The first week in July in 2017 saw the launch of a medium range Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, or ICBM out of North Korea. The Hwasong-14 missile was launched from a mobile launcher, similar in function to that of the Russian Topol-M launch vehicle. While tested from a mobile platform, the test firing was based near the North Korean-Chinese border. The Hwasong-14 was launched towards the Sea of Japan, but estimated ranges for this new missile shows that it may be able to reach as far as Alaska and even may be able to target Hawaii. Reaction from international media and President Trump was swift, and hopes that relations with China will push North Korea towards a less aggressive stance seems to be the first policy position from most Western leaders and their allies in Asia.
The production of ICBMs usually comes with the belief that the sole possession of a weapon of mass destruction will give the country that possesses it leverage over adversaries when smaller conflicts arise. The question remains to whether or not the ones in control are rational actors, and have something to lose in a nuclear conflict. The theory during the Cold War that the Americans and NATO and the Soviets were rational, and therefore would not seek an open nuclear conflict was often wishful thinking in a complex situation. With smaller actors now starting to form nuclear weapons programs that can reach US territory and surely strike US allies, rationality and diplomacy might be the only barrier to saving millions of lives. Smaller nations with power concentrated with one person or a small group of individuals, armed with ICBMs is changing the global balance of power rapidly, and may permit chaos, a muted response and refused justice and the allowance of human rights abuses and genocides that would normally urge international assistance and cooperation. Rational small actors might be harder to come by, and the end result will be a less secure international order.
Strategies in handling those deemed irrational may give rise to policy approaches that lack nuance. The fear of a small state becoming nuclear ready may bring back Cuban Missile Crisis type stand offs or the undercover moves seen in the 1950s that permanently scarred regions like Latin America and the Middle East. Fear of a nuclear based attack as seen with Soviet allies in the Cold War may motivate ill-conceived policy approaches that will make moves like the installing of Pinochet and accusations like those exposed by Snowden more common place. Preventing small countries from obtaining ICBMs might be another option, but the desire for open conflict without a focus and determinable goal and end date may start with positive intentions, and end with another Syria, a conflict that has led to an international political mess, permitted mass genocide and has no end date. Full commitment to limiting ICBMs in the initial phases of the programs might be the best horrible option, otherwise containing those weapons away from regions where conventional weapons are in constant use is the only other option. Defense and new and refined technologies that can counter and kill ICBMs before hitting their targets will also become a growing industry and technology, made by many of the same researchers that produce the ICBM missile technology in the first place. Accepting dictatorial demands from minor strongmen and religious zealots do not seem to be a permanent option, so actions will be needed unfortunately with ICBMs at the bargaining table.
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Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’été de Politique étrangère (n°2/2017). Marc Hecker, chercheur au Centre des études de sécurité de l’Ifri, propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Christophe Lamfalussy et Jean-Pierre Martin, Molenbeek-sur-Djihad (Grasset, 2017, 304 pages).
Les attentats de Paris, le 13 novembre 2015, et ceux de Bruxelles, le 22 mars 2016, ont poussé Christophe Lamfalussy et Jean-Pierre Martin – journalistes à la Libre Belgique et à RTL Belgique – à enquêter sur Molenbeek. C’est dans cette commune située au cœur de la capitale belge que vivaient plusieurs terroristes, et qu’a été arrêté Salah Abdeslam après quatre mois de cavale.
Molenbeek a connu une croissance démographique importante depuis le début des années 1980, sa population passant de 67 000 à 95 000 habitants. Plus de la moitié d’entre eux est originaire du Maroc, en particulier du Rif – région connue notamment pour sa production de haschisch. Le taux de chômage de la commune dépasse les 40 % et atteint même 52 % pour les moins de 25 ans. Selon les auteurs, Molenbeek aurait été délaissée par les pouvoirs publics, et le contrôle social délégué aux imams. Les responsables politiques belges avaient une profonde méconnaissance de l’islam et ont laissé se développer les courants les plus radicaux. Salafistes et Frères musulmans se sont ainsi profondément ancrés dans le paysage local. Molenbeek, dont le territoire couvre 6 km2, compte 25 mosquées dont seules 4 sont reconnues par l’organe qui gère l’islam en Belgique.
La guerre en Syrie a eu un impact considérable sur la commune : 79 de ses habitants sont partis se battre au Moyen-Orient. La Belgique est un des pays occidentaux les plus touchés par le djihadisme : près de 550 ressortissants belges ont rejoint les rangs de Daech ou d’une autre organisation terroriste. Lamfalussy et Martin décrivent avec précision la scène djihadiste belge, structurée autour de trois pôles principaux : le réseau Zerkani – auquel appartenait notamment Abdelhamid Abaaoud –, Sharia4Belgium de Fouad Belkacem, et Le Resto du Tawhid de Jean-Louis Denis.
Ces trois pôles étaient connus des services de renseignement et de la police mais les forces de l’ordre ont été dépassées par l’ampleur du phénomène. Leurs moyens étaient largement insuffisants et n’ont cessé de décroître du fait de coupes budgétaires. La Sûreté de l’État a ainsi perdu 140 agents de 2008 à 2015, ce qui est considérable pour une agence qui en compte environ 600. Le service de renseignement de l’armée (le SGRS) a aussi subi d’importantes réductions budgétaires, tout comme la division antiterroriste de la police fédérale (DR3). Cette unité de 150 hommes – trop peu au regard de la menace – a abandonné la surveillance des frères Abdeslam au printemps 2015.
Les attentats de Paris et de Bruxelles ont constitué un électrochoc. Le gouvernement de Charles Michel a immédiatement annoncé de nouvelles mesures antiterroristes, comme la création d’un Conseil national de sécurité, le déploiement de militaires dans les rues ou l’autorisation de conduire des perquisitions la nuit. Des failles béantes ont été comblées. Par exemple, il a fallu attendre l’été 2016 pour qu’une loi autorise la Sûreté de l’État à intercepter les communications téléphoniques et électroniques de ressortissants belges se trouvant à l’étranger. Les effectifs de la police et des services de renseignement ont été renforcés. À Molenbeek, 50 nouveaux policiers ont été déployés et un centre de prévention de la radicalisation a été ouvert. La Belgique est sortie douloureusement de sa torpeur, pour ne pas dire de son déni. Mais les Belges n’ont pas fini de panser leurs plaies.
Marc Hecker
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Hindu rights activist Shipan Kumer Basu illustrated that Bangladesh has a lot to learn from Israel and that Israel can play a role in assisting the minority communities within Bangladesh.
According to Shipan Kumer Basu, head of the Hindu Struggle Committee, the Jewish people have been persecuted for thousands of years and that due to this history, “Israel has a history of helping people who are in distress throughout the world. Israel is a country full of talent and has vast expertise.” He believes that Bangladesh could benefit from Israeli knowledge in a variety of fields: “Extending their strong helping arms will strengthen our country and the minorities both intellectually and financially.”
He noted that in the past, Israel was very helpful to the Bangladeshi people: “In the 1971 Bangladeshi War for Liberation, then Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi appealed to Israel for help. Israel readily helped with arms and ammunition and thus Bangladesh was born. Israel was the first country to recognize Bangladesh as a country officially. But, the same country did not keep any ties with Israel.” Some Bangladeshi Muslims are now greatly opposed to this reality. As Kaji Aujijul Haq said, “Why can’t we keep ties with Israel, when most of the Arab world is opening up to Israel? Our Prophet instructed us to keep ties with the Jews. Have we become more powerful than the Prophet himself?”
“Israel can help us in many ways,” Basu stressed, noting that Israel has the potential to play a key role in empowering the minorities within his country. According to a report released recently by the Hindu American Foundation, the Hindu minority living in several countries in South Asia are subjected to legal and institutional discrimination, restrictions on their religious freedom, social prejudice, violence, persecution, and political marginalization: “Hindu women are especially vulnerable and face kidnappings and forced conversions in countries such as Bangladesh and Pakistan. In several countries where Hindus are minorities, non-state actors advance a discriminatory and exclusivist agenda, often with the tacit or explicit support of the state.”
For this reason, Basu believes it is of critical importance for Israel to work in order to empower the minority communities within Bangladesh, stressing that this can lead to the re-establishment of diplomatic relations. He seeks for elections to be held as soon as possible under international supervision for he does not trust the Awami League government to hold fair elections: “If the Awami League comes to power again through a showcase voting process, then it will be a disaster. All of the minorities will lose the power to vote. Then, the Awami League will snatch land, kill and force the Hindus to leave Bangladesh. So a very neutral election is in need so that both Hindus and Muslims can live in peace.” Basu has enlisted the support of Israeli Druze diplomat Mendi Safadi, head of the Safadi Center for International Diplomacy and Public Relations, so that the plight of the Hindu minority in Bangladesh can reach the international community. He believes that Israel can play a key role in helping his people to obtain human rights and equality before the law in Bangladesh.
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President Tsai Ing-wen arriving in Panama City on her first overseas state trip in June 2016 (photo: The China Post)
The days of countries paying tribute to China, in order to stay in China’s good graces, may long be gone, but nowadays the tribute appears to flow in the opposite direction. Since opening up its economy in the late 1980s, China has grown into an economic behemoth – capable of flexing its economic muscle to influence not only its own backyard, but far-flung countries in Central America such as Panama.
Last month, Panama became the latest country to cut diplomatic ties with Taiwan and instead recognize China and its “One China” policy, presumably influenced by promises of economic aid and investment. Beijing is not the only country to lavish extensive economic aid in exchange for a country’s political allegiance (“dollar diplomacy”), but it is one of the countries which has the most to offer financially.
Taipei’s efforts at autonomy depend on the international recognition of its Republic of China (ROC) government in Taiwan, and have suffered in recent years as more countries fall under the economic spell of Beijing. To date, only 20 countries recognize the Republic of China’s government in Taiwan, down from 30 countries in the mid 1990s. And the pressure from Beijing is also growing on other countries which do not even have formal diplomatic relations with Taipei – the UAE, Bahrain, Ecuador, Jordan, and Nigeria have been asked by Beijing to rename Taiwan’s representative offices, such as “Taipei Trade Office”, that do not suggest Taiwanese sovereignty.
The linkage between withdrawing diplomatic recognition of Taiwan and receiving economic gifts is not lost on the Panamanian government – countries which vote with China at the U.N. usually receive more aid than other countries, according to AidData. China is the second heaviest user of the Panama Canal, and Chinese companies such as Landbridge Group and COSCO Shipping have been scouting investment opportunities around Panama. Landbridge paid $900 million in May 2016 for Panama’s largest port, Margarita Island Port in the Colon Free Trade Zone, and other Chinese companies seek contracts to upgrade the port for handling larger container ships, as part of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “One Belt, One Road” infrastructure project. COSCO is expected to bid on a tender proposed later this year to develop some 1,200 hectares of land adjacent to the Panama Canal.
Panama was the first overseas visit of President Tsai Ing-Wen since assuming office in May 2016. Following Panama’s reversal, she denounced the decision as a betrayal, arguing, “Oppression and threats are not going to help in cross-strait relations. It will on the contrary increase the discrepancy between the people” of Taiwan and China, and vowing, “We will not compromise and yield under threat”.
Panama is the second country this year to succumb to Beijing’s riches on offer, and Taipei can expect further pressure from Beijing on the diplomatic front in swaying other nations to choose Beijing. And the pressure is mounting on other fronts as well – while Taiwan is routinely blocked from United Nations events (except with permission from Beijing), last month a Taiwanese professor and three Taiwanese students were blocked from using their Taiwanese passports as proof of identification when visiting the public gallery at the United Nations (UN) human rights office in Geneva. Staff at the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) told them only documents issued by Beijing would be acceptable, with one staffer arguing ‘Taiwan is not a country. Please present an identity document from a country recognised by the UN’”.
Incidents such as these, and further deserter countries like Panama, can be expected as strongman Xi Jinping tightens the reins on Taipei, which is being driven further away. Nationalistic distractions like Taiwan will prove useful as Xi attempts to deal with domestic economic and security worries in the run-up to the critical 19th Party Congress in October.
The post Using Economic Muscle, Beijing Sways Panama over Taiwan appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.
Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’été de Politique étrangère (n°2/2017). Céline Pajon, chercheur au Centre Asie de l’Ifri, propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de James D. J. Brown , Japan, Russia and their Territorial Dispute: The Northern Delusion (Routledge, 2016, 168 pages).
L’auteur défend ici une thèse forte : le postulat du Japon dans ses discussions avec Moscou – à savoir le retour, à terme, sous souveraineté nippone, de la totalité des îlots sous contrôle russe depuis 1945 – est irréaliste et illusoire.
Ce parti-pris rend le propos dynamique et stimulant. L’ouvrage s’organise autour de quatre courts chapitres dans lesquels sont présentés puis relativisés, voire invalidés, les arguments japonais. L’argument légal et historique tout d’abord : Tokyo présente les quatre îles les plus méridionales des Kouriles comme son « territoire inhérent » et estime que l’Union soviétique en a repris possession en août 1945 de manière déloyale, en violation du pacte de non-agression. L’auteur minore cet argument, montrant que la Russie maintient une interprétation différente qui peut être recevable, et qu’avant tout, les Kouriles Sud sont aujourd’hui un symbole fort de son identité de vainqueur de la Seconde Guerre mondiale.
Ensuite, l’argument économique – le Japon estime que des incitations financières permettront de créer un environnement favorable à des concessions russes sur la question territoriale – est invalidé. Si la Russie cherche bien à attirer d’importants investissements pour développer son Extrême-Orient, Moscou ne considère plus que Tokyo soit en mesure de proposer une offre décisive : les entreprises japonaises sont peu attirées par la Russie, et son environnement peu favorable aux investissements. Enfin, les dirigeants russes ont rappelé à plusieurs reprises qu’il est inenvisageable de « vendre » le territoire national.
Puis l’auteur aborde l’argument sécuritaire, ou stratégique. Tokyo a tendance à exagérer les tensions entre Moscou et Pékin, et ses tentatives pour éviter un front commun sino-russe, ou contrebalancer la Chine par un rapprochement avec la Russie, sont vouées à l’échec. Si des divergences existent bien au sein du partenariat sino-russe, ce dernier reste essentiel pour Moscou, en particulier depuis la crise ukrainienne. Par ailleurs, l’importance stratégique des Kouriles Sud pour Moscou se renforce : arsenaux et troupes y sont déployés pour mieux contrôler et défendre la mer d’Okhotsk et le passage vers l’Arctique.
L’auteur traite enfin la question des opinions publiques. Tokyo revendique un fort attachement de sa population au retour des quatre îles ; or des sondages récents montrent que les Japonais sont prêts à accepter une solution plus flexible. De manière générale, l’auteur estime que l’émoi serait moindre au Japon qu’en Russie, où un fort nationalisme rend difficile la cession d’une partie du territoire national.
Appuyant son analyse sur de nombreuses sources, japonaises autant que russes, James Brown montre que les deux pays ont toujours des approches irréconciliables sur leur différend territorial. Il n’envisage qu’une seule issue : le retour à la déclaration nippo-russe scellant la reprise des relations diplomatiques en 1956, qui prévoyait qu’une fois un traité de paix signé la Russie transfèrerait les deux plus petites îles des Kouriles Sud au Japon. Tokyo ne s’y est jamais résolu. Y revenir aujourd’hui marquerait sans doute un tournant historique dans la relation de Tokyo avec Moscou, mais pour quels bénéfices, et à quel prix ?
Céline Pajon
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