May 4, 2016 (ED-DAEIN) - A federal commission of inquiry into the recent deadly incident between Rizeigat and Maalia tribes in East Darfur state has completed its work and would submit its report to the minister of justice soon, said reliable sources
On 17 April, twelve people were killed in clashes between the Rezeigat Savanna Militia and gunmen belonging to their arch-rival Maalia tribe over stolen camels in Khor Taan area in Yassin county,East Darfur.
Following the incident, suspected Rizeigat gunmen killed three guards and burned down the house of East Darfur governor Anas Omer in Ed Daein accusing the latter of siding with the Maalia.
A well-informed source told Sudan Tribune on Wednesday that an investigation committee comprising of the ministries of justice and interior besides the security services has interrogated the deputy governor of East Darfur Mohamed al-Hassan and the commander of the military force separating between Rizeigat and Maalia.
Also, the commission of inquiry has interrogated commanders of Muhajiria and Khor Taan military garrisons as well as Maalia tribesmen who witnessed the incident.
According to the source the investigation commission would submit its findings to the minister of justice to take the legal measures.
He pointed that governor Omer has formed a second commission to probe the attack on his house, saying the committee has yet to finish its work.
Following the attack on his house, the governor declared a curfew from 7pm to 7am in the capital Ed-Daien vowing to bring the perpetrators to justice.
The same source said that the deputy governor issued a decree preventing any tribe from going after their stolen cattle and putting the burden of retrieving the looted animals on the military force responsible for separating between the two tribes.
East Darfur state is witnessing one of the longest and most deadly clashes in the region between the Rezeigat and the Ma'alia tribes since 1966. The conflict between the two tribes is triggered by disputes over land ownership.
Both the Rezeigat and the Maalia are pastoralist tribes, based in East Darfur. The centre of Rezeigat territory is in Ed Daein town, while the Maalia centre is in Adila, the second largest town after Ed-Daein.
May 4, 2016 (JUBA/KHARTOUM) - South Sudanese outgoing oil minister has criticized the government of neighbouring Sudan for allegedly backtracking from its initial positive gesture to renegotiate the charges for using its territory to export crude oil from South Sudan to the international markets.
“There has not been any significant progress in the negotiation, even though the starting was a positive gesture,” said Stephen Dhieu Dau, South Sudanese outgoing oil minister.
Dau revealed that Sudan has notified his ministry of its decision to confiscate crude to pay itself of the entitlements which his country owes Sudan in payment for use of its territory.
“They have notified us that they will pay themselves in kind if they are not paid their dues. I took this matter to the council of ministers and it was agreed that we should initiate contacts with our regional partners, the African Union and the stakeholders to help us address this issue,” he said.
Following the huge fall of oil prices in the international markets and upon a request from his South Sudanese counterpart, the Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir last January directed to review oil transit agreement signed in September 2012.
Speaking to the press after a meeting of the national board of oil affairs on Monday, Sudanese petroleum minister Mohamed Zayed Awad said the negotiations with the South Sudan on the review of oil fees are still continuing at the level of committees established in implementation of the directives of President al-Bashir.
Awad further said the South Sudanese oil continues to flow through the pipeline for the exportation as usual, adding that the formation of the transitional government in Juba would contribute to increase oil production in the landlocked country.
According to the Cooperation Agreement, South Sudan pays Khartoum up to $25 per barrel for its crude oil transported through the Sudanese territory.
In January 2016, Juba requested the Sudanese Petroleum and Mining Ministry to reconsider its transit fees in the wake of changes in global oil prices.
The price of crude oil is currently at $29 dollars per barrel in the international markets.
South Sudan is producing oil at 160,000 barrels per day, despite a decline in its oil production due to the violent conflict that engulfed the young nation, killing thousand and displacing nearly two million people.
Dau encouraged his successor to “press the button” of negotiation with Sudan.
The official said he would be more than willing to continue to help his colleague, the newly appointed minister for petroleum, Dak Duop Bichiok, to push on with negotiation.
“We will press the button of negotiation harder but we will continue to ask them and I think they will also understand because it is the interest of the two countries to benefit from the flow of the oil,” he added.
The international community should also use their contacts with Sudan to reciprocate the goodwill of the government to negotiate in good faith and make rational charges.
A month ago, Sudan reconsidered a series of decisions aimed to normalize bilateral relations announced in January and February. Further, Khartoum said Juba continue to support rebel groups despite its goodwill and efforts to end the inter South Sudanese crisis.
Analysts in Khartoum believe that the Sudanese government wants to push Juba to implement a clause in the IGAD brokered peace agreement providing to disarm Sudanese rebels and to prevent their presence in South Sudan.
The two countries agreed in September 2012 on a particular fixed changes when the oil prices were higher.
However, after the global drop in oil prices, South Sudan could no longer benefit a lot due to the charges which continued to take away most of the revenue.
(ST)
A Kreml falánál Moszkvában, az Alexandrovszkij Szadban van a Hős Városok Alléja.
The Benjamin Franklin quote above is increasingly becoming true, even to the old ‘certainty’ in the EU that common tax policies – demanding unanimous decision-making between Member States – will only move at glacier speed through the negotiations.
Corporate taxation currently features big on the European policy agenda, and is unlikely to lose ground any time soon. A combination of heightened media attention, revelations of tax evasion through Luxleaks or Panama Papers, budgetary constraints in many countries and increased awareness by the public have created unprecedented momentum for a more coordinated EU corporate tax policy.
The undeniable truth (?) of the Hart quote notwithstanding, this opportunity to be civilised in itself comes at a prize. The changes to tax rules that already have been and will be discussed have the potential to substantively impact how businesses pay and report taxes, how the companies are structured and not only how they do tax planning, but how they do business as such, in Europe.
Rules on interest deduction limitations, hybrid mismatches and controlled foreign companies, whilst seemingly ‘just’ an implementation of OECD guidelines might have further reaching consequences than any parties imagined when these issues where negotiated – in the context of voluntary guidelines – at the august Paris based institution.
In parallel, companies’ own corporate taxation policies are increasingly scrutinized by the public, with possible impact on reputation and side-effects on the ability to influence public policy not limited to taxation – and with layers to be further applied, if the Commission’s proposal on public country-by-country reporting gets tailwind through legislative negotiations.
Nevertheless… the time for thinking of EU tax policy is now! Work on greater harmonization of corporate taxation rules in the EU and to close loopholes stemming from different national tax laws is on full throttle as no EU government – or anyone else for that matter – wants to be seen as blocking the crack down on tax evasion. And rightly so!
Automatic exchange of tax rulings between EU Member States’ tax authorities and sharing detailed information on companies’ revenues, profits and taxes paid have already been agreed on – in both cases within only a few months after publication of the Commission’s legislative proposal.
Currently, EU countries – pushed forward by the ambitious Dutch Council Presidency – are working hard on the abovementioned issues of the anti-tax avoidance to tackle base erosion and profit shifting – where substantive changes to interest deductibility or hybrid mismatches are expected to be agreed on soon. A new proposal to increase tax transparency of multinational companies has also just been brought forward and later this year more work on a harmonized EU corporate tax base is expected.
But whilst the pace in acting affirmatively towards tax avoidance is laudable, the speed of the legislative process – leaving only a narrow window for the business community and experts to provide input – entails the risk that whilst the starting point and pace was benevolent and laudable, the end result might lead to unwarranted damages – as is always the risk, when regulation is hastened forward.
Last week, I was once again in attendance at the Russian MOD’s Moscow Conference on International Security (MCIS). This was the fifth such conference and the third that I’ve attended. In the past, I’ve summarized all the key speeches by Russian participants. That seems less necessary this year as video from the entire conference has been posted online, both in Russian and in English. I do have the slides from most of the speeches, which have not been posted online by the organizers, and will post them over the next few days. Other than that, it seems more valuable to write up my general impressions, rather than focusing on the specifics of what was said.
The overall tone was less hostile toward the United States than last year. Last year, the speakers were quite open in declaring that the United States was creating threats to international security by undermining governments of states that refused to go along with U.S. “diktat.” This year, the formulations were much more indirect, along the lines of “some [unnamed] states are continuing to have a negative impact on international security by promoting exclusive military blocs, establishing military bases around the world, and dictating their will through the use of their military superiority.” While the target of such formulations is of course entirely transparent, the mere fact that the United States is not being mentioned by name is a sign that the Russian government is at least making an effort to shift its rhetoric to a less hostile stance.
The desire to reestablish a relationship with the United States was made clear when the topic turned to the threat of terrorism, the primary theme of this year’s conference. Here, the Russian officials made sure to argue that the ability of the United States and Russia to cooperate in Syria shows that the two countries can work together and stated that they hoped that such cooperation could be expanded to a broader range of issues. This line was prominent in all the speeches, and particularly in those of Nikolai Patrushev, Sergei Shoigu, and Valery Gerasimov.
Of course, the unspoken subtext underlying this call for cooperation was predicated on the notion that Russia and the United States could solve all the world’s security problems if only the United States followed Russia’s prescriptions on how to act. This was most openly stated by Sergei Lavrov, who said that what the West needs to do is to drop its anti-Russian policies.
While Russia’s relationship with the West was still one of the primary topics for discussion, it was certainly less central than at any of the past conferences. The majority of the non-Russian plenary speakers were from Asian states, and one of the two initial substantive plenary sessions was on military cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. After the usual opening lineup of Russian government heavy-hitters (Patrushev, Shoigu, Lavrov, Bortnikov), the first plenary on the threat of terrorism included the defense ministers of China, Pakistan, and Iran, as well as Hamid Karzai. The Asia-Pacific panel included more Asian defense ministers, this time from India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore, and Laos. The most striking thing about this panel was the lack of any participation by Russian officials. Unlike the first panel, where Valery Gerasimov presented the Russian government’s view on the threat posed by international terrorism, the Russian government chose not to present its view on Asian security issues. The only Russian on the dais for this session was conference host and panel moderator Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov, who said little of substance on the topic at hand.
It seems to me that the Russian government’s lack of participation in the Asia-Pacific discussion was quite deliberate. Russia is in a bit of a bind in the region. One the one hand, it is dependent on its “strategic partnership” with China, especially since the deterioration of relations with the West. On the other hand, it is looking to develop security and especially economic ties with a number of Southeast Asian states — most particularly Vietnam and Indonesia — and to deepen its existing relationship with South Korea. The disputes between China and its Asian neighbors, particularly the maritime border dispute in the South China Sea, places Russia in a difficult position. I would not be surprised if the absence of a Russian speaker on the Asia-Pacific panel was a deliberate decision taken so as to avoid having to make the hard choices about how to thread the needle on the sensitive issue of China’s security relations with its neighbors.
Finally, a few words about the general atmosphere. The conference was much better organized than last year, when panels repeatedly ran over time and the agenda had to be modified on the fly. Shoigu was not visibly unhappy, as he was last year. The conference was also much larger than in the past. The plenary sessions took place in the large Congress Hall, rather than in the meeting rooms of the Radisson Ukraina hotel as in the past. The increase in size was also notable in the addition of breakout sessions and the expansion to a second day of panels.
While in the previous two years, one had a sense of being at a conference that was an opportunity for a wide range of representatives of rogue (and quasi-rogue) states to get together, this was largely absent this year. Sure, the Iranian Defense Minister took the opportunity to go on about “Zionist terrorism,” but this was the exception, rather than the rule. The 2016 list of speakers notably excluded senior officials from countries such as North Korea and Cuba, who had prominently featured in past years. They were replaced by representatives of countries such as Argentina, the Phillippines, and Chile. In addition, the presence of senior officials from South Africa and most major Asian and Middle Eastern states highlights the global nature of the event. The absence of Western officials, which looks set to continue as long as military cooperation between Russia and NATO remains frozen, prevents MCIS from becoming a truly global conference. But even absent the West, the high level of representation from a wide range of countries from around the world is a clear indication that the MCIS has become a regular stop on the global international security conference circuit.