France

Das Postgraduate Programme for Sustainability Cooperation (PGP) des German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS, vormals DIE) bildet seit 1965 Nachwuchs für die deutsche und europäische internationale Zusammenarbeit aus. Wie erfolgreich ist das Programm in der Förderung des Berufseinstiegs und der Kompetenzen seiner Absolvent:innen? Und wie sollte sich die deutsche Ausbildung für internationale Kooperation weiterentwickeln? Anlässlich seines 60-jährigen Jubiläums führte das IDOS eine Verbleibstudie durch, um systematisch den Nutzen des Programms für die rund 1000 Absolvent:innen zu analysieren und Anregungen für seine Weiterentwicklung zu erhalten. 
Die Studie belegt eindrucksvoll die Relevanz des Postgraduierten-Programms und die Identifikation mit ihm über die letzten 60 Jahre hinweg. Dem Programm wird ein hoher Nutzen für die berufliche und persönliche Entwicklung attestiert, und es wird nachfolgenden Generationen klar weiterempfohlen. 
Zugleich befindet sich die Welt in einem Epochenumbruch. Grundlegend ändern sich v. a. die Rahmenbedingungen für Kooperationen, die Anforderungen an Personal im Berufsfeld und die Ausbildung von zukünftigen Fach- und Führungskräften. Ausbildungsprogramme wie auch das PGP müssen sich auf diese drastischen Veränderungen einstellen. Letztlich zeigt sich die Qualität eines Ausbildungsprogramms auch daran, wie gut es grundlegende Kompetenzen fördert, die noch unter veränderten Bedingungen nützlich sind und die helfen, diese Veränderungen mitzugestalten.
Die IDOS-Absolvent:innen wurden auch nach ihren Perspektiven auf Veränderungen im Berufsfeld internationale Zusammenarbeit befragt. Damit ermöglicht es die Befragung, Schlussfolgerungen zur Weiterentwicklung der Ausbildung zu ziehen: 
1. Die Aus- und Fortbildung sollte verschiedene Kompetenzen fördern, die eine Kooperation für nachhaltige Entwicklung gestalten können. Damit in einer zunehmend komplexer werdenden Welt Veränderungen partnerorientiert angestoßen und umgesetzt werden, sind sowohl fachliches und systemisches Wissen wie auch persönliche, soziale, Netzwerk- und Kooperationskompetenzen erforderlich. 
2. Institutionen in der Aus- und Weiterbildung sollten Kooperationskompetenzen durch gemeinsames Lernen mit internationalen Partnern stärken. Dies fördert das Verständnis für jeweils andere Perspektiven und unterstützt die Weiterentwicklung von Partnerschaften.
3. Schon in der Ausbildung sollten postkoloniale und machtkritische Perspektiven berücksichtigt und in der konkreten Zusammenarbeit zwischen Organisationen gelebt werden. Diese Aspekte gewinnen auch nach Einschätzung der IDOS-Absolvent:innen in der internationalen Zusammenarbeit an Bedeutung. 

 

Das Postgraduate Programme for Sustainability Cooperation (PGP) des German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS, vormals DIE) bildet seit 1965 Nachwuchs für die deutsche und europäische internationale Zusammenarbeit aus. Wie erfolgreich ist das Programm in der Förderung des Berufseinstiegs und der Kompetenzen seiner Absolvent:innen? Und wie sollte sich die deutsche Ausbildung für internationale Kooperation weiterentwickeln? Anlässlich seines 60-jährigen Jubiläums führte das IDOS eine Verbleibstudie durch, um systematisch den Nutzen des Programms für die rund 1000 Absolvent:innen zu analysieren und Anregungen für seine Weiterentwicklung zu erhalten. 
Die Studie belegt eindrucksvoll die Relevanz des Postgraduierten-Programms und die Identifikation mit ihm über die letzten 60 Jahre hinweg. Dem Programm wird ein hoher Nutzen für die berufliche und persönliche Entwicklung attestiert, und es wird nachfolgenden Generationen klar weiterempfohlen. 
Zugleich befindet sich die Welt in einem Epochenumbruch. Grundlegend ändern sich v. a. die Rahmenbedingungen für Kooperationen, die Anforderungen an Personal im Berufsfeld und die Ausbildung von zukünftigen Fach- und Führungskräften. Ausbildungsprogramme wie auch das PGP müssen sich auf diese drastischen Veränderungen einstellen. Letztlich zeigt sich die Qualität eines Ausbildungsprogramms auch daran, wie gut es grundlegende Kompetenzen fördert, die noch unter veränderten Bedingungen nützlich sind und die helfen, diese Veränderungen mitzugestalten.
Die IDOS-Absolvent:innen wurden auch nach ihren Perspektiven auf Veränderungen im Berufsfeld internationale Zusammenarbeit befragt. Damit ermöglicht es die Befragung, Schlussfolgerungen zur Weiterentwicklung der Ausbildung zu ziehen: 
1. Die Aus- und Fortbildung sollte verschiedene Kompetenzen fördern, die eine Kooperation für nachhaltige Entwicklung gestalten können. Damit in einer zunehmend komplexer werdenden Welt Veränderungen partnerorientiert angestoßen und umgesetzt werden, sind sowohl fachliches und systemisches Wissen wie auch persönliche, soziale, Netzwerk- und Kooperationskompetenzen erforderlich. 
2. Institutionen in der Aus- und Weiterbildung sollten Kooperationskompetenzen durch gemeinsames Lernen mit internationalen Partnern stärken. Dies fördert das Verständnis für jeweils andere Perspektiven und unterstützt die Weiterentwicklung von Partnerschaften.
3. Schon in der Ausbildung sollten postkoloniale und machtkritische Perspektiven berücksichtigt und in der konkreten Zusammenarbeit zwischen Organisationen gelebt werden. Diese Aspekte gewinnen auch nach Einschätzung der IDOS-Absolvent:innen in der internationalen Zusammenarbeit an Bedeutung. 

 

Das Postgraduate Programme for Sustainability Cooperation (PGP) des German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS, vormals DIE) bildet seit 1965 Nachwuchs für die deutsche und europäische internationale Zusammenarbeit aus. Wie erfolgreich ist das Programm in der Förderung des Berufseinstiegs und der Kompetenzen seiner Absolvent:innen? Und wie sollte sich die deutsche Ausbildung für internationale Kooperation weiterentwickeln? Anlässlich seines 60-jährigen Jubiläums führte das IDOS eine Verbleibstudie durch, um systematisch den Nutzen des Programms für die rund 1000 Absolvent:innen zu analysieren und Anregungen für seine Weiterentwicklung zu erhalten. 
Die Studie belegt eindrucksvoll die Relevanz des Postgraduierten-Programms und die Identifikation mit ihm über die letzten 60 Jahre hinweg. Dem Programm wird ein hoher Nutzen für die berufliche und persönliche Entwicklung attestiert, und es wird nachfolgenden Generationen klar weiterempfohlen. 
Zugleich befindet sich die Welt in einem Epochenumbruch. Grundlegend ändern sich v. a. die Rahmenbedingungen für Kooperationen, die Anforderungen an Personal im Berufsfeld und die Ausbildung von zukünftigen Fach- und Führungskräften. Ausbildungsprogramme wie auch das PGP müssen sich auf diese drastischen Veränderungen einstellen. Letztlich zeigt sich die Qualität eines Ausbildungsprogramms auch daran, wie gut es grundlegende Kompetenzen fördert, die noch unter veränderten Bedingungen nützlich sind und die helfen, diese Veränderungen mitzugestalten.
Die IDOS-Absolvent:innen wurden auch nach ihren Perspektiven auf Veränderungen im Berufsfeld internationale Zusammenarbeit befragt. Damit ermöglicht es die Befragung, Schlussfolgerungen zur Weiterentwicklung der Ausbildung zu ziehen: 
1. Die Aus- und Fortbildung sollte verschiedene Kompetenzen fördern, die eine Kooperation für nachhaltige Entwicklung gestalten können. Damit in einer zunehmend komplexer werdenden Welt Veränderungen partnerorientiert angestoßen und umgesetzt werden, sind sowohl fachliches und systemisches Wissen wie auch persönliche, soziale, Netzwerk- und Kooperationskompetenzen erforderlich. 
2. Institutionen in der Aus- und Weiterbildung sollten Kooperationskompetenzen durch gemeinsames Lernen mit internationalen Partnern stärken. Dies fördert das Verständnis für jeweils andere Perspektiven und unterstützt die Weiterentwicklung von Partnerschaften.
3. Schon in der Ausbildung sollten postkoloniale und machtkritische Perspektiven berücksichtigt und in der konkreten Zusammenarbeit zwischen Organisationen gelebt werden. Diese Aspekte gewinnen auch nach Einschätzung der IDOS-Absolvent:innen in der internationalen Zusammenarbeit an Bedeutung. 

 

Également dans l'édition de vendredi : avantages accordés aux députés européens, retour des migrants, forces kurdes, autorité européenne de protection des données.

The post Crise énergétique : un sentiment de déjà-vu appeared first on Euractiv FR.

L'attaque au cocktail Molotov contre l'ancienne villa d'Enver Hoxha à Tirana, aujourd'hui résidence pour artistes étrangers, relance le débat sur la mémoire du communisme en Albanie. L'intellectuel Fatos Lubonja y voit le symptôme d'une mémoire manipulée et d'un traumatisme historique jamais réellement affronté.

- Articles / PS Albanie, Reporter.al, Albanie, Société, Histoire, Culture et éducation

Will AI kickstart a new age of nuclear power? Credit: Unsplash/Taylor Vick In a data centre (above), servers are high-performance computers that process and store data. Meanwhile, the United Nations has taken a firm stance that decisions regarding the use of nuclear weapons must rest with humans, not machines, warning that integrating Artificial Intelligence (AI) into nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) presents an unacceptable risk to global security.

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, Mar 6 2026 (IPS)

As artificial intelligence (AI) threatens to dominate every aspect of human lives —including political, economic, social and cultural –there is also the danger of the potential militarization of AI.

The integration of AI into nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) systems, as well as its use in military decision-making, introduces severe, unprecedented risks to global security, according to one report.

Key negative effects include the acceleration of decision-making to “machine speed” (leaving little time for human judgment), increased vulnerability to cyberattacks, and the erosion of strategic stability.

According to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, command and control of nuclear weapons is a delicate and complicated system, designed to prevent error while ensuring reliability under high-pressure conditions.

In environments where vast amounts of data shape high-stakes outcomes, artificial intelligence has become a natural consideration.

“The integration of a rapidly evolving technology raises fundamental questions about responsibility, data quality, and system reliability. When a single error could have irreversible consequences, how can confidence be built around the integration of machine learning into systems that have long relied on human judgment and oversight?”

“What guardrails should be maintained? Where are the opportunities for international collaboration and consensus?”

Tariq Rauf, former Head of Verification and Security Policy at the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), told IPS the role of and integration of Artificial Generative Intelligence (AGI) raises some of the most consequential questions of our technological era.

The integration of AGI into nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) systems is not merely an engineering challenge — it is a civilizational one.

The Problem of Machine Speed

Perhaps the most alarming aspect of the integration of AGI into NC3 systems, he pointed out, is the compression of decision-making timelines to “machine speed.” Nuclear strategy has historically depended on deliberate human judgment — the ability of decision-makers to pause, assess ambiguous data, consult advisors, and choose restraint even under pressure or attack.

AGI systems, by contrast, are designed to process and respond at velocities no human can match. In a crisis, this creates a dangerous paradox: the very speed that makes AGI attractive also makes meaningful human oversight nearly impossible.

“If an AGI system misidentifies a sensor anomaly as an incoming missile — something that has happened with human-operated systems before, as the 1983 Soviet false alarm incident illustrates — the window for correction could shrink from minutes to seconds.”

The margin for error in nuclear decision-making has always been uncomfortably thin; AGI risks eliminating it entirely, said Rauf.

Data Quality and System Reliability

Data quality and integrity are foundational concerns regarding AGI. Machine learning systems are only as reliable as the data on which they are trained, he argued.

“Nuclear environments present unique ultra complex challenges: they involve rare, high-stakes events with limited historical data, adversarial actors who may deliberately feed misinformation into sensor networks, and geopolitical contexts that shift faster than training datasets can capture”.

An AGI system that confidently acts on corrupted or misrepresented data in a nuclear context could trigger escalation based on a fiction. Worse still, the opacity of many machine learning models — the so-called “black box” problem — means that even system designers may not be able to explain why a particular output was generated, let alone correct it in real time, declared Rauf.

Vladislav Chernavskikh, Researcher, Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme, at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) told IPS existing state approaches to AI-nuclear nexus already broadly converge on the principle of retaining human control in nuclear decision making, yet there is no consensus on how this should be defined or operationalized.

A formal recognition of this principle by nuclear-weapon states and elaboration of what human control constitutes in this context and how it can manifest in the nuclear weapons domain can be one of the first steps towards minimising risks, he declared.

At the AI Impact Summit in New Delhi last month, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said the future of AI cannot be decided by a handful of countries and the whims of a few billionaires.

Last year, the General Assembly took two decisive steps, he said.

First, by creating an Independent International Scientific Panel on Artificial Intelligence, and second, by launching a Global Dialogue on AI Governance within the UN, where all countries, together with the private sector, academia and civil society, can all have a voice.

He told participants at the summit that real impact means technology that improves lives and protects the planet. And he called on them to build AI for everyone, with dignity as the default setting.

UN Spokesperson Stephane Dujarric told reporters last month, the Secretary-General is not calling for the United Nations to rule over AI. He’s calling for – and has put in place – an architecture with the help of Member States to try to ensure that everybody gets a seat at the table.

And as he said: “AI will and has already impacted all of us. It is vital that those countries who may not have the technology also have a voice and that science and fairness be put at the centre of AI.”

Responsibility and Accountability

In a further analysis, Rauf said when AGI recommendations or autonomous actions contribute to catastrophic outcomes, the question of accountability becomes deeply problematic.

Traditional chains of command assign clear human responsibility at each decision point. AGI integration fractures this clarity. Is it the software developer, the military commander, the government that deployed the system, or the algorithm itself that bears responsibility for a miscalculation? he asked.

The absence of clear accountability frameworks is not just a legal or ethical problem — it is a strategic one, because adversaries and allies alike need to understand who is in control and what decision logic is being applied.

Cyberattack Vulnerability

AGI-enhanced or dependent NC3 systems also expand the attack surface for adversaries. Sophisticated cyberattacks — including adversarial inputs designed to manipulate AGI outputs — could potentially spoof or blind these systems in ways that are difficult to detect until it is too late. The integration of AGI thus creates new vectors for destabilization that did not exist in earlier nuclear architectures, said Rauf.

The Case for International Collaboration

Despite these alarming challenges, international collaboration could be a potential avenue for managing risk. Confidence-building measures, shared technical standards, and bilateral or multilateral ‘enforceable’ agreements on the limits of AGI autonomy in nuclear systems could help preserve strategic stability.

Arms control history, said Rauf, shows that even adversaries can agree on rules that serve mutual interests in survival. Extending that tradition to AGI-enabled NC3 systems is urgently needed — before the technology outpaces diplomacy entirely.

“The integration of AGI into nuclear systems technically might be inevitable. Whether it is managed wisely is a political and moral choice that remains very much open and seems beyond the intellectual, moral/ethical processing capabilities of today’s civil and military ‘leaders’, declared Rauf.

This article is brought to you by IPS NORAM, in collaboration with INPS Japan and Soka Gakkai International, in consultative status with the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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L'agence de notation Fitch a décidé de maintenir, vendredi, la note de la dette souveraine de la France à A+ avec perspective stable. Elle estime que le pays dispose d'une économie diversifiée avec un revenu par habitant supérieur à la médiane des pays notés dans la catégorie A+, mais déplore "un niveau de dette publique en hausse" et un contexte sociopolitique compliqué.

Female fighters recall how the conflict in the northern Tigray destroyed their lives, as fears grow that fighting could resume.

Morocco part company with coach Walid Regragui four months before the World Cup finals, with Mohamed Ouahbi appointed in his place.

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Faced with high borrowing costs, African leaders and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) have selected Mauritius to host a continental credit rating agency to reduce dependence on the “Big Three” and counter perceived bias. But will investors trust it?

Faced with high borrowing costs, African leaders and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) have selected Mauritius to host a continental credit rating agency to reduce dependence on the “Big Three” and counter perceived bias. But will investors trust it?

Faced with high borrowing costs, African leaders and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) have selected Mauritius to host a continental credit rating agency to reduce dependence on the “Big Three” and counter perceived bias. But will investors trust it?

Roblox pourrait être la première plateforme de jeux vidéo à être désignée dans le cadre de la loi sur les services numériques de l'Union européenne.

The post La Commission européenne envisage de soumettre les plateformes de jeux à ses règles numériques appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Sánchez durcit le ton et renforce l'opposition de l'Espagne à la guerre contre l'Iran.

The post Pedro Sánchez : « L’Espagne dit non à la guerre » appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Certains tablaient sur une guerre entre Israël et les États-Unis d'une part, et l'Iran d'autre part, un conflit qui se déroulerait à l'intérieur des frontières de l'Iran et d'Israël. Cependant, les frappes iraniennes ont vciblé les pays voisins.

Chypre accueille deux bases militaires britanniques qui ont déjà été la cible d'opérations liées à l'Iran et au Hezbollah.

The post Une attaque par drone du Hezbollah pourrait constituer une grave menace pour Chypre appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Le M23, qui contrôle cette région riche en coltan, n'a fait aucun commentaire et le nombre de victimes est difficile à vérifier.

Ino Afentouli, Senior Policy Advisor; Head of the Geopolitics and Diplomacy Observatory, ELIAMEP

Barring those directly threatened by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and despite the vast financial and military support their countries have provided, the peoples of the EU never felt that this war was “theirs”. And yet, this was the first military conflict in the heart of the continent since the end of World War II. This repression of the threat of war is largely due to the culture of peace that has been cultivated in Europe over the last eight decades—a culture encapsulated in the phrase “Never Again”. It is also the result of the institutional framework designed to ensure that disputes between European nations are resolved peacefully. Today, the nations of Europe find themselves confronted by a second war; though it is not being fought on their own soil, it poses an equally grave threat to their security.

In both the Ukrainian and the Iranian contexts, the nations of Europe are contending with the fallout from conflicts they neither chose nor planned, and over whose trajectory they lack meaningful control. Nonetheless, these are conflicts that will inevitably impact both the peoples and institutions of Europe. In other words, the present juncture is reminiscent of the summer of 1914, when our continent sleepwalked into the First World War. Now, as then, Europe remains unprepared.

The conflict with Iran, to which Greece and Cyprus are the closest European nations, will be protracted and is already escalating into a broader regional struggle. If Turkey, Syria and Lebanon should get involved, whether directly or indirectly, the consequences for us will be dire. The pre-emptive deployment of Greek forces to Cyprus underscores this reality. Even if the institutions to which we belong, the European Union and NATO, were to trigger their collective defence mechanisms, it would signify that our nations are facing a peril of the highest order. Regrettably, should this worst-case scenario materialize, we will be faced with a second European war, this time with the Eastern Mediterranean at its epicentre.

Triantafyllos Karatrantos, Research Associate, ELIAMEP

The ever-evolving regional security environment in the Middle East

The US-Israeli military conflict with Iran is another—and likely the most important critical—chapter in an ongoing reconfiguring of the Middle East’s security architecture and alliances. The process began after the terrorist attack launched against Israel on 7 October 2023 and the rapid succession of military and geopolitical events that followed it. Since October 2023, we have seen the systematic curtailing of Iran’s power, primarily by Israel. Initially through the weakening or overthrow—as in the case of the Assad regime—of the members of the infamous “Axis of Resistance”, the network which had effectively established Iran as a dominant regional actor. The region has changed radically in the period since the initial attacks: the Assad regime has fallen in Syria; Hezbollah, Hamas and various Shiite militias and paramilitary forces that acted as hybrid proxies for Iran have sustained crippling losses; and the Houthis have seen their influence severely diminished.

Iran had previously exploited the power vacuum created by Washington’s substantial disengagement from the region after 2011. This dynamic has now shifted so fundamentally that Tehran has not only lost its regional power; its theocratic regime is currently fighting for its survival.

Furthermore, Iran’s targeting of neighbouring states has failed to drive a wedge between them and the United States; instead, these provocations have pushed countries like Saudi Arabia into adopting a formal stance against Iran.

Israel has emerged with bolstered regional power and influence, appearing ready to resume the momentum of the Abraham Accords, which had stalled in the aftermath of the October 7 attack. However, it remains to be seen how Israel’s relations with the Arab nations will develop from here—most notably with Saudi Arabia, with which a landmark normalization deal was imminent prior to the conflict. Riyadh, alongside other Gulf countries like Qatar, has also seen its regional standing strengthened.

Nevertheless, the regional picture remains complex. Israel’s fraught relationship with Syria and Turkey—the latter of which also seems to be losing some of its previously amassed regional influence—must be taken into account.

Ultimately, the discourse surrounding a new security architecture cannot be finalized without considering the ultimate fate of the Iranian regime and the broader post-conflict landscape for the country. While the threat from Iran’s missile arsenal and proxies could be reduced, and its nuclear ambitions thwarted, we may see growing extremism, or even the emergence of new—or the evolution of existing—Shiite Islamist militant organizations.

Ultimately, the US has made a dynamic return to the Middle East and it remains to be seen how its rivalry with China and Russia will evolve within the region’s new geopolitical context, while it has become increasingly clear that the European Union must now develop its own distinct geopolitical footprint in the region.

Pantelis Ikonomou, Former Inspector, International Atomic Energy Agency; Research Associate, ELIAMEP

The reality about Iran’s nuclear weapons and the war

A list of the factual drivers, not a justification(!), of the actors involved in the Iranian crisis:

• It is widely held that “the capability to acquire nuclear weapons carries as much strategic weight as their actual possession” (for a historical analysis, see my book Global Nuclear Threat, [2019, in Greek], in which the above serves as an epigraph).
• Tehran utilizing its Possible Nuclear Military Capability since 2013 as strategic leverage to advance its international agenda.
• The landmark diplomatic agreement of 2015: the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) placed Iran’s nuclear programme under stringent international oversight.
• The implementation of the JCPOA, which widened Iran’s breakout window (the time required to acquire the amount of fissile material required to build a nuclear bomb) from two to ten months, effectively containing the situation,
• Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu adamantly declaring since 2013 that “no deal will be a good deal”.
• US President Trump’s unilaterally withdrawing the US from the JCPOA in 2018 and reinstating sanctions against Iran. This counter-intuitive decision effectively reduced Iran’s breakout window back to a mere two months.
• Tehran ceasing to comply with the terms of the JCPOA in 2019/2020, following a series of targeted assassinations of Iranian politicians, military officers and scientists. Iran obstructing and ultimately barring International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors from conducting meaningful oversight of its nuclear programme since then.
• The absence of a credible guarantee since then that Iran is not weaponizing its nuclear programme. Logically, however, had Iran already developed a nuclear capacity, it would have announced it to deter attacks against its territory.
• Israel’s status as an undeclared nuclear-armed state. As it is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it is under no obligation to submit to international inspections. Nevertheless, this status affords Israel a decisive strategic edge and underpins its geopolitical standing in the region.
• A fundamental divergence in the objectives of the parties involved in the escalating conflict: For Iran, the goal is to annihilate Israel. For Israel, it is to dismantle the Iranian state. However, for the US, the ultimate goal remains ill-defined. It is likely linked to Trump’s mercurial temperament and narcissistic need to perform on the world stage.
• Trump’s irrational withdrawal from the JCPOA, followed by the impulsive decision to join the Israeli attack on Iran in June 2025—against the explicit counsel of his own national security advisers—points towards an absolute, if unexplained, subservience to Israeli interests. Historically, no American president (Obama, Bush Jr, or Biden) has ever sided with Israel in a war against Iran.
• The historical root cause of the crisis: the pogroms perpetrated by Christian Tsarist Russia in 1881-1906 against 2.5 million Jews; the anti-Semitic campaigns of Stalin’s Soviet Union after World War II; and, finally, the Holocaust in which six million Jews were killed by Hitler’s—likewise Christian—Germany. These events led the global powers, acting through the UN in 1948, to establish a state of a few million Jews in Palestine—a state surrounded by a few hundred million Muslims.
• A pervasive indifference to the existential fallout currently confronting not only world Jewry and the Palestinians of that land, but the entire planet.
• A personal observation from a natural sciences perspective: the tendency towards chaos and disorder, which is the defining characteristic of universal entropy. In this shared journey, power imbalances are driving the collapse of hegemonies and the emergence of unpredictable multipolar shifts. We may also be experiencing the twilight of the American West. Unfortunately, the consequences remain impossible to foresee.

Cette décision a été vivement critiquée par le puissant Parti populaire européen (PPE), de centre-droit.

The post Le Parlement européen reporte à nouveau l’accord commercial entre l’UE et les États-Unis alors que les menaces tarifaires reprennent appeared first on Euractiv FR.