already underway before the Russia-Ukraine war. Soaring inflation is increasing inequality and making vulnerable countries hungrier and poorer. At the same time, since global factors contribute to food price movements, implying that a crucial component of price inflation is exogenous to individual countries, the effectiveness of national monetary and fiscal policies could be limited. Instead, enhanced cooperation among nations with coordinated policy responses could be important to avoid the exacerbation of prices.

2025. november 5.-én, az Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem, Aula Magnában (1053 Budapest, Egyetem tér 1-3.) kerül megrendezésre az ELTE Innovációs Nap.

Október 28–30. között kihozzuk a tudományt a laborokból, és testközelbe hozzuk a jövőt! A Millenárison újra megnyílik Magyarország legnagyobb tudománynépszerűsítő rendezvénye. A Tudományos Expo három napon át interaktív programokkal, látványos kísérletekkel és inspiráló kutatókkal hozza közel a tudomány világát – mindenkinek, aki kíváncsi a jövőre. A belépés mindenki számára ingyenes!

Moderne Streitkräfte sind enorm abhängig von Softwareprodukten. Diese sind das Ergebnis komplexer Geflechte aus Software-Anbietern, Dienstleistern, Softwarekomponenten und weiteren Unternehmen, die zu­sammen die Software-Lieferkette bilden. Bei »herkömmlichen« Cybersicherheitsvorfällen verschaffen sich Bedro­hungsakteur:innen in der Regel direkt Zugang zu ihrem Ziel. Im Gegensatz dazu haben Risiken der Software-Lieferkette ihren Ursprung an einer vorgelagerten Stelle der Lieferkette und erzeugen dann an anderer Stelle einen Effekt – häufig bei den Endnutzer:innen. Streitkräfte sind besonders anfällig für diese Risiken. Vorfälle im militäri­schen Bereich, bei denen die Software-Lieferkette eine Rolle spielte, haben militärische Betriebsabläufe unterbrochen oder böswilligen Akteuren Wirtschaftsspionage, politische Spionage und Sabotage ermöglicht. Der Bundespolitik und der Bundeswehr stehen mehrere Maßnahmen zur Verfügung, um die Streitkräfte vor den Auswirkungen der Risiken der Soft­ware-Lieferkette zu schützen. Dabei müssen Entscheidungsträger:in­nen zunächst für unterschiedliche Einsatzbereiche von Software ein an­gemessenes Schutzniveau festlegen, um die Balance zu wahren zwischen dem Schutz vor den Risiken auf der einen und Funktionalität, Kosten und Einsatzgeschwindigkeit auf der anderen Seite. Die Bundesregierung und die Bundeswehr sollten einerseits Maßnahmen ergreifen, um einen bewussten Umgang der Streitkräfte mit den Risiken der Software-Lieferkette zu ermöglichen und sich selbst zu schützen; andererseits sollten sie Software-Anbieter dazu bringen, die Angreifbarkeit ihrer Produkte zu reduzieren. Durch die Kombination beider Ansätze kann diese mögliche Bedrohung in Schach gehalten werden.

A Magyarországi Diáklaborok Egyesülete és a kaposvári Táncsics Mihály Gimnázium 2025. október 17-án és 18-én immár második alkalommal rendezte meg a Science Fair tudományos kiállítást, amely idén is egyben az Országos Tudományos és Innovációs Olimpia (OTIO) regionális válogatóversenye volt. A pályázatok között a legnépszerűbb témák a környezetvédelem, az egészségügy és az űrkutatás volt, de ezek mellett sok más tudományág is megmozgatta az ifjú tudósok fantáziáját. Az eseményen bemutatkozott a Selye János Diáklaborhálózat, a NIÜ és a Magyarországi Diáklaborok Egyesületének kezdeményezése is, amely tudománynépszerűsítő és bemutató standdal és mobillaborral várta a fiatalokat.

Härtere Sanktionen, Leistungsentzug, weniger Vermögensschutz: Die neue Grundsicherung wird die Hoffnungen enttäuschen. Es drohen mehr Arbeitslose und höhere Kosten., Viele setzen große Hoffnungen in die geplante Reform des Bürgergelds und die Umbenennung in Grundsicherung. Doch wird die neue Grundsicherung wirklich die Beschäftigung erhöhen, Kosten reduzieren und mehr Gerechtigkeit schaffen? Diese Hoffnungen dürften größtenteils enttäuscht werden. Die große ...