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Iran’s favorite proxy is down but not out.

And really compete with China.

Digital and artificial intelligence (AI)-based systems now shape all phases of inter­national migration – from the pre-screening of applications and profiles to border management and the integration of migrants. States, international organisations, and private providers use digital platforms, biometric systems, and algorithmic processes to manage migration in a more targeted way. At the same time, migrants themselves use digital tools to obtain information, prepare decisions, and secure access to work or support. This development is changing migration not only operationally but also structurally: It enables new forms of digital labour mobility, shifts power relations and dependencies, and embeds migration into a global data economy. For Germany and the European Union (EU), the question arises as to how digitalisation and AI can be shaped in terms of migration, foreign, and development policy so as to deliver effi­ciency gains in administration and procedures, without undermining data protection, equal treatment, and human-rights standards.

Image: Hiroshi-Mori-Stock / shutterstock.com and 内閣広報室 / Cabinet Public Affairs Office / Wiki Commons

By Ria Shibata
Mar 3 2026 (IPS)

 
Sanae Takaichi’s electoral victory in February marks a historic turning point in Japanese politics. As Japan’s first female prime minister and the leader of a commanding parliamentary majority, she represents change in both symbolic and strategic terms. Conventional wisdom long held that younger Japanese voters leaned progressive, were sceptical of assertive security policies, and disengaged from ideological nationalism. Yet a segment of digitally active youth rallied behind a politician associated with constitutional revision, expanded defence capabilities, and a more unapologetic articulation of national identity. This shift cannot be reduced to a simple conservative swing. Rather, Takaichi’s rise reflects a deeper transformation in how democratic politics is constructed in the digital age: the growing power of imagery, digital mobilisation, and algorithm-driven branding in shaping political choice—particularly among younger voters.

Takaichi’s approval ratings among voters aged 18–29 approached 90 per cent in some surveys, far surpassing those of her predecessors. Youth turnout also rose, suggesting that Japanese youth are not politically apathetic. On the contrary, they are paying attention—but the nature of that engagement has changed. Viral images, short video clips, hashtags, and aesthetic cues travelled faster and farther than policy briefings. For many younger voters, engagement began—and sometimes ended—with the visual and emotional appeal of the candidate. This pattern is not uniquely Japanese. However, the scale of its impact in this election suggests that political communication has entered a new phase in which digital imagery can shape electoral outcomes as much as—or more than—substantive debate.

A New Phase of Digital Politics in Japan

In the months leading up to the election, Takaichi’s image proliferated across social media platforms. Supporters circulated clips highlighting her confident demeanour and historic candidacy. A cultural trend sometimes described as ‘sanakatsu’ or ‘sanae-mania’ framed political support as a form of fandom participation. Hashtags multiplied. ‘Mic-drop’ moments went viral. Even personal accessories—her handbags and ballpoint pens—became symbolic conversation pieces.

Political enthusiasm has always contained emotional and symbolic elements. What is new is the speed and scale at which digital platforms amplify them. Algorithms reward content that provokes reaction—admiration, anger, excitement. A charismatic clip often outperforms a detailed explanation of fiscal reform. For younger voters raised in scroll-based media environments, political information increasingly arrives as curated snippets. Policy complexity competes with—and often loses to—aesthetic immediacy.

Post-election surveys and interviews suggested that many first-time voters struggled to articulate specific policy distinctions between parties. Instead, they cited impressions—strength, change, decisiveness, novelty—suggesting that digital engagement does not automatically translate into policy literacy. Political identity can form through repeated exposure to imagery and narrative rather than sustained examination of legislative proposals. When campaigns are optimized for shareability, they are incentivized to simplify. Nuance compresses poorly into short-form video.

The Politics of Strength in an Age of Uncertainty

Japan’s younger generation has grown up amid prolonged economic stagnation, regional insecurity, and global volatility. China’s rise, tensions over Taiwan, North Korean missile launches, and persistent wage stagnation form the backdrop of their political participation. For many, the future feels uncertain and structurally constrained.

In such an environment, Takaichi’s assertive rhetoric carried emotional resonance. Her emphasis on strengthening national defence, revisiting aspects of the postwar settlement, and making Japan “strong and rich” projected clarity rather than ambiguity. Where institutional politics can appear technocratic or slow, decisive messaging offered the voters psychological reassurance.

At the core of her appeal is a narrative of restoring a ‘strong’ Japan. Calls for constitutional revision and expanded defence capabilities are framed as steps toward recovering national self-confidence. For younger Japanese fatigued by protracted historical disputes and what some perceive as externally imposed guilt, language emphasising pride and sovereignty resonates more readily than complex historical debates. This may not signal a rejection of peace. Rather, it may reflect a generational reframing of peace itself—understood not solely as pacifism, but as deterrence, defence capability, and strategic autonomy. Messages stressing ‘sovereignty’, ‘strength’, and ‘normal country’ can circulate more effectively in shareable digital formats than nuanced and complex historical analysis.

A Global Pattern: Virtual Branding, a Democratic Crossroads

Japan’s experience mirrors a broader transformation in democratic politics: the rise of virtual branding as the central organizing principle of electoral strategy. In earlier eras, campaigns revolved around party platforms and televised debates. Today, strategy increasingly begins with platform optimization. Campaigns are designed not only to persuade, but to perform within algorithmic systems. The guiding question is no longer only “What policies do we stand for?” but “What content travels?”

The election of Donald Trump in the United States illustrated how virtual media strategy can reshape political competition. Memorable slogans and emotionally charged posts dominated attention cycles, often eclipsing policy detail. Scholars have described this as “attention economics in action”: the candidate who captures digital attention shapes political reality before formal debate even begins. More recently, figures such as Zohran Mamdani have demonstrated how youth-centered digital branding can mobilize support with remarkable speed. Campaigns became participatory; supporters did not merely consume messaging but actively distributed political identity.

Takaichi’s recent victory reflects the evolving mechanics of digital democracy. Her leadership will ultimately be judged not by imagery but by governance — by whether her policies deliver economic stability, regional security, and social cohesion. The broader question, however, transcends any single administration. It means political decisions have migrated into digital environments optimised for speed and visual communication. In an age where images travel faster than ideas, democratic choice risks being guided more by what is seen than by what is discussed. In such an environment, political campaigns will be forced to adapt, and produce content that performs well within these algorithmic constraints. Over time, this may reshape voter expectations and politics will begin to resemble influencer culture. Campaigns that fail to master digital branding risk will appear outdated. Those that succeed can mobilize youth at scale.

Democracy has always balanced emotion and reason. The challenge today is ensuring that emotion does not eclipse reason entirely. The future of informed citizenship may depend on restoring that balance. This does not suggest that previous eras were immune to personality politics. What has changed is the proportion. The digital environment magnifies symbolic cues and compresses policy discussion. If democracies wish to maintain robust deliberation, they must consciously rebalance image and substance. This requires civic education focused on media literacy, virtual platform incentives that elevate substantive debate and political leadership willing to engage in depth, not just virality. And the responsibility is collective—voters, educators, media institutions, and candidates alike. The question facing democracies is whether this transformation can coexist with substantive deliberation or whether branding will increasingly overtake it.

Related articles:
Japan Stumbles: The Taiwan Fiasco
The New Takaichi Administration: Confronting Harsh Realities on the International Stage
Middle Powers After Davos

Ria Shibata is currently a Senior Research Fellow at the New Zealand Centre for Global Studies, and the Toda Peace Institute in Japan. She also serves as a Visiting Scholar at the University of Auckland. Her research focuses on identity-driven conflicts, reconciliation, nationalism and the role of historical memory in shaping interstate relations and regional stability in Northeast Asia.

This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from the original with their permission.

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Les commerçants et entrepreneurs de la ville de Kabinda, dans la province de Lomami, se disent prêts à s'acquitter de leurs obligations fiscales, mais exigent en contrepartie, une amélioration visible des services publics et des infrastructures de base.

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IPI, together with the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations, co-hosted a public discussion on “Peace Operations and Peacebuilding: Supporting Effective UN Transitions for Sustaining Peace” on March 3rd.

Mission transitions represent an important opportunity for the UN to reconfigure its presence and strategy to support peacebuilding objectives, as articulated in Resolution 2594, adopted unanimously in 2021. Well-planned and integrated transition processes that place peacebuilding at the center require strong coordination and coherence between host governments, missions, resident coordinators, country teams, and civil society. In addition, both the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) can play valuable roles in supporting national and inclusive ownership in transition processes. To that end, the twin resolutions adopted in November 2025 on the review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture encourage the secretary-general to consider how the PBF can further enhance its support to countries undergoing transitions from peace operations and to strengthen cooperation between the Security Council and the PBC on transition processes.

Over the past two decades, the Secretariat has developed policies and guidance aimed at promoting more effective transitions that support peacebuilding objectives. However, many transitions take place amid political and security challenges that make it difficult to implement the good practices outlined in the guidance. Against this backdrop, IPI and the Permanent Mission of Japan to the UN hosted a panel discussion on how peacebuilding gains can be sustained during and after mission transitions.

Overall, the discussion identified ways to strengthen coordination and coherence between partners on transition processes, both within and outside the UN, to bridge gaps between humanitarian, development, and peace activities. Panelists also explored opportunities to enhance the roles of the PBC and the PBF in supporting effective UN transitions.

Several speakers discussed the critical importance of ensuring that peacebuilding processes are inclusive, consultative, and nationally owned. Noting the ambiguity of the term “national ownership,” one speaker shared their view of the essential elements that constitute nationally owned peacebuilding, highlighting the centrality of a social contract that narrows the gap between legitimacy and legality, strong national capacity, a locally determined definition of a successful peace process, and financial resources, including national resource mobilization. Others echoed this point, underscoring the importance of integrating lived experiences in decision-making and recognizing that institutional reforms alone cannot sustain peace.

During the discussion, speakers also addressed the UN’s capacity to support transitions. In a context of limited resources, speakers emphasized the need to enhance planning and coordination to more effectively sustain peacebuilding gains during and after UN mission transitions. Many highlighted the role of UN agencies, funds, and programs, which often leverage greater in-country capacity to support peacebuilding efforts before, during, and after transitions. There was also broad consensus on the importance of leveraging the UN peacebuilding architecture, namely the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), Peacebuilding Fund, and Peacebuilding and Peace Support Office. Encouraging the PBC to hold more regular dialogue on transition contexts, speakers and participants stressed the need to integrate the peacebuilding architecture into UN mission mandates from their inception. While pointing to these different UN instruments, some highlighted the need to develop a common operational framework to advance work on the ground in a coherent manner.

Welcoming Remarks:
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations and Peacebuilding, International Peace Institute

Opening Remarks:
H.E. Yamazaki Kazuyuki, Permanent Representative of Japan to the UN

Panelists:
Adedeji Ebo, Director and Deputy to the High Representative, UN Office for Disarmament Affairs
Turhan Saleh, Deputy Director, Crisis Bureau, UN Development Programme
Robert Pulver, Chief, Justice and Corrections Service Branch, UN Peacebuilding and Peace Support Office
Ai Kihara-Hunt, Professor at the Graduate Program on Human Security and Deputy Director of the Research Center for Sustainable Peace, University of Tokyo (VTC)
Cedric de Coning, Research Professor, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (VTC)

Moderator:
Lauren McGowan, Policy Analyst, International Peace Institute

The post Peace Operations and Peacebuilding: Supporting Effective UN Transitions for Sustaining Peace appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Dans un contexte de recomposition des équilibres géopolitiques et de priorisation accrue des dépenses sécuritaires et militaires, comment l’UNICEF analyse-t-il la marginalisation progressive des droits de l’enfant dans les stratégies d’aide internationale des États donateurs ? Face à l’émergence de nouveaux acteurs influents de l’aide (pays du Sud, puissances régionales, financements conditionnés), comment l’UNICEF préserve-t-il l’universalité et l’indivisibilité des droits de l’enfant, sans les subordonner à des intérêts géopolitiques ou diplomatiques ? Un an après les coupes de l’Agence des États-Unis pour le développement international (USAID) et la baisse significative des financements européens, comment l’UNICEF adapte-t-il sa stratégie pour continuer à défendre les droits de l’enfant sans sacrifier les programmes essentiels ? Face à la concurrence accrue entre crises humanitaires, comment l’UNICEF hiérarchise-t-il ses interventions tout en garantissant le respect des droits fondamentaux des enfants, notamment dans les pays les plus fragiles ? Enfin, quel rôle peuvent jouer la société civile, le secteur privé et les citoyens pour compenser la baisse des financements publics et contribuer à remettre les droits de l’enfant au cœur de l’agenda international ?

Entretien avec Aïda Ndiaye, chargée plaidoyer et programmes internationaux à UNICEF France.

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L’article Les droits de l’enfant : comment en faire une priorité de l’aide internationale dans un contexte de baisse des financements ? est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

This chapter traces the evolution of bus rapid transit (BRT) and examines its implications for urban mobility policymaking, particularly in cities in the Global South. It reviews BRT’s historical origins and global diffusion, its socio-economic and environmental impacts, as well as the distinct political dynamics that characterize the system’s implementation and operations. The chapter posits that BRT has undergone three key transformations since the 1960s-70s. The system originally emerged as a cost-effective alternative to urban rail projects, in the 2000s it then reinvented itself as a tool for sustainable urban development, and most recently it has started to reinvent itself yet again as a planning instrument for transportation formalization. Despite these changes in the policy objectives underpinning BRT initiatives, the system’s core innovation has remained unchanged: its modular flexibility. This flexibility has enabled the system’s widespread adoption and adaptation. The chapter argues that BRT offers policymakers an instructive case of how context-sensitive transit planning can help cities build more efficient, inclusive, and sustainable urban mobility systems.

This chapter traces the evolution of bus rapid transit (BRT) and examines its implications for urban mobility policymaking, particularly in cities in the Global South. It reviews BRT’s historical origins and global diffusion, its socio-economic and environmental impacts, as well as the distinct political dynamics that characterize the system’s implementation and operations. The chapter posits that BRT has undergone three key transformations since the 1960s-70s. The system originally emerged as a cost-effective alternative to urban rail projects, in the 2000s it then reinvented itself as a tool for sustainable urban development, and most recently it has started to reinvent itself yet again as a planning instrument for transportation formalization. Despite these changes in the policy objectives underpinning BRT initiatives, the system’s core innovation has remained unchanged: its modular flexibility. This flexibility has enabled the system’s widespread adoption and adaptation. The chapter argues that BRT offers policymakers an instructive case of how context-sensitive transit planning can help cities build more efficient, inclusive, and sustainable urban mobility systems.

This chapter traces the evolution of bus rapid transit (BRT) and examines its implications for urban mobility policymaking, particularly in cities in the Global South. It reviews BRT’s historical origins and global diffusion, its socio-economic and environmental impacts, as well as the distinct political dynamics that characterize the system’s implementation and operations. The chapter posits that BRT has undergone three key transformations since the 1960s-70s. The system originally emerged as a cost-effective alternative to urban rail projects, in the 2000s it then reinvented itself as a tool for sustainable urban development, and most recently it has started to reinvent itself yet again as a planning instrument for transportation formalization. Despite these changes in the policy objectives underpinning BRT initiatives, the system’s core innovation has remained unchanged: its modular flexibility. This flexibility has enabled the system’s widespread adoption and adaptation. The chapter argues that BRT offers policymakers an instructive case of how context-sensitive transit planning can help cities build more efficient, inclusive, and sustainable urban mobility systems.

Luther Bois Anukur, Regional Director of IUCN ESARO, interviewed at the IUCN Regional Headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya. Credit: Isaiah Esipisu/IP

By Isaiah Esipisu
NAIROBI, Mar 3 2026 (IPS)

As the global community marks 2026 World Wildlife Day today (March 3), this year’s focus is on Medicinal and Aromatic Plants: Conserving Health, Heritage and Livelihoods. However, beneath these celebrations, a difficult question emerges: who will bear the cost of conservation when traditional donor funding becomes uncertain and in the face of climate change?

With geopolitical shifts causing traditional funders to tighten their budgets, conservation across Africa has reached a critical juncture.

In an exclusive interview with Luther Bois Anukur, the Regional Director for the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Eastern and Southern Africa, we explore how governments must now go further by creating space for community-led biodiversity conservation initiatives to evolve into sustainable enterprises. We discuss why protecting biodiversity matters as much as maintaining roads or power grids and why national budgets should consider it a priority.

IPS: With conservation donors tightening their budget, how serious is this funding shift for Africa, and what risks does it create for biodiversity protection?

Anukur: Overall, there has been a shrinking of financing for biodiversity conservation, especially with the closing of USAID, which was a big financier for biodiversity work in Africa. This came as a shock and certainly slowed down the work of biodiversity conservation in Africa because some organisations have gone under, and some projects have closed altogether.

However, having said that, there is a huge opportunity for Africa to relook at biodiversity financing models. Indeed, relying on donor funding is not the right way to finance biodiversity conservation. Biodiversity is not a charitable cause. It is actually part of the sovereign natural assets, and so we need to look at ways in which countries can link their economies to biodiversity conservation.

For example, you’ll find that what underpins our economies in Africa is fresh water, agriculture, tourism, and energy, and all these form the backbone of biodiversity conservation.

IPS: African communities often live with wildlife and bear the costs of conservation. How possibly can this be turned into community-led initiatives that can evolve into sustainable enterprises?

Anukur: First and foremost, people in Africa have lived alongside wildlife for many years. However, the cost of living with wildlife has been very high, because you find there’s crop loss, there’s loss of livestock, and even loss of lives. Yet, we have not seen benefits go to communities in a proportional manner.

To change this, there is certainly a need to rethink and redesign our conservation efforts so that communities can be right at the centre. We need to see benefits going to communities in an equitable manner that is commensurate to the services and the sacrifices they provide by living alongside wildlife.

We need to stop seeing communities as beneficiaries but as leaders of conservation efforts. And when we do that, then we will go a long way in conserving wildlife.

IPS: Why should finance ministries in Africa treat conservation as a core national investment rather than an environmental afterthought

Anukur: In many cases, ministers of finance look at risks, they look at assets, and they look at returns. That is what they usually understand. But very clearly, nature is Africa’s largest asset. And so investing in our environment basically means that we are supporting our water systems, our agriculture, our fisheries, and our ecosystems. That basically means that we are strengthening our economies.

The reverse is true. If we do not support that, we will face disasters. We are going to have a higher impact from climate change, and we are going to get into food imports. When you balance the books, investing in conservation makes sense, as it will ultimately affect national economies. So investing in natural assets will greatly support the GDPs of our countries and the livelihoods of our people.

IPS: Can you share examples of models that governments should be using to support protection of biodiversity as well as community-led conservation initiatives?

Anukur: There have been good examples in Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Kenya, among other countries, which have been able to demonstrate that community-led conservation can generate not only ecological recoveries but also economic returns.

But the key thing with these models is that you need to secure the land rights, make sure that there is accountable governance, and that revenue flows directly to communities. There is also a need to have partnerships with multi-stakeholders, especially the ethical private sector.

IPS: Tools like the IUCN Red List and Green List provide data on species and protected areas. How can governments better use these frameworks to move beyond reactive conservation decisions toward long-term, evidence-based policies?

Anukur: IUCN has got quite a number of tools; we have the red list of species, which basically looks at extinction risk, but we also have the green list, which looks at how effectively we manage our ecosystems. Governments have extensively used these tools as reference documents.

However, we would want to see these tools being used to build evidence for planning. This is because when you plan well, then you are able to avert risks. For instance, you need these tools to plan roads, infrastructure, agriculture, and mining.

IPS: Many African governments face pressure to expand infrastructure, agriculture, and extractive industries. What strategies can realistically balance economic development with ecosystem protection, especially for communities living closest to nature?

Anukur: There has been a big debate for a very long time about whether Africa should prioritise development or whether it should be conservation. But that debate is now very old. What we are focusing on is moving from extractive growth to generative growth. We also need to balance everything. For example, you can do agriculture but ensure that you have healthy soils. You can do energy transition in a manner that is not degrading to the environment. Or even create infrastructure that avoids critical ecosystems.

The most important thing is that there should be cross-sectoral collaboration. We have seen environmental and conservation issues treated as an afterthought. We would want the environment to be right at the centre of budget projections, as well; communities should also be brought to the centre for people to benefit from natural assets.

IPS: As we celebrate World Wildlife Day, what message would you give to African governments regarding the conservation of biodiversity?

Anukur: This time is an opportune moment when the world is changing. At the moment we have a lot of geopolitical change. We also do have a lot of geo-economic change. If Africa is to look at itself, the biggest asset is already what we have. The continent is viewed as poor, but the truth is that Africa is not poor. All we need is to connect with our natural assets and use them for development.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Excerpt:

Relying on donor funding is not the right way to finance biodiversity conservation. Biodiversity is not a charitable cause. It is actually part of the sovereign natural assets, and so we need to look at ways in which countries can link their economies to biodiversity conservation. - Luther Bois Anukur, IUCN Eastern and Southern Africa

• In the contemporary environment, economic diplomacy encompasses four key dimensions: a) trade/investment diplomacy, b) the diplomacy of international rules and agreements, c) development cooperation, and d) economic security diplomacy.
• In Greece, the system of economic diplomacy is organised around the General Secretariat of International Economic Relations and Openness of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the same time, other ministries and government services also play an important role, creating a complex institutional ecosystem in which coordination is necessary in order to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the relevant actions.
• Although the importance of economic diplomacy is recognised and relevant initiatives have been undertaken in the right direction, both at the level of organisation and at the level of actions, the main challenges that Greek economic diplomacy continues to face are: a) the absence of a holistic approach and strategy, b) the tackling of bureaucracy and business barriers, c) limited resources, and d) insufficient recognition of its value.
• International practices, such as the Team Finland network, the French model of special representatives for economic diplomacy, as well as the national strategies of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom for the creation of a national economic identity, constitute some good practices followed in Europe and may, under certain conditions and with appropriate adjustments, inform relevant Greek initiatives.
  • The policy recommendations are structured on the basis of three categories:
  • Structure and organisation:
    • Strengthening Enterprise Greece,
    • Reorganisation of the recruitment and training system for officials of the Offices of Economic and Commercial Affairs (OEY).
  • Operations and adaptability:
    • Enhancing relations with local and sectoral chambers of commerce,
    • Establishing a formal consultation mechanism for direct interaction with the “users” of economic diplomacy,
    • Modernising procedures, following a detailed mapping of the needs and obstacles faced by the stakeholders involved,
    • Providing tailored services by Offices of Economic and Commercial Affairs based on the size, and therefore the needs, of businesses,
    • Better utilising the Greek diaspora and Greek communities abroad.
  • Formulation of a strategy for economic diplomacy:
    • National dimension:
      • Creation of a National Strategy for Economic Diplomacy with a horizon beyond 2030, with a central role given to the geoeconomic dimensions of economic diplomacy,
      • Raising the visibility of a unified Greek “brand name”.

• European Dimension:
  • Promoting the idea of establishing a European Export Credit Agency, while recognising the relevant reservations expressed by our partners in the EU – the Greek Presidency of the Council of Ministers in 2027 could provide an opportunity to further explore this idea,
  • Achieving a positive “pillar assessment”, in order for Greek institutions to become eligible for the financing of actions in third countries,
  • Promoting and implementing, particularly during the Greek Presidency of the Council of the EU in 2027, measures aimed at completing the Single Market, on the basis of the Draghi and Letta reports,
  • Increasing the number of Greeks serving in key positions in European institutions, as well as hosting new European agencies in cities across Greece.

Read here in pdf the Policy paper by Spyros Blavoukos, Professor, Athens University of Economics & Business; Senior Research Fellow and Head of the ‘Ariane Condellis’ European Programme, ELIAMEP; Panos Politis Lamprou, Research Fellow, European Institutions & Policies, ELIAMEP; Panagiota Pagoni, Research Assistant Trainee (January–September 2025).

Lors de son déplacement à l’île Longue en Bretagne, le 2 mars 2026, le président de la République Emmanuel Macron a délivré un discours consacré à l’avenir de la dissuasion nucléaire française, qui a lieu une fois par mandat présidentiel.

Entre guerre en Ukraine, incertitudes sur la garantie américaine et montée des tensions internationales, le président a présenté le concept inédit de « dissuasion avancée ». Que signifie cette évolution ? S’agit-il d’une européanisation de la force nucléaire française ? Cette nouvelle orientation signifie-t-elle que la France partage sa doctrine ou conserve-t-elle le contrôle exclusif de la décision ?

Mon analyse des enjeux stratégiques que soulève ce discours.

L’article Macron annonce la dissuasion avancée est apparu en premier sur IRIS.