Feed aggregator

Spokespersons for Parliament and for the political groups will hold a briefing on the 5 – 8 October plenary session, on Friday at 11.00 in Parliament’s Anna Politkovskaya press room.

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Japan can use the Iran war to reexamine its security framework, with particular attention to preparations for a contingency involving Taiwan.

Central Asia aligns rhetorically with Beijing and Moscow in regional group settings, materially with Washington in bilateral deals, and with no one in particular at the United Nations.

Five military officials were arrested in connection to the deaths of 14 servicemen lost at sea during a combat exercise in southwestern Kazakhstan, as a day of national mourning is observed.

Sommaire

Numéro spécial : Les cinq verrous de la mer Rouge
- L’Erythrée
- Djibouti : le siècle français
- Afar et Issa : l’impossible démocratie ethnique
- Djibouti, un Etat-Port
- La question somalienne
- Somalie : la crise de l‘année 2026 
- La Somalie : un protectorat turc ?
- Le Puntland n’est pas une fiction
Livres
Relire Henry de Monfreid pour comprendre les constantes de la géopolitique de la Mer Rouge et du détroit de Bab el Mandeb


Editorial de Bernard Lugan
Intervenant après  la quasi fermeture du détroit d’Ormuz, la prise de contrôle de la rive arabe du détroit de Bab el-Mandeb par les Houtis alliés de l’Iran bouleverse la géopolitique des flux maritimes. Par le détroit de Bab el-Mandeb  transitent en effet  10 à 15 % du commerce mondial et près de 30 % du trafic conteneurisé. Toute perturbation dans ce détroit affecte donc immédiatement les chaînes logistiques entre l’Asie, le Golfe, l’Europe et le reste du monde. 
La mer Rouge et le détroit de Bab el-Mandeb n’ont  pas attendu la guerre  américano-iranienne pour être au cœur de la géopolitique  mondiale. Depuis le XVIe siècle, cette artère économique majeure est en effet au centre des convoitises des  grandes et des moyennes puissances. Longtemps cul-de-sac, la mer Rouge est devenue un des axes maritimes mondiaux les plus fréquentés après 1869, date de l’inauguration du Canal de Suez. Cependant, aujourd’hui encore, ses rivages inhospitaliers sont longés par des boutres mouillant au débouché de ces routes caravanières si bien décrites par Henry de Monfreid, et dont les constantes ethno-tribales s’inscrivent en arrière-plan des conflits actuels.
Aujourd’hui, le contrôle de ses ports clés, Djibouti, Berbera, Assab, et plus au nord ceux du Soudan, explique la présence militaire régionale des États-Unis, de la Chine, de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne, des EAU et de la Turquie. Djibouti, « hub » militaire et logistique de la mer Rouge, accueille ainsi une base américaine, une base chinoise, une base française et des navires japonais et italiens  y sont régulièrement présents. Sans perdre de vue que la Turquie qui a fait de la Somalie un quasi protectorat a opéré un retour spectaculaire dans ce qui fut son ancienne zone d’influence dont elle avait été chassée durant le premier mondial.
L’émiettement entre trois Etats, Erythrée, Djibouti et Somalie, plus deux Etats auto-proclamés, le Somaliland et le Puntland disputés entre les puissances régionales et extra régionales, ajoute à la complexité de la situation actuelle. Le but de ce numéro spécial est d’en expliquer les constantes.
D'autant plus que depuis la fin du mois de septembre, la guerre a repris en Éthiopie, une guerre sur trois fronts (Tigré, Afar et Amhara). Avec à la base, une fois encore, des questions ethno-territoriales qui menacent de faire éclater la mosaïque ethnique d’un pays enclavé depuis l’indépendance de l’Erythrée. Or, si ce conflit devenait une nouvelle guerre de tous contre tous, ce serait alors toute la région de la Corne qui pourrait s'embraser. L'Afrique Réelle du mois de novembre 2026 consacrera un important dossier à ce nouveau conflit  et à ses conséquences.

Les commissions de l’environnement et de la santé publique souhaitent que le prochain outil européen de prévention et de réaction fasse plus pour anticiper les crises et soutenir la reprise.
Commission de l'environnement, de la santé publique et de la sécurité alimentaire
Commission de la santé publique

Source : © Union européenne, 2026 - PE

Well, it feels like I picked a good time to start trying to blog more.

Andy Burnham’s speech to the Labour party conference has fired the gun on something that felt pretty unlikely just a few weeks ago: a debate about the UK’s relationship with the EU.

Given that one month ago I myself was arguing that silence reflected a likely low profile for EU affairs for Burnham, I am forced to reconsider my position, which I happily do, even if I’m not yet fully sold on how far this new process will go.

Burnham’s speech highlighted the degree to which we shouldn’t oversell the move right now. The section on the EU was pretty short and vague in its intent, coming after a much more impassioned and developed exploration of social care; even electoral reform got more of a commitment than Europe.

But Burnham did move the dial in saying that Brexit had done “more harm than good”. With that came the implication that red lines might have to change or go, something confirmed by subsequent remarks that leave all options on the table.

As someone who’s spent years saying we need to have a public debate about what the UK’s relationship with the EU should be, including the costs and benefits of different options, it’s very odd to hear an actual Prime Minister say just that, and I guess I should feel more positive than I do.

Part of my hesitancy is that there’s a big gap between saying you want a debate to see if you can find a consensus picture and actually doing that. As we know, there has been a lot of talking about what individuals would like to see happen (as last week) which largely involves ignoring inconveniences like other people having ideas (and votes) too. Like the EU itself.

On this, Burnham has not said much, although there appears to be some recognition that there’s no point in coming up with a plan that won’t fly in Brussels or national capitals.

Moreover, there is also a tendency in British discussions to date to treat ‘Europe’ as a separate box from the rest of politics. If we might learn one thing from Brexit, then it is that involvement in the system of European integration comes with extensive and deep entanglements across the full range of economic and political life, in ways that aren’t immediately apparent. To flip that on its head, any discussion of European policy will also have to consider government policy in general, since the former can only be sustainable if it is married to the latter and the conceptualisation of the UK’s development.

Here, Burnham has been less explicit and given the relative disconnect of social care or electoral reform from the EU’s remit we might wonder if there becomes a splitting off of European work to allow the other items to press on.

And finally, despite everything we’ve experienced in the past decade, we risk forgetting that most people don’t have strongly held views on European integration or British policy. Preferences are relatively shallow and liable to shift, depending on what information you give people, a point highlighted by some polling over the summer by Britain Elects. More pertinently, the ability of campaigners to reframe options in active political debates was well demonstrated by the Leave campaign in 2016, building on long experience in articulating eurosceptic arguments; something largely absent in Remain.

This is perhaps where Burnham has been least adventurous. He seems to know his own mind on much of his politics and has previously expressed a desire for much closer EU relations, but here seems determined at this stage not to prejudge a debate where a consensus view might not quite match his.

Fair enough, but in the prospective of having to defend going across red lines, up to and including rejoining, there needs to be much more development of the rhetorical lines and arguments that will convey the logic and imperative of that change.

Go back to the conference speech and the section on the EU, which I include here:

“Later this year, there will be a UK-EU summit where one of the issues on the agenda will be how we best work together on immigration.

And beyond that we will work to secure gains for our industries most harmed by Brexit.

Conference, these are important concrete steps.

But they are not enough.

I say this to you and the country.

We will not give Britain the clear path we need into the rest of the century until we decide on a long-term relationship with what is still our largest market.

I cannot say to you truthfully that where we are is good enough.

Brexit has done more harm than good.

We need to restore a higher level of growth and prosperity for Britain.

So, I will take the opportunity around the summit to lay out to you, to lay out to the country, what I believe the different options are for Britain’s long-term relationship with our European partners.

And there are different options.

And I will see if we can find consensus around one which will give us clarity about our position, and the future of the continent we live in.”

So is this just about ‘growth and prosperity’ and ‘markets’, or does ‘the future of the continent’ cover something more? Burnham will recall that owning the rational argument in 2016 didn’t cut it against the emotional lines that Leave advanced, but we wait to see if he has his own take to bring to the matter.

So we wait for some more flesh on the bones of this moment. Potentially, it opens up a path to major movement in British policy, even if that seems likely to be limited to manifesto commitments in the general election to break current red lines. Certainly, the initial response has been at the better end of expectations, with generally positive reactions in Labour and more muted lines from Reform and the Conservatives (partly reflecting their focus on the pension triple lock, where they think there’s more traction).

The possible unblocking of the reset negotiations to allow for a late November summit is an important contextual development here, since it is a marker of how serious Burnham is about moving forward. The uncertainty here is that university fees seems to be parked in the youth mobility deal, something that had been a big EU ask: if it has been disconnected, then that suggests the EU is also up for moving things promptly and amicably. If that turns out not to be the case, then we are back to underlining the centrality of EU preferences in all this.

In the meantime, it might be helpful to start laying the groundwork for what’s coming. The following graphics offer a summary of possible models and some key points to keep in mind as the debate starts. As ever, my interest in how we might move towards a grounded and resilient relationship that works for most people means that I’ve got to step up on providing useful and impartial support, so if you have any questions or queries then do just ask.

 

 

PDF: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic150

 

PDF: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic149

The post “And there are different options” appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Alessia ist seit 2025 Doktorandin an der Berlin School of Economics und dem DIW Graduate Center und verstärkt unser Team in der Abteilung Kriminalität, Arbeit und Ungleichheit als wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin. Sie hat ihren M.Sc. in Economic and Social Sciences an der Bocconi-Universität in ...

Durée de la vidéo : 60'

Clause de non-responsabilité : L'interprétation des débats facilite la communication mais ne constitue en aucun cas un enregistrement authentifié des débats. Seuls le discours original ou la traduction écrite révisée du discours original peuvent être considérés authentiques.
Source : © Union européenne, 2026 - PE

Dauer des Videos : 60'

Haftungsausschluss : Die Verdolmetschung der Debatten soll die Kommunikation erleichtern, sie stellt jedoch keine authentische Aufzeichnung der Debatten dar. Authentisch sind nur die Originalfassungen der Reden bzw. ihre überprüften schriftlichen Übersetzungen.
Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Length of video : 60'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

ENTWURF EINER STELLUNGNAHME zum vierten EU-Aktionsplan für die Gleichstellung der Geschlechter mit Prioritäten für die Gleichstellung der Geschlechter und die Frauenrechte in der Außenpolitik
Ausschuss für auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Hannah Neumann

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Three Vietnamese policy documents, issued between 2019 and 2024, changed how I understood the new EU-Vietnam partnership. Resolution 52-NQ/TW, issued by the Politburo in 2019, set a target for the digital economy to reach approximately 30 percent of GDP by 2030. In 2021, the National Green Growth Strategy, approved by Prime Ministerial Decision 1658/QĐ-TTg, set the same target at 30 percent. Resolution 57-NQ/TW, issued by the Politburo in 2024, set it again: at least 30 percent. All three documents predate the January 2026 upgrade, showing that Vietnam’s digital priorities were established well before the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership — not once, but three times over.

I brought this case to the UACES Annual Conference in Prague this year, presenting it on a panel about reimagining the EU as a global development actor. The partnership itself was still very new. Vietnam and the EU marked 35 years of diplomatic relations in 2025, and on 29 January 2026 that relationship was formally upgraded to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership through a Joint Statement adopted in Hanoi, making Vietnam the EU’s first Comprehensive Strategic Partner in ASEAN. Within that broader context, my research poses a more focused question: why science and technology cooperation was prioritised in the CSP, and how the EU’s Global Gateway framework actually supports it in practice. The paper does not attempt to assess results because of how recently the partnership was established. It stays with the policy justification, and with what the documents themselves reveal about where this priority came from.

Reading these documents changed how I approached the CSP. I had initially focused on what the EU was offering Vietnam. But the Vietnamese documents made me ask a different question: how does this partnership fit priorities Vietnam had already set for itself?

Two theoretical lenses helped me make sense of that question. Normative Power Europe explains part of the EU’s side: the Joint Statement pursues cooperation through funding and institutional dialogue, the two channels that echo what Manners calls transference and procedural diffusion. Some of the language also invites comparison with the Brussels Effect, which Bradford describes as unilateral and market-driven. The Joint Statement speaks of promoting “convergence of international standards in the digital domain.” Yet I read this as negotiated, shared cooperation rather than one-sided regulatory export, although the wording alone cannot tell us how much influence each side will have over those standards. The document places this language under digital cooperation, alongside 5G and semiconductor supply chains. Research cooperation, including Horizon Europe, appears elsewhere. I noticed that distinction while mapping the Joint Statement: the issues are all technological, but they do not raise the same kinds of questions for the two sides. A research exchange and a telecoms contract involve different interests and negotiations. That may help explain why cooperation in research was easier to present as low-friction common ground, even while the more difficult digital questions remained.

Financing is where the picture becomes less clear. Global Gateway has put significant money behind energy and transport projects in Vietnam, and some of those commitments came before the CSP. Science and technology look different. The two sides signed a Letter of Intent in May 2026, and Vietnamese researchers were already taking part in Horizon Europe, but I could not find a separate Global Gateway funding package for this area. One possible reason is timing. Energy cooperation had the Just Energy Transition Partnership, agreed in 2022 with the EU, the G7 and other partners, in place well before the CSP, whereas the newer science and technology commitments are still being worked out. I need to look more closely at how these funding decisions were made before drawing a firmer conclusion.

The conversation did not end when the panel did. The session chair followed up with a set of questions that I am genuinely grateful for: whether those Global Gateway projects were already planned before the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership was established, what exactly makes cooperation “low-friction”, and how Global Gateway connects institutionally to Horizon Europe across two different Commission directorates. These were exactly the kinds of questions that make a paper better, and they are ones I am taking back with me to think through properly.

What stays with me most from Prague, more than any single finding in the paper itself, is a clearer sense of how much this work still needs refining. Science and technology cooperation under this Comprehensive Strategic Partnership looks like a genuine, shared priority, but the fuller story of how far that priority is actually being resourced is one I am still working through. That unfinished work is what I am bringing home from this conference.

The post Converging Priorities: Vietnam and the EU in Science and Technology appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Newsletter - 5-8 October 2026 - Strasbourg plenary session

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Dauer des Videos : 135'

Haftungsausschluss : Die Verdolmetschung der Debatten soll die Kommunikation erleichtern, sie stellt jedoch keine authentische Aufzeichnung der Debatten dar. Authentisch sind nur die Originalfassungen der Reden bzw. ihre überprüften schriftlichen Übersetzungen.
Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Length of video : 135'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Dauer des Videos : 60'

Haftungsausschluss : Die Verdolmetschung der Debatten soll die Kommunikation erleichtern, sie stellt jedoch keine authentische Aufzeichnung der Debatten dar. Authentisch sind nur die Originalfassungen der Reden bzw. ihre überprüften schriftlichen Übersetzungen.
Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Length of video : 60'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Le capitaine Smit Machchhar a été agressé par un autre pilote à bord du vol Flydubai à destination de Tel Aviv.