European Union

“We cannot afford a narrow accounting approach with a complete lack of political vision”, says the EP’s negotiating team for the long-term EU budget and Own Resources reform.
Committee on Budgets

Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP

“We cannot afford a narrow accounting approach with a complete lack of political vision”, says the EP’s negotiating team for the long-term EU budget and Own Resources reform.
Committee on Budgets

Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP

Investing in Europe is not about millions of euros, it's about millions of people.

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Investing in Europe is not about millions of euros, it's about millions of people.

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Find out what the European Parliament is doing to avoid plastic waste and marine littering as well as boost plastic recycling in Europe.

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Delegations

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Next AFET committee meeting will be held on Monday 16 March 2020 from 15.00 - 18.30 and on Tuesday 17 March 2020, 9.00 - 12.30 and 14.30 - 18.30, meeting room József Antall (2Q2), Brussels
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Parliament President David Sassoli reminded EU leaders Parliament approval is needed for the EU budget and said MEPs would not accept just any agreement.

Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP

Parliament President David Sassoli reminded EU leaders Parliament approval is needed for the EU budget and said MEPs would not accept just any agreement.

Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP

The Truman Doctrine Redux:

21st Century American Foreign Policy and Eastern Mediterranean Sea

and the Middle East

By

 Vassilios Damiras, Ph.D.

International Relations Expert

 

The Genesis of the Doctrine

The geostrategic role of the Truman Doctrine in helping prevent the fall of the then Greek kingdom to communism during the late 1940s created a great design for American diplomatic and strategic planners that they then utilized throughout the Cold War. Its critical precepts continue in the current war against global terror under the Bush administration. This article analyzes the geostrategic and geopolitical significance of the Truman Doctrine and its 21st-century application to ongoing American involvement in the Middle East. Moreover, since this specific policy combined the theoretical principals of realism and idealism, it is argued that Harry S. Truman created the foundations of American liberal imperialism in his readiness to fight Soviet/Slavic communism as an ideological menace in the Balkans and Greece’s immediate geographic vicinity. Parallels will be drawn between the Truman Doctrine’s resistance toward communism of the late 1940s, and the present Bush administration’s focus on counter-terrorism.

Finally, the implementation and execution of strategies founded on the Truman Doctrine established a robust military presence in the southeastern Mediterranean area and the Middle East, which appearance, with its strategic implications, prevails today. In a “Truman Doctrine redux,” the Trumanesque Bush foreign policy strategy has expanded the American presence in the Middle Eastern region in the war on terror.

President Truman, influenced by his classical education, believed that in protecting Greece from communism, American military advisers defended the cradle of Western civilization, indeed of their American culture. Furthermore, Greece founded the glorious Byzantine Empire and the Greek Eastern Orthodox Christian faith. Without a doubt, Truman recognized that the modern Greek socio-political system was not as pure in democratic and cultural values as during the ancient times; nevertheless, the United States, in Truman’s interpretation, had an obligation to assist the country that provided the tenets of the American democracy. Also, he realized that through Greece, American military power would significantly shape the region.

The Truman Doctrine opened a new page in American foreign policy. President Truman’s reaction to the Korean military crisis in 1950 relied on his firm conviction that “this is the Greece of the Far East. If we are tough enough now,” he declaimed, “there won’t be another step.” President Dwight D. Eisenhower perceived the ongoing military crises in Indochina and the Middle East through the geopolitical/geostrategic lessons of the Greek Civil War (1947-1949), warning that if these strategic regions fell to Soviet communist influence, Europe and other areas could likewise collapse under Soviet totalitarian pressures. In the early 1960s, President John F. Kennedy and Adlai Stevenson argued forcibly that the Greek case provided an example for American military action in Vietnam.

Moreover, Walt Rostow, chair of the U.S. State Department’s policy planning council, assured U.S. Secretary Dean Rusk that “there is no reason we cannot win as clear a victory in South Vietnam as in Greece, Malaysia, and the Philippines.” Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., who had strongly supported the Truman doctrine in its infancy, declared in a 1964 speech that “We, of the Free World, won in Greece…. And we can win in Vietnam.” In 1965, immediately after the first U.S. combat troops were dispatched to South Vietnam, President Lyndon B. Johnson alluded to the Truman Doctrine in reassuring the American public that the U.S. armed forces would win the war against communist aggression in the Southeast Asian region as they had won in Greece in the 1940s. The following year, Rusk quoted Truman’s 1947 address to U.S. Congress in justifying American military involvement in South Vietnam.

In the current war on terror, George W. Bush has used the basic foundations of the Truman Doctrine to combat Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. The Bush Doctrine uses liberal imperialism to both fight terrorism and promote American democratic values globally, particularly in the Middle East. The Truman Doctrine indelibly influenced both past and present American foreign and defense policies.

An Analysis of the Truman Doctrine in a Historical-Political Perspective

There have been disparate interpretations of the Truman Doctrine since its inception and implementation. The Doctrine has been the focus of serious debate since its promulgation. Critics have called it the “first shot of the Cold War”; an American global license for liberal imperialism; an exaggerated response to an imagined communist threat that led to the monster of McCarthyism; a reactionary foreign policy placing the American government on the side opposite freedom, political and social reform; strong proof of an “arrogance of power” that continuously forced United States into other countries’ domestic political quarrels.

Defenders of the Truman Doctrine argue that this specific policy illustrated American determination and ingenuity in the fight against communism. The Doctrine was representative of the American commitment to free world ideals and beliefs. When the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan were combined, magnanimous financial aid assisted first Greece and Turkey and later, other nation-states threatened by communism. Yet, in focusing on these important issues, historians have failed to credit the Truman administration with creating a foreign policy designed to protect freedom by helping embattled countries help themselves.

The tenets of the Truman Doctrine left their imprint on the seminal stages of an American foreign policy that was adaptable, restrained, and not necessarily based on military power. Later, when President Kennedy introduced “flexible response,” Truman and his advisers (some advisers later joining Kennedy) adopted a foreign policy intended to fight the ever-growing political and strategic challenges to democracy with a broad-ranging arsenal of responses corresponding to the socio-political danger at hand.

Moreover, President Truman’s Doctrine arguably anticipated to the Nixon Doctrine of the 1970s, which called for partnerships based on the nation at risk sharing the burden of safeguarding itself by essentially providing the bulk of the manpower needed for its security. The Truman administration’s approach to the Greek problem proved idealistic in purpose, but realistic in application. Its composite thrust was political, economic, and military, allowing for adjustments and fine-tuning as the nature of the threat changed. The political facet included creation of a stable democracy in Greece; economic emphasis supported viable economic opportunities in the Greek population.  The military focus was upon capable defense of Greek national interests by modern Greek armed forces, assisted by their American counterparts. The policy constituted a viable response to multifaceted threats against which real victory lay in convincing democracy’s enemies that they could not win.

Although various historians have long debated the political and strategic reasons for the Greek government’s victory, one observation has been especially stressed: American military aid was solely responsible. The Greek communists could have gone on indefinitely if they had not switched from guerrilla tactics to conventional warfare, and if they had continued to receive refuge and outside military assistance. Tito’s defection from the Soviet bloc broke the guerrillas’ resistance was considered crucial, enabling American firepower to forge a victory. Although these ingredients surely proved vital to the final outcome of the Greek civil war, the full explanation does not lie either in the Balkans or in American military assistance.

The Truman administration achieved its objectives in Greece because of a flexible American foreign policy that was global in theory but constrained by reality. White House advisers at that time had defined the nation’s interests in Greece in relation to the rest of the world, developed a strategy with manageable goals, and operationalized it within the limitations of America’s capacity to influence events and people. Most significantly, they cultivated a Greek populace rich in democratic values and traditions, staunchly nationalistic, who opposed communism and welcomed U.S. aid. America’s foreign policymakers kept the struggle within the technical confines of a civil war, repeatedly refusing to permit the conflict to grow into larger war. After achieving the financial aid bill’s passage, the administration toned down its rhetoric to avoid military confrontation with the communists, quietly persuaded the British to remain in Greece as part of a bilateral security effort, and thus gained time for the American strategy to reach fruition.

The Truman Doctrine provided the rationale for a global strategy that rested on equivalent and limited responses to carefully defined and continually changing levels of danger. During the Greek involvement, the Truman administration considered every option from outright withdrawal to direct military intervention. In 1947, the communist emergency in Greece necessitated strong military aid and operational advice; once that specific threat subsided in late 1949, the American focus shifted to long-range economic rehabilitation. Decisions resulted from recommendations and proposals presented not only by specialists in Greek and Turkish affairs, and others.

Vital information came from British and Greek analysts, the U.S. State and Defense departments, U.S. National Security Council, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and other intelligence organizations, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency and U.S. Army Intelligence. The new foreign and defense policies emerged from serious considerations regarding their impact on Greece and neighboring nation-states, on America’s allies and the nonaligned countries, and on Americans at home. Averting a unilateral and more dangerous involvement was crucial; the possibility of graceful de-escalation or even total withdrawal was debated, as were the effects of events in Greece on global strategy. During all this time, the Truman White House sustained continual assessments of the Greek dispute to keep the American commitment flexible and under control.

On the economic level, United States did the following:

• assisted in the creation, for the time in Greek history, of a national electric power system, designed by American engineers, modeled on the TVA, with a quasi-independent, public corporate entity interlinking new hydroelectric generating stations at various sites, with Athens Piraeus Electric Company (APECO) and a new thermal generating station based on the mining of lignite at Aliveri;
• supported the expansion and modernization of Greece’s traditional industries (cement, textiles, fertilizers) while promoting new ones;
• helped re-open and re-equip the chromite, bauxite and pyrite mines, and to clear and re-equip the nation’s ports and harbors, and the Corinth Canal;
• re-equipped the fishing fleet and agricultural processing and storage plants;
• helped develop village potable water supplies, completing an anti-malarial program;
• contributed to modernization of hospitals and clinics;
• provided for re-building and improving of highway and railway networks from Kalamata to Alexandroupolis;
• facilitated building and repair of museums, archeological sites and hotels to support the goals of future tourism.

The U.S. Department of Agriculture provided the following financial support:

• to create and train a Greek force roughly equivalent to America’s county agents for Greek villages, including instruction in fertilizer and pesticide use, general land management and animal husbandry;
• to undertake large-scale land reclamation works;
• to supply the government’s mechanical cultivation service and its well-drilling service with heavy equipment
• to construct farm-to-market roads and to link formerly isolated villages with trunk and highway systems and to market towns.

In military affairs, the American government created special programs to arm and train the Greek armed forces. Eventually, Greece and Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan helped create a self-sustaining and self-reliant Greek nation-state, ready to negotiate future military, political, or economic threats. The United States became a guardian of Greek democracy; without American military aid, it was likely, or at least plausible, that Greece would have succumbed to the Soviet communist expansion. If the Soviets had managed to control the Greek countryside, the survival of the free world would have been at risk.

Control of the Bosporus Passage and the Dardanelles Straits was the raison d’etre underlying the American posture and strategic actions within the region, due to ongoing Soviet aspirations and intentions for direct access to the Aegean. In 1945, during the Potsdam Summit meeting, Stalin openly claimed the right to create military bases in the Thessaloniki or Alexandoupolis harbors as alternatives to bypass the Turkish Straits. Simultaneously, the Soviet regime exerted acute political pressure on the Turkish government to revise the Montreaux Convention to gain joint control of the Straits with the Turkish Republic (Proposals of June 22, 1946).

The Truman precepts buttressed the policy of containment and organized resistance against Soviet communist expansionism, and were the foundation of a long-lasting American foreign policy with global dimensions and implications. NATO, the American Joint Task Forces in the Mediterranean, and Atlantic and Pacific communication/surveillance installations and facility/military bases became and remain pillars of American global policy promulgated in the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan.

The American engagement in World War II (1939-1945) incurred a total loss of $341 billion with 460,000 personnel casualties. It was the greatest investment in peace and military security any American administration had ever made. It demanded an everlasting guarantee. Containment doctrine was the appropriate answer to those concerns at that time, in locations distant from the American continent. Greece’s and Turkey’s military roles in the Marshall Plan and later in NATO would be key factors in the balance of power in the geostrategic system, along with other European nation-states strengthened by the American military presence on the Continent.

A full network of military bases and related facilities in Greece and Turkey was organized within the framework of various bilateral accords with the American government to support integrated security functions in the Eastern Mediterranean. (The current Bush administration has used these facilities to pursue the war in Iraq.) The Aegean islands area and the island of Crete are crucial to the necessary strategic breadth and depth to defend the straits and thereby, access to the Mediterranean Sea, and are under Greek operational responsibility as part of NATO’s command structure. Greece also committed to American such as the critical Suda Bay naval base for the U.S. Navy Sixth Fleet. Currently, the U.S. Defense Department is in the process of upgrading the Suda Bay naval base in order to accommodate more naval and Special Forces assets in the fight against Al Qaeda and another terrorist/insurgent operatives.

The Truman Doctrine positioned the United States as the protector of Greece and its respective regions and continues to play a vital role even in the current global situation. During the twentieth century, Greece offered much and lost many in the battles for freedom and democratic values. In no other period of its long history has Hellenism suffered such great upheaval and destruction. For years, the Truman Doctrine tenets have safeguarded the Greek culture and nation from a variety of exogenous threats.

The Contemporary Implications of the Truman Doctrine

The Truman Doctrine was born out of the American geostrategic and geopolitical perception of Greece as a key nation-state regarding security in the Middle East, crucial to the protection of American national interests in the Mediterranean region. Greek and Turkish territory is a unified strategic area in the American view, with both of the countries operating as supplementary security elements. The consequence of this strategic outlook was the contemporaneous entry and integration of both nation-states into the NATO civil-military alliance.

During the Greek civil strife, the Truman Doctrine put into realistic practice what Alexander the Great said in the town of Opi in 324 B.C., “For me any good foreigner is a Greek, any bad Greek is worse than a barbarian.” In 1947, the “good foreigners” were the Americans. The “bad” Greeks were the Greek communists who attempted to destroy the values of the Greek culture. The implementation of Truman’s doctrinal concepts aborted this process.

Although history indicates that the most convincing argument in international relations is inextricably tied to power, the greatest achievement of political human beings is the building of universal peace based on mutual confidence and the consolidation of human rights and liberties. In recognition of the value of universal peace, the wall of bipolarity was demolished, and the world set on the road to peace. It is not only national and military power that has made the United States a global hegemon; it is rooted in the trust of people and human expectations for freedom and political and economic prosperity. The Truman Doctrine incorporated these realistic and idealistic norms and values.

Moreover, the Bush administration continues to deal with current geopolitical challenges based on the complex formulations so well developed by Truman. Present security threats include instability in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East, due to local independence and irredentist conflicts, nationalism, terrorism, and Islamic fundamentalism. In addition, the illicit proliferation of nuclear weapons and guided missile systems are serious dangers to U.S.-European, not to mention global, security.

Furthermore, the expansion of NATO and its inclusion of operational areas outside its traditional borders are important innovations emerging from the Truman Doctrine in support of the pursuit of freedom around the globe. Today’s NATO comprises a unique, organized multinational force, largely responsible for pan-European security. NATO continues to evolve in its capabilities relevant to the new geostrategic challenges of the 21st century.

The military execution of the Truman doctrine was based on realistic perceptions of how to apply hegemonic military power in times of crisis (much as Bush has done presently). Protecting democracy was based on the idealism of expanding and promoting democracy across the globe. The Truman principles coherently fused realism and idealism; this is the main rationale for their continued applicability in today’s increasingly complex geopolitical and geostrategic environment. Truman based his foreign policy on ideas from his classical education and precepts of classical liberalism. This eclectic and sophisticated educational/philosophical background assisted him in creating a cogent and cohesive foreign policy with an enduring effect on American decision-making processes, policies, and outcomes. The Bush administration follows the tenets of classical liberalism regarding post 9/11 American foreign and defense policies. Finally, the Bush Doctrine, similar to the Truman Doctrine, has introduced a political, economic, and military evolution to Afghanistan and Iraq, for the purpose of stabilizing and establishing democratic values and beliefs. In the current war on terror and in the promotion of democracy, the Bush Doctrine clearly parallels the Trumanesque concepts for global security and democratic development.

President Barack Obama’s foreign policy was a two-part process in two parts: first, his goals and decision-making mechanism and, second, his plans and implementation. His foreign policy-making team, which centered on the White House, is headed by the President, who relies on Vice President Joe Biden and his National Security Adviser General James Jones. His National Security Council is over 200 people in stuff is almost four times large that NSC staff of Presidents Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, and George H. W. Bush and nearly ten times as large a President John F. Kennedy. Also, Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hilary Clinton play an essential role in the President’s foreign policy decision. Moreover, Rahm Emmanuel, his chief of staff, and David Axelrod, his senior adviser, are part of the foreign policy decision-making machine. Finally, the President relies on various special foreign policy envoys such as Richard Holbrooke regarding Afghanistan and Pakistan. Of course, President Obama himself is the primary source of strategic direction. The new U.S. strategic direction indicates a very vague and idealistic approach to U.S. national security interests.

President Donald Trump has developed a transactional/realist approach to foreign policy. Lately, he focuses on enlarging the American presence in Greece and Cyprus to protect the American national interest in the region and to monitor and stop the Russian expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea region and the anti-NATO behavior of Turkey. Moreover, to collaborate with Italy, France, Greece, Cyprus, and Israel to explore the natural gas resources. Also, the Souda bay U.S. naval base in Crete has been used for the various attacks against Syria and to fight jihadist terrorism in the Middle East. Greece is the fourth large recipient of U.S. military assistance. The current American administration wants to turn Greece as the bastion of the American national interest in the region. Both countries have a common enemy radical jihad. Last but not least, currently in the northern city of Alexandroupolis, the American military installed a state of the art radar to operate jointly by American and Greek personnel. This radar can monitor the region as far as the Black Sea. President Trump vividly tries to recreate parts of the Truman Doctrine.

The post The Truman Doctrine Redux: 21st Century American Foreign Policy and Eastern Mediterranean Sea and the Middle East appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Criticisms directed at the European Union (EU) and its institutions over the past decade have often been interpreted as a sign of fundamental weakness. However, using the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) as an example, Claire Godet argues that contestation should not be seen as a sign of failure, but rather as an opportunity for justification.

The case of the EU ETS

In the last decade, the European Union (EU) has faced many backlashes and criticisms. This turmoil has led some scholars to declare the EU’s legitimacy crisis. It is popular to assume that if citizens are dissatisfied, the EU must be facing legitimacy challenges that could eventually lead to the withdrawal of support, and therefore systemic troubles. However, negative claims and critiques might not be as threatening as these studies imply. Critiques also provide a valuable opportunity for the EU to justify itself, and can test, rather than threaten the system, which can wither or thrive according to its reaction.

Analysing the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is particularly enlightening on the matter. The ETS is the policy that establishes an ’emissions market’ to limit polluting emissions and encourage climate friendly economy. European industries receive allocations that define how much polluting emissions they are allowed to produce. If they exceed their quota, they must buy more allocations. If they reduce their emissions, they can sell their surplus of allocations.

The ETS is quite recent (it was designed in the early 2000s), and has suffered many objections from all sides since its creation. Green activists denounced the commodification of climate protection; energy-intensive industry complained about the burden on their competitiveness; think tanks decry the Commission’s overly optimistic projections.

From its very first days, the ETS has been questioned; and since then, criticisms have reappeared with each round of reforms. Despite the challenges, the ETS has survived and developed; and the next phase, starting in 2021, will integrate the emissions market further than ever before.

The ETS and its critics

How is it that the ETS has continued to grow – in leaps and bounds – while stakeholders continue to disparage it? The answer is that the Commission has managed to transform complaints into opportunities to justify the system.

When establishing the ETS, the Commission justified it by affirming that a market-based instrument was the most cost-effective solution to mitigate climate change. This has defined the EU’s climate policy for the following 20 years: it focuses primarily on emission reductions (rather than, for example, changing the mode of production); and it is constructed around market mechanisms (rather than imposing environmental standards, for instance).

Critiques of the ETS usually fall into two categories: on one hand, actors can criticise the technical aspects of the ETS, i.e. they believe that the ETS is the best solution, but still suggest measures to make its realisation more efficient. On the other hand, actors can argue that the ETS is based on fundamentally flawed premises and that market mechanisms are not the best option available.

The first type of critiques does not represent a threat for a system’s legitimacy since it does not attack the system’s normative justifications. The actors who point out technical shortcomings do not ask for better or new moral grounds; they simply attempt to make the system work better (whether this means having greater climate ambitions or lowering the burden on industries). The Commission has taken advantages of these criticisms to foster the development of the ETS and the emissions market integration. Cleverly, the Commission does not deny any of the shortcomings of the ETS: it acknowledges its deficiencies and recommends deeper integration to achieve both steeper emissions reduction and fewer market distortions.

However, the second type of critiques does jeopardise the system, as it asserts that the system cannot be legitimised while its justifications rest on biased assumptions. These critiques attempt to delegitimise the system in order to replace it. They do not believe that market mechanisms and/or emissions reduction should be the guiding principles of EU’s climate policy: according to them, market-based instruments are not the best solution to mitigate climate change. These ‘anti-system’ critiques are harder to convey because the actors involved in the current system, even when unhappy, fear changes that could, in the end, be more detrimental to them.

Critique as an opportunity for legitimation

The Commission has managed to deflect these critiques. For instance, NGOs who advocate for the scrapping of the ETS are castigated, on one hand, by industries that dread an ecotax, and on the other hand, by green actors who apprehend a return to zero. Nevertheless, by urging for controversial changes, these NGOs have given a valuable opportunity to the Commission to reassert its justification that the ETS is the most cost-effective solution to provide both climate mitigation and economic development.

Criticisms do not necessarily represent a threat to a system’s legitimacy. Firstly, not all negative claims target the system’s justifications. They might intent to better the system rather than challenging its normative grounds. Secondly, criticisms that question a system’s legitimation are merely a test that the system can overcome by reaffirming its normative justifications.

This does not mean, however, that criticisms are inconsequential in political systems: negative claims, as any discourse, can affect a system in many ways depending on their intensity, popularity, etc. Nevertheless, the relation between critique and legitimacy is more complex than expected and should be explored carefully before making any assumptions about a legitimacy crisis.

The EU is currently facing criticisms from all parties: rather than seeing this as a challenge, this could be a valuable opportunity for the EU to justify itself to its citizens. By criticising the EU, citizens also express what they want and expect from the Union. It is now time for the EU to listen.

This article was originally published on the UACES Graduate Forum blog, ‘Crossroads Europe’.

The post Critique as an opportunity for legitimation: the case of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

In the wake of the financial crisis, EU governments spent taxpayers’ money to rescue European banks. That displaced a financial crisis into political systems by straining public finances and social protections in all EU member states. Some states were brought to the point of insolvency, and the survival of the EU’s single currency, perhaps even of the EU itself, was threatened. But is the EU experiencing a legitimacy crisis?

Three types of legitimacy crisis

Legitimacy is at the core of ‘good government’. It means the justified or rightful exercise of political power. Since a right to exercise political power implies that people have an obligation to comply also with laws they do not like, legitimate political orders are more likely to enjoy the unforced compliance of citizens. Political systems that can concentrate on satisfying the needs and values of citizens, rather than coercing them, are more likely to deliver high levels of economic performance and to score well on indicators of human development.

Whilst the EU has experienced serial crises since the financial crisis, spanning from geopolitics and Brexit to dealing with refugee flows, it remains to be investigated whether it has experienced a legitimacy crisis. We lack the knowledge, concepts, theories and methods needed to investigate scientifically just how far, if at all, the Union’s ability to make legitimate use of political power corresponds to what it needs to do in crises.

We might say that legitimacy crises occur where a political order is unable to satisfy all necessary conditions for the justification of its powers. That is an intentionally abstract and generic definition, designed to avoid assuming any one form of political order; any one set of necessary conditions for legitimacy; any one set of standards of justification; and any one form of crisis. If we want to understand if a particular political order is subject to a legitimacy crisis, we must ‘fill in’ the generic definition by specifying standards and necessary conditions for the justification of powers specific to that order. Against this background, I argue that the European Union may experience three types of legitimacy crisis.

Failed direct legitimacy

The first type of legitimacy crisis occurs where the EU cannot satisfy all conditions to be directly democratically legitimate with citizens. The Union defines rights, makes law and allocates values. However, in democracies, citizens must be able to control as equals their own rights, laws and allocations of values.  Consider, though, the conditions that are needed for democratic institutions and politics. These include freedoms and rights, political competition that offers voters relevant choices, a civil society in which all groups have equal opportunity for organised influence, a public sphere in which all have equal access to public debate, and a defined people, a demos, or at least agreement on who should have votes and voice in the making of decisions that are binding on all.

Achieving all those conditions simultaneously may be hard for the EU, given that it is a multi-state, non-state political system that operates from beyond the state. The capacity of the state to concentrate power, resources and legal enforcement has historically been useful in ensuring that the decisions of democratic majorities are carried out; in providing universal and equal systems of representation; in guaranteeing rights needed for democracy; in drawing the boundaries of defined political communities; and in motivating voters and elites to participate in democratic political competition for the control of an entity which manifestly affects their needs and values.

Failed indirect legitimacy

So, what of the alternative where the EU somehow derives or borrows democratic legitimacy from that of its member state democracies? That might be more than a second-best where it is difficult for the European Union to develop its own democratic politics and institutions in full. There may also be important justifications for a form of European Union in which individuals are citizens of national democratic political communities of states that are member states of a Union that is itself an association of both national democracies and their citizens.

However, member state democracies could make contradictory demands on the Union’s legitimacy. Attempts to legitimate the EU via its member state democracies could produce democracy-on-democracy domination. Either suggests a second form of legitimacy crisis where the EU cannot be indirectly legitimated by all its member states simultaneously.

Failed input, output or throughput legitimacy

However, cutting across any need to be directly or indirectly legitimated by publics, the EU may also need to be input, output and throughput legitimate. Imagine a political system that was procedurally perfect in its voting and deliberations. Yet it had no outputs. Would we consider it legitimate? Perhaps not, if we think that political power is justified only where it has outcomes important to securing rights, justice and the most basic of public goods needed for personal security and economic and social welfare. So democratic legitimacy needs inputs from votes and voices, outcomes that are valued by citizens and throughputs, or procedures, that convert inputs from votes and voices into outcomes that deliver value, rights and public goods. A political system may also need to be able to make legitimate trade-offs between optimal outcomes and ideal procedures.

Hence, in a third form of legitimacy crisis, the Union might struggle to provide essential inputs, outputs and throughputs simultaneously. As a Union of democracies, a high level of agreement between member states may be a procedural condition for input and throughput legitimacy. However, multiple veto points may make it harder to secure the outputs that are thought to justify collective action at the European level.

The research project Post-crisis Democracy in the European Union (PLATO) explores these tensions. It aims to build new theory through multiple, connected PhD projects that investigate different actors with whom the EU needs to be legitimate, and different standards of democratic legitimacy. I invite you to explore findings from the individual studies on this blog and to engage in conversations on the EU’s struggle for legitimacy.

The post From financial crisis to legitimacy crisis? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Ceriana by Roberto Martini

The weeks and months following Brexit are taking those of us who would have preferred the UK to stay in the EU into strange new territory. While politicians and technocrats get on with working out the practicalities, the question for us ordinary Europhiles is: how to remain European?

On this new terrain is the underlying stuff, the issues that (from the Remainer point of view) the referendum was really about – relationships with other countries, curiosity about different cultures and participation in other ways of life. They’re expressed in various ways, through learning languages, taking trips or spending periods abroad: most Europhiles have one continental country they’re particularly attached to. Eyes lighting up at the thought of French cuisine, the Italian language, a Spanish village or a German city – all these are signs and elements of a European identity and set of affinities that will endure regardless of what happens at the institutional and multilateral level.

But, as with all relationships, Britain’s connections with its continental neighbours will need care and cultivation if they are to thrive – more so than ever, since the UK’s political decision to leave the EU has left many in Europe with a sense of hurt and bemusement.

Crucially, strong connections require a mood beyond the anger that characterised much of the Remain campaign, a constructive and creative set of emotions and attitudes that foster an outward focus rather than the tendency to stay locked into an insular battle with the ‘other side’.

So here, in no particular order, are some ideas about How To Be A New Remainer.

Be Consciously Continental

Cultivate continental habits and interests. As a practising glutton, I’ve long brought back favourite foods from places I’ve spent time in and integrated them into my everyday life, with the result that I consume Arabic coffee, drink tea like a Palestinian and put chorizo in everything. Having a periodic ‘Table for Europe’ – one of the ideas for marking the day of the UK’s departure from the EU – in which you share a continental meal with at least one fellow Europhile, is a simple but powerful way of giving an ordinary act cultural and political significance.

In a consumer society, we all have a degree of economic power which we can use to make our preferences matter. As K L McGhee points out on Facebook, another easy act of post-Brexit activism is Euro-consumerism, supporting cafes, delis and other continental businesses wherever possible.

But, as my Austrian great-aunt never actually said, there’s more to life than eating. There’s a vast pool of European culture to dip into, diverse enough to suit all tastes and deep enough to last a lifetime (or several). Jonny Watson, also on Facebook, suggests reading 27 books, each one written by an author from a different member of the EU: ‘Balzac for France, Cervantes for Spain, Goethe for Germany,’ he suggests, adding, ‘not sure what to suggest for Slovakia.’ Or confine yourself to one country and set yourself the task of reading some of its greatest classics, picking the sauciest one for your book group.

Following European news is a way of countering both the declining levels of foreign news coverage in the British media and the national self-absorption that has taken hold since the referendum. Learning Spanish in the run-up to Brexit, I found solace and a sense of perspective in El Pais, often discussing the latest developments with my incredulous Spanish conversation exchange partner. Many of the major outlets in European countries publish in English, such as the German public broadcaster Deutschewelle and the pan-European news channel Euronews.

Forge Partnerships and Connections

This article from The Spectator is a timely reminder of the lost innocence of the 1970s, when all things continental held a certain glamour. Back then, a ‘continental breakfast’ was a rare treat rather than just a couple of croissants that leave you hungry, and a continental quilt was an exotic feature of only the most sophisticated bedrooms.

New Remainers, of course, don’t believe in pointless nostalgia. But perhaps there’s a useful truth in this backward glance, one that has to do with recovering the romance and excitement of discovering how differently others organise their lives. In recent decades, this sense of discovery has largely been an individual, pleasure-seeking affair, pursued through regular holidays to the continent. But the post-Brexit world creates the need – and opportunity – to promote more formal links for cultural exchange.

Some potential partnerships will flow naturally out of the gaps left by a pro-Brexit government, generating the need to create and maintain pan-European links in academia, for example. Lobbying for the continuation of the Erasmus scheme is vital for future generations of Europe, as Timothy Garton Ash argues in this wide-ranging piece. In short, a kind of continental third sector could emerge out of the mess to provide a counterweight to the anti-Europeanism at the top.

Meanwhile there’s scope for developing connections at the municipal and local level with a revival of the twin town movement. This article, published before the EU referendum was even a twinkle in David Cameron’s eye, shows that there is untapped potential for links between towns within the framework already in place. Some councils are already seeing the potential. In a display of solidarity after the referendum, the mayor of Bromley visited the borough’s twin town in Germany. Neuwied’s mayor Jan Einig responded in kind: ‘We can look forward resolutely together despite Brexit, because what connects us is our friendship and our friendship cannot be destroyed by Brexit.’

Travel to the Continent

When it comes to understanding the Other, even in the digital age nothing can replace the in-body, analogue experience of travelling to another country.

Marcel Proust had it in this more nuanced formulations of the adage ‘travel broadens the mind’: ‘The real voyage of discovery consists not in seeking new landscapes, but in having new eyes.’ And since the evidence suggests that twenty-first century humans still have a problem with difference, Mark Twain’s claim that ‘travel is fatal to prejudice, bigotry, and narrow mindedness, and many of our people need it sorely on these accounts’ remains apposite.

The benefits of continental travel have been recognised in British society since the Grand Tour became an essential part of a gentleman’s education, a civilising post-study tour which survives in the democratised form of inter railing. In these climate-anxious days, such trips can circumvent the objections to flying because the continent to which the UK still belongs, having physically detached from mainland Europe a mere eight thousand years ago, is accessible by boat and train.

There are signs that long-haul train travel is becoming increasingly popular. The Austrian state railway has recently relaunched part of its overnight train service, while the Independent’s Europe correspondent Jon Stone has been sharing his experiences of a train journey from Brussels to Prague on Twitter, highlighting fares to rival those of budget airlines.

All of which calls to mind another adage-in-the-making: true remainers never leave, they just find new ways of staying European.

Alex Klaushofer is writing a book about the state of Europe by way of three lesser-known continental cities.

 

The post The New Remainers: How To Stay European After Brexit appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

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Written Presentation by Dr Rebecca E. JOHNSON, Executive Director, Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy and founding President of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN, 2017 Nobel Peace Laureate), UK
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Find out about the opportunities and challenges that make regulating artificial intelligence in the EU necessary.

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