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Le 23 juin, les Britanniques se prononceront par référendum pour ou contre le maintien du Royaume-Uni dans l'Union européenne. Que se passera-t-il s'ils décident de la quitter ? La série "Avec un Brexit..." invite des spécialistes à expliquer, nuancer ou invalider les pronostics les plus courants sur ce sujet.

Cette recension d’ouvrage est issue de Politique étrangère (1/2016). Yves Gounin propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Jean-Yves Camus et Nicolas Lebourg, Les droites extrêmes en Europe (Paris, Seuil, 2015, 320 pages).

Les « droites extrêmes » se caractérisent par leur diversité, justifiant largement l’usage du pluriel de préférence au singulier « extrême droite ». Elles se caractérisent aussi par leur plasticité intellectuelle (dont témoigne par exemple le nazi-maoïsme d’un Franco Freda) qui s’accommode mal d’être réduite à « un point ultime de l’axe linéaire droite-gauche ». Cela ne signifie pas qu’on ne puisse leur rechercher des caractéristiques communes. La première est l’organicisme, c’est-à-dire      « l’idée que la société fonctionne comme un être vivant ». Comme un être vivant, la société doit être défendue contre ce qui la menace (l’altérophobie, qui se décline selon les lieux et les époques en antisémitisme ou en islamophobie), et rassemblée autour de ce qui la constitue (l’autophilie, déclinée en suprématisme raciste ou en intégrisme religieux). Autre caractéristique : le sentiment de faire partie du camp des laissés-pour-compte (vaincus de la Révolution française, des Trente Glorieuses, de la chute du Mur, de la mondialisation…), et le désir de laver cette injustice. Au-delà de ces caractéristiques communes, les droites extrêmes peuvent se diviser en deux catégories. D’un côté les    « nationaux » conservateurs et réactionnaires, qui inscrivent leur action dans le jeu démocratique. De l’autre, les « nationalistes » révolutionnaires, plus jeunes et plus violents, résolument antisystème.

Suivant une approche historique, les auteurs distinguent depuis 1945 quatre vagues de partis extrémistes de droite, qui se sont stratifiées au fil du temps. La première vague, néofasciste, entre 1945 et 1955, se caractérise par sa proximité vis-à-vis des idéologies totalitaires des années 1930. Le MSI italien et le NPD allemand en sont issus. La deuxième correspond à une radicalisation des classes moyennes. C’est le poujadisme en France, ou les mouvements intégristes hostiles à Vatican II (l’Œuvre française, la Fraternité sacerdotale Saint-Pie X). Arrivent ensuite, avec la crise, les mouvements nationaux-populistes tels que le FPÖ autrichien, la Lega Nord italienne ou le Vlaams Blok flamand. La quatrième vague, depuis 2000, a fait de la lutte contre l’immigration son cheval de bataille : le PVV de Geert Wilders aux Pays-Bas, Aube dorée en Grèce, Jobbik en Hongrie, PEGIDA en Allemagne…

Le Front national est en France un parti « attrape-tout », qui a su fédérer tous ces mécontentements. Avec Marine Le Pen, il s’est dédiabolisé en écartant les fascistes les plus enragés, et déringardisé en marginalisant les catholiques intégristes. Il prospère avec la crise économique, la montée du chômage et la peur du déclassement. Mais son succès n’est pas réductible aux seuls facteurs économiques. Le serait-il, on ne comprendrait pas les différences entre des pays qui ont tous été frappés par la crise. Pourquoi l’Espagne, où le taux de chômage frise les 25 %, ne connaît-elle pas de droite extrême ? L’explication est historique : l’extrême droite y est durablement décrédibilisée par les longues années du franquisme. Mais l’explication est aussi politique : l’extrême droite se développe là où les partis de gouvernement échouent. Terrible conclusion pour la droite et la gauche françaises.

Yves Gounin

S’abonner à Politique étrangère.

A rendkívüli körülmények esetén végzett ideiglenes belső határellenőrzés fenntartását lehetővé tevő ajánlást a Tanács 2016. május 12-én elfogadott végrehajtási határozata tartalmazza.

Az ajánlás elfogadásának napjától Ausztriának, Németországnak, Dániának, Svédországnak és Norvégiának legfeljebb hat hónapos időtartamon át továbbra is ajánlott arányos ideiglenes határellenőrzést fenntartania a következő belső határokon:

• Ausztria az osztrák–magyar és az osztrák–szlovén szárazföldi határon
• Németország a német–osztrák szárazföldi határon
• Dánia a Németországba kompjáratokat üzemeltető dán kikötőkben és a dán–német szárazföldi határon
• Svédország a déli és nyugati rendőrségi körzetben található svéd kikötőkben és az Öresund hídon
• Norvégia a Dániába, Németországba és Svédországba kompjáratokat üzemeltető norvég kikötőkben

Az említett ellenőrzések bevezetését megelőzően azonban az érintett tagállamnak véleménycserét kell tartania az érintett szomszédos tagállammal (tagállamokkal) annak biztosítása érdekében, hogy a belső határellenőrzésre a belső határnak csak azokon a szakaszain kerüljön sor, ahol az a Schengeni határ-ellenőrzési kódex szerint szükségesnek és arányosnak minősül.

A határellenőrzést célzottan kell végezni, hatályát, gyakoriságát, helyét és idejét tekintve pedig szigorúan a közrendet vagy a belső biztonságot az irreguláris migránsok továbbutazása miatt fenyegető súlyos veszély kezeléséhez szükséges mértékre kell korlátozni.

Az ajánlás nem irányozza elő a légi vagy tengeri úton Görögországból érkező vagy oda induló utasok ellenőrzését.

Háttérinformációk

A 2013/1053/EU tanácsi rendelettel létrehozott schengeni értékelési mechanizmus a schengeni szabályok betartásának ellenőrzésére szolgál. Az ellenőrzést az adott tagállamba kiküldött, a Bizottság és a tagállamok által kijelölt szakértők csoportjai végzik ellenőrző látogatások keretében, melyek lehetnek előre bejelentettek vagy váratlanok is. Ezek alapján elkészül a schengeni értékelési jelentés, amelyet a tagállami szakértőkből álló schengeni értékelési bizottság is jóváhagy. Amennyiben a jelentés a schengeni vívmányok kérdéses területét illető hiányosságokat állapít meg, a Bizottság korrekciós intézkedésekre vonatkozó javaslatot nyújt be a Tanácsnak.

A Bizottság 2016. február 2-án fogadta el a Görögországra vonatkozó schengeni értékelési jelentést, majd ajánlást nyújtott be a Tanácsnak a külső határellenőrzés egyes hiányosságainak orvoslására. A Tanács 2016. február 12-én elfogadta az ajánlást és javaslatot tett Görögországnak a korrekciós intézkedésekre vonatkozóan.

Amennyiben a tanácsi ajánlás elfogadása után három hónappal továbbra is súlyos hiányosságok mutatkoznak és az addigi intézkedések elégtelennek bizonyulnak, a Bizottság elindíthatja a Schengeni határ-ellenőrzési kódex 29. cikke szerinti eljárást.

E cikk értelmében a Bizottság végső esetben javasolhatja a határellenőrzés visszaállítását egy vagy több tagállam határának teljes hosszán vagy egy részén. A javaslatot a Bizottság a Tanácsnak nyújtja be, amely azt minősített többséggel fogadhatja el. A belső határellenőrzést legfeljebb hat hónapos időszakra lehet visszaállítani. Ez az időszak további hat hónapos időszakokkal meghosszabbítható összesen legfeljebb kétéves időtartamra.

Görögország, annak ellenére, hogy jelentős haladást ért el, a három hónapos határidő elteltével nem tudta az értékelésben megállapított súlyos hiányosságok mindegyikét megfelelő módon és teljes mértékben megszüntetni. A Bizottság ezért 2016. május 4-én úgy vélte, hogy a Schengeni határ-ellenőrzési kódex 29. cikke szerinti körülmények továbbra is fennállnak, így ajánlást nyújtott be a Tanácsnak az öt schengeni tagállam által bevezetett ideiglenes belső határellenőrzések meghosszabbítására vonatkozóan.

How Rwanda is becoming a magnet for high-tech investment.

The US has deployed the first ground missile defense system in Romania. Russian officials said that such actions violate strategic stability and may lead to even more serious challenges in the region. Russia will increase spending on next-generation technologies. NATO officials continue saying that the BMD Aegis Ashore system is no threat to Russia

General : More than half of young Europeans aged 16-30 feel marginalised in their own country due to the economic crisis, but few want to move abroad because of it, finds the latest Eurobarometer poll, commissioned by the European Parliament and published on Friday. Nevertheless, for almost all respondents it is important to learn about the EU and how its institutions work.

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

The West’s current focus on the refugee crisis in Europe obscures the larger truths of a global crisis of displacement that endangers the international order. This is a crisis largely born out of war, and one that will be with us for decades to come. Understanding this reality is essential if Europe is to mount an effective response.

A un peu plus d'un mois de l'échéance du référendum sur le maintien du Royaume-Uni dans l'Union européenne, les prises de paroles des différents acteurs de la vie économique et monétaire britannique font grand bruit. La Banque d'Angleterre vient de lancer un avertissement sur les dangers d'un Brexit, tandis qu'à la City, le cœur financier de Londres, on navigue entre catastrophisme et pragmatisme.

In Zeiten großer Instabilität in mehreren Regionen Afrikas und anhaltender Migrationsströme sind gute Beziehungen zwischen Europa und Afrika wichtiger denn je. Vor dem Hintergrund anstehender Verhandlungen über ein Folgeabkommen zwischen der EU und der Afrika-Karibik-Pazifik-Gruppe (AKP) nach 2020 luden Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung und Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung gemeinsam mit dem Europäischen Netzwerk Politischer Stiftungen (ENoP) am 2. und 3. Mai 2016 zu einem Austausch in Brüssel ein.

Le 09 mai 2016 plusieurs missions ont mobilisé l’ensemble des aéronefs de la base aérienne projetée en Jordanie (BAP), aboutissant à la destruction d’une demi-douzaine d’objectifs. Lors de cette journée les huit Mirage 2000D et l’Atlantique 2 stationnés sur la BAP ont été engagés dans des missions de bombardement au-dessus de l’Irak.

Le 28 mai prochain marquera le lancement de la saison 2016 des meetings de l’air avec, pour commencer, le meeting du centenaire de la base aérienne 110 de Creil.

Plenáris ülés : Az Europol hatékonyabban tud fellépni a terrorizmus, kiberbűnözés és egyéb súlyos bűncselekmények ellen azoknak az új szabályoknak köszönhetően, amelyeket a szerdai strasbourgi plenáris ülésen fogadott el a Parlament. Az EP-képviselők egy plenáris vitán kifejtették, hogy a dublini rendszert fel kell váltani egy tagállami szolidaritáson alapuló hatékony menekültügyi rendszerrel, valamint hangot adtak aggodalmuknak a török vízumliberalizáció kapcsán. Összefoglaló a plenáris fontosabb témáiról.

Forrás : © Európai Unió, 2016 - EP

Civil wars and other armed conflicts within states kill tens of thousands of civilians every year, destroy many more livelihoods and have forced millions of people to flee their homes over the last five years alone. For many years since the mid-1990s, armed intrastate conflicts seemed to be steadily receding, but this trend has reversed itself since 2013. For populations affected by civil war, 2014 – the year for which the most recent data is available – was deadlier than any year since the Rwandan genocide in 1994.
Most violent conflicts today are recurrences of previous wars. Thus, besides ending ongoing violence, preventing wars from breaking out again is one of the major challenges the world faces today. Since the 1990s, this has been the exact objective of peacebuilding activities. But how successful are efforts to stabilise peace after armed conflict really? And what can be done to make them more effective?
Summarising a broad range of empirical research on post-conflict peace support, this briefing paper reports which types of external engagement are known to be effective, and which ones are not. International peacebuilding efforts focus mainly on four issue areas: providing security, (re-)starting socio-economic development, advancing democratic governance and promoting transitional justice. Assessing the evidence available in each area, three messages for external actors who wish to support peace in post-conflict environments emerge most clearly.

• First, international peacekeeping missions are in many cases an effective instrument for stabilising peace after civil war, indicating that the immediate security concerns of affected populations is of utmost importance. Yet, security alone is not enough. Peacekeeping is all the more successful when it is embedded in a multidimensional approach, supporting the notion that political, economic and social concerns also need to be addressed early on if peace is to last.
• Second, supporters of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes and security sector reforms need to embrace the political character of these processes. Approaching them merely as technical issues – as outside actors often do – and turning a blind eye to the vested interests involved risks fuelling new conflicts instead of preventing them.
• Third, transitional justice is an important area of post-conflict peace consolidation – but only if it meets the interest and support of key stakeholders in the affected population: in parliament, in government and administration, and in civil society.

One-size-fits-all strategies for how to support sustainable peace after civil wars do not exist. Different types of conflicts obviously require different pathways to peace. One direction of future research should be a more systematic analysis of post-conflict contexts that are similar enough to call for similar strategies of peace support.

A választási törvény a nagy pártoknak kedvez.

Welcome to Thursday’s edition of our daily Brussels Briefing. To receive it every morning in your email in-box, sign up here.

Is Recep Tayyip Erdogan bluffing? Almost every day this week, Turkey’s president has taken a crude swipe at the “hypocritical” EU. An EU-Turkey deal that has stopped the migrant boats looks in danger. He hasn’t quite repeated his past threat to arrange Berlin-bound buses for refugees. But Mr Erdogan has cast the coming months as a historic turning point. If the EU fails to deliver billions of euros in funding and visa-free travel rights, he warns, the migration deal will die and with it Turkey’s EU orientation.

Take this extract from Mr Erdogan’s speech on Thursday, where he lashed out over EU demands that he soften terrorism laws as a condition of visa-free travel:

“They believe they have the right [to fight terrorism] but find it a luxury and unacceptable for us. Let me say it clearly – the name for this is hypocrisy. A EU that tramples on its own values and principles will be worth nothing to its members, or the world …The visa business … we sorted it, we signed it … now they come with 72 conditions. They squeeze terrorism [reforms] in there. Where did that come from? Show me where that’s in the acquis, in the visa rules …. Did they demand it when South American countries were given visa-free travel? We know very well what the reason is – don’t let anybody be fooled. We’re waiting for this union’s warped and wary attitude to Turkey to end. In the near future we will either strengthen our ties with the EU, or we will find ourselves a new path. Our preference is to build new Turkey with our European friends. We’re waiting for their response.”

Where will this end? The positive scenario you hear in Brussels and Berlin casts this all as bluster. Mr Erdogan is brashly talking up his negotiating hand, tickling nationalist sentiment at home, while aiming to bag vote-winning visa rights to propel him in his real goal: an executive presidency giving him boundless power in Turkey. These officials think his bravado hides vulnerability. Turkey’s economy has weaknesses. And failing to deliver travel rights could also hurt Mr Erdogan at the ballot box. As Jean-Claude Juncker, European Commission president, claimed: “that will be his problem.”

The EU side think a compromise is in sight if they hold their nerve.

Read more

BERICHT mit einem Vorschlag für eine Empfehlung des Europäischen Parlaments an den Rat zur 71. Tagung der Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen
Ausschuss für auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Andrey Kovatchev

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2016 - EP

Annyiba kerülne elutasítani egy menedékkérőt, mint kiadni egy Matolcsy-könyvet.

Le Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies aux droits de l'homme (HCDH) s'est déclaré vendredi très préoccupé par le sort de dizaines de manifestants qui ont été arrêtés lors d'une manifestation pacifique les 14 et 16 avril dans la capitale gambienne Banjul.

Le Conseil de sécurité a exigé vendredi que le groupe extrémiste Boko Haram s'abstienne immédiatement et sans équivoque de toute violence, de toute atteinte aux droits de l'homme et de toute violation du droit international humanitaire dans la région du bassin du lac Tchad.

The National Unity Government (NUG) has finally moved to fill the last two vacant key posts in the national cabinet, those of defence minister and head of the intelligence agency. In the climate of mistrust between its two camps, it was not easy to identify mutually acceptable candidates – and, so, the names are neither a surprise nor new. AAN senior analyst and co-director Thomas Ruttig (with input from Kate Clark, Fazal Muzhary, Ehsan Qaane, Jelena Bjelica and Christine-Felice Roehrs) looks at their biographies and the politicking around the nominations – with both candidates still needing parliament’s approval.

Five months after the resignation of the head of the country’s intelligence agency and ten months after their last pick for defence minister was rejected by parliament, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and his quasi-prime minister, Dr Abdullah, have come up with (not so) new picks for both posts. The names – Muhammad Massum Stanakzai for the National Directorate of Security (NDS) and General Abdullah Khan Habibi for Defence – were made public in two different presidential decrees during the night of 5 to 6 May 2016. The decrees also included the candidates’ immediate appointments as acting heads of the institutions they are supposed to lead, once approved by parliament.

With this, Abdullah Khan replaces Stanakzai, who has been acting as defence minister ever since the Afghan parliament denied him its vote of confidence in early July 2015. The NUG, now in its 19th month, never had a regular defence minister; its four previous candidates were either voted down or withdrew before the vote. As for the NDS, it has been led by an acting director general (its head has cabinet rank but is not called a minister), Massud Andarabi, since December 2015. His predecessor, Rahmatullah Nabil, left (or lost) his job, after he publicly criticised President Ghani’s efforts to re-engage Pakistan and re-launch peace talks with the Taleban during a trip to Islamabad.

Forward to the past

Both names come as no surprise. Stanakzai, who was the first ever civilian in a defence position (although never confirmed by parliament), had, according to Kabul’s rumour mill, long been considered the favourite candidate for the NDS job. Abdullah Khan, who is already the fifth NUG candidate for the top defence job, had already been picked once before (he was third in this line at the time) but was never officially introduced to parliament. (It is not clear why, although it might have had to do with his lacklustre mujahedin background). The fact that he has yet to be rejected might make him acceptable to the parliamentarians who, over the past years, have blocked many attempts, mainly by Ghani’s predecessor Hamed Karzai, to re-introduce candidates already voted down.

The filling of these two positions has been a recurring demand of both houses of parliament (see this AAN analysis) (both led by politicians who are close to the new quasi-opposition), but also of donor countries. Ghani is expected to attend the 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw in early July 2016, and it would cost him a degree of credibility in those circles (who, off the record, are all but uncritical about the NUG’s poor performance so far) if he, in spite of repeated promises, were to show up with those two positions still vacant. The other key positions, which were vacant for a long time, that of interior minister and attorney general, were filled in April 2016.

Abdullah Khan is not unknown. He is a career army officer who has served in every regime since that of President Najibullah (ie also under the mujahedin and Taleban regimes), posts that have culminated in his current position as director of the Afghan army’s general staff. Stanakzai, however, is the more prominent of the two. As the long-standing head of the Joint Secretariat of the High Peace Council and CEO of the Afghanistan Peace and Reconciliation Programme from 2009 to 2015, he was a key figure for the international community in its (so far futile) attempt to get peace talks with the Taleban underway. He managed to gain Ghani’s trust, even though according to a number of Afghan and international insiders he was initially suspicious of Stanakzai as a ‘Karzai man.’ But the president has obviously been convinced of Stanakzai’s qualities, to the extent that he kept him on as acting defence minister for almost a year after he was rejected by parliament. This, despite the fact that when he took office, Ghani had insisted that he wanted to run a ‘legal cabinet’ without unapproved acting ministers.

Ghani seems to have held on to Stanakzai for a number of reasons. For one, both seem to work well together – a rarity given the president’s temperament and his frequent impatience with even the highest-ranking government officials’ performances. Stanakzai also gets on well with Hanif Atmar, now in charge of what has become the overarching security agency, the National Security Council. He also, maybe equally importantly, got on well with the US commanders of both NATO’s Resolute Support mission and the US counter-terrorism mission, Freedom’s Sentinel. The US seems to have lobbied throughout 2015 to keep Stanakzai at the defence ministry. Given its large financial footprint, most certainly it will have had a say. (According to the October 2015 report of the US government’s Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (pp 75,78, 79), US funding for the Afghan security sector was over 3.2 billion dollars in 2015, totalling 68.4 billion since 2002. For 2017, 3.5 billion dollars more have been requested from US Congress.)

While he was kept on in his position, US diplomats say Stanakzai delivered on some key issues that had been long lagging in the MoD, including sending home high-ranking officers past retirement age and clarifying competencies in the ministry and in the provincial defence departments – something that had apparently not been undertaken for many years, despite massive international funding for the ANA.

Stanakzai has, incidentally, not only been appointed acting NDS chief but also adviser-minister (see presidential website in Dari here), which looks like a precautionary measure in case the Wolesi Jirga says “no” to him again. The lively twitter account of the Kabul Council of the Jamiat-e Islami party, in a hint of dissatisfaction, has already reminded its readers of Stanakzai’s last rejection by parliament. With no safety net in place, this could otherwise easily end his political career; however the adviser position would enable him to continue to serve the NUG from the second row, although with less public prestige.

Lieutenant General Abdullah Khan, whose penultimate position was chief of personnel in the ANA’s general staff, comes across as a good choice to succeed Stanakzai at the MoD. According to officials both in the National Security Council and the Resolute Support Mission, he enjoys a reputation of professionalism, attaining high marks in his military training (including in the Soviet Union), and clean hands. This was confirmed to AAN by Atiqullah Amarkhel, a former high-ranking MoD official who has worked with Abdullah Khan. Amarkhel, who is now a military analyst, had stated before:“If the government wants better war management, the institutions should be non-political and the heads of the institutions must be professional people.” With his unbroken career throughout the most diverse regimes, Abdullah Khan seems to be ‘un-political’ enough to be considered for this position – but, at the same time, might lack full-hearted political backing.

Ethnicity and politics

The nominations also continue to go against the 50:50 job distribution formula between the two NUG camps, often considered along ethnic lines: both are Pashtuns – Abdullah Khan is a Kunari and Stanakzai is a Logari. (The Ghani side mainly nominates Pashtuns, the Abdullah side mainly Tajiks – the latter has already led to protests on social media by other allies, including Hazaras and Uzbeks, who demanded to know why none of their own were being considered.)

When reviewing Stanakzai’s chances of becoming defence minister in 2015, people involved in the appointment negotiations on both sides of the NUG told AAN that the president wanted what he considered ‘loyal Pashtuns’ in all four key security positions. With Atmar in the NSC, then-NDS and Interior Minister chiefs Rahmatullah Nabil and Nur ul-Haq Ulumi (both out of their offices now) and Stanakzai acting, this had clearly been achieved. However, it came at the cost of increasing criticism that the NUG had been disregarding the role of former mujahedin leaders.

In the controversy surrounding Ulumi, the former interior minister who had been an Abdullah candidate, his political affiliations seemed to have been even more important than his ethnicity: for the former mujahedin who opposed his nomination, it appeared to be of significance that he had not only not been a mujahed (instead a former communist general), but that he was a Pashtun – despite the fact that Ulumi had been a political ally of Dr Abdullah since the 2009 election. In particular, memories of former ‘communist’ affiliations do not fade away. (The reason Abdullah introduced him was probably that he wanted a professional officer as his candidate and to show that he also nominated non-‘northerners’.) With General Jahed (a Panjshiri Tajik, mujahed and relative of the former ‘Northern Alliance’ (NA) leader, Qassim Fahim) having succeeded Ulumi in April 2016, this might have partly been rectified in their eyes. Abdullah Khan, who, according to his former colleague Amarkhel, joined Jamiat-e Islami after the collapse of Najib’s regime (a step many former communist generals took; there are also rumours that he has an ID card from Panjsher province), might still run into the same problems due to his affiliation with the former PDPA regime. Some senators during the session on 8 May 2016 already voiced their criticisms of both candidates for not having a ‘transparent background.’

Recycling the elite

That two old names came up again shows that the NUG continues to have trouble finding candidates for key positions that are acceptable to both camps. There do not seem to be many obvious, well-trained or mutually acceptable newcomers for the top positions in the security ministries, beyond the relatively limited circle who already held positions during the post-2001 period. The names of the former incumbents were brought into the discussion following the inauguration of the NUG in late 2014 and again now, including former interior and defence minister General Bismillah Muhammadi and former NDS chiefs Amrullah Saleh and Eng. Aref Sarwari – and now Stanakzai and Abdullah Khan again.

The situation has become even more difficult since many influential former mujahedin leaders, as well as those in circles close to former President Karzai, have made it one of their goals to give Ghani a hard time for appointing too many young people to influential positions. But it is also a sign of a much wider problem that the post-2001 elites – largely consisting of the 1978-96 mujahedin elite, plus a number of ‘technocrat’ newcomers, some ex-communists and a sprinkling of ex-Taleban officials – have clung to their posts, powers and privileges. This is particularly the case for the former mujahedin, who seem to believe that only those who have fought the Soviets and the Taleban are fit to govern.

It is not clear yet when the Wolesi Jirga will vote on Stanakzai and Abdullah Khan.

 

Annex: Biographic details for both candidates

Abdullah Khan Habibi 

(an official biography in Dari of Abdullah Khan Habibi can be found on the MoD website)

Abdullah Khan, as he is usually known, had already been flagged for the MoD position in 2015 but he withdrew before being introduced to the Wolesi Jirga for a vote, possibly in response to misgivings among some former mujahedin to his ‘communist’ background (despite his shift to Jamiat). A Pashtun from Sauki district of Kunar province (year of birth 1952, equivalent to the Afghan year 1331), he is a professional army career officer who was trained as an artillery officer both at the Military Academy in Kabul (graduated 1972/1351 with a bachelor’s degree) and in the Soviet Union in the late 1970s (lisans [master’s equivalent] of Military Science in 1980), all reportedly with distinction. He held different posts at the Ministry of Defence during the Najibullah, Rabbani, Taleban and Karzai governments. This included a stint as the head of the Afghan border troops under Najibullah. (The border troops were under the defence ministry then. Also, shifts between army and police are normal in Afghanistan; see also current interior minister Jahed who came from the army.)

In 1995, during Rabbani’s government, he became the head of the training and education department; he was deputy head of the same department during the Taleban regime. In the early Karzai years he initially continued to work in the same department, until in 2003 he became head of inspection at the office of the Chief of Army Staff, and then the head of information (pezhandwal) department in the same office. From 2008 to 2010, he served as a military aide for the minister of defence and in 2010 he became Commander of the 201st ANA corps, responsible for the eastern region (Nangarhar, Kunar, Nuristan, Laghman). This is also his place of origin, close to the Pakistani border, and surely one of the areas he had an eye on when heading the border police. In 2012, he returned to his former positions as the head of pezhandwal department at the office of the Chief of Army Staff. From there, in 2015, he rose to the position of Chief of Staff (rais-e arkan) where he served in this capacity until his ministerial nomination.

 

Muhammad Masum Stanakzai 

(shortened version from an earlier AAN dispatch)

Stanakzai (born in 1958) is a Pashtun from Logar province. He graduated from the communications (mukhabara) section of Kabul Military University. Later, he got a Masters degree in Philosophy of Engineering for Sustainable Development from Cambridge University. As a young man, Stanakzai served in the Afghan army for a decade, where he worked his way up, eventually attaining the rank of Colonel in Communications. No official dates are given, but this would have been during the PDPA era. At some point, he moved into NGO work in Peshawar, serving as Director of one of the largest Afghan NGOs, the Agency for Rehabilitation and Energy Conservation (AREA) (2001-2002). Stanakzai also served on the steering committee of ACBAR, the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief.

He moved into government in 2002, first as Minister of Telecommunications (2002-2004), then as an advisor on security to President Karzai. In 2009, he was appointed Head of the Joint Secretariat of the newly created High Peace Council (HPC) and its Afghanistan Peace and Reconciliation Programme (APRP) – one of the few senior officials to stay in office during the transition from Karzai to Ghani. Stanakzai was centrally involved in Karzai’s peace-making efforts, serving as his loyal ally and having contact with the Taleban. His final action in this capacity – under Ghani – appears to have been organising and “holding talks,” as it was reported in The Wall Street Journal, with three senior Taleban officials on 19 and 20 May 2015 in Urumqi, the capital of China’s western Xinjiang region.

In September 2011, Stanakzai was seriously injured in the suicide bombing that killed Burhanuddin Rabbani, the head of the HPC. He eventually recovered from his injuries, although he still walks with a cane. He returned to his job, although he was targeted in another suicide attack on 21 June 2014.