Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Trump should become the first U.S. president to visit the region and celebrate the 10th anniversary of the C5+1 in a summit with the five Central Asian presidents.

The Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Programme is the new EU financial instrument designed to allow EU Member States to speed up their defence readiness by enabling urgent and significant investments in support of the European defence industry, with a focus on filling critical gaps in capabilities and equipment. It is the first pillar of the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030 strategic plan that aims to unlock €800 billion in defence spending across the EU.[1]

SAFE will provide up to €150 billion in competitive long-maturity loans to Member States that request financial assistance for investments in defence capabilities. These loans will finance urgent and large-scale procurement processes, ensuring that Europe’s defence industry can deliver the requisite equipment.

The features expected of the submitted proposals

The proposals should be:

• Relevant to the defence capabilities of Member States and the EU (e.g. border protection, countering hybrid threats, protecting critical infrastructure, countering cyber warfare, etc.)
• For urgent, large-scale procurement efforts, not small projects
• Involve at least two Member States in a common procurement procedure
• However, requests from individual Member States can also be approved, but only if they are linked to an urgent need and broader geopolitical realities; the proposal must also be submitted on the basis of the timely procurement and delivery of critical assets[2] (for example, the need to procure drones to counter migration movements along routes experiencing a significant increase in traffic, or systems to protect critical infrastructure from potential terrorist threats linked to the situation in the Middle East, could be supported). This is a temporary exception with an initial duration of one year.
• In addition, no more than 35% of the cost of the products’ manufacturing components can originate from outside the EU, EEA-EFTA, or Ukraine, while the countries of origin must meet the conditions set out in the Programme Regulations.

What will SAFE fund?

Category 1:

• Ammunition and missiles
• Artillery systems, including deep-precision strike capabilities
• Ground combat capabilities and their support systems, including soldier equipment and infantry weapons
• Small drones (NATO 1 class[3]) and related anti-drone systems
• Systems and equipment for critical infrastructure protection
• Cyber defence and cyber security systems
• Military mobility, including counter-mobility

Category 2:

• Air and missile defence systems
• Maritime surface and underwater capabilities
• Drones other than small drones (NATO-2 and NATO-3 class) and related anti-drone systems
• Strategic enablers such as, but not limited to, strategic airlift, air-to-air refuelling, C4ISTAR systems (Command, Communications, Information, Control, etc.), as well as space assets and services
• Space asset protection systems
• Artificial intelligence and electronic warfare systems

Countries that have expressed an interest in participating in SAFE and a Timeline for the Next Steps

By 29 July 2025, when the Programme’s first key deadline expired, 19 Member States had expressed an interest in accessing loans through the SAFE mechanism, with potential defence purchases of at least €127 billion.

The Member States in question are Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Spain.

The following resources have been tentatively allocated to the Member States as follows:

Member-State Allocation of Resources (€) Belgium 8,340,027,698 Bulgaria 3,261,700,000 Croatia 1,700,000,000 Cyprus 1,181,503,924 Czech Republic 2,060,000,000 Denmark 46,796,822 Estonia 2,660,932,171 Finland 1,000,000,000 France 16,216,720,524 Greece 787,669,283 Hungary 16,216,720,524 Italy 14,900,000,000 Latvia 5,680,431,322 Lithuania 6,375,487,840 Poland 43,734,100,805 Portugal 5,841,179,332 Romania 16,680,055,394 Slovakia 2,316,674,361 Spain 1,000,000,000

 

30 November 2025 Submission of National Defence Investment Plans

January 2026 Adoption of Council Implementing Decisions

February 2026: Negotiation of loan agreements and operational arrangements, triggering pre-financing.

In search of a European strategic culture and interoperability: Behind the Lines

1. The Programme is part of the EU’s overall strategy on the indivisibility of external and internal security—a strategy which informs every strategic and institutional document it produces in relation to internal and foreign policy. SAFE follows in the wake of the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, but also the intensification of hybrid threats. It is therefore to be expected that it bears the imprint of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as well Moscow’s hybrid attacks against Ukraine and its hybrid operations against EU Member States. Apart from blurring the lines between war and peace—which is a key characteristic of hybrid threats in general—, the specific threat posed by Russia highlights the extent to which internal security is now significantly threatened by a malicious external actor, which can also be a state. This constitutes a further significant change in the recognition and assessment of threats.
2. The main threats that can be addressed through projects submitted to SAFE for funding extend beyond military attack by a hostile nation to include hybrid threats, cyber-attacks, the weaponization of migration and mass border breaches, terrorist attacks, malicious acts, and the sabotaging of critical infrastructure. Which is to say, precisely those threats that are stressed in the broader strategic and political philosophy underpinning the new EU defence policy, mainly via the White Paper on European Defence Preparedness 2030.
3. This works in tandem with the EU Preparedness Union Strategy, which sets out an integrated approach to every threat to the Union’s preparedness for conflict, anthropogenic and natural disasters and crises, the White Paper on European Defence Preparedness 2030, and the Internal Security Strategy: Protecting the EU.
4. SAFE emphasizes investment in the protection and resilience of critical infrastructure/entities, cyberspace, borders, transport, supply chains, information and communication technologies, as well as space investments, technologies and facilities. It is worth noting that most Member States are in the process of transposing the Directive on the Resilience of Critical Entities into national law and developing related strategies.
5. SAFE is a Programme that can further enhance interoperability between the armed and security forces, as well as dual use in the defence / security / civil protection sectors in line with the framework put in place by the EU Preparedness Union Strategy to prevent and react to emerging threats and crises—in particular those in the areas of hybrid threats, border protection, the resilience of critical infrastructure, and cyber security.
6. It can act as a bottom-up catalyst for the emergence of a European strategic culture in both threat identification and investment planning; for the creation of collaborative economies of scale; and for the increased interoperability of assets and systems on the basis of a common European defence capability. This procedure has been followed in other cases where there were difficulties reaching an agreement at the Council level—for example, in the prevention of radicalization. However, there is always the risk that the absence of a statutory coordinating body could lead to fragmented proposals that simply reproduce the various strategic cultures and assessments of risk. Let’s hope that this time, the glass is half-full.

 

[1] For details on SAFE, see the relevant EXPLAINER by S. Blavoukas and P. Politis-Lamprou at https://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/EXPLAINER-4-EL.pdf. More generally, on the European Defence Fund and the EU Defence Industrial Ecosystem, see S. Blavoukos; P. Politis-Lamprou and G. Matsoukas at https://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Policy-paper-182-Blavoukos-Politis-Matsoukas-FINAL-EL.pdf

[2] https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/safe-security-action-europe_en

[3] The classification is based on their weight and the altitude they can reach under normal conditions. Specifically, they are:
Class I: small>20 kg; mini 2-20 kg, micro<2kg
Class II: 150-600 kg (regular)
Class III: >600 kg with three subcategories (strike, HALE, MALE).
On the categories, and more generally on NATO’s approach to unmanned aerial vehicles, see Joint Air Power Competence Centre https://www.japcc.org/

Die Rufe nach einem Beschuss von unerlaubten Kampfjets aus Russland sind laut, auch US-Präsident Trump sprach sich dafür aus. Helge Adrians ist selbst Offizier und forscht bei der Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik zu internationalen Sicherheitsthemen. Worin der Experte aktuell die größte Gefahr sieht.

The Transatlantic Periscope is an interactive, multimedia tool that brings together expert commentary, high-quality media coverage, official policy documents, quantitative data, social media posts, and gray literature. It will provide on a monthly basis a summary of the most important news concerning the Greek-US relations, as reflected in the media. Below you will find an overview for August 2025.

On August 4, 2025, the Greek Minister of Environment and Energy, Stavros Papastavrou, met with the new Chargé d’Affaires at the US Embassy in Athens, Josh Huck, to discuss energy cooperation between Greece and the US and electricity interconnection projects in the Eastern Mediterranean. Papastavrou said that the discussion focused on energy cooperation, the South-North Vertical Gas Corridor, the utilization of infrastructure for American LNG in Revithoussa and Alexandroupolis, and the keen interest in electricity interconnection projects in the Eastern Mediterranean.

On the same day, a statement released by the American Hellenic Chamber of Commerce on the recent EU-US Trade Deal noted that the deal may present important opportunities for Greece. As it is specifically noted in the statement: “As a member of both the EU and NATO, and as a growing logistics, energy, and digital hub in Southeastern Europe, Greece stands to benefit significantly from the strengthening of transatlantic trade ties. In fact, improved market access, increased regulatory coordination, and the prospect of expanded zero-for-zero tariff arrangements can translate into tangible results for Greek exporters, investors, and technology-driven sectors”.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio held a call with Prime Minister of Greece Kyriakos Mitsotakis on August 8 regarding the strategic importance of US–Greece energy cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean. During the call, Secretary Rubio reaffirmed the continued strength of the United States’ bilateral relationship with Greece and its role as a key NATO Ally.

At the same time, Greece and the United States are in talks to revise their Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement (MDCA), a move that could see the establishment of two new bases for US forces in mainland Greece and a significant expansion of the American military footprint in the country. The ongoing negotiations are also focused on upgrading existing facilities. The US will remain in the strategic northeastern port of Alexandroupoli and is set to spend $42 million to upgrade its naval base at Souda Bay in Crete. According to officials, the two new locations being considered for US forces are the Petrochori firing range in the western Peloponnese and the Dalipis Army Base near Thessaloniki.

More at: https://transatlanticperiscope.org/relationship/GR#

The economist articulated a series of statist economic principles that continue to guide decision-making in Indonesia to the present day.

The advent of artificial intelligence has the potential to enhance nations' military capabilities. It has also created a host of new security challenges.

Despite the recent turbulence in the relationship, geopolitical realities will continue to push New Delhi to seek a closer relationship with Washington.

President Prabowo Subianto is accused of eroding the firewall erected between the military and civilian spheres after the fall of Suharto in 1998.

The bloc, which includes around a third of global GDP, has assumed greater significance following Washington's sharp protectionist turn.

Das diesjährige Gipfeltreffen der Shanghaier Organisation für Zusammenarbeit (SOZ) in Tianjin war das bisher größte in ihrer Geschichte. Mehr als 20 Staatschefs und zehn Vertreter internationaler Organisationen nahmen an dem Gipfel teil. Während dieser SOZ+ hielt Chinas Staats- und Parteichef Xi Jinping eine Rede, in der er promi­nent die Global GovernanceInitiative (GGI) des Landes ankündigte. Entwicklung, Sicher­heit, Zivilisation und Governance bilden für Peking die vier Säu­len für den Aufbau einer »Gemeinschaft mit einer gemeinsamen Zukunft der Mensch­heit« oder, konkreter, einer neuen Weltordnung. Daher ist es dringend geboten, dass Deutschland und Europa China in dieser Phase anhaltenden Umbruchs als global­strategische Herausforderung begreifen.

The anti-corruption protests, which took place across Manila and other cities, are the largest to take place since the “Million People March” in 2013.

Semey, the center of Kazakhstan’s Abai Region, will hold its first ever direct election for akim on October 12.

The top contenders, including Koizumi Shinjiro and Takaichi Sanae, have moderated their positions since the 2024 race.

An analysis of 20 years of congressional speeches shows that support for Taiwan is increasingly a central pillar in the U.S. competition with China.

New high-altitude drones could revolutionize India's ability to supply troops along its contested northern borders with China and Pakistan.

The academic debate over the history of the Asia-Pacific War and Japan’s colonial era has been largely resolved. So why does that history remain so politicized? 

A scheduling issue is one reason, but there are other factors that underscore why the defense treaty has yet to be signed.