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La langue russe ne serait plus enseignée en France, affirme un internaute sur les réseaux sociaux. S'il est exact qu'en 2026, aucun poste d'enseignant de russe n'a été proposé aux concours de recrutement de l'Éducation nationale, des cours existent toujours bien au collège et au lycée.

In 2025, 13.5 million ‘zero-dose’ children did not receive vaccinations in their first year. More than half of these children live in fragile, conflict-affected or vulnerable countries, where immunization may be disrupted due to a number of factors. Credit: UNICEF

By Shuli Wong
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 22 2026 (IPS)

Despite growing up and working in vastly different geographic regions and environments — one shaped by decades of armed conflict and political instability, and the other by remote, hard-to-reach areas — both Sagal and Johao encounter children daily who have never been vaccinated. Sagal and Johao are members of UNICEF’s Global Youth Health Advisory Group, where they advance children’s health by shaping UNICEF’s strategies, policies, and campaigns, while working directly in their own countries to connect community realities to global conversations about children’s health.

Sagal, 23, lives in the Darul-Salam district in Mogadishu, Somalia, where she works as a junior doctor in maternal and child health. Sagal’s passion lies in promoting vaccine confidence, addressing health misinformation, and empowering the youth to become advocates for healthier communities, she told Inter Press Service. While global vaccine coverage is improving, Sagal describes Somalia’s situation as “still very difficult.” Somalia has one of the lowest vaccination rates due to years of conflict, and while coverage is improving, “not all children are reached equally and a child’s chance to get vaccines depends on where they live, especially in unsafe or hard-to-reach places.”

Johao, 14, lives in Ecuador’s Amazon region, where he has seen firsthand the realities of why children in rural, remote, and isolated areas struggle to get vaccinated. Johao has hands-on volunteer experience in infectious disease research and community health projects and is also a part of U-Report, GeneraciónMÁS, and FixMyFood networks in Ecuador. The biggest challenges Johao encounters when it comes to childhood vaccination campaigns, he told Inter Press Service, are “reaching communities with limited infrastructure, overcoming transportation difficulties, and ensuring that accurate information reaches families before misinformation does.” Both conflict-affected and hard-to-reach areas face their own challenges, but what is particularly difficult in remote communities is “isolation and limited access to essential services.”

The World Health Organization (WHO) defines “zero-dose” children as those who lack access to or are never reached by routine immunization services, which is measured as children who have never received their first dose of diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis (DTP). According to the annual WHO-UNICEF Estimates of National Immunization Coverage (WUENIC), 90 percent of infants globally received at least one dose of a DTP vaccine and 85 percent completed the three-dose series in 2025. However, in 2025, an estimated 13.5 million zero-dose children did not receive a single vaccine in their first year of life, and an estimated 7.3 million infants received their first DTP vaccine but dropped out before receiving their first measles dose. Globally, more than half of all zero-dose children live in fragile, conflict-affected or vulnerable countries (FCV) where immunization programs are affected by political instability, insecurity, and underfunding.

The Immunization Agenda 2030 (IA2030) Mid-Term Review, identified FCVs as “one of the greatest challenges to achieving global immunization goals.” In Somalia, Sagal explained how “most zero dose and dropout children live in places that are unsafe, far away, or completely unreachable. These children face many problems at the same time, including, no vaccines, poor nutrition, very few health services, and almost no social support.”

Sagal, 23, a Somalian junior doctor and member of the UNICEF Global Youth Health Advisory Group. Credit: UNICEF

The situation is similar in Ecuador, where Johao explained, “children who have never received vaccines often live in remote rural or Indigenous communities, where transportation is limited and access to health services can be difficult.”

UNICEF Executive Director Catherine Russell emphasized that while vaccination rates have bounced back since dropping during the COVID-19 pandemic, millions of children are still left vulnerable due to displacement, poverty and war.

“We must reach every child, and we must rebuild trust where it is fraying. No child should suffer from a disease that a simple vaccine can prevent,” said Russell.

WHO and UNICEF have identified the urgent need to counter the spread of misleading information and erosion of trust, which has led to a surge in vaccine hesitancy and anti-science sentiment. In particular, IA2030 called for tailored support in FCV settings to “promote nuanced and context-specific advocacy messaging and approaches, and foster trust through sustained community engagement.”

Aside from logistical access, there are other factors that determine people’s decisions to get vaccinations. Sagal shared that in Somalia people forgo vaccinations for a variety of reasons, including fear of vaccine side effects or rumors that vaccines cause infertility. In Ecuador, Johao detailed how some families lack clear information regarding vaccination schedules and have vaccine concerns influenced by misinformation, with these “barriers affecting their trust in and ability to access health services.”

As a member of the UNICEF Global Youth Health Advisory Group, Johao, 14, speaks to the experiences of children in Amazon communities in Ecuador. Credit: UNICEF

In FCV and hard-to-reach settings, mistrust surrounding vaccines is driven by multiple complex and multifaceted aspects, including misinformation campaigns, conspiracy theories, religious opposition, low health literacy, sociodemographic factors, and the politicization of vaccines that undermines science.

Both Sagal and Johao’s work sits at the intersection of access and trust. As members of the UNICEF Global Youth Health Advisory Group, Sagal and Johao are not only bringing vaccines to children who would otherwise be missed, but doing so in contexts where the social and political conditions that make vaccination difficult are the same conditions their communities live with every day.

When it comes to rebuilding trust and reaching children in FCV settings, youth advocates’ “presence and credibility help [them] enter spaces where formal systems cannot,” Sagal said. “Youth advocates speak the same language and come from the same communities, [so] families trust us more than big institutions.” In Somalia, she explained, youth advocates help to rebuild trust in fragile areas by “reaching other young people quickly, communicating in a natural and friendly way, fighting misinformation fast, and mobilizing communities faster than traditional actors.”

Across settings, culture, language, and traditions strongly influence health decisions. Johao noted how “vaccination messages are more effective when they are communicated respectfully and acknowledge local knowledge and beliefs.”

In order to reach the IA2030 goal and ensure vaccines reach everyone, everywhere, at every age, WHO and UNICEF have put forth four concrete actions. These actions include strengthening immunization programs in FCV settings, countering false and misleading health information to support vaccine uptake, increasing and sustaining global funding for immunization programs, and investing in stronger data and disease surveillance systems.

Sagal and Johao’s lived experiences highlight the dire need for these actions. From Sagal’s experiences, zero-dose children “need health and nutrition support delivered in ways that work in fragile and dangerous environments.” As members of the UNICEF Global Youth Health Advisory Group, Johao explained that to effectively help their communities, “we need access to reliable information, training, resources, and opportunities to work closely with health professionals and community leaders.”

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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La progression de la Chine dans l’intelligence artificielle met à l’épreuve la domination américaine et le récit de son « exceptionnalisme financier », qui alimente la bulle spéculative. Elle montre ce qu’il est possible de réaliser en combinant collaboration open source, expertise technique et stratégie industrielle. Plutôt qu’un coup de génie, cette avancée s’appuie sur les compétences d’ingénieur, des investissements raisonnés et une organisation industrielle efficace. La faiblesse de la demande intérieure chinoise signifie également qu’elle intégrera de plus en plus ses modèles et les semi-conducteurs dans sa stratégie d’exportation massive.

Dans le même temps, la Chine poursuit une ambition géopolitique. En se posant en championne de l’IA open source, le pays utilise la technologie comme levier d’influence mondiale, proposant une alternative aux systèmes propriétaires fondés sur des financements insoutenables. Ce positionnement est d’autant plus notable que l’open source est en fait omniprésent dans les technologies numériques occidentales, au point d’en constituer le socle. Pourtant, de nombreux fournisseurs américains, comme le mal-nommé OpenAI, s’en sont éloignés, emportés par l’euphorie et les excès financiers.

Les progrès actuels s’appuient sur des compétences en ingénierie partagées à l’échelle mondiale. La voie vers la compétitivité technologique reste ouverte à tout pays, y compris en Europe, à condition de soutenir une éducation scientifique ambitieuse, de donner les moyens nécessaires à ses jeunes générations et de récompenser l’innovation plutôt que l’inertie bureaucratique. Avec de la détermination, des ressources et un réalisme industriel, le rattrapage reste à portée de main.

Analyse de Rémi Bourgeot, économiste et ingénieur, chercheur associé à l’IRIS.

Course à l’innovation et stratégie open source

Depuis le « moment DeepSeek »de l’an dernier, le paysage mondial de l’IA a connu un bouleversement bien au-delà des entreprises surcotées de la Silicon Valley. Les États-Unis conservent une avance dans les modèles d’IA de pointe, qui établissent leurs standards en matière de raisonnement, de programmation et de tâches multimodales. Pourtant, l’émergence de modèles chinois comme Kimi K3 de Moonshot AI ou DeepSeek V4 a introduit une nouvelle donne, avec des performances comparables à celles des modèles américains, mais à un coût bien inférieur.

La façon dont la Chine conteste désormais la domination américaine apparaissait inattendue il y a encore quelques années, si l’on se fiait au récit de l’exceptionnalisme américain. Pourtant, cette progression devient bien plus compréhensible en se basant sur les compétences traditionnelles en mathématiques et en ingénierie. Bien que ne disposant pas des budgets colossaux des géants mondiaux, la startup française Mistral avait d’ailleurs démontré, avant même DeepSeek, qu’il était possible de développer un modèle compétitif avec une équipe alors réduite à quelques dizaines de chercheurs de haut niveau.

La concurrence chinoise bouleverse les équilibres économiques et financiers, au point de remettre en cause les valorisations stratosphériques des géants américains. Par ricochet, elle commence aussi à ébranler les fabricants de semi-conducteurs, notamment en Asie, qui bénéficient des flux financiers massifs en provenance des GAFAM, dépensant sans compter en puissance de calcul et en infrastructures.

L’avantage coût prend une dimension particulièrement convaincante à l’ère des agents IA, où les actions itératives entraînent une consommation exponentielle. Les entreprises orientent de plus en plus leurs tâches vers les modèles chinois pour réduire leurs coûts. Dans la course à l’échelle de l’IA, l’accessibilité financière devient presque aussi cruciale que la performance.

Au-delà des questions de prix, la philosophie et la stratégie politique derrière le développement de l’IA sont déterminantes. Lors de la Conférence mondiale sur l’IA à Shanghai ce mois de juillet, les dirigeants et les responsables technologiques chinois ont présenté leur pays comme le champion mondial de l’IA open source. Contrairement aux États-Unis, où les modèles propriétaires dominent désormais, la Chine présente ses avancées en IA comme ouvertes, accessibles et collaboratives, en opposition aux systèmes fermés et contrôlés par les géants de la Silicon Valley.

En proposant des outils d’IA accessibles et peu coûteux, la Chine conquiert le Sud global et bien au-delà, suivant l’idée que l’IA doit être considérée comme un bien public plutôt que comme un actif privé. Bien sûr, le diable se cache dans les détails, et il sera intéressant d’observer dans quelle mesure les entreprises et les décideurs chinois honoreront cet engagement dans le temps. Il reste frappant de constater que la Chine s’approprie officiellement une approche qui a longtemps été un pilier discret de la scène technologique occidentale, autour de Linux et au-delà. OpenAI avait d’ailleurs été lancé sur cette promesse à l’origine.

La stratégie open source de la Chine sert trois objectifs clés. Elle ébranle la domination technologique américaine en offrant une alternative viable aux systèmes propriétaires. Elle construit une nouvelle alliance technologique, en particulier parmi les pays en développement qui manquent de ressources pour des modèles coûteux. Enfin, elle pose les bases d’un écosystème technologique parallèle, réduisant la dépendance vis-à-vis des États-Unis, avec du matériel national, des plateformes de cloud alternatives, et une influence sur les normes.

Alors que les États-Unis misent sur des systèmes propriétaires et des contrôles à l’exportation pour maintenir leur avance, la Chine parie sur l’ouverture et l’accessibilité pour gagner en influence mondiale. La tentation pour les États-Unis de répondre par une interdiction de ces modèles risque de se retourner contre eux, en coupant leurs propres entreprises des avancées réalisées dans l’IA open source, y compris au niveau national dans une certaine mesure, et en laissant les utilisateurs nationaux à la merci de tarifications dépendant des fluctuations de la bulle.

Les semi-conducteurs et la bataille pour la souveraineté technologique

La révolution de l’IA ne se limite pas aux algorithmes. Elle est indissociable du matériel. Depuis 2022, les États-Unis ont progressivement interdit l’exportation vers la Chine des puces les plus avancées de NVIDIA, invoquant des raisons de sécurité nationale. Ces restrictions ont atteint leur paroxysme lorsque le département du Commerce a bloqué l’accès des ressortissants étrangers aux modèles comme Claude Fable 5 et Mythos 5, forçant leur suspension mondiale et illustrant l’impact étendu des contrôles américains à l’exportation.

La réponse chinoise a suivi une logique stratégique. Bien que la carte graphique Ascend 910B de Huawei reste en retrait par rapport aux H200 ou même H100 de NVIDIA, elle alimente désormais des avancées notables des modèles chinois. Le principal fabricant chinois de semi-conducteurs progresse, même s’il n’a pas encore accès aux techniques de lithographie de pointe (EUV) dominées par l’entreprise néerlandaise ASML. Pour accélérer son autonomie, la Chine a investi des sommes quasi illimitées et consenti des efforts massifs au profit de son industrie des semi-conducteurs, avec pour objectif que la majorité des charges de calcul en IA fonctionnent sur des puces locales d’ici quelques années.

Les restrictions américaines, destinées à contrer les ambitions chinoises, ont en réalité accéléré sa quête d’autosuffisance. Pendant ce temps, des entreprises américaines comme NVIDIA et AMD voient progressivement leur accès au lucratif marché chinois se réduire, comme l’a récemment reconnu Jensen Huang.

Cette course dans les semi-conducteurs ne concerne pas seulement la compétitivité économique, mais aussi la souveraineté technologique. Les États-Unis ont compté sur leur capacité à contrôler les flux de puces avancées pour maintenir leur avance. Mais en construisant son propre écosystème, des puces aux plateformes cloud, la Chine crée un marché parallèle où son industrie technologique peut prospérer avec de moins en moins de composants américains. Cette évolution tend vers un ordre technologique mondial de plus en plus divisé, avec des implications sur les normes, les chaînes d’approvisionnement et les alliances.

Ces stratégies rappellent celles employées par des pays européens, comme la France à l’ère gaullienne, pour rattraper les technologies américaines, jusqu’à ce qu’un changement culturel profond permette aux dépendances critiques de proliférer, aboutissant à l’impasse industrielle actuelle.

De l’IA au nouveau paysage militaro-industriel

La compétition dans les domaines de l’IA et des semi-conducteurs concerne de plus en plus la sphère militaire. Cela se manifeste dans l’essor de la guerre asymétrique, où des pays comme l’Iran ont montré comment des systèmes bon marché et produits en masse peuvent efficacement défier la supériorité militaire américaine et israélienne.

La Chine, elle aussi, tire parti de ses avancées technologiques à des fins militaires. Sa stratégie veille à ce que les percées en IA et en semi-conducteurs profitent à ses capacités de défense. Les missiles hypersoniques, les drones autonomes et les outils de cyberguerre pilotés par l’IA en sont des exemples, illustrant comment la Chine combine technologies commerciales et militaires. Cela constitue un avantage clé dans la nouvelle confrontation par blocs, où la capacité à déployer et à étendre rapidement des systèmes avancés peut déterminer l’équilibre des puissances.

Des décennies de désindustrialisation ont laissé les États-Unis et l’Europe dépendants des chaînes d’approvisionnement mondiales pour les technologies critiques, des terres rares aux semi-conducteurs avancés. Aux États-Unis, et dans une moindre mesure en Europe, les « Chips Acts » tentent de reconstruire une capacité de production nationale. Pourtant, pour l’instant, TSMC à Taïwan reste le maillon central de la chaîne d’approvisionnement mondiale en puces, rendant les clients vulnérables aux perturbations. Pendant ce temps, la capacité croissante de la Chine à produire son propre matériel, même si elle accuse encore un retard sur certains modèles américains les plus récents, lui confère un degré de résilience que les États-Unis ne possèdent pas actuellement.

La démocratisation des technologies militaires, portée par les progrès en IA, drones et missiles, signifie qu’un nombre croissant de pays peuvent défier les superpuissances militaires traditionnelles.

L’avenir de la diplomatie technologique

Alors que la compétition en matière d’IA et de semi-conducteurs s’intensifie, le Sud global émerge comme un front politique crucial. La Conférence mondiale sur l’IA à Shanghai n’a pas seulement servi de vitrine à la puissance technologique chinoise, mais aussi de scène pour sa diplomatie technologique. En se positionnant comme leader de l’IA open source, la Chine séduit les pays en développement, avides d’alternatives accessibles et abordables aux systèmes occidentaux.

Pour beaucoup, le choix entre des modèles américains coûteux et propriétaires et des alternatives chinoises open source et moins chères ne se pose pas. Les startups africaines et sud-asiatiques, par exemple, adoptent de plus en plus les modèles chinois d’IA pour des applications dans l’agriculture, la santé et la finance, où le coût et l’accessibilité sont essentiels. En offrant formation, financement et soutien infrastructurel, la Chine cultive un réseau de partenaires qui redessine progressivement le paysage technologique mondial.

La puissance internationale se jouera en grande partie sur la maîtrise de l’IA, des semi-conducteurs, de la robotique et de la production industrielle. L’Europe, en particulier, doit retrouver la culture d’ingénieur qui a porté son succès industriel d’après-guerre, avant que la bureaucratisation, les politiques industrielles manquant d’intuition scientifique, et l’importation de la crise culturelle américaine (sans ses programmes scientifiques d’excellence ni ses financements) ne l’en éloignent.

La puissance se construit aussi par la capacité des pays à proposer le récit le plus convaincant pour l’ordre technologique mondial, en dehors des tendances financières insoutenables. Le pari chinois sur l’open source en est un signal clair. Dans un ordre multipolaire, la capacité à offrir des solutions technologiques accessibles, innovantes et inclusives sera essentielle.

L’article Succès de la Chine dans l’IA : diplomatie open source et culture d’ingénieur est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

Emmanuel Macron a usé beaucoup de ministres issus de la société civile depuis son arrivée à l'Élysée en 2017. Pour la plupart d'entre eux, la vie gouvernementale et son lot d'arbitrages s'est souvent avérée délicate à gérer. Et encore plus lorsque c'est le fauteuil de ministre de la Transition écologique qu'ils occupaient, à l'image de Monique Barbut.

L’Arabie saoudite est aujourd’hui l’un des États les plus influents du Moyen-Orient. Plus grand pays de la région, puissance énergétique majeure et gardien des deux principaux lieux saints de l’islam, le royaume exerce une influence qui dépasse les frontières de la péninsule Arabique. Son poids économique, religieux et diplomatique en fait un acteur incontournable des grands dynamiques régionales et internationales.

Depuis l’arrivée au pouvoir de Mohammed ben Salmane (MBS), le pays connaît une transformation sans précédent. Vision 2030, mégaprojets futuristes, réformes économiques et sociales visent à dessiner les contours d’une nouvelle Arabie saoudite.

Mais cette modernisation affichée se heurte à une réalité plus complexe. Système politique autoritaire, répression des opposants, recours massif à la peine de mort et assassinat du journaliste Jamal Khashoggi en 2018 rappellent que les réformes ne s’accompagnent pas d’une libéralisation politique. Par ailleurs, des fragilités structurelles demeurent : dépendance à la rente pétrolière, défi de l’emploi pour la jeunesse, mégaprojets aux coûts exorbitants et tensions régionales persistantes.

Sur la scène internationale, l’Arabie saoudite redéfinit ses alliances. Longtemps fidèle à son partenaire américain, Riyad diversifie désormais ses partenariats vers la Chine, le Pakistan et la Turquie, tout en jouant la prudence vis-à-vis des BRICS. La guerre à Gaza et la confrontation avec l’Iran ont par ailleurs compliqué ses calculs diplomatiques, entravant la perspective d’une normalisation avec Israël.

Comment s’est construit cet État au cœur de la péninsule Arabique ? Quels sont les fondements de son système politique ? Comment Riyad prépare-t-il l’après-pétrole tout en affirmant ses ambitions géopolitiques ? Retour en cartes, photos et infographies sur un géant du Golfe dont les choix façonnent aujourd’hui l’équilibre du Moyen-Orient et au-delà.

L’article L’Arabie saoudite, le royaume des ambitions | Expliquez-moi… est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

In recent years, Germany has gradually reformed the Skilled Immigration Act (FEG) to make the recruitment of workers from third countries easier. Little political atten­tion has been paid to the fact that this also entails an increased risk of exploitative working conditions – particularly since abusive practices often begin as early as the recruitment stage in the country of origin. The Federal Government should therefore complement its efforts to attract international skilled labour with an effective regu­la­tory framework for private recruitment agencies, stronger cross-border cooperation, and a more targeted use of migration-related development cooperation in key countries of origin and transit.

Russland transportiert mit seiner Schattenflotte erfolgreich sanktioniertes Öl über die Ostsee. Europa tut sich schwer damit, die Tanker aufzuhalten. Warum eigentlich?

Einen Monat nach der Vereinbarung zwischen USA und Iran gibt es fast täglich wieder Angriffe. Nina Barth über die Stimmung in den USA. Bettina Meier über die Lage in Israel. Nahost-Experte Guido Steinberg zu der Frage, wer für Frieden sorgen könnte

Cold Seas as a Distinct Category for the Operational Ordering of Maritime Domain

Against the backdrop of an Ebola disease outbreak, the new Africa Health Security (AHS) Index, released today, reveals significant gaps in critical health infrastructure despite important progress in health security capacity in recent years.

Der Konflikt in Tigray, Äthiopien, begann 2020 und forderte viele Opfer. Ein Friedensabkommen brachte keine vollständige Lösung. Afrika-Forscher Gerrit Kurtz weiß: Die Region steht vor großen Herausforderungen.

Climate mitigation and adaptation require substantial investment to advance sustainable development. In low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), mobilising such finance is particularly challenging for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) due to persistent market failures, including limited financial disclosure and weak credit-risk information. High upfront costs, uncertain returns and weak regulatory frameworks further constrain adoption of low-carbon technologies. While fiscal constraints and the capital-intensive trans­ition underscore the need for private capital, traditional bank financing is restricted by long project horizons, high risk and macroeconomic instability. Blended finance and guarantees are key instruments for mobilising private investment in LMICs. Blended finance combines concessional public resources with private or additional public capital to mitigate profitability risks, while guarantees reduce perceived risk by covering partial losses, particularly for non-commercial risks. This policy brief assesses their role in scaling SME climate finance, alongside their limitations and context-specific applicability. Evidence suggests that leverage effects, especially for blended finance, are more modest than often assumed and are context dependent; nonetheless, these instruments remain relevant for de-risking SME finance, contingent on improved design and implementation. The policy brief advances the following recommendations:

- Financial intermediaries should prioritise SMEs facing binding financing constraints that prevent projects with clear socio-economic and environ­mental benefits. Project selection should integrate financial and climate vulnerability, though assess­ment remains difficult in low-income countries (LICs). De-risking instruments should target specific constraints, with guarantees mitigating risks and blended finance supporting projects with insufficient risk-adjusted returns to attract private capital. Multilateral development banks (MDBs) and development finance institutions (DFIs) should ensure additionality, minimise concessionality and strengthen monitoring and transparency.
- MDBs and DFIs should better align donor incen­tives with effective risk-sharing and flexible finan­cing structures. Concessional senior loans dominate blended finance but have limited loss absorption, reducing effectiveness in high-risk environments. A more balanced mix, including subordinated debt, equity and guarantees, can improve risk allocation and crowd in private investors. Greater use of special purpose vehicles and off-balance-sheet structures can further expand financing capacity in fragile contexts.
- MDBs and DFIs should strengthen coordination, standardisation and local engagement. Frag­menta­tion in blended finance and guarantees increases complexity and transaction costs and deters institutional investors. Greater harmoni­sation across MDBs, DFIs and private investors would improve capital allocation and comple­mentarity, while standardised procedures and contracts would streamline project preparation and scaling in LMICs.
 Governments in LMICs should address structural constraints, with MDBs and DFIs providing com­plementary de-risking and capacity-building support. Weak investment climates, shallow finan­cial markets, poor project pipelines and weak credit information systems reduce the effective­ness of blended finance and guarantees, particu­larly in LICs. Governments should strengthen investment climates, deepen financial markets and improve SME capabilities, while MDBs and DFIs support local intermediaries and broader reforms.

Climate mitigation and adaptation require substantial investment to advance sustainable development. In low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), mobilising such finance is particularly challenging for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) due to persistent market failures, including limited financial disclosure and weak credit-risk information. High upfront costs, uncertain returns and weak regulatory frameworks further constrain adoption of low-carbon technologies. While fiscal constraints and the capital-intensive trans­ition underscore the need for private capital, traditional bank financing is restricted by long project horizons, high risk and macroeconomic instability. Blended finance and guarantees are key instruments for mobilising private investment in LMICs. Blended finance combines concessional public resources with private or additional public capital to mitigate profitability risks, while guarantees reduce perceived risk by covering partial losses, particularly for non-commercial risks. This policy brief assesses their role in scaling SME climate finance, alongside their limitations and context-specific applicability. Evidence suggests that leverage effects, especially for blended finance, are more modest than often assumed and are context dependent; nonetheless, these instruments remain relevant for de-risking SME finance, contingent on improved design and implementation. The policy brief advances the following recommendations:

- Financial intermediaries should prioritise SMEs facing binding financing constraints that prevent projects with clear socio-economic and environ­mental benefits. Project selection should integrate financial and climate vulnerability, though assess­ment remains difficult in low-income countries (LICs). De-risking instruments should target specific constraints, with guarantees mitigating risks and blended finance supporting projects with insufficient risk-adjusted returns to attract private capital. Multilateral development banks (MDBs) and development finance institutions (DFIs) should ensure additionality, minimise concessionality and strengthen monitoring and transparency.
- MDBs and DFIs should better align donor incen­tives with effective risk-sharing and flexible finan­cing structures. Concessional senior loans dominate blended finance but have limited loss absorption, reducing effectiveness in high-risk environments. A more balanced mix, including subordinated debt, equity and guarantees, can improve risk allocation and crowd in private investors. Greater use of special purpose vehicles and off-balance-sheet structures can further expand financing capacity in fragile contexts.
- MDBs and DFIs should strengthen coordination, standardisation and local engagement. Frag­menta­tion in blended finance and guarantees increases complexity and transaction costs and deters institutional investors. Greater harmoni­sation across MDBs, DFIs and private investors would improve capital allocation and comple­mentarity, while standardised procedures and contracts would streamline project preparation and scaling in LMICs.
 Governments in LMICs should address structural constraints, with MDBs and DFIs providing com­plementary de-risking and capacity-building support. Weak investment climates, shallow finan­cial markets, poor project pipelines and weak credit information systems reduce the effective­ness of blended finance and guarantees, particu­larly in LICs. Governments should strengthen investment climates, deepen financial markets and improve SME capabilities, while MDBs and DFIs support local intermediaries and broader reforms.

Climate mitigation and adaptation require substantial investment to advance sustainable development. In low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), mobilising such finance is particularly challenging for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) due to persistent market failures, including limited financial disclosure and weak credit-risk information. High upfront costs, uncertain returns and weak regulatory frameworks further constrain adoption of low-carbon technologies. While fiscal constraints and the capital-intensive trans­ition underscore the need for private capital, traditional bank financing is restricted by long project horizons, high risk and macroeconomic instability. Blended finance and guarantees are key instruments for mobilising private investment in LMICs. Blended finance combines concessional public resources with private or additional public capital to mitigate profitability risks, while guarantees reduce perceived risk by covering partial losses, particularly for non-commercial risks. This policy brief assesses their role in scaling SME climate finance, alongside their limitations and context-specific applicability. Evidence suggests that leverage effects, especially for blended finance, are more modest than often assumed and are context dependent; nonetheless, these instruments remain relevant for de-risking SME finance, contingent on improved design and implementation. The policy brief advances the following recommendations:

- Financial intermediaries should prioritise SMEs facing binding financing constraints that prevent projects with clear socio-economic and environ­mental benefits. Project selection should integrate financial and climate vulnerability, though assess­ment remains difficult in low-income countries (LICs). De-risking instruments should target specific constraints, with guarantees mitigating risks and blended finance supporting projects with insufficient risk-adjusted returns to attract private capital. Multilateral development banks (MDBs) and development finance institutions (DFIs) should ensure additionality, minimise concessionality and strengthen monitoring and transparency.
- MDBs and DFIs should better align donor incen­tives with effective risk-sharing and flexible finan­cing structures. Concessional senior loans dominate blended finance but have limited loss absorption, reducing effectiveness in high-risk environments. A more balanced mix, including subordinated debt, equity and guarantees, can improve risk allocation and crowd in private investors. Greater use of special purpose vehicles and off-balance-sheet structures can further expand financing capacity in fragile contexts.
- MDBs and DFIs should strengthen coordination, standardisation and local engagement. Frag­menta­tion in blended finance and guarantees increases complexity and transaction costs and deters institutional investors. Greater harmoni­sation across MDBs, DFIs and private investors would improve capital allocation and comple­mentarity, while standardised procedures and contracts would streamline project preparation and scaling in LMICs.
 Governments in LMICs should address structural constraints, with MDBs and DFIs providing com­plementary de-risking and capacity-building support. Weak investment climates, shallow finan­cial markets, poor project pipelines and weak credit information systems reduce the effective­ness of blended finance and guarantees, particu­larly in LICs. Governments should strengthen investment climates, deepen financial markets and improve SME capabilities, while MDBs and DFIs support local intermediaries and broader reforms.

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 22 2026 (IPS)

A proposal to restrict US visas to foreign journalists assigned to cover the US has triggered a strong protest from the New York-based Foreign Press Association (FPA).

The FPA says it is dismayed by the US administration’s proposals for restricting international press visas. The shortened duration of the press “I” visa would make it impossible for overseas press to maintain consistent coverage of the US, let alone staff a bureau.

The likely administrative backlogs and possible politically motivated visa denials fly in the face of the First Amendment in the US and challenge international media standards.

“The demand for frequent visa renewal obviates any chance that correspondents could maintain any kind of family life, let alone to develop the network of sources and resources essential for professional journalism.”

“The benefits of free press coverage stand in their own right. However, we should also point out that many essential US industries depend on international media coverage.”

Markets, education, entertainment, STEM, sports, and culture are just some examples of industries where companies and institutions could decide to relocate to more cosmopolitan and accessible countries, the FPA said.

The administration rule changes reducing the length of stay for foreign journalist (I) visas to 240 days and 90 days for Chinese journalists harm the international media’s ability to cover the United States. Journalists, who have spent years building relationships and developing a deep understanding of the U.S. economy, people, culture, and politics, would join the millions whose ability to travel to and work in the U.S. is challenged by the administration’s policies.

According to the US State Department, media (I) visas are for representatives of the foreign media, including members of the press, radio, film, and print industries. The media representative must be traveling temporarily to the United States to work in their profession. The individual may only participate in informational or educational activities, essential to the foreign media function.

Activities in the United States while on a media (I) visa must be for a media organization with a home office outside of the United States. Activities in the United States must be informational in nature and generally associated with the newsgathering process and reporting on current events.

Since at least the Second World War, the FPA pointed out, the State Department has set an example for other countries with its untrammelled welcome for the foreign press and its consistent defense of First Amendment rights. The flurry of reflexive xenophobia represented by these proposals reverses all those decades in a way that clearly does not take account of the needs of the press, nor indeed of the USA.

“Many of us can testify to the professional development of journalists from more restrictive countries like China when exposed to a more open press here, which makes it even more illogical that the proposals impose additional restrictions on Chinese media”.

“We recall that the Headquarters Treaty with the United Nations and other international bodies commits the host country, the US, to facilitate entry to press from member countries to cover the work, and cannot see any provisions to ensure that this international treaty obligation is fulfilled. Once again this suggests that these proposals were rushed through without consideration of the realities, and we can testify, with no consultation with the media affected”.

Ian Williams, President, Foreign Press Association of the USA, told Inter Press Service (IPS), “It’s worse than a crime; it’s a screw-up (mistake), as Napoleon’s general didn’t say… They have lumped journalists in with the overall category of foreigners and acted with reflexive xenophobia—perhaps exacerbated because if there’s any group they hate more than foreigners, it’s journalists.”

The proposals, he said, show no sign of intelligent appreciation of the role of journalism or journalists, and they have produced no statistics for journalists and the alleged threat to security or immigration. Their arguments and proposals are an exercise in knee-jerk prejudice, a reflex that operates without the intervention of the intellect.

“One also wonders whether they have given any thought to American interests. Whatever you think of their social utility, NYSE and NASDAQ depend on global media for international investors,” he said

Similarly, as one would expect from a bunch of Philistines with no professional experience, by bundling the media, along with educational visas, they may have muddied the waters. Higher education has a heavy dependence on foreign tuition income, and they will fight back politically and in the courts, maybe joined by the Murdoch Press, which has regularly imported reactionary talent from abroad.

“Ironically one thinks of the foreign press personalities who have come into the USA—people like Rupert Murdoch, Andrew Neill, Douglas Murray, Conrad Black, Andrew Sullivan, and Stuart Varney—and furthered the conservative cause here, but that is not who they are thinking about,” declared Williams, a former President of the UN Correspondents’ Association (UNCA).

Dr. Alon Ben-Meir, President, Institute for Humanitarian Conflict Resolution, told IPS that by conditioning a journalist’s ability to live and work in the United States on repeated, discretionary renewals, the administration is creating precisely the climate of self-censorship that the First Amendment was meant to prevent.

If a reporter knows that a critical story about the president or his allies might translate into a denied extension, the line between immigration policy and political reprisal evaporates, he said.

“This is not a hypothetical danger. The rule expressly allows the government to scrutinize the “content” a journalist is covering when deciding whether to grant an extension, opening the door to ideological filtering of who gets to report from the United States. That logic is indistinguishable from the methods long used by authoritarian regimes that the United States has historically condemned,” said Dr Ben-Meir

The proposal also creates a ready-made instrument for selective punishment of journalists from countries with which the Trump administration has tense or adversarial relations. The singling out of Chinese journalists for especially harsh 90-day limits is an explicit signal that Washington is prepared to wield visa policy as a geopolitical stick, not a neutral administrative tool, he pointed out.

Once this precedent is established, nothing prevents the administration from tightening the screw further on reporters from other states whose governments it wishes to pressure—or punish.

The result would be a two-tiered press landscape in which journalists from favored countries enjoy relative stability, while those from disfavored states face constant uncertainty and the implicit demand to “behave,” he declared.

Dr. Ben-Meir said foreign governments and international bodies, including the UN, should make it clear that undermining foreign press access in the United States will invite reciprocal restrictions on American journalists abroad—further isolating US audiences from the world.

And American citizens, who ultimately bear the cost of an information-starved public sphere, must insist that their government not abuse immigration law as a backdoor censorship tool.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Credit: Luke Dray/Stringer via Getty Images. Source IMF

By Martin Schindler, Nikola Spatafora and Andrew Tiffin
WASHINGTON DC, Jul 22 2026 (IPS)

A farmer in Kenya gets weather and planting advice on a basic phone. A teacher in Nigeria uses a chatbot to help students catch up in math. South Africa’s revenue authority uses data analytics to better target tax audits. These are not futuristic examples from Silicon Valley. They are early signs of the broader transformation that artificial intelligence (AI) could bring to sub-Saharan Africa.

AI will reshape the global economy. The question for Africa is whether it rides the wave or gets left behind.

Transformative potential

Our research shows AI’s promise, but it also points to significant risks and challenges. At current levels of preparedness, we estimate that AI will add just 0.2 percent to the region’s GDP over the next decade—little more than a rounding error. However, if countries can put the right foundations in place to accelerate adoption and extend the impact of AI beyond today’s digitally connected firms, the gains could rise to about 4 percent over the decade—nearly half a percentage point of additional growth a year.

That extra growth is critical given Africa’s vast jobs challenge. By 2030, sub-Saharan Africa will account for roughly half of new entrants into the global labor force. But the issue is not only the number of jobs needed—it is also their quality. Most workers are still in informal microenterprises or smallholder agriculture, where productivity is far below that of formal firms.

For the region, AI’s main promise is not about replacing office workers, but boosting productivity across the economy—helping informal firms manage inventory, enabling farmers to increase yields, and supporting mid-sized firms to transition to formality and export readiness.

The risk is that the opposite happens. AI adoption in sub-Saharan Africa currently lags well behind every other region. If richer economies race ahead while African firms and governments lag, the productivity gap between the region and the rest of the world will only widen.

A different reality

Aid flows have always fluctuated. But this episode stands apart.

The recent cuts are large and broadly simultaneous across countries. They are driven by donor decisions rather than changes in recipient economies. And they come at a time when traditional buffers are weaker: multilateral institutions and NGOs, which have often cushioned past declines, are themselves facing funding constraints. While non-traditional donors, such as China and the Gulf States, have grown their aid presence in the region, the magnitudes are not able to cover the reduction in traditional donors.

The cuts are also difficult to manage because they follow six years of successive shocks—including the pandemic, tighter global financial conditions, and food and energy crises—that have already eroded fiscal space.

Delivering on AI’s promise

Two priorities for AI adoption stand out.

First, countries must build the foundations for broad adoption.

AI depends on reliable electricity, affordable broadband and data infrastructure, and workers with digital skills. That means investing in power and connectivity, supporting regional data infrastructure where viable, and strengthening digital and AI literacy through education and training. Countries in Africa do not need to develop the world’s most powerful AI models. But they do need the capacity to adopt, adapt, and scale AI quickly.

Second, build trust—and scale.

AI can widen inequality if its benefits are concentrated among large firms, skilled workers, and urban hubs. It also creates risks around privacy, cybersecurity, misinformation, and dependence on foreign providers. Governments need clear and practical rules on data, competition, consumer protection, cybersecurity, and the public sector’s use of AI. Regional cooperation will also be essential. Many African economies are too small to build AI ecosystems alone. But together they can create the scale needed for infrastructure, data standards, regulation, and markets.

AI in Africa is not just a technology policy issue—it is central to the region’s growth strategy. Africa does not need to win the race to build cutting-edge AI models, but it must find ways to use AI widely, cheaply, and safely. The window is narrow. Over the next debate, Africa’s young and growing workforce will either find more productive jobs, or watch the global productivity gap widen further. The outcome will not be shaped in Silicon Valley, but in the choices made across governments, schools, farms, and firms from Dakar to Dar es Salaam.

Martin Schindler is an advisor, Nikola Spatafora is a senior economist, and Andrew Tiffin is a deputy division chief, all in the IMF’s African Department.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Tensions between Addis Ababa and the Tigray Region are gradually mounting. Mis­calculations could even trigger another large-scale war, although the parties involved may not directly seek one. Since the war in northern Ethiopia ended in November 2022, no new, stable political order has emerged. Tigray remains suspended between war and peace. Responsibility for this lies with both the Ethiopian government and its partner in peace, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Having lost power in the national government in 2018, the TPLF has yet to find a new role for itself; in­stead, it has been marked by internal power struggles and characterised by authoritarian tendencies. Conversely, the Ethiopian government has not done enough to facilitate the return of internally displaced persons and restore Tigray’s territorial integrity. A renewed outbreak of hostilities could draw in Eritrea, Sudan and other regional actors. Germany and the European Union (EU) should firmly commit to crisis prevention in order to avoid further escalation in the already tense Red Sea region.

DIW Energiewende-Monitor: Photovoltaik fällt hinter steigende Ausbauvorgaben zurück – Wärmepumpen und Elektrofahrzeuge gewinnen Marktanteile, kommen aber zu langsam voran – Strompreise zeigen wachsenden Flexibilitätsbedarf – Großbatterien wachsen Die Energiewende in Deutschland kommt weiter voran, ...

By CIVICUS
Jul 22 2026 (IPS)

 
CIVICUS discusses land grabs and environmental damage linked to a luxury coastal resort project with Eva Kushova, Director of Destination Management Organisation Albania, a civil society organisation that supports sustainable tourism in Albanian destinations, seeking to preserve culture and nature while maximising benefits for communities.

Eva Kushova

Since May, protests have rocked Albania over a luxury coastal resort project linked to US President Donald Trump’s family, to be built on protected land near Vlorë. Protests, now dubbed the ‘Flamingo Revolution’, have spread nationwide and won diaspora support, broadening into an anti-corruption movement.

What are the impacts of Albania’s foreign investment laws?

The Law on Strategic Investments was passed in 2015 to attract foreign investment and boost Albania’s economy. Its deadline has since been extended several times, most recently to 2027. In practice, it has become a vehicle for serious abuses. Unlike ordinary investment laws, it gives the state the power to expropriate private property on investors’ behalf, often at compensation well below market value. Some residents say they were forced off their land after refusing this compensation.

Despite the law’s stated purpose, only two of around 44 projects approved so far are genuinely foreign investments. Most are owned by domestic investors with close connections to the government. The system gives selected companies access to public land, beaches, forests and national assets, and grants them tax exemptions for up to 10 years. The state also pays for all the necessary infrastructure, including electricity, roads, telecommunications and water, effectively subsidising private profit. In some cases, water meant for villages has been diverted to supply resort swimming pools. Meanwhile, local communities lose beach access and remain economically marginalised.

What does the Zvërnec case reveal about how these deals are made?

The Zvërnec project, a luxury resort planned on the coast near Vlorë, in southern Albania, comprising around 10,000 accommodation units, drew international attention because of its Trump family ties, but it exposed broader governance failures. It includes a large property allegedly acquired by an internationally wanted drug trafficker under highly questionable circumstances, and there are also allegations that officials manipulated property records at the regional land registry. Many local residents claim ownership of the property, yet it was suddenly recognised as belonging to the trafficker, who then sold it to Arab investors.

This fits a wider pattern in Albania’s land governance. After communism collapsed in 1991, the law mandated redistribution of agricultural land to rural families in small parcels. Thirty-five years on, most Albanians own only limited land, while strategic investors obtain vast coastal properties through questionable transactions, controversial expropriations and alleged manipulation of property records. Property rights have remained unresolved for over 30 years, forcing people into costly court proceedings.

The secrecy around the Zvërnec deal is typical too. The public only learns about the projects once construction machinery arrives on site. News of Zvërnec, and of Sazan Island, an island off Albania’s Adriatic coast earmarked for luxury development, broke via international media in March 2024. Even now, the identity and ownership of the investors behind several of these projects remain unclear, and sites are fenced off with barbed wire. Authorities say this is in preparation for infrastructure works, fuelling further distrust.

What environmental damage have these developments caused?

The Zvërnec coastline is home to the Narta Lagoon, one of Albania’s most biodiverse areas and a critical stopover for thousands of migratory birds travelling between Africa and Europe. It was first threatened by the construction of Vlora International Airport and now by the Zvërnec resort.

The legal groundwork was laid in 2022, when the government removed thousands of hectares from protected areas, cutting total coverage by 20 per cent. In 2024, another law opened the door to construction inside protected areas, allowing for the transformation of one of Albania’s last wild coastal lagoons into a heavily urbanised area. A further law passed in 2025 extended the threat to forests and pastures elsewhere in the country.

This runs counter to Albania’s European Union (EU) membership bid, targeted for 2030. All candidate states must align their laws with EU standards across 33 negotiating chapters before joining, and chapter 27 covers environmental protection. The European Commission’s 2025 Enlargement Report raised serious concerns on this front, criticising recent legal changes for weakening environmental standards. The Bern Convention’s Standing Committee, an international body that protects European wildlife and habitats, has repeatedly asked Albania to suspend construction of Vlora International Airport inside the Pishë Poro–Narta Protected Area, which includes the lagoon, pending proper environmental assessment. So far these requests have gone unheeded. But sustained EU pressure could still force a repeal of regressive laws and the introduction of stronger protection for natural areas.

What has driven recent protests, and how has the government responded?

Protests began on 23 May in Zvërnec after the developer fenced off part of the beach with barbed wire. They intensified after footage emerged on 30 May showing private security guards beating a protester while police stood by without intervening. The movement spread to the capital, Tirana, the next day, then to other Albanian cities, Kosovo and diaspora communities abroad, becoming known as the ‘Flamingo Revolution’. Protesters have marched nightly since under the slogan ‘Albania is not for sale’, demanding the project’s cancellation and Prime Minister Edi Rama’s resignation.

What began as opposition to a single resort has broadened into a wider anti-corruption movement, with protesters citing grievances such as poor public healthcare. A nationwide protest on 10 June deliberately coincided with a national historic commemoration, joined by Albanians from the diaspora on five continents. Yet Rama has stayed defiant, arguing that the backlash has more to do with the Trump links than with the project itself.

There are encouraging signs of accountability, though. The Special Structure against Corruption and Organised Crime, an independent judicial body created in 2016, has opened an investigation into the 2024 legal changes that enabled the Zvërnec deal. Arrest warrants have been issued against around 20 businesspeople suspected of illegally obtaining land or permits linked to various projects. People hope public pressure will keep judicial investigations alive, ensuring accountability for abuses of power, environmental damage and property rights violations.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

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SEE ALSO
Albania: protesters and police clash at anti-corruption demonstrations; amendments partially decriminalising defamation criticised CIVICUS Monitor 22.Apr.2026
Albania: ‘Corruption is a serious problem, but no political force commands enough public trust to unite demands’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Gresa Hasa 13.Feb.2026
Albania: ‘Diaspora voting ensured every citizen, regardless of location, could exercise their right to vote’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Erida Skëndaj 01.Jun.2025

 

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Le Parlement a adopté mardi la loi d'urgence agricole, qui prévoit notamment le doublement des volumes de stockage d’eau à des fins agricoles d’ici 2035. Très attendu par les agriculteurs dans un contexte de sécheresse exceptionnelle, le texte suscite des inquiétudes quant à la répartition entre usagers de cette ressource stratégique. Décryptage avec Gabrielle Bouleau.