Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

The reconstruction of Syria lacks a solid foundation, as Ahmad Al-Sharaa and his interim government prefer to establish facts rather than a social consensus. In his victory speech, al-Sharaa promised a social contract, but protection, provision and participation are still lacking. The interim government has fallen short of its responsibility in all three areas as evidenced by a series of violence including the forceful takeover of Kurdish-dominated territory in early 2026, large-scale investments without clear benefit for Syria’s suffering population, and polarized public discourse lacking genuine commitment to pluralism and tolerance. Social rifts are deep, including within the Syrian diaspora, which also requires a minimum of trust and security – so only some members of the diaspora may choose to engage with their homeland. The international community should not remain silent over these destabilizing developments in Syria’s domestic politics.

The reconstruction of Syria lacks a solid foundation, as Ahmad Al-Sharaa and his interim government prefer to establish facts rather than a social consensus. In his victory speech, al-Sharaa promised a social contract, but protection, provision and participation are still lacking. The interim government has fallen short of its responsibility in all three areas as evidenced by a series of violence including the forceful takeover of Kurdish-dominated territory in early 2026, large-scale investments without clear benefit for Syria’s suffering population, and polarized public discourse lacking genuine commitment to pluralism and tolerance. Social rifts are deep, including within the Syrian diaspora, which also requires a minimum of trust and security – so only some members of the diaspora may choose to engage with their homeland. The international community should not remain silent over these destabilizing developments in Syria’s domestic politics.

The reconstruction of Syria lacks a solid foundation, as Ahmad Al-Sharaa and his interim government prefer to establish facts rather than a social consensus. In his victory speech, al-Sharaa promised a social contract, but protection, provision and participation are still lacking. The interim government has fallen short of its responsibility in all three areas as evidenced by a series of violence including the forceful takeover of Kurdish-dominated territory in early 2026, large-scale investments without clear benefit for Syria’s suffering population, and polarized public discourse lacking genuine commitment to pluralism and tolerance. Social rifts are deep, including within the Syrian diaspora, which also requires a minimum of trust and security – so only some members of the diaspora may choose to engage with their homeland. The international community should not remain silent over these destabilizing developments in Syria’s domestic politics.

Dem Wiederaufbau Syriens fehlt das Fundament, denn Ahmad Al-Scharaa und seine Übergangsregierung schaffen lieber Fakten als einen gesellschaftlichen Konsens. In seiner Siegesrede versprach Al-Sharaa einen Gesellschaftsvertrag, doch Schutz, Daseinsvorsorge und die Möglichkeit bürgerlicher Teilhabe lassen weiterhin zu wünschen übrig. Die Übergangsregierung ist ihrer Verantwortung in allen drei Bereichen nicht nachgekommen. Das zeigen, erstens, das wiederholte Wiederaufflammen von Gewalt, darunter die gewaltsame Übernahme des kurdisch dominierten Gebiets Anfang 2026, zweitens, die groß angelegten Investitionen ohne klaren Nutzen für die notleidende Bevölkerung und, drittens, die polarisierte öffentliche Debatte ohne echtes Bekenntnis zu Pluralismus und Toleranz. Die sozialen Gräben sind tief, auch innerhalb der syrischen Diaspora. Mangels Vertrauen und Sicherheit wird nur ein Teil der Syrer im Ausland bereit sein sich, über Rücküberweisungen hinaus, für ihr Heimatland zu engagieren. Die internationale Gemeinschaft sollte zu diesen besorgniserregenden Entwicklungen in der syrischen Innenpolitik nicht schweigen.

Dem Wiederaufbau Syriens fehlt das Fundament, denn Ahmad Al-Scharaa und seine Übergangsregierung schaffen lieber Fakten als einen gesellschaftlichen Konsens. In seiner Siegesrede versprach Al-Sharaa einen Gesellschaftsvertrag, doch Schutz, Daseinsvorsorge und die Möglichkeit bürgerlicher Teilhabe lassen weiterhin zu wünschen übrig. Die Übergangsregierung ist ihrer Verantwortung in allen drei Bereichen nicht nachgekommen. Das zeigen, erstens, das wiederholte Wiederaufflammen von Gewalt, darunter die gewaltsame Übernahme des kurdisch dominierten Gebiets Anfang 2026, zweitens, die groß angelegten Investitionen ohne klaren Nutzen für die notleidende Bevölkerung und, drittens, die polarisierte öffentliche Debatte ohne echtes Bekenntnis zu Pluralismus und Toleranz. Die sozialen Gräben sind tief, auch innerhalb der syrischen Diaspora. Mangels Vertrauen und Sicherheit wird nur ein Teil der Syrer im Ausland bereit sein sich, über Rücküberweisungen hinaus, für ihr Heimatland zu engagieren. Die internationale Gemeinschaft sollte zu diesen besorgniserregenden Entwicklungen in der syrischen Innenpolitik nicht schweigen.

Dem Wiederaufbau Syriens fehlt das Fundament, denn Ahmad Al-Scharaa und seine Übergangsregierung schaffen lieber Fakten als einen gesellschaftlichen Konsens. In seiner Siegesrede versprach Al-Sharaa einen Gesellschaftsvertrag, doch Schutz, Daseinsvorsorge und die Möglichkeit bürgerlicher Teilhabe lassen weiterhin zu wünschen übrig. Die Übergangsregierung ist ihrer Verantwortung in allen drei Bereichen nicht nachgekommen. Das zeigen, erstens, das wiederholte Wiederaufflammen von Gewalt, darunter die gewaltsame Übernahme des kurdisch dominierten Gebiets Anfang 2026, zweitens, die groß angelegten Investitionen ohne klaren Nutzen für die notleidende Bevölkerung und, drittens, die polarisierte öffentliche Debatte ohne echtes Bekenntnis zu Pluralismus und Toleranz. Die sozialen Gräben sind tief, auch innerhalb der syrischen Diaspora. Mangels Vertrauen und Sicherheit wird nur ein Teil der Syrer im Ausland bereit sein sich, über Rücküberweisungen hinaus, für ihr Heimatland zu engagieren. Die internationale Gemeinschaft sollte zu diesen besorgniserregenden Entwicklungen in der syrischen Innenpolitik nicht schweigen.

Dreißig Jahre nach Gründung der Zollunion mit der Europäischen Union (EU) sieht Ankara durch die Freihandelsabkommen der EU mit Drittstaaten, zuletzt mit Indien, wachsende wirtschaftliche Risiken. Während die Verhandlungen zum EU-Indien-Freihandels­abkommen Ende Januar abgeschlossen wurden und nun ebenfalls die Sicher­heits­kooperation zwischen der EU und Indien ausgeweitet werden soll, bleibt Ankara außen vor. Aus Sicht der Türkei könnte das Abkommen zudem ihr Gewicht im strate­gischen Kalkül der EU schwächen. Mit Nachdruck fordert Ankara daher die Modernisierung der Zollunion. Denn nicht auszuschließen ist, dass sich die struk­turellen Asymmetrien in der Zollunion zu seinen Lasten weiter verfestigen: Markt­integration ohne politische Mitgestaltung kann eine dauerhafte Benachteiligung der Türkei bedeuten und belastet ihre Beziehungen zur EU. Mit Inkrafttreten des Frei­handels­abkommens werden indische Produkte leichter auf den tür­kischen Markt gelangen, türkische Produkte aber nicht nach Indien. Aufgrund geo­politischer Diver­genzen mit Indien bestehen aus türkischer Perspektive überdies Risiken für eigene regionale Interessen. Brüssel und Berlin könnten diese Konstellation nutzen, um die Koopera­tion mit Ankara auf eine tragfähige institutionelle Grundlage zu stellen.

Die Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz zeigt: Das transatlantische „Wir" ist nicht mehr selbstverständlich. Globale Ordnung muss neu verhandelt werden. Ein Gastbeitrag von Julia Leininger.

Die Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz zeigt: Das transatlantische „Wir" ist nicht mehr selbstverständlich. Globale Ordnung muss neu verhandelt werden. Ein Gastbeitrag von Julia Leininger.

Die Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz zeigt: Das transatlantische „Wir" ist nicht mehr selbstverständlich. Globale Ordnung muss neu verhandelt werden. Ein Gastbeitrag von Julia Leininger.

Dr Sophia Clément Mavroudis, former Professor at the École de guerre of the École Militaire in Paris and at Sciences Po, provides a concise analysis of the upcoming Greece-France Defense Agreement. Scheduled to be signed in spring 2026, the agreement establishes an enhanced framework for strategic military cooperation, significantly strengthening the defense capabilities of both countries.

Read the ELIAMEP Explainer here.

Der Präsident des Europäischen Rates, António Costa, reist diese Woche zu hochrangigen Treffen nach Oslo. Der Besuch zeigt die starke Dynamik der bilateralen Beziehungen zu Norwegen, einem gleichgesinnten Land, das zu den engsten Partnern der Europäischen Union gehört.

Der Rat hat eine Richtlinie förmlich angenommen, mit der die Liste der Schadstoffe (Pestizide, Arzneimittel, PFAS u. a.), die Oberflächengewässer und Grundwasser beeinträchtigen, erweitert und aktualisiert wird.

Africa has become import-dependent for staple food cereals over the past five decades. It is an ongoing dispute if increasing import dependency in Africa is causing food security risks for its population fueled by recent increases of uncertainties around international trade caused by geopolitical tensions and global trade policy disruptions. We call for an all-African approach based on regionally coordinated domestic support policies to increase Africa’s self-sufficiency and reduce international imports. We argue that the recent trend towards self-sufficiency as the overarching goal is not a sufficient strategy to improve food security because domestic support policies distort markets, increase prices, and set wrong incentives. Trade distorting policies risk undermining the benefits of regional and international trade for food security because often only trade can provide an efficient insurance mechanism against local supply shocks. A regional policy coordination is required for country-specific policy decisions framed by an all-African trade policy framework to balance production and imports primarily at the continental level. If a food self-sufficiency approach — for political reasons — is to be pursued, it should be in a way that is less distortive of the domestic and regional markets.

Africa has become import-dependent for staple food cereals over the past five decades. It is an ongoing dispute if increasing import dependency in Africa is causing food security risks for its population fueled by recent increases of uncertainties around international trade caused by geopolitical tensions and global trade policy disruptions. We call for an all-African approach based on regionally coordinated domestic support policies to increase Africa’s self-sufficiency and reduce international imports. We argue that the recent trend towards self-sufficiency as the overarching goal is not a sufficient strategy to improve food security because domestic support policies distort markets, increase prices, and set wrong incentives. Trade distorting policies risk undermining the benefits of regional and international trade for food security because often only trade can provide an efficient insurance mechanism against local supply shocks. A regional policy coordination is required for country-specific policy decisions framed by an all-African trade policy framework to balance production and imports primarily at the continental level. If a food self-sufficiency approach — for political reasons — is to be pursued, it should be in a way that is less distortive of the domestic and regional markets.

Africa has become import-dependent for staple food cereals over the past five decades. It is an ongoing dispute if increasing import dependency in Africa is causing food security risks for its population fueled by recent increases of uncertainties around international trade caused by geopolitical tensions and global trade policy disruptions. We call for an all-African approach based on regionally coordinated domestic support policies to increase Africa’s self-sufficiency and reduce international imports. We argue that the recent trend towards self-sufficiency as the overarching goal is not a sufficient strategy to improve food security because domestic support policies distort markets, increase prices, and set wrong incentives. Trade distorting policies risk undermining the benefits of regional and international trade for food security because often only trade can provide an efficient insurance mechanism against local supply shocks. A regional policy coordination is required for country-specific policy decisions framed by an all-African trade policy framework to balance production and imports primarily at the continental level. If a food self-sufficiency approach — for political reasons — is to be pursued, it should be in a way that is less distortive of the domestic and regional markets.

There is increasing recognition that significant hidden costs associated with agrifood systems are not reflected in market prices. Coffee is among the three most traded agricultural commodities in the world and supports the livelihoods of more than 30 million smallholder households. This study quantifies the environmental and social hidden costs of coffee value chains in three countries in Eastern Africa (Ethiopia, Uganda, and Tanzania) to guide interventions to address them. We apply and refine simplified True Cost Accounting (TCA) methodologies to quantify environmental hidden costs associated with climate, soil, water, and biodiversity, as well as social hidden costs associated with child labour, gender inequality, and the living income gap. We use the marginal damage cost approach of Lord (2023) to monetize externalities and quantify significant social and environmental hidden costs that add up to USD 5–7 per kilogram of coffee. These hidden costs equal 70%–125% of the farm gate price for Arabica and about twice the farm gate price for Robusta, relative to average prices at the time of the surveys. Hidden costs associated with the living income gap constitute the largest share, particularly in Ethiopia. Large variations in hidden costs across different production systems and regions underscore the importance of detailed value chain assessments to take action to address these hidden costs.

There is increasing recognition that significant hidden costs associated with agrifood systems are not reflected in market prices. Coffee is among the three most traded agricultural commodities in the world and supports the livelihoods of more than 30 million smallholder households. This study quantifies the environmental and social hidden costs of coffee value chains in three countries in Eastern Africa (Ethiopia, Uganda, and Tanzania) to guide interventions to address them. We apply and refine simplified True Cost Accounting (TCA) methodologies to quantify environmental hidden costs associated with climate, soil, water, and biodiversity, as well as social hidden costs associated with child labour, gender inequality, and the living income gap. We use the marginal damage cost approach of Lord (2023) to monetize externalities and quantify significant social and environmental hidden costs that add up to USD 5–7 per kilogram of coffee. These hidden costs equal 70%–125% of the farm gate price for Arabica and about twice the farm gate price for Robusta, relative to average prices at the time of the surveys. Hidden costs associated with the living income gap constitute the largest share, particularly in Ethiopia. Large variations in hidden costs across different production systems and regions underscore the importance of detailed value chain assessments to take action to address these hidden costs.

There is increasing recognition that significant hidden costs associated with agrifood systems are not reflected in market prices. Coffee is among the three most traded agricultural commodities in the world and supports the livelihoods of more than 30 million smallholder households. This study quantifies the environmental and social hidden costs of coffee value chains in three countries in Eastern Africa (Ethiopia, Uganda, and Tanzania) to guide interventions to address them. We apply and refine simplified True Cost Accounting (TCA) methodologies to quantify environmental hidden costs associated with climate, soil, water, and biodiversity, as well as social hidden costs associated with child labour, gender inequality, and the living income gap. We use the marginal damage cost approach of Lord (2023) to monetize externalities and quantify significant social and environmental hidden costs that add up to USD 5–7 per kilogram of coffee. These hidden costs equal 70%–125% of the farm gate price for Arabica and about twice the farm gate price for Robusta, relative to average prices at the time of the surveys. Hidden costs associated with the living income gap constitute the largest share, particularly in Ethiopia. Large variations in hidden costs across different production systems and regions underscore the importance of detailed value chain assessments to take action to address these hidden costs.

We contribute to the understanding of household resilience to shocks by using high-frequency data collected in short spans of two to three months. We examine three issues: first, whether frequent shocks within the year affect households’ food security in short periods of two to three months. Secondly, whether Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis (RIMA II) can be used to measure the resilience capacity of households to shocks using high-frequency data, and whether the accumulation of shocks erodes this resilience. Thirdly, whether the resilience estimation using RIMA II compares closely with the subjective resilience measure. Our study reveals that (1) shocks specifically drought and theft of agriculture produce within the year affect the food security of the households, (2) RIMA-II metrics can be used to measure the resilience capacity of households with high-frequency data collected in six months duration, (3) the asset pillar is a crucial factor in ensuring the resilience of households within short periods (4) RIMA II and the subjective resilience measure are moderately comparable and each may identify different factors that constitute resilience. The results highlight the need for development and humanitarian agencies to consider supporting asset building and non-farm income-generating activities to moderate the effects of shocks on resilience.