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Social media can do a lot of good for a brand’s image. It can be a place where an audience comes together to share their love of a brand, posting pictures and stories to engage with it.

It can also rip a brand to pieces: remember #AskSeaWorld. Sea World fell under public scrutiny for their treatment of orcas, due to the success of the film Blackfish. They invited the public to ask questions online using the hashtag #AskSeaWorld. Of course, they were hoping for real questions from concerned citizens.

But they forgot that they were opening up their Q&A to the world and disaster ensued. Rather than changing the conversation—their intended goal—they highlighted it and gave people a launchpad from which to collectively criticize Sea World. In fact, though the hashtag was first introduced more than a year ago, it is still in active use on Twitter today.

Another great (cautionary) example of trying to use a hashtag to reframe a narrative comes from the NYPD. During a particularly difficult time for their “brand” due to violence in the community, they invited the internet to come together and share nice stories about the NYPD using the hashtag #MyNYPD. What happened was as intense as it was predictable.

Israel—a country whose very mention can start fights on college campuses and at family dinners—decided that this was a model worth emulating. To celebrate Israeli Independence Day, Prime Minister Netanyahu hosted a Twitter conversation inviting people to ask him questions about Israel using the hashtag #AskNetanyahu. Unsurprisingly, chaos ensued.

Netanyahu tweeted from his personal handle @netanyahu and was also backed up by the more official channel @IsraeliPM. He responded to questions with text and short videos, both in English and in Hebrew. Some of the interactions were positive:

• He was asked if the dress was blue and white or black and gold. “The colors of the dress were clearly blue and white. Like my pen. Like my suit. Like our flag.”
• When asked if he was “human,” @IsraeliPM responded “01111001 01100101 01110011.”
• When asked if he would fire the person responsible for the hashtag, he responded, “Nope. Actually, I’m going to give… her a treat. You want to see her?” He then panned the camera down to show his very sweet dog sitting quietly at his side.

But of course, for every positive questioner, there were 1000 more looking to insult, provoke and ask truly difficult policy questions, ranging from Israel’s treatment of Holocaust survivors to their conflict with the Palestinians. If you search Twitter right now for the hashtag, here are the top images you will find:

Even though the Q&A component of the hashtag started—and ended—over a week ago, people are still using the hashtag to attack Netanyahu personally and Israeli policy towards the Palestinians in general. The campaign, rather than starting a positive conversation, instead served as an online space for critics. The movement was already there, and this campaign simply provided them with a gathering place.

The most retweeted instance of the hashtag, including any tweet sent by @Netanyahu or @IsraeliPM (save for the 01111001… tweet), was actually a bit of an ambush. Netanyahu received this question:

He saw the tweet, gauged that it was a real question from a real person (a journalist in fact!) and responded accordingly:

Hasan then responded:

Hasan’s response garnered over 500 retweets. What it did not garner: a response from Netanyahu. Therein lies one of the challenges of taking questions so publicly. A “real” or “fair” question can quickly turn into something the brand, organization, business or—in this case—world leader may not be prepared to answer. To me, this single interaction was more problematic for Netanyahu than any other component of the whole mess. He started a conversation that he was not prepared to finish. This made him look weak.

A town hall is a hard thing to manage. You never know what kind of questions you are going to get and once it starts, you are trapped. You cannot end it early because things are not going your way. Hosting a town hall on Twitter is like handing infinite microphones to an infinite crowd and then inviting them to pelt you with them as hard as they can.A quick search of keywords associated with the hashtag reveals the myriad hazards that overshadowed any potential political gain.

And yet it happened. And really, it’s still happening. While you probably won’t get an answer from him anytime soon, feel free to head over to Twitter and #AskNetanyahu any pressing questions you might have for him. You won’t be alone. Here is the current usage of #AskNetanyahu on Twitter.

Fun post script to the campaign: it even earned itself its very own parody handle! The fake @Ask_Netanyahu has over 3000 real followers. And it shares with its audience such nuggets as “I don’t believe in God, but God gave me the land,” “Had a long day reviewing records of newborns from Gaza’s Al-Shifa Hospital. I need to update my #KillList” and “I’ve initiated strategic long term planning consultations with George Zimmerman’s life coach.“

Follow me on Twitter @jlemonsk.

The post With #AskNetanyahu, Bibi Asks for Trouble appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

A mérgek történetét ismertető kiállítás nyílik Kolozsváron a Gyógyszerészeti Múzeumban május 28-án, szombaton. Ennek keretében a többi között bemutatják az arzén és higany alapú mérgeket. A kiállítás augusztus 28-ig, vasárnapig látogatható. kolozsvári rádió...

Tegnap 23 mentőakciót hajtottak végre Földközi-tengeren, és a térségben állomásozó összes hajót bevetették az Afrikából Európába igyekvő emberek kimentésére. Az ENSZ Menekültügyi Főbiztosságának adatai szerint év eleje óta 34 ezernél több migráns érte el az olasz partokat önállóan vagy az őket megmentő hajókkal. Ez több, mint a tavalyi év hasonló időszakában volt. Esélyes, hogy az időjárás javulása következtében egyre többen kelnek útra főként Líbiából az olaszországi Lampedusa szigete vagy Szicília felé.

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La Hongrie s’honore d’être le premier pays de l’UE à avoir approuvé la ratification de l’accord de Paris sur le climat.

Les députés hongrois ont voté à l’unanimité en faveur de la ratification du traité, mardi 24 mai. Des sites d’actualités pro-gouvernementaux se félicitent de ce que la Hongrie soit le premier pays de l’Union européenne à le faire.

Le premier, vraiment ? Le gouvernement français s’était fait une joie d’annoncer, le 17 mai, que la France était le premier pays industrialisé à voter le projet de loi “autorisant la ratification de l’accord de Paris adopté le 12 décembre 2015“. Sauf que…pour être approuvé définitivement par le Parlement français, il doit encore passer devant le Sénat le 8 juin.

Cette adoption rapide par le parlement hongrois a surpris les observateurs, souligne le site Hungary Today, qui rappelle que la Hongrie s’était toujours rangée aux côtés de la Pologne et d’autres pays d’Europe centrale et orientale producteurs de charbon, pour s’opposer à des lois plus sévères en matière de climat à l’échelle européenne. Le site estime que le président János Áder, “un avocat bien connu des questions liées à la protection de l’environnement“, a contribué à faire accélérer le vote.

The Council of the European Union (ECOFIN): 

-       WELCOMES the Commission Communication "Towards a single EU VAT area - Time to decide" (VAT Action Plan) and TAKES NOTE of the Special Report of the Court of Auditors No. 24: "Tackling intra-Community VAT Fraud: More action needed", as well as of the findings and recommendations set out therein; 

-       RECALLS Council conclusions of 15 May 2012 "On the Future of VAT", where the Council has emphasised that the EU needs a simpler VAT system, which at the same time is more efficient, more robust, fraud-proof and tailored for single market and has pointed out the following principles and legal considerations, which should be taken into account in furtherance of any future action: cost-efficiency, proportionality, unanimity, data protection legislation, compliance with the subsidiarity principle and full respect for the respective competences of the Union and the Member States; 

-       AGREES that the EU VAT system needs to be modernised and improved with these general objectives in mind, while stressing the importance of keeping the EU's business environment competitive; 

-       ACKNOWLEDGES the objectives outlined in the VAT Action Plan, which provide a framework to achieve a Single EU VAT area, and 

-       ADOPTS the following conclusions: 

I.       ON URGENT MEASURES TO FIGHT VAT FRAUD AND TACKLE THE VAT GAP

The Council of the European Union: 

1.      RECALLS the utmost importance of robust legal rules which hamper VAT fraud and AGREES with the Commission and the Court of Auditors that improving administrative cooperation between tax authorities is of significant importance in the fight against VAT fraud, and hence UNDERTAKES to pursue discussion on means of enhancing the scope of administrative cooperation and stepping up efforts to exchange information between tax administrations; 

2.      CONFIRMS that there is a need for further co-operation in a spirit of good understanding among business and tax administrations, as well as between tax administrations of EU Member States; 

3.      UNDERLINES that further initiatives in this area should form an efficient addition to existing rules and instruments and also seek to guarantee high standards of data protection, and fully take into account the principles of sovereignty, subsidiarity and proportionality; 

4.      TAKES NOTE of the Commission's intention to table in 2017 a legislative proposal that will aim at improving the exchange, sharing and analysis of key information and foresee conducting of joint audits; 

5.      ACKNOWLEDGES that improvement of information exchange could result in a clear improvement of efficiency in the fight against VAT fraud, and CALLS upon the Commission to propose ways of addressing  legal obstacles and practical limitations that might exist in the EU and in the Member States that prevent from making a qualitative leap in this area in the EU; 

6.      HIGHLIGHTS that this work should promote co-operation and cover the full range of available means and methods and alignment of procedures, including, inter alia, VIES, Eurofisc, feedback procedures and customs procedure 42, where the challenges both to customs and tax authorities must also be addressed; 

7.      LOOKS FORWARD to the other measures referred to in the VAT Action Plan that the Commission will propose to the Council with the objective of improving cooperation between tax administration and customs authorities; 

8.      UNDERLINES that as discussed during an informal meeting of ECOFIN ministers in Amsterdam, automatic exchange of information is one of the ways forward in the fight against fraud; 

9.      CONFIRMS that risk assessment and analysis remains a major area for further improvement in the EU, and INVITES the Commission, after the results of the feasibility study on Transaction Network Analysis have been evaluated by Member States, to present relevant initiatives enabling the Member States, wishing to start this tool on a voluntary basis, to exercise such an option, and at the same time ASKS the Commission to consider the possibilities of an explicit legal basis; 

10.    RECOGNISES that some Member States are more heavily affected by VAT fraud than others and the need to find practical and short-term solutions rapidly, and TAKES NOTE of the position of the Commission regarding a possible temporary derogation for certain Member States to apply the reverse charge mechanism in a wider scope and that the implementation of such derogation would require legislative measures;

11.    CONFIRMS that such derogations should not disproportionally hamper the proper functioning of the internal market; 

12.    UNDERLINES, without prejudice to a definitive VAT system, that the information obtained from a temporary derogation could be useful to decide on the most efficient way of fighting VAT fraud, and LOOKS FORWARD to an in-depth analysis by the Commission on possibilities for a temporary derogation, to be presented at the upcoming June ECOFIN; 

13.    TAKES NOTE of the non-legislative measures whereby the Commission intends to tackle the VAT gap and STRESSES that the Council will examine these non-legislative measures on the basis of the principles of sovereignty, subsidiarity, and proportionality. 

II.      ON SHORT AND MEDIUM-TERM ACTIONS IN VAT AREA AND SMEs 

The Council of the European Union: 

14.    WELCOMES the call by the Commission to reduce VAT compliance burdens for business, particularly for SMEs, both within Member States and across borders, and TAKES NOTE of the Commission's intention to make legislative proposals in  2016 and 2017; 

15.    EMPHASISES that the ultimate objective remains that VAT compliance costs in the single market are brought closer to the levels of those in domestic trade, however, further simplification should not result in an increase of VAT fraud risks or disproportionate rise of the costs of tax administration; 

16.    HIGHLIGHTS the importance of reflecting upon the position of micro-SMEs in the VAT system, in order to promote growth, jobs and real economy in the EU, without causing distortions of competition; 

17.    In the context of the Digital Single Market Strategy, STRESSES the importance of finding an EU-level solution rapidly to eliminate the competitive disadvantage for EU suppliers and UNDERTAKES to review the scope and discuss the possibility of repealing the VAT exemption for final importation of small consignments of goods into the EU by non-EU suppliers, considering also the impact of possible changes on the customs administration; 

18.    RECOGNISES the need to simplify cross-border e-commerce, and the opportunity to extend the "One Stop Shop" for online sales of tangible goods to final consumers and CALLS FOR further analysis and technical work to be undertaken on a common EU-wide simplification measure, including a threshold; 

19.    NOTES that the debate will continue concerning a possible  introduction of legal means allowing for home country checks, including a single audit of cross-border businesses;

20.    In this context, LOOKS FORWARD to receiving the results of the ongoing Commission' study on VAT obstacles to cross-border e-commerce and the legislative proposals by the Commission; 

21.    STRESSES that improvements on the current system could be possible and necessary in the short term. 

III.    ON THE DEFINITIVE VAT SYSTEM (SINGLE EU VAT AREA) 

The Council of the European Union: 

22.    TAKES NOTE of the points made by the Commission in its VAT Action Plan as regards the way forward towards the definitive VAT system and of its intention to present a legislative proposal in 2017 for the definitive VAT system for cross-border trade, as a first step;

23.    NOTES, while working towards the definitive VAT system in the EU, the importance of fully respecting the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and taking full account of how potential EU-level solutions would best fit with the aspects upon which Member States continue to exercise their competence; 

24.    REITERATES that the principle of “taxation in the Member State of origin of the supply of goods or services”, as envisaged in article 402 of Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax, should be replaced by the principle of “taxation in the Member State of destination” for the definitive VAT system for B2B transactions, as stated in the Council conclusions of 15 May 2012; 

25.    WELCOMES the in-depth technical work conducted by the Commission so far, as well as the broadly based dialogue it initiated with Member States to examine in detail the different possible ways how to best implement the destination principle; 

26.    STRESSES nevertheless that the work has to continue to set ground for the political choice to be made with regard to the definitive VAT system; 

27.    TAKES NOTE that taxation with cross-border reverse charge in the Member State of destination could be analysed as an option to the proposed taxation of cross-border supplies for the definitive VAT system; 

28.    UNDERSCORES that the Council will continue to follow up the debate to reach an agreement on the political guidance to the Commission to conduct further analysis that would enable it to carry this work forward and enable the Council to properly evaluate the impact of possible technical solutions and adopt those that suit the common EU objectives best. 

IV.    ON VAT RATES 

The Council of the European Union: 

29.    TAKES NOTE of the directions of action proposed in the Commission Action Plan on VAT with regard to the VAT rate system and its intention to make a legislative proposal in 2017, proposing a reform to give more freedom to Member States in setting up rates and proposing two options; 

30.    RECALLS the conclusions of the European Council of 17-18 March 2016 which welcomed "the intention of the Commission to include proposals for increased flexibility for Member States with respect to reduced rates of VAT, which would provide the option to Member States of VAT zero rating‎ for sanitary products";

31.    WELCOMES the intention of the Commission to present a proposal for increased flexibility for Member States, so that they could benefit from the existing reduced and zero rates in other Member States, INVITES the Commission to include an impact assessment, and STRESSES that a sufficient level of harmonisation in the EU remains required and the adopted solution has to be carefully balanced to avoid distortion of competition, rise in business costs and negative impact on the functioning of the single market; 

32.    INVITES the Commission to present a legislative proposal which integrates provisions concerning VAT rates for e-publications in the context of Digital Single Market initiatives by the end of 2016 and include an impact assessment; 

33.    CALLS UPON the Commission, in line with the March 2016 European Council conclusions, to present to the Council a legislative proposal foreseeing an option to Member States of VAT reduced or zero rating for women's sanitary products at the earliest opportunity. 

Le 18 mai 2016, les casques bleus français ont reçu la visite de monsieur Emmanuel Bonne, ambassadeur de France au Liban, sur le camp de Dayr Kifa.

Henri Ladyi works to demobilize children from militias in the DRC.

In 2003, Henri Ladyi turned his back on the endless fighting in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) when he started working at a small peace group called Centre Résolution Conflits. Twelve years later he has been called “Africa’s Schindler” for his efforts towards peacebuilding in the eastern DRC.

The vast Democratic Republic of Congo has seen many decades of suffering before and after independence from Belgium in 1960. The colony was originally a private fiefdom of Belgium’s King Leopold II. But Belgium had to take it over in 1908 from the king’s International Association of the Congo (IAC) after a public outcry. This private company had, not unlike the militias that plague the east of Congo today, achieved Leopold’s quotas on exports like rubber through a regime of forced labour, mass executions, torture and mutilation.

Belgium administered the region as a colony, but did little to develop it or create a type of civic national identity of the sort which has kept the peace in multi-ethnic countries like the United States or Great Britain. When independence came the Congo’s new politicians unsurprisingly failed to build a functional central government or control the new ‘Armée Nationale Congolaise’ (ANC). General Joseph Mobutu, who had risen through the ranks of the ANC, eventually seized power. His regime became a Western-backed kleptocracy for the duration of the Cold War. Its three decade rule, and the manner of the Mobutu’s final fall in 1997, were almost as ruinous for the DRC as Leopold II.

When conflict reached his area in 1997, Henri Bora Ladyi was a young man in the Ituri area of the DRC’s north-eastern Orientale province. The invasion had started the year before, as Mobutu’s meddling in neighboring Rwanda finally caught up with him. A full-scale rebellion against his dictatorship had begun during 1996 in the eastern border provinces of North and South Kivu. In concert with the armies of neighboring Rwanda and Uganda, rebel units swept westwards as Mobutu’s renamed Forces Armées Zairoises (FAZ) and his regime more or less dissolved.

For years the DRC’s state apparatus had been gradually ceasing to function in more and more parts of the country as the regime’s mixture of waste, incompetence and corruption undermined the formal economy. But the fall of the central government completed the country’s ruin. It set off a scramble by neighboring governments and their local allies to seize control of the DRC’s vast mineral wealth in an orgy of looting.

In the first 1996-1997 war Ituri was on the invasion path of the Ugandan army and its allies. But it also suffered from the same type of ethnic hatreds that had caused so much inter-Congolese violence, and left the fractured country prey to its neighbors. Under Mobutu, the north-eastern region had seen major outbreaks of violence between Ituri’s Lendu and Hema ethnic groups in 1972, 1985 and 1996. These earlier struggles revolved around the historically unequal land distribution between the two communities dating back to pre-Belgian times and favoring the Hema.

A politicized Mobutu-era land law passed in 1973 was also a recurring source of conflict. Under its provisions, people could purchase already-inhabited property, and then present title to the land in court two years later, by which time it became incontestable. The Lendu alleged the Hema elite used it to drive Lendus off valuable land, with the help of complicit Hema officials and forged documents. Certainly many Hema leaders thrived economically in the DRC’s chaotic economic conditions, and in the late 1990s some used their greater wealth and clout to further marginalize and exploit the Lendu.

Thus in 1998, when a second regional war began on the heels of the first, the Ituri area was still occupied by the Ugandan People’s Defense Force (UPDF). The UPDF wished to exploit Ituri’s resources of gold, diamonds, coltan, timber, and coffee. Human Rights Watch has chronicled how it used its control of the region to illegally export resources, especially gold, to international buyers. The money gained was then used to support local Hema warlords who helped in the Ugandan operation.

Elite Hema landowners, in their efforts to drive the Lendu off land they considered theirs, also called upon members of the Ugandan army to help them. Those Lendu not run off were often forced to work in the majority Ugandan-controlled mines under threat of violence. This state of affairs inevitably produced a negative reaction in response to the actions of Hema and Ugandan forces. The Lendu quickly formed their own militant groups to fight back and violence rose sharply by 1999.

Henri described the pressure put on him at the time to choose sides in vivid terms. When the Ugandans arrived in Ituri he was running a telecoms bureau in the provincial capital of Bunia, telling the BBC in Kinshasa what was happening in this eastern part of the Congo. Members of the local community would often come and use his satellite phone or other office equipment and he had a talent for making useful connections.

But the bureau itself also made him a target for Hema militants, who suspected him of passing on information about their operations to his Lendu compatriots. Henri was tortured several times by the militiamen, once having metal batons interwoven between his fingers and having his hands crushed. Even when he managed to talk his way out, his own people treated him as a potential traitor, shooting up his office and ransacking his home as warnings.

As events deteriorated his Lendu community demanded protection from its young men. Henri remembers members of his family joined Lendu militia groups and several of his relatives were killed in the violence. Political shifts meant Bunia changed hands several times, and at one point during the struggle Henri found himself press ganged into joining the ranks of the temporarily victorious Lendu militants in order to prove his loyalties.

He talked his way into job as a technician which kept him away from the frontlines, but by the spring of 2003 the tides of war had changed again. This time it was Hema fighters who were advancing on the city and they were looking for revenge. Even Henri could not talk his way out of this kind of trouble. Instead when Hema soldiers came searching to kill him, he had to flee into the bush with his young family.

Henri fled with 5,000 other refugees through the jungle towards the safety of Beni in neighboring North Kivu province. It was a week-long two hundred kilometers trek on foot and he was in an angry mood, with plans to buy weapons in the city and run them back to his brothers in Ituri to continue the struggle. But along the way an incident happened which was to change the course of Henri’s life.

At a village called Gety, militiamen held up the refugees, paranoid about traitors hidden inside their ranks. A massacre loomed over the mass of displaced people trapped there as the militants debated their fate amongst themselves. A natural leader, Henri asked to speak to their leader, despite being threatened with a machete to keep quiet. He knew already he was persuasive; unasked he took a dangerous gamble and negotiated with the militia commander for the refugees’ lives and freedom.

“As the eldest child there is no one do things for you.” Henri says with a laugh. “You learn to be the responsible one when you are very young.”

After a night of bargaining Henri got his way; the commander agreed to let the displaced civilians go. It was the start of a new direction in his life. When he arrived in Beni, instead of continuing with his plans to become a gun-runner, Henri got to hear of a church based peace group that was working with displaced people. The Centre Résolution Conflits (CRC) organization had also had to relocate twice because of the war, but was continuing to hold peace rallies and invite its congregations out to learn how they could promote peace in the region. Henri joined it, and by 2004 he had become risen to become the CRC’s director. Eleven years later and he has never looked back.

CRC’s work has lead Henri into all sorts of situations as it has developed down the years. The group retain a reputation as effective mediators, a mixed blessing in a dangerous part of a country filled with guns. In one case they were asked to negotiate between the UN and a rebel militant group holding a village hostage. The UN was threatening to storm the settlement, while the militants believed themselves possessed by spirits that made them immune to physical harm. Eventually the CRC were able to resolve the situation by negotiating safe passage for the fighters out of the village.

In another instance Henri was contacted by militia commanders with too many mouths to feed. Wishing to barter for supplies they offered to demobilize some of the child soldiers in their ranks in return for goats. A bizarre exchange rate of goats for children had to be worked out; undeterred Henri went into the bush to negotiate and a ratio of ten animals for 40 children was agreed. With the help of UK charity Peace Direct, one of CRC’s international partners, enough goats to free 100 child soldiers were sent.

As the CRC has persuaded fighters to demobilize, or let children and teenagers leave the bush to return home, its operations have had to change to cope. The CRC has faced the task of reintegrating these fighters into communities filled with their former victims and often it is no longer a just a case of overcoming interethnic hatreds. Over time many militia groups degenerated into fronts for banditry or just formed to terrorize their own areas into handing over food and other supplies.

Many ex-fighters, adults, children and youths, are psychologically scarred by the terrible things they have seen and done, and afraid of communal rejection as well as revenge attacks. Faced by a lack of support and economic alternatives in one of the world’s poorest countries, they can easily be seduced back into armed groups.

Still based in North Kivu, Henri and the CRC have piloted a number of projects designed to mitigate these problems as much as they can. As well as disarming ex-combatants and returning them home, they try to give each a skill that can make them employable. Special efforts are made to prepare communities for the return of ex-fighters, so they are not rejected out of hand. Child soldiers are returned to their families or placed with special trained foster parents and then returned to school or given a livelihood.

Similarly for women who have suffered rape or sexual assault at the hands of the various combatants, they provide trauma counseling and micro-finance to set up small businesses. The organization also run community radio stations in more than 70 places, supporting interactive clubs which broadcast discussions by the community members about local issues, including the dangers of joining militia groups.

It has been twelve years since the end of the formal end of the war that set Henri on this path and he recently celebrated another anniversary with CRC. Although his work may never quite end, the legacy as a peace-builder he leaves behind him will be a proud one.

This article first appeared in H Edition magazine and is re-published here with kind permission.

The post A New Direction: Henri’s Story appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Bogdan Diaconu pártelnök szerint csak a PRU, az ország egyetlen nacionalista pártja állítja meg Románia hanyatlását. Véleménye szerint a nagy pártok, mint a PSD és a PNL bebizonyították, hogy képtelenek a megújulásra, és amennyiben jelöltjeik nyernek a helyhatósági választásokon, folytatódni fognak a korrupciós cselekedetek és a pazarlás.

Prioritásának a helyi közigazgatás átláthatóvá tételét tekinti, ígérete szerint, ha megnyerné a június 5-i választásokat, a marosvásárhelyiek mindig időben értesülnének a város fejlesztési projektjeiről és naprakészen tájékoztatná a lakosokat a helyi tanács döntéseiről. Mircea Dușa, a PSD Maros, Hargita és Kovászna megyei kampányfőnöke arra buzdította a marosvásárhelyi románokat, egy román jelöltet támogassanak szavazatukkal, hiszen ha a szavazatok megoszlanak a román jelöltek között, az összmagyar polgármesterjelölt, Soós Zoltán nyeri a választásokat. Mircea Duşa problémának nevezte azt, ha magyar polgármestere lenne a városnak, és szerinte feltétlenül román polgármesterre és román többségű tanácsra van szükség a városban.

Az RMDSZ megyei tanácselnök-jelöltje Szászrégenben nyilatkozta ezt a sajtótájékoztatón, amelyet Nagy András RMDSZ-es polgármesterjelölttel együtt tartott. Felhívták a figyelmet a környék turisztikai lehetőségeire is, a megyei tanácselnök-jelölt szerint európai szintű sípályarendszert létesíthetnének a Görgényi-havasokban, amely az egész megye javára válna. Péter Ferenc azt mondta, ahogyan Szovátán is sikerült az idegenforgalmat fellendíteni, odafigyeléssel az egész megyét is bele lehetne kapcsolni a turisztikai körforgásba.

A független polgármesterjelölt úgy véli, a parkolási problémák megoldásához a városközpontban és a lakónegyedekben is emeletes parkolóházakat kellene építeni, az utakat ugyanis nem lehet szélesíteni, és a zöldövezeteket nem szabad feláldozni. Polgármesterként sürgetni fogja akár több belvárosi parkolóház megépítését, nyilatkozta Soós Zoltán. Erre a célra a városközpontban három lehetőség is van. Az egyik a Mureş Mall bevásárlóközpont melletti üres terület lehetne, ahol egy többszintes parkolóházat kellene építeni. A Park Szálló mögötti telekre egy kisebb, két szintes parkolót lehet létrehozni, továbbá a Nemzeti Színház mögötti terület is alkalmas erre− mondta Soós Zoltán független polgármesterjelölt.

Benedict Oramah, le président de de la Banque africaine d'import-export, avait récemment annoncé des objectifs de financement externe très ambitieux en 2016.

Cet article Afreximbank lève 750 millions de dollars à Londres est apparu en premier sur JeuneAfrique.com.

La mémoire de la Shoah est présentée aujourd'hui comme une leçon universelle partagée par la communauté internationale, un point de repère pour construire le XXIe siècle sur des valeurs civiques et morales communes.
Une mémoire omniprésente dans les sociétés contemporaines, cette mémoire de la Shoah est investie d'une fonction éducative éminente soutenue par des publications d'ouvrages, des témoignages, des productions audiovisuelles, des commémorations, expositions, musées et monuments mémoriales.
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Plenáris ülés : Az utóbbi években számos új, speciális fizetőeszköz jelent meg a fizetésforgalomban, mint például a virtuális pénzek. Ezeket nem bankok bocsátják ki, hanem közös adatbázisokra támaszkodva tartják nyilván a virtuális egyenlegeket és számolják el a tranzakciókat. Az EP-képviselők szerdán vitáznak arról a jelentésről, amely többek között létrehozna egy munkacsoportot a terület megfigyelésére és szükség esetén szabályozására. Jakob von Weizsäcker (szocialista, német) jelentéstevővel beszélgettünk.

Forrás : © Európai Unió, 2016 - EP

Plenary sessions : President Schulz paid tribute to Marco Pannella, who died on 19 May. He remembered Mr Pannella, a long-serving Italian MEP with whom he worked for many years, as a passionate defender of human rights, pacifism and pluralism, a staunch opponent of the death penalty, an advocate of prisoners’ rights, LGBT rights, and an early proponent of equality between men and women.

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Plenary sessions : President Schulz paid tribute to Marco Pannella, who died on 19 May. He remembered Mr Pannella, a long-serving Italian MEP with whom he worked for many years, as a passionate defender of human rights, pacifism and pluralism, a staunch opponent of the death penalty, an advocate of prisoners’ rights, LGBT rights, and an early proponent of equality between men and women.

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Thirty-six years after the death of Josip Broz Tito, his nostalgic admirers in many of the former Yugoslav states still commemorate his birthday despite criticism of his undemocratic regime.

Május 25-én, szerdán hosszú betegség után elhunyt Tempfli József nyugalmazott váradi püspök életének 86., papságának 54., püspökségének 27. évében. Csanáloson született 1931. április 9-én. Nagyváradon végezte líceumi, majd Gyulafehérváron a teológiai tanulmányait. 1962. május 31-én szentelték pappá....