European Union

Greece cannot waive its obligation to help asylum seekers by citing EU protocols, the UN has pointed out.

The European disease prevention agency on Monday increased the risk of coronavirus infection in the EU to "high," as the outbreak spread to 18 member states. The commission also launched a "corona response team" to work on halting the disease.

Latvia said Monday a citizen thought to be working for Russia has been arrested for allegedly trying to recruit a secret service officer to also spy for Moscow, AFP reports. Contacted by AFP, the Russian embassy in Latvia declined comment. Russian espionage activity in Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania has increased since tensions with the West have grown over its backing for rebels in eastern Ukraine.

SEDE organised a public hearing on 'The future of nuclear arms control regimes and the security implications for the EU' on Tuesday 18 February 2020 from 09.00 to 10.30hrs in room SPINELLI 1G3, with external experts.
Programme
Poster
Presentation by Dr Rebecca E. JOHNSON, Executive Director, Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy and founding President of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN, 2017 Nobel Peace Laureate), UK
Written presentation by Dr Rebecca E. JOHNSON, Executive Director, Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy and founding President of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN, 2017 Nobel Peace Laureate), UK
Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP

Cases brought before the Court of Justice: new practice directions to parties

On 20-21 February 2020, European Union heads of state met for a special European Council, dedicated to the EU long-term budget for 2021-2027.  It ended without a political agreement; soon, another summit will take place for further negotiations. Today I will not write about what why the EU’s long-term budget (2021-2027) did not go through; although how the cost of the budget should be shared among the net contributors, and whether the net payers can claim a rebate were the primary sources of the fallout.

 

Reuters/Pool

Next time around when the heads of the Member States meet, the proposal to linking EU funds with the Rule of Law may strike another friction between the MSs. For example, when Viktor Orban, Hungarian Prime Minister, was asked if the proposal for tying community funds to the rule of law in recipient countries were agenda in the EU budget discussions, he said: “{T}his issue might emerge in the final phase of negotiations”.⁠

In this descriptive piece, I will provide an outline of how and why the EU proposes to link sound financial management of the long-term budget with respect for the rule of law. Also, I will highlight on the mechanism and measures, proposed to address generalised deficiencies with the rule of law in the EU. I will heavily draw on the European Commission’s Proposal of May 2018 on the protection of the Union’s budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the MS. Finally; I will speculate on the effectiveness of the new mechanisms in dealing with lack of respect for the rule of law.

I like to begin with defining what is meant by (i) the rule of law and (ii) generalised deficiency.

The rule of law refers to the Union value enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, which includes the below-listed principles:

• legality, implying a transparent, accountable, democratic and pluralistic process for enacting laws,
• legal certainty,
• prohibition of arbitrariness of the executive powers,
• adequate judicial protection by independent courts, including of fundamental rights and,
• separation of powers and equality before the law.

Generalised  deficiency as regards the rule of law means a widespread or recurrent practice or omission, or measure by public authorities, which affects the rule of law.  Examples of what may be considered as generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law:

• endangering the independence of the judiciary,
• failing to prevent, correct and sanction arbitrary or unlawful decisions by public authorities and,
• limiting the availability and effectiveness of legal remedies.

Why the EU wants to connect the rule of law with the EU budget?

The Commission considers that there is a close link between the respect for the rule of law and mutual trust and financial solidarity amongst the MSs. Thus it is believed that sufficient respect for the rule of law is a prerequisite for confidence that EU spending in M is sufficiently protected.  While it is expected that the different constitutions and judicial systems of the EU MS are in principle well designed to ensure the rule of law and equipped with in-built safeguards to protect citizens against any threat to the rule of law.  It is suggested that several recent events, for instance in Hungary and Poland, have demonstrated generalised weaknesses in national checks and balances and have shown how a lack of respect for the rule of law can become a matter of severe and common concern within the EU. Following which the European Parliament and the public in large have requested from the EU to take actions to protect the rule of law. Thus it has been proposed that existing obligations to ensure effective control systems should be supplemented by new measures to ensure respect of the rule of law.

What mechanisms will identify generalised deficiency?

The new proposal proposes that the identification of a generalised deficiency require a qualitative assessment by the Commission. That assessment could be based on the information from all available sources and recognized institutions, including judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union, reports of the Court of Auditors, and conclusions and recommendations of relevant international organisations and networks, such as the bodies of the Council of Europe and the European networks of supreme courts and councils for the judiciary.

When however the Commission considers that the generalised deficiency as regards the rule of law is established, it shall submit a proposal for an implementing act on the appropriate measures to the Council. Then the decision shall be deemed to have been adopted by the Council, unless it decides, by a qualified majority, to reject the Commission proposal. Nevertheless, the Council, acting by a qualified majority, may amend the Commission’s proposal and adopt the amended text as a Council decision.

Carl Court/Getty Images

What are the proposed sanctions?

If the Commission found generalised deficiencies in one of the MSs as regards the rule of law, it could:

• suspend payments or the implementation of the legal commitment or terminate the legal commitment; issue a prohibition on entering into new legal commitments,
• suspend the approval of one or more programmes or amend such programmes,
• suspend commitments; reduce commitments, including through financial corrections or transfers to other spending programmes,
• reduce pre-financing,
• interrupt payment deadlines and,
•  suspend payments.

These sanctions could be invoked when a generalised deficiency as regards the rule of law in an MS endangers:

• The proper functioning of the authorities implementing the Union budget,
• the proper functioning of investigation and
• public prosecution of fraud or corruption relating to the budget
• the effective judicial review by independent courts,
• the prevention and sanctioning of fraud, corruption or other breaches of EU law relating to the budget, or
• the effective and timely cooperation with the European Anti-Fraud Office and with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office.

How and when sanctions will be lifted?

The MS, which is under scrutiny, could at any time submit to the European Commission evidence to show that the generalised deficiency as regards the rule of law has been remedied or has ceased to exist. Following that, the Commission shall assess the situation in the MS once it is concluded that generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law cease to exist in full or in part, the Commission could submit to the Council a proposal for a decision lifting those measures in full or in part.

Next,

The legal basis of the proposal (a Regulation) is Article 322 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, through which financial management rules are set. This means that the proposal is adopted jointly by the European Parliament and the Council, the latter acting with a qualified majority.  While the above proposal puts forward the European Commission’s aspirations in dealing with the non-compliant MSs from a budgetary perspective. The Rule of Law mechanism is an essential part of the overall set of proposals on the long-term budget 2021- 2027. The instrument and its final shape are currently negotiated between the institutions.  In September 2019, the EP expressed its support for plans to link EU funds to the rule of law. However, the EP is demanding equal footing in this process.

While I cannot predict if a formal agreement will be achieved in the next Summit not just on the long-term budget of the EU, but also on the proposal to link the sound management of the EU budget with the rule of law. I suspect that the subject matter will spark heated negotiations among the heads of the MSs. We know that many Western EU governments are keen to introduce new safeguards to protect EU funds in case of the rule of law deficiencies impacting the bloc’s financial interest. In contrast, countries like Hungary and Poland, with poor rule of law records do not find it fair that there is a plan to link budgetary funds to the rule of law.

Ultimately, the question is how effectively the EU will enforce the new mechanisms against those MSs, who do not comply with the rule of law standards of the EU. Since the approval of the sanctions, as outlined above, do require qualified majority from the European Council, I am not convinced if the necessary support for activation of the sanctions will ever be reached. The aspiration of the European Commission to link EU funds with respect for rule of law can be another nuclear option like the Article 7 procedure, which is available for the EU to use when needed, but it remains untouched.

Then you have every right to ask: why the fuss?

The post Linking non-compliance with the rule of law in the EU to the management of the EU budget appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

MEPs will discuss the EU’s response to the coronavirus and talk to Greta Thunberg about tackling climate.

Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP

MEPs will discuss the EU’s response to the coronavirus and talk to Greta Thunberg about tackling climate.

Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP

Jon Danzig next to a cut-out of Winston Churchill at the European Parliament in Strasbourg, which has an entire building named after the great war leader in recognition of him being one of the founders of the EU.

Britain’s greatest war leader, Sir Winston Churchill, was one of the first to call for the creation of a ‘United States of Europe’. He is recognised as one of the 11 founders of today’s European Union.

In the immediate years following the Second World War, Churchill was convinced that only a ‘united Europe’ could guarantee peace. His passionate aim was to eliminate the European ills of nationalism and warmongering once and for all.

Even before the war, back in 1930, in an article for America’s ‘Saturday Evening Post’, Churchill concluded that:

‘The concept of a United States of Europe is right.’

In that prescient article, which today reads like an early blueprint for the European Union, Churchill imagined:

A Europe without internal barriers or tariffs, or passports, or multiple currencies, which would enable ‘the free interchange of goods and services’ and ‘the free travel of people’ across the continent.

The idea of ‘European unity’ was not new, he asserted. Reminding his American readers of the Roman Empire, Churchill wrote:

‘Europe has known the days when Rumanians lived on the Tyne and Spaniards on the Danube as equal citizens of a single state.’

He added:

‘Everywhere, in every age, in every area however wide, our every grouping of peoples however diverse, unity has made for strength and prosperity for all within its circle.

‘Why should Europe fear unity?’

It was clear from this article, however, that at that time Churchill did not envisage Britain – which then headed a huge Empire and Commonwealth straddling the world – needing or wanting to be part of a ‘United States of Europe’.

He wrote:

‘We are bound to further every honest and practical step to which the nations of Europe may make to reduce barriers which divide them and to nourish their common interests and their common welfare.

‘We rejoice at every diminution of the internal tariffs and the martial armaments of Europe. We see nothing but good and hope in a richer, freer, more contented European commonality.

‘But we have our own dream and our own task. We are with Europe, but not of it. We are linked, but not comprised. We are interested and associated, but not absorbed.’

However, Churchill’s view in 1930 would be bound to change after 1945, by which time Europe had suffered two world wars and was desperate to avoid another.

Churchill was never a ‘little Englander’. He supported an ambitious union of governments, and even called for a “world super-government” without which, he said, the prospects for peace and human progress were “dark and doubtful.”

During the Second World War, it was Prime Minister Churchill who announced in June 1940 the ‘Declaration of Union’ between Great Britain and France.

With the full backing of his Cabinet, Churchill stated:

‘The two governments declare that France and Great Britain shall no longer be two nations, but one Franco-British Union…

‘Every citizen of France will enjoy immediately citizenship of Great Britain; every British subject will become a citizen of France.’

An Anglo-French stamp was even designed to commemorate the proposed Anglo-Franco union, but the Nazi invasion of France scuppered those plans.

The proposals did demonstrate, however, that Churchill was in favour of political union between European countries.

After the first British victory of the Second World War at El Alamein, Churchill wrote to his foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, on 21 October 1942:

‘Hard as it is to say now.. I look forward to a United States of Europe, in which the barriers between the nations will be greatly minimised and unrestricted travel will be possible.’

In a lecture about this in December 2011, Oxford Professor of Government, Vernon Bogdanor, described Churchill’s letter as, “remarkably prescient” adding that he thought the comment, “would get him expelled from the Conservative Party today”.

After the Second World War, Churchill strongly believed that a united Europe was the only way to avoid future conflicts and wars on our continent.

In his famous Zurich speech of 1946, Churchill said:

“We must build a kind of United States of Europe..

“The structure of the United States of Europe, if well and truly built, will be such as to make the material strength of a single state less important..

“If at first all the states of Europe are not willing or able to join the union, we must nevertheless proceed to assemble and combine those who will and those who can.”

In May 1948 Churchill said in the opening speech to the Congress of Europe in Holland, that the drive towards a United Europe, “should be a movement of the people, not parties”.

Churchill, who also proposed a European ‘Charter’ and ‘Court’ of Human Rights, continued:

“We aim at the eventual participation of all the peoples throughout the continent whose society and way of life are in accord with the Charter of Human Rights.”

During this momentous speech, Churchill proclaimed:

“We cannot aim at anything less than the union of Europe as a whole, and we look forward with confidence to the day when that union will be achieved.”

And Churchill went much further than the idea of the immediate and urgent creation of a United States of Europe. Looking boldly to the future he stated,

“We must endeavour by patience and faithful service to prepare for the day when there will be an effective world government resting on the main groupings of mankind.”

In August 1949, at the first meeting of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, Churchill delivered his speech in French, and said:

“There is no reason for us not to succeed in achieving our goal and laying the foundation of a United Europe.

“A Europe whose moral design will win the respect and acknowledgement of all humanity, and whose physical strength will be such that no person will dare to disturb it as it marches peacefully towards the future.”

The following year, in 1950, Churchill called for the creation of a European Army ‘..under a unified command, and in which we should all bear a worthy and honourable part.’ (France objected to this plan).

In an article for The Independent newspaper in 1996 by former UK prime minister, Edward Heath – who I interviewed when I was a teenager – he wrote:

‘I knew Winston Churchill, I worked with him, I stayed with him at his home, and I have read his speeches many times. I can assure you that Winston Churchill was no Eurosceptic.’

On Churchill’s call in 1946 for a ‘United States of Europe’, Edward Heath clarified:

‘I readily accept that at that time Churchill did not envisage Britain being a full member of this united Europe, but in gleefully seizing upon this point, Eurosceptics have misunderstood or misrepresented the nature of Churchill’s attitude to full British participation in Europe.

‘This reluctance was based on circumstance; it was not opposition based on principle. And the circumstances have changed in such a way that I am sure Churchill would now favour a policy that enabled Britain to be at the heart of the European Union.’

He added:

‘Churchill would be the first to realise that in the world today, where an isolated Britain would be dwarfed by five great powers, the United States, Russia, China, Japan and the European Union, Britain’s full participation in the European Union is vital, both for Britain and the rest of the world.’

 MY OPINION? When read fully and in context, my view is that Churchill not only enthusiastically believed in the ever-closer union of Europe, in which the UK would play a leading role, but also eventually a world government.

He was, at the least, a confederalist, but I would also argue, even ‘a kind of’ federalist too. He had great vision for a political ‘union of nations’ which it seems few today fully recognise or acknowledge.

And although it seems that Churchill didn’t at first envisage Britain being a full member of ‘a kind of’ United States of Europe, it’s clear that Churchill’s views later changed, as the British Empire and Commonwealth diminished, and Britain’s world influence shifted.

(Churchill was renowned for changing his views according to circumstances: he started his political life as a Conservative MP; then resigned to become a Liberal MP; then resigned from the Liberals to become a Conservative MP again).

Churchill made his last speech about Europe at London’s Central Hall, Westminster in July 1957, some four months after six founding nations – France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg – established the European Economic Community by signing the Treaty of Rome.

Churchill welcomed the formation of a ‘common market’ by the six, provided that ‘the whole of free Europe will have access’. Churchill added:

“We genuinely wish to join a European free trade area.”

But Churchill also warned:

“If, on the other hand, the European trade community were to be permanently restricted to the six nations, the results might be worse than if nothing were done at all – worse for them as well as for us.

“It would tend not to unite Europe but to divide it – and not only in the economic field.”

 (Source: Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches Vol. 8 page 8681)

During the 1960s Churchill’s health rapidly declined, but his support for a united Europe didn’t. According to Churchill’s last Private Secretary, Sir Anthony Montague Brown, in August 1961, Churchill wrote to his constituency Chairman:

‘I think that the Government are right to apply to join the European Economic Community..’

In this letter, Churchill supported the ‘welding’ of West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg into ‘an organic whole’, which he described as a ‘happy outcome’ of the European Economic Community.

Churchill added:

‘We might well play a great part in these developments to the profit of not only ourselves, but of our European friends also.’

Sir Anthony also confirmed that in 1963, just two years before Churchill died, he wrote in a private letter:

‘The future of Europe if Britain were to be excluded is black indeed.’

• Watch my video, ‘Why the EU was started and why Britain joined’:

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes

________________________________________________________

• Join and share the discussion about this article on Facebook and Twitter:

During #WorldWar2 #Churchill wrote, 'Hard as it is to say now.. I look forward to a United States of Europe, in which the barriers between the nations will be greatly minimised and unrestricted travel will be possible.’ Churchill wasn't a #Brexiter! Share: https://t.co/zcLvOmoSIv

— Jon Danzig (@Jon_Danzig) March 1, 2020

 

The post ‘We must build a kind of United States of Europe’ said Churchill appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Committee and political group meetings, Brussels

Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP

Philipp Lutz, David Kaufmann & Anna Stünzi

Following a surge of refugee arrivals in Europe in 2015, the numbers of new arrivals have significantly declined and the issue of asylum has ceased to dominate the political agenda. Nevertheless, the European Union remains deeply divided on how to establish responsibility-sharing among its member states and how to reform the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Despite intense political debates, no effective cooperation among European states for the common provision of humanitarian protection has been established. The existing academic literature explains this cooperation failure mainly by examining the willingness and capacities of European countries to engage in an effective cooperation in the protection of refugees. We, however, argue that the understanding of responsibility-sharing in the provision of humanitarian protection requires going beyond the state-centric view, and to take account of the strategic role of refugees, too. Policy-makers and academics should perceive refugees as actors with own rational strategies, motivations and aspirations to improve their life prospects. In our article, we bring together public good theory with public policy literature and formal modelling to develop a more comprehensive model on the provision of humanitarian protection.

©Ajdin Kamber, Adobe Stock

Refugee protection is an obligation under international law but it leaves open which states should bear what share of that responsibility. Following the logic of public good theory when some countries do not admit refugees, they increase the responsibility for the other countries to protect refugees. The admission of refugees, on the other hand, provides benefits to all countries such as a stable political order, public safety and the securing of human rights. Due to these public good characteristics, countries have incentives to free-ride on the protection efforts of other states. Accordingly, the provision of humanitarian protection is a common European public good: protecting refugees contributes to the normative power of the EU as a stronghold of human rights and liberal democracy and it ensures the functional requirements for the free movement of people and the border-free travel area,, as main institutional pillars of the EU.

The common perspective is that the provision of international public goods could be achieved if there was effective responsibility-sharing between states. Thus, the provision of humanitarian protection depends solely on the willingness of states to contribute. How refugees behave is largely absent from the analysis. Following the public policy literature, we argue that policies can only achieve their objectives if the relevant target groups comply with those policies or behave in ways that are consistent with the enunciated objectives of the policy. Empirical research shows that refugees have rational preferences about the country where they want to seek protection and that they are willing to accept substantial risks and costs to submit an asylum request in their preferred destination country. Only in exceptional cases do refugees want to stay in the country of first entry, as assigned by the existing Dublin Regulation. Thus, the current asylum system sets disincentives to comply for their main target group and is therefore designed to fail: refugees are people with credible motivations to comply or not comply with European asylum policies. The persistent non-compliance by refugees is a result of strategic behaviour of individuals maximizing their life prospects. It is therefore not sufficient when states establish cooperation in order to provide humanitarian protection. Only mutual compliance between states and refugees results in the provision of the public good.

Our findings have important implications for policymaking in the European Union. The very idea that refugees should be able to exert any choice is a central blind spot in the current political and policy debates. Our research suggests that the agency and preferences of refugees should be incorporated into the analysis and design of international asylum regimes. We demonstrate that efforts to increase the enforcement of state compliance (i.e. through sanctions) or the enforcement of refugee compliance (i.e. through securitisation) are unlikely to overcome the current problems of the CEAS. As long as the responsibility allocation opposes the fundamental interests of the refugees seeking protection, the perspectives for an effective provision of humanitarian protection remain bleak.

This piece draws on the article Humanitarian Protection as a European Public Good: The Strategic Role of States and Refugees published in the Journal of Common Market Studies (JCMS).

Philipp Lutz

Philipp Lutz is a  post-doctoral researcher at the Department of Political Science and International Relations of the University of Geneva (Switzerland) and a Fellow of the Swiss national science program nccr on the move. He obtained his PhD in Political Science from University of Bern in 2019. His main research interest is in understanding the political consequences of international migration and covers comparative politics as well as international governance.

@LutzPhilipp

 

David Kaufmann

 David Kaufmann is Assistant Professor of Spatial Development and Urban Policy at ETH Zürich. He is a policy scholar with an interest in urban studies, planning and migration studies.

@kaufmada

 

 

 

 

 

Anna Stünzi

Anna Stünzi is a doctoral candidate at ETH Zurich at the Center for Economic Research. She studied psychology and economics at the universities of Zurich and Copenhagen. Anna Stünzi’s thesis covers different topics of climate change mitigation policy, mainly focusing on the empirical analysis of feedback effects from policy announcements. Besides academic research, Anna Stünzi is president of foraus, a Swiss think tank on foreign politics.

 

The post Why European asylum policies should account for refugees’ preferences appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Commission v Greece (Pollution par les nitrates)
Environment and consumers
Greece is ordered to pay a lump sum of 3.5 million euros for having been slow in implementing EU law on the protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources

Constantin Film Produktion v EUIPO
Intellectual and industrial property
EUIPO must give a fresh decision on the application made by Constantin Film for registration of the sign Fack Ju Göhte as an EU trade mark

Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP

By constraining the powers of executives and developing a political culture of accountability, national parliaments play a key role in the fight against corruption. However, their normative powers may be marginalized in the process of democratic consolidation. Based on original research from three European states, Emilija Tudzarovska-Gjorgjievska argues that weak parliaments contribute to the vicious cycle of corruption when they give a pretence of legitimation but do not act as democratic institutions proper.

Illustration: colourbox.com

Liberal democracy, which rests on democratic institutions as well as citizens sharing democratic values, is under stress. In Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), democracy has deteriorated, the quality of democracy is backsliding and weak law enforcement fails to deliver effective rule of law. This weak point in the systems of checks and balances is not conducive to regime change towards full functional democracy. When European states fall short of delivering democratic standards and principles, the EU’s democratic legitimacy is also threatened. Why is this the case?

The problem of weak law enforcement in corrupt systems

Weak law enforcement is not only an indicator of ineffective rule of law. It is also an important indicator of ineffective control of corruption and a major obstacle for the successful implementation of anti-corruption strategies. Moreover, corrupt systems and weak rule of law stimulate social traps whereby citizens choose either to resist the corrupt system, or to comply with the system, leading to clientelism, patronage or other informal practices.

Both types of social traps are informally institutionalized when the rule of law is biased and the exercise of power is manipulated for private interest. On both occasions, weak law enforcement rests on citizens’ mistrust in the system’s legality and equality, or in its ability to offer equal access to justice. What is more, when actors fail to offer justifications for the exercise of power as part of a legitimation process involving public scrutiny and public forums, the citizens’ trust in the ability of the political system to solve problems is further undermined. This jeopardizes democratic legitimacy both on national and supranational levels.

The role of national parliaments

My research confirms that national parliaments, which are public forums for scrutiny and key to securing democratic legitimacy, have a key role to play in breaking the patterns of social traps and the vicious cycle of corruption. My findings also indicate that the weak role of national parliaments in constraining the powers of executives has provided a breeding ground for law manipulation, and elites’ influence on the ‘rules of the game’. As a result, parliaments, which are supposed to hold governments to account, have acted as façades of legitimation, rather than as democratic institutions proper serving the citizens. The latter become detached from the systemic chain of account-giving when parliaments fail to engage them and develop a political culture of accountability. Under these conditions, taking control of corruption becomes a very difficult task – in some cases even an impossible task.

In my PhD project, I look into the cases of Slovenia, Croatia and North Macedonia, as all three states have experienced challenges in law enforcement and in providing equal access to justice. This has made it difficult to root out corruption from their political systems. Based on a qualitative comparative data analysis, drawn from interviews, legal documents and other secondary literature, I find that the marginalization of the oversight role of national parliaments in the process of democratic consolidation has created a pretence of legitimation, through a technical exercise of democratic accountability and deviations of norms. Moreover, the detachment of citizens from their elected representatives creates a political culture where parliaments are ‘accountable to no one’, adding to the vicious cycle of corruption and creating situations of social traps.

Shortcomings in the democratic consolidation

Yet, the EU’s acknowledgment of this risk to democratic legitimacy remains incremental and partial. On the one hand, the process of Europeanization as an instrument of democratization in CEE countries introduced new weight on the legal and institutional aspects of their political systems. On the other, this instrument proves to be necessary for exercising soft power pressure for countries to pursue political and economic reforms in line with the EU’s democratic values. Yet, even after becoming EU members CEE countries share similar challenges of law enforcement and difficulties in consolidating democracies.

Indeed, the post-communist political systems have been unfamiliar with the concept of democratic oversight or public scrutiny over processes and results. The process of democratic consolidation should have addressed these institutional gaps and shortcomings in democratic accountability. However, on the one hand, the EU has taken a top-down, technical approach in addressing corruption. On the other, the characteristics of the institutional matrix at national level and its ability to prevent corruptive practices have not been sufficiently acknowledged. As a result, citizens remain entrapped in a broken chain of democratic accountability between electoral cycles.

New EU strategy needed

Against these risks, the EU’s approach to address the problems of corruption remains inadequate, and it fails to take a decisive role. The European Commission’s first EU Anti-Corruption report in 2014 offered an overview of the corruptive risks in all EU member states. However, in 2017, the European Commission took a much-disputed decision to drop this instrument. The process of monitoring corruption was transferred to the European Semester, which is an economic governance tool. As such, it is not designed to address key, country-specific challenges nor to address shortcomings in law delivery. The EU also lacks a strategy for repairing the citizens’ detachment from supposedly democratic institutions.

The direct link between the quality of democracy at nation-state level and the citizens’ trust in that political order requires us to revisit the EU’s legitimacy. Corrupt political systems and ineffective rule of law present imminent risks for representative democracies. Abuse of power occurs for real and the EU and its member states rely on each other in addressing these challenges. Acknowledging a joint responsibility will be the first step towards a new approach, where safeguarding the interests of the citizens and repairing the frailty of democratic legitimacy must take centre stage.

This research is forthcoming in a volume which collects case studies from the PLATO project, edited by Dirk de Bièvre, Peter Bursens, Chris Lord and Ramses Wessel.

The post National parliaments’ role in the fight against corruption appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The EU budget is all about working together to deliver improvements to the lives of Europeans. How much do you know about it? Try our quiz and find out.

Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP

The EU budget is all about working together to deliver improvements to the lives of Europeans. How much do you know about it? Try our quiz and find out.

Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP

AMENDMENTS 1 - 50 - Draft opinion Guidelines for the 2021 Budget - Section III
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Nikos Androulakis

Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP

OPINION on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Belarus on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Petras Auštrevičius

Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP

OPINION on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Belarus on the facilitation of the issuance of visas
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Petras Auštrevičius

Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP