Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

DIW-Studie beleuchtet kognitive Fähigkeiten im Lebensverlauf – Späterer Abbau als bislang angenommen – Lesefähigkeiten nehmen erst ab Mitte 40 ab, Rechenkompetenzen ab Anfang 40 – Aktive Nutzung und lebenslanges Lernen können kognitive Alterung verlangsamen Kognitive Fähigkeiten wie Lesen und ...

According to the US government, the Russian government is developing a programme to arm some of its satellites with nuclear warheads. Should the Kremlin acquire this capability, it could destroy key parts of the civilian satellite infrastructure by detonat­ing a single nuclear weapon in low Earth orbit. Important US military satellites are also located in space. The use of Russian nuclear weapons there could severely weaken the US military and potentially trigger a military escalation on Earth. The deployment of a nuclear warhead in space would constitute a violation of the Outer Space Treaty. The development of this capability appears to align with Russia’s strategic approach of undermining the established international order and engaging in high-risk actions to extract concessions from the West, particularly in the context of Ukraine. The Kremlin is also attempting to incorporate the increasingly militarised domain of space into this strategy by using non-nuclear anti-satellite weapons. Europe must be prepared to address this ongoing challenge.

On 21 May, an AU-EU ministerial meeting in Brussels will take stock of the cooperation results since the first summit and set out new goals and ambitions for cooperation. In today’s turbulent international environment, it may be tempting to prioritise short-term cooperation and external investment under the Global Gateway strategy. However, this approach risks overlooking the enduring legacies that shape current partnerships. Rather than maintaining an ahistorical lens, there is a pressing need to confront the full historical context of these relationships, including their uncomfortable truths, to build more equitable and informed cooperation.

On 21 May, an AU-EU ministerial meeting in Brussels will take stock of the cooperation results since the first summit and set out new goals and ambitions for cooperation. In today’s turbulent international environment, it may be tempting to prioritise short-term cooperation and external investment under the Global Gateway strategy. However, this approach risks overlooking the enduring legacies that shape current partnerships. Rather than maintaining an ahistorical lens, there is a pressing need to confront the full historical context of these relationships, including their uncomfortable truths, to build more equitable and informed cooperation.

On 21 May, an AU-EU ministerial meeting in Brussels will take stock of the cooperation results since the first summit and set out new goals and ambitions for cooperation. In today’s turbulent international environment, it may be tempting to prioritise short-term cooperation and external investment under the Global Gateway strategy. However, this approach risks overlooking the enduring legacies that shape current partnerships. Rather than maintaining an ahistorical lens, there is a pressing need to confront the full historical context of these relationships, including their uncomfortable truths, to build more equitable and informed cooperation.

South Africa’s transition to a low-carbon economy requires substantial infrastructure investments—modernizing electricity grids, deploying renewables, and enabling new sectors such as green hydrogen. However, infrastructure alone cannot achieve a just transition. Drawing on data from the Just Energy Transition Investment Plan (JET IP) and stakeholder consultations, the brief highlights a persistent imbalance: while it is expected that infrastructure absorbs a large share of grant funding due to its capital intensity, this has come at the expense of adequate support for social dimensions such as skills development, worker protection, and economic diversification in coal-dependent regions like Mpumalanga. Only 11.21% of tracked grants have been allocated to skills development, and less than 5% of Mpumalanga’s funding needs are met—the U.S. withdrawal from the International Partners Group in 2025 further strains the financing landscape. To mitigate socio-economic disruption and promote inclusive growth, the op-ed recommends scaling TVET programs, strengthening social protection systems, and increasing local participation in renewable energy value chains. Achieving a just transition will require recalibrating financial strategies to ensure that people and communities remain at the core of South Africa’s energy future alongside essential infrastructure.

South Africa’s transition to a low-carbon economy requires substantial infrastructure investments—modernizing electricity grids, deploying renewables, and enabling new sectors such as green hydrogen. However, infrastructure alone cannot achieve a just transition. Drawing on data from the Just Energy Transition Investment Plan (JET IP) and stakeholder consultations, the brief highlights a persistent imbalance: while it is expected that infrastructure absorbs a large share of grant funding due to its capital intensity, this has come at the expense of adequate support for social dimensions such as skills development, worker protection, and economic diversification in coal-dependent regions like Mpumalanga. Only 11.21% of tracked grants have been allocated to skills development, and less than 5% of Mpumalanga’s funding needs are met—the U.S. withdrawal from the International Partners Group in 2025 further strains the financing landscape. To mitigate socio-economic disruption and promote inclusive growth, the op-ed recommends scaling TVET programs, strengthening social protection systems, and increasing local participation in renewable energy value chains. Achieving a just transition will require recalibrating financial strategies to ensure that people and communities remain at the core of South Africa’s energy future alongside essential infrastructure.

South Africa’s transition to a low-carbon economy requires substantial infrastructure investments—modernizing electricity grids, deploying renewables, and enabling new sectors such as green hydrogen. However, infrastructure alone cannot achieve a just transition. Drawing on data from the Just Energy Transition Investment Plan (JET IP) and stakeholder consultations, the brief highlights a persistent imbalance: while it is expected that infrastructure absorbs a large share of grant funding due to its capital intensity, this has come at the expense of adequate support for social dimensions such as skills development, worker protection, and economic diversification in coal-dependent regions like Mpumalanga. Only 11.21% of tracked grants have been allocated to skills development, and less than 5% of Mpumalanga’s funding needs are met—the U.S. withdrawal from the International Partners Group in 2025 further strains the financing landscape. To mitigate socio-economic disruption and promote inclusive growth, the op-ed recommends scaling TVET programs, strengthening social protection systems, and increasing local participation in renewable energy value chains. Achieving a just transition will require recalibrating financial strategies to ensure that people and communities remain at the core of South Africa’s energy future alongside essential infrastructure.

Die jüngsten Wahlen in den Vereinigten Staaten und in Deutschland haben Debatten über die Zukunft der internationalen Zusammenarbeit ausgelöst, insbesondere bei polarisierenden Themen wie Migration. Trotz seiner Bedeutung wurde dem Klimawandel jedoch nicht viel Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt. Dabei sind Klimawandel und Migration eng miteinander verknüpft, und politische Maßnahmen, um diese Überschneidung wirksam anzugehen, sind unerlässlich. 

Die jüngsten Wahlen in den Vereinigten Staaten und in Deutschland haben Debatten über die Zukunft der internationalen Zusammenarbeit ausgelöst, insbesondere bei polarisierenden Themen wie Migration. Trotz seiner Bedeutung wurde dem Klimawandel jedoch nicht viel Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt. Dabei sind Klimawandel und Migration eng miteinander verknüpft, und politische Maßnahmen, um diese Überschneidung wirksam anzugehen, sind unerlässlich. 

Die jüngsten Wahlen in den Vereinigten Staaten und in Deutschland haben Debatten über die Zukunft der internationalen Zusammenarbeit ausgelöst, insbesondere bei polarisierenden Themen wie Migration. Trotz seiner Bedeutung wurde dem Klimawandel jedoch nicht viel Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt. Dabei sind Klimawandel und Migration eng miteinander verknüpft, und politische Maßnahmen, um diese Überschneidung wirksam anzugehen, sind unerlässlich. 

Since 2001, the Eastern Mediterranean has been one of the key gateways for refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants seeking to enter Europe from the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. This route encompasses crossings to Greece, Cyprus (and to a lesser extent Bulgaria), primarily via Türkiye, but increasingly also from Lebanon and Libya. Against the backdrop of regional instability, the Eastern Mediterranean route has remained a constant point of attention for European Union (EU) policymakers—especially after 2015, when the Syrian refugee crisis thrust it into the spotlight.

Although the COVID-19 pandemic and global border closures briefly slowed movement, recent years have seen a steady uptick in arrivals, particularly in Greece, with Cyprus also experiencing record numbers of irregular entries compared to previous periods. Both countries face complex, mixed migratory flows, still largely transiting through Türkiye but with a noticeable surge in movements originating from Lebanon and Egypt.

The reports produced under the ‘Mediterranean Migration’ project delve into these evolving migration dynamics and the policy responses in Egypt, Lebanon, Cyprus, and Greece, looking at the period 2021-2024. While these countries occupy different positions in the migratory journey—whether as points of origin, transit, or destination—the research reveals striking similarities in how they navigate and attempt to manage these roles within the broader regional migration landscape.

Country Reports:

Country Report Cyprus

Country Report Egypt

Country Report Lebanon

Country Report Greece

Policy briefs by Country:

Policy brief  Cyprus

Policy brief Egypt

Policy brief Greece

Policy brief Lebanon

Synthesis Report:

Extensive, Synthesis Report

More information can be found here.

The Colombian government’s response to the Venezuelan displacement crisis has largely been lauded for its efforts to support displaced persons by granting legal residency. However, this comes with challenges, as resources at the local level are strained. These challenges can be understood through the lens of social cohesion, which encompasses a sense of belonging, trust, the common good, shared values, identity and, at its core, inequality. By examining the case of Colombia, this research provides context-specific findings that potentially deepen our understanding of social cohesion in displacement contexts. In a very short period, Colombia has received more than 3 million displaced Venezuelans. The government of Colombia responded to this displacement with open-door policies that included large regularisation programmes. In response, Colombians have learnt to live with Venezeulans in relative harmony, despite the structural economic and social issues affecting the communities.
Looking to the future of developing greater social cohesion in the context of Venezuelan displacement in Colombia, the research points to four main themes. Investments in civic education and support with integration at the local level can help Venezuelans and host communities better understand one another’s social and economic realities in the present and future. This is key since Venezuelans struggle to understand the long-standing Colombian conflict and how the violence permeates the society and their communities. Engaging with local peacebuilding actors can help develop a shared understanding about violence in Colombia, both for Venezuelans and host communities. While xenophobia and discrimination have diminished over time, policy-makers should build on the local efforts that have helped tamp down xenophobia. Finally, the media has an important role in spreading xenophobic narratives about migrants harming social cohesion in the communities. These narratives can have a toxic effect on building social cohesion in host communities, and leaders need to push back against these messages.

Dr Stephanie López Villamil is an independent consultant.

The Colombian government’s response to the Venezuelan displacement crisis has largely been lauded for its efforts to support displaced persons by granting legal residency. However, this comes with challenges, as resources at the local level are strained. These challenges can be understood through the lens of social cohesion, which encompasses a sense of belonging, trust, the common good, shared values, identity and, at its core, inequality. By examining the case of Colombia, this research provides context-specific findings that potentially deepen our understanding of social cohesion in displacement contexts. In a very short period, Colombia has received more than 3 million displaced Venezuelans. The government of Colombia responded to this displacement with open-door policies that included large regularisation programmes. In response, Colombians have learnt to live with Venezeulans in relative harmony, despite the structural economic and social issues affecting the communities.
Looking to the future of developing greater social cohesion in the context of Venezuelan displacement in Colombia, the research points to four main themes. Investments in civic education and support with integration at the local level can help Venezuelans and host communities better understand one another’s social and economic realities in the present and future. This is key since Venezuelans struggle to understand the long-standing Colombian conflict and how the violence permeates the society and their communities. Engaging with local peacebuilding actors can help develop a shared understanding about violence in Colombia, both for Venezuelans and host communities. While xenophobia and discrimination have diminished over time, policy-makers should build on the local efforts that have helped tamp down xenophobia. Finally, the media has an important role in spreading xenophobic narratives about migrants harming social cohesion in the communities. These narratives can have a toxic effect on building social cohesion in host communities, and leaders need to push back against these messages.

Dr Stephanie López Villamil is an independent consultant.

The Colombian government’s response to the Venezuelan displacement crisis has largely been lauded for its efforts to support displaced persons by granting legal residency. However, this comes with challenges, as resources at the local level are strained. These challenges can be understood through the lens of social cohesion, which encompasses a sense of belonging, trust, the common good, shared values, identity and, at its core, inequality. By examining the case of Colombia, this research provides context-specific findings that potentially deepen our understanding of social cohesion in displacement contexts. In a very short period, Colombia has received more than 3 million displaced Venezuelans. The government of Colombia responded to this displacement with open-door policies that included large regularisation programmes. In response, Colombians have learnt to live with Venezeulans in relative harmony, despite the structural economic and social issues affecting the communities.
Looking to the future of developing greater social cohesion in the context of Venezuelan displacement in Colombia, the research points to four main themes. Investments in civic education and support with integration at the local level can help Venezuelans and host communities better understand one another’s social and economic realities in the present and future. This is key since Venezuelans struggle to understand the long-standing Colombian conflict and how the violence permeates the society and their communities. Engaging with local peacebuilding actors can help develop a shared understanding about violence in Colombia, both for Venezuelans and host communities. While xenophobia and discrimination have diminished over time, policy-makers should build on the local efforts that have helped tamp down xenophobia. Finally, the media has an important role in spreading xenophobic narratives about migrants harming social cohesion in the communities. These narratives can have a toxic effect on building social cohesion in host communities, and leaders need to push back against these messages.

Dr Stephanie López Villamil is an independent consultant.

Aktueller Stand, Trends und politische Konfliktlinien

The international landscape in mid-2025 is characterized by a retreat from liberal institutionalism, exemplified by the United States’ withdrawal from the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and its adoption of transactional, power-based international relations, and its potential withdrawal from some multilateral bodies. In this context, this paper argues that traditional models of universal multilateralism are increasingly untenable, and that new forms of collective action grounded in shared interests and normative alignment are both necessary and feasible. This paper focuses on developing the concept of ‘like-minded internationalism’ as a response to the erosion of multilateral cooperation in a period marked by geopolitical contestation and the resurgence of nationalist foreign policies. Drawing on two illustrative cases—UNITAID, a global health financing mechanism, and the High Ambition Coalition, a climate and environmental diplomacy initiative—the paper outlines the characteristics, formation, and operational logic of like-minded internationalism. The paper concludes by considering implications for the future of global development (cooperation). We argue that the ‘Plan B’ presented is not a retreat from multilateralism, but an adaptive response to its breakdown—one rooted in coalitional agency, institutional pluralism, and strategic pragmatism.

The international landscape in mid-2025 is characterized by a retreat from liberal institutionalism, exemplified by the United States’ withdrawal from the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and its adoption of transactional, power-based international relations, and its potential withdrawal from some multilateral bodies. In this context, this paper argues that traditional models of universal multilateralism are increasingly untenable, and that new forms of collective action grounded in shared interests and normative alignment are both necessary and feasible. This paper focuses on developing the concept of ‘like-minded internationalism’ as a response to the erosion of multilateral cooperation in a period marked by geopolitical contestation and the resurgence of nationalist foreign policies. Drawing on two illustrative cases—UNITAID, a global health financing mechanism, and the High Ambition Coalition, a climate and environmental diplomacy initiative—the paper outlines the characteristics, formation, and operational logic of like-minded internationalism. The paper concludes by considering implications for the future of global development (cooperation). We argue that the ‘Plan B’ presented is not a retreat from multilateralism, but an adaptive response to its breakdown—one rooted in coalitional agency, institutional pluralism, and strategic pragmatism.

The international landscape in mid-2025 is characterized by a retreat from liberal institutionalism, exemplified by the United States’ withdrawal from the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and its adoption of transactional, power-based international relations, and its potential withdrawal from some multilateral bodies. In this context, this paper argues that traditional models of universal multilateralism are increasingly untenable, and that new forms of collective action grounded in shared interests and normative alignment are both necessary and feasible. This paper focuses on developing the concept of ‘like-minded internationalism’ as a response to the erosion of multilateral cooperation in a period marked by geopolitical contestation and the resurgence of nationalist foreign policies. Drawing on two illustrative cases—UNITAID, a global health financing mechanism, and the High Ambition Coalition, a climate and environmental diplomacy initiative—the paper outlines the characteristics, formation, and operational logic of like-minded internationalism. The paper concludes by considering implications for the future of global development (cooperation). We argue that the ‘Plan B’ presented is not a retreat from multilateralism, but an adaptive response to its breakdown—one rooted in coalitional agency, institutional pluralism, and strategic pragmatism.