Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Humanitarian organizations have repeatedly called attention to the challenges that counterterrorism resolutions and UN sanctions regimes can pose to humanitarian action. In response, the council has progressively incorporated language that better takes into consideration international humanitarian law (IHL), international human rights law (IHRL), humanitarian principles, and the need to protect principled humanitarian action from the potential negative consequences of sanctions and counterterrorism measures. Most notably, in December 2022, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2664, which provides a cross-cutting humanitarian exemption to asset freezes under all its sanctions regimes, including the 1267 counterterrorism regime against ISIL/al-Qaida, to safeguard the timely and effective conduct of humanitarian activities.

In this context, IPI and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation Office in New York hosted a closed-door, hybrid roundtable on November 14, 2023, to assess the implementation and impact of Resolution 2664, including its potential application to counterterrorism measures. This roundtable provided a platform for exchanges between humanitarian organizations, member states, the UN Secretariat, civil society organizations, and independent experts, including those based in Geneva and New York.

There was broad agreement among participants that Resolution 2664 is a milestone achievement representing a fundamental policy shift within the Security Council. However, the resolution does not resolve all obstacles facing humanitarian actors seeking to provide aid in contexts where sanctions from the UN and autonomous regimes, as well as counterterrorism measures, apply. Participants thus provided the following recommendations on how to continue to safeguard principled humanitarian action:

• Member states should incorporate the obligations of Resolution 2664 into national and regional frameworks;
• Member states should take steps to apply the humanitarian exemption to autonomous sanctions regimes and counterterrorism measures;
• Donors should streamline reporting requirements for humanitarian actors;
• UN entities, humanitarian actors, and member states should invest in greater guidance and capacity building on the implementation of Resolution 2664; and
• UN entities, international and local humanitarian actors, member states, and the private sector should continue to engage in inclusive, multi-stakeholder dialogue at the national and global levels on the implementation of Resolution 2664 and risk-mitigation measures.

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Sollte der Europäische Rat im Dezember oder später grünes Licht dafür geben, EU-Beitrittsverhandlungen mit der Ukraine und Moldau zu eröffnen, dann geht es nicht mehr nur um symbolische Solidarität mit einem von Russland überfallenen bzw. be­drohten Nachbarn. Vielmehr beginnt im Schatten des Krieges ein neues Kapitel der Erweiterungspolitik. Nach der Türkei und den sechs Ländern des Westlichen Balkans bildet Osteuropa mit der Ukraine, Moldau und Georgien den dritten Erweiterungsraum. Spätestens seit Russlands Vollinvasion in der Ukraine versteht Brüssel unter Erweiterung die Expansion in strategisch wichtige Räume. Geopolitische Forderungen nach schnellen Beitritten nagen dabei an der konservativen Erweiterungsdoktrin – nach der es weder Rabatte auf die Kopenhagener Kriterien für eine EU-Mitgliedschaft geben darf noch Abkürzungen auf dem Weg zur Aufnahme. Hinzu kommt, dass die Beitrittsfragen bald in die Fährnisse der Kriegsdiplomatie geraten könnten, wenn es um dauerhafte Sicherheit für die Nachkriegs-Ukraine gehen wird. Die Europäische Kommission greift nun Ideen auf, wie neue Mitglieder schrittweise integriert werden könnten. Damit versucht sie, dem Dilemma zwischen Geo- und Integrationspolitik auszuweichen.

The UN Security Council is expected to renew MONUSCO’s mandate on December 20, 2023. The upcoming negotiations will unfold against the backdrop of the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) request to the Security Council on September 1, 2023, for the mission’s accelerated withdrawal to commence at the end of 2023; the government and the mission’s signing in November of a disengagement plan to implement this accelerated withdrawal; and the general elections, slated for December 20, 2023. The past two months have also seen renewed fighting between the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC), the M23 rebel group, and other armed groups. The Nairobi and Luanda peace processes were disrupted by the resumption of hostilities and heightened tension between the DRC and Rwanda. The security and humanitarian conditions continue to worsen in the eastern provinces of the DRC, with persistent threats to human rights and the protection of civilians.

In this context, the International Peace Institute (IPI), Security Council Report, and the Stimson Center cohosted a roundtable discussion on November 21, 2023, to reflect on MONUSCO’s mandate renewal. This roundtable offered a platform for member states, UN officials, civil society stakeholders, and independent experts to share their assessments of the situation in the DRC in a frank and collaborative manner. The discussion was intended to help the Security Council make more informed decisions with respect to the prioritization and sequencing of MONUSCO’s mandate, as well as the mission’s strategic orientation and actions on the ground as it prepares for a drawdown.

Given the context of MONUSCO’s transition and withdrawal in the coming months, the mission will likely need to balance the following issues:

• Prioritizing the protection of civilians and safeguarding humanitarian access to prevent the widening of protection gaps during the mission’s drawdown;
• Enhancing engagement with local communities and civil society organizations to execute the withdrawal plan in line with specific needs in regions within and outside eastern DRC;
• Improving coordination between the UN and regional partners that are present in eastern DRC through regular communication, information sharing, and joint planning;
• Providing a clearer definition of and political guidance on security sector reform to ensure the appropriate and timely transition of security responsibilities to national actors;
• Reinforcing support to the Congolese government on the implementation of its Demobilization, Disarmament, Community Recovery and Stabilization Program (P-DDRCS); and
• Supporting the revitalization of the Luanda and Nairobi processes following the December 2023 presidential election.

With annual population increases of 7 per cent, Nigeria’s capital, Abuja, has become the fastest-growing city in Africa in the past 20 years. A population of a mere 880,000 people at the turn of the millennium will have grown to more than 5 million by 2030. Abuja thus embodies the continental trend: Africa is urbanising at an historically unprecedented pace and scale. The world’s 10 fastest-growing cities are all in Africa, and the urban population will increase by around 900 million people by 2050, thereby nearly tripling. And two-thirds of the African cities that will exist in 2050 have yet to be built.

Since more than half of the residents in most African cities currently live in informal settlements with limited access to basic services and jobs, this rapid urbanisation is a daunting scenario. However, the positive social and economic effects from Africa’s urbanisation in the past decades are often overlooked. They offer insights into the opportunities and necessary steps needed to make Africa’s future urbanisation a success.

The overlooked successes of Africa’s urbanisation

Based on the most comprehensive analysis of Africa’s urbanisation, the report “Africa’s Urbanisation Dynamics 2022” provides a new, more positive understanding of urbanisation on the continent during the period between 1990 and 2020. Compared to rural regions, cities offer significantly better living conditions, especially regarding job opportunities and higher wages, but also better public and private services. Although larger cities are better off overall, the conditions in small and medium-sized cities are much better than in rural regions. These advantages that cities enjoy over rural regions have been maintained, despite a tripling of the urban population since 1990. The underlying expansion of urban infrastructure, services and economic opportunities to the approximately 500 million new urban dwellers during this period is, for all its shortcomings, an often overlooked achievement.

Urban population growth has also directly contributed to the economic growth of African countries through economic agglomeration effects. Almost one-third of Africa’s average annual per capita growth since 2001 can be attributed to this alone. In rural areas, too, urbanisation has improved income opportunities and living conditions by creating rural–urban value chains, especially around smaller cities. City clusters also promote trade and growth.

Despite these positive developments, many African cities are characterised by high levels of inequality, poverty and an insufficient number of formal and well-paid jobs, all of which has been exacerbated by the Covid pandemic. These factors are related to the biggest weakness of the urbanisation process in Africa so far: urbanisation without structural economic transformation. Increased productivity, diversification, and thus growth in manufacturing and higher-value services, which lead to significantly more and better-paid jobs, have mostly failed to materialise. However, for the successful urbanisation of the continent, such a structural transformation is necessary.

Africa’s urban future as historic opportunity

There are two scenarios that can help with imagining the possible changes to Africa’s cities through urbanisation over the next two and a half decades. In the first scenario, the growth and emergence of cities is largely unregulated and without sufficient investment. This would exacerbate already existing urban problems. Inequality would be even more extreme in 2050, with extraordinarily rich residential and business districts being separated from the rest of the city, including the poorer neighbourhoods where the majority of the city’s residents live. These neighbourhoods would sprawl much further into the urban periphery than they already do now, housing standards would remain low as costs rise, public services would be almost non-existent, traffic jams would become even longer than they already are and insecurity would increase. People would also suffer more from the increasing effects of climate change, such as floods and life-threatening heatwaves. These living conditions could lead to political instability and increased migration to neighbouring countries and beyond.

In the second scenario, urbanisation would be planned in advance and supported through public and private investments. A structural economic transformation with a growing manufacturing sector and higher-value services could create many jobs and improve living conditions. These cities would stimulate economic growth in rural areas as well, and local revenue would finance the expansion of urban infrastructure and public services adapted to climate change. Political stability would be more likely and migration pressures would decrease.

These extreme scenarios show the range of possible developments over the next two and a half decades. Some structural conditions favourable to the successful governance of urbanisation include the fact that Africa has by far the youngest population, the increasing availability of alternative energy sources, digitalisation and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

What to do

Whether Africa’s urbanisation will be a success or not depends on how it is governed in the coming years. But time is running out – cities grow and develop, creating material structures every day that limit the room for manoeuvre. For example, one of the decisive factors for the economic performance and climate impact of a city is its agglomeration. Simply put, a high density strengthens economic performance and reduces climate damage. Uncontrolled urbanisation, on the other hand, leads to urban sprawl. This is not only harmful to the climate in itself, but subsequent adjustments to the infrastructure are much more expensive and often politically challenging to enforce. Therefore, with every year that urbanisation proceeds without proactive governance, the negative scenario described above becomes more likely.

African and international organisations, think tanks and academics have developed recommendations for governing Africa’s urbanisation. There are four key aspects:

• Governance: The role of cities and local governments in national development planning should be significantly upgraded. In a multi-level approach, they should be understood and supported as central, independent actors of economic and social development. Small cities in particular, which have a strong impact on rural areas, have an important role to play. More local autonomy, revenues, and the use of participatory and experimental formats such as “urban labs” are important to promote local embeddedness and innovation.
• Planning: Due to the diversity of cities, planning should be based on local urban characteristics and potentials. Western planning paradigms should be questioned, and locally appropriate approaches and resources should be prioritised. For example, cooperatives and religious organisations play a major role in the provision of housing and infrastructure in many African cities. The inclusion of women and disadvantaged groups as well as the consideration of nature-based solutions are of particular importance.
• Financing and investment: Based on the calculations for selected countries, the resources needed to finance the climate-friendly growth and construction of new cities in Africa until 2050 amount to trillions of euros and cannot possibly be raised by African countries alone. Public and private as well as national and international investments are needed, while at the same time cities need to increase own-source revenues, which are comparatively low in Africa.
• Infrastructure and services: The proactive provision of urban infrastructure and services is the most important and most cost-effective lever to positively influence the productivity of cities as well as their climate impact. In addition to secure land tenure, electricity and transport routes, this includes education and health care, affordable housing and social protection systems, which increase productivity and quality of life.  

Apart from the people and countries most directly affected on the African continent, the consequences of successful or failed urbanisation in the coming decades will also be felt in Europe. It is therefore in Europe’s and Germany’s interests to more systematically and comprehensively support the proactive governance of urbanisation in Africa. One new approach for doing that would be Just Urban Transformation Partnerships (JUTPs), based on the model of the Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs). JUTPs would be multilateral, multi-actor cooperation and investment agreements in which a group of countries would work with national governments, including relevant national actors such as the Ministry of Urban Development and the Association of Cities or Mayors’ Forums, for example, and selected cities as well as local governmental, non-governmental and private-sector stakeholders. JUTPs would complement the cooperation of national governments with a more territorial approach. Germany could also build on existing city partnerships and its longstanding engagement in decentralisation processes. Another possibility would be to support international city networks more strongly (“urban diplomacy”). There are many potential approaches for collaborating on urbanisation. First of all, however, actors need to realise what a unique opportunity Africa’s urbanisation presents for the continent’s structural transformation and development.

Michael Roll is a researcher at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS). He currently works on the governance of urban sustainability transformations in the Transformative Urban Coalitions (TUC) project.

Responsibility for the content, opinions expressed and sources used in the articles and interviews lies with the respective authors.

Im Aufbau einer neuen globalen Gesundheitsarchitektur nach der Covid-19-Pandemie stehen wichtige Weichenstellungen an, insbesondere bei der Verhandlung des Pande­mie­abkommens und der Schaffung robuster Lieferketten. Vor dem Hintergrund ihrer systemischen Rivalität betrachten die USA und China globale Gesundheitspolitik als Feld geopolitischer Konkurrenz. Das gefährdet die Umsetzung der Lehren aus der Covid-19-Pandemie und den Schutz menschlicher Gesundheit. Für Deutschland stellt sich die Frage, inwieweit es seinen multilateralen Ansatz in der globalen Gesundheits­politik anpassen muss, um auf die zunehmenden geopolitischen Spannun­gen zu ant­worten. Dazu empfiehlt es sich, unabhängige Gestaltungsmacht zu ent­wickeln und gleichzeitig ein verlässlicher, multilateraler Partner zu sein.

Die Europäische Union hat 2020 mit dem 750 Milliarden Euro schweren Zusatzhaushalt unter dem Namen »Next Generation EU« (NGEU) und mit der europäischen Aufbau- und Resilienzfazilität (ARF) eine eindrucksvolle und innovative Reaktion auf die Covid 19-Pandemie und deren sozio­ökonomische Folgen beschlossen. NGEU knüpft zwar an die vorhandenen Instrumente und Strukturen der europäischen Strukturfonds an und greift auf Elemente des sogenannten Europäischen Semesters zur wirtschaftspolitischen Koordinierung zurück. Grundsätzlich neu ist aber die Finanzierung des Programms durch die Aufnahme von Krediten, die bis 2058 getilgt sein müssen. Der Beschluss zu dieser gemeinsamen Aufnahme von Schulden und zu deren Tilgung aus dem EU-Haushalt wurde häufig als europäischer Hamilton-Moment bezeichnet, also als erster Schritt auf dem Weg zu einem europäischen Bundesstaat. Jedoch erscheint diese Interpretation der langfristigen integrations­politischen Wirkung von NGEU und ARF nicht angemessen. Realistisch ist allenfalls die Wiederholung einer gemeinsamen Kreditaufnahme für zweckgebundene, befristete und in ihrem Umfang begrenzte Ausgaben als Antwort auf eine erneute schwere Krise in der Europäischen Union.

Um das Verhältnis zwischen Ankara und Athen ist es nicht zum Besten bestellt. Das will der türkische Präsident mit einem Besuch in Griechenland nun offenbar ändern.

Mit dem großangelegten Angriffskrieg gegen die Ukraine seit Februar 2022 haben sich die Rahmenbedingungen der russisch-chinesischen Kooperation fundamental geändert. Die wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit mit China ist für Russland überlebenswichtig geworden. Der russisch-chinesische Handel hat seit Beginn von Moskaus Invasion stark zugenommen. Dagegen sind die chinesischen Investitionen in Russland, die ohnehin schon gering waren, seither weiter geschrumpft. Fossile Energieträger bleiben das Rückgrat der russisch-chinesischen Wirtschaftskooperation, wobei jedoch die Infrastruktur für eine schnel­lere Ausweitung der russischen Exporte fehlt. Russlands Rüstungsexporte nach China sind seit einigen Jahren rück­läufig. China exportiert seinerseits immer mehr Dual-Use-Güter nach Russland, die von der russischen Rüstungsindustrie dringend benötigt werden. Die russisch-chinesische Kooperation in der IT-Industrie ist seit Beginn des Angriffskrieges gegen die Ukraine stark zurückgegangen, da die chinesischen Digitalkonzerne US-Sekundärsanktionen fürchten. Russlands Handel mit China wird größtenteils in Yuan abgewickelt. Für den Handel mit anderen Staaten ist Russland allerdings weiterhin auf den US-Dollar angewiesen.

 

Megatrends Afrika (MTA): You have written and researched extensively on Black Feminism. What trends do you see in the current feminist discourse? How are the conversations in Europe and on the African continent similar or different?

Minna Salami (MS): From my vantage point, feminism is not really a movement that has trends. It is a social movement that responds to the zeitgeist. What may seem like a trend is a response to socio-political developments and all of the conversations that are going on in society at large.

What we see today is that feminists around the globe are debating the same crises: Feminists are talking a lot about climate change, as we always have. The environment has always been a big issue for women’s movements, as well as authoritarianism and the erosion of democracy, because they go hand in hand with patriarchy. There is no authoritarian regime that is not patriarchal and, in a sense, all patriarchal systems are authoritarian towards women. War and conflict affect women particularly in dire ways. And then, of course, there are still the perennial issues that we never seem to be able to escape: the asymmetrical distribution of power, sexual objectification, the disempowerment of girls in relation to boys.

This polycrisis affects women differently across the world. If you look at the wars in Africa – in Sudan, for example – the flags are not raised as urgently as in other wars. African women accordingly are treated differently in these situations. There should never be any kind of hierarchy when it comes to war, but that is one of the challenges that African Feminists are facing.

It is similar with climate change: Africa contributes only 2 to 3 per cent of the world’s carbon emissions, and yet it is the continent that faces the most severe consequences. African women bear the brunt of that weight. They do the majority of agricultural work on the continent. That already gives you an idea of the gendered impact of environmental degradation.

MTA: Does this open up space for cross-regional feminist discussions on a more level playing field? Is it an opportunity to find a common language?

MS: I certainly think it requires that kind of thinking. This is a time when we need feminism, and we need international feminism to intervene. It does not mean that we have to be some kind of united front. We do not! This discussion is why the movement is at a standstill. Feminists have made monumental achievements. But we could achieve even more if we did not feel this kind of obligation to have the exact same politics. I think that is really part of a backlash narrative against feminism; it is the first thing we always hear: “Oh, you cannot even get along.” And the fact is, we do not have to. We do not need to have the same feminist politics on every issue. But we do need to be aware of – and critically engage with – each other’s work, I think.

MTA: At the same time, of course, there are always blind spots. What areas do not receive the attention they deserve, especially in the European political debate?

MS:The big thing is Eurocentrism: It always has been, and it still is. And it is difficult to overcome. I am proudly European as well as African, and I cannot understand why it is so difficult for Europeans, and also European feminists, to get rid of Eurocentricity. We know how toxic it is.

For decades, non-Western feminism has shown that we cannot end patriarchy anywhere as long as we are reinforcing it with Eurocentric feminist work at the same time. I think we need to start being more matter-of-fact about Eurocentricism. It is not about blame. It is not about guilt. All these emotions exist within the movement. But I think we need to move away from it because it is the tool that patriarchal systems use to manipulate feminist work.

More specifically, I have noticed, for example, that when I am introduced as a Black Feminist, Europeans – and even European feminists – find it difficult to understand that Black Feminism is a school of thought. People limit this to my identity, down to certain individuals or to humanitarian development projects. And this blind spot is really troubling. Black Feminism is a school of thought in the same way that Psychoanalytic Feminism or Post-structural Feminism are, and that is the way that we need to engage with it.

MTA: Eurocentrism also comes up increasingly in the debates around decolonising Africa policies and integrating intersectional approaches.

MS: Yes, it is fantastic that we have politicians in the West talking about decolonisation and intersectionality. Five years ago, let alone decades ago, that would have been unheard of. So, I want to acknowledge that this is an important first step. Yet, it needs to be said that it is damaging when influential people talk about intersectionality but do not put it into practice, and do not even try to.

One thing that I see happening with intersectionality is people saying that they are doing intersectional feminism or intersectional politics or whatever, and then they just go on and talk only about gender, for example. I see this a lot in the West. They bring in all the feminist arguments but do not talk about race. Conversely, in Africa, there are a lot of people touting intersectionality, but then they talk only about race. Yet, the very premise of intersectionality is, of course, the intersection of race and gender and other forms of identity and oppression.

The same with decolonisation. Today, all kinds of institutions and organisations are decolonising all kinds of things. Decolonise your computer or your museum, your body, your nail polish. Great! But again, they are not necessarily putting the question of Eurocentrism on the agenda. And if you do not do that, then it is not a decolonial approach. Such a reductive approach to decolonisation, which describes a centuries-long movement for emancipation and a rigorous field of knowledge, makes the concept even more decontextualised.

Decolonisation in the 21st century is still a political project, but it is also a mental and a psychosocial project. Overcoming Eurocentrism is the decolonisation of our time. So, raise this issue whenever a project claims to be about decolonisation.

MTA: As you said, we have a much more prominent discussion about feminism these days. At the same time, the anti-feminist movement is growing here and on the African continent. How can we counter these narratives?

MS: It is a complex question. I think it is really important to see all of feminism as this huge compendium of knowledge about how to break free from patriarchy. And if that is the case, then we have a lot of language to counter anti-feminism. Feminism is the language itself.

I would say it is very much about critical argument, analysis and imagination. Those three qualities are present in all the great feminist works and achievements. Analysis, so that we understand the predicament of what we are trying to oppose, and then a formulation of critical arguments against it, but at the same time an overarching vision, a kind of creative imagining of a better future.

How can we make an argument that is both critical and creative? You could go for the most radical critical argument, or sometimes the most radical approach is to be strategic and pragmatic. Right? But you must still make the critical argument, you still do the analysis and you still do the creative, imaginative work. And that is how we are going to counter all forms of authoritarianism, anti-gender, anti-feminism.

It does not always appeal to people because it is long-term work. It takes a certain amount of stepping back, observing and then proposing something new. But that has always been a key component of feminism. And it is necessary for fighting against these negative forces in society today.

MTA: We already touched upon the notion of the polycrisis earlier. Could you give us some insights into your research on it?

MS: People use various terms for it: Nested crises, perma-crisis, multi-crisis. But there is certainly something about the zeitgeist today that is unique because of the vast number of crises, of huge catastrophes, happening at the same time and exacerbating each other.

What the polycrisis essentially means is that there is an enormous and unprecedented amount of suffering in the world. To me, the polycrisis is a painful, ugly situation that we should never have found ourselves in. It implies suffering, death, all of the worst things that humanity has done to itself and to its ecosystems.

Now, when you hear people talking about the polycrisis, I do not hear that sentiment. I am hearing urgent diagnostics. I see a lot of data. I do not hear the horror, the dystopia that this term – if it is going to be used that way – is telling us. And honestly, it drives me mad. It makes me desperate.

Also, I think we are not talking enough about peace, not just peace from war and conflict, but just this notion of peace-building that, at its core, also implies making space for silence and ease. Remember that the pursuit of peace is the seed that bolstered the early Feminist movement with women’s peace congresses and issues alike in the early 19th and 20th centuries. That seed can and should never be completely eradicated. It is there. But we are neglecting it.

So, how do we create peace in a world that is in polycrisis? Black Feminism offers a lot of different ideas, but I think the most famous is intersectionality. The theory offers useful ways of countering the polycrisis. The original theory centred on Black women being crushed by different systems – patriarchy, sexism, racism. With the polycrisis, you could say it is like if you replace the Black woman in the centre of this traffic jam with the planet. It is being crushed by these systems of consumerism, capitalism, patriarchy, authoritarianism, global warming and biodiversity loss.

The moment you look at the polycrisis from the Black Feminist lens, you cannot help but see that we are talking about suffering, we are talking about oppression and recklessness. We are talking about pain, exclusion, lack of care. You can see that this is not just about economic crises or political crises. It is also about a crisis of affect, a crisis of relationship.

MTA: From a feminist perspective, should we be focussing less on data and the technocratic side of issues and more on their impact at the individual and societal levels?

MS: Feminism always brings complexity. And that is not what we see in patriarchal crisis strategy. It is almost laughably immature because it is so banal. It is so devoid of complexity. It treats the world in a dualistic way, that is binary, very black or white – as if that has ever worked in history. Feminism is the voice that says: “Hey, these are complex questions. You cannot deal with A if A and B are connected and you ignore B, and C, D, E and F, for that matter.”

An example? A simple one might be the way that we usually see a spike in domestic violence when men are unable to find work, and that much of this job loss is caused by extractive systems that put many men out of work while also destroying the planet, which further exacerbates violence. So, that is always the kind of complexity that we need to bring to these issues.

MTA: How can we better integrate feminist perspectives into policy processes and the decision-making processes around them? We have seen a lot of stakeholder consultations and other instruments, for example. What would be your ideas on how to integrate feminist voices from academia, grassroots movements and civil society in this space?

MS: It is important to create spaces for feminist voices. When it comes to Africa, there is a curious thing going on. The gender and development sector is huge on the continent and does important work. But at the same time, it is not the same as “African Feminism”. In fact, it is in some ways a kind of backlash against the African Feminist movement.

What I mean is that it can be convenient for policy-makers to focus on that sector because they can avoid working with feminists while claiming to be feminist. But if you want to implement a Feminist Foreign Policy that claims to be truly feminist or intersectional, then work with the local feminists. Do not just go and work with some (international) NGO that might actually be pretty stridently anti-feminist but is helping women in some way in a certain project. Always consult African Feminists, academics, locally led organisations, intellectuals and grassroots movements. There are many across the African continent.

MTA: Just to clarify, in the area of gender and development: Do you think there are some initiatives that everybody can get behind while other important initiatives are still being neglected? For example, it is easier to support primary education for girls than the big issue of sexual and reproductive health.

MS: I mean all of that, actually. Pretty much everything you just mentioned is part of focussing on gender over feminism. This language has taken over the African continent, and it is strongly influenced by European and Western politics. In some ways, this is a backlash against the Feminist movement. And I know this is a very controversial statement. I do not know if all African Feminists would even agree with me. And I would be cold-blooded if I said that organisations that are working on issues like girls’ education or maternal health care are not doing good work. But they are often also importing Eurocentrism into Africa. Instead of pushing feminist ideas, they are often also importing and validating a prevalent patriarchal mindset.

African Feminists are then left to rebuild years of work. All I am saying is that if you are claiming to do feminist work in Africa, then you have to talk to African Feminists. It is really very obvious.

MTA: What does this mean in practice? Because I suspect the response to this criticism would be: “Oh, we are already doing that. Obviously, we are already in touch with African Feminists.”

MS: First of all, do they call themselves feminists? And even then, secondly, have you had a dialogue with them about feminism? Is there a tradition of feminism in that organisation? If you claim that you are working on a feminist project, then you should not be in a position where you have to question these things. And if you do not take these steps, then that is Eurocentric. If we were working on a feminist project in Europe, policy-makers would not just contact any humanitarian actor, they would approach a Feminist organisation. It is not enough to assume that doing charitable work equals a feminist approach. That is not necessarily the case. So why assume that it is the case in Africa?

But the problem is also that decision-makers have to first question the patriarchal structure of their own organisations. That is my third recommendation. If you do not interrogate the problem of sexism and patriarchy and racism within your own institution, then do not work with African organisations on the issue of feminism because you are just going to make the situation worse. Again, that is Eurocentrism, and potentially it is a saviour mentality. You cannot go and “help” people with a problem that you are not fighting to overcome yourself.

Megatrends Afrika's Anna Hörter conducted this interview with feminist author, journalist and critic Minna Salami in October 2023. Ms Salami, also known as MsAfropolitan to her followers on social media, is currently Program Chair at The New Institute.

Responsibility for the content, opinions expressed and sources used in the articles and interviews lies with the respective authors.

Deutschland und Südkorea verbinden nicht nur ähnliche historische Erfahrungen und enge wirtschaftliche Beziehungen, sondern auch gemeinsame Werte und Inter­essen. Lange waren die bilateralen Beziehungen von einem Austausch über tradi­tio­nelle Kooperationsthemen geprägt, etwa den Teilungs- und Wiedervereinigungserfahrungen sowie vor allem den wirtschaftlichen Verbindungen. Jüngst weiten sie sich auch auf den sicherheitspolitischen und strategischen Bereich aus. Um das Potential aus­zuschöpfen, bestehende Herausforderungen zu bewältigen und die bilateralen Beziehungen zukunftsfähig auszugestalten, sollten Berlin und Seoul diese weiter inten­sivieren und zu einer strategischen Partnerschaft aufwerten.

The proportion of affected populations who flee violent conflict is much smaller than is widely assumed. Many decide to remain in the conflict zones. They are often referred to as stayees. Three groups can be identified. Some people stay voluntarily. Others do so involuntarily, for example because they lack the resources to flee or because violent actors restrict their freedom of movement. Another group acquiesce to their immobility. Little is known about stayees, their needs and the reasons for their im­mobility. But several factors relevant to their decision-making can be identified. These include type of conflict, type of violence and personal situation. Whether they remain voluntarily or involuntarily, stayees employ sur­vival strategies including collaboration, neutrality, protest and resistance. Knowledge about stayees and their survival strategies is important for humanitarian aid and development actors. Only if they are well informed can they align their activities with actual needs and provide meaningful support to people living in and with violent conflicts. It is therefore essential to consider the entire spectrum of (im)mobility and to understand this expanded perspective as a positive – without neglecting the forcibly displaced. The agency of civilians in violent conflicts needs to be recognised and they must be protected from abuse and exploitation by aid workers (do-no-harm principle). Finally, stayees must be systematically included in all post-conflict initiatives supporting vol­untary return and reintegration.

 

Development policy in times of increasing autocratisation is a major discussion for European and German cooperation with Africa. In practical terms, Europe has given up on using its development aid and other economic instruments to incentivise democratisation in non-European countries. This change has become inevitable, as non-EU countries have rejected the notion of Europe driving particular forms of state-society relations, especially in former colonies. At the same time, European security and migration management interests, which are often at odds with democracy promotion, have been prioritised over programmes that support risky transformation processes.

This change in emphasis has been particularly notable in the EU’s cooperation with North African countries, where increased financial and rhetorical support for political change in the years following the 2011 Arab Uprisings has given way to pragmatic support for social, political and economic stability, especially since Tunisia’s democratic experiment was suspended in 2021. 

The change in emphasis has also been accompanied by a new policy framework. The Global Gateway infrastructure investment programme is becoming the new paradigm for European cooperation with the ‘Global South’. The Global Gateway cooperation model re-conceptualises development aid as a catalyst for investment, prioritises development projects that serve ‘mutual interests’, places principal focus on the ‘hardware’ of physical infrastructure and de-emphasises ‘software’ aspects such as governance, inclusion and rights.

Practical and moral considerations

The fact that investment partnerships are being formed with state actors in authoritarian countries raises important practical and moral questions. On a practical level, issues arise around transparency and efficacy. On a moral level, there are unanswered questions about the kinds of values that Europe wants to promote with its development cooperation and especially the issue of who should benefit: societies, or established autocratic elites. 

The EU has touched on these practical and moral questions in its communications around the Global Gateway. In her contribution to this blog series, Commissioner Urpilainen noted that ‘Global Gateway takes centre stage in strengthening the Africa-EU Partnership, with valuable support from various partners, including Germany. This partnership embodies the ideals of a more interconnected, collaborative world and shared values.’ The European Commission lists six ‘core values’ on its website, the first two of which are ‘democratic values and high standards’ and ‘good governance and transparency’. The Commission does not offer much detail about how these principles should influence investment projects in authoritarian partner countries.

As the Global Gateway gathers momentum, the practical and moral questions are becoming more relevant for Germany as well. Germany is a key financer and influential broker of EU-level decision-making. Germany is a key ‘Team Europe’ partner in several Global Gateway projects, both running and planned. In this context, the German government would be well advised to elaborate strategies to deal with inevitable trade-offs and to make effective use of its influence at the EU level.

The Global Gateway in North Africa: Democratic Oversight, Environmental Sustainability & Geopolitics

As Werenfels and Lacher discussed in this blog series, the EU has different interests in North Africa than in Sub-Saharan Africa. These are shaped by proximity and shared concerns about rapid global warming, energy security and demographic change. Moreover, as most North African countries already have closer economic relations with Europe than their sub-Saharan neighbours, cooperation across the Mediterranean under the Global Gateway is likely to be deeper, the Gateway’s whole-of-Africa ambition notwithstanding.

The EU – and therefore Germany – faces significant challenges in implementing the Global Gateway in North Africa. These range from the economy to social and environmental sustainability issues and geopolitical considerations, which raise practical and moral dilemmas for cooperation.

The first major challenges that arise stem from the inherent risks of doing deals in countries where not only the business environment and the investment climate lack transparency and accountability, but where political stability may be a mirage. The social and economic pressures that drove the Arab Spring uprisings in 2010 and 2011 have not been addressed, and in some countries have even worsened. Anti-government protests from late 2016 in Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria were only suppressed by the COVID-19 pandemic, regime repression and electronic surveillance. Commissioner Urpilainen’s assurances about‘democratic values and high standards’ and ‘good governance and transparency’ are welcome, but clear definitions are missing and related monitoring and control mechanisms still need to be developed.

A second set of challenges arises around authoritarianism and environmental sustainability – a central objective of both Global Gateway and the European Green Deal. Trade-offs between sustainability and authoritarianism arise when trying to reconcile environmental standards (for instance for biodiversity or natural resources protection) with local needs of populations. In authoritarian settings, environmental policies tend to reproduce governance patterns, but if centralized top-down approaches do not consider local concerns, solutions may not be sustainable in the long term and produce negative side effects. The exclusion of relevant stakeholders and disregard for negative environmental impacts in Tunisia’s green hydrogen strategy is a case in point.

Furthermore, the Global Gateway’s investment guarantees are likely to support authoritarianism in North Africa, where governance systems are based on the rent-seeking behaviour of elites. The new rents may reinforce these patterns as well-connected businessmen grab market opportunities in green technologies. This raises serious questions about the equity of the so-called ‘just transition’ and thereby the legitimacy of Europe’s agenda.

A third set of challenges arises from the Global Gateway’s geopolitical ambitions. North Africa has witnessed several shifts in economic influence since independence, where prevailing economic ties with former colonial powers are increasingly replaced by extended cooperation with former Cold War allies (such as Algeria and Russia), regional partners such as Turkey and the Gulf States, and of course China. The Global Gateway is both an imitation of and a competitive response to China’s belt-and-road initiative. China has considerably expanded its presence in North Africa through infrastructure investments and the control of cyberspace, and will not be dislodged easily. The same goes for major Gulf investments such as the Saudi Green Initiative.

Build Credibility Along with Connectivity

The Global Gateway attempts to sidestep the reality of cooperation with authoritarian governments by focusing on infrastructure and mutual interests. Most European policymakers would still want to realise the ‘ring of friends’ vision of the European Neighbourhood Policy, and an open and democratic North Africa would be a major part of this. However, after several decades of half-hearted democracy promotion efforts, European leaders are well aware that they do not have the power to force transformation, nor the will and moral backbone to support regional forces of change when established elites resist.

While the rise of anti-democratic populism in European politics is not going unnoticed in North Africa, the universality of democratic values was evident in the Arab uprisings, and more recently in the pre-Covid protests in Algeria especially. The likelihood that these values will again surface in a region where social, economic and environmental tensions remain unresolved is high, and Germany and the EU would be wise to be prepared for this.

In theory, the Global Gateway may have significant potential, both for treading the path of least resistance and for providing momentum for positive change in North Africa. The EU has used cooperation on critical infrastructure to foster European integration and enable the free movement of goods, capital, expertise and people. This process was not without practical and moral dilemmas, and they were not easy to resolve even within Europe. In most cases, however, European dilemmas were not simply ignored in the hope that they would go away.

For Germany and the EU, openly articulating and addressing the challenges mentioned above would be a major contribution not only towards more effective implementation of the global gateway but to Europe’s credibility as a legitimate and reliable partner in turbulent times. With the necessary honesty regarding practical and moral challenges, the Global Gateway could provide opportunities for addressing double standards, historic responsibilities and broken promises. Germany, as a major player within the EU, could seize the opportunity to shape the initiative in this direction.

Both authors, Dr Annabelle Houdret and Dr Mark Furness, are Senior Researchers at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), where they are part of the research and advisory project team ‘Stability and Development in the Middle East and North Africa’.

Responsibility for the content, opinions expressed and sources used in the articles and interviews lies with the respective authors.