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What Does Joe Biden's State of the Union Address Mean for the Middle East?

The National Interest - Sat, 09/03/2024 - 19:04

President Joseph Biden delivered a strong State of the Union address last night, drawing sharp contrasts with former President Donald Trump and congressional Republicans.

Opening with a forceful defense of America’s NATO allies, Biden called on Congress to approve more funding for Ukraine’s defense against Russian invasion. Biden took Americans back to 1941 when the United States was about to enter World War II and had to summon the political will to rebuild its armed forces.

Today presents a similar moment and similar test. The president repeatedly reminded Americans that “history watches” how the nation responds to crises. “Not since President Lincoln and the Civil War have our freedom and democracy been under attack at home like they are today,” Biden said.

“What makes our moment rare is that freedom and democracy are under attack simultaneously at home and abroad.”

It was a critical moment for Biden, who is working hard to advance his foreign and domestic agenda through a divided Congress.

Biden's most significant announcement came near the end of his speech when he confirmed that the U.S. military would establish a “temporary Mediterranean pier on the coast of Gaza” to receive shipments of water, food, and medicine.

Biden promised the mission would not involve deploying U.S. troops on the ground while allowing life-saving supplies to flow into Gaza.

While reiterating his belief in Israel's right to defend itself against Hamas, Biden condemned the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. “To Israel, I say this: humanitarian aid cannot be a secondary consideration or a bargaining chip. Protecting and saving innocent lives must be a priority,” he said. “As we look to the future, the only real solution to the situation is a two-state solution over time.”

Washington and its Arab partners realize that amid the traumatic events since October 7, Israelis and Palestinians are in no mood to consider a peace deal now or soon. Likewise, they recognize that the Palestinian Authority, undermined by successive Netanyahu governments and despised by its voters for its incompetence and corruption, is not up to the task of governing Gaza.

But in the modern Middle East, political vacuums still invite violence and terrorism. We, therefore, need a realistic and, above all, pragmatic solution that can withstand the unrest that will inevitably follow the war.

Since even a “revitalized” Palestinian Authority, as advocated by the White House, could not legitimately govern Gaza after the war without the approval of Hamas. Even with the complete destruction of Hamas’ strategic assets, the radical ideology will remain, and Iran will continue to support whatever political form it takes.

In short, Iran’s grip on Gaza will remain, no matter how many bombs are dropped. Loosening that grip is America’s biggest challenge. The United States needs a clear and unmoving policy towards Iran that recognizes that Tehran’s strategic goals—driving America from the Middle East and shattering Israel’s democracy—are fundamentally antithetical to U.S. interests. 

Thomas Friedman described it wonderfully in the New York Times: “We should have no illusions about the risks because the shadow war playing out there could come screaming out of the shadows at any moment.”

Finally, we need a realistic and courageous American approach that recognizes that the Palestinians need an alternative to Hamas’ ideology and the perpetual conflict it feeds. That alternative must provide real hope for jobs, housing, schools, and hospitals. Out of Palestinian prosperity will come lasting peace that ensures security and dignity for Israelis and Palestinians.

Ahmed Charai is the Publisher of Jerusalem Strategic Tribune and serves on the boards of directors of the Atlantic Council, the International Crisis Group, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and the Center for the National Interest.

Image: Shutterstock.com. 

Navy Battleship USS New Jersey Is Getting a Major Upgrade

The National Interest - Sat, 09/03/2024 - 16:53

Summary: The USS New Jersey, a historical Iowa-class battleship and the embodiment of an era when battleships dominated naval warfare, is currently undergoing a significant $10 million refurbishment. This once-in-a-generation maintenance cycle includes repainting, applying a new protective coating, repairing the cathodic protection system, and conducting inspections for leaks to preserve the ship for future visitors. The maintenance work offers a unique opportunity for dry dock tours during weekends. Post-refurbishment, the USS New Jersey will return to the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, where it was originally constructed in the 1940s.

Historic Battleship USS New Jersey Prepares for a New Era with Major Repairs

Once upon a time, battleships ruled the waves. These giant steel behemoths could weigh up to 70,000 tons and pack enough firepower to obliterate an entire coast. World War Two was the last dance of the battleship, and since only a small number of these warships survive.

The USS New Jersey is one of them undergoing an important maintenance cycle to ensure its survival. 

The battleship is heading for significant repairs that will ensure that it is suitable for visits well into the future. As part of a $10 million refurbishment, the USS New Jersey will get a repainting, new coating, and repairs on the warship’s cathodic protection system.

In addition, it will be inspected for potential leaks that might endanger the structure. The USS Texas, an older battleship that serves as a floating museum, is undergoing major repairs after leaks listed the warship six degrees. 

“We will be offering a dry dock tour on the weekends when work is not being done at the shipyard, and information about that will be announced in conjunction with an announcement that will hopefully be forthcoming very soon about when, in fact, the ship is actually going to move here from Camden,” said Marshall Spevak, CEO of the Battleship New Jersey Museum and Memorial.

Once the repairs are over, the USS New Jersey will return to the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, where it was initially built in the 1940s.

The USS New Jersey 

The USS New Jersey has an interesting history. As an Iowa-class battleship, the USS New Jersey is part of the last batch of battleships ever built by the U.S. Navy. It was designed in an era when battleships ruled supreme and before aircraft carriers became the center of attention.

However, with the end of World War Two, battleships became obsolete. Aircraft carriers and the scores of fighter jets they could carry meant that battleships could no longer survive in the seas. 

In total, the battleship was commissioned and recommissioned an impressive four times. This rather unusual fact is due to the fluctuating ship numbers of the Navy in the years after World War Two and the perceived needs of the Cold War. When Ronald Reagan became president in 1980, he launched an intense defense program that sought to build a 600-ship navy. To reach that number, the Navy recommissioned older ships like the USS New Jersey and equipped them with the necessary modern tools to make them relevant.

For example, after its 1982 refurbishment, the USS New Jersey packed nine 16-inch (406mm) main guns, 12 5-inch (127) secondary guns, 32 BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles, 16 RGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and four 20mm Phalanx CIWS autocannons. The battleship could also land four helicopters. 

The USS New Jersey was decommissioned for the last time in the early 1990s and has been serving as a floating museum since then, keeping naval history alive. 

About the Author  

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Shutterstock. 

The XF-85 Goblin Fighter Was a Total Failure

The National Interest - Sat, 09/03/2024 - 14:38

Summary: The McDonnell XF-85 Goblin, a unique "parasite fighter" designed during the late 1940s, was an innovative yet ultimately unsuccessful attempt to extend the defensive capabilities of U.S. strategic bombers. Intended to be deployed from the bomb bays of the B-35 and B-36 bombers, the Goblin was envisioned as a compact, deployable defense against enemy fighters. Despite its futuristic design, including stubby wings, three tail stabilizers, and a distinctive hook for reattachment to its mothership, the XF-85 faced significant operational challenges, particularly in re-docking with the carrier aircraft. Turbulence and technical difficulties during test flights led to multiple crash landings and ultimately, the cancellation of the program in 1949.

From Dream to Reality and Back: The Tale of the XF-85 Goblin

Its manufacturer called it the “Goblin”—and by looks alone, the egg-shaped jet certainly deserved the name. The McDonnell XF-85 jet resembled little more than a pressurized cockpit on top of a bulbous J34 turbojet engine, with small stubby swept-back wings that could fold inwards. Rounding out its ghastly appearance were an unusual three tail stabilizers, three shark-like belly-mounted fins, and a giant extendable hook rising from the open snout of its jet intake.

To top off the Goblin’s disreputable looks, it lacked landing gear, and had to make do with a retractable steel skid for emergencies. That’s because the XF-85 was a “parasite fighter.” It was designed to be carried aloft by a huge nuclear bomber and air dropped to defend its ponderous mothership from attacking enemy fighters. Upon accomplishing its mission, the Goblin was supposed to use its protruding hook to snag a ride back to home base attached to its mothership.

The XF-85 was intended to protect gigantic B-35 fly-wing and B-36 Peacemaker strategic bombers designed to fly thousands of miles carrying nuclear weapons in their capacious bomb bays. These had fuselages large enough to fully enclose a Goblin in their bomb bays.

Though it may sound like a concept strait out of a Rescue Rangers cartoon, parasite fighters actually had a long but obscure history. The first were British biplanes that were tested hooking up to military airships during World War I. Then during the 1930s the Navy deployed F9C Sparrowhawk biplanes on board 239-meter-long helium-filled rigid airships Akron and Macon. The Sparrohawks also used hooks to “land” onto a trapeze extended from the airships. However, both scouting airships had crashed by 1935.

During World War II, the Soviet Union briefly mounted I-16 fighters onto a hulking TB-3 bombers for air strikes in 1941, and Japan deployed rocket-powered Okha (“Cherry Blossom”) kamikaze plans on G4M bombers.

The Air Force’s formally requested its own parasite fighters in January 1944 at time its long-range strategic bombers were experiencing heavy losses to German fighters in World War II. In the short term, the Air Force would develop effective long-range piston engine P-47 and P-51 fighters with drop-tanks to accompany the bombers all the way to target.

But the Air Force knew new jet fighters would soon enter service that would dramatically outperform piston-engine fighters—while also guzzling fuel at a much faster rate. Thus, the theory went that having a bomber lift parasite jet fighter into enemy airspace would overcome the range problem.

However, only the St. Louis-based McDonnell aircraft company responded to the Air Force’s request for proposals in March 1945. That October the Air Force ordered two XP-85 prototypes (later re-designated XF-85s) and additionally planned for parasite-carrying capability in its forthcoming B-36 bombers, some of which were planned to trade away their bombloads entirely to carry three XF-85s.

The Goblin actually exhibited decent handling characteristics and theoretically could attain respectable speeds of 650 miles per hour on its lone axial-flow turbojet. Four .50-caliber machine guns in the side fuselage were to constitute its relatively light armament.

As the B-35 never entered service and the B-36 was still being developed, in 1948 the Goblin was instead “nested” in the yellow-painted belly of a specially converted EB-29B bomber named “Monstro.” The little jet was attached via a retractable trapeze based on the type used on the Akron-class airships, with the lower half of the Goblin protruding from it.

 As Goblin #46-523 was damaged in a crane accident during wind tunnel testing, #46-524 would fly all but one of the trial flights.

At first the XF-85 was carried aloft and retracted into launch position but not deployed. Finally on August 23, McDonnell test pilot Edwin Schoch launched the XF-85 from the extendible trapeze it was mounted on. The Pennsylvanian was an experienced Navy Helldiver pilot decorated for damaging a Japanese battleship during the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

However, turbulence from Monstro’s air-cushion buffeted Schoch as he attempted to gently guide the Goblin back onto the hook for recovery. The two-ton fighter weighed less than half the weight of the F-80 jet he had practiced hook-up approaches with earlier.

After ten minutes of unsuccessful hook-up attempts, to the horror of the B-29 crew the XF-85’s canopy smashed into the hook, shattering the glass and ripping off Schoch’s flight helmet and oxygen mask.

The Goblin tumbled downwards, but Schoch managed to regain control of the Goblin and skid-land it on a dry lake bed in the Muroc desert below in southern California.

Undeterred, Schoch recommenced testing on October 14–15 with a repaired Goblin modified with upward-folded wingtips for more precise control.

On three occasions, he successfully managed to hook bizarre jet back on to the EB-29 mothership. But two subsequent hookups failed, with the skyhook actually breaking on the last attempt. Schoch was forced to crash-land his XF-85 each time. XF-85 46-523 also failed to hook up on its only flight in April 8 the following year.

Though McDonnell sought to devise an improved trapeze system, news of the XF-85’s difficulties, combined with constrained budget, led the Air Force to promptly cancel the project in October 1949, leaving Schoch the only pilot to have ever flown the Goblin on its seven flights.

The Pentagon’s faltering interest stemmed from several new development. Excellent Soviet MiG-15 jets already promised to outperform the XF-85. The Air Force had already ordered a new long-range escort fighter drawing upon wingtip fuel pods resulting in the XF-88 and XF-90 prototypes. And improving aerial-refueling technology promised to soon extend the combat radius of its short-range fighters.

The Air Force wasn’t entirely done with parasite fighters, however. The service’s Fighter Conveyor program (FICON) focusd on pairing F-84 Thunderjet fighter-bombers with the B-36.

Project Tip Tow involved having two modified EF-84Ds towed by the wingtips of an EB-29, but turbulence and wing-strain complicated the project. A fatal F-84 on B-29 crash ended the program.

Project Tom-Tom alternately sought to implement the wingtip approach using a specially modified GRB-36 Peacemaker and two RF-84F Thunderflash swept-wing reconnaissance jets, was also terminated after a nearly fatal decoupling.

The Air Force instead returned to the Goblin-like concept of belly-mounting jets from retractable trapeze hooks. They successfully tested mating F-84s to a GRB-36, though the Thunderjets couldn’t fit all the way inside the Peacemaker.

The scheme worked well enough that ten GRB-36s and twenty-five RF-84K Thunderflash armed reconaissance fighters were operationally deployed from 1955–1956 before being replaced by U-2 spy planes.

As for the Goblins, the parasite jets went on to enjoy a quiet retirement and can be seen at the U.S. Air Force Museum in Dayton, Ohio and the Strategic Air Command & Aerospace Museum in Ashland, Nebraska.

About the Author 

Sébastien Roblin holds a master’s degree in conflict resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring.

From A-12 Avenger to the X-36: The Stealth Aircraft That Never Were

The National Interest - Sat, 09/03/2024 - 14:25

Summary: The United States boasts an extensive history of developing stealth aircraft, far beyond the widely recognized F-22 Raptor, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, and B-2 Spirit. Numerous stealth projects, including those that never reached operational status or were intended solely for technology demonstration, have contributed to America's stealth capabilities. Among these, Boeing's Bird of Prey served as a cost-effective stealth technology demonstrator, influencing future designs with its innovative production techniques.

Secret Skies: The Story of America's Classified Stealth Aircraft Programs

The United States operates more stealth aircraft than any other country on the planet, both in terms of volume and variety, with three publicly disclosed stealth platforms in service and at least three more at some stage of development.

But for every F-22 RaptorF-35 Joint Strike Fighter, or B-2 Spirit, there are a number of stealth jets that never found their way into operational hangars either because of program cancellations or, often, because they were never intended for combat service at all: Sometimes, programs aim to prove advanced new technological concepts, test classified new systems, or prove the efficacy of a capability meant for inclusion in other aircraft.

Because of the very nature of the technology, new stealth aircraft are usually developed under the utmost secrecy. The F-117 Nighthawk, as one famous example, was operational for years before the American government acknowledged its existence. Likewise, prototypes, technology demonstrators, and even programs meant for service but canceled for various reasons often remain shrouded in mystery for years, even after they stop flying.

Still commonly referred to as “Black Programs,” the Pentagon has a long and illustrious history of funding the classified development of advanced technologies. Today, the most secretive efforts fall under what’s commonly referred to as “Special Access Programs,” or SAPs, for which the distribution of information is limited even among those with the highest-reaching security clearances. But even within the world of SAPs, there remains another, even murkier designation: Unacknowledged SAPs, or USAPs. These efforts are so secretive that briefings are kept off paper and delivered by word of mouth only to the highest levels of government.

As we discussed in our in-depth coverage of the legend surrounding America’s seemingly mythical Aurora reconnaissance plane, many of these aircraft may never be revealed at all… But a few of these highly secret stealth aircraft have managed to peek out from behind the Black Budget veil, and some may have slipped beneath your radar since their disclosure.

BOEING’S BIRD OF PREY

Throughout the 1990s, a team of engineers from McDonnell Douglas’ Phantom Works (which later came under Boeing when that company acquired McDonnell Douglas) developed and tested a unique stealth aircraft shrowded in the secrecy of Area 51. This aircraft was known to most as the Bird of Prey. Unlike most stealth programs, the Bird of Prey, developed under the alias “YF-118G,” wasn’t aiming for operational service, but was a stealth technology demonstrator: elements of its design and production process are still working their way into Uncle Sam’s hangars to this very day.

Perhaps the most lasting contribution this incredible and exotic airframe made to America’s defense apparatus was in its audacity and subsequent success. While most stealth aircraft are known for their high cost, the Bird of Prey went from a pad of paper to the skies over Area 51 for less than the cost of a single F-35 today. The entire program cost just $67 million from start to finish.

Powered by a single Pratt & Whitney JT15D-5C turbofan engine, which produced just 3,190 pounds of thrust, the Bird of Prey wasn’t a fighter, but it did prove that Boeing had the chops to produce a stealth aircraft while advancing technologies linked to rapid prototyping, and single-piece composite material construction.

MCDONNELL DOUGLAS’ A-12 AVENGER II

On 13 January 1988, a joint team from McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics was awarded a development contract by the Navy for what was to become the A-12 Avenger II (not to be confused with Lockheed’s proposed A-12 of the 1960s). Once completed, the Navy’s A-12 would have been a flying-wing design reminiscent of Northrop Grumman’s B-2 Spirit or B-21 Raider, though much smaller. The sharp triangular shape of the A-12 eventually earned it the nickname, “the flying Dorito.“

The Navy planned to saddle the platform with an “A” prefix to demonstrate its use against ground targets despite actually having the ability to engage air targets with its two internally stored AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles. In other words, the A-12 Avenger II would have been America’s first real stealth fighter.

By 1991, however, the A-12 was significantly overweight, over budget, and behind schedule, leading to its unceremonious cancellation.

BOEING’S MODEL 853-21 QUIET BIRD

The largely forgotten Model 853-21 Quiet Bird is a prototype stealth aircraft that predates the first flight of the Have Blue – F-117’s precursor – by nearly 15 years.

The effort began as a study into developing a low-observable aircraft to serve as an observation plane for the U.S. Army.

Throughout 1962 and 1963, Boeing experimented with stealth aircraft design concepts for the Quiet Bird, incorporating different shapes and construction materials in an effort to reduce the jet’s radar cross section (RCS) long before Denys Overholser at Lockheed’s Skunk Works would develop the means to accurately calculate an RCS without placing the aircraft in front of a radar array.

Although Boeing’s tests did indeed prove promising, the Army didn’t fully appreciate the value a stealth aircraft could bring to the fight and the program was ultimately shelved. However, Boeing has credited lessons learned in the development of the Quiet Bird for some of the success it would later find with the AGM-86 Air Launched Cruise Missile.

NASA AND BOEING’S X-36 TAILLESS FIGHTER AGILITY RESEARCH AIRCRAFT 

Like the Bird of Prey, the X-36 program wasn’t about fielding a new stealth aircraft for combat, so much as for maturing the technologies that may eventually find their way there.

Today’s stealth fighters are extremely difficult to target, but are not very difficult to spot and track using even dated radar arrays. Because of the performance requirements of a fighter, jets like the F-35 and F-22 need components like large jet inlets and vertical tail surfaces; yet, these can be omitted from less aerobatic stealth aircraft like the B-2 Spirit. These components don’t compromise a stealth fighter’s low-observability against high-frequency targeting arrays, but do so against low-frequency early-warning radars that aren’t capable of providing a target-grade lock.

In the mid-’90s, NASA and McDonnell Douglas (later Boeing) teamed up to try to bridge the gap between the stealth capabilities of flying-wing designs like the B-2 and aerobatic fighters like the F-22. Their X-36 was designed to fly without the empennage, or tail assembly, found on most fighters.

The X-36 was built to a 28-percent scale of a full-sized fighter, measuring just 19 feet long. It used a canard forward of the wing, split ailerons, and thrust vector control to help compensate for the missing tail. A pilot on the ground controlled the aircraft using a heads-up display connected to a nose-mounted camera.

The X-36 flew a total of 31 successful flights over just 25 weeks, racking up 15 hours and 38 minutes of flight time utilizing four different flight control software iterations.

While no subsequent aircraft has been directly linked to the X-36 program, it’s worth noting that nearly all official renders coming from the Air Force’s NGAD and the Navy’s F/A-XX fighter programs in development show stealth aircraft without conventional tail surfaces, suggesting the X-36’s legacy may simply still be shrouded in secrecy.

Alex Hollings is a writer, dad, and Marine veteran.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

Main Image: Creative Commons. 

Russia's Kirov-Class Battlecruisers: A Nightmare That Won't End

The National Interest - Sat, 09/03/2024 - 14:08

Summary: The Kirov-class battlecruisers, once envisioned as the crown jewels of the Russian Navy, failed to live up to their formidable reputation. Despite being among the largest warships, second only to America's aircraft carriers, their operational effectiveness has been questioned. Launched in 1977, these nuclear-powered giants were heavily armed but struggled to match the enduring capabilities of their U.S. counterparts. With only two of the original four ships remaining by 2023, and one stuck in drydock since 1999, their future seems uncertain amid ongoing modernization efforts. This scenario mirrors a broader trend where traditional surface warships face obsolescence due to advanced anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems and hypersonic weapons. Both Russian and American navies have heavily invested in these large platforms, potentially at the expense of other, more relevant capabilities like submarines. The sinking of the Moskva, a smaller Russian battlecruiser, by Ukrainian forces underscores the vulnerability of such assets in modern warfare. The focus, instead, should shift towards developing effective countermeasures against emerging threats and enhancing the reach of offensive systems beyond A2/AD bubbles, ensuring naval forces remain competitive in contested environments.

End of an Era: The Decline of the Mighty Kirov-Class Battlecruisers

If the centerpiece of the United States Navy’s offensive strategy was the aircraft carrier, since the Cold War era, the Russian Navy’s main offensive system was their battlecruiser. Heavily armed, nuclear-powered, and seriously armored, the Kirov-class battlecruiser was to be the most important strategic asset in the Russian fleet. 

Yet, as my colleague, Peter Suciu, outlined in an article in these pages last year, the Kirov-class “never lived up to the hype.” 

Of course, one could say the same about America’s vaunted aircraft carriers in the age of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) defensive systems of the kind that both China and Russia possess (as well as their partners in Iran and North Korea).

The fact of the matter is that the era of surface warships might be at an end because of how sophisticated A2/AD has become (and how ubiquitous these systems have become). As for the Kirov-class, they struggled in ways that America’s flat tops never did. The Soviets and, later the Russians, envisaged these beasts raging across the world’s oceans in ways that sent shivers down the spines of even the Americans. 

The Kirov-Class Never Lived Up to Its Hype

Launched in 1977, the Kirov-class’s eponymously named warship was the second largest warship to traverse the oceans (next to America’s aircraft carriers). Four of these behemoths were built since then. They inspired so much fear-and-loathing among the US Navy’s brass that the Iowa-class battleships were refurbished and brought back into service in the 1980s as a counterweight to the Soviet battlecruiser threat. The Kirovs were loaded with potent long-range missiles rather than the traditional “big guns” that usually armed the decks of similar sized warships.

These warships carried an assortment of other missiles as well as torpedoes. They also housed three helicopters. 

Despite these beastly armaments, the Kirov-class lacks the staying power those other systems, such as those belonging to the US Navy, enjoy. Four warships were built between 1977-1988. 

Of those four, only two remained until 2023. The Admiral Nakhimov has been languishing in drydock since 1999! The other battlecruiser, the Pyotr Veliky, was slated to be modernized but the Russian Navy ultimately announced it was being retired last year. 

As for the Admiral Nakhimov, it has been undergoing “modernization” in port for years. There is real concern among Russia’s military planners that the warship will never leave port; that it will simply be constantly upgraded. Nevertheless, the Russians appear committed to refurbishing this weapon of war—giving it all new and deadlier weapons, to boot!

The Russian Battlecruiser and American Aircraft Carrier Aren't Useful Today

Although, this gets back to a point raised earlier: are large surface warships even relevant in today’s era of A2/AD and hypersonic weapons? 

The Americans have overcommitted to their aircraft carrier capability to the detriment of other, more relevant capabilities, such as their submarines. Meanwhile, the Russians appeared to have done something similar with their Kirov-class battlecruisers. 

In fact, the Russians should have gotten the wake-up call when their warship, the Moskva, which belonged to the smaller and cheaper Russian battlecruiser Slava-class, was sunk by the Ukrainians at the outset of the Russo-Ukraine War.  

Investing heavily into modernizing the remaining Kirov-class battlecruisers is a waste. 

Circumventing A2/AD with Distance

A similar fate which befell the Moskva could easily befall the Kirov-class, modernization notwithstanding. A better use of resource for any navy today would be to spend its money on developing effective countermeasures against drone swarms, hypersonic weapons, and massive numbers of antiship missiles. 

At the same time, being able to deploy offensive systems far beyond the range of A2/AD systems would ensure that a navy remained relevant in this age of contested environments. 

The Russians are making the same mistake that the Americans are in investing so heavily into their surface prestige weapons. These systems will not prove decisive. They are boondoggles. 

About the Author 

Brandon J. Weichert is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, as well as at American Greatness and the Asia Times. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower (Republic Book Publishers), Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Aircraft Carriers: The U.S. Navy's Greatest Weakness

The National Interest - Sat, 09/03/2024 - 13:50

Summary: The aircraft carrier, a dominant force since World War II, has long been the centerpiece of American naval strategy, symbolizing unmatched maritime power. However, the rise of sophisticated anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, particularly by China, poses significant threats to these carriers. China's investment in antiship missiles and hypersonic weapons is designed to counter the strategic advantages of U.S. carriers. Despite the carriers' defense mechanisms and support from their battle groups, the U.S. lacks effective defenses against hypersonic missile attacks. Given the evolving threat landscape, it's crucial for the U.S. Navy to adapt by keeping carriers away from A2/AD bubbles and focusing on modifications that enhance their survivability and operational reach. This strategic pivot is necessary to maintain the relevance and effectiveness of carriers in the face of emerging challenges, ensuring they continue to serve as a vital asset rather than a liability in potential conflicts with major state rivals like China.

From Dominance to Vulnerability: The Future of American Aircraft Carriers

The advent of the aircraft carrier during the Second World War was one of the most significant events in the annals of modern warfare. A floating airbase that could be moved close to enemy positions, or wage naval combat at great distances, as occurred in the Pacific Theater of the Second World War, was revolutionary. 

After the Second World War, the US Navy internalized the offensive strategic value of the aircraft carrier and made that system, rather than heavy cruisers or battleships, the lynchpin of their naval strategy. For 80 years, the American advantages in both aircraft carrier technology—and the strategic advantages these systems conferred upon the US Navy—made it the hegemon of the high seas. 

Not even the mighty Soviet Navy could compete with the Americans in this arena.

But 80 years is a long time to depend upon a weapon system—even one as complex and massive as an aircraft carrier.

Eventually, a challenger will arise who seeks to defeat the American power by creating strategies to defeat some of its most potent weapons. The Chinese have led the way in building a sophisticated arsenal of relatively cheap (compared to the cost of US aircraft carriers) antiship missile and advanced hypersonic weapons that negate many (if not all) of the advantages that aircraft carriers once conferred upon the US military.

China Leads the Way in Challenging US Aircraft Carriers

In the last decade, the world’s militaries have shifted their focus from developing offensive means to exert their will upon the world to creating ingenious defensive methods to prevent the world’s sole remaining superpower from meddling in what these rival states, such as China, view as their backyard. 

The goal is to draw the Americans into a fight near China, where they have established these sophisticated A2/AD “bubbles” meant to deny America access to these regions, while also threatening the survival of key American weapons platforms, like the expensive aircraft carriers. 

Sure, US aircraft carriers have a coterie of self-defense capabilities primed at preventing antiship missiles from sinking them or damaging their important flight decks. And US carriers are usually protected by a battle group consisting of submarines, destroyers, and other ships capable of adding to the protection of these carriers. 

Yet, for years China has laid the groundwork for building out defensive systems specifically aimed at destroying US aircraft carriers. For example, China leads the Americans (and the Russians, technically, lead both the Chinese and Americans) in the critical area of hypersonic weapons. Whatever defenses that US aircraft carriers and their attendant battle groups possess, the US military lacks the capabilities to defend itself against hypersonic missile attacks. 

What’s more, as Bill Gertz reported in his 2006 book, Enemies: How America’s Foes Steal Our Vital Secrets—and How We Let It Happen, in the 1990s, Chinese spies stole the classified plans for how the Navy trains its sailors to keep its warships afloat, even after having been hit with enemy weapons. 

The reason this development is important for understanding China’s threat to our warships—especially the aircraft carrier—is because Chinese war planners have had decades to develop weapons and tactics for hitting US warships in such a way that their crews would be unable to save their stricken ships. 

Beijing is prepared to decimate the US carrier fleet while the US Navy’s carriers are not defended against the systems China (and its autocratic allies) have amassed to stunt the power of US aircraft carriers.

Keep US Carriers Away from A2/AD Bubbles

For now, US aircraft carriers need to be kept back from these hotspots. Because so much money has been spent on building and maintaining these war leviathans, they should still be used. But not for going after great state rivals, notably China, who have an A2/AD arsenal capable of ending the aircraft carrier threat to their forces. 

Modifications should be made to the existing fleet of aircraft carriers to give them a real chance of being able to survive the flurry of Chinese antiship ballistic missiles and hypersonic weapons that will be lobbed their way if they come too close to what China considers their strategic area of interest. 

American flattops and the ships belonging to their battle groups should be modified to carry longer-range weapons and drones that would allow for power projection into contested domains while mitigating the physical threat to those carriers.

Until these changes are made, the US aircraft carrier will be more of a strategic liability than an asset in any conflict (which is coming soon) with China over Taiwan. 

About the Author 

Brandon J. Weichert is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, as well as at American Greatness and the Asia Times. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower (Republic Book Publishers), Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

The Navy Needs Medium Aircraft Carriers to Save the Aircraft Carrier

The National Interest - Sat, 09/03/2024 - 13:37

Summary: The strategic landscape's evolution, marked by robust anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) defenses from adversaries like China and Russia, challenges the U.S. Navy's reliance on its traditional, large aircraft carriers for power projection. Given the vulnerabilities of Nimitz-class and Ford-class carriers to such threats, the Navy could benefit from pivoting towards medium-sized aircraft carriers or adopting Japan's helicopter carrier concept. The concept of medium-sized carriers, once considered in the 1970s but abandoned during the Reagan-era defense buildup, offers a potentially more cost-effective, less complex alternative to the "monstrosities" currently favored. With defense budgets under scrutiny and the imperative of maintaining operational capabilities in contested zones, smaller, less sophisticated carriers could enhance the Navy's agility and survivability. The Izumo-class "helicopter-destroyer" from Japan, capable of operating F-35B Lightning II stealth fighters, exemplifies this approach with its significant cost savings and operational flexibility compared to the exorbitant Ford-class carriers. As the strategic value of massive aircraft carriers wanes in the face of evolving threats, exploring alternatives that balance power projection with survivability and cost-effectiveness becomes crucial for the Navy's future.

America Should Build Medium Aircraft Carriers Like Japan

Because the United States Navy has invested so much of its resources into its aircraft carrier program, letting go of the flat top as a key element of its fleet will be difficult to do. So, rather than totally abandoning the carrier program in the age of the contested battlespace, it might be best to compromise. 

Aircraft carriers certainly allow for immense power projection (so long as the area these warships are being deployed to can be penetrated by naval airpower without significant risk to the expensive carrier). As it stands now, however, China, Russia, and some other American rivals have robust anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) defenses in their respective regions of the world that would likely negate the power projection advantages that the US Navy’s aircraft carriers provide. What’s more, the Nimitz-class and new Ford-class aircraft carriers are so large that they might provide an easy target for those A2/AD systems.

The Navy might want to invest instead in building up its medium-sized aircraft carriers. Or, look at the Japanese helicopter carrier concept. The US military has previously explored the concept of medium-sized carriers (designated “CVV”). Back in the 1970s, the Navy was interested in building a fleet of these medium-sized carriers as opposed to the costlier, more complex Nimitz-class carriers. 

Yet, the Reagan era defense buildup of the 1980s allowed for the Navy to sink these plans for more cost-effective, less complicated medium-sized carriers, and continue to build the monstrosities that it (and the defense contracting community) prefers.

Navy Costs are Unsustainable

Today, just as with the 1970s, the United States cannot afford to lavish its tax dollars on the defense department—or any government program, really—the way that it has done for the last 30 years. Interestingly, it is precisely because Congress and successive presidents from both parties have lavished gobs of tax dollars on the Department of Defense that we are now at risk of losing a major war. 

These expensive weapons systems, such as the aircraft carriers the Navy relies upon, have become so complex and costly that we lack the means to replace them or even repair them in a timely, affordable manner if they are lost or damaged in combat. If these systems are taken out of the fight, as America’s rivals plan to do early in any conflict, then America would risk losing a war, as there are few other offensive systems that could project power the way that US flat tops can.

America’s rivals understand that the sophisticated and expensive systems, such as the aircraft carriers, are now at least as much of a liability for the US Navy in the face of their robust A2/AD capabilities as these systems are an advantage for the US military looking to project power. 

Therefore, building less sophisticated, smaller, and harder-to-destroy systems will be key for the United States. Because, right now, the aircraft carriers that once played such an important role for maintaining America’s deterrence against its foes are no longer performing that function. Rival states, notably China, do not fear the American aircraft carrier as they did during the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis.

Navy Should Look to Japan's Izumo-Class for Inspiration

According to Stavros Altamazoglou, “The Navy is exploring ‘Lightning Carriers’ that can operate the F-35B Lightning II stealth fighters, offering a versatile and risk-mitigated approach to maintain operational capability in contested regions like the South China Sea and near Taiwan.” 

Again, this is precisely the concept underlying Japan’s investment in helicopter carriers (from where vertical-takeoff warplanes, like the F-35, can be deployed). Japan’s Izumo-class “helicopter-destroyer” cost around $1.2 billion to build and is widely considered the most advanced indigenously built and operated warship in Asia today. 

Compare that to the $13 billion-a-pop Ford-class aircraft carriers (which, again, might not even be deployable in a contested environment, like the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait).

The Navy is steadfast in its commitment to the concept of aircraft carriers. If they won’t abandon this cultish obsession with a weapons system that could easily be proven to be too valuable to fight, at least they could invest in cheaper, more maneuverable, harder-to-hit medium-sized carriers, like the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force has been doing.

About the Author 

Brandon J. Weichert is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, as well as at American Greatness and the Asia Times. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower (Republic Book Publishers), Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

How the U.S. Navy's Iowa-Class Battleships Went to War One Last Time

The National Interest - Sat, 09/03/2024 - 02:40

Summary: During Desert Storm, an operation less commonly associated with naval might, the USS Missouri (BB-63) and USS Wisconsin (BB-64), both Iowa-class battleships, played a pivotal role. Originally commissioned during World War II and decommissioned thereafter, these vessels were brought back into service as part of President Ronald Reagan's initiative to build a 600-ship navy in response to the Soviet Union's military expansion during the 1980s. These battleships underwent modernization to become relevant in the late 20th century. Deployed to the Persian Gulf during the Gulf War, the Missouri and Wisconsin conducted bombardments against Iraqi positions, marking the last combat use of American battleships. Their deployment was part of a broader military strategy to liberate Kuwait and demonstrated the adaptability and enduring capability of naval firepower in modern warfare.

Desert Storm's Forgotten Giants: The Last Combat of Iowa-Class Battleships

Specific weapons systems tend to become associated with specific conflicts. Americans, for example, tend to associate the smoothbore musket with the Revolutionary War; rifled musket with the Civil War; mustard gas with the Great War; P-51 Mustang and B-17 Flying Fortress with World War II; ICBM with the Cold War; Napalm with Vietnam; et cetera.

What Americans do not associate is the battleship with Desert Storm. Rather, Desert Storm tends to conjure images of M1 Abrams tanks, tomahawk missiles, and Apache helicopters.

Yet, two battleships did indeed participate in Desert Storm, firing ordnance from the Persian Gulf in what would mark the US’s last use of a battleship in combat.

Back to the Future

The Americans used two battleships in Desert Storm, the USS Missouri (BB-63) and the USS Wisconsin (BB-64). Both ships belonged to the famed Iowa-class, which were commissioned during World War II and decommissioned long before Saddam Hussein ever invaded Kuwait.

The Soviet Union deserves credit for the recommissioning of the battleships, and their subsequent use in Desert Storm. President Ronald Reagan, in an effort to augment US military forces amidst a 1980s arms race against the Soviet Union, pressed to create a 600-ship navy. Creating a 600-ship navy is easier said than done; however, bridging the gap by building new ships was not a viable option.

The most expedient way to augment the navy’s ship strength was to recommission mothballed vessels – like the Missouri and the Wisconsin. Again, recommissioning wasn’t as simple as dusting off the dashboard and firing up the engine. Modernizing retrofits were required to make the World War II era battleships relevant in the age of Madonna, Ozzy Osbourne, and Sylvester Stallone.

The Battleships of Desert Storm

When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August of 1990, President George H.W. Bush sent troops and naval forces to Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf, respectively, to support Kuwait. (Sidebar: the deployment and perpetual stationing of US forces in Saudi Arabia motivated Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda to launch multiple attacks against American targets.) Two of the ships deployed: the Missouri and the Wisconsin.

In January 1991, the Missouri participated in her first bombardment action of Desert Storm, shelling an Iraqi command and control bunker near the Saudi border. The bombardment marked the first time the Missouri had fired her guns in combat since March 1953 off the coast of Korea.

The Wisconsin relieved the Missouri in February 1991. Then, the Wisconsin fired her guns for the first time in combat since March 1952, sending shells 19 miles away, to destroy an Iraqi artillery battery in southern Kuwait.

In sum, the Iowa-class battleships performed admirably during Desert Storm. Granted, the Iraqis lacked the capacity to pose much threat to a US naval vessel. And granted, the Navy took a backseat to both the Army and the Air Force during Desert Storm.

But the fact is that the Iowa battleships were essentially raised from the graveyard, from a bygone era, and performed admirably in a modern conflict.   

About the Author: Harrison Kass

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Keep the Water Flowing in the Pacific—Or Else China Will

The National Interest - Sat, 09/03/2024 - 01:40

Water scarcity may seem like an oxymoron in Oceania, but access to drinking water remains challenging for many small island nations in the South Pacific region. This is partly due to the remoteness of the various archipelagos, atolls, and islands, as well as the underdeveloped water treatment infrastructure. The United States has more than one reason to offer humanitarian aid to this thirsty region in the Pacific. 

Although islands and atolls such as Palau, the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia may seem unimpressive, the United States has a significant strategic interest in maintaining regional development aid through the Compacts of Free Association (COFAs) at a time when China has become increasingly aggressive in expanding its regional sphere of influence by funding its own infrastructure and water development projects. Although many Americans are skeptical of foreign entanglements like the war in Ukraine, the COFAs allow the United States to deprive China of the islands by occupying the power vacuum in the region at a meager cost. The Senate should follow the House in renewing COFA with a greater emphasis on funding infrastructure projects that secure the island’s inhabitants and U.S. military assets. 

China has made engagement in the Pacific region a key priority as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seeks to control key shipping lanes and island chains vital for protecting their largest coastal cities. China classifies eight countries in the region as “comprehensive strategic partners,” the highest rank within China’s diplomatic agencies. These small islands contain the few remaining countries in the world that recognize Taiwan, with China directing more than  $3.9 billion in aid to island nations in a bid to isolate the country further. The Solomon Islands recently awarded a contract to a Chinese state-owned firm to upgrade the port in the capital city of Honiara after inking a security pact with China in 2022.

The Solomon Islands, as well as other COFA nations, need more critical water infrastructure. Many towns in the Solomon Islands’s interior are forced to fetch water for homes and farms, while an ongoing drought means freshwater supplies for Micronesia will remain stretched thin. Farms in Micronesia rely on groundwater for crops. In a country where agriculture employs almost half its workforce, low groundwater supplies could result in farms being shut down and many people losing their jobs. As the sea level rises, other countries like Tuvalu must keep freshwater from being contaminated by seawater, alongside upgrading existing seawalls and other infrastructure to keep the rising tides at bay.

Infrastructure assistance through the COFA agreements will help make these island nations more resilient to rising sea levels and drought while further securing U.S. military assets in the region from environmental damage. “Ultimately, the COFA agreements serve as a backbone for the U.S. defense architecture in the Indo-Pacific. COFA allows the U.S. to sustain military preparedness and deny China a foothold in the Pacific,” said Andrew Harding, a Research Assistant at The Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center. 

Preparedness is the primary objective of the Marshall Islands’ Roi-Namur atoll, which hosts a U.S. military ballistic missile testing site. Rogue waves damaged large portions of the atoll’s infrastructure earlier this year, resulting in the U.S. military pointing to a monthslong recovery, impacting military readiness in the region. The Marshall Islands also struggles with maintaining consistent freshwater supplies, with the government rationing gallons of water daily during severe droughts. COFA grants for further development of reverse osmosis systems that allow saltwater to be converted into safe drinking water will allow the Marshall Islands’ government to be less reliant on groundwater since their Laura groundwater reservoir has to be recharged with rain. Having a source of freshwater removed from the risks of drought will help the islands become more self-sufficient and require less direct support from the United States to import crucial water supplies. 

The previous COFA agreements provided the United States with crucial monitoring, resupply, and transportation hubs critical in supporting regional allies. Palau is set to host a new Air Force radar station that will allow the United States and its allies advanced warning of missile launches and tests by the Chinese military, adding to assets already in the region. While the Chinese army is pulling out all the stops to secure a permanent military outpost in the region, the United States may let funding for the COFA agreements lapse. Renewing the COFA agreements and assisting Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands in increasing their freshwater reserves and hardening physical infrastructure gives the United States a strategic advantage while being cheaper than constructing whole islands in the Pacific, as China is already doing. 

Since the first COFA was signed in 1986, the agreements have provided critical economic and infrastructure assistance to Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands. If the United States chooses to forgo renewing these agreements, Pacific Island nations will find that China is more than willing to assist them in securing freshwater supplies and upgrading infrastructure. 

The current cost to renew the COFA agreements is less than one-tenth the cost of the United States’s assistance to Ukraine since 2022. Policymakers should renew the compacts to get the most strategic bang for their buck, assisting these islands and securing their future and our security.

Roy Mathews is a Writer for Young Voices. He is a graduate of Bates College and a 2023 Publius Fellow at The Claremont Institute. His work has appeared in The Wall Street Journal, Washington Examiner, and Law & Liberty. Follow him on X.

Editor's Note: Shortly after this article was published, the Senate passed the COFA renewal. It now awaits President Biden's signature.

It is Not Just Ukraine and Gaza: Joe Biden’s Wars are Just Beginning

The National Interest - Fri, 08/03/2024 - 23:04

It is a truism across administrations: Unexpected crises define foreign policy legacy. For Jimmy Carter, it was Iran’s Islamic Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Ronald Reagan faced the Marine Barracks bombing in Lebanon, followed two years later by a humiliating withdrawal. For George H.W. Bush, it was Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Bill Clinton faced the “Black Hawk Down” crisis in Somalia, followed by wars in the Balkans. The September 11, 2001 terror attacks catapulted George W. Bush into wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Barack Obama promised to end “dumb wars,” but not only did he return troops to Iraq and remain in Afghanistan, but he also joined fights in both Libya and Syria. Donald Trump was the first president since Carter not to engage troops in a new conflict, but COVID—and the Chinese Communist Party—transformed his presidency.

Joe Biden ran on his foreign policy credentials. He proclaimed, “diplomacy is back,” while surrogates declared, “the adults are back in charge.” As Biden’s term winds down, wars, not peace, will define his presidency. Spin aside, the Afghanistan withdrawal confirmed defeat. And, while Biden is not to blame for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ambition, the humiliation and abandonment of allies Biden was willing to accept in Afghanistan colored Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine.

His legacy in the Middle East will be poor. Just days before Hamas set the region aflame, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan credited Biden diplomacy for making “The Middle East region … quieter today than it has been in two decades.” However the war ends, its reverberations will ripple through the region for years. These wars may just be beginning. With the Islamic Republic of Iran even threatening Antarctica, the liberal order is under assault on every continent.

Consider the following conflicts that could become hot at any moment:

Venezuela vs. Guyana

Over four decades have passed since a transnational war erupted in South America. In 1982, Argentine dictator General Leopoldo Galtieri took a page from failing dictators worldwide: instigate a conflict to distract the public with jingoism. With the economy in shambles, he reignited dormant claims to the Falkland Islands, ruled by the British for almost 150 years. Galtieri calculated that the United Kingdom, riven with domestic discord, no longer had the will to defend a few thousand sheep farmers in the far reaches of its empire. He was wrong. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher rallied and roundly defeated Argentina.

Today, the pattern repeats; it is only the fortitude of the White House, not 10 Downing Street, under challenge. Socialism has transformed Venezuela, once South America’s richest country, into one of its poorest. As President Nicolás Maduro has little charisma and few friends, he takes a page from Galtieri, reviving a territorial dispute that Venezuela settled more than a century ago and then reaffirmed a half-century ago. Maduro’s claims to Guyana’s Essequibo region are groundless. It was Dutch territory that the Netherlands ceded to Great Britain during the 1815 Congress of Vienna to form British Guyana, and it never belonged to Venezuela.

In 2009, as vice president, Maduro briefly resurrected the claim. At the time, it was an empty threat; today, it may not be. The situation in Venezuela is exponentially worse. On December 3, 2023, Maduro sponsored a referendum to demonstrate popular support for using the Venezuelan military to seize oil-rich Essequibo. While Biden’s team condemned the move and rushed some troops to Guyana to participate in joint exercises, White House attention was scattered. Over the last month, the White House has sent Jon Finer, Sullivan’s deputy and chief messenger, to pledge support for Guyana. Still, just a week later, National Security Council spokesman John Kirby downplayed Venezuelan troop movements as being “of a small nature and size and scale and scope.”

Kirby reflects the White House’s wishful thinking. Satellite imagery shows significant Venezuelan military preparations. During a meeting with visiting Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on February 20, 2024, Maduro signaled his desire to meet with Putin after the Russian elections in March; Maduro likely seeks a green light.

If Maduro orders troops into Guyana, there may not be much Guyana can do. Its military numbers only 3,400 men, roughly the size of Washington, DC’s police force. Unlike Ukraine, it is unclear whether Guyana can fight or, Finer’s assurances notwithstanding, the United States will engage militarily. While defending Guyana’s offshore oil infrastructure is easier, Maduro may calculate he can either compel Exxon-Mobil to suspend operations or lead the White House to bend to pressure. That is, after all, what both Special Envoy Amos Hochstein did with Lebanon’s expansive maritime claims and what Secretary of State Antony Blinken has done by promising arms to Turkey even as it doubles down on its illicit claims to Cypriot waters.

Azerbaijan vs. Armenia

Guyana is not the only small state under threat. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may not be Europe’s last war on Biden’s watch. Biden entered office promising to recognize the Armenian genocide. He, unlike his predecessors, followed through and deserves credit. There is no doubt that more than one million Armenians died during and immediately after World War I. Nor, despite what the Bernard Lewis School of Turkish Studies teaches in the United States, were their deaths the result of the fog of war. The Young Turks planned and then executed genocide. For all President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s bluster, Turkey (Türkiye) is a paper tiger. When successive countries recognized the genocide, Turkey did nothing.

Unfortunately, Biden’s team believed it could play both sides. Just two days after Biden recognized the Armenian genocide, Blinken waived sanctions on Azerbaijan despite its attack months before on millennia-old Armenian communities in Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan’s claim that Nagorno-Karabakh belonged to it did not justify its military action. Nor, for that matter, was Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh as cut-and-dry as its supporters claim.

Both before the September 2023 seizure of Nagorno-Karabakh and after, Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev signaled his goal both to eradicate Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh and to conquer Armenia proper under the notion that present-day Armenia is Western Azerbaijan. “Present-day Armenia is our land,” he declared on December 24, 2022. Aliyev may believe he can get away with murder because of the emptiness of the State Department’s red lines. Four days before Aliyev ordered his forces to complete Nagorno-Karabakh’s ethnic cleansing, for example, Acting Assistant Secretary Yuri Kim declared, “We will not tolerate any attack on the people of Nagorno-Karabakh” only then to do just that.

Aliyev’s belligerence is proportional to his belief he can act without consequence. Blinken and Sullivan compound the problem with a rush to peace. Forcing concessions from democratic Armenia and allowing Aliyev to avoid demarcating the Azerbaijan-Armenia border while he undertakes a multibillion-dollar military build-up guarantees renewed conflict and may lead Aliyev to believe he can overrun Armenia.

Congo vs. Rwanda and Ethiopia vs. Somalia

Ossified State Department policy has pushed the Horn of Africa and Africa’s Great Lakes region to the brink of war. It need not have been like this. Somaliland and Rwanda are African miracles. Both Somaliland’s Isaaqs and Rwanda’s Tutsis survived the genocide. Both emerged stronger and became regional oases. Somaliland even became the first country in the world to secure voter registration with biometric iris scans.

In a region where insecurity is permissive, Somaliland and Rwanda are exceptions. Both states deny space to terrorists, weapons smugglers, militant groups, and foreign militaries. Both host multi-billion dollar companies and investments. Somaliland’s Berbera port can compete with Djibouti and Dubai’s Jebel Ali. Rwanda, meanwhile, has become Africa’s Silicon Valley. Both are among the world’s greatest success stories in the war against corruption. Today, Rwanda ranks alongside Slovakia, Poland, and Greece in terms of levels of corruption, while its neighbors Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo are among the world’s most corrupt states. Somaliland’s e-economy enables transparency.

Neighbors, however, now threaten both countries. Somaliland became independent in 1960 and, after a failed merger with Somalia, re-declared independence in 1991. While “Blackhawk Down” seared Somalia’s failure and anarchy into the American mind, Somaliland remained at peace. Democracy and government capacity matter. When drought hit the Horn of Africa in 2006, 2011, and 2017, Somalis suffered, but Ethiopia and Somalilanders rallied, transporting food where the population needed it most and saving their citizens’ lives. Much of the population of Somaliland escaped starvation as, local government officials explained to me, they were able to transport food across the country without fear of looting.

Somalia’s warlords, however, are not far away. Using billions of dollars in aid, Mogadishu purchased Chinese weaponry and Turkish drones. In December 2022, China sponsored a localized insurgency in the Somaliland Sool district to punish Somaliland for choosing Taiwan over China.

The threats Rwanda today faces are likewise rooted in 20th-century genocide. What many Americans know about Rwanda’s anti-Tutsi genocide is from the Hollywood film Hotel Rwanda. Few know the aftermath. When the Rwandan Patriotic Front took Kigali and drove the French-backed Hutu génocidaires across the border into the Democratic Republic of Congo, conflict continued.

Here, the United Nations is to blame. Just as it established refugee camps for Palestinians just across from Israel’s borders and refused to disarm the militants inside them, so too did the UN allow génocidaires to establish camps within sight of Rwanda’s borders. In 2021, I surveyed the Rwanda-Congo border from Goma northward for several dozen miles; I could see the smoke of rebel camps just two miles away. Just as armed Palestinians destabilized Lebanon, so too have Hutu génocidaires undermined eastern Congo’s stability. As a result, Africa’s Great Lakes region remains a tinderbox like the Horn of Africa.

Enter Team Biden with a match. Whereas the United States once treated the Somalia-Somaliland issue in parallel to China’s one country, two systems policy, today Blinken treats Somaliland as a pariah to appease Somalia. By signaling blind support for Somalia, Washington encourages Somali revanchists to choose force.

Faced with U.S. efforts to appease its tormentors, Somaliland has turned to Ethiopia, striking a bargain in which Somaliland leases landlocked Ethiopia a port in exchange for recognition. On cue, the State Department condemned the deal. Many in Mogadishu see the condemnation as a green light to act militarily. Today, a fight looms just a stone’s throw across the Bab el-Mandeb from where Houthis attack global shipping.

Rwanda, too, faces a war born out of American incompetence. The Democratic Republic of Congo is, by area, Africa’s second-largest country. Theoretically, it should be one of its wealthiest, with $24 trillion worth of strategic minerals within its borders. Decades of war and dictatorship, however, took a toll, killing more than five million. While many Congolese blame Rwanda, failure to disarm Hutu militias and the Congolese government’s effort to co-opt the génocidaires catalyzed the fight.

Enter Michael Hammer, the U.S. ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Congo until recently. Regional diplomats say that he pressed for Washington to accept the end of a UN-mandated military purchase reporting requirement to ingratiate himself with local leaders while still in Kinshasa. UN Security Council Resolution 2641 passed in June 2022 with U.S. acquiescence,  lifting the requirement. President Félix Tshisekedi then went on an opaque shopping spree that coincided with his turn to ethnic politics in eastern Congo, a reality acknowledged by both sides during research trips to both Kigali and Kinshasa. 

Over the past fifteen months, approximately 1,200 mercenaries from two companies—the Bulgaria-based Agemira and the Romania-based Asociatia-RALF—have arrived in Goma, eastern Congo’s major city. The mercenaries today deploy across the region. In June 2023, regional sources say approximately 200 mercenaries arrived in Goma and traveled to Bukavu by boat. In October 2023, a Boeing 737 arrived in Goma from Bucharest, Romania, via Luxor, Egypt, to supplement the existing deployment and rotate out some private contractors. Blackwater founder Erik Prince is also in Congo.

The mercenaries train the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo snipers and supplement the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FLDR), which grew out of the exiled génocidaires. They also help train the Congolese army to operate recently purchased unmanned aerial vehicles, many of which are of Chinese origin.

While Congo undertakes an unprecedented military build-up, Blinken and U.S. Agency for International Development Administration Samantha Power blame the victim and criticize Rwanda instead. This may lead Tshisekedi to believe Washington would turn a blind eye should Congo attack. Additionally, he confuses possession of advanced platforms with military competence. His new Chinese toys and misplaced State Department encouragement have created a perfect storm that may soon erupt into war.

Entering the Eye of the Storm

Adversaries are sophisticated. They study the American political calendar and time operations to coincide with American distractions. Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia and Azerbaijan’s 2020 attack on Nagorno-Karabakh both coincided with American election season. As the 2024 campaign crystalizes, danger looms. Uncertainty about American leadership has encouraged dictators to believe war works. Forces of altruism do not fill the vacuums of leadership. Biden may be about to learn that lesson the hard way.

Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum. Follow him on X @mrubin1971.

Littoral Combat Ship: The U.S. Navy's Nightmare That Won't End

The National Interest - Fri, 08/03/2024 - 21:40

Summary: The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, a post-Cold War initiative aimed at enhancing the U.S. Navy's green-water capabilities, has become a symbol of defense procurement failure. Initially costing $500 million per ship, the LCS was envisioned as a versatile, modular warship adaptable to various missions with a small crew and fast maneuverability. However, the reality has been far from the promise. Several LCS have been retired early, and others are frequently out of action, earning the nickname "Permanent Dry Dock Club" due to their frequent need for repairs. This situation underscores a broader issue of defense spending inefficiency, with high expectations leading to underperforming assets. As the U.S. enters a competitive global environment, the legacy of such missteps raises concerns about the military's readiness and strategic capabilities.

The Littoral Combat Ship: A Tale of Naval Ambition and Reality

Whenever a defense contractor or a Pentagon spokesperson starts talking about their new “cost-effective” program, just know that it’s a bunch of malarkey. The program is usually going way over budget, the product itself will not be as good as promised, and the systems will be delivered late – meaning that We, The People, as well as our military, are about to get hosed.

Such is the case with the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). The program introduced warships so awful that many in the U.S. Navy have taken to calling them "Little Crappy Ships.” 

Littoral Combat Ship: The Navy Wanted a Green-Water Navy

It seems strange today, with all the talk about China’s threat to the U.S. Navy and the possibility of a great-power war erupting, but there was a time in recent memory when the Navy was obsessed with the notion of building what is known as a green-water navy. 

The Cold War ended with most of the world’s powers laid low. Only America stood tall as the last remaining superpower. The enemies of the United States were a combination of terror groups and rogue states. Their power and reach were limited. 

So the U.S. military needed to devise new strategies and weapons to fight that enemy. Since these enemies had limited ability to project power, the Navy needed to get closer to where they were.

A green-water navy is basically a group of warships that operates very near the coastlines of other countries, or of its own. It cannot conduct independent operations in the blue waters of the deep oceans. So these smaller warships bring the fight to the enemy’s shores. The concept made sense in the 1990s and early 2000s. 

In theory, the Navy still needs a much greater green-water capability. Sadly, the Navy’s war planners chose to meet the demand by investing in the LCS at the cost of a whopping $500 million per ship.

The LCS: A Swiss Army Knife of a Warship

The origins of the LCS can be traced back to 2002,  when then-head of U.S. Naval Operations Adm. Vernon Clark visited a Danish destroyer. During that visit, he noted how the Danes swapped the warship’s weapons in less than 40 minutes. The American admiral quickly envisioned creating a Navy warship that could operate like a Swiss Army knife. 

The warship’s parts would be interchangeable depending on the mission. The LCS would be operated by a crew of 40 sailors — far smaller than any other warship the U.S. Navy had. It would be fast and lightly armed, but the plug-and-play model of the LCS would revolutionize Navy operations. 

After nearly two decades of commitment, the Navy has already begun retiring several of the LCSs, even though they are among the youngest warships in the Navy's fleet. Others are falling apart because they were never able to meet the demands of having interchangeable parts. As a result, the LCS is an even bigger boondoggle than the Zumwalt-class destroyer

The LCS and the Zumwalt class represent two evolutionary dead ends for the Navy. More painfully, they could have been avoided.

Almost from the start of the research and development phase of the LCS program, multiple high-level engineers on the project began voicing their concerns. Nevertheless, the Navy had decided. The bureaucracy was totally behind the LCS concept. There would be no stopping it. 

Too bad for everyone that, in this case, the naysayers were proven correct. 

The LCS: Standing Members of the Permanent Dry Dock Club

The LCS program was a total failure. The Navy’s next generation of warships are not currently sailing the high seas, despite having been operational since 2016. They spend more time in port being repaired, prompting some Navy officers to nickname these warships "Dry Dock One," since they spend so much more time being repaired than they do at sea.

What has that $500 billion per LCS unit gotten us? A whole lot of nothing. The Navy attempted to make the LCS a jack of all trades, and ultimately the LCS was a master of none. 

The Littoral Combat Ship is another example of how absurd the post-Cold War era was for the U.S. defense community. When America should have been pulling back from its defense commitments and focusing on enhancing itself at home, the “end of history” and “unipolar moment” types in Washington convinced themselves — and U.S. leaders — that the end of the Cold War was a green light to let loose, blowing the nation’s wealth on military products that were never going to live up to their expectations.

Now that the unipolar era is over and America is in a very competitive global environment, it is left with the bitter legacy of that post-Cold War policy decadence. 

The question now is: Can the U.S. military recover from these missteps in time to prevent a strategic catastrophe from befalling U.S. forces? 

About the Author 

Brandon J. Weichert is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, as well as at American Greatness and the Asia Times. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower (Republic Book Publishers), Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

The Iowa-Class Battleship's 16-Inch Guns Were Raw Naval Power

The National Interest - Fri, 08/03/2024 - 21:15

Summary: The Mark 7 16-inch/50-caliber gun, equipped on the iconic Iowa-class battleships, stands as a testament to U.S. naval engineering prowess during the mid-20th century. Developed as a compromise between firepower and treaty restrictions, the Mark 7, paired with the Armor Piercing (AP) Mark 8 projectile, rivaled the destructive power of larger caliber guns while adhering to displacement limits. Featuring advanced construction techniques including autofrettage and chromium-plated bores, the Mark 7 offered increased barrel life and superior firepower. Each gun was part of a three-gun turret system requiring a crew of 77 sailors for operation. The Mark 7's versatility was further demonstrated by its wide range of ammunition types, from conventional high explosive shells to the nuclear Mark 23 warhead, showcasing its adaptability and formidable combat capability.

Power & Precision: Unveiling the Legacy of the 16-inch Mark 7 Gun

The Iowa class was the last U.S. battleship ever built, and one of the most iconic. Fittingly, the class was equipped with what might be the most iconic naval gun, the celebrated 16-inch/50-caliber Mark 7. Let’s take a look at the Mark 7 to better understand what made the gun so superlative.

The Development of the Mark 7 16-Inch Gun on Iowa-Class

In the late 1930s, the U.S. commissioned a set of studies for “fast battleship” designs. The General Board, which considered design options, initially considered using an 18-inch/47-caliber gun that had been in use since the 1920s. The 18-inch gun was massive and formidable. But accommodating the gun would have meant increasing displacement above the 45,000-ton limit that, in the late 1930s, was still treaty-enforced.

Eventually, the General Board settled on the 16-inch Mark 7. The gun was originally designed to fire a lighter, 2,240-pound Armor Piercing (AP) Mark 5 projectile. But the Mark 7’s shell handling system was redesigned to handle the heavier, 2,700-pound AP Mark 8. The Mark 7, paired with the Mark 8 projectile, allowed the guns to achieve penetrating power similar to that of Japanese 18.1-inch guns, despite weighing less.

“In 1969, Capt. Edward Snyder of the USS New Jersey (an Iowa-class battleship) reported that the armor piercing shell could penetrate 32 feet of reinforced concrete,” Tim Migaki wrote. “Reportedly, the explosion of a High Capacity shell would create a crater 50 feet wide and 20 feet deep.”

Clearly, the designers had built a gun with considerable firepower. 

The design of the Mark 7

The Mark 7 was built with “a liner, A tube, jacket, three hoops, two locking rings, tube and liner locking ring, yoke liner,” Migaki wrote. “Some components were autofretted. The bores were also chromium-plated to increase barrel life.”

To build the Mark 7, each piece of the gun was heated and expanded, and then slid down over the tube. As the gun part cooled, it would shrink, creating a tight unit.

On the deck of an Iowa-class ship, the Mark 7 would be mounted in turrets on individual slides, which could be elevated independently of each other. The result was, technically, a three-gun turret, rather than a triple turret.

“Each turret assembly consists of a gun house with a rotating structure, a fixed structure, a barbette, and magazines,” Migaki wrote. “The gun house is the rotating armored structure that contains the guns, sighting, and rangefinder stations. The gun pit and machinery flat extend below the shelf plate of the hun house into the upper and lower barbettes.”

Remarkably, a bare minimum of 77 sailors was needed for the operation of a single Mark 7 turret.

The arming of the Mark 7 16-Inch Gun 

Of course, the Mark 7 could be loaded with different types of ammunition. These included Armor Piercing; High Capacity; High Explosive – Controlled Variable Time; Improved Conventional Munition; High Explosive – Electronic Time/Point Detonating; and later, the Nuclear Mark 23 with a 15-20-kiloton nuclear warhead.

About the Author: Harrison Kass

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image Credit: Public Domain.

Podcast: Joe Biden's Fiery State of the Union (w/ Harry Kazianis)

The National Interest - Fri, 08/03/2024 - 20:40

Facing growing scrutiny over his age, President Joe Biden came out swinging Thursday night with a forceful State of the Union address that set the tone for the 2024 general election. Will his performance assuage doubts about his fitness, at age 81, to lead the U.S. through an increasingly volatile global order? In this episode, Jacob Heilbrunn speaks with Harry J. Kazianis, executive editor of The National Interest. Kazianis previously served as part of the foreign policy team for Senator Ted Cruz's 2016 presidential campaign and worked for the conservative Heritage Foundation.

Joe Biden's Fiery State of the Union (w/ Harry Kazianis)

F-35 Armed Ford-Class Aircraft Carrier John F. Kennedy Headed to Pacific

The National Interest - Fri, 08/03/2024 - 20:33

Summary: The USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67), the last conventionally-powered aircraft carrier built for the U.S. Navy, was decommissioned in 2007 after nearly 40 years of service, including key operations like the initial strikes in Operation Desert Storm. Succeeding it is the Gerald R. Ford-class nuclear-powered supercarrier CVN-79, named the future USS John F. Kennedy, set to enter service in 2025 and make its maiden deployment with the United States Pacific Fleet. Despite being a year behind schedule due to an altered Post-Shakedown Availability (PSA) strategy, the new carrier is 90% complete. This strategy aims to integrate necessary modifications and efficiency improvements learned from its predecessor, the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), including adaptations for the F-35C Lightning II and the upgraded Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar. This approach, endorsed by Congress, replaces the previously considered dual-phase delivery with a more capable single-phase delivery, ensuring the carrier's readiness for deployment to the Indo-Pacific, thereby bolstering U.S. naval deterrence in the region.

Next-Gen Power: The Future USS John F. Kennedy Set for Pacific Deployment

During her nearly 40 years, the Kitty Hawk -class variant aircraft carrier USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67) – the last conventionally-powered flattop built for the U.S. Navy – saw more than a dozen deployments to the Mediterranean and also commenced the very first strike operations against Iraqi forces as part of 1991's Operation Desert Storm.

Decommissioned in 2007, the now-retired warship will be succeeded by the Gerald R. Ford-class nuclear-powered supercarrier CVN-79, which was laid down in July 2015, and launched four years later. The future USS John F. Kennedy is now scheduled to enter service in 2025, but her initial deployment won't be in the same waters as the former carrier named for the 35th president of the United States.

Rather, it was announced last November that CVN-79 will become a unit of the United States Pacific Fleet when she makes her maiden deployment later this decade, Sea Power Magazine reported.

According to Captain Brian Metcalf, the U.S. Navy's program manager for the Ford-class aircraft carriers, following the commissioning and training workups, the nuclear-powered warship would make a deployment to the Indo-Pacific region and arrive at its new homeport on the U.S. West Coast. Metcalf made the comments while speaking at a panel of the American Society of Naval Engineers' Technology Systems and Ships seminar in November.

Metcalf also reaffirmed that the future USS John F. Kennedy was 90% complete at HII's Newport News shipyard, adding that the program office plans to complete much of the vessel's Post-Shakedown Availability (PSA) work would be completed on during the construction and before commissioning, would enable the Kennedy to enter its basic training phase on time.

USS John F. Kennedy Aircraft Carrier: Behind Schedule – But Still Coming

The second nuclear-powered carrier of the Ford-class is currently about a year behind schedule according to Fiscal Year 2024 (FY24) budget documents released a year ago. The delays were due to the altered PSA.

"The Navy is implementing a strategy to pull baseline work from the Post Shakedown Availability (PSA) into the construction period in order to provide more capability at ship delivery," the U.S. Navy's shipbuilding budget documents noted, USNI reported.

That revised schedule would ensure that CVN-79 would be ready to deploy to the Indo-Pacific when she enters service.

"This approach will prepare CVN 79 as the first FORD class aircraft carrier to operate in the Indo-Pacific region and decrease the amount of time CVN 79 would be required to be at the shipyard after ship delivery to conduct the PSA," the documents added. "CVN 79s PSA will align to a traditional period of resolving discrepancies discovered during trials. The revised strategy maintains the overall 'ready for deployment workups' milestone for CVN 79."

Dual Phase Delivery Scrapped

The sea service had decided to switch from a dual-phase delivery for the carrier to a single-phase delivery, which added two years of work to the flattop's detailed design and construction contract.

Initially, the U.S. Navy had employed the dual-phase to save money on construction schedules in the shipyard while avoiding significant overlap between USS John F. Kennedy entering the fleet and USS Nimitz (CVN-68) leaving. However, under the dual-phase approach, the Ford-class carrier would have received retroactive modifications for the carrier-based Lockheed Martin F-35C after delivery.

Instead, following a mandate from Congress, HII's Newport News Shipbuilding provided the modifications for the F-35C Lightning II during the vessel's construction, while other issues that were found during the construction of the lead vessel USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) were also addressed. In addition, CVN-79 received the upgraded Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar.

"Shifting to single phase and incorporating the F-35C modifications will enable the delivery of a more capable and lethal carrier," said James Geurts, assistant secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition. "Initiating this work now will build on the lessons learned from USS Gerald R. Ford to maintain the optimal construction timeline for the shipyard and to avoid inefficiencies."

Progress on the carrier continues, and it was last month that Newport News Shipbuilding began topside testing of the electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS) on the carrier.

The U.S. Navy's newest nuclear-powered carrier, operating with the most advanced multirole fighter will be heading to the Indo-Pacific by the end of the decade – serving as a strong deterrent to China.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

In Waiting for the Great Displacement

Foreign Policy Blogs - Fri, 08/03/2024 - 19:43

The first recorded loss on an American made M1 Abrams tank in Ukraine was documented around the same time as the 2024 NATO Summit.

In a recent NATO meeting, the territorial losses Ukraine has recently suffered along with documented losses of Western equipment has put NATO and Ukraine’s allies in an anxious position. Claims by some NATO members that NATO troops could be sent to the front in Ukrainian territory would approach a Vietnam like scenario, where young people in Western nations would slowly see their friends and relatives enter live combat, hoping that laws requiring Conscription would not be passed in those countries. With this meeting coming at a time when Russia’s Opposition leader Navalny dying or being murdered in custody, bad policy decisions in the recent past may lead to some significantly terrible consequences for Western allies.

In addressing in the main threats to the West, there should be three different approaches to the three main threats in Asia, Europe and the Middle East. This is based on the actual popularity of the current governments in those regions as well as the relationship those governments have with their population in putting them and keeping them in power. This would affect the outcomes of challenging these actors, as each scenario is different as well as their end goals. The main issue in all three regions is that only half measures have been taken to discourage increased conflict or to abate it. Voting matters more than ever in 2024, as it is affecting everyone personally.

When consumer products mattered more to Western countries than the fate of Hong Kong’s democracy, and an Olympic Games was held close to a region where minority communities were suffering systemic human rights abuses, it was made perfectly clear that relations with China did not include actual human rights issues in its application. Ignoring core values in our democracies when dealing with foreign powers has resulted in eventual tensions with China. This lacking policy has damaged relations to the point where on Feb 27th 2024, the American news program The National Desk did a report on how the Fentanyl crisis in North America is wholly and directly related to China’s Government, even extending to operations in Mexico. With a nation changing foreign interference debate also taking place in Canada at the moment, the policy the West has had towards China is a direct outcome of ignoring our core values and beliefs.

It is difficult to know the popularity of China’s Government by its people, but it is well known that China’s biggest fear is an uprising by its citizens against the current Government. The first generation of the current Government in China is has not been experienced by this generation and has been re-characterized in a positive light in the recent past. A healthy economy is what is keeping China operating, and it is likely best for China to take actions to keep exports high as it is questionable how an open conflict with Taiwan or India would be taken by citizens in China, and what the outcome would be if the Government actually fell to a popular uprising. Since the West will not challenge China and does little to protect itself from China degrading their own youth in the US and Canada, it would be best that the West use China to displace its support for Russia’s war effort, while giving needed equipment and artillery to Ukraine. This of course should be done with an acknowledgment of local crises, and actions being taken to end the crisis, as opposed to policies that extend its destruction.

China and Russia are not natural allies, and have fought wars on their border over still simmering territorial disputes. While Russia can exchange oil for arms, it would be in China’s best interest to not be linked to one side of a conflict far from its borders. China is actively seeking to displace Russia’s arms sales and much of their artillery uses Soviet designed technology that can be used with old Soviet equipment; equipment also used by Ukraine. China also constructs fairly new and updated equipment faster than any other nations, so their retired artillery and anti-air systems from 2008 could be purchased directly or via a third party as China is actively promoting weapons sales abroad. If there is no stomach to challenge China and they are dependant on exports to Western nations, a displacement of arms to Russia as well as an effective policy to protect our own communities is essential to avoiding a larger conflict.

Russia’s long term goals were always plausible due to the high level of support Russia has in their own population as well as a sanctions regime by the West that is more virtue signal than action. While the US and Canada do little to nothing to displace Russian oil and gas export revenues, Russian oil and gas is still being purchased by Western countries via third countries, who themselves have questionable human rights records. NATO and Western allies that are not united in the objectives of ending funds that go to Russia’s war effort have helped produce a scenario where Ukraine is starting to lose territory. These same countries have diminished the support for Ukraine by enabling its support to be used for local political gain in countries that are suffering from high prices and energy costs due to a lack of displacement of energy, along with social crises as described like those above that result in local crime and chaos. Ukraine should consider openly questioning allies who contribute to Russia’s propaganda, energy funding, and military, and request that NATO inquire into these allies that are undermining the war effort directly or indirectly. Policies and stronger sanctions should not come only after we have lost Navalny, and there is little that can be done to change the support Russians have for their Government if we allow people like him to be detained indefinitely. We need to displace the funding to stop the arms factories, and we must end our own contributions as well as external supplies to their war effort.

Iran has famously lost much of its local support from its population, a freedom movement that have been frequently abandoned by the West as is common treatment with most of the pro-Western communities in the Middle East. So lacking is the support for their movement, that several opportunities have been given to abuse and harass those living in Iran, as well as against those in the larger Middle East. It should be noted that the first people to be conquered by the Iranian Regime was the Iranians themselves, and actions that leave them to be brutalised are the same ones that have lead to atrocities in the greater region that will expand abroad.

In the same time period that we found out that ballistic missiles from Iran were purchased by Russia, there was also a story about Western technology aiding in the design of Iranian drones used to murder innocent people in Ukraine, as well as networks in North America seeking to assassinate regime opponents in the United States directly. With so much conflict via proxies, via Yemen and arms exports to Russia, it would be wise to challenge threats to the West and its allies at its source as the passive approach has lead to a NATO that had to debate openly between its own leaders in a display of panic and weakness. When direct threats are oppressing their own citizens, innocents in the near region, and affect the entire global community, ignoring threats or taking half measures only ensured future conflict and the normalisation of brutality. While China can be financially managed and Russia can be fought into debt and attrition, when several incidences of Casus Belli take shape, passive responses will simply encourage a horrific outcome. If the West want to win or simply gain stability, they must take concrete actions to avoid a larger conflict.

NATO at a Crossroads? Trump’s Remarks and the Future of the Alliance

Foreign Policy Blogs - Fri, 08/03/2024 - 19:00

 

Former President Trump is no stranger to controversy, but his recent remarks represent perhaps his most alarming challenge to transatlantic unity. During a campaign rally on February 10, the likely Republican presidential nominee declared that he would not defend a NATO ally that fails to meet the 2% GDP defense spending requirement. Beyond undermining deterrence and establishing conditions for an attack on NATO, this statement tramples on the alliance’s foundational ethos of indivisible security and “one for all, all for one.” With prospects of a second Trump presidency on the horizon, the specter of diminished American involvement hovers over NATO once again. This time, however, the alliance confronts a belligerent Russia to the east amidst a rapidly deteriorating global security environment.

On the other hand, the invasion of Ukraine has galvanized the transatlantic community, leading to a surge in defense spending across the board. With the Russo-Ukrainian war approaching its second-year mark on February 24, it is time to revisit the discourse surrounding NATO’s 2% minimum. Trump’s comments also prompt two disconcerting questions: will he withdraw from NATO, and can the world’s most powerful alliance survive without America’s guiding hand?

To be sure, Trump’s callousness departs from the norms of transatlantic diplomacy, but his association with the 2% controversy skews what is fundamentally a longstanding issue. Every administration since Eisenhower has lamented the inequitable distribution of defense costs within NATO, with Ike himself once bemoaning that the Europeans were “making a sucker out of Uncle Sam.” The disparity became even more pronounced after the Cold War, and by 2014, only three member states allocated at least 2% of their GDP to defense. From the perspective of the American security establishment and public, Europeans are free-riding off U.S. taxpayers despite America being more secure and arguably deriving less benefit from NATO. In fact, there is widespread consensus in the public policy community that Trump is correct about inequitable burden-sharing, but his modalities are ill-conceived and have only strained relations. Where Trump is wrong lies in his utter disregard for the sanctity and historical bonds that underpin U.S.-European ties.

Nonetheless, the tides are turning, and tangible changes are evident. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine triggered a fundamental reassessment of how European nations conceptualize and define their security interests. In 2024, NATO anticipates that 18 member states will meet the minimum 2% defense spending requirement, the highest number to date. This uptick undoubtedly bolsters NATO’s capabilities, but it more significantly reflects a reinvigorated political determination and commitment to collective security.

While the U.S. should take satisfaction with this improvement, the ongoing debate places excessive emphasis on the numerical benchmark itself and insufficient focus on the fund’s allocation. Simply achieving the 2% GDP expenditure on defense does not inherently translate into a net benefit for the alliance. Take Greece, for example; it has historically met the threshold, but in 2014, 77% of its military budget covered personnel costs in the form of pensions and salaries. While compensating service members is necessary, many strategically vital activities lie beyond the scope of this requirement. Critical investments in logistics, infrastructure, and mobility play pivotal roles in operations but fall outside the umbrella of defense spending, raising questions about whether NATO should consider more flexibility in the existing criteria.

Despite incremental progress, the Russian invasion clearly showed that Europe continues to depend heavily on the U.S. for its security. Therefore, if Trump turned away from NATO or pulled out altogether, could the alliance endure in America’s absence? The answer is yes, but not without caveats. America’s withdrawal would severely degrade the alliance’s capabilities, cutting its tank and artillery fleet in half. NATO would also be devoid of strategic and stealth bombers, as well as assets like aerial control, reconnaissance, and, most critically, aerial refueling. While the remaining 30 members possess the expertise and wherewithal to adapt, such a transition would take years and substantial investment. For instance, Belgium would require $5-7 billion and several years to produce sufficient ammunition for merely two months of combat. Furthermore, providing additional assistance and weaponry to Ukraine while maintaining adequate stockpiles for conventional deterrence would be out of the question.

Nevertheless, the alliance would retain supremacy on the seas and in the skies. Most NATO members operate American-made F-16 and F-35 fighter jets, and the complementary French Rafales and Eurofighter Typhoons represent formidable weapons in their own right. France, the UK, Italy, and Turkey would ensure continued naval proficiency, while the British and French nuclear arsenals provide the alliance with a much-needed nuclear deterrent. Additional optimism accompanies its newest members in Finland and, pending approval, Sweden. While all members contribute strategic value, Sweden and Finland stand out with cutting-edge defense industries and relatively sizable armed forces. Still, no single or combination of members could fill the void left by the U.S., but the alliance, at the very least, could effectively stand its ground against Russia in due time.

Fortunately, given that Russia has its hands full in Ukraine, its military is in no position to initiate a conflict along the 1,500-mile-long Russian-NATO border. Moreover, chances of the U.S. leaving NATO are virtually nonexistent, even if Trump wins reelection. It is crucial to digest Trump’s comments within the context of American populism and the domestic support he garners through anti-NATO rhetoric. Furthermore, for reasons of bureaucratic inertia and logistics, America’s exit from NATO would incur far greater costs in terms of finances, time, and influence compared to the status quo. With approximately 100,00 troops stationed in Europe, the U.S. boasts 16 military bases, four naval stations, and eight air force bases across the continent. Washington also maintains around 150 nuclear weapons throughout Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. Even if Trump intended to leave NATO, negotiating the transfer or dismantlement of these assets in a four-year timeframe is as impractical as it is impossible.

That said, if Trump secures reelection, the alliance will inevitably grapple with issues of cohesion, and the future of Ukraine is far less certain. However, one should take comfort that his anti-NATO rhetoric appears grounded in populist posturing and the costs associated with burden-sharing. NATO has endured thus far, and while present concerns are legitimate, there is ample reason to believe that history’s most powerful alliance will remain so in the foreseeable future.

Iowa-Class: The U.S. Navy's 58,000 Tons of Raw Battleship Firepower

The National Interest - Fri, 08/03/2024 - 18:22

Summary: The Iowa-class battleships stand as one of the most iconic symbols of naval power from the late 19th to the mid-20th century, epitomizing the zenith of battleship design and capability. Notably large, these ships measured 860 feet in length and displaced 58,460 tons, surpassing the limits set by international treaties due to strategic necessities. Armed with formidable weaponry, including the massive 16-inch Mark 7 naval guns, they were designed primarily to counter the Japanese Navy during World War II. The Iowa class boasted unparalleled firepower and speed, with a propulsion system generating 212,000 horsepower, enabling speeds over 32 knots. Only four were built, yet they served in multiple conflicts including World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Desert Storm, marking a significant chapter in naval history and leaving a lasting legacy in military and public consciousness.

Iowa-Class Battleships: Titans of Naval Warfare History

One of the most iconic vessels in the history of naval warfare is the battleship. From the late 19th century through the mid-20th century, the battleship was the pre-eminent naval vessel and the lynchpin of the world’s most powerful naval forces. Memorialized with a board game, Hasbro’s Battleship, the battleship transcended military culture and entered the public consciousness. 

The battleship was, and in many respects is, what the general public thinks about when they think about a warship. And of all the different varieties of battleship, from Germany to America and from Britain to Japan, perhaps the most iconic of all was the Iowa class. 

Introducing the Iowa-Class

The Iowa class was a large ship. Measuring 860 feet at the waterline with a beam of 109 feet and a draft measuring 37 feet, it displaced 58,460 tons. In fact, the ships were so large that they would have violated an international treaty, which capped battleship displacement at 45,700 tons, had it not been for the elevator clause of the Second London Naval Treaty. That clause allowed for larger builds given Japan’s withdrawal from the original treaty. 

The Iowa wasn’t just large but well-armed, bristling with an array of devastating weaponry. Indeed, of all the battleships to ever sail, the Iowa was the most heavily armed. 

First laid down in 1940, the Iowa class was designed as a thwart to the formidable, and expanding, capabilities of the Japanese Navy. As such, its ships were fitted with nine breech-loading 16-inch (406mm)/50-caliber Mark 7 naval guns. These were housed in three 3-gun turrets, configured with two turrets forward and one turret after, in the “2-A-1” configuration.

Each of the Mark 7 guns measured 66 feet long – 50 times longer than their 16-inch bore. Only about two-thirds of the Mark 7 gun was visible, as the gun house obscured the other third. The Mark 7s were truly massive, weighing about 239,000 pounds apiece. Each Mark 7 could fire a 2,700-pound armor-piercing shell at a muzzle velocity of 2,500 feet per second, to a range of up to 24 miles.

The Mark 7 was not the only gun nestled on the Iowa’s deck. It was joined by the Mark 12. While smaller than the Mark 7, the Mark 12 still weighed nearly 4,000 pounds, with a bore length of about 16 feet. The Mark 12 fired shells at about 2,500 feet per second and was classified as a “dual-purpose gun,” or DP, because it could be toggled to target between surface and air targets.

For propulsion, the Iowa class used eight Babcock & Wilcox boilers and four double reduction cross-compound geared turbines, with each turbine driving a single shaft. The power plant was sufficient to generate 212,000 horsepower, which could propel the Iowa at more than 32 knots per hour. To keep the power plant engaged, the Iowa class would sail with 9,000 tons of fuel, which enabled an operating range of 18,300 miles.

Only four Iowa-class battleships were built, but they made an outsized impact, serving in World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Desert Storm

About the Author: Harrison Kass

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

CVV: The Medium Aircraft Carrier the U.S. Navy Never Built

The National Interest - Fri, 08/03/2024 - 17:22

Summary: The concept of the CVV, a medium-sized aircraft carrier proposed over 50 years ago during Admiral Enzo Zumwalt's tenure as chief of naval operations, is gaining renewed interest in the U.S. Navy. Initially designed as a conventionally powered vessel to carry 55 to 65 fighter jets and helicopters at a lower cost than Nimitz-class carriers, the CVV idea was shelved with the increase in the military budget under President Ronald Reagan. However, contemporary challenges, particularly Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategies by U.S. adversaries, have led to reconsideration of similar concepts. The Navy is exploring "Lightning Carriers" that can operate F-35B Lightning II stealth fighters, offering a versatile and risk-mitigated approach to maintain operational capability in contested regions like the South China Sea and near Taiwan, indicating a potential revival of the CVV concept to adapt to modern strategic needs.

CVV: Could Medium-Sized Carriers Be the Answer to the Navy's A2/AD Challenge?

The U.S. Navy fields the most aircraft carriers in the world. The service’s 11 supercarriers are complemented by several other warships that can double as light carriers when needed. 

The concept of the light aircraft carrier isn’t new. But the Navy has a mixed relationship with it, usually preferring fewer but stronger carriers for its fleet. 

More than 50 years ago, the Navy came close to fielding an interesting carrier. 

The CVV Concept 

In the 1970s, the Navy was undergoing a major change. Adm. Enzo Zumwalt was the chief of naval operations, the top officer in the Navy, and he was pushing for a naval force of more but smaller warships. 

As part of that push for numbers, Navy officials circulated the idea of an interim aircraft carrier. The Aircraft Carrier (Medium) CVV concept envisioned a conventionally powered warship that would be cheaper and smaller than the Nimitz-class supercarriers that were then under construction. 

With a displacement of more than 62,000 tons, a complement of about 4,000 men, and the ability to carry 55 to 65 fighter jets and helicopters, the CVV concept promised to diversify the Navy’s fleet. 

A single prototype was planned, and the Navy released artistic impressions of the ship. But the CVV concept perished when Ronald Reagan came to the presidency and unleashed the military’s budget. With money no longer a limiting factor, the Navy could just build more Nimitz-class aircraft carriers – vessels that could carry almost 100 aircraft and were also nuclear-powered. 

All of this took place more than 40 years ago, but today’s challenges might revive the CVV concept. 

Countering Adversary Strategies 

The idea for a CVV fleet might have died an inglorious death in the planning boards of the Navy Yard in Washington, D.C., but the concept behind the medium aircraft carrier lives on. 

For several years now, U.S. adversaries have been developing Anti-Access/Aerial Denial (A2/AD) capabilities that aim to restrict America’s Nimitz- and Ford-class supercarriers from contested waters. Indeed, a well-placed hypersonic munition could damage, destroy, or sink a multi-billion dollar aircraft carrier like the USS Gerald R. Ford, which cost $13 billion. 

The Navy is looking for ways to counter A2/AD capabilities and continue to operate without restriction close to geopolitically important regions such as Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Black Sea. 

One of the concepts under development is that of the “Lightning Carrier.” The concept is similar to the CVV. A cheaper, smaller aircraft carrier comes with less risk for military planners, and it offers more solutions. The Navy has been pairing amphibious assault ships with the right aircraft – AV-8B Harrier attack jets and F-35B Lightning II stealth fighter jets. These aircraft have Short Take-off, Vertical Landing capabilities, meaning they can take off and land like helicopters. 

As the possibility of a near-peer conflict in the Indo-Pacific increases, the concept of the medium aircraft carrier is becoming more enticing to Navy planners. 

About the Author  

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

U.S. Navy Battleship USS Texas Is Now Back in the Water

The National Interest - Fri, 08/03/2024 - 17:08

Summary: This remarkable journey of restoration and preservation for the USS Texas, a venerable symbol of naval history, stands as a testament to the enduring respect and dedication to maritime heritage. The USS Texas (BB-35), having served with distinction in both World Wars, represents a living bridge to pivotal moments in history. Its recent emergence from the dry dock at the Gulf Copper facility in Galveston, after extensive repairs that included the replacement of nearly 700 tons of steel, is not just a technical achievement but a renewal of its legacy.

Battleship USS Texas Is Now Back in the Water Once Again 

A historic warship is now back in the water after 18 months of repairs. The USS Texas (BB-35), the only surviving battleship to see service in both World Wars, has been undergoing repairs at the Gulf Copper dry dock in Galveston, where the warship's hull was recently patched and painted. Nearly 700 tons of steel was recently replaced.

The retired U.S. Navy battleship has served as a floating museum since 1948. It exited the dry dock on Tuesday morning, marking a significant milestone in the $75 million restoration effort to preserve the vessel for future generations.

"We feel great. It's been in the dry dock [for] 18 months. It was a major victory to get her here in the dry dock and this is a result of our hard work and what we’ve been doing for the last 18 months working on the hull," Tony Gregory, president and CEO of the Battleship Texas Foundation, told Houston-area TV station KHOU

It is still too early to celebrate, however. The ship will continue to undergo repairs for the next 18 to 24 months, during which time crews will replace the deck superstructure and refurbish the interiors.

"So we're going to be restoring 60 spaces inside or semi-restoring 60 spaces inside, as well as replacing the wood deck and repairing the superstructure. This is going to make it accessible to the public and relaunch it as an exciting, modern technological museum when we reopen to the public," added Matthew Pham, vice president of development for the Battleship Texas Foundation.

USS Texas: Returned for Former Glory

Restoration has focused on making the battleship appear as it did in 1945, at the end of the Second World War. As previously reported, above the boot top – the black band on the hull – the ship has been painted Navy Blue 5-N. That color was matched from existing examples found both internally and externally on the vessel.

Though the USS Texas was launched in 1914 and saw service in both World Wars, time and the elements have been her greatest enemies. Before she was moved to Galveston for repairs, the iconic 122-year-old dreadnought made its home at the San Jacinto Battleground State Historic Site for more than 70 years. All that time in the water took its toll on the old battle wagon, and in June 2017, a six-by-eight-inch hole about 15 feet below the waterline opened and caused the USS Texas to list six degrees. 

The historic battleship was only kept afloat by pumps as the vessel took on 2,000 gallons of water per minute. At one point the situation was so dire that there were concerns the warship might sink. Fortunately, efforts were made to ensure the warship won't be lost to the elements. While there is still much work to be done, significant progress has been made to restore the honorary flagship of the Lone Star State to her former glory.

Video footage of the USS Texas being floated for the first time in 18 months was shared on X.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu 

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Marcel Fratzscher: „Klares Signal für Kehrtwende verpasst – EZB könnte alten Fehler wiederholen“

Zu den Ergebnissen der jüngsten Sitzung des Rates der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) äußert sich Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), wie folgt:

Die EZB hätte ein klares Signal für eine Kehrtwende ihrer Geldpolitik und eine baldige Zinssenkung geben sollen. Die Entscheidung der EZB und ihre Kommunikation sind eine verpasste Chance, mehr Klarheit zu schaffen und die Finanzierungsbedingungen zu verbessern. Damit bleibt die Geldpolitik eine der wichtigsten Bremsen für die Konjunktur und für die schwachen Investitionen in der Eurozone und in Deutschland.

Die EZB läuft Gefahr, ihren Fehler von vor zwei Jahren zu wiederholen und zu spät zu handeln, denn Geldpolitik entfaltet ihre volle Wirkung erst nach anderthalb bis zwei Jahren. Die Inflation in der Eurozone ist deutlich gesunken und die Inflationserwartungen sind schon jetzt konsistent mit der Preisstabilität. Die von der EZB immer wieder betonte Sorge vor sogenannten Zweitrundeneffekten – vor allem, dass die Inflation zu höheren Löhnen und einer stärkeren Nachfrage führt – hat sich bisher nicht bewahrheitet. Es ist richtig, dass Löhne steigen und auch die Lohnstückkosten zulegen. Aber dies sind notwendige temporäre Aufholeffekte. Es gibt keinerlei Anzeichen für permanente Effekte, beispielsweise durch eine Lohn-Preis-Spirale, durch die sich eine höhere Inflation verfestigen könnte.

Die Wahrscheinlichkeit ist heute höher, dass die EZB ihr Ziel der Preisstabilität über die nächsten drei Jahre unterschießen wird, als dass die Inflation zu hoch bleiben wird. Dies würde nicht nur die Glaubwürdigkeit der EZB erodieren, sondern könnte auch der Wirtschaft einen empfindlichen Schaden zufügen.

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