The National Interest

The Russian Navy continues its buildup as the Western powers dither. Specifically, Russia’s once-mighty Northern Fleet appears to be breaking out of its post-Cold War era stupor and returning to its previous levels of lethality. 

On the morning of December 27, the Russian Navy reportedly received the newest Yasen-M-class nuclear-powered attack submarine. Built by the legendary Russian Sevmash shipyard, the submarine, designated K-564 Arkhangelsk, is now the fourth Yasen-M-class submarine built, and the second to be incorporated into Russia’s growing Northern Fleet.

Russia’s Northern Fleet is based in Severomorsk and its history as a strategic asset for Russia dates back to 1733, when the Northern Fleet was first created. Its area of operation is, as its name suggests, the regions around Russia’s northern frontier. So, you’ll find Russian Northern Fleet warships and submarines operating in the Arctic, as well as the Barents Sea, and Kara Sea. 

The Northern Fleet is also tasked with defending the approaches to Russia from places like the Norwegian Sea and Atlantic Ocean.

Back in 2008, Moscow’s annual National Security Memo, which outlines the main objectives and grand strategy for the Russian military, identified the Arctic as the most important strategic region for Russia. Even before Russia’s invasion of neighboring Ukraine in February 2022, Moscow spent its time and money modernizing and expanding the Northern Fleet to meet this desire to dominate the Arctic.

What’s more, now that the Ukraine war is underway, with NATO so heavily invested in supporting the Ukrainian cause against Russia, the Northern Fleet is on the hook for protecting the maritime passes into Russian waters on the side of Russia that borders Northern Europe.

Designed to replace the aging Oscar-class cruise missile and Akula-class nuclear-powered attack submarines from the old Soviet era, the Yasen-class was designed by the legendary Soviet-era Malakhit Marine Engineering Bureau to be deployed decades ago. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the chaos of the immediate post-Soviet era of Russia in the 1990s created many challenges that led Russian engineers to create an even more updated variant of the Yasen, which is the Yasen-M.

Yasen-M-class submarines carry a crew of around sixty-four Russian sailors. This boat is one of the best submarines that Russia has produced. It’s meant to be a submarine killer, so it combines massive firepower, endurance, and stealth. That Russia seems to be frontloading its Northern Fleet with a whopping four of these boats should indicate to readers just how important Moscow views its northern frontier, both defensively and, more importantly, as a region of immense power projection.

A Yasen-M-class submarine displaces around 8,600 tons when surfaced and 13,800 tons when underwater. At the surface, she travels at 16 knots (just 18.41 miles per hour); undersea, however, Yasen-Ms become minnows. The average underwater speed for a Yasen-M is a little bit more than 35 miles per hour (31 knots).

For purposes of comparison, the United States Navy’s fastest boat is likely the advanced Seawolf-class nuclear-powered attack submarine, which travels at 35 knots, or 40 mph. Considering the extreme costs of the American submarine, though, compared to the relatively cheap Yasen-M class, the Russians have a scalable, cost-effective, and highly lethal boat that is more practical than the American systems are, unfortunately (for the West).

While in “quiet mode,” the submarine can operate between 20 to 28 knots (23 to 32 mph). If these claims by the Russian designers of the Yasen-M are true, then it rivals even the powerful (and infinitely more expensive) U.S. Navy Virginia-class subs.

In terms of her power plant, the Yasen-M comes equipped with a fourth-generation KTP-6 monoblock nuclear reactor. It is designed to run for twenty-five to thirty years without needing refueling. Her sonar is the spherical system known as MGK-600 Irtysh-Amfora that, according to Army Recognition, “enhances detection capabilities while maintaining minimal noise levels.” Indeed, the boat itself is constructed from low-magnetic steel, assisting in the sub’s impressive stealth capabilities.

As for weapons, since it is technically a guided-missile submarine (SSGN), this boat carries a potent mix of long-range cruise missiles for sea-to-surface attack missions. Among the lethal payloads these boats carry are Kalibr and Oniks cruise missiles. Most naval analysts assess that the Yasen-M carries between twenty-four and forty missiles, thanks to its UKSK Vertical Launch System (VLS).

Moreover, the Yasen-M has been designed to incorporate the mighty Zircon hypersonic missile. The Americans lack both their own hypersonic weapon counterweight or a significant defensive capability to stop attacks from the Zircon and similar Russian hypersonic weapons platforms.

In other words, the U.S. Navy (and the navies of its NATO allies) are totally outmatched by the firepower of the Russian Northern Fleet’s Yasen-M-class submarines.

With 10 torpedo tubes (at 533 mm), the Yasen-M is meant for close combat with rival submarines. Utilizing its ultra-quiet rigging, these sea monsters can tailgate American or NATO subs, perhaps completely undetected, and then spring an attack on them with their 533 mm torpedoes.

Dittos for the Yasen-M attack profile against U.S. and NATO surface warships.

Russia’s Northern Fleet is becoming more lethal than what it is facing on the other side. This strategic imbalance, while still manageable for now, will become decisive in Russia’s favor over the next decade as the naval shipyards of the West continue struggling to meet present demand and increase productivity to meet the demands that the unstable global threat environment places upon them.

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Kuleshov Oleg / Shutterstock.com

The Royal Australian Air Force received its seventy-second—and probably last—F-35A Lightning stealth fighter jet, completing its fifth-generation fighter jet fleet for the time being.

In December, the Australian military received its seventy-second F-35A stealth fighter jet, completing the roster of the third operational squadron.

“The delivery of the final F-35A Lightning II aircraft is a practical demonstration of the Air Force’s ability to deliver highly effective air power as part of an integrated and focused force, in line with the National Defence Strategy,” chief of air force, Air Marshal Stephen Chappell, said in a press statement.

With the delivery of the last F-35, the Royal Australian Air Force becomes the strongest in the southeastern Pacific and one of the most powerful in the entire Indo-Pacific area of operations.

“Australians should be proud that our Air Force is flying the most advanced multi-role fighter in the world,” he added.

Now, the Royal Australian Air Force flies three types of fighter jets: the F-35A Lightning II, the F/A-18F Super Hornet, and the EA-18G Growler.

The F-35 is a fifth-generation stealth aircraft and the most advanced fighter jet in the skies today. The “A” version Australia is operating is the conventional take-off iteration—the F-35 has two other versions, B and C, with different landing and take-off capabilities.

The F/A-18 Super Hornet is an agile and capable fourth-generation fighter jet. Australia has twenty-four of those aircraft.

The third type of aircraft in service, the EA-18G Growler, is a variation of the F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet that specializes in electronic warfare—tracking and destroying enemy air defenses. Australia has twelve EA-18G aircraft.

“The F-35A aircraft fleet, in conjunction with the EA-18G Growler and F/A-18F Super Hornets, are the cornerstone of Australia’s air defence and strike capability, as outlined in the 2024 National Defence Strategy,” the Australian Air Force states about its fleet.

Initially, the Royal Australian Air Force had planned for the procurement of 100 F-35A Lightning II stealth fighter jets. Indeed, if you take a look at Lockheed Martin’s publicly released data on F-35 orders, it lists Australia with an order of 100 aircraft. However, earlier in 2024, the Australian military decided not to procure a fourth squadron of F-35A, thus limiting its order to seventy-two stealth aircraft. It is unclear whether Canberra will exercise its right to a fourth F-35 squadron down the line.

The reason for not procuring additional F-35 was dual: first, Canberra decided to upgrade its F/A-18F Super Hornet fleet to allow the fourth-generation aircraft to be competitive in a near-peer environment and fly well into the 2030s; and second, the F-35A proved to be a bigger success than Australian officials expected.

“We’ve decided to keep the Super Hornets in service for two reasons: one, they’re doing great work, and secondly, the Joint Strike Fighter is even more capable than we initially thought,” Defence Industry Minister Pat Conroy said in April.

“We can delay the replacement of the Super Hornet, which frees up funding to invest in more long-range missiles, for example,” the Australian defense official added.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image: moh_bagusov2 / Shutterstock.com

The Russian Navy is ending 2024 with a new Project 885 (also known as the Yasen-M) nuclear-powered submarine in its fleet. The Arkhangelsk officially entered service on Friday as Captain First Rank Alexander Gladkov received the St. Andrew's naval flag.

"An official ceremony took place at the Sevmash Shipyard to deliver the Yasen-M-class fourth-generation nuclear-powered submarine Arkhangelsk to the Russian Navy. The ceremony was held under the direction of Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Alexander Moiseyev," the Russian Ministry of Defense said in a statement to Tass.

The latest Project 885 submarine is named for the northern Russian city of Arkhangelsk, also known as "Archangel" in English.

"The Arkhangelsk is the third serial-built sub in the family of Yasen-M-class multi-purpose nuclear-powered submarines," Tass added. "A ceremony of rolling out the submarine from the Shipyard's slipway took place on November 29, 2023. The Arkhangelsk has become the 141st nuclear-powered submarine constructed for the Russian Navy at the Sevmash Shipyard. The project was designed by the St. Petersburg-based Malakhit Design Bureau of Marine Engineering."

Development of Project 885 boats began at the end of the Cold War, initiated by the Leningrad-based (now St. Petersburg-based) Malakhit Design Bureau. It intended to replace the aging Akula-class nuclear-powered attack submarines in service with the Soviet Navy.

However, the program only progressed slowly following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The baseline Project 885 lead nuclear-powered underwater cruiser Severodvinsk was laid down in 1993, but due to funding issues as a result of the post-Cold War Russian financial crisis, the project languished for more than a decade. Only in the late 2000s was Moscow able to return to the project—Severodvinsk was finally launched in June 2010, and subsequently commissioned in late December 2013. The submarine entered service with the Russian Navy in 2014.

The delay meant that the submarines were on the verge of obsolescence, resulting in the program's modernization.

The second boat, the upgraded Project 885M lead submarine Kazan, also saw delays, yet it was built in eight years—half the time of the Severodvinsk.

Despite the turmoil involved in the program's development and construction, the Yasen class should be seen as capable vessels. Each has a submerged displacement of 13,800 tons and can reach a maximum speed of up to thirty-five knots.

The Yasen-M revision further offered revamped onboard electronics, a slightly reduced overall length, and reportedly a new KTP-6 rector that is believed to reduce the submarine's noise levels significantly. The upgraded Project 885 submarines are also noted for utilizing new technological developments that emerged since Severodvinsk started construction in 1993.

Unlike older attack submarines built in the late Soviet period, the Project 885/885M boats were developed as multipurpose vessels that could carry different weapons, including the new, long-range Tsirkon hypersonic cruise missiles. There are ten silos for vertically launched cruise missiles, and according to reports, the submarines can also be equipped with Kalibr-PL and Oniks cruise missiles as their basic strike weapons. The Kazan is also equipped with the UKSK (3P-14B) vertical launch system comprised of 8SM-346 modules.

"This enables Yasen-M-class submarines [to] remain an effective and advanced weapon. Thanks to this, they make their invaluable contribution to maintaining global and regional security in peacetime," Commander-in-Chief Admiral Alexander Moiseyev told Tass.

Four additional Project 885M submarines are now under construction at Russia's Sevmash Shipyard in Severodvinsk on the White Sea. Named for Russian cities, these include the Perm, the Ulyanovsk, the Vladivostok, and the Voronezh. Those submarines will be based either with the Northern Fleet on the coast of the Barents Sea or with the Pacific Fleet in the Far East.

"The construction of a series of submarines of this Project will continue," Moiseyev continued. "You shoulder high responsibility: you make the necessary, complex and serious weapons for our country. The ships built by the Sevmash Shipyard are our pride, strength and mightiness and Russia’s reliable shield."

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.
Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

Image: Kuleshov Oleg / Shutterstock.com

The lead vessel of the United States Navy's class of fast battleship, USS Iowa (BB-61) underwent much-needed TLC in the spring of 2024—although plans for the ship's relocation at the Port of Los Angeles are on hold due to costs. The historic World War II warship will hopefully be maintained for future generations, even if she will never sail again.

However, the legacy of the warship will live on: The U.S. Navy took delivery of its newest attack submarine just before Christmas. The future USS Iowa (SSN-797) also became the "12th battle force ship delivered to the Navy" in calendar year 2024, the sea service announced.

SSN-797 is now the fifth U.S. Navy vessel named for the Hawkeye state. In addition to BB-61, the prior ships included a Civil War steamboat that was used to ferry troops on the Mississippi; BB-4, a pre-dreadnought battleship that was in service during the Spanish-American War; and BB-53, a South Dakota-class battleship that was laid down after World War I but canceled due to the Washington Naval Treaty, signed in 1922.

The future USS Iowa is the twenty-fourth Virginia-class submarine (VCS) to be "co-produced by General Dynamics Electric Boat (GDEB) and HII-Newport News Shipbuilding through a long-standing teaming agreement and the 13th attack submarine delivered by GDEB."

"The Virginia-class submarine represents a Navy and industry commitment to deliver warfighting excellence to the fleet," said Capt. Mike Hollenbach, Virginia Class Submarine program manager. "Iowa is the second Virginia-class submarine delivered this year. With each delivery, the Navy continues to strengthen our Nation’s undersea advantage."

SSN-797 was officially christened in June 2023 at a ceremony at GDEB's shipyard in Groton, Connecticut, and the current timeline calls for the submarine's commissioning ceremony to be held on April 5, 2025, also in Groton.

With the delivery to the United States Navy, SSN-797 will be able to begin its tests and trials, which need to be completed before it is commissioned into active service.

The future USS Iowa is the sixth of a planned ten VCS Block IV submarines.

As previously reported, the Block IV boats incorporate design changes that were focused on reducing total ownership costs for the U.S. Navy. Smaller-scale design changes were made to increase the component-level lifecycle of the submarine, while the U.S. Navy was also able to increase the periodicity between depot maintenance availabilities and increase the number of deployments. The main improvement of the Block IV over the preceding Block III is the reduction of major maintenance periods from four to three, increasing each boat's total lifetime deployments by one.

The VCS Block IV submarines displace 7,835 tons, with a hull length of 377 feet and a diameter of 34 feet. Powered by an S9G nuclear reactor, the boats can attain speeds of 25 knots and remain submerged for up to three months at a time. The propulsion further employs a pump-jet system that enables quieter and more efficient movement, making the boats extremely hard to track.

Each of the Block IV subs can dive to more than 800 feet. The submarines feature Mark 48 advanced capability torpedoes and Tomahawk cruise missiles. The boats are equipped with the Virginia Payload Module, an 84-foot-long, mid-ship section that has four large-diameter, vertical launch tubes for keeping and launching more Tomahawks and other payloads.

Even as SSN-797 is now on track to enter service in the spring of 2025, the entire VCS program is running approximately three years behind schedule.

"Part of the scheduling problem is that only two shipyards can build a U.S. Navy submarine," warned Harrison Kass, writing for The National Interest earlier in December.

Thus, even as the Navy has much to celebrate with the delivery of USS Iowa, its program is running late by several years. That problem isn't likely to be solved anytime soon.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.
Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

Image: DVIDS.

What do new sixth-generation warplanes, the world’s largest amphibious landers, and a brand-new early warning and control aircraft all have in common? Well, for starters, they’re all Chinese. And they were all part of Beijing’s newest media blitz meant to scare the already twitchy minds of uncertain Western defense analysts.

More importantly, the capabilities demonstrated by China indicate that Beijing is preparing to drop the mother of all hammers (and sickles) on its U.S.-backed neighbors, such as those who live just 100 miles away in the democratic nation of Taiwan. 

The sixth-generation plane is a distraction, though. The Type 076 amphibious lander is more important to this discussion. What’s more, the KJ-3000 early warning and control aircraft is extremely relevant to any potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan. And, just like the other two systems mentioned here, the KJ-3000 seems to be another leveling-up moment for a People’s Republic of China that is increasingly keen on permanently settling the Taiwan question.

An electronic surveillance plane, the KJ-3000 is designed to provide important intelligence-collection, electronic warfare (EW), and situational awareness for any large Chinese force making the perilous journey across the Taiwan Strait on its way to invading Taiwan. Very few details have been shared by China about the KJ-3000. What can be deduced based solely on the (rather blurry) photographs of the plane is that it has a large rotodome and its tail is bulging. 

This bird is meant to dominate the skies over the Taiwan Strait—all while keeping an eye out for American, Japanese, or other allied forces looking to complicate China’s likely run on neighboring Taiwan. Yes, the United States and many other modern militaries have planes like this. However, those birds are not as big as the KJ-3000. 

With the aforementioned rotodome, the KJ-3000 is granted a bird’s eye view of any battlefield. Nothing will sneak beyond its detection systems. Inside that rotating device are a bevy of radar systems, notably an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, all moving together in tandem to render visible any enemy that wishes to remain invisible. 

The radar system itself will be a real problem for the Americans. It’s believed that the radar detection range on the KJ-3000 is between 372 miles and 621 miles. Oh, and it can supposedly pick up U.S. stealth warplanes, such as the F-22 and F-35—and it tracks up to 100 targets at once. In terms of the payload, the KJ-3000 carries a whopping 66 tons and is powered by WS-20 jet engines, a significant upgrade from the older KJ-2000 early warning planes.

Upon further examination, it appears that China’s KJ-3000 is designed to serve as a hub for network-centric warfare.

That bulge in the back, you see, looks to be the key element for an airborne command center. So, when Chinese forces are operating jointly, this bird will be the lynchpin coordinating everything together electronically—all the while looking out for incoming enemy attacks.

Make no mistake: China is building the capacity to invade Taiwan and threaten the Americans and their allies. The KJ-3000 plays an integral role in that. And the Americans, as always, are poorly prepared for this challenge.

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: VanderWolf Images / Shutterstock.com

The People’s Republic of China is making all the rounds on international media recently. That’s because China has made a series of, frankly, shocking announcements about its growing military technological capabilities. Most recently, the Chinese unveiled their Type 076 “Sichuan” amphibious assault ship. And, boy, does it have Western military analysts sweating bullets. 

That’s because amphibious landers (they basically look like mini aircraft carriers) are a telltale sign of China’s growing capacity to seriously threaten its U.S.-backed, democratic neighbors in Taiwan.

Until recently, most Western military analysts simply shrugged at the prospects of a Chinese invasion of the tiny island democracy because, as they so often—mockingly—said of China: The Chinese military lacks a requisite number of amphibious landing craft.

While the Chinese still technically lack a sufficient number of these mission-critical warships, the launching of the Type 076 Sichuan has just given China an added capability. From there, one can anticipate that the superior manufacturing infrastructure in China will churn these warships out at a breakneck pace, meaning that the Chinese invasion threat will multiply significantly.

Although, it must be stressed that China today already possesses this ability since it has spent the last decade building its civilian Roll-On-Roll-Off (RoRo) ferries to be military grade (and China currently has the largest RoRo ferry fleet in the world).

The Type 076 boasts an impressive array of capabilities, too. The Sichuan is comparable in size to American amphibious assault carriers (specifically, the Wasp-class or America-classes). Of course, the Americans have a finite number of these warships and, with the defense industrial base in the United States basically broken, there is no real hope that the number of amphibious assault ships the Americans possess will grow anytime soon. 

But, that is another matter for another article. 

Anyway, it has been speculated that the Type 076 actually has a flight deck that is larger than any other amphibious assault ship in the world while the ship is equipped with an electromagnetic catapult.

This is a next-generation catapult system used to launch aircraft from the flight deck that the Americans first innovated for their new Ford-class aircraft carriers (and that Washington accuses Beijing’s spies of having stolen). The Sichuan has a unique twin-island design that improves visibility, maximizes the deck space onboard, and allows for greater air traffic control. Which, during an invasion of Taiwan, would be a key feature for an amphibious lander.

It is believed that the Type 076 can launch and recover a medley of aircraft—including large numbers of drones, prompting many analysts to dub the Type 076 as a “drone mothership.” Technically, that is true.

The Type 076 has a 21-megawatt gas turbine and diesel-fuel powerplants along with a medium-voltage direct-current integrated power system.

As for weapons, the Sichuan has an arsenal that Naval News describes as “robust.” For instance, it carries “three 24 round-HQ-10 missile launchers and three 11 barrel H/PJ-11 30mm [Close-In Weapon System] of similar configuration found on [China’s aircraft carrier, the Fujian].” There are also four Type 726 series 24-round decoy launchers onboard. A dual-band rotating AESA radar provides greater situational awareness for the crew. 

China is building the capabilities to effectively invade Taiwan. At the rate at which the People’s Republic of China is producing increasingly sophisticated systems (of the kind needed to take Taiwan), should Beijing decide to invade, China will be able to do so sooner than anyone in the West thinks. Heck, China could probably pull off an invasion well before the Pentagon’s 2027 timeframe. In fact, it could hit Taiwan as early as this upcoming spring. 

The Americans—and the Taiwanese, for that matter—are not ready for the hammer (and sickle) that is about to fall upon them. The Type 076 is a symbol of just how unprepared we all are. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: quiggyt4 / Shutterstock.com

The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime has left a variety of factions fighting for power in Syria. Although none yet presents a clear threat of terrorism to the United States, the lack of stability leaves the country vulnerable to terror groups in the future. Western leaders should establish a foreign policy that balances non-intervention with support for anti-terror infrastructure in the region.

Three main players are currently jockeying for power in the leadership vacuum left by the Assad regime. First is the rebel group known as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a collection of Sunni Islamist groups that were the primary drivers of the recent offensive that ousted Bashar al-Assad from power. HTS was formerly known as the Al-Nusra Front, the Syrian branch of Al-Qaeda. HTS claims to have renounced its extremist views, although time will tell if that’s true. 

Second is the Syrian National Army (SNA), which, despite its name, is a rebel group fully backed by Turkey. They occupy territory in the northwest part of Syria and are fighting to take more territory, including territory held by the Kurds. 

The last contenders are the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a primarily Kurdish group that occupies territory in northeastern Syria.

HTS currently controls most of the territory between the three. However, there are several critical reasons why Israel and the United States should think twice before recognizing HTS as the new official government of Syria. The first is that insurgent groups have a long history of becoming terrorist groups. The most notable example is how the Mujahideen went from opposing the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan to morphing into the Taliban and Al Qaeda. HTS itself already has a prior affiliation with Al Qaeda, a connection that potentially makes it even more dangerous. While it has renounced ties to Al Qaeda, the fact that HTS originated as part of one of the deadliest terror groups in the world should give policymakers a healthy dose of skepticism in dealing with them.

The SNA, meanwhile, is backed by Turkey, which is a member of NATO. This is not a point in the SNA’s favor, however, since Turkey has proven to be an unreliable NATO partner, recently sliding toward dictatorship and opposing Israel in its war against Hamas. Furthermore, unlike HTS, which has a formalized structure and leadership, SNA is a decentralized collection of groups. In the event of a breach between member factions, there is no guiding establishment to prevent terror groups from taking over and opposing Israel and threatening regional security.

That leaves the Kurds. While they have been reliable partners with the United States against ISIS, they control a small amount of territory in Syria. Any attempts to establish the Kurds as a primary power in Syria would be impractical. The majority Arab population would not accept a Kurdish-led government as legitimate. Yet, Israel and the United States should still offer financial and air support to Kurdish-led groups to maintain critical anti-terror infrastructure in Syria. 

It is in the West’s best interests for the SDF to maintain its power in the region. Civil war is likely to continue in Syria, as the formal integration of HTS, SNA, and SDF forces has not occurred. Meanwhile, the SNA is actively attacking SDF territory. As in Afghanistan and Iraq after the U.S. invasions, instability leaves the region vulnerable to the rise of Islamist terror groups. Both Israel and the United States need partners in the Middle East who can help counter these developments, and the Kurds have proven themselves dependable allies. The SDF is currently standing guard over thousands of former ISIS fighters who are in prisoner-of-war (POW) camps all over SDF-held territory. This is yet another reason why it is in the West’s best interest for the SDF to maintain its power: If the SDF is destroyed or weakened, these former fighters could revitalize the Islamic State.

The United States has had troops on the ground operating in support of Kurdish forces since 2014. It is well past time for them to come home, but the United States should continue its support of Kurdish forces in other ways. Israel should also recognize the importance of Kurdish forces in their own battle against terrorist forces and send the SDF military aid. With financial support from the United States and air support from the IDF, the Kurdish forces would be well-equipped to fight extremist groups on their own. Diplomatically, the United States must use its weight in NATO to keep Turkey from wiping the SDF off the map via its proxies. While Turkey vehemently opposes the nationalist aspirations of Syria’s Kurds due to its own sizable Kurdish population, it must also recognize the Kurds’ value in the fight against extremist militias. Political pressure, sanctions, and withholding military tech are just some of the tools President-elect Trump can use to pressure Turkey to end its war against the Kurds.

Some make the case that Turkey should be kicked out of NATO, but perhaps this move can be held as a trump card to keep Ankara in line when it comes to Syria. If the United States can get the SDF to agree not to encourage revolts by Kurds living in Turkey, then maybe Turkey will agree not to attack the Kurds in Syria.

The fall of Assad has created much uncertainty in Syria. For Israel, it has yet another unstable state for a neighbor. For the United States, it is another potential haven for terrorist groups. Both have the potential to make security gains through supporting the Kurdish-led SDF.

Matt Cookson is a contributor and a Middle East History and Policy Fellow with Young Voices. He also works in the supply chain for a U.S. Defense Contractor. His commentary has appeared in Real Clear Politics, the American Thinker, Providence Magazine, China Source, and the Idaho Freedom Foundation. You can follow him on X @MattCookson95. 

Image: Olmo Couto / Shutterstock.com.

Numerous U.S. military programs are running years behind schedule, but one is running almost like clockwork, at least by procurement standards. In 2019, United States Air Force officials had suggested the Northrop Grumman B-21 Raider would make its maiden flight by the end of. Yet, it wasn’t until December 2022 that the flying wing aircraft—designed to replace the aging Rockwell B-1B Lancer and Northrop B-2 Spirit—received its official unveiling.

However, since that public reveal two years ago, the program has made notable progress, including making its maiden flight just eleven months after it was officially introduced to the world.

Aerospace giant Northrop Grumman recently announced that flight tests have continued throughout 2024. The Raider is now on track to enter service in 2026 or 2027.

“The B-21 Raider made significant progress in our flight test campaign this year, continuing to demonstrate the value of our digital technology and the power of the world’s first sixth-generation aircraft,” Northrop Grumman said in a statement. The aviation firm noted its close collaboration with the U.S. Air Force, “We extend our gratitude to the United States Air Force for their partnership in bringing the B-21 to life.”

There have also been reports that the flight tests are progressing as expected, and according to the defense contractor, the B-21 has performed well.

“Overall, I am pleased to see the performance of our test jet. The handling qualities are better than expected coming out of the simulated environment—validating the accuracy of the digital models the team has developed and analyzed over many years,” said Chris “Hoss” Moss, Northrop Grumman B-21 Raider test pilot, in a September interview.

“Flight test is an exciting time, and we’re making great progress on B-21,” added Tom Jones, corporate vice president and Northrop Grumman Aeronautics Systems’ president, in the same report. “The CTF team has demonstrated we can execute multiple flight test events within the span of a week. Northrop Grumman’s digital ecosystem is enabling that progress, allowing us to analyze test data, make updates and return to flight test with speed and efficiency.”

As of the beginning of 2024, six B-21 Raider prototype aircraft were already in distinct phases of production. That approach has enabled engineers and technicians to troubleshoot and apply lessons learned directly to follow-on aircraft.

In addition to constructing a state-of-the-art bomber, Air Force officials have underscored their focus on containing costs while allowing for maximum flexibility.

The B-21 Raider is now nearly a decade in the making. Northrop Grumman first attained the contract for the next-generation bomber in 2015, and the company then quickly assembled a nationwide team to build it. The Raider—named for the eighty men who participated in the 1942 “Doolittle Raid” on Tokyo in 1942—was developed using the aerospace firm’s pioneering digital engineering practices and advanced manufacturing techniques.

In late 2023, the U.S. Department of Defense approved the B-21’s move into low-rate initial production (LRIP), and Northrop Grumman was provided a Pentagon LRIP contract in January 2024. The LRIP phase is currently on track for five lots and will run through the end of this decade.

The Air Force has set a goal of acquiring a fleet of at least 100 B-21s, but some analysts have called for that number to be doubled.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites, with over 3,200 published pieces and over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image: Anatoliy Lukich / Shutterstock.com. 

Over the past few months, the Levant sub-region in the Middle East has experienced geopolitical changes of historic proportions. The shockwaves from these changes, which are still very much in play as various powers and factions holding pieces of territory in Syria try to tilt the gameboard and pull the area’s future in their direction, will be felt throughout the entire Middle East and, through it, the world. 

The situation is fraught with both danger—and opportunity. President-elect Donald Trump clearly indicated in his recent interview with Time Magazine that when it comes to the Middle East, “…I support whatever, whatever is necessary to get not just peace, a lasting peace. It can’t go on where every five years you end up in tragedy. There are other alternatives.” In seeking to make these aspirations a reality, the incoming president has his work cut out for him. Unfortunately, one place where he is unlikely to get any practical help is France. 

One could argue that the recent upheaval in Lebanon, which, along with Syria, used to be a French protectorate, began when Hezbollah began firing into northern Israel a day after Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023. By September 2024, Israel began hitting back hard—first blowing up the pagers, cell phones, and laptops used by Hezbollah field commanders and then eliminating its leadership, including its central leader, Hassan Nasrallah. During most of this period, Lebanon’s and Syria’s former colonial ruler, France, was largely missing in action, except for occasional, often contradictory, and occasionally grandiose comments from French President Emmanuel Macron. 

Although Macron recently held discussions with Trump about the seismic developments in the Middle East, the French leader’s beleaguered domestic position will likely complicate matters for the incoming American administration. Macron’s unstable and debt-ridden National Assembly already has gone through a record-breaking three prime ministers only this year. 

On December 13, Macron appointed centrist political ally Francois Bayrou as prime minister, a week after Bayrou’s predecessor, Michel Barnier, was forced to resign after losing to a vote of no confidence in parliament, where Macron faces major opposition from far-right and left-wing forces. Hours later, credit ratings agency Moody’s downgraded France’s rating because “the country’s public finances will be substantially weakened over the coming years” as “political fragmentation is more likely to impede meaningful fiscal consolidation.” With France’s debt already set to rise over 6 percent of GDP, this only increases pressure on the new premier to gain support from legislators for his plans to manage the country’s strained financial situation—as was evident from the ousted prime minister’s failure to get approval for the 2025 budget. 

Facing a dreary domestic situation, France Macron is in search of a diplomatic triumph. Hence, his efforts to insert himself in the international efforts to achieve a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. Paris used the November 21 International Criminal Court (ICC) warrants against Netanyahu and then-defense minister Yoav Gallant, who the ICC claims were engaged in war crimes in Gaza, to its advantage.

Initially, France was vociferous in insisting that it would arrest Netanyahu if he set foot on French soil. Within a week, however, the rhetoric from Paris shifted once Israel agreed during a Netanyahu-Macron phone conversation to have France play a mediator role in the ceasefire talks. 

The French position dramatically changed from one of unwavering commitment to international law to equivocation, saying that while France respects the ICC, Netanyahu may enjoy immunity as a serving cabinet minister in a country that is not party to the ICC agreement. That Paris had to go to such lengths to try and regain a say in the future security of Lebanon underscores the extent to which the French have lost ground in their former colony. Indeed, until the unprecedented weakening of Hezbollah in the conflict with Israel over the past few months, Iran had more influence in the country and the broader Levant than France. 

With the dramatic toppling of the Assad regime at the hands of Turkish-backed rebels in the wake of the weakened Iranian position in both Lebanon and Syria, it is important to note that France heavily shaped the modern Levant following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of its defeat in World War I. While France’s involvement in Lebanon’s sectarian conflicts actually dates back to the nineteenth century, both Syria and Lebanon fell under French control as per the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement with the British. 

This arrangement was solemnified under the mandate system of the League of Nations after the end of the First World War. In the early period of French rule, the area was divided into a half dozen smaller entities largely along confessional lines, such as Damascus, Aleppo, a Maronite-dominated Greater Lebanon, and Alawite and Druze states. By the 1930s, the French had consolidated these various states into the modern republics of Syria and Lebanon. Lebanon was granted independence during World War II in 1943, while Syria became a sovereign nation-state in 1946. 

Devastated by World War II, France’s ability to influence events in the Levant declined greatly. The rise of left-leaning Arab nationalism, especially in Syria in the form of the Baath Party, led to the Soviet Union becoming an influential external power. France continued to retain its influence in Lebanon. However, in 1975, the Lebanese Civil War broke out, and Syria (under the regime of Hafez al-Assad, who came to power in 1971) intervened militarily. The Syrians, along with their new ally in Tehran, the Islamic Republic, together developed Hezbollah in the aftermath of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, altering the balance of power in the country. By this time, the French had aligned with Saudi Arabia, which had gained considerable influence in Lebanon (especially among its Sunni population) after emerging as the world’s leading oil producer. 

The civil war came to an end in 1990, but it left Hezbollah as the most powerful faction in the country. By this time, Iran and Syria had begun to weaken French and Saudi influence in the country. The French and the Saudis hoped to stage a comeback in 2005 when Syria was forced to withdraw its 14,000 troops strong task force from Lebanon following the assassination of Lebanese prime minister Rafik al-Hariri. But Hezbollah had become too powerful for Paris and Riyadh to counteract. The Arab Spring uprising only further strengthened Iran and Hezbollah by rendering the Syrian regime dependent on the patron and proxy along with Russia for its survival. 

The French likely see the events of the past several months as an opportunity to revive their influence, at least in Lebanon. However, the geopolitical chessboard is too complicated for France. Lebanon is at risk of internal strife because of the weakening of Hezbollah and, more importantly, the collapse of the Assad regime and the empowerment of Sunni Arab forces under the leadership of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an offshoot of Al Qaeda. Turkey, through its backing of HTS and other Sunni Arab rebel forces, is in a position to replace Iran as the dominant power in Syria. Meanwhile, the latest news out of Paris indicates that Macron may face the loss of his most recently appointed prime minister in the very near term. 

Despite its long legacy as a liege of the Levant, France lacks the wherewithal to help the Trump administration manage the Middle East effectively.

Kamran Bokhari, PhD is Senior Director of the Eurasian Security & Prosperity at the Newlines Institute for Strategy & Policy in Washington. He is also a national security and foreign policy specialist at the University of Ottawa’s Professional Development Institute. Bokhari has served as the coordinator for Central Asia studies at the U.S. State Department’s Foreign Service Institute.

Image: Antonin Albert / Shutterstock.com. 

Weeks before President Trump retakes the White House, an American ambassador is tanking a strategic gas pipeline that would increase U.S. natural gas exports to Europe. In the process, he has damaged a country’s national sovereignty and worsened Balkan instability, all in the name of the State Department’s identity politics.

The Southern Gas Interconnection pipeline would feed U.S. natural gas to Bosnia-Herzegovina and end that country’s reliance on Russian energy imports. In 2019, neighboring Croatia’s government bucked its climate lobby by building a floating liquified natural gas terminal to wean Eastern Europe off Russian energy dependency. Its strategic value has helped make the U.S. the largest LNG supplier to Europe. Croatia wants to expand the pipeline further.

Yet, the State Department has hamstrung the plan with an aggressive nation-building project that seeks to force the country’s Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs to dispense with their national identity and adopt an overarching Bosnian identity embraced only by the country’s Muslim leadership. In fact, many Bosniak Muslims have taken Croatian citizenship, betraying little actual belief in a Bosnian construct.

Bosnia-Herzegovina has not moved on from the 1995 Dayton Accords, which ended the war in the Balkans. Instead, it has been saddled with an unworkable constitutional framework in which international diplomats have pushed an “anti-nationalist” ideological agenda while enjoying ultimate legal authority over the country. Serbs govern half the country, and Croats and a larger number of Bosniak Muslims rule the other half jointly. Neither entity enjoys sovereignty. Indeed, it is a failed state.

A new law to authorize the pipeline extension presented outgoing U.S. Ambassador Michael Murphy a last-ditch chance to impose the State Department’s identity politics on the country by forcing Croat parliamentarians to hand control of the pipeline to Sarajevo’s corrupt and indebted state gas operator in a country whose level of corruption is rated worse than that of Ukraine. BH Gas’s management team is entirely Bosniak, reflecting the systemic employment discrimination that has led to the halving of the Croat population. Croatian leaders seek a new entity to manage the project. Nevertheless, the law passed with no Croat votes, which has exacerbated inter-communal tensions. 

Parliamentary deputy speaker Mladen Boskovic, a Croat, blasted the outcome: “This law was written in such a way that Croats were deleted as participants in the process of designing and routing the gas pipeline. All decisions will be left to one company under the complete control of the Bosniak parties.”

Murphy earned a sharp rebuke from Croatian president Zoran Milanovic, a backer of the pipeline, accusing “foreign governors of humiliating and systematically disintegrating Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state.”

Murphy’s overt intervention to get the gas law passed was unprecedented. He publicly accused Croat officials of Russian collusion for opposing it and their elected leader of seeking “personal political and economic benefit.” Yet, the previous director of BH Gas had previously resigned to avoid becoming “an accomplice to [the company’s] criminal actions.” 

About a dozen U.S. Embassy staff hounded Croat parliamentarians in their offices during the vote proceedings, prompting some to walk out in protest. According to local media, Murphy threatened them with sanctions. Bosniak parliamentarians, uneasy about breaking the tradition of consensus decision-making on key legislation, were threatened with dismissal by our officials.

This region is familiar to millions of American Catholics. The pipeline route passes by Medjugorje, a village visited by 40 million Christian pilgrims who believed it hosted apparitions of the Virgin Mary. The combination of Christian fervor and the economic boon it has generated there is anathema to the Biden administration’s global crusade for abortion and an LGBTQ agenda that Secretary Blinken declared “profoundly in our national interest.” 

In nearby Hungary, the U.S. ambassador has led a culture war against its conservative government. Nathalie Rayes, U.S. ambassador to Croatia, one of the most pro-life countries in Europe, was vice-chair of the Planned Parenthood Action Fund.

Who are the winners that emerged from this fiasco? First, Russia, as Croatia is unlikely to proceed with its section of the pipeline while its ethnic kin in Bosnia-Herzegovina are locked out of the project. Communist China gains from growing tensions within Europe. Turkey wins, given its familial relations with Sarajevo’s Muslim leadership and its global ambition to promote political Islam. The losers? The Catholic Croats see little stake in a state that treats them as second-class citizens. For America, Murphy’s law undercuts the prospect of securing American energy dominance in Europe.

The gas law now goes to the upper chamber, the House of Peoples, where it needs to muster a majority of Muslim, Serb, and Croat deputies, each wielding veto power. Croats are expected to lose that constitutional protection as well, as the country’s High Representative, a European diplomat empowered by Dayton with the final say over all of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s laws, is expected to side with the Bosniaks. 

Max Primorac is a Senior Research Fellow at the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, The Heritage Foundation. He was the Acting Chief Operating Officer at the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Image: BalkansCat / Shutterstock.com. 

Shortly after the surprise mockup of China’s new sixth-generation “White Emperor” warplane appeared at this year’s Zhuhai Air Show in Guangdong, China, Beijing stunned the world by putting on a dazzling display of two different, working variations of their sixth-generation plane. 

In fact, the science-fiction-like planes have sent many Western observers into a tailspin, at once denying that they are real planes and simultaneously calling it a “Sputnik” moment. Now, just as the U.S. Air Force was coming to grips with the fact that their own sixth-generation warplane dreams were dying under the weight of America’s harsh economic reality, the clamoring for the Air Force’s ghastly program has restarted.

Funny how that works.

After all, many of the people publicly calling for the creation of what the Air Force has dubbed its “Next-Generation Air Dominance” (NGAD) fighters are the same people who routinely downplay China’s impressive technological capabilities. Now that it serves its own purposes, though, the storyline is shifting. We must have a plane that will take years to produce, cost up to $300 million per plane, and only marginally enhance American air superiority because China is readying to build its own.

Shortly after the Christmas festivities were finishing up in the United States, pictures from China emerged of what appeared to be not one, but two, distinct potential sixth-generation warplanes. One plane was larger than the other. The larger possible sixth-generation plane belonged to China’s Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC), and the smaller one is believed to belong to China’s other major warplane developer, the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation (SAC).

Both planes are believed to be “demonstrator models.” This means that they may be test aircraft that the Chinese military will not ultimately use. The U.S. military has made countless demonstrator birds over the past several decades.

They are critical for learning about aerodynamics involved with next-generation planes and can be used as testbeds for an assortment of technologies undergirding advanced warplanes. While these are important steps toward developing next-level technologies that would outpace anything the Americans and their allies have, they are not necessarily the birds that China will ultimately mass produce and deploy over the next decade.

Further, it is believed that in 2020, the Americans did test their own demonstrator of a sixth-generation plane. This is to say nothing of the demonstrators of things like the SR-72 “Son of Blackbird” hypersonic unmanned aerial vehicle that Skunkworks has been playing with in the California desert for the last few years. That’s not to say that people should not be concerned about China leapfrogging the Americans in key technologies. Indeed, this author has spent the better part of a decade publicly warning about the probability that China is set to outpace the Americans and their allies in key technologies.

On the matter of a sixth-generation warplane, though, there are still many steps that China must go through to ensure that their demonstrators work properly and that mass-producing these birds as they are currently designed is worth the cost.

To be clear, if China decides to mass-produce these planes, it can and it will. Unlike the United States, China dominates global manufacturing and supply chains. It has the resources, domestic human capital, actual capital, and excess capacity to churn such systems out like sausages.

But will they want to?

After all, the Chinese military is only now getting its fifth-generation warplanes humming along in terms of production quotas and domestically produced capabilities. For years, for example, the Chinese had difficulty making their indigenously produced engines work for the Chengdu J-20 “Mighty Dragon,” which was first unveiled in 2011. After years of trial and error, the J-20s are only now operating with the powerful Chinese-made WS-10 after-burning turbofan engines.

And China is only just now revealing the extent of its investment in its other fifth-generation warplane, the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation’s J-35. The J-20 is much more advanced than the J-35. But the J-35 is already advancing along. Despite these successes, why would China still be investing in their fifth-generation planes the way they are if they were already all-in on their proposed sixth-generation warplane?

The fact is, they’re not as invested as Western pundits assume.

But Beijing has no qualms about making the eggheads at the Pentagon believe that they’re already working on an arsenal of sixth-generation war machines. China’s rulers know the U.S. government has a massive spending problem. And the United States has a national debt to prove that view. Both Beijing and its allies, in places like Russia, dream of collapsing the U.S. economy. America’s onerous, self-inflicted debt load is the surest point of attack by these great powers.

What better way for China to hasten the American economic and financial collapse than by convincing us that they’re readying to field an arsenal of fantastical “air-space” fighter planes?

It is likely that China has no real intention (yet) of scaling its sixth-generation warplane demonstrators. Instead, it wants the Americans to overreact and bankrupt themselves trying to counter the mythical Chinese “air-space” fighter. Washington cannot fall for this obvious ruse. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, The American Spectator, MSN, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Hamara / Shutterstock.com. 

There is no holiday season in Ukraine, where the fighting continues with no respite. While people celebrated Christmas and the holidays around the world, the Russian military was capturing an important settlement in the Donbas.  

“Russian forces have likely seized Kurakhove following two months of intensified offensive operations aimed at seizing the settlement and eliminating the Ukrainian salient north and south of the settlement,” the Institute for the Study of War assessed in its latest estimate of the war.

Nestled in the Donetsk Oblast, in southeastern Ukraine, Kurakhove was an important part of the Ukrainian defensive line. The Russian military had been trying to capture it for several months now, dedicating large numbers of troops and resources to the operation.

To take the settlement and clear the Ukrainian positions to the north and south of Kurakhove, the Russian military concentrated up to 36,000 troops in the area. Although exact numbers are available, the Russian forces very likely suffered heavy casualties in their efforts to capture Kurakhove. This is mainly due to the fact that the Russian military’s preferred method of offensive is mass infantry attacks.

However, taking Kurakhove doesn’t mean that the Russian military is close to an operational breakthrough. On the contrary, the Russian forces are making slow, and costly, gains, but they struggle to achieve more than tactical progress. On the other end, the Ukrainian military usually defends a position for as long as it can before falling back to a better-defended position to continue the fight.

“Russian forces may struggle to advance rapidly further west of Kurakhove along the H-15 Kurakhove-Pokrovske highway should Ukrainian forces choose to defend in the Kurakhivska TPP and Russian forces fail to outflank Ukrainian positions in the TPP near Dachne or Ulakly,” the Institute for the Study of War assessed.

The Russian forces lost a lot of men in their attempt to capture Kurakhove, and that can stem immediate further advances in the region.

Meanwhile, the Russian forces continue to take heavy casualties on the ground. Over the past twenty-four hours, the Russian military, paramilitary units, and pro-Russian separatist forces lost approximately 1,650 troops killed or wounded. In addition, the Russian invaders lost around eighty-two tactical vehicles and fuel trucks, twenty-eight unmanned aerial systems, twenty-two artillery guns and multiple launch rocket systems, eighteen infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, fourteen main battle tanks, one air defense weapon system, and one piece of special equipment.

Overall, the Russian forces have lost approximately 785,000 troops in the fighting, with over 200,000 killed and more than 580,000 wounded.

Despite these heavy casualties, Russian president Vladimir Putin and his military leadership have chosen a strategy of attrition. They are content with losing thousands of troops a day and tens of thousands of troops every month as long as that translates into tactical gains on the battlefield. Since the Russian military is incapable of achieving an operational breakthrough via maneuver warfare, attritional tactics, such as human wave attacks, are the Kremlin’s only reasonable option.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image: Dmytro Larin / Shutterstock.com

Earlier in December, an A-10 Thunderbolt II close air support aircraft made a rare appearance in southeast Asia in what could be a picture from the future.

The American aircraft worked with the Philippine Air Force, sending a clear message to China.

Between December 9 and 13, U.S. Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt II close support aircraft from the 25th Fighter Squadron completed a Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) as part of a bilateral exercise with the Philippine Air Force. The American aircraft operated alongside Philippine’s A-29B Super Tucanos, another close air support aircraft, and other conventional and special operations aircraft.

“DFE’s are important because it allows us to project airpower at the time and place of our choosing with as small footprint as possible at the location we conduct these DFE’s at,” Maj. Gregory St. Clair, Pacific Air Forces chief of future operations, said in a press release. “In addition to that it allows us to train closely with our allies and partners which is our greatest strength.”

The Philippines is a key U.S. ally in the Indo-Pacific. Too close to China for comfort, the Philippines looks to the United States to ensure its sovereignty in the region. In exchange, the United States has a willing ally and a great expeditionary base for its aircraft, warships, and other assets.

“Flying with the Philippine Air Force has been incredible; I was blown away by how willing they were to work and engage with us to continue to strengthen this alliance we have in the Indo-Pacific. We continue to promote stability and freedom to all our partners in the region,” Capt. Ben Burmester, 25th Fighter Squadron project officer, stated.

The 25th Fighter Squadron participated in the training event with eight A-10 Thunderbolt II aircraft.

“The main goal of this DFE was to show we are super close with our allies and partners so that we can train and be effective together,” added Major St. Clair. “DFE’s are not a new concept and we will continue to do them in the future and we’re only going to get stronger by continuing to do them.”

The A-10 Thunderbolt II is beloved by ground forces. It is, after all, a dedicated close air support aircraft that can bring impressive firepower and save the day for a beleaguered ground unit. A-10 Thunderbolt IIs saved many an infantry and special operations unit in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the A-10 Thunderbolt II was almost retired by the Air Force and was only saved after Congress prohibited the service from pushing out the venerable aircraft.

The aircraft’s biggest shortcoming is probably its inability to effectively operate in a permissive or semi-permissive operational environment. Designed to take out enemy tanks and infantry, the A-10 Thunderbolt II is slow and cumbersome. As such, its survival rate in a near-peer environment with potent enemy air defenses is low. But in an environment of air superiority, the A-10 Thunderbolt II can really shine.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image: StockPhotosLV / Shutterstock.com

The Kremlin claimed on Thursday that it shot down an American-made F-16 Fighting Falcon. The multirole combat aircraft was allegedly struck by a Russian air defense system over southeastern Ukraine. Kyiv has not confirmed the loss of the F-16, which if true would be the first Western-made and Western-supplied fixed-wing aircraft to be lost in the conflict, which has been raging since February 2022.

"An F-16 aircraft was shot down in the Zaporizhzhia region at its launch site," Russian state news agency RIA Novosti announced via the Telegram social messaging app on Thursday.

Tass also reported, "Chairman of Russia's Civic Chamber Commission on Sovereignty, Patriotic Projects and Support of Veterans Vladimir Rogov [said] that the F-16 aircraft was downed in the Zaporozhye Region when preparing for a missile strike on the region."

Russia had previously claimed in September that it had shot down a Fighting Falcon, but that was later proven to be false. However, Kyiv did confirm in August that an F-16 was lost while attempting to shoot down a Russian cruise missile, and there have been reports since then that it may have been a friendly fire incident involving one of Ukraine's U.S.-supplied MIM-104 Patriot air defense systems.

According to Bulgarian Military (not to be confused with the Bulgarian Armed Forces), Sergey Shmotyev, CEO of the Russian energy firm Fores, had said he would pay a 15 million ruble ($145,000) reward for the first Fighting Falcon that was downed. It is unclear if it would apply to the aircraft that was reported to have been shot down on Thursday or a future F-16.

This isn't the first such bounty that Russian oligarchs have offered to the country's military—while the Kremlin has also put bounties on Western-made hardware including the German Leopard 2 and American M1 Abrams main battle tanks (MBTs). The firm had put a bounty on the fighter in July.

In August 2023, U.S. president Joe Biden approved the transfer of the F-16 from multiple NATO members. One year later, in early August 2024, Ukraine received the first ten Fighting Falcons.

NATO members Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway pledged to provide around ninety of the fourth-generation aircraft.

However, Ukrainian aviators have largely received a "crash course" of sorts, with the training on the F-16s reduced to several months instead of the years that Western pilots have received. That fact may have led to the loss of one of the F-16s just weeks after it arrived in the country. Efforts have been made to increase the training the Ukrainian aviators are receiving on the F-16.

The American-made multirole fighter has been employed to successfully down Russian missiles and drones fired at Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure. In addition, in October, a Ukrainian Air Force F-16 was also credited with shooting down a Russian Sukhoi Su-34 (NATO reporting name Fullback).

The news of the downing of the F-16 came just a day after an Azerbaijan Airlines' Embraer jet crashed in Kazakhstan on Christmas Day, killing at least thirty-eight of the sixty-seven people on board. It has been alleged that the airliner was shot down by a Russian air defense system.

And on Friday, a Russian blogger released a propaganda video that showed Santa Claus being shot down over Moscow with assistance from De Moroz—a Slavic version of Saint Nicholas or Father Christmas. The video ends with Ded Morz telling a Russian serviceman, "We don't need anything foreign in our skies. Happy New Year!"

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Shutterstock.

Could China Sink a U.S. Navy Aircraft Carrier in a War?

USS Parche: The Navy Submarine That Could Self-Destruct

The Apple+ miniseries The Masters of the Air, which debuted in January 2024, tells the story of World War II aviators who served in the U.S. Army Air Force’s 100th Bomb Group of the 8th Air Force. The follow-up to Band of Brothers and The Pacific by producers Steven Spielberg and Tom Hanks has already been noted for its gritty realism. It features the vast armadas of the Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress during its missions over occupied Europe.

Those bombers were able to strike deep into German-held territory, hitting individual factories and other precision targets. Still, they whittled away at the fighter strength of the Luftwaffe in some of the largest and bloodiest air battles in history. The B-17 flew more than 290,000 sorties in the European theater of operations and dropped in excess of half a million tons of bombs.

While the UK’s Royal Air Force (RAF) conducted night-time bombing raids over Germany, the U.S. 8th Air Force bombed during the day, and the B-17 proved especially well-suited for the task—yet it came at a steep price. As noted in the Apple+ series, the Flying Fortress was easy to fly and absorbed a lot of returning fire. The aircraft could be shot up and remain in the sky, and its Norden bombsight gave American forces bombing accuracy unmatched by any other nation during the war.

Newspapers hype crowed that the bomber could “drop a bomb into a pickle barrel” from thousands of meters in the air. That was a bit of hyperbole, and the truth was that only one of every ten bombs landed within close range of their target. On the second bombing raid against the ball-bearing factories at Schweinfurt in October 1943, the 8th Air Force sent more than 250 B-17 bombers at the target, yet the attackers failed to destroy the factory completely.

As further depicted in The Masters of the Air, the tactics to bomb German targets around the clock were costly. Tragically, more than 47,000 U.S. 8th Air Force crewmen were killed in those daylight raids over Germany.

Development of what was to become the B-17 began in the mid-1930s, and it first took to the skies in July 1935. While it was already a well-armed warbird for the era, Boeing soon began to plan the development of the next-generation bomber. That led to the development of the B-29, but Boeing also continued to refine and improve the B-17. The aircraft increased in size and weight while it also received increased armor, self-sealing fuel tanks, and notably greater armament.

It also earned its now infamous nickname from a supportive journalist’s report.

The often-repeated story is that after Richard Williams, a reporter from The Seattle Times, observed the Model 299 prototype on the ground, he described it as a “15-ton flying fortress” in a photo caption. Boeing quickly responded by trademarking the name, and the rest is history.

The aircraft went on to be even more heavily armed to deal with the threats from enemy fighter aircraft after it entered service.

The B-17G variation that saw service in the tail end of World War II was armed like no other aircraft before it, with up to a “lucky thirteen” M2 .50 caliber (12.7 mm) machine guns placed in nine positions located throughout the airframe, each able to fire upwards of 700 rounds per minute. This aircraft variant of the famous “Ma Deuce” was dubbed the AN/M2 (officially the “Browning Machine Gun, Aircraft, Cal. .50, AN/M2”)—and it was fitted with a substantially lighter thirty-six-inch length barrel.

Ten crew members —the pilot, co-pilot, bombardier, navigator, radio operator, and five gunners—were crammed into the small cabin for six to eight hours per mission. The main cabin was barely tall enough for the crew to stand up straight, and flying at altitudes above 27,000 feet meant the aircraft got very cold, often below freezing.

Crews had to be careful when touching the guns, which could be dangerously cold until fired. When enemy fighters approached, everyone but the pilot and co-pilot was expected to operate a machine gun.

Each B-17 initially carried around 5,000 rounds of ammunition—with the tail gunners and turret gunners having around 1,000 rounds available. According to some sources, the ammunition supply was doubled by the end of the war.

The B-17G’s thirteen machine guns were positioned throughout the aircraft to allow it to take on enemy fighters from nearly any direction, while the bombers also flew in tight formations.

There were two machine guns in the main cabin operated by the waist gunner(s) to defend from side attacks. Two more machine guns were positioned in the nose for the bombardier and navigator to operate when they weren’t conducting other duties. At the same time, twin .50 caliber machine guns were also positioned in the “chin turret” to the front of the aircraft and operated remotely.

It should be noted, too, that the bombardier was located at the extreme front end, protected only by a Plexiglas window. Just behind him, the navigator sat on a mounted table with access to maps and charts to best plot the bomber’s course during each mission. However, the B-17 was most vulnerable to a head-on attack—with many bombardiers and navigators killed in the early stages of the daytime bombing missions. The added .50 caliber machine guns provided them a chance to fire back at approaching German fighters.

Directly behind the flight deck, where the pilot and co-pilot were seated, were twin .50 caliber machine guns in a top or dorsal turret. It was the turret gunner’s job to scan the horizon for any incoming enemy fighters. A radio operator, located behind the turret, also operated one machine gun that fired upwards.

The underside of the B-17 was equipped with a Sperry ball turret, a spherical space about four feet in diameter and capable of rotating 360 degrees. After takeoff, the ball turret gunner—who was typically one of the smallest crew members—would crouch into a fetal position while entering the turret to operate a pair of machine guns. It may have provided a stunning view of the ground, but the ball turret gunner was still only protected by his flak jacket and the Plexiglas.

At the extreme end of the fuselage were two more twin .50-caliber machine guns, which the tail gunner operated. His job was to protect the rear of the aircraft from attack.

Initially, the bomber crews wore only heavy flight jackets and sheepskin flight trousers, which were about protecting the wearer from the cold at extreme altitudes. However, the effects of Triple-A (anti-aircraft artillery)—also known as flak—resulted in the development of flak jackets and even specialty helmets.

Though the B-17 was not literally a fortress in the sky, it should be remembered that sometimes fortresses need some outside support. This turned out to be the case with the B-17. The huge losses seen in raids like the one over Schweinfurt convinced the Allied leadership that the B-17 could not go to war over German-held territory unescorted. In the latter stages of the war, the P-51 Mustang fighter plane proved to be the bomber’s little friend all the way to Berlin and back.

The B-17 Flying Fortress went on to make its mark on history and became among the most famous aircraft of the Second World War. Yet, it wasn’t actually the bomber that was produced in the largest number. A total of 12,731 B-17s were produced, while 18,482 Consolidated B-24 Liberator bombers were also built by the end of World War II. However, both heavy bombers had a well-earned reputation for being the workhorses of the USAAF.

Today, there are reported to be only forty-five surviving B-17s, of which thirty-eight are in the United States. Just ten are airworthy. Among the most famous of the surviving aircraft is the “Memphis Belle,” which is currently on display at the National Museum of the United States Air Force.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites, with over 3,200 published pieces and over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image: VanderWolf Images / Shutterstock.com.

On November 30, 2024, President-elect Donald Trump made a resounding statement on X, declaring that BRICS countries are moving away from the dollar “while we stand by and watch is OVER.” This statement’s timing not only came a month after dignitaries from thirty-six countries and six international organizations attended the sixteenth BRICS summit held in Kazan, Russia, but also doubled down that countries would “face 100 percent tariffs” whether they intended to replace the dollar with the BRICS currency or any other currency. 

Trump’s bold threat comes at a critical point in international economic relations, as many world leaders like Russian president Vladimir Putin have openly criticized the dollar’s role as a “weapon.” Additionally, Trump’s call for 25 percent tariffs on Canada and Mexico and a 10 percent tariff on China calls into question whether this new raft of tariffs can safeguard the dollar’s primacy and the underlying financial hegemony of G7 institutions.

Once a moniker from a Goldman Sachs banker Jim O’Neill’s report from 2001 raising concerns of a coalition of countries that could challenge, if not supplant, the G7 nations, the group has now expanded and rolled out an array of parallel institutions to offer small and middle power countries an alternative to the liberal international order. As of 2024, BRICS countries’ share of global GDP in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) is 34.9 percent as opposed to the G7’s 30.05 percent, whereas, in 2000, the G7 stood at 43.28 percent, and the BRICS constituted only 21.37 percent.

Trump’s return to the White House has also raised concerns about whether the G7 nations, with an avowedly isolationist leader in Washington, can weather the BRICS bloc. In one of his campaign rallies in battleground Wisconsin as early as September 8, 2024, Trump adamantly condemned the de-dollarization of global trade, stating clearly, “You leave the dollar and you’re not doing business with the United States because we are going to put a 100 percent tariff on your goods.” This threat explains why BRICS-aligned nations have been seeking to build alternatives to the dollar for the last sixteen years. In fact, during Trump’s first administration, Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi observed in November 2017 how it has become “increasingly difficult for Western governance concepts, systems, and models to keep up with the new international situation,” arguing further that Western-led global governance has “malfunctioned” and reached a point “beyond redemption.” 

It is no surprise, then, that BRICS was established in 2009, immediately after the 2008 global financial crisis. According to a report from the Boston Consulting Group, trade among BRICS economies has outpaced trade between BRICS and G7 nations. Representing half of the world’s population and between a quarter and a third of the global economy, the group of nine countries has a fourfold purpose: (1) create an alternative financial system to the Western one, (2) better coordinate economic policy, (3) seek greater representation in global governance, and (4) reduce reliance on the U.S. dollar. 

While the strategic discourse laid out by analysts attempts to provide threat assessments from Western capitals, Western academics in the field of international relations have better constructed a framework to explain this unique phenomenon through power transition theory. Coined in 1958 by University of Michigan political scientist A.F.K. Organski, power transition theory explains how the prevailing hegemon in the international system finds itself in danger of systemic war as a rising challenger catches up with or overtakes a declining hegemon. Organski explains how the aggressor originates from a small group of dissatisfied, strong countries, where the weaker, rather than the stronger power, is most likely to be the aggressor. Applied to the BRICS countries, this explains how Russia and China can alternate in leading the charge of leveraging geography, population, and economic heft to propose a new set of international organizations bent on replacing G7-led Western institutions. 

In pursuit of the alternative financial system goal, the BRICS countries, through the economic heft of China, have created the New Development Bank (NDB), Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) in order to challenge the prominence of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). Professors Saori Katada, Cynthia Roberts, and Leslie Elliott Armijo argue in their book, BRICS and Collective Financial Statecraft, how this unique club of rising powers has united over their shared interest in “global revisionism” through military and financial power resources to impact international outcomes through club theory. 

Professors Deborah Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, in their book The Quest for Status: Chinese and Russian Foreign Policy, explain how social psychology explains the need for these two rising powers to seek preeminence in a new area to enhance their realization of great power status. With these new multilateral institutions, spearheading the creation of these alternative institutions reflects their increased power and status, motivated by their frustration of not receiving recognition commensurate with China’s power and rise.

However, skeptics of the BRICS and the China-Russia axis’s stewardship of an alternative global financial system are quick to point out the vast disparities in economic capacities between the BRICS countries and the prevailing G7 institutions. Professor of Economics and Political Science at UC Berkeley, Barry Eichengreen, lays out these limitations by listing how the Chinese renminbi accounts for less than 6 percent of trade settlements, Chinese banks manage only 3 percent of daily transactions by value of U.S.-based clearinghouses, and Beijing’s ability to provide liquidity, privacy and data-protection laws remain murky. 

Within the BRICS, security and geopolitical faultlines between member states also raise doubt over whether this forum can be conducive to any sort of cooperation. For instance, China and India have treaded carefully since the 2020 Galwan border clash, which led to the death of twenty Indian and four Chinese soldiers. The aftermath of this episode of border conflict along the Sino-Indian border has led to New Delhi deepening ties with the United States, as evident in Indian prime minister Narendra Modi’s 2023 state visit to Washington, resulting in the largest U.S.-Indian defense cooperation deals. The DoD confirmed that twenty years ago, there was no defense cooperation at all, whereas, as of 2023, the two countries are “co-producing and co-developing major systems together.” 

Additionally, the recent inclusion of Middle Eastern states like Iran, Egypt, and the UAE after the 2023 BRICS Summit raises questions about BRICS cohesion, given the regional rivalry such a big tent would now inherit. Saudi Arabia’s recent inclusion also draws doubt, given its ongoing endemic security rivalry with Iran. Riyadh made this point clear during the 2024 BRICS Summit in Kazan, where the Saudi foreign minister only attended the last day, making clear that it is hedging its commitment to a club it perceives as a hedging club for middle powers.

While the BRICS members have clear attributes, such as their status as non-Western states, the security rivalries they carry may and have proven to stand as impediments to becoming a fully-fledged treaty-bound organization with any semblance of a security commitment. Commentators are quick to couple the relative lack in economic heft to U.S.-led organizations in addition to this big tent of geopolitical rivals, which has shown serious flaws, particularly with the India-China and Iran-Saudi rivalries as well as its framing as an anti-Western coalition.

There is no clear formula for what makes an ideal BRICS member, just as no clear path exists for these member states to chart any form of coordination. Negative assessments of the BRICS as a paper tiger or house of cards are still as common in 2024 as they were in the early 2000s and 2010s when the group did not have its China-led multilateral institutions in place or carry as much economic clout. While some players like New Delhi, Brasilia, and Ankara are hedging against uncertainties to garner more negotiating power with Washington, others argue that new members like Egypt and Ethiopia are simply deepening ties with non-Western members, unlike Russia or Iran. Bringing Trump into the equation at the helm of the G7 bloc doesn’t immediately signal any tightening of alignment within BRICS. Still, it can potentially accelerate common causes over concerns like climate cooperation and financial statecraft in the interests of member states already under heavy sanctions. 

Rimon Tanvir Hossain is a Research Assistant with the Middle East Institute’s Program on Strategic Technologies and Cybersecurity. He received his M.P.P. from the UCLA Luskin School of Public Affairs and his B.A. from UC Berkeley. He is an MPhil/PhD Candidate at the Pardee RAND Graduate School and an Assistant Policy Researcher at the RAND Corporation. Previously, Rimon served as a congressional staffer for the Office of U.S. Senator Alex Padilla, where he led the State Department portfolio as a Constituent Services Representative.

Image: Irzhanova Asel / Shutterstock.com. 

World War II saw a de facto rematch between the Mauser and the Mosin-Nagant, but it was with new versions of each respective rifle. Following a trend that had begun with the British Army's Short Magazine Lee Enfield (SMLE), which proved better suited to the trench warfare of World War I than the longer rifles of the era, and without compromising range or accuracy—the length of both the Soviet (Russian) and German rifles decreased.

Production of the Mosin-Nagant continued in the Soviet Union, but in 1930, the rifle underwent some notable changes. The basic M1891/30 saw the barrel shortened by about 3.5 inches to the length of the "Dragoon variant" produced for the Imperial Russian Army's cavalry before World War I.

The M91/30 was the standard issue weapon of Soviet troops when the nation was invaded by the Germans in 1941, and it remained in production throughout the war. As the manufacture of the semi-automatic Tokarev SVT-40 was disrupted following Nazi Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union, emphasis was placed again on the Mosin-Nagant—which was easier to produce. It also proved to be more reliable and rugged, both necessities as the Motherland was fighting for her very survival.

Millions of Soviet rifles were made during the war, and it remained the main small arm of the largest mobilized army in history with some 17.4 million being manufactured from 1941 to 1945. Numerous variations were produced notably a sniper version and a carbine version that was introduced in 1944. Arguably one of the most widely produced firearms ever (with the possible exception of the AK-47 assault rifle), some 37,000,000 were made between 1891 and 1965.

Officially designated the Karabiner 98 Kurz or Kar98K, it wasn't technically a "carbine" in the traditional sense, although there had been a carbine version of the Gewehr 98. Rather, it was a short rifle and became the standard service rifle of the German military when it was adopted in 1935.

As for why it wasn't the Kar35K comes down to restrictions placed on Germany under the Treaty of Versailles. The development of a new rifle was concealed, but it was a direct descendant of the Model 98 rifle. The new model resembled its preceding version in its basic shape, except for being almost six inches shorter, while also incorporating a few design improvements. The Kar98K used the same controlled-feed bolt-action system of its predecessor, while the most immediate difference is the straight bolt handle of the Gewehr 98 that was replaced by a turned-down bolt handle that made it easier to rapidly operate, and reduced the amount the handle projected beyond the receiver. That enabled the mounting of options directly above the receiver. The Langevisier—rollercoaster—rear sights were also replaced with a more conventional tangent leaf sight.

Though it was the standard infantry weapon of the Wehrmacht at the start of World War II and continued to serve in that role until Germany's defeat in May 1945, it was gradually supplemented by the semi-automatic Gewehr 43/Karabiner 43 (G43/K43), which almost ironically incorporated an improved short-stroke pistol gas system employed in the aforementioned SVT-40. Yet, while more than 9 million Kar98Ks were manufactured by the war's end, only around 402,000 K43s were produced.

As the war drew to a close, Germany was in the beginning stages of slowly replacing its bolt action rifle with the Sturmgewehr 44 (StG44) assault rifle designed by Hugo Schmeisser—and that weapon would go on to influence the AK-47 and other post-war assault rifles.

Neither the Model 90/31 nor the Kar98K could be seen as a revolutionary step forward, and they were really simple evolutionary changes. The same level of German precision design and engineering is present with its rifle, while the Soviet weapon retained the same rugged reliability.

Both rifles could hold five rounds and could be loaded with a stripper clip or individually by hand. As with the previous models, the range and accuracy are about the same. The Soviet weapon was produced in massively larger numbers, which is fitting as Soviet leader Joseph Stalin was quoted as saying "Quantity is a quality of its own." Truer words were never spoken in wartime. The Mosin-Nagant M91/31 was certainly among the weapons that helped save the motherland during her darkest days.

So is one better than the other?

Now with nearly eighty years of hindsight, it may come down to collectability. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, Kar98Ks were so common that tens of thousands (perhaps more) were "sporterized" and converted into a poor man's hunting or target rifle. Throughout much of the Cold War, Mosin-Nagants weren't exactly rare, but certainly not as widely available as they are now.

Then in the 1990s and early 2000s, the Mosin Nagant flooded the market. As noted, those are still collectible, but not quite in the same way as the Mauser that the Doughboys brought home after the Great War or the Greatest Generation came back with following World War II. It should be noted that Mauser collectors can look to countless variations made for countries around the world, while Mosin-Nagants were made in far fewer flavors.

As the better rifle, it may be a matter of personal preference, but both will have a legacy that lasts for eons to come!

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Twice in the twentieth century, the German Army marched eastward, where it engaged in brutal combat against a determined foe. It could be argued that the record for the German military was one-to-one—as it essentially defeated the Imperial Russian Army during World War I, but was utterly destroyed by the Soviet Red Army a generation later.

Notable is the fact that the primary weapons employed by each side in the two conflicts were bolt-action rifles that had evolved only slightly. A case could also be made that it was German engineering and design going against Russian ruggedness and reliability.

"Mauser" and "Mosin Nagant" are practically synonymous among collectors and firearms enthusiasts for Germany's and Russia's respective rifles of the two world wars. But the devil is truly in the details.

Both stories can rightfully be described as "complicated."

The Mauser-made Gewehr wasn't actually the first German-made military bolt action rifle, as that distinction goes to the Gewehr 88—also known as the Model 1888 commission rifle. Of course, a case could be made that the Dreyse needle gun was a German rifle, but it was designed in the Kingdom of Prussia before the unification of Germany.

By the early 1880s, the Dreyse was outdated, and that led to the development of the Gewehr 88, which was adopted in 1888 as the result of an arms race between Germany and France. It was not developed by Mauser; instead, it was the result of the German Rifle Commission. Notably, Mauser was also one of the few major German arms makers that didn't produce any Gewehr 88s.

However, Paul Mauser continued to refine his design and patented a bolt-action design as the Mauser Model 1895. It was soon adopted by several nations in South America—and was later purchased by Spain, which used the rifle during the Spanish-American War, where it helped influence the design of the American military's Springfield Model 1903.

Berlin saw that it was quickly becoming outclassed by a German-made rifle employed by other nations, and that led to the development of the Gewehr 98.

As stated by Robert W.D. Ball in his epic tome Mauser: Military Rifles of the World, the Gewehr 98 was adopted on April 5, 1898, and it was truly the finest in German engineering at the time. Ball noted that the first troops to receive the rifle were those of the East Asian Expeditionary Force, followed by the Imperial German Navy and three premier units of the Prussian Army Corp. The Gewehr 98 had its baptism of fire during the Boxer Rebellion (1898-1901), and then in the colonial conflict/genocide in German Southwest Africa against the native Hereros.

In 1904, contracts were placed with Waffenfabrik Mauser for 290,000 rifles and with Deutsche Waffen und Munitionsfabriken (DWM) for 210,000 rifles. Total production of the Gewehr 98 by the end of the First World War exceeded five million.

While not as common as even a decade ago, it is hard not to find a Mosin Nagant at the local gun show. As one of the most produced rifles of all time, vintage rifles from old Soviet stocks were commonly sold for little over $100, and oftentimes with Cold War-era ammo pouches or other accessories.

However, those were the later models, and the story of the Mosin-Nagant dates back almost half a century. While it was a firearm that was almost ideally suited to the Russian peasant, it wasn't a wholly Russian design. It incorporated designs and features from two different designers: Sergei Ivanovich Mosin, a captain in the Imperial Russian Army, and Belgian gun designer Leon Nagant. Each submitted their rifles for testing, and while Mosin's rifle was selected, the modified version featured key details of the Nagant design including the fixed box magazine and the magazine spring.

The first fight involving the rifle wasn't even on a battlefield but in the courts—both legal and in the Russian Imperial Court of the tsar. To sum up a complicated situation, Nagant claimed patent protection despite borrowing the idea from Mosin, who couldn't file a patent as he was an officer in the Russian Army, making the design property of the government and a military secret. In the end, Nagant was paid off and continued to design weapons for the Russian military, notably the Nagant M1895 revolver.

Moreover, in addition to incorporating design aspects from the Belgian maker, the first 500,000 rifles were produced by the French arms factory, Manufacture Nationale d'Armes de Châtellerault. It wasn't the only time the most famous of Russian rifles was produced in a foreign land.

The Mosin-Nagant entered service officially as the Russian 3-line rifle M1891, and domestic production began in 1892. The gun fired the 7.62x54mmR cartridge, a round that remained in service for more than 130 years!

Russia's new battle rifle first saw combat during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), and by that time some 3.8 million rifles were already in service. Its combat results were mixed, but gun historians say a larger part of this is that the infantrymen were not properly trained with this new weapon.

Millions more were made during World War I, and in another unique twist, the Russian demand far outpaced the supply, so much so that 1.5 million rifles were ordered by the Russian government and produced by Remington Arms in the United States. An additional 1.8 were further produced by New England Westinghouse. Many of these rifles didn’t make it to Russia before the Revolution and Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and thus were never delivered to the Russian government. Some were supplied to American and British expeditionary forces sent to Russia in 1918 and 1919, but many were later used by U.S. National Guard and ROTC units.

As Terence W. Lapin described in his book The Mosin-Nagant Rifle, the Russian-made weapon "is not an attractive firearm. It has none of the elegance of, say, the 1903 Springfield, nor is it particularly arresting in appearance. The venerable rifle is, however, robust, dependable, and reasonably accurate." That could also sum up the differences between Russia's peasant army, and the more refined German military.

Yet, from a cursory glance, the rifles are quite similar. Each weighs around nine pounds empty, holds five rounds, and is chambered for similar cartridges—the 7.62x54mmR for the Mosin-Nagant and the 7.92x57mm round for the Gewehr 98 (in post 1903 versions). With similar effective ranges of about 500 meters (550 years), it is hard to suggest one is better than the other.

Mauser fans will certainly disagree, and fair competition is challenging as many of the Russian rifles sold as surplus have been reworked and certainly used and abused. Those who favor the Mosin-Nagant will argue it can take a bit more punishment and keep working.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image: Sebastian_Photography / Shutterstock.com

Military and financial assistance from the United States and the West is the main reason why Ukraine has been able to defend itself for so long against Russian aggression.

A U.S.-led international coalition comprised of over forty countries has provided over $100 billion worth of military aid to Ukraine.

In exchange, the Ukrainian military has been able to hold, and in many instances defeat, the Russian forces for over 1,000 days, while seriously diminishing the conventional capabilities of the Russian military in the process.

In terms of military aid, the United States is by far the single most important supporter of Ukraine. With over $62 billion worth of security aid packages, the United States has provided the Ukrainian military with key weapon systems and support capabilities.

Just to name a few important transfers, the United States has provided Ukraine with M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), MGM-140 Army Tactical Ballistic Systems (ATACMS), MIM-104 Patriot air defense batteries, M1 Abrams main battle tanks, M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, M-777 155mm towed howitzers, M109 Paladin 155mm self-propelled howitzers, T-72B main battle tanks, National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS), FIM-192 Stinger shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, over 4 million artillery munitions, and more than 500 million small arms bullets and grenades. These are just some of the weapon systems and capabilities provided to Ukraine.

As the manufacturing country, the United States has also authorized other countries to provide Ukraine with F-16 Fighting Falcon fighter jets.

In terms of transferring these weapon systems to Ukraine, the United States has been doing it in two different ways: Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) packages and Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) packages.

PDA packages draw from the Pentagon’s existing stocks to provide immediate relief and capabilities to the Ukrainian forces. Of course, the U.S. military has been providing weapon systems from its reserves in order not to jeopardize its global deterrence posture. But even these older weapon systems are effective against the Russian military.

USAI packages provide the Pentagon with money to buy brand-new capabilities for the Ukrainian military. Although these weapon systems are new, it can take years before they are delivered to the Ukrainian military.

The United States and its allies have also been looking for alternative methods of funding Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression.

On Tuesday, the United States sent Kyiv the first tranche of loans generated solely from profits from seized frozen Russian assets. According to Kyiv, the first loan was worth $1 billion and it will go toward ensuring Ukraine can survive Russian aggression. Japan will also be sending $3 billion generated from seized frozen Russian assets. Earlier in December, the United States announced that it would be allocating approximately $20 billion from seized frozen Russian assets to Ukraine.

Since the war began on February 24, 2022, there has been international pressure to seize Russian assets from all over the world and give them to Ukraine to defend itself. Although it took more than 1,000 days, the United States and its partners are now moving in the right direction. For example, the Group of Seven, under the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration Loans initiative, will provide approximately $50 billion to Ukraine in 2025 from the profits generated from seized frozen Russian assets; the funds will go toward helping the Ukrainian military, as well as providing important financial relief to the Ukrainian government.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image: Shutterstock.

As Western powers continue to provide and approve Ukraine’s use of advanced weaponry against Russia, the veracity of Vladimir Putin’s deterrent threats against such provocations is increasingly called into question. 

Throughout the war, each step up the escalation ladder taken by the West—whether supplying Ukraine with fighter jets, long-range missiles, and, most recently, $20 billion in aid funded by seized Russian assets—was preceded by warnings of dire consequences from Moscow. However, no retaliation against the United States or its NATO partners has resulted. Now, this anticlimactic pattern has led many, including President-elect Donald Trump’s designated envoy to Ukraine-Russia, to believe that Putin’s nuclear threats are more bluff than bluster, arguing that the United States should “lean in” to challenge Russia rather than back down. Now, many contend that the unexpected fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria dealt a blow to Russia’s geopolitical standing, fueling more calls to capitalize on Moscow’s weakened position.

Yet, assuming limited risk or expected advantage in continuing escalation against Russia is dangerously flawed. This hardline approach misreads and oversimplifies the dynamics of escalation and overlooks Russia's increasing conventional military capabilities.

Contrary to the bravado on display, crisis escalation is non-linear and inherently unpredictable. Despite the analytic investment by scholars to study its dynamics, our grasp of escalation games remains limited, at best, while our understanding of nuclear escalation is virtually non-existent. Not only are there no standard units of measurement to gauge and evaluate the mechanics that underpin escalation, but also, the rules are not governed by simple cause-and-effect frameworks, fixed interests, or stable perceptions. In continuously adaptive feedback, the context, stakes, and calculations evolve with each new development and maneuver.

Likewise, the difficulties inherent in interpreting signals add another layer of complexity to understanding escalation. For instance, the assertion that Putin is bluffing wrongly conflates rhetoric with policy and behavior. Most likely, Moscow’s deterrent threats directed toward the West serve as tools of coercive diplomacy—signals meant to manage escalation from spiraling out of control—rather than represent triggers of an imminent military response. Still, to cross a so-called “red line” doesn’t necessarily nullify the threat or confirm the bluff. Indeed, repeated provocations could aggravate and intensify Russia’s threat perceptions, gradually building deferred pressure among decision-makers in Moscow. Eventually, this could lead to a tipping point, where Russia might act decisively to reaffirm its credibility.

Needless to say, Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine on February 24, 2022, was itself a dramatic act of escalation. It was marked by many instances of its warnings going unheeded by the United States and NATO until it provoked a response. In effect, what held true in the past may not hold true in the future—and assuming otherwise invites miscalculation.

Certainly, escalation doesn’t necessarily mean recklessness. Sometimes, it’s a rational choice in militarized crises. In such cases, meeting specific criteria can justify advancing the escalation ladder. First, the stakes must be vital enough to warrant the risks. Second, escalation must be controllable or manageable to ensure strategic advantage, a position referred to as “escalation dominance.” Finally, diplomacy must be exhausted or unviable at that juncture of the crisis to render escalation a last resort.

However, last month’s approval by Western powers for Ukraine to launch long-range strikes inside Russia—through American-supplied ATACMS, British-supplied Storm Shadow missiles, and French-supplied SCALPs—disregarded these principles. Such provocations prompted Russia to rattle its nuclear saber, revising its nuclear doctrine to expand the conditions for deployment.

No doubt, the odds of Russia resorting to nuclear weapons are slim—but slim odds are still far from an impossibility. With the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, Russia’s modern warheads include “dial-to-yield” technology, enabling adjustable explosive power to be reduced down to a fraction of its potential. This makes tactical nukes more suitable for limited battlefield engagements or demonstrating resolve. Hence, even a trivial probability warrants caution.

Paradoxically, overconfidence in the stability of the “nuclear taboo” has emboldened the provocative actions that prompted Russia’s nuclear threats—behavior the taboo is meant to prevent. Indeed, many Western policymakers and pundits alike dismiss any risk of nuclear use by Russia, categorizing it as suicidal. However, this argument fails to connect the premise to its conclusion logically.

For starters, Ukraine doesn’t possess nuclear weapons. Moreover, while unlikely, Russia’s use of a tactical nuke in Ukraine is still more plausible than a U.S. retaliation through direct war, especially in response to nuclear use against a third country. Such a scenario would compel any American president to confront the stark reality of nuclear escalation and the grave risks of direct conflict with Russia. Thus, assumptions about the existential risk to Putin’s survival in response to nuclear use overestimate NATO’s ability to credibly deter Russia on behalf of a non-treaty partner. In fact, NATO has no extended deterrence over Ukraine and has ruled out direct defense of the country, having refrained from deploying its own ground forces.

Of course, Russia isn’t likely to go nuclear so long as it’s not losing the war. But even if nuclear fears are overstated, to rely on its improbability to justify further escalation precariously overlooks Russia’s formidable conventional power. Indeed, Western hardliners fail to grasp that Moscow still has ample room to turn up the dial and escalate below the nuclear threshold. Moreover, this stratum of high-tech conventional capability only grows more dynamic and potent, with no clear countermeasures on the horizon.

Undoubtedly, Russia's November 21 debut of its “Oreshnik” missile, which targeted a weapons factory in the central Ukrainian city of Dnipro, was a powerful display of its developing conventional forces. An intermediate-range hypersonic ballistic missile with multiple reentry targeting capabilities is reported to exceed speeds of Mach 10, bypassing any air defense system. Putin regards this weapon system as a versatile tool, enabling flexible and calibrated responses against Western escalation and allowing Russia to avoid the troubles of going nuclear.

“Oreshnik is not a weapon of mass destruction,” Putin declared on November 28, adding that if deployed “several missiles at once, in a cluster, their single strike will be comparable to the use of nuclear weapons.” On December 10, he emphasized that “what we need now is not to improve the nuclear doctrine, but to advance the Oreshnik,” claiming that with enough of these advanced systems, Russia would be “on the brink of virtually no need to use nuclear weapons.” Now entering mass production, with plans to potentially forward-deploy the weapon to Belarus in 2025, Russia has signaled its intent to rely on this system more extensively.

Contrary to its intended purpose, escalation by Western powers hasn’t degraded Russia’s military. Instead, the war of attrition intensified and prolonged by Western aid, has worked to transform Russia’s massive latent power into tangible military strength. Today, Moscow has a range of tools to intensify and expand the war within Ukraine and beyond, if necessary. This toolkit includes advanced development in hypersonic missile technology, precision-guided munitions, anti-missile defense, armored vehicles and tanks, and drone, cyber, and electronic warfare.

Apart from its advanced technological expertise, Russia’s vast reserves of critical minerals, energy resources, and industrial metals provide the raw materials necessary to sustain large-scale weapons production, which hasn’t yet reached its potential output. In a war where artillery remains “King of the Battlefield,” Russia produces artillery shells three times faster—and at a quarter of the cost—compared to American and European NATO members combined. To boot, Russia’s strategic partnerships with states like China, Iran, and North Korea have bolstered its access to key military ingredients, such as machine tools and microelectronics, in addition to combat-ready weapons like drones and artillery. This ensures its ability to sustain a high-intensity war even longer.

By all metrics, Russia’s war-making capacity has grown stronger, whereas Ukraine’s has progressively weakened. This vulnerability stems from the cascading risks inherent in a protracted war of attrition. It’s no surprise that Russia’s strategy centers on grinding down Ukraine’s military at a favorable casualty-exchange ratio while hindering it from replenishing and reproducing the quality of its forces. Since the war’s onset, Ukraine’s military has been forced to rev its engines and run on all cylinders. This relentless pressure and tempo have left its military with no auxiliary capacity to regulate its intensity or manage escalation within what it’s able to sustain organizationally. Over time, institutional breakdown or capitulation becomes a more plausible scenario for Ukraine than for Russia. 

Today, Washington is urging Kyiv to address its critical shortages in manpower and lower the conscription age to eighteen as Russian military advances accelerate on the ground.

Equally important, Moscow’s capacity for conventional escalation is matched by its willingness to act. Despite talk in Western capitals about Moscow’s reluctance to enforce its threats, Russia has instead managed its escalation with calibration, minimizing overexposure and mitigating risks of overreach and overheating. Against evolving and emerging threats, Russia has expanded its political aims, intensified its firepower, and further mobilized troops to correspond with changes in goals and strategy. But its will to fight stems from the balance of resolve in Ukraine, where Russia’s stakes outweigh those of NATO. Again, it’s not a coincidence that Western commitment to Ukraine remains distant, limited to support from afar rather than direct defense.

Yet, despite clear evidence of Russia’s resolve, the United States and Europe remain entrenched in outdated assumptions that still underestimate it. To the detriment of their own coercive strategies, Western policymakers consistently fail to recognize, let alone accept, that Russia’s willpower is not driven by imperial ambition but by the conviction that NATO’s deepening relationship with Ukraine—and the endeavor to incorporate it into the alliance—constitutes a threat to its national security. History has repeatedly shown that when a state perceives its security threatened, its resolve hardens.

Today, Russia’s conventional escalation in Ukraine could still intensify in two major ways. First, the range of military targets could expand further. While this has already included Ukraine’s critical infrastructure—such as energy, electricity, and communications—the intensity of attacks could still be ramped up significantly. Likewise, its crosshairs could shift toward Ukraine’s command-and-control and government institutions. Second, Moscow could expand its war aims further. Beyond the four regions annexed in 2022 and Crimea in 2014, Russia could seek to grab more territory, such as Odesa and Kharkiv.

For NATO, the premise of escalation began with the aim to overburden Russia’s invasion, pressuring it to abandon its military objectives and withdraw from Ukraine. Today, escalation aims to coerce Moscow into accepting Western-favored terms for a negotiated settlement.

This strategy—coercive bargaining—is destined to fail on the merits of an inconvenient truth: the West doesn’t hold escalation dominance against Russia. To coerce without advantage is a recipe for diminished coercive power in return.

As such, Donald Trump’s return to the White House provides an opportunity for a course correction in Ukraine. Further escalation, however, must be avoided. To seek to gain or apply leverage is a perilous gamble in this case and will unlikely extract a better deal in the future. Prone to backfire, it’ll force upward pressure on the Kremlin to respond in kind and grant Russia the pretext to flex its conventional muscle even further. As a result, Ukraine’s eroding position on the battlefield—and thus, at the negotiating table—will be accelerated.

For the sake of Ukraine’s people, the practical and moral course is to shift toward a policy of accommodation with Russia, abandoning unproductive attempts to negotiate from an unattainable position of strength. Neither escalation nor time is on Ukraine’s side. The new administration must understand the intransigence of this reality, recognize Russia’s security concerns, and seriously engage with its terms for ending its war on Ukraine.

The pill will surely be a bitter one to swallow now, but its bitterness will only grow with time.

Ramzy Mardini is an associate at the Pearson Institute for the Study and Resolution of Global Conflicts at the University of Chicago. He is also a research affiliate at the Center for International Security & Cooperation at Stanford University.

Image: Seneline / Shutterstock.com.