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ENTRETIEN - La présidente du département des Bouches-du-Rhône souhaite rétablir « la vérité » sur la situation de la métropole qu’elle a présidée et dont le budget n’a toujours pas été adopté. L’élue appelle à une réforme de la collectivité.

Credit: IAEA
 
IAEA’s 70th General Conference highlights growing strains on safeguards and nuclear security as attention shifts to the first review of the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty.

By Katsuhiro Asagiri
VIENNA, Sep 24 2026 (IPS)

The international nuclear order is facing another test as governments move from an inconclusive review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in New York to renewed disputes over safeguards and nuclear security in Vienna—and toward the first Review Conference of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) later this year.

The 70th General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), held in Vienna from September 14 to 18, came less than four months after the 11th NPT Review Conference ended without consensus on a substantive outcome.

It was the third consecutive NPT Review Conference, following those in 2015 and 2022, to conclude without agreement on substantive conclusions and recommendations—underscoring the growing difficulty of reaching consensus amid heightened nuclear risks and geopolitical tensions.

UN Secretary-General António Guterres expressed disappointment at the outcome while reaffirming the NPT as a cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

The IAEA does not negotiate nuclear disarmament. Its responsibilities include promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and applying safeguards to verify that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Yet the issues confronting the Agency—from Iran and North Korea to Ukraine and naval nuclear propulsion—show how safeguards, nuclear security and armed conflict are increasingly intertwined with wider questions about the future of the international nuclear order.

Map of Iran

Iran Puts Verification Under Pressure

Iran remains one of the most difficult issues facing the Agency.

For the IAEA, the central question is not simply the political dispute surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme, but whether it can maintain the continuity and credibility of independent verification.

Restrictions on access and uncertainty surrounding nuclear material, including highly enriched uranium, have intensified concerns about the effectiveness of safeguards.

The issue has taken on an additional dimension following attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities. Beyond competing political and military claims lies a wider question for the international community: how can nuclear facilities—and the verification system surrounding them—be protected during armed conflict?

Ukraine Tests Nuclear Safety in Wartime

Ukraine presents another challenge.

The war has placed major nuclear facilities in or near areas of military operations, with the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant remaining at the centre of international concern.

The IAEA has maintained experts at the site as part of efforts to reduce risks to nuclear safety and security.

Russia and Ukraine have repeatedly accused each other of actions threatening nuclear installations. While those claims remain contested, the underlying issue extends beyond this war: international nuclear governance mechanisms must now operate in circumstances where a major nuclear facility can be exposed to prolonged armed conflict.

Water is used to cool processes at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine. Credit: IAEA/Fredrik Dahl

North Korea and the Limits of Verification

Credit: journal-neo.org

North Korea remains another major test of the non-proliferation regime.

The IAEA continues to monitor developments in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from outside the country and maintains its readiness to resume verification activities should political circumstances permit.

The case illustrates a fundamental limitation of international verification: even sophisticated monitoring institutions ultimately depend on access and cooperation.

More broadly, the Vienna conference reflected the growing difficulty of achieving consensus. Political divisions are increasingly affecting debates even within an institution whose work is largely technical, encompassing safeguards, nuclear safety and security, and peaceful nuclear applications.

At the same time, progress in other safeguards cases shows that multilateral verification can produce results when governments provide access, transparency and sustained cooperation.

Civil Society Bridges the NPT and TPNW

Hideto Matsuura, head of Nihon Hidankyo, addresses an event hosted at the sidelines of the 2026 NPT Review Conference. Credit Naureen Hossain/IPS

The debate over the future of nuclear disarmament is not confined to governments.

At the 2026 NPT Review Conference, Soka Gakkai International (SGI) was among civil society organizations advocating nuclear disarmament education, nuclear risk reduction and greater attention to the humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear weapons.

On April 30, SGI and the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation co-organized a side event examining extended nuclear deterrence through the lens of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.

Hideto Matsuura, an atomic bomb survivor representing Nihon Hidankyo, described how radiation-related illnesses continue to affect Hibakusha more than eight decades after the atomic bombings.

The discussion raised a question that lies at the heart of the continuing debate over nuclear deterrence: whether security should be viewed primarily from the standpoint of states or also through the lens of human security.

Such civil society engagement provides a link between the NPT process and the humanitarian approach that contributed to the emergence of the TPNW.

From Vienna to New York

The next major stage of the 2026 nuclear diplomacy cycle now moves back to New York.

From November 30 to December 4, states parties to the TPNW will hold the treaty’s first Review Conference at United Nations Headquarters.

United Nations Headquarters. Credit: Katsuhiro Asagiri

The TPNW does not replace either the NPT or the IAEA.

The NPT combines three pillars—nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy—while the IAEA provides much of the safeguards and verification machinery supporting the non-proliferation regime.

Credit: IAEA

The TPNW approaches the nuclear question from a different direction. It prohibits activities including the development, testing, production, possession, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and establishes a legal framework aimed at their elimination.

The three frameworks therefore address distinct but interconnected dimensions of the nuclear order.

The 2026 NPT Review Conference demonstrated the difficulty of reaching political agreement on disarmament and non-proliferation. Vienna, meanwhile, highlighted the practical challenges confronting verification and nuclear security amid armed conflict, regional proliferation disputes and geopolitical divisions.

The first TPNW Review Conference will now examine what the prohibition treaty can contribute under these conditions.

Nuclear-armed states remain outside the TPNW, placing clear limits on what the treaty can achieve on its own. At the same time, its states parties and supporting civil society organizations have placed the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and their elimination at the centre of international debate.

When delegates gather in New York on November 30, the discussion will therefore extend beyond the implementation of a single treaty.

After another NPT Review Conference ended without substantive consensus, a broader question remains: how can established and newer multilateral frameworks work alongside one another to reduce nuclear risks, strengthen verification and advance nuclear disarmament?

From Vienna to New York, that question is set to remain at the centre of nuclear diplomacy in 2026.

This article is brought to you by INPS Japan in collaboration with Soka Gakkai International in consultative status with UN ECOSOC.

IPS UN Bureau

 

 

 

 

It’s party conference time, so everyone’s pushing their ideas into the public domain, hoping they will get picked up by the faithful (and the media) just at the point that policy might get changed.

The IPPR have a useful report on the costs of not having mutual recognition of conformity assessment with the EU, highlighting how this might generate much more economic impact than any of the reset dossiers. Sadly, it doesn’t appear to engage with why the EU has steadfastly refused to even discuss such an agreement for the past several years (spoiler: there’s no good reason for them to do it).

But the eye has been caught much more by the latest report from the Tony Blair Institute, with a foreword from the man himself. This prompted some initial thoughts from me.

At one level, there’s quite a lot to be positive about from the work. It rightly argues (as I’ve been trying to since, well, ages) that the UK needs to develop a more positive vision of what its relationship with the EU should be, grounded in an understanding of how that fits into the country’s development and position in the world, rather than being driven by unhappiness with How Things Are.

It also is correct to note that the UK can’t avoid this, given its exposure to the EU (economically and geopolitically). If Britain gets a cough when Europe sneezes, then being involved in helping Europe not get poorly makes sense.

But these good points are lost in what follows, which reads much like Tony’s Special Wishlist of All The Things.

By becoming a progressive and dynamic place and setting a goal of rejoining within the next decade, the UK can more effectively press for new deals with the EU that serve the former’s advantage (calculated by a “Power Maximising Test” that will tell us all what the right level of cooperation is for any given area).

That in turn will also allow the UK to stop the EU doing bad things that hurt it and the UK, because everyone will see that’s the right thing.

Oh, and the EU itself will be simultaneously a much more powerful and effective global actor, speaking with one voice on all manner of things, while also being a “Europe of nation states”, i.e. one that lets each country do what it wants when it needs to.

There is minimal sense that the EU understands itself to have the dominant position in the relationship, as the larger and the less-needy party, nor of how it will see being told how to sort itself out by politicians from a country that – not that long ago – decided it wanted out of the organisation altogether.

There’s also no recognition that the EU has never, ever let itself be changed by non-members’ preferences or needs, and has repeatedly used the accession process to require massive adjustments on the part of the acceding state.

To take one obvious example, the then EEC developed its Common Fisheries Policy in the early 1970s precisely because several new states with large fishing waters wanted to join and the existing members wanted to embed their preferences about access and management before the new lot got a say. Just like the new EU made choices about institutional arrangements and funding for agriculture and regional development before admitting Central and East European states in the 2000s: if only I could remember the name of the guy in charge in the UK back then.

I find it very hard not to lay this at the feet of Blair himself, given how closely this all reads to his previously stated views on the matter. The helpful sections on specific domains of cooperation get lost in the over-extrapolation the report authors are asked to make, for example.

Given that the initial response to the report has been generally as bad as might be expected, it’s tempting just to write this off as Late Stage Blairism and move on.

But again, the diagnosis of the failings of the current (and historic) British approach to European policy still stands up, as does the need to start building an alternative grounded in a positive mission and set of objectives that tie into the country’s wider development.

I don’t think bathwater can be either stupid or ridiculous, but there is still a baby to be saved in all this, and whether that’s done will be a much better marker of whether the UK has got beyond Brexit than anything else in all this.

The post Today in motivated reasoning news appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Jake Horton, Ben Chu et Rupert Carey, de BBC Verify, ont examiné les déclarations du président et les ont recoupées avec les données et les éléments disponibles.

By James Alix Michel
VICTORIA, Seychelles, Sep 24 2026 (IPS)

After decades in which the high seas were too often treated as a distant frontier—vast, ownerless and beyond meaningful protection—the High Seas Treaty entered into force on 17 January 2026.

It was a landmark achievement for international cooperation and a reminder that, even in an increasingly divided world, nations can still come together in defence of the common good. But celebration must not be confused with protection. A treaty on paper will not restore depleted marine life. It will not prevent harmful activity and it will not ensure that the benefits of ocean science are shared fairly. Nor will it secure a healthy ocean for future generations unless the international community gives it the resources, institutions, scientific capacity and political courage necessary to succeed. That is the real test now before us.

The Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) Agreement, also known as the High Seas Treaty, creates a framework for the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction. It addresses four essential areas: the fair and equitable sharing of benefits from marine genetic resources; marine protected areas and other area-based management tools; environmental impact assessments; and the capacity-building and transfer of marine technology. These areas will secure the future of the global ocean—and, by extension, the future of every nation whose climate, food security, economy and heritage depend upon it.

For small island developing states, it is our climate regulator, our food source, our economic space, our history and our future. We do not look at the sea as a faraway expanse beyond our borders. We live with it every day. We prosper or suffer according to its health.

During my years as President of Seychelles, this understanding shaped my conviction that the ocean had to be placed at the centre of national development. Seychelles chose to pursue a blue-economy vision at a time when the phrase was less familiar than it is today. We worked to protect large areas of our maritime space, advanced marine spatial planning, and explored innovative approaches to ocean finance, including debt-for-nature arrangements and the blue bond.

Our actions were not driven by the illusion that a small island nation could fix a global crisis single-handedly. Instead, we acted out of a core conviction: true leadership belongs to more than just the largest landmasses, the richest economies, or the most dominant militaries. While we are a small island state in land, we are a vast ocean nation. We possess a wealth of experience, strategic maritime vision, and deep resolve. It is this exact spirit—proving that stewardship is measured by commitment rather than geographic size—that must anchor and define the High Seas Treaty.

The treaty rightly recognises the special circumstances of developing states, including small island developing states and coastal African states. It acknowledges that access to data, research, equipment, technical knowledge, monitoring systems and trained people is essential if all countries are to participate meaningfully in ocean governance. However, this principle must now be honored in practice. Too often, developing countries are invited to global negotiations only to discover that the real advantages remain concentrated elsewhere: locked away in distant laboratories, research vessels, satellites, and data systems. If the benefits arising from marine genetic resources are to be genuinely shared, then access to the knowledge and tools required to understand and use those resources must also be shared. The ocean cannot become another arena in which wealthier nations draw the greatest benefit while poorer and more vulnerable countries are asked merely to endorse the rules.

The first Conference of the Parties for the High Seas Treaty, scheduled to take place in early January 2027, will be a critical moment. It must not become a narrow exercise in procedure or a meeting dominated by those already best equipped to influence outcomes. It should establish an implementation culture based on ambition, inclusion and urgency. It must ensure that the financial mechanism is strong enough to support developing countries, that scientific cooperation is meaningful, and that capacity-building is not reduced to occasional workshops or vague promises. The treaty’s decision-making body is expected to convene within its first year in force, making the coming months decisive for how this new era of ocean governance is shaped.

There is another important lesson here. The world has too often separated environmental protection from development, as though nations must choose between conserving nature and improving the lives of their people. For island states, this is a false choice. A healthy ocean is development. It supports fisheries and livelihoods. It protects coastlines. It regulates climate. It sustains tourism, culture and community. It offers scientific discoveries that may help humanity confront disease, food insecurity and environmental change. To protect the ocean is not to turn away from progress. It is to redefine progress so that it can endure.

This is why the High Seas Treaty matters so deeply. It offers a chance to move beyond a culture of reaction—responding only after a fishery declines, a species disappears, a reef bleaches or an ecosystem is damaged beyond repair. It gives the international community an opportunity to act with greater foresight: to assess environmental risks before they are allowed to grow, to establish protected areas before the last refuge is lost, and to place stewardship alongside opportunity. But no agreement, however historic, can substitute for political will.

The treaty will need champions: governments willing to invest in its success; scientists willing to share knowledge; institutions prepared to support fair access; civil society determined to hold leaders accountable; and young people who refuse to accept that the ocean’s future should be decided without them. Seychelles has long believed that the world must see the ocean not as a boundary between nations, but as the great connector of humanity. That belief is even more urgent today.

The high seas belong to no single country and its condition affects us all. The High Seas Treaty is therefore more than a legal instrument. It is a test of whether multilateralism can still respond to the challenges that no nation can solve alone.

The ocean has a law and now the world must give it life.

James Alix Michel, is Former President of the Republic of Seychelles

IPS UN Bureau

 

 

 

 

À l’occasion de la parution de « Comment l’Amérique a donné l’Iran aux mollahs » signé par le grand reporter états-unien Scott Anderson (éditions Saint-Simon), Pascal Boniface revient sur les grands moments qui ont mené la chute du Shah d’Iran en 1979. D’après l’auteur, les États-Unis, aveuglés par leur confiance en leur allié et sourds aux revendications de la population iranienne, portent une lourde responsabilité dans l’arrivé au pouvoir de l’ayatollah Khomeiny.

L’ouvrage de Scott Anderson nous plonge dans les rouages qui ont contribué à la fin du régime monarchique : perception d’une soumission de l’Iran vis-à-vis de Washington, société fracturée entre un Téhéran bourgeois et une ruralité déstabilisée par une modernisation à marche forcée, et surtout méconnaissance totale par les diplomates états-uniens du pays dans lequel ils évoluaient.

Une lecture précieuse qui permet de percevoir sur un nouveau jour les errements de la stratégie de Washington dans la guerre actuellement menée à l’encontre de la République islamique.

L’article J’ai lu… « Comment l’Amérique a donné l’Iran aux mollahs » de Scott Anderson est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

On 23 September 2026, European Council President, António Costa, delivered a speech at the United Nations Security Council meeting on maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine, in the margins of the United Nations General Assembly High Level Week.

On 23 September 2026, European Council President, António Costa, delivered a speech at the High Level meeting to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the Declaration on the Right to Development, in the margins of the United Nations General Assembly High Level Week.

Main agenda items, approximate timing, public sessions and press opportunities.

On 23 September 2026, European Council President, António Costa, delivered a speech at the “Building an Economy for the Many” High level breakfast hosted by New York City Mayor, Zohran Mamdani.

Press briefing ahead of the upcoming Agriculture and Fisheries Council will take place on Friday, 25 September 2026 at 12.30.

Press briefing ahead of the upcoming Foreign Affairs Council (Defence) will take place on 25 September 2026 at 09.50.

The Council of the European Union set its position ahead of negotiations with the Parliament on amending and reinforcing the market stability reserve.

On 22 September 2026, European Council President, António Costa, delivered a speech at the High level international meeting on the Two-State solution and the Comprehensive Peace Plan for Gaza, “The Road Ahead: One Year After the New York Declaration and the Comprehensive 20-point Peace Plan”, summit co-hosted by France, the United Kingdom and Canada, in the margins of the United Nations General Assembly High Level Week.

The Council prolonged the restrictive measures targeting those responsible for undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine for another 36 months, until 22 September 2029.

The Council adopted a decision to amend the first assistance measure by increasing financial allocations to €20 million under the EPF to further strengthen the defence capacities of the Djibouti Armed Forces.

On 21 September 2026, European Council President, António Costa, together with the leaders of Australia, Barbados, Brazil, Canada, India and Kenya, convened the Partners for multilateralism, international law, peace and prosperity summit (P4M summit), in the margins of the United Nations General Assembly High Level Week.

On 21 September 2026, European Council President, António Costa, together with the leaders of Australia, Barbados, Brazil, Canada, India and Kenya convened the Partners for multilateralism, international law, peace and prosperity summit (P4M summit), in the margins of the United Nations General Assembly High Level Week.

The President of the European Council, António Costa, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen and the Prime Minister of Australia, Anthony Albanese met on 21 September in the margins of the United Nations General Assembly.

Declaration of the Partners for Multilateralism (P4M) summit, 21 September 2026: a joint commitment to multilateralism, international law, peace and prosperity.