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Plenary sessions : MEPs scrutinise how money has been spent by the European Commission and the other EU institutions and agencies in a procedure known as discharge. Over the years, the procedure has become a very important tool to check how public funds have been spent and EU projects carried out. The European Parliament has the exclusive right to approve the budget implementation of the EU institutions. On 27 April MEPs debate the discharge of the 2014 annual budget and vote on it the following day.

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Enseignant chercheur en communication à McDaniel College Budapest

Le moins que l’on puisse dire est que le marché des sous-marins en Australie a été gagné de haute lutte par l’entreprise française DCNS face aux Japonais de Mitsubishi Heavy Industries et Kawasaki Heavy Industries et à l’entreprise allemande ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS). Les Français ne partaient pourtant pas favori.

Sur le plan diplomatique, les Japonais avaient une longueur d’avance. Ce sont des riverains du Pacifique et le gain du marché par le Japon aurait permis de renforcer l’alliance trilatérale entre l’Australie, le Japon et les Etats-Unis pour faire face à la Chine. C’était la solution privilégiée du précédent gouvernement australien présidé par Tony Abbott et les Japonais ont espéré jusqu’à la fin de l’année 2014 que l’Australie opte pour des sous-marins japonais sans même qu’un appel d’offre ne soit lancé. Si ce pays a en effet libéralisé sa politique d’exportation le 1er avril 2014, il aurait éprouvé les plus grandes difficultés à transférer les technologies nécessaires à la fabrication des bateaux dans les chantiers d’Adélaïde. De plus, l’Australie a sans doute craint qu’un choix pour le Japon n’indispose trop fortement la Chine qui devient le partenaire commercial incontournable de la région, y compris en Australie.

Les Allemands pouvaient compter pour leur part sur un atout majeur : TKMS est le plus grand fabricant mondial de sous-marins conventionnels. Mais les Australiens avaient besoin d’un sous-marin qui ait une allonge plus grande que ceux fabriqués jusqu’alors par TKMS afin de pouvoir croiser jusqu’en Asie du Nord-Est. Sur le plan diplomatique, le choix allemand n’était certes pas susceptible d’effrayer la Chine, mais l’Australie avait besoin de plus qu’un fabricant de bateau, il voulait un partenaire stratégique qui ait des intérêts dans la région ce qui est le cas de la France avec notre présence en Nouvelle Calédonie et dans les Iles du Pacifique. La France conserve en effet de ce fait, même en quantité réduite, des moyens militaires dans la région.

Enfin dans cette équation australienne, il y avait également un quatrième pays qui comptait dans la décision : les Etats-Unis. Rien ne pouvait certainement se faire sans leur aval tant l’équipement en sous-marins de l’Australie joue un rôle dans l’équilibre militaire de la région. Cette implication américaine dans le choix du sous-marin japonais était symbolisée de deux manières. D’une part le système de combat qui devait équiper le sous-marin australien était nécessairement américain pour cause d’interopérabilité avec les forces américaines dans le Pacifique. D’autre part les Australiens avaient été jusqu’à nommer un ancien secrétaire d’Etat à la marine américain à la tête du panel d’experts qui avait été désigné pour évaluer les offres remises par les trois concurrents en novembre 2015. Pour cause d’alliance stratégique, on a d’ailleurs cru longtemps que les Japonais auraient gain de cause avec l’appui des Américains.
De ce fait il faut considérer le choix non seulement comme une victoire technologique et industrielle mais aussi comme une victoire diplomatique.

Sur le plan technologique et industriel, DCNS présentait tout d’abord la garantie de pouvoir développer le type de sous-marins que souhaitaient les Australiens. Celui-ci, plus gros que les sous-marins conventionnels fabriqués habituellement par DCNS, sera dérivé du sous-marin d’attaque fabriqué à l’heure actuelle pour la marine française. La différence majeure viendra du fait que le sous-marin australien aura une propulsion classique diesel/électrique et non une propulsion nucléaire comme le Barracuda français.

En second lieu, DCNS est habitué désormais à gérer des contrats importants de ventes de sous-marins comprenant la fabrication sur place et des transferts de technologie. C’est le cas des ventes de sous-marins Scorpène à l’Inde en 2005 et au Brésil en 2009. Or la question des emplois créés en Australie a pris une importance grandissante avec le temps. Le plan de charge en chute libre du chantier local ASC devait se traduire par des suppressions d’emplois dans la région d’Adélaïde, dans le Sud de l’Australie. Cette question était devenue un enjeu de campagne électorale en Australie avant les élections anticipée au mois de juillet de cette année et il était important pour le Premier ministre Malcolm Turnbull de communiquer rapidement et de manière positive sur ce sujet. C’est ce facteur qui a d’ailleurs desservi les Japonais dans la dernière ligne droite. Ces derniers avaient fait l’objet d’une campagne de presse très négative de la part des élus locaux du Sud de l’Australie et de la presse australienne, les Japonais ayant annoncé à l’origine qu’ils fabriqueraient les sous-marins destinés à l’Australie au Japon. Sur ce plan, DCNS a donc pu donner toute garantie quant à sa capacité à travailler avec les entreprises australiennes qui seront impliquées dans la fabrication du sous-marin.

Enfin, c’est une victoire diplomatique pour la France. Pour ce type de contrat très important il est en effet impossible de l’emporter sans une implication diplomatique forte. Le Premier ministre japonais Shinzo Abe et la chancelière allemande Angela Merkel l’ont d’ailleurs fait mais sans succès. La France a peut-être su profiter d’une relative discrétion à ce niveau, préférant agir sans grande déclaration médiatique, en s’appuyant sur son bon positionnement diplomatique. La France est un acteur stratégique de la région, contrairement à l’Allemagne, mais elle n’est pas marquée aussi fortement que le Japon dans son opposition à la Chine ce qui pouvait rassurer les Australiens. La France a également sans doute profité de la bonne relation stratégique qui s’est nouée avec les Etats-Unis ces dernières années. Car si la décision ne se prenait pas à Washington, les Américains pouvaient en revanche certainement s’opposer à un choix qui n’aurait pas conduit à un renforcement de l’alliance stratégique dans la région.

Les conséquences de de contrat sont multiples. Tout d’abord, il va se traduire par un nombre important d’emplois en France : 4000 pour les six prochaines années selon DCNS. En second lieu, le phénomène the winner take all pourrait s’imposer. La concurrence est féroce sur le marché de l’exportation des sous-marins et la perte du contrat australien est une mauvaise nouvelle pour l’entreprise allemande TKMS. Ce choix peut donc être aussi l’occasion de relancer un processus de consolidation de l’industrie navale militaire européenne qui s’imposera de toute manière avec le temps.

A Jog és Igazságosság pártja meg akarja semmisíteni az alkotmányossági rendet.

Megújulnak a maláj Hawkok.

Le Shortfin Barracuda de DCNS a été retenu pour équiper la marine australienne. Peut-être autant
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King Felipe, left, meets with Mariano Rajoy during coalition negotiations earlier this year

It’s been four months since Spanish voters went to the polls and delivered a result so inconclusive that most political observers – including incumbent prime minister Mariano Rajoy himself – have been predicting another round of elections almost since the results were first counted. Unless King Felipe can pull a rabbit out of the hat today when he meets the heads of the four largest parties for a final time, Spaniards are likely to head to the polls again on June 26 to have another try.

Would another election change anything? Recent opinion polls show that Mr Rajoy’s centre-right Popular party may gain a little more than the 28.7 per cent it won in December, and the second-place Socialists would lose a bit on their 22 per cent take. But the numbers have held pretty steady throughout the four-month drama. Which would suggest that the parties should hunker down and find a coalition that works rather than risk a repeat. But several hurdles have prevented any agreement, particularly within the Socialists and the far-left Podemos insurgent party.

The Socialists have resisted Mr Rajoy’s repeated entreaties to form a grand coalition, and one only need to look at what happened to the centre-left Pasok party in Greece to understand why: joining in a grand coalition in Athens led by the centre-right allowed far-left Syriza to claim the mantle of the left from Pasok, and the Spanish Socialists are deathly afraid of Podemos repeating the feat in Madrid. But Podemos has been equally resistant, blowing up the only long-shot coalition attempt that was seriously tried during the talks – a Socialist-led government with Podemos and the upstart centrist Ciudadanos party joining in – when its membership voted overwhelmingly to reject it earlier this month.

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On 17 December 2015, in Skhirat, Morocco, the representatives of the Congress of Tripoli and of Tobruk Chamber signed an agreement for the formation of the Government of National Accord, under the aegis of the United Nations. After the fall of Muammar Gaddafi, two fundamental consequences resulted from political instability in Libya: the spread of the groups belonging to the Islamic State and the increase of migrant flows in the central Mediterranean. The International Organization for Migration estimates that 6,021 migrants and refugees arrived in Italy since 14 February 2016. The Organization also states that these numbers will increase during the coming days. In recent times, much attention has been devoted to the migration crisis in the eastern part of the Mediterranean, but the migration flows in central Mediterranean raise concerns for the European Union again. This article aims to analyze the European policies in the central Mediterranean, the relations with the Libyan government, and the Council conclusions of 18 and 19 April 2016.

In 2011, the Resolution 2009 of the UN Security Council (SC) established to set up a support mission in Libya (UNSMIL), at the request of the Libyan authorities following six months of armed conflict to support the country’s new transitional authorities in their post-conflict efforts. All UN activities for the Libyan people were guided by the principle of national ownership. The mandate of UNSMIL was to help and support transitional authorities in:

• Restoring public security and promoting the rule of law;
• Beginning an inclusive political dialogue, promoting national reconciliation and the establishment of decision-making and electoral process;
• Extending State authority through the strengthening of the emerging institutions and restoring public services;
• Promoting human rights, particularly those of vulnerable groups, and supporting the judiciary transitional process;
• Starting the economic and financial recovery.

The Mission is overseen by the United Nations’ Department of Political Affairs, which provides guidance and operational assistance. Since 2011, following UN policy, the EU has kept assisting Libya in its efforts to establish a democratic, stable and prosperous State. This effort has involved the promotion of democratic transition based on an inclusive constitution, the emergence of strong, transparent and accountable institutions, and support to an alert civil society and a vibrant private sector. On 22 May 2013, the Council of the European Union gave the green light to EUBAM Libya, a civilian Mission under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), to support the Libyan authorities in improving and developing the security of the country’s borders. This civilian mission responds to a request issued by Libya and it is part of the EU’s comprehensive approach, which upholds the Libyan post-conflict reconstruction. The EU’s total programme in Libya now stands at 108 million euro. It focuses on public administration, security, democratic transition, civil society, health, vocational training and education. This comes in addition to the 80 million euro disbursed for humanitarian assistance during the 2011 revolution. Nevertheless, the internal clashes in Libya have resulted in a reduction of border controls. According to data provided by the Ministry of the Interior of the Italian Republic, 42.925 migrants arrived in Italy in 2013, 170.100 in 2014, and 153.842 in 2015. Indeed, the civil wars in the heart of Central Africa, the expansion of terrorist groups linked to ISIL, and persistent poverty caused the displacement of thousands of migrants to Libya: a state with few controls on the southern border, representing a direct channel to the Mediterranean.

The Italian Migration Compact

On 30 March 2016, the government recognized by the UN took office. The Chair of the Presidential Council, Fayez al-Sarraj, has promised that he will work to unite the institutions of the Libyan state. Furthermore, he announced the implementation of a package of urgent measures aimed at alleviating the suffering of the citizens and at boosting the achievement of the national reconciliation. However, three different government units are still active in Libya. The governments based in Tobruk and Tripoli are not officially recognized by the UN as the legitimate representatives of the Libyan people, whereas the government led by al Serraj enjoys the support of the United Nations. On 23 April 2015, the European Council re-launched the Union’s initiative to mobilize all efforts to prevent further loss of lives at sea, to tackle the root causes of the human emergency in the Mediterranean and to fight human smugglers and traffickers, all that in cooperation with the countries of origin and transit. On 18 May 2015, the Council approved the Crisis Management Concept for a military CSDP operation to disrupt the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean. As a result, and as part of the European Union’s Comprehensive Approach, on 22 June 2015 the EU launched a European Union military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED). The aim of this military operation was to undertake systematic efforts to identify, capture and dispose of vessels as well as enabling assets used or suspected of being used by migrant smugglers or traffickers.

Notwithstanding that, the flows are accelerating: in 2016 on the Italian coast arrived 14,493 migrants, a strong increase compared to the same period of last year. The closure of the Balkan route and the recent agreement UE-Turkey about migrants threaten to increase the migration flows in Central Mediterranean, i.e. the sea route from Libya to South Italy. According to the latest data of the Italian Interior Ministry, the migrants arrived between 1 January and 24 March 2016 were 14,493. Landings increased by 43% in relation to the same period in 2015. According to Interior Ministry, migrants come mainly from Nigeria (2,426), Gambia (1948), Senegal (1373), Ivory Coast, and Mali. The first three arrival ports are those of Pozzallo (3344), Augsburg (3043), and Lampedusa (2655).

For this reason, on April 16, the Italian government announced the «Migration Compact». For the Italian authorities the Migration Compact is essentially an action plan to slow down migration flows, acting at the economic and political level targeting the country from where migrants leave the continent to cross the Mediterranean sea. The Migration Compact provides:

• investment projects in the social sectors and infrastructure in the countries from where the boats leave, like Tunisia and Libya;
• the establishment of EU-Africa bond to help the financial markets;
• the common border control and cooperation in the fight against crime and traffickers, in addition with the prolongation of the existing Med-Eunavfor mission;
• the cooperation between the judiciary;
• the establishment of programs of migrants integration within the labour market in the arrival country;
• compensation system reserved to countries that cooperate in giving asylum to refugees with the help of UNHCR.

The implementation of the Migration Compact must go through the necessary permission of Libya and only at its request, even if Fayez al-Serraj has already informally accepted the proposition.

The EU foreign affairs Council decision

On 18-19 April, in Luxembourg, the Council discussed the EU’s activities related to the external aspects of migration, and it stressed the need to concentrate on both the Eastern and the Central Mediterranean routes. It reviewed the EU measures and initiatives taken on the Central Mediterranean route. The Ministers underlined actions on the fight against traffickers and smugglers, notably with the EU naval operation “EUNAVFOR med Sophia”, the EU support to Africa through the Emergency Trust Fund, the launch of a series of comprehensive high level dialogues on migration with African countries. According to Federica Mogherini, the EU High Representative a possible civilian CSDP mission could support Libyan efforts upon request of and following consultations with the Libyans. This kind of mission would inter alia offer them EU advice and capacity-building in the fields of police and criminal justice, especially with regard to counter-terrorism, border management, countering irregular migration, smuggling of migrants and trafficking of human beings. In the Council conclusions on Libya, we find the three major following points:

• EU reiterates its commitment to fully provide a package of immediate and substantial measures in support of the GNA and the Libyan people, totalling €100m in a number of different areas, to be defined and prioritised in close cooperation with the GNA and in coordination with UNSMIL;
• EU will ensure that its contribution will respond to the requests and needs of the Libyan authorities guaranteeing full Libyan ownership, and will be coordinated and coherent with other international kind of support under the overall coordination of UNSMIL;
• Finally, EU stands ready to support the GNA in managing migration and asylum, in close coordination with UNHCR and IOM, taking into account the outcomes of the Valletta Summit.

During a joint meeting with their counterparts in defence, the foreign ministers spoke in a videoconference to Libya’s Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj. The High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, said that al-Sarraj had underlined a number of sensitive issues: among those, migration, security, the fight against Daesh, the need to rebuild the state, the support to local authorities, humanitarian aid, economic recovery and social conditions. She added that her teams would work immediately on implementing some of these elements, but she did not give a detailed program. The EU foreign ministers confirmed the EU’s commitment to implementing a series of immediate and substantial measures for €100 million. Elsewhere, Mogherini announced the disbursement of €3.8 million in humanitarian aid through the Facility for Stability, under the aegis of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

The European Union has concentrated its efforts mainly on the eastern front, bowing to Turkish claims in order to implement an approach based on the control of migration numbers, and less on the political solution to the deep causes. Until now, the exchange of information with Libya seems politically productive: at least in its intention, the European program wants to intervene both in the Libyan structures, and in the migrants’ origin countries. The EU approach in Libya seems more comprehensive than the approach used in Turkey, but it is true that we must underline the necessary differences between the causes of Syria’s crisis and the Libyan instability. The events of the next few months will tell us which of the two approaches will produce the most comprehensive results. Or perhaps even the Council knows, and knew, which of the two can work.

Maria Elena Argano

For further information:

 

• EEAS Site, EUNAVFOR MED operation SOPHIA: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eunavfor-med/index_en.htm
• Ministero degli interni della Repubblica italiana, “Trend Sbarchi”: http://www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/trend_sbrachi_migranti_2013-2014-2015.pdf
• EEAS Site, EU relations with Libya: http://eeas.europa.eu/libya/index_en.htm
• UN Site, United Nations missions support mission in Libya: https://unsmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3543&language=en-US
• Istituto Mediterrano di Studi Internazionali Site, Libia: nasce il governo di unità nazionale: http://imesipalermo.blogspot.be/search?updated-min=2015-01-01T00:00:00-08:00&updated-max=2016-01-01T00:00:00-08:00&max-results=50
• European Council Site, Foreign Affair Council: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2016/04/18-19/
• European Council Site, Council Conclusions on Libya: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/04/18-fac-libya-conclusions/
• La Repubblica Site, Libia, premier Serraj arriva a Tripoli: « Uniamoci contro l’Is ». Scontri nella capitale : http://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2016/03/30/news/libia_premier_serray_con_il_governo_e_a_tripoli-136556408/
• Notizie Geopolitiche Site, Mogherini presenterà lunedi il Migration Compact per fermare i flussi in arrivo dalla Libia: http://www.notiziegeopolitiche.net/?p=62321
• La Repubblica Site, Migranti è già record di sbarchi: http://www.repubblica.it/solidarieta/immigrazione/2016/03/24/news/sbarchi-136216489/?refresh_ce

 

 

Classé dans:Accords et politiques de coopération, Conditions d'accueil des migrants et réfugiés, DROITS FONDAMENTAUX, Immigration légale, Lutte contre l'immigration illégale, MIGRATIONS ET ASILE, Protection des minorités, RELATIONS EXTERIEURES

Le holding bancaire Atlas Mara annonce un résultat net de 11,3 millions de dollars, contre une perte pro-forma de 47,8 millions en 2014. Il évoque aussi une possible combinaison avec le consortium qui tente de racheter Barclays Africa.

Cet article Atlas Mara annonce ses premiers profits et s’exprime sur Barclays Africa est apparu en premier sur JeuneAfrique.com.

Entwicklungstrends in der US-Verteidigungspolitik und die Folgen für Europa

The latest edition of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies was recently been published and is available online.  This is a special issue focusing on the Ukraine crisis and Sub-State and Non-State Actors, guest edited by Dr Emmanuel Karagiannis and Dr Tracey German, both of King’s College London. The introduction is free to access and explains that ‘there has been a change in the distribution of power throughout the international system with the emergence of a range of non-state actors who are threatening to fundamentally alter the basis of traditional state-based power.’

The issue features pieces looking at this issue from a variety of angles, including articles on ‘ideas, political-social norms and emotions as mobilization mechanisms,’ ‘hybrid civil Society in Ukraine,’ ‘the outcomes of using non-state actors in civil conflicts’ and ‘Paramilitary motivation in Ukraine.’ A number of the articles are free to access as well for a limited time.

You can find more information here.

L’ancienne base aérienne de Varennes-sur-Allier, qui avait fermé ses portes en août, va accueillir sept entreprises et créer des emplois dans le cadre de sa reconversion. « Une entreprise, installée depuis un an, NSE, devrait compter à terme une trentaine d’emplois. Les sept entreprises qui vont arriver dans les prochains mois ont des activités dans la ...

Le groupe français DCNS a remporté un mégacontrat estimé à 34 milliards d’euros en vue de la construction de sous-marins australiens. Le Premier ministre australien Malcolm Turnbull a annoncé mardi lors d’une conférence de presse l’issue d’un processus d’appel d’offres de plusieurs années, après en avoir informé le président français François Hollande. Lire la suite ...

Créé à l’été 2016, le 5e régiment de dragons (5e RD) est un régiment préfigurateur SCORPION. Concrètement, sa densification vise à en faire une unité des forces avec des objectifs et moyens particuliers. Ses missions seront les mêmes que celles des autres régiments de cavalerie, auxquelles viendront s’ajouter celles de l’évaluation SCORPION.