Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Une trentaine de kilomètres sépare l’Iran d’Oman. Un passage maritime étroit, quand on place le curseur sur Ormuz. Un détroit qui connecte l’immense océan Indien avec l’exigüe golfe Persique. La guerre qui embrase l’Iran et le Moyen-Orient, derrière les bombes, les drames et les communications politiques, nous propose une formation accélérée de géoéconomie contemporaine.

Le golfe Persique d’abord, parlons-en. Un espace de 250 000 km2, dix fois moindre que la Méditerranée, représentant à peine 1 % de l’espace océanique mondial. Mais 50 % des réserves prouvées en pétrole et 40 % dans le cas du gaz[1]. Une taille énergétique et économique colossale, concentrée dans une piscine aux dimensions restreintes, à la profondeur maximale d’une centaine de mètres et à la largeur de 300 kilomètres environ dans son étirement le plus prononcé. Dans ce golfe Persique, huit États riverains, peuplés de 200 millions d’habitants dans leur ensemble, dont 60 à 70 millions de personnes vivant au bord de la mer, sur ces littoraux convoités, où l’eau rassure quand on a un vaste désert dans le dos. Même les champs énergétiques dominants, exploités ou en devenir, sont off-shore, au fond de la mer. La conquête du maritime, pour ces pays riverains, c’est donc avant tout de l’économique. On dessale l’océan pour disposer d’eau potable ou irriguer les quelques cultures agricoles qui peuvent composer avec l’aridité du milieu. On fore les profondeurs pour pomper ces hydrocarbures dont la planète raffole, et qui enrichissent mécaniquement les nations riveraines. Et puis on aspire au maritime car c’est l’accès au grand large, pour exporter ou pour importer. À condition que le robinet du détroit d’Ormuz soit ouvert.

Le détroit d’Ormuz est une artère vitale pour ces pays du Golfe persique et un poumon énergétique d’une bonne partie du globe. Quand les flux s’organisent sans anicroches, ce qui est généralement le cas, car il est rarement intéressant de se priver d’oxygène économique, ce détroit s’exprime avec amplitude : un tiers du commerce mondial en pétrole (avec 12 à 13 millions de barils par jour !), 20 % en gaz naturel liquéfié (GNL), 30 % en gaz de pétrole liquéfié, 15 % en produits pétroliers raffinés ou encore 30 % en engrais azotés[2], pour prendre la moyenne annuelle sur la période 2023-2025. Pour ces matières premières, le déplacement se fait par tankers, méthaniers ou vraquiers. Chaque navire de commerce présente une valeur qui se chiffre vite en plusieurs millions de dollars. La majorité d’entre eux font route vers l’Asie. La Chine capte près de 40 % du pétrole qui sort du Golfe persique, 80 % même de l’or noir iranien depuis quelques années[3]. Ne sous-estimons pas les volumes de pétrole qui transitent par Ormuz et vont en Inde (15 %), en Corée du Sud et au Japon (10 % chacun)[4]. Dans le cas du gaz et des engrais azotés, les destinations sont moins polarisées sur l’Asie, prennent la route de l’Afrique ou de la mer Rouge, pour remonter vers les marchés européens. L’Union européenne importe 8 % de son GNL grâce aux ressources qataries[5], à titre d’exemple. L’importance stratégique de ce passage maritime est considérable pour les économies des nations riveraines du Golfe persique. Les exportations d’hydrocarbures du Koweït et du Qatar dépendent entièrement du détroit d’Ormuz, tandis que celles de l’Irak et de l’Iran y transitent à près de 95 %[6]. L’Arabie saoudite, dont l’essentiel des champs pétroliers est situé sur sa façade orientale, dépend également de cette voie maritime pour environ 90 % de ses exportations[7]. Les Émirats arabes unis sont légèrement moins exposés grâce à leur accès direct à l’océan Indien et leur port commercial de Khor Fakkan, d’où partent 25 % environ des flux émiratis[8]. La géographie dicte sa loi à la logistique, tout comme l’économique, car ces matières premières ne circulent ni par le ciel ni par voies terrestres ferroviaires ou routières, sauf sur les derniers kilomètres à parcourir afin d’éclater en de multiples points les volumes. Mais sinon, c’est bien l’océan qui connecte l’offre et la demande.

Les événements en cours transforment Ormuz en goulet d’étranglement pour l’économie locale, régionale et potentiellement mondiale. L’Iran prétend pouvoir fermer le détroit. En tout cas, les risques s’y démultiplient suffisamment pour que l’on observe un arrêt brutal des échanges. Le ballet de navires se croisant laisse place à des ronds dans l’eau de la part de bateaux coincés dans le golfe Persique, chargés et loin des quais (près de 500), ou stationnaires dans le golfe d’Oman, car le danger est tel qu’il n’est plus sage de traverser le détroit. Les États-Unis annoncent de potentielles actions sur site pour débloquer le détroit d’Ormuz. D’autres pays y songent, les retombées économiques pouvant cascader à mesure que cette situation perdure. D’ores et déjà, les primes d’assurance explosent. Il est vivement conseillé d’éviter le détroit d’Ormuz, où des navires ont été touchés par des tirs militaires ou des drones sous-marins kamikazes. Après Maersk et MSC, le géant chinois du transport maritime Cosco a suspendu ses services à destination et en provenance de pays du Golfe. La donne géostratégique pourrait s’aggraver si des mines flottantes sont posées pour rendre le détroit d’Ormuz encore moins praticable. Par ailleurs, une marée noire, en cas de tanker coulé, serait une catastrophe écologique dans cette mer quasi-fermée.

Depuis le 28 février 2026, ces tensions géopolitiques extrêmes ont déjà entraîné une hausse significative du prix du pétrole et du gaz. Si le détroit d’Ormuz devait être bloqué pendant un mois, ou plus, un choc énergétique et donc économique mondial est à redouter, sachant qu’il s’inscrit dans un contexte de marchés déjà particulièrement volatiles, nerveux et de plus en plus opaques. Du Covid-19 à l’Ukraine, en passant par d’autres secousses depuis 2020, l’inflation s’est réinvitée dans le vocabulaire du quotidien. Une hausse de plusieurs centimes à la pompe est attendue en Europe d’ici quelques jours. Avec un gaz plus cher, les factures d’électricité pour des pays très dépendant comme l’Allemagne devraient se renchérir. Ormuz est aussi ce détroit vital pour nourrir les populations du golfe Persique, hyper-dépendantes d’approvisionnements extérieurs, venant de loin, pour répondre aux besoins alimentaires d’une zone dépourvue d’agricultures consistantes. Ce sont 15 à 20 millions de tonnes de grains (céréales, soja) qui entrent dans le Golfe persique chaque année[9], avec des fournisseurs principaux nommés Brésil, Russie, Australie, Turquie ou encore Ukraine. Pour plusieurs États membres de l’UE, là aussi, une présence essentielle dans une zone aux consommations croissantes. L’Italie, la France et les Pays-Bas, pour ne citer qu’eux, vendent des biens agro-alimentaires sur ces marchés structurellement importateurs. Les flux en grains, en janvier et février 2026, entrant dans le golfe Persique, ont été deux fois supérieurs aux moyennes. Chaque pays a visiblement anticipé la crise et accru ses stocks, mais ces derniers ne couvrent a priori pas plus d’un semestre.

Le détroit d’Ormuz nous rappelle à la fragilité de ces chaines longues pour des ressources à utilisation mondiale mais extrêmement localisées à la source. Ce qui se joue en ce moment avec l’Iran, le golfe Persique et ce détroit, c’est donc aussi une guerre géoéconomique qui de loin déborde du périmètre régional. Le passage en mer Rouge, déjà complexe depuis deux ans, en raison de tirs Houthis sur les navires de commerce qui passent par Bab el-Mandeb, va de nouveau être sous tensions, puisque le régime iranien réactive les dernières forces de ses proxys. Le commerce maritime se redéploie donc vers le sud de l’Afrique et ce cap de Bonne-Espérance. Le temps est rallongé, le coût du transport est augmenté. Comme souvent, nous devons intégrer ces variables géoéconomiques dans nos grilles de lecture globale sur les conflits ou les rivalités entre puissances. Si la stratégie des Mollahs iraniens est d’aller dans une logique jusqu’au-boutiste, c’est-à-dire de jouer un va-tout dans ce grand soir d’affrontements avec l’ennemi israélien et états-unien, il n’est pas exclu de provoquer le plus de dégâts possibles sur ce terrain économique, quand bien même le blocage ou le saccage du détroit d’Ormuz pénalise l’Iran directement.

Que vont faire les nations voisines, notamment ces monarchies du Golfe, Arabie saoudite en tête, qui semblaient plaider pour une non-intervention ces dernières semaines, sans doute par crainte d’une boite de Pandore aux instabilités multiples ? N’oublions pas que le rabibochage entre Téhéran et Riyad est tout frais, qu’il fut réalisé sous l’égide d’une Chine qui pourrait sur cette guerre s’activer en raison de facteurs géoéconomiques, et que par ailleurs peu de nations du golfe Persique ont un appétit coopératif avec leurs voisines. On dialogue, on se compare mais on crée peu de solidarités durables, par primauté d’intérêts souverains et par sécurité… Donc n’oublions pas que le Moyen-Orient est l’un des plus grands magasins d’armements de la planète et que si des journées portes ouvertes sont annoncées, nous pourrions aussi voir l’embrasement s’intensifier et changer de registre. Les vacances à Dubaï, bye-bye. 

[1] US – Energy Information Administration

[2] Argus-Media

[3] World Energy Council

[4] Eurostat

[5] US – Energy Information Administration

[6] US – Energy Information Administration

[7] US – Energy Information Administration

[8] US – Energy Information Administration

[9] International Grain Council

L’article Ormuz : petit détroit, grandes secousses est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

His continued incarceration is a telling example of the erosion of both India’s judicial independence and its democracy.   

Having overthrown regimes in Latin America and the Middle East, why would Washington draw the line at Asia?

From energy to innovation, Kim Jong Un’s growth strategy is up against structural limits.

The intense U.S. bombing of Iran reveals the limits of Beijing’s relationship with Tehran and the pragmatism of China’s Middle Eastern strategy

Both countries are navigating a geopolitical environment far more turbulent than the one that shaped their post-Cold War outlook.

»Multipolarität« ist in der internationalen Politik zu einem zentralen, aber höchst ambivalenten Bezugspunkt von Debatten über die künftige Weltordnung geworden. Verwendet wird der Begriff sowohl deskriptiv, nämlich zur Beschreibung von Machtverschiebungen, als auch normativ, und zwar als Konzept für eine gerechtere internationale Ordnung. Die vergleichende Analyse von sieben Staaten zeigt jedoch, dass selbst in Ländern, die Multipolarität propagieren, kein kohärentes Verständnis davon vorherrscht. Scharfe Trennlinien verlaufen vorwiegend zwischen einerseits den USA, die das Konzept Multipolarität lange als gegen sich gerichtet verstanden haben, andererseits Russland und China, die mit ihm die Infragestellung der US-Hegemonie verbinden. Dabei strebt Russland eine disruptive und gewalttätige Transformation an, China hingegen eine evolutionäre. Andere Staaten wiederum, allen voran Indien und Südafrika, erhoffen sich von Multipolarität in erster Linie erweiterte außenpolitische Spielräume und leiten daraus teilweise eigene Reformvorschläge auf multi­lateraler Ebene ab. Deutschland und die EU müssen sich intensiver mit den unterschied­lichen Interpretationen und Verwendungen des Konzepts Multipolarität auseinandersetzen. Es sollte nicht per se als irrelevant oder antiwestlich abgetan werden, da es wesentliche Erkenntnisse über außenpolitische Anschlussfähigkeiten ermöglicht. Auch birgt die unreflektierte Verwendung des Begriffs Risiken, da er hochgradig politisiert ist und von verschiedenen Akteuren mit zum Teil gegensätzlichen Zielen verknüpft wird. Wichtiger als Grundsatzdiskussionen zu führen ist es, konkrete ordnungs­politische Reformansätze in diversen Politikfeldern zu entwickeln, etwa Handel, Gesundheit, Energie und Klima. Deutschland und die EU sollten die Forderung nach Multipolarität auch als Indikator für Reformbedarf verstehen und über die europäische Ebene Aushandlungsprozesse mit anderen Staaten anstoßen. Hierfür müssen sie zunächst klären, welche Ordnungsvorstellungen sie selbst bevorzugen, um darauf aufbauend passende Partner und Institutionen zu identifizieren.

Air and air-defense capabilities remain Afghanistan’s most vulnerable security component. 

Ino Afentouli, Senior Policy Advisor; Head of the Geopolitics and Diplomacy Observatory, ELIAMEP

Barring those directly threatened by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and despite the vast financial and military support their countries have provided, the peoples of the EU never felt that this war was “theirs”. And yet, this was the first military conflict in the heart of the continent since the end of World War II. This repression of the threat of war is largely due to the culture of peace that has been cultivated in Europe over the last eight decades—a culture encapsulated in the phrase “Never Again”. It is also the result of the institutional framework designed to ensure that disputes between European nations are resolved peacefully. Today, the nations of Europe find themselves confronted by a second war; though it is not being fought on their own soil, it poses an equally grave threat to their security.

In both the Ukrainian and the Iranian contexts, the nations of Europe are contending with the fallout from conflicts they neither chose nor planned, and over whose trajectory they lack meaningful control. Nonetheless, these are conflicts that will inevitably impact both the peoples and institutions of Europe. In other words, the present juncture is reminiscent of the summer of 1914, when our continent sleepwalked into the First World War. Now, as then, Europe remains unprepared.

The conflict with Iran, to which Greece and Cyprus are the closest European nations, will be protracted and is already escalating into a broader regional struggle. If Turkey, Syria and Lebanon should get involved, whether directly or indirectly, the consequences for us will be dire. The pre-emptive deployment of Greek forces to Cyprus underscores this reality. Even if the institutions to which we belong, the European Union and NATO, were to trigger their collective defence mechanisms, it would signify that our nations are facing a peril of the highest order. Regrettably, should this worst-case scenario materialize, we will be faced with a second European war, this time with the Eastern Mediterranean at its epicentre.

Triantafyllos Karatrantos, Research Associate, ELIAMEP

The ever-evolving regional security environment in the Middle East

The US-Israeli military conflict with Iran is another—and likely the most important critical—chapter in an ongoing reconfiguring of the Middle East’s security architecture and alliances. The process began after the terrorist attack launched against Israel on 7 October 2023 and the rapid succession of military and geopolitical events that followed it. Since October 2023, we have seen the systematic curtailing of Iran’s power, primarily by Israel. Initially through the weakening or overthrow—as in the case of the Assad regime—of the members of the infamous “Axis of Resistance”, the network which had effectively established Iran as a dominant regional actor. The region has changed radically in the period since the initial attacks: the Assad regime has fallen in Syria; Hezbollah, Hamas and various Shiite militias and paramilitary forces that acted as hybrid proxies for Iran have sustained crippling losses; and the Houthis have seen their influence severely diminished.

Iran had previously exploited the power vacuum created by Washington’s substantial disengagement from the region after 2011. This dynamic has now shifted so fundamentally that Tehran has not only lost its regional power; its theocratic regime is currently fighting for its survival.

Furthermore, Iran’s targeting of neighbouring states has failed to drive a wedge between them and the United States; instead, these provocations have pushed countries like Saudi Arabia into adopting a formal stance against Iran.

Israel has emerged with bolstered regional power and influence, appearing ready to resume the momentum of the Abraham Accords, which had stalled in the aftermath of the October 7 attack. However, it remains to be seen how Israel’s relations with the Arab nations will develop from here—most notably with Saudi Arabia, with which a landmark normalization deal was imminent prior to the conflict. Riyadh, alongside other Gulf countries like Qatar, has also seen its regional standing strengthened.

Nevertheless, the regional picture remains complex. Israel’s fraught relationship with Syria and Turkey—the latter of which also seems to be losing some of its previously amassed regional influence—must be taken into account.

Ultimately, the discourse surrounding a new security architecture cannot be finalized without considering the ultimate fate of the Iranian regime and the broader post-conflict landscape for the country. While the threat from Iran’s missile arsenal and proxies could be reduced, and its nuclear ambitions thwarted, we may see growing extremism, or even the emergence of new—or the evolution of existing—Shiite Islamist militant organizations.

Ultimately, the US has made a dynamic return to the Middle East and it remains to be seen how its rivalry with China and Russia will evolve within the region’s new geopolitical context, while it has become increasingly clear that the European Union must now develop its own distinct geopolitical footprint in the region.

Pantelis Ikonomou, Former Inspector, International Atomic Energy Agency; Research Associate, ELIAMEP

The reality about Iran’s nuclear weapons and the war

A list of the factual drivers, not a justification(!), of the actors involved in the Iranian crisis:

• It is widely held that “the capability to acquire nuclear weapons carries as much strategic weight as their actual possession” (for a historical analysis, see my book Global Nuclear Threat, [2019, in Greek], in which the above serves as an epigraph).
• Tehran utilizing its Possible Nuclear Military Capability since 2013 as strategic leverage to advance its international agenda.
• The landmark diplomatic agreement of 2015: the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) placed Iran’s nuclear programme under stringent international oversight.
• The implementation of the JCPOA, which widened Iran’s breakout window (the time required to acquire the amount of fissile material required to build a nuclear bomb) from two to ten months, effectively containing the situation,
• Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu adamantly declaring since 2013 that “no deal will be a good deal”.
• US President Trump’s unilaterally withdrawing the US from the JCPOA in 2018 and reinstating sanctions against Iran. This counter-intuitive decision effectively reduced Iran’s breakout window back to a mere two months.
• Tehran ceasing to comply with the terms of the JCPOA in 2019/2020, following a series of targeted assassinations of Iranian politicians, military officers and scientists. Iran obstructing and ultimately barring International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors from conducting meaningful oversight of its nuclear programme since then.
• The absence of a credible guarantee since then that Iran is not weaponizing its nuclear programme. Logically, however, had Iran already developed a nuclear capacity, it would have announced it to deter attacks against its territory.
• Israel’s status as an undeclared nuclear-armed state. As it is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it is under no obligation to submit to international inspections. Nevertheless, this status affords Israel a decisive strategic edge and underpins its geopolitical standing in the region.
• A fundamental divergence in the objectives of the parties involved in the escalating conflict: For Iran, the goal is to annihilate Israel. For Israel, it is to dismantle the Iranian state. However, for the US, the ultimate goal remains ill-defined. It is likely linked to Trump’s mercurial temperament and narcissistic need to perform on the world stage.
• Trump’s irrational withdrawal from the JCPOA, followed by the impulsive decision to join the Israeli attack on Iran in June 2025—against the explicit counsel of his own national security advisers—points towards an absolute, if unexplained, subservience to Israeli interests. Historically, no American president (Obama, Bush Jr, or Biden) has ever sided with Israel in a war against Iran.
• The historical root cause of the crisis: the pogroms perpetrated by Christian Tsarist Russia in 1881-1906 against 2.5 million Jews; the anti-Semitic campaigns of Stalin’s Soviet Union after World War II; and, finally, the Holocaust in which six million Jews were killed by Hitler’s—likewise Christian—Germany. These events led the global powers, acting through the UN in 1948, to establish a state of a few million Jews in Palestine—a state surrounded by a few hundred million Muslims.
• A pervasive indifference to the existential fallout currently confronting not only world Jewry and the Palestinians of that land, but the entire planet.
• A personal observation from a natural sciences perspective: the tendency towards chaos and disorder, which is the defining characteristic of universal entropy. In this shared journey, power imbalances are driving the collapse of hegemonies and the emergence of unpredictable multipolar shifts. We may also be experiencing the twilight of the American West. Unfortunately, the consequences remain impossible to foresee.

The U.S. sank an Iranian warship, which was returning home from an India-hosted exercise, off the Sri Lankan coast yesterday. India’s silence in response is deafening.

The research data described below was produced by the Working Paper titled "Russia’s Nuclear Signaling in the War Against Ukraine: A Chronology of the Biden Era" covering the period between February 24, 2022, and November 2025. The project traces Russian and Western political interactions with a nuclear dimension following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, building on the current state of research in International Relations and deterrence theory to address the question of how to interpret nuclear rhetoric. The central objective is to understand how nuclear interactions unfolded in the context of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In particular, the project brings the following questions to the fore: What statements and actions with a nuclear dimension did Russia and the West make in the context of the invasion? What reactions did Russia's nuclear rhetoric trigger among Western states? And in turn, how did Russia react to Western rejoinders, warnings, and counter-threats? To answer these research questions, the researchers collected all politically significant statements and actions by the Russian Federation and Western states, particularly the United States and NATO allies, with a nuclear dimension. The publication was produced under the leadership of Dr Liviu Horovitz from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) and Dr Michal Smetana from the Peace Research Center Prague (PRCP). The project was financed through the Strategic Threat Analysis and Nuclear (Dis-)Order (STAND) project at SWP, funded by the German Federal Ministry of Defence, and from summer 2024 onwards also by funding available to the PRCP. In summary, this study provides a comprehensive chronology of the nuclear rhetoric and escalation management strategies employed by Russia and the West in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

The data covers the following time period: 01.02.2022-01.11.2025

Eleni Ekmetsioglou, Non-Resident Fellow, ELIAMEP

The French President gave a much-awaited speech at the French strategic submarine force (FOST: Force Océanique Stratégique) base of Ile Longue in Brittany, last Monday (02.03.2026). It was a historical moment for France and an even more critical event for the future of the European continent. Even though the European dimension of France’s vital interests has been highlighted many times in the past by all Presidents since François Mitterrand, Emmanuel Macron is the first president that acted upon this claim and created the basis for a European cooperation scheme on nuclear deterrence. The scheme comprises of bilateral agreements with seven states – Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Poland, Denmark and Sweden- at the heart of which lies the coordination on conventional support of nuclear operations, what the French call ‘épaulement’.

As a reminder, France is estimated to have about 290 nuclear warheads. The French nuclear arsenal encompasses four nuclear submarines (SSBNs) that can carry up to 64 nuclear warheads each in its MIRV’ed Submarine Lunched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). In addition, the French nuclear arsenal includes two squadrons (40 aircraft in total) of nuclear capable Rafale aircraft (Force Aérienne Stratégique) where the nuclear warhead is delivered by a mid-range cruise missile, the ASMPA (air-sol moyenne portée-amélioré).

Continuities and discontinuities in Macron’s speech

The French, to their credit, worked hard to adapt and adjust their very unique nuclear posture in a way that is fitted for the challenging geopolitical environment Europe is faced with these days. Within this context, some components of the French nuclear posture were left to the past while others were repeated and further highlighted. What was not negotiable for the French side was their absolute control over the planification, implementation and ultimate use of the nuclear weapon in the event of crisis. While President Macron for the first time introduced the term ‘forward deterrence’ (dissuasion avancée) to extend French protection over its partners, he did highlight that France would not be dragged into others’ wars and that the definition of France’s vital interests will lie within the President’s responsibilities only and with no exception.  Another important continuity was France’s explicit rejection of battlefield nuclear weapons reiterating its commitment to regard the nuclear bomb as a strategic weapon that is militarily unusable and only politically useful within the context of deterrence.

Continuities aside, some important modifications to France’s nuclear posture were mentioned in the speech. President Macron announced that France will further consolidate its tritium production and that it will seek to increase its number of nuclear warheads escaping from France’s cherished principle of ‘strict efficiency’ (stricte suffisance). It was stressed that the exact numbers will not be disclosed, and that France will no longer be transparent about the size and the composition of its nuclear arsenal. Another principle that was left to the past was the term ‘dommages inacceptables’ (unacceptable damage). In previous articulations of its nuclear posture, France claimed to cause unacceptable damage to the adversary that would threaten its vital interests with the possibility of firing a warning shot when the President fell that the nature of the conflict was about to cross the nuclear threshold in order to reinstate deterrence. On March 2nd, however, the French President did not talk about causing unacceptable damage to the adversary anymore but instead he highlighted that France’s posture will be centered around a nuclear strike the adversary would not be able to recover from. This raises a number of questions about France’s targeting policy. Based on France’s nuclear history, one could hypothesize that the new posture is a more expansive version of its traditional countervalue strategy. However, the way Macron phrased it leaves room for one to wonder if France’s targeting policy has been modified towards the inclusion of strikes against military targets that could either seriously degrade or critically complicate the enemy’s implementation of its nuclear operations. For instance, even though urban centers might remain as the main targets, some critical nodes of the enemy’s nuclear operations such as Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) centers could be targeted as well in order to prevent the enemy from carrying out their nuclear operations. The strategic ambiguity here is intentional but we should highlight that a mix of both urban and military targets will require investments in Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) for engagement with fleeting targets or even HUMINT intelligence for the location of critical nodes in the adversary’s nuclear arsenal. The intentional ambiguity notwithstanding, a more expansive countervalue targeting policy is within current capabilities and in harmony with France’s nuclear doctrinal tradition.

Forward Deterrence: What It Encompasses & Why the Conventional Pillar Should Be Highlighted

But what does forward deterrence really mean and how does it translate into actual domains of cooperation? For now, the term is the overarching concept under which a number of activities will take place: joint exercises, signaling during crisis, deployment of French strategic aircraft (FAS) on allied territory leveraging the strategic depth of the European continent in order to disperse nuclear platforms and increase their survivability. The deployment of French strategic forces on allied territory will be under specific circumstances (circonstancielle) which alludes to crises, but the French President refrained from being more specific, which could give room for alternative interpretations.

The most important part -the actual cornerstone of France’s forward defense posture one could argue- is the cooperation of all partners on conventional support for nuclear operations; something that is known amongst NATO partners as CNSO (Conventional Support of Nuclear Operations). Conventional support is broken down into three pillars: a. the creation of Early Warning capabilities for the detection of incoming ballistic missiles b. missile and drone defense and c. conventional deep strike capabilities. It needs to be highlighted that even though the speech has been about upgrading Europe’s nuclear deterrent, the conventional component should be regarded as equally important. The creation of a small group of partners who will exchange knowledge, experiences, technical and scientific know-how on ISR or deep strike capabilities has the potential of spilling over towards the creation of a tight network of capabilities across the kill chain. Cooperation on Early Warning systems through ISR collaboration and intelligence sharing is the first step towards the creation of a network where the sensors will send real time information to Command & Control Centers (C2) for information processing and then straight to interceptors for missile or drone defense. Successful deep strike capabilities are also dependent on intelligence sharing and collaboration on ISR which further intensifies the need for flawless cooperation through interconnectivity and interoperability. Put differently, conventional deterrence is the pillar of a credible nuclear deterrence. If preparations for conventional operations are carried out successfully, then the whole effort has the potential of ‘locking’ states into a web of interconnectivity and deep leveled cooperation where absolute synchronization along the kill chain will have the potential to increase lethality and military effectiveness in the theater of operations. In a nutshell, even though Macron’s speech was, prima facie, about nuclear deterrence, if one scratches beneath the surface, the project has important potential for enhancing cooperation in the conventional domain and, in specific, in three fields that are of paramount importance for future warfare.

Lastly, something that we need to keep in mind; President Macron called the initiative a work in progress (démarche progressive). This gives the impression that the cooperation scheme that France has put forward under its leadership is a malleable structure where partners can shape their own contribution based on what it is that they are willing to offer and how they want to benefit from their participation. Joint exercises, deployments of FAS Rafales abroad and the conventional coordination for nuclear operations are just the starting points. Within the context of this smaller group of European partners, collective action should be easier and cooperation prospects promise to be more dynamic. The bilateral deliberations will continue, and it remains to be seen how each partner will shape its participation and contribute to the scheme.

The Enemy Within: Lack of Nuclear Strategy Expertise When it is Most Needed

After the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons scored very low on countries’ lists of priorities and nuclear expertise was no longer needed. From the ‘90s onwards, we saw the golden age of arms control where the emphasis was put on technical knowledge for supporting the treaty verification regimes. The nuclear shadow over world politics faded away and gave its position to optimism about the future of humanity away from the prospect of a nuclear conflagration. And yet, sadly, nuclear weapons are back to haunt inter-state relations and all the expertise that was dismantled needs to be rebuilt while taking into account both traditional theories and models but also, and most critically, the new features of our current international environment.

Therefore, while Europe takes its nuclear deterrent more seriously and policy makers continue bilateral deliberations towards new concepts and postures, it is paradoxical that the biggest enemy of a credible European nuclear deterrent is not Russia’s or China’s nuclear arsenals but the wider lack of nuclear strategy expertise within a shrinking nuclear policy community. The nuclear bomb is above everything else a strategic weapon which implies that more involvement by educated and informed civilians is necessary. We need an active and dynamic nuclear policy community to serve two goals: a. work in tandem with governmental institutions, brainstorm and provide innovative ideas to decision makers and b. hold policy makers accountable pushing states towards responsible nuclear policies that avoid unnecessary risks.

Taking a step further, we need to leverage new knowledge on nuclear strategy apart from the traditional theories. After the end of the Cold War, access to archival data in the US, Russia and Europe led to the production of a big volume of knowledge in Cold War nuclear history, nuclear cultures and the diversity in state views with regard to the requirements of a credible deterrent. Modern nuclear policies need to be informed by and learn from Cold War events and the experiences nuclear powers had to go through. At the same time, apart from looking back into historical lessons, we need to keep our eyes open for the particularities of our strategic environment such as the emergence of new technologies and their impact on nuclear postures, strategy and doctrines. New technologies create the illusion of escalation control breathing fresh air into damage limitation and nuclear warfighting doctrines that, however, increase the chance nuclear use in the future. This creates a strategic environment that is even more complex and challenging that the Cold War one. For all these reasons, we need experts from a diversity of fields to voice new ideas and share their expertise with governmental organizations supporting them in their critical mission of nuclear deterrence in this very challenging strategic environment.

Any attempt to build a credible European deterrent will be incomplete if it is not married to an investment in the intellectual capital of a wider nuclear policy community that will serve as the free market where ideas will circulate, policies will be discussed, critiqued, legitimized or rejected. A nuclear policy community that will serve as the bridge between decision makers and the public opinion that needs to remain informed and part of the wider discussion. President Macron and partner states did the first step towards a credible European nuclear deterrent. For this effort to be sustained, we now need to start working on building the intellectual capacity that will underpin Europe’s nuclear peace.

 

Depuis le coup d’État militaire de 2021 au Myanmar, l’Armée d’indépendance kachin (KIA) a consolidé son emprise sur les principaux sites d’extraction de dysprosium et de terbium dans les régions de Chipwi et Pangwa, générant plus de 200 millions de dollars de revenus annuels en imposant taxes et redevances aux entreprises chinoises opérant sur son territoire. Ainsi, les terres rares birmanes, indispensables aux moteurs électriques et aux éoliennes, sont désormais contrôlées par une entité proto-étatique en guerre ouverte avec son gouvernement central. De ce fait, le contrôle des gisements de terres rares au Myanmar par des groupes armés non étatiques devient une question stratégique majeure pour la sécurité d’approvisionnement en minerais critiques.

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L’article Myanmar : quand les groupes armés non-étatiques deviennent des acteurs stratégiques de la transition énergétique est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

Angesichts steigender Energiepreise infolge des Iran-Kriegs wird die Einführung eines Tankrabatts diskutiert. Dazu eine Einschätzung von Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Der Iran-Krieg birgt bei einer weiteren Eskalation erhebliche Risiken für die deutsche Wirtschaft. Steigende Energiepreise könnten die Produktionskosten erhöhen und über höhere Verbraucherpreise auch die Haushalte spürbar belasten. Eine solche Entwicklung hätte das Potenzial, die ohnehin fragile wirtschaftliche Erholung in Deutschland auszubremsen.

Ein Tankrabatt zur Abfederung höherer Spritpreise wäre allerdings ein teurer Fehler und eine falsche Entscheidung der Bundesregierung. Zwar kann die Bundesregierung die internationalen Preisentwicklungen nicht verhindern, sie kann jedoch die sozialen Folgen abfedern. Entscheidend ist dabei eine möglichst zielgenaue Entlastung der besonders betroffenen Bevölkerungsgruppen. Vorrangig sollten Haushalte mit niedrigen Einkommen unterstützt werden. Eine mögliche Maßnahme wäre etwa eine Senkung der Mehrwertsteuer auf Lebensmittel. Darüber hinaus sollte geprüft werden, ob eine Übergewinnsteuer eingeführt werden kann, um außergewöhnliche Krisengewinne etwa im Mineralölsektor abzuschöpfen und möglichen Missbrauch in angespannten Marktsituationen zu bekämpfen.

Bericht über die 6. internationale Konferenz des Netzwerks Enjust zum Thema "Offsetting Justice? Environmental Justice in the age of market and militarized conservation" in Bonn.

Bericht über die 6. internationale Konferenz des Netzwerks Enjust zum Thema "Offsetting Justice? Environmental Justice in the age of market and militarized conservation" in Bonn.

Bericht über die 6. internationale Konferenz des Netzwerks Enjust zum Thema "Offsetting Justice? Environmental Justice in the age of market and militarized conservation" in Bonn.

Im SPIEGEL-Talk diskutieren Richard David Precht, CDU-Politiker Roderich Kiesewetter und Iranexpertin Azadeh Zamirirad über die Zukunft des iranischen Volkes, den Flächenbrand in Nahost und den Schulterschluss von Friedrich Merz mit Donald Trump.

Der Chef der Monopolkommission Tomaso Duso reagiert auf die Kritik des neuen Deutschlandchefs von Telefónica in der F.A.Z.: Mehr Netzanbieter sind gut für Verbraucher und für Europas Wettbewerbsfähigkeit., Wenn Santiago Argelich Hesse, der neue Deutschlandchef von Telefónica, in der F.A.Z. für mehr Konsolidierung im europäischen Telekommunikationsmarkt wirbt und sich über einen „ruinösen Wettbewerb“ beschwert, aufgrund dessen sich Investitionen nicht ausreichend lohnen würden, dann ist das eigentlich ...