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ARI 37/2016 - 19/5/2016
Gonzalo Fanjul
Los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible constituyen una agenda de progreso global que escapa el ámbito exclusivo de la cooperación. Aplicarla tendrá implicaciones políticas institucionales, políticas y financieras que deben ser aclaradas cuanto antes.

AAN has done a series of twelve in-depth interviews with families of Afghans who recently travelled to Europe. The conversations provided a fascinating insight into the practicalities of both the decision making processes and the journey, the complex interplay between economic and security considerations and the mixed feelings families often have once their loved ones have finally, safely, reached Europe. In this third and last installment, AAN’s Martine van Bijlert takes a closer look at what happened since the migrants arrived and lays out the hopes and concerns their families have, now that brothers and sons are in Europe.

This series of three dispatches is based on twelve interviews done for a joint project with (and funded by) the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) and resulted in a joint study titled “’We Knew They Had No Future in Kabul’: Why and How Afghan Families Decide to Leave” published on 27 April 2016.  The data collection was conducted in the spring of 2016 with selected Afghan households to explore the decision-making processes at the family level of a small number of migrants. (1) The three dispatches present the main findings and place them in a wider context. The first dispatch in the series focused on the main motives and decision making processes and can be found here. The second dispatch focused on the details of the journey, the routes and practical preparations and can be found here.

Situation after arrival in Europe

During the interviews, migrants’ families were asked where their loved ones were now and how they were doing. The fact that the interviews were done with the relatives of the migrants, rather than with the migrants themselves, obviously means that the information is partial and that everything is seen through the lens of those who stayed behind. But it is also instructive, as it provides insight into the continued linkages with the home front – a factor that tends to be underplayed in asylum interviews. (Many migrants, in particular minors, are coached to claim they no longer have living relatives or that they have lost all contact).

In all interviews except one, the migrants who had left Afghanistan in 2015 had arrived in Europe, although their journey had often been long and stressful (see this earlier dispatch in the series for details). The one exception was an interview with a young man from Kandahar, a migrant himself, who had tried to reach Europe but had failed; he was in Kabul at the time and preparing to attempt the journey again.

All migrants who had arrived in Europe were now awaiting a decision as to whether they could stay or not. Information about their situation tended to be fairly patchy. All relatives knew in which country their family members were staying, but none of them seemed to know the name of city (or they did not mention the city during the interview). Details tended to be about whether they had received money or language lessons, whether they were allowed to work and how they had been housed.

My son is now in Germany, but I don’t know the name of the city where he is living right now. He arrived there almost a month ago. I don’t have a lot of information about his status, but he is living in a camp and is waiting for the bureaucracy to decide whether he can stay. (Father of a 19-year old migrant from Kabul)

They are in Germany. They are learning German over there and now know a little already. I do not know what is going to happen to them. They arrived 40 days ago. They have been registered in Germany now, but not interviewed yet. They were given a card so that they can go to the city and buy necessary things, but they are not permitted to work. My eldest son gets 180 Euros and my younger son gets 150 Euros every two weeks. That is all they have received until now. They were given a room in a block where other Afghan migrants live. I don’t remember the name of the city. (Mother of a 15-year and an 18-year old, from Kabul)

My son is in Belgium. He arrived there almost six months ago. He did not choose a country. He just wanted to leave Afghanistan because he was tired of everything here. … He wants to stay in Belgium and is taking language classes. He is paid by the Belgian government and is happy there. He was supposed to have his interview after two weeks. I don’t know how it went. (Father of a 23-year old migrant from Kabul)

The relatives tended to have rudimentary knowledge of the bureaucratic procedures, but often had little detail, other than whether interviews had already been held or whether a decision had yet been taken.

Now, he is in Germany. He has got through two courts in Germany. He gave them his documents that explain the main factors and reasons for him going. His last appearance – in the high court – is going to be next month. He told us on the telephone that they would send him to the next court. (Brother of a 22-year old migrant from Sar-e Pul)

He has an apartment with two bedrooms. I’m not sure [when they arrived there]. They are waiting for their second or third interview. (Brother of a migrant from Herat, who left with his whole family)

Linkages to home

In the past, once a migrant left his or her home country, communication became cumbersome, erratic and expensive. However, increased access to the internet and the growing use of smart phones, well beyond urban areas and the upper middle class, have made it much easier for families to stay in touch. The access this provides to information all over the world and the ability to stay connected after departure has obviously impacted the migration process. Afghans contemplating the journey can now gather information beforehand, those en route can ask for help and those who have arrived can get their families to send copies of crucial documents needed for their asylum procedure.

We thought he was joking when he said he wanted to leave, but once he got his Iranian visa, we started believing him. He used Facebook on a daily basis to read about the situation along the route. He read that the border between Turkey and Greece was open, he might have been motivated by this. He is currently in Belgium. (Brother of 30-year old migrant from Helmand)

They went illegally, so they did not take any documents with them. They took money and when they got to Europe, we sent pictures of their national ID cards (Tazkira) via mobile phone. The day they left, my eldest son took one hundred dollars from me and left without our blessings. When my younger son left, we gave him money. His father gave him 150 USD for the journey. When they were in Iran, we again sent them money. (Mother of a 15-year and an 18-year old, from Kabul)

However, not everybody has easy access to communication. One father said he only had limited contact with his son as neither of them had a smart phone (which would make them dependent on an expensive landline-to-cell phone service rather than speaking via internet services such as Skype). (But his son had also left for Europe without telling his father and had only called him later, so he may also intentionally be keeping his father in the dark.)

He said it was a very difficult journey, but he did not tell us about the details because he did not want to make us upset. Also, neither my son nor I have the device [smart phone] to enable us to talk for a long time. (Father of a 23-year old migrant from Kabul/Maidan Wardak)

Hints of regret

Most families said their relatives planned to stay where they had ended up, even though in some cases this was a different country to where they had initially intended to get to, and that they were happy there. A few, however, said their family members in Europe were unhappy.

My 17-year old brother left for Europe. He basically intended to go to Belgium but couldn’t make it, as he was trying to reach Belgium when the Paris attacks happened. So he returned to Germany and then left for Italy. Belgium was his first choice because we believed that people were accepted as migrants easily there. He is currently living in Italy. He arrived there in 2015. He is very, very unhappy there with no legal status. He intends to leave for a city in France where it is believed he would be accepted as an asylum seeker more quickly. (Brother of a 17-year old migrant from Nangarhar)

The case of the younger brother from Nangarhar was further complicated by the fact that the boy had left against the wishes of his family and that the journey had been expensive:

He decided to leave even though all the other members of our family were opposed to it. I am still encouraging him to return because, even after spending around 8,000 US dollars, he now also regrets going. He decided to go because my niece who was already in Europe kept calling him to come to Europe. Also, my brother was not happy here because when he failed the entry test to university. He wanted to join the Afghan National Army (ANA), [but] we did not want him to join the ANA, because he would have been killed if he had joined. (Brother of a 17-year old migrant from Nangarhar)

When asked what his vision for his younger brother was now that he was in Europe, the older brother was not very optimistic:

There were serious concerns about him and now we don’t have any hopes for his future. He ruined his life and all we can do is hope for something better for him. We don’t specifically know what will happen to him next; he knows this better. (Brother of a 17-year old migrant from Nangarhar)

In another case, the migrant simply seemed to be tired of moving around and affected by being away from home.

He is exhausted from traveling and he says if his case is accepted in Finland, he will stay in Finland. He is really tired of moving, so he also said if his case doesn’t get accepted, he will return to Afghanistan. (Brother of 20-year old migrant from Baghlan)

In several of the interviews it became clear that those staying behind had disagreed with their loved ones’ wish to go. In some cases they were ultimately persuaded, while in other cases they continued to disagree even after their relative had left.

Actually everyone, including his wife, opposed his going. At the same time, family members were not sure how to stop him as neither the economic nor security situations got better. He said he wanted to leave and take the risk just like other people who were leaving. (Brother of a 30-year old migrant from Helmand, who left behind a family)

My brother had been interested in going to Iran or Turkey. His classmates and friends had discussed it for a long time. They heard life was better there and they would have better job opportunities, but my family did not agree with him. We wanted him to finish his studies and to get a job with the government. It is not easy for parents to send their kids away. Parents want their children to live with them. It was hard for us, but we wanted him to live in a peaceful place. My brother began talking about this topic, but we did not agree with him. But when security began to deteriorate, the family agreed to send him abroad. (Brother of a 20-year old migrant from Baghlan)

We all disagreed with his going, all the brothers. We believe more in our own tradition rather than going to another place. We are a traditional family with our own character. I’ve been to many conferences overseas and I know about the difficulties of being a foreigner, especially those with Asian traditions and culture, and languages and religion, even the skin is different. And even if your skin isn’t different, there is racism there sometimes. There are many advantages in Europe, but people can’t count on them. (Brother of migrant from Herat, who left together with his family)

Relatives who had had misgivings before the migrants left, other than just the risks of the journey, tended to still feel conflicted even after their family members had arrived in Europe. Some of them felt they had left behind a good life and would face greater difficulties in Europe. See for instance, again, the comments of the brother of the journalist from Herat:

I would have preferred him to stay because there is an advantage here for a traditional family and a journalist in having a normal life. He goes there and for many years he will try to learn a new language and a new culture and it will take some years for his case to be accepted – and then the golden time of his life will be over. That’s why I was telling him, and persuading myself, that if there is one chance to stay, it is better to stay. If there had not been a threat, he would have stayed. For an Afghan man, this might be the maximum adventure he can have: a salary, a car, a wife, kids. What more do you want? (Brother of migrant from Herat, who left with his family)

Visions for the future

Apart from feeling relief that their relatives had safely reached Europe, family members obviously hoped that their loved ones would be allowed to stay and build a life; that they would be able to focus on their education or finding a good job, maybe start a family or bring some of their remaining family over as well and, of course, help out those who stayed behind:

He is in Germany now and has been there for around eight months. He is waiting for some sort of court to decide his case. He intends to stay in Germany. We hope he can help us take our land back [ie pay back the mortgage that was needed to pay for the journey] and that he will help us build a house for ourselves, because we are currently living in a rental house. We also want to get him engaged. We definitely had worries about the journey, but now that he is there, we have some hopes. (Brother of a 25-year old migrant from Takhar)

At least now we are relaxed that he has a peaceful life, and will not be seeing robbers or bomb blasts. My hope for him was and still is that he will have a better life and that he may get married or have children, so they would have a better future. If he has a good salary, he can maybe help us too. We don’t know what will happen to my son. It totally depends on the will of God. (Father of a 19-year old migrant from Kabul)

The mother, who had initially opposed her young sons going, now feels relief that at least two members of her family are safe. And she hopes one day she may be able to join them:

I hope that, after enduring the risks and hardships of this journey, the boys study there and have a better future – because we knew that they had no future in Kabul. I would like to go and join them in Germany. Their younger siblings would also like to join them. Afghanistan is not safe anymore and everyone wants to live in a safer place. We are happy with this decision now. If, God forbid, something happens to us in Kabul, then at least two of our family are safe and alive in Germany. (Mother of two migrants, 15 and 18-year olds, from Kabul)

But there were also relatives who had concerns about the life the migrant may lead. For instance, in the case of the man from Helmand, who had left behind his family and had initially only planned to travel as far as Iran or Turkey:

Well, we are definitely hopeful he will get a good job and can at least help support his own family and children. But we cannot forecast the future. It’s up to the Belgian government now. … The only concern we have is that he left Afghanistan and will be working in another country instead of Afghanistan, while he could have spent his energy improving his own country. Also, my parents are worried about his religious practices. Even if he continues his religious practices, they are concerned about the next generation who they think might not stick to our religious beliefs. (Brother of a 30-year old migrant from Helmand)

And then there is of course the uncertainty over whether the migrants will be allowed to stay or whether they will be sent back. Many interviewees did not dwell on this very long, most of them merely referred to the fate of the migrant now being in the hands of God and the host country. Others were more outspoken.

The goals and vision we have for him are that he will have a safe and good life. We do not have to worry about his safety anymore. We do not have to worry that Kuchis, or Daesh, or the Taleban will kill him one day. [But] we are not sure about his future. It depends on the host country and whether they give him refugee status or send him to another country or deport him. In this regard, I cannot say anything. (Father of a 23-year old migrant from Kabul/Maidan Wardak)

Based on the information I have received from friends and relatives, if he gets accepted in Finland and stays there, I think he will have a better future. He will, at least, not live in war. He will get a better education and will have a better chance of getting a good job. But if his case doesn’t get accepted, he might have a very dark future. He spent more than a year trying to get there. He has been away from his culture during this time. He has also been away from higher education so if he doesn’t get accepted, he will be devastated and will have a dark future. He will suffer psychologically as well. If he returns home, maybe my father and all of us will tell him that we spent all our money on you and you returned home with nothing and no future. So there will be a lot of pressure on him. My father will probably tell him that we don’t have any more money to invest in you and nobody else will risk giving him any money either. (Brother of a 20-year old migrant from Baghlan)

The pressure to be a “good investment”

In many cases the wish for their relatives to do well was intertwined with the hope that the risk, the stress and the expenses of the journey would ultimately turn out to have been a good investment, not just for the individual but also for the larger family. In some cases this was an important reason driving the decision to “send” a relative to Europe. In the case of the migrant from Takhar for instance, after one of the brothers was killed and their house was set on fire, the family pooled their resources to send one of them to Europe:

All the family decided together that we would send our brother to Europe so he could help out the whole family financially once he makes it. We specifically chose Germany. We expected that our brother would be accepted as an asylum seeker in Germany and that he would be able to bring the whole family to Germany, because there is nothing left for us in Afghanistan. (Brother of a 25-year old migrant from Takhar)

Similarly, in the other cases, where the decision to embark on the journey seemed primarily driven by other factors, the opportunities that Europe represented still played a role in the families’ considerations.

His employment as a driver with an organisation brought him threats, so my father persuaded my brother to leave the country for a safer place. … At first my brother decided to go to Iran. Then his friends encouraged him to go to Turkey and consequently, he was motivated to try to reach Germany after consultation with family members. We thought, if our brother stays in Turkey, all he would do was work as a labourer. So we thought he should go to Germany, continue his education there and then help us to get there too. … We always wanted to go to a safer place but we didn’t have enough money to leave as a whole family – we still owe some of our relatives for the expenses we spent on our brother leaving. (Sister of a 22-year old migrant from Kunduz)

However, the possibility that their gamble may not pay off still looms, particularly for those whose families had struggled to gather the money and those who left despite opposition from their relatives. This is neatly summarised by the older brother of the 20-year old migrant from Baghlan:

Like my brother, my cousins who left, their families also struggle financially. They sold their land and other possessions and gathered money to send their kids to a safe place with better opportunities. It hasn’t been easy on either side. The families are still waiting to hear good news from their boys and the kids live with uncertainties in Europe. The family of one of my cousins who went to Europe still hasn’t paid the smuggler in full, so the smuggler comes knocking on their door every day asking for the outstanding money. 

I have to tell you that all the families that I know of, who sent their sons abroad, are hoping that their sons will get settled in Europe and will help them in return, because they have spent all their money to get their sons there. So far, no family has received anything from their boys in Europe during the last year. The families in Afghanistan are not very hopeful because we know that the influx of refugees in Europe has made it more difficult for Afghans. (Brother of a 20-year old migrant from Baghlan)

The pressure to be a “good investment” in this case was particularly strong, given that the young man came from a family that struggled financially.

In a way, travel to Europe has always been a ‘high-end’ addition to the regular diversification and coping strategies that many Afghan families employ. For several families this was not the first child or sibling to travel abroad, nor was it the first instance of displacement. Several families had moved—to the provincial capital, another province, or to Kabul—when the situation in their own area had become too insecure, and many of them had spent long years either in Pakistan or Iran. The family from Herat had spent many years in Iran, with several other distant relatives still living there and two siblings already living abroad.

Many youngsters from the family are still in Iran. Some have left for Europe or are planning to go because of economic difficulties and new restrictions there, but there are dangerous challenges. Many hesitate to go. … I have a small brother in Iran, another in India. But they are similar cultures. There is an advantage with education and facilities and incomes that encourage people to travel to Europe. Many from our own family, however, prefer to stay. (Brother of a 29-year old migrant from Herat)

One of the sons of the family in Helmand had also already gone to Europe in 2000.

Two earlier arrivals

The migrants who arrived in Europe some months ago are still very much at the beginning of their new lives, provided they are allowed to stay. Two interviews done earlier this year for AAN by Anne Wilkens provide some insight into the difficulties the recent arrivals might still face.  Both interviews are with Afghans who were still minors when they arrived in 2010. They were accepted and are, to a certain extent, well integrated. They were quite forthcoming about their difficulties, probably much more than they will have been to their relatives. The evaluation of their stay in Europe is also informed by hindsight:

In Sweden, Jawad has done exceptionally well: he has learned the language and graduated from high school with good marks. But he still thinks his life is tough, albeit in a manner different from before. He misses his country, its nature and his home. … He is not used to living alone and feels psychologically vulnerable: “In Afghanistan we had no money but we were together and we were happy inside. Here it is the other way around: we have money, but inside we are alone.” … He wants to return to Afghanistan as soon as possible, saying again: “In Afghanistan, we were free inside.”

Unlike Jawad, Massud has been reunited with his family. After a couple of years, his mother and five siblings arrived in Sweden, but it was not a happy day for him. Massud felt overwhelmed by his feeling of responsibility for them all: “I cried and cried so much, I had to leave the house. My mother seemed so much older, and was no longer the competent person I thought she was.”… Massud says he has lost himself: “I miss myself and will never be able to find myself again.” He has seen a couple of therapists, but it has not helped him. As he sees it, he has sacrificed himself for his family: “It was not the intention but this is how it turned out.”

 

(1) The study consisted of twelve in-depth, semi-structured interviews that took place across Afghanistan’s regions as follows: four interviews in Kabul and Wardak province; four interviews in Takhar, Sar-e Pul, Kunduz and Baghlan; one interview in Nangarhar; two interviews in Helmand and Kandahar; and one interview in Herat. The ethnic composition and urban/rural population ratio in the provinces was taken into account in the selection of interviewees. Respondents were selected and located through a referral system where AAN researchers reached out to their networks looking for families where at least one member had left for Europe in 2015. The respondents were interviewed about the departure of their family member(s), how decisions were made prior to their departure, details of the trip to Europe and thoughts on the future of the migrant in Europe. In addition, basic household information was collected for each of the families. For a shorter summary of the study, published jointly with FES, see here.

All migrants included in the study were male, with one exception where a whole family – husband, wife and young children – travelled together. In one case, two young brothers from one household travelled together, and in one case a migrant who had been forcibly returned, was interviewed directly. All migrants included in this study were between the ages of 15 and 30 years. Most of the interviewees giving information about the migrants in question were brothers and fathers (there was one mother and one sister).

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The case is made paper maintains that the EU-Turkey CU of 1995 covering industrial goods should be modernised and modified to take into account the various and growing criticisms of the original CU. Furthermore, economic integration between the EU and Turkey should be strengthened by signing a complementary deep integration regional trade agreement (RTA) between the EU and Turkey, covering agriculture, SPS measures, services, government procurement, investment, and dispute settlement. For Turkey, the objective would be to achieve comprehensive liberalisation, while for the EU this is an ideal opportunity to harness the economic and political potential of deeper integration with Turkey, in line with its wider trade and investment policy.
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

The case is made paper maintains that the EU-Turkey CU of 1995 covering industrial goods should be modernised and modified to take into account the various and growing criticisms of the original CU. Furthermore, economic integration between the EU and Turkey should be strengthened by signing a complementary deep integration regional trade agreement (RTA) between the EU and Turkey, covering agriculture, SPS measures, services, government procurement, investment, and dispute settlement. For Turkey, the objective would be to achieve comprehensive liberalisation, while for the EU this is an ideal opportunity to harness the economic and political potential of deeper integration with Turkey, in line with its wider trade and investment policy.
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

The resolution of the Syrian conflict and the European Union ... 

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Az illegális bevándorlás kérdése alapvetően napjainkra Európa és az ázsiai valamint az afrikai kontinens “szembenállásává” egyszerűsödött le és amely kérdés megoldásában jelenleg csak egy dolog látható biztosan: a fejetlenség. A témában már szinte mindenki elmondta a maga véleményét és a maga javaslatát, így ennek a posztnak nem ez képezi témáját, hanem az a küzdelem, amelyet egyes közép-afrikai országok folytatnak a hozzájuk érkező migránsokkal szemben. A legutóbbi hírek arról szólnak, hogy Dél-Kamerunban több száz bevándorló torlódott fel, miután Egyenlítői-Guinea és Gabon hozzálátott az összes olyan személy kitoloncolásához a területéről, akik nem rendelkeznek azonosító okmányokkal vagy nem legális úton érkeztek az érintett államok területére.

Egyes szemtanúk még azzal is megvádolták a két, stabil és alapvetően gazdagnak számító afrikai országot, hogy ezen, sok esetben már évek óta ott élő migránsok házait lerombolták, minden pénzüket elkobozták. Vannak köztük több mint 10 éve Gabonban és Egyenlítői-Guineában dolgozó emberek is, akik valószínűleg az olaj árának esése miatt bekövetkező gazdasági visszaesés áldozatai lettek, hiszen az általában elég jól működő munkaerőpiacokon ismét jelentősebb munkaerőtöbblet jelent meg, ráadásul a hatóságok szerint a migránsok egy jelentősebb része illegális tevékenységekben vesz részt, bűnözői csoportok tagjaként keresi napi betevőjét. A kiutasított bevándorlók között több száz kameruni is volt, úgyhogy jelenleg a kameruni hatóságok a helyszínen, a határ mellett próbálják felmérni a helyzetet – a másik oldalról Gabon és Egyenlítői-Guinea egyértelműen hangsúlyozta, az afrikai országoknak saját maguknak kell gondoskodniuk polgáraik lehetőségeiről, nem lehet elvárás mondjuk Gabonnal szemben, hogy minden odaérkező munkást befogadjon és munkával lásson el.

Önmagában valószínűleg sokak számára ez a kiutasítási mizéria nem bír hírértékkel, de fontos megértenünk a mögötte zajló folyamatot is, azaz a tényt, hogy az afrikai migránsok többsége továbbra is a kontinensen belül vándorol(na), így a Gabonhoz hasonló egyre keményedő fellépések valószínűleg további tömegeket fognak Európa felé tolni. Gabon amúgy is mindig egy fontos célállomás volt Afrikában, az alacsony lélekszámhoz relatíve stabil és erős (ásványkincsekre építő) gazdaság társul, amely sokáig a régióban jelentős felszívóerőnek számított a migránsok tekintetében, de az elmúlt 1 évben a librevillei vezetés hozzáállásának keményedését láthatjuk, azaz Gabon igyekszik becsukni kapuit a bevándorlók előtt.

És ez a folyamat máshol is tetten érhető: a kisebbik Kongó százával küldi haza a Kongói DK-ból érkezett illegális bevándorlókat, a dél-afrikai xenofób támadásokról már volt itt szó, de például még az alapvetően rengeteg migránst útnak indító Niger és Csád is ezrével utasított ki embereket területéről, hogy az illegális bevándorlás megfékezésével a Boko Haram terjedésének is gátat szabjon. Sőt, például Algéria és Niger megállapodást is aláírt, hogy előbbi gond nélkül hazaküldhesse az algériai városok utcáin zömében koldulásból élő több ezer nigerit még tavaly, úgyhogy bár sehol nem kap főcímet, a bevándorlás és a bevándorlók kérdése Afrikában belül is téma, megoldásra váró probléma – egyrészt biztonsági szempontokból, másrészt azért is, mert ha nincs regionális, kontinentális megoldás, akkor az Európa számára is nehéz jövőképet vetít előre.

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Megvitatta és feltételesen elfogadta az Európai Bizottság szerdán a Lengyelországot érintő „jogállamisági véleményt”. Ennek jövő hétfői beélesítésére a testület első alelnökének, Frans Timmermansnak adtak mandátumot arra az esetre, ha addig Varsó nem tud „számottevő haladást” felmutatni a jogállamisági észrevételek orvoslásában.

Τον Μάρτιο του 2016 η Κύπρος έγινε το τέταρτο από τα πέντε Κράτη-Μέλη της Ευρωζώνης που έλαβαν οικονομική βοήθεια από την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση (ΕΕ) και το Διεθνές Νομισματικό Ταμείο (ΔΝΤ). Ολοκλήρωσε το πρόγραμμα του με το ΔΝΤ την 7η Μαρτίου και με τον Ευρωπαϊκό Μηχανισμό Στήριξης (ΕΜΣ) την 31η Μαρτίου. Αυτό παρουσιάζεται συχνά ως ‘έξοδος από τα Μνημόνια’. Είναι όμως πραγματικά έτσι; Τι σημαίνει η ολοκλήρωση ενός προγράμματος οικονομικής βοήθειας με την ΕΕ και το ΔΝΤ, και πότε επέρχεται η πραγματική έξοδος από το Μνημόνιο;

Τα προγράμματα οικονομικής βοήθειας ΕΕ-ΔΝΤ αποτελούνται από δύο μέρη: (1) την δανειακή σύμβαση ή σύμβαση διευκόλυνσης, και (2) τις διαρθρωτικές μεταρρυθμίσεις υπό τον όρο ικανοποίησης των οποίων απελευθερώνονται οι δόσεις της οικονομικής βοήθειας. Οι μεταρρυθμίσεις αυτές περιλαμβάνονται στα διαβόητα πλέον Μνημόνια (Memorandums of Understanding – MoUs), τα οποία συνάπτονται μεταξύ του Κράτους-Μέλους που επωφελείται της οικονομικής βοήθειας, του ΔΝΤ και της Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής (εκπροσωπώντας τον ΕΜΣ, μέλη του οποίου είναι τα Κράτη-Μέλη της Ευρωζώνης). Η αξιολόγηση τήρησης των όρων του  Μνημονίου διεξάγεται από την λεγόμενη ‘Τρόικα’: Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή, Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα (ΕΚΤ) και ΔΝΤ.

Η εκτενής δυνατότητα της Τρόικα να επηρεάζει σχεδόν άμεσα ένα μεγάλο εύρος πολιτικών των Κρατών-Μελών υπό οικονομική βοήθεια, πολλές από τις οποίες θεωρούνται καίριες για ένα κράτος (π.χ. προϋπολογισμός, φορολογία, κλπ), όπως και η σημαντικά μειωμένη συμμετοχή αντιπροσωπευτικών θεσμών (π.χ. εθνικό Κοινοβούλιο),  έχουν εγείρει  ανησυχίες σχετικά με την επίπτωση της διαδικασίας αυτής στις αρχές και σωστή λειτουργία της δημοκρατίας. Η ολοκλήρωση του προγράμματος οικονομικής βοήθειας παρουσιάζεται συχνά ως η πολύ-αναμενόμενη λύση των ανωτέρω προβλημάτων και η επαναφορά της κανονικότητας και ορθής λειτουργίας των δημοκρατικών διαδικασιών. Στην πραγματικότητα, όμως, η ολοκλήρωση του προγράμματος δεν συνεπάγεται και έξοδο από τα Μνημόνια.

Όσον αφορά στο ΔΝΤ, μετά την λήξη του προγράμματος και εάν το επωφελούμενο κράτος χρωστάει περισσότερο από το ποσό βοήθειας που αντιστοιχεί στο 100% της ποσόστωσης του στο ΔΝΤ (ή εάν κριθεί αναγκαίο από το ΔΝΤ ανεξαρτήτως του οφειλόμενου ποσού), άρχεται η διαδικασία παρακολούθησης μετά το πρόγραμμα – το λεγόμενο Post-Programme Monitoring (PPM). Η διαδικασία περιλαμβάνει την παρακολούθηση των πολιτικών του επωφελούμενου κράτους, ώστε να  εντοπιστούν αυτές που θα έθεταν σε κίνδυνο την οικονομική βιωσιμότητα και πρόοδο του κράτους και, κατ’ επέκταση, την αποπληρωμή του ΔΝΤ. Το PPM διεξάγεται δύο φορές το χρόνο.

Όσον αφορά στην ΕΕ, έχει δημιουργηθεί μία παρόμοια διαδικασία παρακολούθησης, με την ονομασία Post-Programme Surveillance (PPS), σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 14 του Κανονισμού 472/2013. Η διαδικασία εφαρμόζεται μετά την ολοκλήρωση του προγράμματος οικονομικής βοήθειας ενός Κράτους-Μέλους της Ευρωζώνης και έως ότου εξοφληθεί το 75% της χρηματοδοτικής βοήθειας που έχει ληφθεί (είτε από τον τωρινό και μόνιμο ΕΜΣ, είτε από προηγούμενους μηχανισμούς οικονομικής βοήθειας που είχαν συσταθεί παλαιότερα). Σύμφωνα με την διαδικασία του PPS, η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή και η ΕΚΤ διενεργούν τακτικές αποστολές και επιθεωρήσεις στο Κράτος-Μέλος, για να εκτιμήσουν την οικονομική κατάσταση του. Σε περίπτωση διαπίστωσης πολιτικών που θέτουν σε κίνδυνο την οικονομική βιωσιμότητα, και συνεπώς την δυνατότητα αποπληρωμής της βοήθειας που έχει χορηγηθεί, η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή και η ΕΚΤ συντάσσουν έκθεση σχετικά με τα διορθωτικά μέτρα που το Συμβούλιο των Υπουργών της ΕΕ έχει τη δυνατότητα να ζητήσει να θεσπιστούν απο το Κράτος-Μέλος προς διόρθωση των αποκλίσεων. Αξίζει να σημειωθεί ότι η διαδικασία ψηφοφορίας της ανωτέρω έκθεσης στο Συμβούλιο των Υπουργών είναι η αντίστροφη ειδική πλειοψηφία ή Reverse Qualified Majority Voting (RQMV). Αυτό σημαίνει ότι η έκθεση της Επιτροπής θεωρείται ότι έχει εγκριθεί, εκτός εάν σχηματιστεί πλειοψηφία καταψήφισης της – δηλαδή είναι εύκολο η έκθεση να υιοθετεί και πιο δύσκολο να απορριφθεί.

Στην ουσία λοιπόν, η ολοκλήρωση του προγράμματος, η οποία παρουσιάζεται συχνά και ως το τέλος των Μνημονίων, αφορά ουσιαστικά μόνο στην ικανότητα του επωφελούμενου Κράτους-Μέλους να δανειστεί από τις αγορές. Το μέρος του προγράμματος που αφορά στην παρακολούθηση πολιτικών του Κράτους-Μέλους παραμένει για ένα σημαντικό χρονικό διάστημα μετά τη λήξη της οικονομικής βοήθειας. Το ίδιο παραμένει και η επιτήρηση της Τρόικα.

Ως εκ τούτου, είναι πολύ σαφές ότι η Κύπρος είναι μακριά από την πραγματική έξοδο της από το πρόγραμμα οικονομικής βοήθειας ΕΕ-ΔΝΤ, όπως και τα υπόλοιπα κράτη μέλη της Ευρωζώνης που έλαβαν σχετική βοήθεια. Η Κύπρος είναι σε θέση να εξασφαλίσει οικονομικούς πόρους από τις αγορές και δεν λαμβάνει πλέον οικονομική βοήθεια. Παρά ταύτα, η επιτήρηση και αξιολόγηση των πολιτικών, ήτοι, επί της ουσίας το Μνημόνιο, θα παραμείνουν τουλάχιστον μέχρι το 2029 για την ΕΕ, δηλαδή 13 χρόνια μετά την λήξη της οικονομικής βοήθειας και, για το ΔΝΤ, έως ότου εξοφλήσει περισσότερα από €820 εκατομμύρια.

Οι δημοκρατικές επιπτώσεις των ανωτέρω είναι σημαντικές. Μέσω της διαδικασίας οικονομικής βοήθειας ΕΕ-ΔΝΤ, η Κύπρος θα είναι υπό στενή παρακολούθηση των πολιτικών της επί τη ουσίας για σχεδόν 20 έτη. Και αυτό, δεδομένης της περιορισμένης οικονομικής βοήθειας που έλαβε η Κύπρος σε σύγκριση με άλλα Κράτη-Μέλη της Ευρωζώνης, όπως π.χ. η Ελλάδα. Για τα κράτη αυτά, η περίοδος επιτήρησης των πολιτικών, ήτοι του Μνημονίου, θα είναι πολύ μεγαλύτερη.

The post Πότε μία χώρα “βγαίνει από το Μνημόνιο” ΕΕ-ΔΝΤ? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Political myths are a particular kind of narrative used to shape the legitimacy of a political system, writes Jeremy F. G. Moulton. He argues that, despite the difference between the academic and common usages of ‘myth’, political myth theory can generate important insights for political authority, and that it may prove useful in understanding questions around the EU’s legitimacy.

Flag of the European Union – Berlin 2012, Thomas Quine, CC-BY-2.0

Last week, I presented a paper at the 2016 UACES Student Forum Conference at the University of Kent’s Brussels School of International Studies. The paper focused on EU climate action and its interpretation as political myth; that is, a story that is used to explain and justify political authority.

Like most in academia, I like to flatter myself that my chosen field of study is both interesting and important – the reaction from the other attendees at the conference at least gave me reason to believe that the former may well be true. The discussion following my presentation revealed that political myth is a subject that has the potential to be of great interest and to promote spirited discussion, but it also showed that, as of yet, it has a limited readership.

This did not come as a great surprise. Within the academic writing on political myth theory, it has been recognised that sparse attention is paid to the matter. Yet, there is reason to argue that this should be (and is) changing. Since JCMS’s special issue on the subject in the EU in early 2010, more overt attention has been given to the European project’s political myths. But misconceptions about what political myth is remain prevalent.

What a Political Myth Is

Political myths are narratives that become central to a polity’s, or other political authority’s, raison d’être. They are used both by those in political authority and the wider population in order to legitimate that political authority. A political myth is a story that must be widely accepted as true, though its veracity is not the central issue. In fact, the truth behind a myth may well be questionable. What matters is the dominant belief and acceptance of the story.

I think political myths are best understood as developing in four stages (an approach I’ve adapted from the work of Della Sala 2010 and Bouchard 2013).

1. Initial framing – in this stage, a potential myth is framed as a narrative – one would imagine by those acting within or in favour of a given polity or political authority.
2. Diffusion – here the narrative is told and spread. Two distinct roles emerge: storytellers and listeners. For a potential myth to be successful, initial listeners must become storytellers and further diffuse the story. According to Della Sala, aside from political actors, initial storytellers are likely to be ‘cultural elites, public intellectuals and academics’.
3. Ritualisation – in this stage, a narrative becomes part of normal life, it is widely accepted as fact and becomes a basis of political, social, cultural and collective action.
4. Sacralisation – in this final stage, the narrative becomes a central part of a polity’s mode of being and the two become inextricably linked.

There are a number of ways to classify and differentiate political myths, but one set, that of foundational and functional myths, is especially useful in relation to the EU.

Foundational myths are the stories that relate to the how and why of a polity’s formation. In the EU, foundational myths are of European peace, necessitated by two World Wars originating in Europe, and that of a united Europe being a prosperous Europe.

Functional myths are those that are used to justify a polity’s political authority and existence based on the functional benefits the polity provides. Of special interest to me is that of EU climate action, but other functional political myths in the EU include the EU as a sui generis international actor, as a protector of fundamental rights and as the Single Market and source of competitiveness.

What a Political Myth Isn’t

One of the queries that arose from the presentation of my paper was whether political myths were not simply narratives. In the political myth literature, one finds many references to narratives. Some who write on narratives also find it useful to conflate the two (e.g. Manners and Murray 2016).

However, there is an important analytical distinction between them. Political myths can be understood as extensions of narratives. One can state that a truly successful narrative is one that becomes a political myth – as Della Sala writes ‘political myths are sacred narratives’ – that is, narratives that have progressed through the stages of mythification to the point of become sacralised.

The central difficulty with political myth is the terminology. ‘Myth’ is a term that has such a clear definition in the vernacular that, without background reading on political myth theory, one naturally approaches the term thinking it denotes a fiction. This is something that Flood has written on, saying:

Studies of myth almost invariably open with the caveat that the reader should not confuse the popular, pejorative term myth as a synonym for falsehood, distortion, or delusion with the scholarly usage which stresses that myths have unquestioned validity within the belief systems of the social groups which cherish them.

I would temper Flood’s certainty that the scholarly term identifies narratives of ‘unquestioned validity’ with the addition of ‘largely’, as every story has its disbelievers. With that aside, the quote from Flood necessarily establishes the two separate uses of the term.

Whilst it might appear desirable to create a new, academic term for ‘myth’ that steers away from any confusion, I would maintain that this is not the best course. It would mean, at least, partial divorce from the rich body of political myth literature that exists to date and would represent something of a disruption to the field and its theoretical development.

Instead, in academic texts, the term should be defined clearly, with the alternative meaning addressed. In less academic, more public-facing discussions of the subject, I would suggest that alternatively terminology is used. Perhaps Della Sala’s ‘sacred narratives’ would be suitable.

Myths and the European Union

The future of the EU is dependent on the Union finding narratives that resonate with European citizens to the point of becoming sacralised. It should be remembered that political myths can be used to both bolster the legitimacy of a polity and undermine it. As Aning and Nsiah have written, if leaders fail to provide a new myth, then ‘any passionate fringe group will fashion a political myth – positive or negative – for the state’.

In the context of EU crisis and raised levels of Euroscepticism, I believe that political myth theory allows for EU scholars to ask important questions on European unity and can provide insight into possible pathways for the future of a unified Europe.

Academics have a role to play in the establishment, diffusion and interpretation of these potential myths. For example, scholarly investigations into the negative myths that have developed around the EU, such as the democratic deficit, would make fascinating additions to a field which has largely focused on positive myths to date. I certainly look forward to the development of the field in the coming years, and hope to see others sharing my enthusiasm for it.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Student Forum or UACES.

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Jeremy F. G. Moulton | @JFMoulton
University of Hull

Jeremy F. G. Moulton is PhD Candidate in Politics at the University of Hull. His research focuses on EU climate action, political myth and multi-level governance.

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The post Political Myths and How to Study Them appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

On March 2016, Cyprus became the fourth out of the five Eurozone Member States under European Union (EU) – International Monetary Fund (IMF) financial assistance to end its program – a so called ‘exit’ (IMF on the 7th). Despite appearances and terminology, however, this is actually not a whole-out, true program exit. What does it really mean to end an EU-IMF program, and is it really an ‘exit’?

Cyprus requested financial assistance on 25th of June 2012.  The request came amid growing problems within the Cypriot banking sector, primarily due to its exposure to Greek debt and Private Sector Involvement (PSI) Greek bond ‘haircut’ process. However, the program was entered into almost a year after (29th of April 2013), on account of differences that arose during the negotiations between the Troika and the Cypriot government. Because of the prolonged negotiating period and the consequent increasing flight of capital from Cypriot banks, a bank holiday was imposed for almost two weeks and ensuing capital controls continued for two years until April 2015. Cyprus borrowed a total of up to €10 bln from the EU-IMF financial assistance: €9 bln from ESM and €1 bln from IMF (equal to 563 per cent of Cyprus’ IMF quota).

What of the process of EU-IMF financial assistance? The financial assistance program consists of two parts: (1) the financial assistance or loan agreement, and (2) the policy adjustment that this assistance is conditional upon, outlined in the now infamous Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs). This policy conditionality is monitored by the so-called Troika: The European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the IMF. The MoUs, as well as the intrusive monitoring capacity that the Troika has in the Member States under this policy conditionality framework that cover an extensive amount of policies that are key to a State (e.g. budget or taxation), have raised concerns in terms of the democratic process. The end of the program is often portrayed as the long awaited remedy and redemption of democratic process. But is this really the case?

The process of ending a financial assistance program is similar for the EU and the IMF. For the IMF, after the program concludes, and provided that the State concerned owes more than the amount of the assistance equivalent to 100 per cent of its IMF quota (or should it be deemed necessary by the IMF regardless of the amount owed), the process of Post-Program Monitoring (PPM) is initiated. The process was introduced in 2000 and is provisioned under the IMF’s operating principles. PPM aims at ensuring that the State concerned returns the amount owed to the IMF regularly and on time, by monitoring policies and circumstances of that State in order to identify and address risks that could jeopardize its progress to external viability and thus impair repayment of the IMF.  PPM is conducted normally twice a year.

For the EU, there has been a similar process instituted, termed Post-Program Surveillance (PPS), under Article 14 of Regulation 472/2013. PPS applies as long as the Eurozone Member State concerned has repaid less than 75% of the financial assistance under the ESM (or the previous EFSM and EFSF SA). Under PPS, the EC and ECB conduct regular review missions to the State concerned to assess its economic situation and, where applicable, report on corrective measures, which the Council can then request be adopted by that State. It is also worth noting that the voting procedure in the Council is reverse qualified majority (RQMV), i.e. the Commission’s report is deemed adopted unless a blocking majority is formed, making it easier to adopt the report and harder to reject it.

In essence, then, the ending of the program only refers to the ability of the State concerned to procure capital through the markets on its own. The policy monitoring and conditionality aspects remain very much in place for a substantial amount of time after financial assistance has ended, as does the Troika monitoring and supervision.

As such, it is clear that Cyprus is a long way from actually exiting its EU-IMF program, as are the rest of the Eurozone Member States that received assistance. While Cyprus is able to procure financial resources on its own, policy conditionality and monitoring is still in place, and will be for a substantial amount of time. The EU’s PPS will last at least until 2029, i.e. 13 years from now, while the IMF’s PPM will last until Cyprus has repaid more than €820 mln to the IMF.

The democratic repercussions of this in the political realm are considerable. Through the EU-IMF financial assistance process, Cyprus will have been under close policy monitoring and conditionality effectively for close to 20 years! And this is considering Cyprus’ limited financial assistance; consider, for example, the rest of the Eurozone Member States which have received considerably more assistance (e.g. Greece through the EU).

The post When does a Eurozone Member State actually exit its EU-IMF bailout? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

It is no longer any real secret that the ruling regime knows how to crack down on "undesirable" elements.

Britain: 2016

Should an extraterrestrial land on Earth tomorrow and decide to base his decision on where to live solely on economic forecasts provided by the European Commission, there’s a fair chance they’d pick the UK.

In country-specific recommendations published yesterday for almost all EU countries, Britain comes out looking pretty good, with a “dynamic” economy, “strong” household balance sheets and a banking sector whose resilience “continues to improve.” Even the risks to the economic outlook are presented as being contained, or mitigated by the government’s “wide-ranging” reform agenda.

All well and good. The only perplexing thing is, how does this fit with the altogether less peppy assessment that the EU Commission made this time last year? What could be happening to change their view?

Read more

Am 18. Mai 2016 hat der Ausschuss der Ständigen Vertreter (AStV) im Namen des Rates eine Einigung mit dem Europäischen Parlament über einen einjährigen Aufschub für die neuen Wertpapiermarktvorschriften bestätigt.

Diese Verschiebung der Termine für die Umsetzung und Anwendung um ein Jahr wird sich auf die Erbringung von Dienstleistungen im Bereich der Anlagen in Finanzinstrumente und auf den Betrieb geregelter Finanzmärkte auswirken. Die vorläufige Einigung mit dem Europäischen Parlament war am 2. Mai erreicht worden, und die Fristverlängerung muss nun in einer Verordnung festgeschrieben werden.

"MiFID" und "MiFIR"

Eine kürzlich erfolgte Überarbeitung der Vorschriften über Finanzinstrumente dient der Förderung der Integration, der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und der Effizienz der Finanzmärkte in der EU. Der Rat hat diese Vorschriften im Mai 2014 angenommen und dadurch einen bestehenden "MiFID"-Text zur Regelung der Märkte für Finanzinstrumente geändert und ersetzt.

Die Vorschriften sind in zwei Gesetzgebungsakten niedergelegt:

• der Verordnung 600/2014 ("MiFIR") mit dem Ziel einer Verbesserung der Transparenz von Handelstätigkeiten und des Wettbewerbs unter ihnen durch eine Beschränkung der Ausnahmen[1] betreffend Offenlegungsanforderungen und durch die Gewährleistung eines nichtdiskriminierenden Zugangs zu Handelsplätzen und zentralen Gegenparteien für alle Finanzinstrumente wie auch die Anforderung, dass Derivate an organisierten Handelsplätzen gehandelt werden müssen;
• der Richtlinie 2014/65/EU ("MiFID II"), mit der die Vorschriften über die Zulassung und die organisatorischen Anforderungen für die Erbringer von Wertpapierdienstleistungen und über Anlegerschutz geändert werden. Mit der Richtlinie wird auch eine neue Art von Handelsplatz eingeführt, das organisierte Handelssystem (OTF). Standardisierte Derivatkontrakte werden in zunehmendem Maße über diese Plattformen gehandelt, die derzeit nicht geregelt sind.

Neue Termine

Gemäß der Vereinbarung mit dem Europäischen Parlament wird

• der Endtermin für die Mitgliedstaaten zur Umsetzung von MiFID II in nationales Recht auf den 3. Juli 2017 festgesetzt;
• der Endtermin für die Anwendung sowohl von MiFID II als auch von MiFIR auf den 3. Januar 2018 festgesetzt.

Sonstige Bestimmungen

Zudem wurden Änderungen vereinbart, die den Eigenhandel, Transaktionspakete, die Angleichung an die EU-Richtlinie über Wertpapierfinanzierungsgeschäfte und den Geltungsbeginn bestimmter Bestimmungen einer Verordnung über Marktmissbrauch betreffen.

Mit der technischen Durchführung verbundene Herausforderungen

Sowohl die Richtlinie als auch die Verordnung sollten 30 Monate nach Inkrafttreten, d.h. ab 3. Januar 2017, anwendbar sein, und die Mitgliedstaaten hätten die neue Richtlinie bis zum 3. Juli 2016 in nationales Recht umzusetzen müssen. Aufgrund von mit der technischen Durchführung verbundenen Herausforderungen, mit denen sich die Europäische Wertpapier- und Marktaufsichtsbehörde (ESMA) und die zuständigen nationalen Behörden konfrontiert sehen, werden wesentliche Dateninfrastrukturen nicht zum 3. Januar 2017 zur Verfügung stehen.

Nach dem neuen Rechtsrahmens müssen Handelsplätze und systematische Internalisierer den zuständigen Behörden zu den Finanzinstrumenten Referenzdaten übermitteln, die die Merkmale der einzelnen Finanzinstrumente, die in den Anwendungsbereich von MiFID II fallen, in einheitlicher Weise beschreiben. Zur Gewährleistung einer effizienten und harmonisierten Datenerhebung muss eine neue Infrastruktur für die Datenerhebung entwickelt werden. Deshalb muss die ESMA in Zusammenarbeit mit den zuständigen nationalen Behörden ein Datensystem einrichten, das angesichts des erweiterten Anwendungsbereichs von MiFID II ein breiteres Spektrum von Finanzinstrumenten abdeckt.

Am 2. Oktober 2015 hat die ESMA der Kommission mitgeteilt, dass eine Verschiebung der technischen Durchführung von MiFID II unausweichlich sei. Weder die zuständigen Behörden noch die Marktteilnehmer werden in der Lage sein, die neuen Vorschriften ab 3. Januar 2017 anzuwenden. Dies würde zu Rechtsunsicherheit und potenziellen Marktstörungen führen.

Die Verordnung zur Verlängerung der Fristen für die Umsetzung von MiFID II und MiFIR wird vom Europäischen Parlament voraussichtlich in erster Lesung gebilligt werden. Anschließend wird sie dem Rat zur Annahme unterbreitet.

[1] Durch Festlegung einer Gesamtobergrenze für die EU und einer Obergrenze je Handelsplatz für die sogenannten Ausnahmen vom Referenzkurs bzw. vom ausgehandelten Geschäft.

It could have been a scene straight out of The Sopranos. On Saturday, 15 cars rocked up to the Khovanskoye cemetery on the southwestern outskirts of Moscow.