The National Interest

Without a doubt, the Allies defeated the Axis during World War II thanks in large part to air superiority; this air superiority was due to fantabulous fighter planes such as the P-38 Lightning, P-47 Thunderbolt, and especially the P-51D Mustang.

Yet ironically, in one of the great statistical anomalies of the war, the top-scoring individual aces of the Axis far outscored the Allies’ top aces. (An “ace” is defined as a combat aviator with a minimum of five air-to-air victories.) For example, the top three Allied aces were the Soviet Union’s Ivan Nikitovich Kozhedub (sixty-four kills); Britain’s (South African-born) Marmaduke Thomas St John “Pat” Pattle (at least forty victories, more likely over fifty); and America’s Richard Ira “Dick” Bong (forty kills). Compare and contrast those numbers with the top three Axis aces: Imperial Japan’s Tetsuzo Iwamoto (at least ninety-four victories; 202 kills personally claimed); Nazi Germany’s Gerhard "Gerd" Barkhorn (301 kills); and Germany’s Erich Hartmann (whose mind-numbing tally of 352 kills makes him the most successful fighter ace in the history of aerial warfare).

Though both sides of the war had their fair share of “aces in a day” (including America’s Chuck Yeager), the Germans also laid the claim to the fastest pilot and plane combo to achieve that rarified status: then-Major Werner Streib and the Heinkel He 219 Uhu (“Eagle-Owl”).

The Uhu made her maiden flight on November 15, 1942, and officially entered operational service with "die Vaterland (the Fatherland)" the following year. The warbird had a number of features that were then state-of-the-art, such as cannons mounted to fire at an oblique angle, the first steerable nosewheel on an operational German aircraft, and the world's first ejection seats on an operational aircraft of any nation.

The He 219’s specifications and vital stats included:

-Fuselage Length: 50 ft 4 in (15.33 m)
-Wingspan: 60 ft 8 in (18.5 m)
-Height: 13 ft 5 in (4.1 m)
-Empty weight: 24,692 lb (11,200 kg)
-Gross weight: 33,731 lb (15,300 kg)
-Powerplant: two × Daimler-Benz DB 603E V-12 inverted liquid-cooled piston engines, 1,324 kW (1,776 hp) each
-Max Airspeed: 420 mph (670 km/h, 360 kn) at 23,000 ft (7,000 m)
-Cruise Speed: 340 mph (540 km/h, 290 kn)
-Combat Range: 960 mi (1,545 km, 834 NM)
-Service Ceiling: 41,700 ft (12,700 m) (absolute)
-Armament
--two × 20 mm (0.787 in) MG 151/20 cannons in a detachable fairing under the fuselage, 300 rounds per gun (rpg)
--two × 20 mm MG 151/20 cannons in wing roots, 300 rpg
--two × 30 mm (1.181 in) MK 108 cannons, Schrage Musik (oriented 65 degrees)

Total production of the He 219 amounted to just under 300 airframes.

Werner Streib was born on June 13, 1911, in Pforzheim in the southwest German state of Baden-Wurttemberg. Werner began his military career as an infantryman in the Wehrmacht in 1934; however, he obtained a transfer to the Luftwaffe in 1936 and started as an observer in a reconnaissance unit. He later trained as a fighter pilot.

He scored his first aerial victory on May 10, 1940, setting the stage for a very successful combat record.

Warren Gray of Gunpowder Magazine tells the story in a September 25, 2021, article:

“[The Uhu’s] auspicious, combat debut occurred on the night of June 11 to 12, 1943, when Major Werner Streib, a Messerschmitt Bf 110G-4 Zerstörer (“Destroyer”) night-fighter ace with 50 confirmed kills to his credit already, and his radar operator, Sergeant Helmut Fischer, sitting back-to-back inside the cockpit, flew their He 219 pre-production prototype V9, recently upgraded to He 219A-0/R2 production standards, and marked “G9+FB” on the sides of the aircraft, on a nocturnal sortie from Venlo Airfield, in the German-occupied Netherlands … Streib quickly shot down a Royal Air Force (RAF) Halifax four-engine bomber at 1:05 AM, southeast of Roermond, then a second Halifax near Rheinberg at 1:20 AM, a third Halifax north of Mook at 1:55 AM, a four-engine, Avro Lancaster bomber southwest of Nijmegen at 2:16 AM, and a fourth Halifax bomber near Sambeek at 2:22 AM, for a total of five confirmed kills in a single mission, an astounding, ‘ace-in-a-night’ accomplishment. They expended virtually all of their ammunition.” 

By the time of the collapse of the Third Reich, Werner Streib had attained the rank of oberst (colonel) with sixty-six confirmed aerial kills. He spent eleven years working in the grocery business, then resumed his military career with the post-WWII Luftwaffe (unlike the Wehrmacht turned Bundeswehr Heer [army] and the Kriegsmarine turned Deutsche Marine [navy], the German Air Force has retained its WWII moniker to the present day) from 1956 to 1966 retiring with the rank of brigadegeneral (Brigadier general). He passed away on June 15, 1986, at the age of seventy-five, and was buried with military honors at the Ostfriedhof (Eastern Cemetery) in Munich.

As for the aircraft flown by Streib on his history-making mission, there is exactly one fully intact, fully restored, surviving specimen today. Werknummer ("Work Number") 290202 is at the Smithsonian National Air & Space Museum's Steven F. Udvar-Hazy Center in Chantilly, Virginia (near Washington Dulles International Airport); I've personally toured the museum twice and recommend it highly.

Christian D. Orr is a Senior Defense Editor for National Security Journal (NSJ). He is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch, The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security, and Simple Flying. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS). If you’d like to pick his brain further, you can ofttimes find him at the Old Virginia Tobacco Company (OVTC) lounge in Manassas, Virginia, partaking of fine stogies and good quality human camaraderie.

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North Korea’s expanding ballistic missile program, along with its advancing nuclear weapons project, is a serious and growing threat both to its regional neighbors and the United States. 

That is why the Trump administration’s quest to achieve a more stable diplomatic relationship, after literally decades of hostilities between the West and North Korea, was such a monumental move. 

One North Korean system of note is the Hwasong-7, otherwise known as the Nodong-1 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM).

The Nodong-1 missile provides North Korea with the capability to reach out and threaten its regional neighbors both with conventional and, likely, nuclear attacks. Nodong-1 can cover all of South Korea and parts of Japan. Its accuracy, however, remains a major source of debate. Many Western analysts assess that the circular error probable for this system is one to two miles, meaning that this system is likely not as effective against military targets as it is against larger, softer targets like the cities of South Korea and parts of Japan. 

Although, these are all estimates made by the West and should be taken with a grain of salt, seeing as the intelligence picture of North Korea is even less informative to observers than black holes. 

One thing to keep in mind, though, is that North Korea’s overall ballistic missile threat has been growing. The technology undergirding the North Korean program has gotten better with each test launch. In turn, these launches have helped to further North Korea’s overall threat to the United States and its regional partners. 

And since 2013, when Pyongyang’s forces developed the capability to miniaturize nuclear warheads, North Korean ballistic missiles can now reliably carry advanced nuclear weapons. 

Anyway, the Nodong is especially helpful to Pyongyang as it seeks to gain leverage over its regional rivals. The presence of the Nodong system in large quantities allows North Korea’s negotiators to gain greater concessions from their rivals at the negotiating table. Should war ever erupt between North Korea and its neighbors, Pyongyang would have a significant capability to deal out death and wanton damage to its foes with the Nodong missile. 

So, it doesn’t only provide great diplomatic capital, but the Nodong-1 missile is a serious strategic advantage for North Korea’s military.

As of 2024, most intelligence assessments indicate that there are only 100 Nodong-1 launchers deployed. And since the Nodong-1 was first developed in the mid-1980s, North Korea’s ballistic missile program has truly evolved into a potent and comprehensive regional (indeed, global threat). Today, North Korea’s arsenal includes the Hwasong-12, Hwasong-14, Hwasong-15, and Hwasong-17, all of which likely overshadow the capabilities of the Nodong-1 IRBM system. 

Yet, the Nodong-1 is an important link in the evolution of North Korea’s ballistic missile program.

What’s more, the Nodong-1 is likely to be upgraded for at least the next decade before Pyongyang ever contemplates phasing this system out of its arsenal entirely. Further, as the incoming Trump administration finds its footing, it is probable that the administration will seek to rekindle its previous good relations with Pyongyang. 

A key element of renewed negotiations with North Korea will be in the domain of arms control. Having the 100 or so Nodong-1s still in service will force the Americans and their allies to focus and negotiate on those systems as opposed to newer ones. So, again, the Nodong-1 serves as a useful tool in terms of North Korean diplomacy with the West.

Like so many weapons in the North Korean arsenal, the Nodong-1 is derived from older Soviet-era missile technology. Specifically, the Soviet R-17 Elbrus (a.k.a. “Scud”) missile. The design was adapted by North Korean weapons designers to augment the range and lethality of its Soviet predecessor. Nodong-1 is a single-stage, liquid-fueled missile, which employs a unique combination of unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) and AK-27 (nitric acid with nitrogen oxides) for propulsion. 

Nodong-1 is approximately 53 feet in length, with a diameter of a little less than five feet. Its range is approximately between 745 miles to 932 miles and its payload capacity is about 2,600 pounds. Nodong-1 is a serious threat to its neighbors and the North Koreans should not be underestimated. 

The fact that Nodong-1 is not even the most advanced ballistic missile in North Korea’s arsenal shows how important arms control talks will be in the new Trump administration—and the price of getting America’s North Korea policy wrong.

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

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2024 was the deadliest thus far in the war in Ukraine.

Both Russia and Ukraine lost hundreds of thousands of troops killed and wounded in the fighting. Russia, in particular, lost approximately 430,000 troops in just one year.

The year 2024 will go down as the year in which the Russian military wrestled back the initiative and launched its attritional strategy.

Since January 2024, the Russian forces have been on the offensive, but it wasn’t until May that the Kremlin unveiled its attritional strategy. Under this strategy, the Russian military exchanged men for territory. Starting in May, the Russian military threw hundreds of thousands of men against the Ukrainian defensive lines. And, steadily but slowly, the Russian forces advanced, capturing important battlefield points in southeastern and eastern Ukraine.

Most of the progress achieved by the Russian forces took place in the fall.

“Russian forces made 56.5 percent of their 2024 territorial gains during the September through November 2024 period,” the Institute for the Study of War assessed in its latest estimate of the conflict.

In the closing days of 2024, Ukrainian commander-in-chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi revealed that the Russian forces took approximately 427,000 casualties throughout the year. In exchange for those casualties, the Russian forces captured about 1,609 square miles of territory in Ukraine and Russia (the Kursk Oblast salient). These numbers translate to around 267 men killed and wounded for every square mile captured. Moreover, the Russian losses translate to an average of 1,178 losses every single day, with lows in the low hundreds and highs of over 2,000 losses per day.

In terms of quality, the territory the Russian forces captured mainly comprised of farm fields and small settlements. Indeed, Bakhmut is the last major town the Russian forces captured in the war, and they did so back in 2023.

As far as losses, the Russian military has managed to recruit just enough troops through a variety of ways, including mercenaries, conscripts, and North Korean soldiers, to maintain its attritional strategy.

“Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on December 24 that 440,000 recruits signed military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in 2024, suggesting that Russia is likely recruiting just enough military personnel to replace its recently high casualty rates one for one,” the Institute for the Study of War added.

But whether and for how long the Russian military can maintain such high recruitment levels remains the big question.

The Ukrainian military tried to stem the Russian progress by launching a surprise offensive against Russia itself. In early August, Ukrainian mechanized brigades stormed Kursk Oblast, which borders eastern Ukraine, and made immediate progress. In just a few days, the Ukrainians captured hundreds of square kilometers of territory and scores of settlements, creating a salient inside Russia. As a result of the Ukrainian attack, the Russian military was forced to draw forces from the fighting inside Ukraine to contain the threat in Russia.

However, the Ukrainian offensive proved to be only a temporary distraction for the Russian military.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

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The Pentagon awarded Lockheed Martin a contract for 145 F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter jets worth almost $12 billion.

In the last days of December, the Pentagon awarded Lockheed Martin an “undefinitized, fixed-price incentive (firm-target), firm-fixed-price modification” to a contract for the production of 145 F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter jets. The contract is worth $11.7 billion.

Essentially, the contract is an extension to a previously awarded contract for F-35s. But for legal and practical reasons, the U.S. military and some other F-35 customers order F-35s—and indeed other aircraft—in batches as opposed to making one contract for the full number. Indeed, in the case of the U.S. military, that would be mighty impractical since it has decided to order approximately 2,500 F-35s of all types for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps.

This extension in the F-35 contract highlights the international nature of the F-35 program, which is one of its biggest strengths. Work for the 145 F-35s will be performed in at least four different countries (the United States, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom), and within the United States, five different states will benefit from the work (Texas, California, Maryland, New Hampshire, and Florida).

Specifically, the extension to the original contract is for the production and delivery of 145 F-35s from the Lot 18 batch. Out of these aircraft, there are forty-eight F-35A for the Air Force, fourteen F-35C for the Navy, and sixteen F-35B and five F-35C for the Marine Corps. Moreover, fifteen F-35A and one F-35B are destined for non-U.S. Department of Defense program partners, and thirty-nine F-35A and seven F-35B for Foreign Military Sales customers.

As you can tell, the F-35 Program is a highly complex one with twenty member countries and three variants of the same aircraft (F-35A, F-35B, and F-35C) involved.

The twenty member countries are the United States, United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, Denmark, Norway, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Belgium, Poland, Singapore, Finland, Switzerland, Germany, the Czech Republic, Greece, and Romania. Turkey was also in the program until it decided to purchase the S-400 Triumpf air defense system from Russia, thus triggering the anger of the United States and NATO and resulting in its defenestration from the program.

The total order of F-35s from these countries is approximately 3,579 aircraft. In terms of the specific variants, the F-35A is the most popular, with around 2,700 orders, followed by the F-35B, with 575 orders, and the F-35C, with 340 orders. The U.S. military is by far the largest F-35 purchaser with a total order of 2,456 aircraft (the Air Force has ordered 1,763 F-35As, the Navy 270 F-35Cs, and the Marine Corps 353 F-35Bs and seventy F-35Cs). Interestingly, the U.S. military is the only one operating the F-35C, which is designed for aircraft carrier operations.

The F-35 Lightning II is the most advanced fighter jet in the skies today and is capable of evading enemy air defenses with its stealth characteristics.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

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The United States Air Force saw thirty-nine—or nearly 20 percent—of its fleet of 218 Cold War-era Fairchild Republic A-10 Thunderbolt II close air support (CAS) attack aircraft retired in 2024. In fact, these birds were sent to the 309th Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group (AMARG) for long-term storage at Davis-Monthan Air Force "Boneyard" in Tucson, Arizona. The cuts were double the number of A-10s that had been retired in the fiscal year 2023 (FY23), and even more, Thunderbolt IIs will face the chopping block in the coming months.

That could include the two dozen stationed in South Korea at Osan Air Base with the 25th Fighter Squadron, which is likely to return to the United States in the coming weeks, Simple Flying reported.

As part of the annual defense policy bill for fiscal year 2025 (FY25), signed into law by President Joe Biden last month, the Air Force could see its operational fleet of A-10s further reduced.

Known affectionately among pilots and ground crews as the Warthog, the A-10 first entered service in March 1976, replacing the Vought A-7D Corsair as the Air Force's primary CAS aircraft. The aircraft was developed to counter a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, where it served as a modern tank buster.

It more than delivered when it went to war—albeit in Iraq rather than Europe.

It was during the 1991 Gulf War, Air & Space Forces magazine reported in 1993, that "the A-10 force was credited with destroying 987 tanks, 926 artillery pieces, 1,355 combat vehicles, and a range of other targets-including ten fighters on the ground and two helicopters shot down in air-to-air engagements. The A-10 force, flying more than 8,000 combat sorties, suffered only five A-10s destroyed (a loss rate of .062 percent)."

Over three decades later, the A-10 has continued to fly in a CAS role, and it was among the aircraft that the Air Force deployed to the Middle East in 2024. It was reported to have flown strafing runs on Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia militia columns and ISIS targets in Syria.

Despite the role the aircraft continues to play, the Air Force has sought for years to retire the aging A-10, arguing that it is ill-suited to a modern conflict with a near-peer adversary such as China. Those calls for its retirement met repeated objections from lawmakers. Yet finally, in 2022, Congress approved the service's calls to begin to retire the iconic attack plane.

The U.S. Air Force has set a goal to see the last of the A-10s sent to the Boneyard by 2030.

Even as some in the U.S. Air Force have apparently lost faith in the A-10, there has been chatter that the Warthog should be sent to Ukraine or Jordan.

As previously reported, in July, lawmakers on the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services directed Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin III to "explore the possibility of transferring" the A-10s now being retired to the Royal Jordanian Air Force. The Warthog may be well-suited to Jordan's ongoing counter-drug campaign, which has included airstrikes on positions near the Syrian border. The Middle Eastern kingdom also played a significant role in fighting ISIS over the past decade and could likely do so again. The A-10 is an ideal aircraft for such campaigns against insurgent forces.

Jordan isn't the only nation that has expressed interest in the A-10.

The U.S. Air Force had previously discussed a plan to supply Colombia with a squadron of Thunderbolt IIs to counter drug cartels in that country, but it never moved forward.

Of course, aviation experts have continued to suggest that the A-10 could be the perfect aircraft for the Ukrainian Air Force, as it was designed to survive even after sustaining heavy damage and can operate from austere airfields. In contrast, the Ukrainian Air Force already operates the similar (but far less capable) Sukhoi Su-25 (NATO reporting name Frogfoot). This slow-flying ground attack aircraft has been employed to strike Russian tanks.

For aviation buffs, 2024 also marked the end of the line for the A-10C Thunderbolt II Demonstration Team, which took to the skies for a final time at the Stuart Air Show in Witham Field, Florida, as part of the Veterans Day Weekend celebrations in November.

"We want to extend a huge thank you to everyone who supported us and everyone who came out to watch an amazing airframe, pilot, and team, perform for you at 1800 shows across 10 countries over the course of more than 40 years," the A-10C Thunderbolt II Demonstration Team expressed in a statement, posted to Facebook.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

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In the wake of the horrific Hamas attacks on Israel on October 7, 2023, the Israeli government initiated a series of strikes upon its enemies to both seek justice for the terrorist attacks upon Israel and to restore deterrence that had been lost by the attacks. 

Beginning with their counterstrike on Hamas targets in Gaza, the Israelis pushed hard against their enemies in the West Bank and Syria and even the Iranian-backed Hezbollah terrorist network to the north in Lebanon. 

Indeed, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) even managed to launch long-range strikes against the Iran-backed Houthis in distant Yemen and against targets within Iran itself.

In the aftermath of those stunning Israeli airstrikes directed against Iranian targets, the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu proudly announced that it had obliterated a key component of Iran’s purportedly complex air defense network. Countless Russian-built S-300 air defense systems were destroyed by the striking F-35I Adir fifth-generation warplanes that the Israelis had deployed to attack those targets within Iran. 

Israel claims that they eviscerated the Iranian national air defense networks surrounding key targets in their nation. In other words, the Israeli military is saying that they maintain escalation dominance. With those key targets being vulnerable to repeat attacks from the IAF. 

What’s more, now that the pro-Iran (and Russian-backed) Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria has collapsed, the Israelis have taken over large swathes of the country that borders their eastern territories. The IDF is now ensconced in Syria and has created what amounts to an air corridor that its planes can use to reliably strike Iran and return to safety.

A lack of reliable air defenses means that Israel now holds all the cards in any military engagement against Iran. 

But did Israel really destroy all the air defense systems that the Iranians possessed? Surely, Iran has more systems than just the Russian-made S-300. Since the Israeli strike that knocked out all of Iran’s S-300 air defense batteries, the Islamist regime in Tehran has fought to downplay the damage. Both the Israeli government and the Biden administration have told The Times of Israel that the Islamic Republic is “essentially naked.” 

In April of last year, the Iranians expressed interest in purchasing the more powerful Russian-built S-400 air defense system. By November, though, Iran claimed it did not need the Russian system. Instead, the Iranians have the Bavar-373, which Tehran claims is comparable to the Russian S-400. According to Iranian state sources, the Bavar-373 is a long-range anti-ballistic missile defense system that can, purportedly, destroy Israeli and American fifth-generation warplanes.

Of course, the question that everyone should be asking is, why didn’t these systems knock Israel’s F-35Is out of the sky before they could obliterate the Iranian S-300 sites and sensitive Iranian military targets during their October airstrikes on the Islamic Republic? 

The fact is that the Iranians have struggled to beef up their air defense network. That’s partly because they’ve not fought a near-peer rival since the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s (and Iran barely survived that experience). 

There’s more, too. For instance, the Iranian military, on top of being saddled with older indigenously built systems, lacks the appropriate doctrine for effectively using air defense systems. While it’s true that older systems are not especially helpful against newer fifth-generation warplanes, like the F-35I, a lack of proper understanding of the science and tactics behind reliable air defenses complicates Iranian attempts at defense. 

Meanwhile, the Iranians have expanded their defensive perimeter into Shiite-controlled zones of neighboring Iraq. But that extended defense perimeter only works if, again, the Iranians are using reliable technology and have an effective air defense doctrine they’re employing.

So, yes, the Israelis have basically ensured they have escalation dominance over the Iranians. 

A weakened central Syrian government in the post-Assad era is presiding over the de facto partition of Syria, leading the Israelis to take portions of western Syria near the Golan Heights.

The Israelis are trying to create an air corridor to allow their planes to strike deep inside Iran. If Iran’s air defenses are truly gone the way that Israel and the United States claim they are, then Tehran is going to be subjected to the mother-of-all air wars over the next year or so, as the Israelis seek to end the Iranian regime’s threat and the Americans back their play.

Further, the Israeli destruction of Iranian air defenses with their F-35I is a testament to the fact that the F-35, while it has certainly encountered massive problems over the course of its development, is still quite a lethal fighter.

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

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Russian social media is running wild with images of an American M1A1 Abrams Main Battle Tank (MBT) being captured by the Russian Army fighting in Ukraine. According to these Russian sources (take from them what you will), the Abrams in question is being sent back to Moscow to be reverse-engineered. Indeed, this is hardly the first American Abrams captured by Russian forces fighting in Ukraine. 

As Military Watch Magazine has assessed, since September, “the rate at which Ukrainian forces have been losing Abrams tanks has increased significantly.”  

And it isn’t just the Abrams MBT that has struggled in the muddy, blood-soaked killing fields of Ukraine. Most of the other classes of NATO MBTs have either been destroyed or rendered useless in Ukraine’s fight against the invading Russians. Even the much-ballyhooed German-built Leopard 2A6 MBTs have not fared as their proponents in NATO claimed they would.

Most independent analysts assess that of the thirty-one Abrams tanks handed over to Ukraine, an astonishing twenty of them have been destroyed within the first year of their deployment to Ukraine. According to Military Watch Magazine, most of the kills that the Russians have enjoyed over the Abrams tanks have been conducted by the ubiquitous “kamikaze” unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that both sides in the war have been using to terrorize each other. 

More shockingly, at least one confirmed Russian kill of the M1A1 Abrams in Ukraine was achieved by an old Russian T-72B3 MBT (thereby proving this author’s long-running supposition that the T-72 is the best tank in the Ukraine War).

Multiple media sources have interviewed U.S.-trained Ukrainian tank crews, all of whom have expressed extreme dissatisfaction with the Abrams tank. In the summation of these tank crews, their Abrams tanks are plagued with technical issues, and there is very little active defense provided against the aforementioned threat posed by Russian kamikaze drones. 

What’s more, the advances in anti-tank weaponry have complicated the ability of MBTs belonging to both sides in the Ukraine War to defend themselves. 

In the case of Russia, their 9M133 Kornet dual-warhead anti-tank weapon is a nightmare for any Ukrainian tank (as much as the NATO-provided Javelin anti-tank system is a problem that Russian MBTs struggle to overcome).

The real question that Western strategists must answer is why the M1A1 Abrams has struggled to perform well in the Ukraine War.

After all, the Abrams is America’s primary MBT, and the Pentagon is spending gobs of money on an updated variant of the Abrams, which will be the U.S. Army’s primary armor force for decades to come. However, if the M1A1 Abrams’ lackluster performance in Ukraine is any indication of its utility in a future war, then the Pentagon’s investment in this system might be a bad choice.

Is this really a case of the vaunted Abrams finally being made obsolete by the changing tide of warfare, or is this really a user error?

While it’s easy to simply say that the Americans have not kept pace with the changing face of war in the modern age, the fact remains that the M1A1 Abrams, along with the other tanks provided by NATO, such as the aforementioned German-built Leopards, are highly technical. It takes years for troops to master these systems. NATO expected Ukrainians under siege to learn the intricacies and innovate tactics for these systems in a few months’ time. 

What’s more, the tanks in question had to undergo several retrofits to better comport with the radical demands of the Ukrainian battlefield. So, between the rapid technical changes along with the novice-level crews manning these systems, to say nothing of the absurdity of placing so much hope on what amounts to a small number of tanks against such a large Russian force, the Abrams’ experience in Ukraine was doomed from the outset. 

That’s not to say that the Americans aren’t going to need to radically upgrade their existing fleet of M1A1 Abrams as well as to ensure that the new AbramsX the Pentagon is developing can better cope with the kind of anti-tank weapons and drones that adversaries will use against American MBTs in a future conflict (which is coming sooner than most people think). 

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: ArChe1993 / Shutterstock.com.

With the fall of the Assad regime in Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon defeated and increasingly isolated, attention turns to the Houthis in Yemen. Perhaps the strongest remaining Iranian proxy force in the region, the Houthis are certainly the most active in terms of their attacks on Israel and also on international shipping in the Red Sea. 

With confrontation between the Houthis and Israel, and perhaps America too, seems set to escalate, this will likely raise questions of whether the regime in Sanaa will prove as frail as its former partner in Damascus.  

Like Assad’s regime, the Houthis are a corrupt organization representing a narrow segment of the population, leaving the majority mired in poverty. This poverty stems less from war or sanctions and more from systemic corruption, nepotism, and deliberate isolation. These regimes facilitate depredation of the populace via a common tool kit: bribes demanded by underpaid officials, monopolized industries that benefit insiders, and rigged systems for the import of goods, as exports play little role in the ravaged economies of Iran’s satellite states. 

Reform of state institutions is implausible, as their dysfunction is a deliberate choice to ensure that the regime’s core supporters enjoy economic and social preeminence. 

The high levels of corruption and exploitation made both the Assad and Houthi regimes deeply unpopular, forcing them to depend on brutal security apparatuses to maintain power. Indoctrination through media and education, framing these governments as anti-colonial defenders of national independence, grows less convincing as public suffering at the hands of the regime worsens and as dependence on foreign sponsors, especially Iran, increases.  

Despite these parallels, key differences between the Assad and Houthi regimes suggest their trajectories may diverge. The Houthi leadership is younger and more energetic than Assad’s aging cadre. For example, Houthi intelligence chief Abulhakim al-Khaiwani is under forty, while his Syrian counterpart, Hossam Louka, was nearing sixty-five before Assad’s fall. 

Moreover, ten years after taking Sanaa, the Houthis remain in the early stages of a revolutionary extremist movement. In contrast, the Assad regime had become a stagnant, ideologically hollow dynasty after fifty years in power. 

The Houthi leaders also differ in their likely response to a challenge. Unlike Assad, who ultimately fled to Russia, Houthi leaders may return to guerrilla tactics in Yemen’s mountainous regions rather than abandoning their exile movement. Many senior Houthis have rarely, if ever, left Yemen, probably making them more inclined to resist until the end rather than seek refuge abroad. 

While the Houthis’ long-term survival remains uncertain, their regime faces a growing legitimacy crisis. Cracks in its foundations are widening, and the leadership increasingly relies on brutal violence to suppress dissent. Eventual collapse seems likely but is not necessarily imminent. 

Decisive action by regional and global actors opposing Houthi terrorism could accelerate their downfall. The U.S., Israel, and their allies should intensify political, financial, and military pressure on the Houthis. Cutting off their ability to divert humanitarian aid would significantly weaken their financial position. 

Instead of subsidizing a regime that perpetuates terror and destabilizes the region, the international community should allocate resources to helping its victims and those who are trying to resist it, including Yemeni refugees abroad and Yemeni forces in southern Yemen who are fighting back against the Houthis.  

The current crises facing Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran’s Quds Force make this an opportune moment to pressure the Houthi regime. While the Houthis may have once drawn confidence from Tehran’s backing, they are likely re-evaluating that assessment in light of recent recent events in Syria. 

This may create an opportunity to pressure the Houthis into halting their Red Sea attacks. Still, even this would be a temporary respite, not a real solution to the long-term threat the Houthis pose to other states in the region, not to mention their subjects.  

This raises the question: How might the downfall of the Houthis occur?  

Real change in Yemen would require three key developments. 

First, change would require a rise in public anger from grievances held by the Yemeni population, probably related primarily to economic conditions but perhaps also to anger at the imposition of their religious views at odds with the beliefs of the majority of the population. 

Second, there would need to be a loss of favor or support from key elite constituencies, which could be Houthi bureaucrats or allied tribes on whom the regime relies to suppress dissent. 

Third, instability would have to drive a wedge within the leadership class, driven by external pressures on the regime or internal power struggles; power struggles could arise organically within the predatory and secretive regime, but they might be accelerated by sudden, significant events, such as the death or assassination of key figures within its leadership. 

Together, these factors would leave the regime in a state of disarray, unable to keep its ruthless hold on twenty million Yemenis. That could, in turn, create a momentum that the regime would find increasingly difficult to reverse. 

How this process unfolds is not under the control of anyone and certainly not of any force outside of Yemen. However, the Syrian experience suggests that continued pressure and coordination with opposition forces will be more effective than trying to negotiate with a regime devoted to internal repression and external aggression. 

Like Assad, the Houthis will someday lose power, and Yemenis will remember who helped them in their hour of need and who did not. Keeping up the pressure, military, political, and economic, is critical. Denying the regime legitimacy and opportunities to divert foreign aid is a key component of that effort. Assad’s experience shows that these tyrants do not last forever and that investing in long-term diplomatic relationships with them is a losing bet.  

Ari Heistein is an advisor to Israeli startups seeking to sell to the U.S. federal government, a consultant on issues relating to Yemen, and a nonresident fellow at the Counter Extremism Project. He has previously worked in business development for an Israeli cyber intelligence company and served as a research fellow and chief of staff at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv.

Nathaniel Rabkin worked as an Arabic translator and interpreter for the U.S. military in Iraq’s Wasit province in 2008-2009 and as an analyst embedded with the Department of Defense’s Human Terrain System in Anbar province 2010-2011. He has also performed work for several business and security consultancies and NGOs operating in the Middle East. He worked from 2013 to 2020 as managing editor of Inside Iraqi Politics, a political risk newsletter.

Image Credit: Shutterstock.com.

Fans of the “cowboy culture” will instantly recognize and associate the name Wrangler with a popular line of Western wear.

But clothing isn’t the only “frontier-style” product bearing the Wrangler name; it’s also been bestowed on a rimfire single-action (SA) revolver made by one of America’s Big Three handgun manufacturers. Say hello to the Ruger Wrangler .22 Long Rifle (.22 LR) revolver.

Sturm, Ruger & Co. Inc. (headquartered in Southport, Connecticut) introduced the Wrangler in 2019, based on their enduringly popular Ruger Single-Six, which in turn dates back to 1953 (four years after the company was founded). As Ruger product manager Graham Rockwell said in an October 2019 interview with J. Scott Rupp of Guns & Ammo Handguns Magazine:

“Our ultimate goal was to provide yet another rugged reliable firearm to our customers at an affordable rate…With the Single-Six as our starting point, we saw an opportunity not only to use different materials but also to bring our single-action manufacturing process up to a modern level. Those two things combined are really what set the Wrangler apart from the rest of our single-action line as far as affordability.”

Those “different materials” include an aluminum alloy cylinder frame, synthetic checkered black grip panels, and a manufacturing process known as investment casting which confers the win-win benefits of being both more durable and more affordable than the manufacturing processes used by competitors such as Colt and Smith & Wesson. The guns also come factory standard with a rust-resistance and corrosion-resistant finish known as Cerakote, with color options such as black, silver, and Burnt Bronze.

Barrel length options include 3.75 inches, 4.62 inches, 6.50 inches, and 7.50 inches. The 4.62-inch version has an overall length of 10.25 inches and a weight of 30 ounces. As with the majority of revolvers, the cylinder capacity is six rounds (hence the slang term “sixgun”).

According to my colleague Peter Suciu, “As of the end of June [2020], the handgun topped the list for the best-selling revolvers to those under the age of fifty and came in second in the category—only after the hugely popular Colt Python—for shooters above the age of fifty (Source: National Shooting Sports Foundation [NSSF] data).”

I have thirty-five years of shooting experience under my belt, and I’ve been an actual gun owner for thirty of those years, and those of you who either know me personally and/or have read my previous firearms articles know that I’m more of a pistolero than a long gun person. As far as that pistolero experience goes, I own multiple semiautomatic pistols and double-action (DA) revolvers; in the latter category, I’m especially fond of Ruger’s GP-100 and Redhawk in .357 Magnum and .44 Magnum, respectively.

However, I have comparatively little experience with an SA revolver and have never owned one. Accordingly, I plan to remedy that in the near future by making a so-called “hogleg” my next gun purchase. Moreover, I’m fixin’ to get one in .22 caliber, since an anonymous friend of mine generously donated a giant tub of .22 ammo (mostly .22 LR, but with some .22 Winchester Magnum Rimfire [WMR] thrown in for good measure; the former can be used in my beloved Beretta M9A1-22, but not the latter).

With that in mind, I recently went to the excellent XCAL indoor shooting range facility in Ashburn, Virginia, to test out their rental Wrangler; this particular specimen had a 4.62-inch bbl. and the Burnt Bronze finish. To enable my evaluation, I purchased fifty rounds of CCI Mini-Mag 22 Long Rifle Ammo 40 Grain Copper Plated Round Nose ammo and a USPSA/IPSC paper target. I divvied the course into twenty-five rounds of headshots at 7 yards and twenty-five rounds of torso shots at 25 yards, delivered from a Classic Weaver Stance.

Impressions?

It had decent accuracy, once I took “Kentucky windage” and adjusted fire for a 5 o’clock hold at both distances to make up for the fact that the gun was printing extremely high left relative to my point of aim; at 7 yards, my very first shot missed the head completely! After the adjustment, I scored twenty hits in the A-zone box and four in the C-zone of the head. At 25 yards, I got six hits in the A-zone, seven in the C-zone, and the remainder in the D-zone. (For whatever reason, USPSA/IPSC targets omit the B-zone.)

I like the fact that this gun, unlike more old-school SA wheelguns, doesn’t require coming to half-cock for loading & unloading.

It also has a decent trigger.

The bladed front and integral notch rear sights provided for an okay sight picture, but not as user-friendly as those on the DA revolvers from this same manufacturer.

The extraction of empty cartridges was a major pain! Unless you align the individual chamber with the loading gate just right, the empties will stick…and even when I did get the alignment right, I often needed to work the extractor rod multiple times to clear the damn thing, which was not only frustrating as hell but also cut into my 1-hour range reservation time limit (and mind you, I still had another gun to test afterward). Thank God for the invention of both the double-action (DA) revolver (with its swing-out cylinder) and the semiautomatic pistol alike!

Bottom line, while the Wrangler is a decent gun, it doesn’t impress me as much as the company’s DA revolvers. I’m feeling strongly inclined to try out the Heritage Rough Rider, which carries an MSRP of $207.99 —and also comes with a .22 WMR cylinder as extra “bang for the buck”—before I make my final “hogleg” buying decision.

True Gun Value states that “A RUGER WRANGLER pistol is currently worth an average price of $226.90 new and $140.27 used. The 12-month average price is $225.55 new and $140.65 used.” Sturm, Ruger’s official website lists an MSRP range of $269.00 to $279.00.

Christian D. Orr is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch, The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security, and Simple Flying. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS). If you’d like to pick his brain further, you can ofttimes find him at the Old Virginia Tobacco Company (OVTC) lounge in Manassas, Virginia, partaking of fine stogies and good quality human camaraderie.

Image: Archlane / Shutterstock.com

As Q once told James Bond in “Skyfall” about his weapon: “The Walther PPK/S 9 millimeter short. It's been coded to your palm print, so only you can fire it. Less of a random killing machine, more of a personal statement.”

Thus it was in that 2012 movie that “The World’s Most Famous Secret Agent” finally received an upgrade in ballistic power from his longstanding standard model Walther PPK in .32 ACP (7.65mm) caliber that he was issued way back in the very first film in the series, 1962’s “Dr. No.”

The “nine-millimeter short” cartridge that the 2012 version of Q is referring to is better known to American gun enthusiasts as the .380 ACP (Automatic Colt Pistol); the “Short” label refers to the fact that its shell casing is 17 millimeters in length, 2mm less than that of the full-powered 9mm cartridge (aka, the 9mm Parabellum, 9mm Luger).

Having said all that, the PPK/S variant also comes in the .32 ACP chambering. So then, what truly differentiates it from the standard PPK?

Carl Walther GmbH introduced the PPK/S in 1968—thirty-seven years after the advent of the original PPK—after the antigun Lyndon B. Johnson administration imposed the Gun Control Act (GCA) of 1968 which, among other things, arbitrarily banned the PPK from import into the United States due to its compact size. The PPK/S circumvented the GCA by combining the frame of the 1929-vintage PP, which was deeper than the PPK, and the slide of the PPK. As noted by the Walther Arms Inc. product info page:

“An evolution of the classic PPK, the PPK/s maintains the timeless features, essence, and elegance of the original with an additional extended grip allowing for added capacity and improved ergonomics.”

The PPK/S retains the traditional double-action (TDA) trigger system of its predecessor, i.e., a heavy (13.4 lbs.) double-action (DA) pull for the first shot and a lighter (6.1 lbs.) single-action (SA) the rest of the way until the safety/decocker is applied.

Dimensions include a barrel length of 3.3 inches, overall length of 6.1 inches, height of 4.3 inches, and an empty weight of 19 ounces. Magazine capacity is seven rounds.

I have owned a standard PPK .32 ACP (with a stainless steel finish) since 2011, specifically one of the specimens built in the joint venture with Smith & Wesson that has an extended grip tang to offset the gun’s age-old vice of hammer bite. However, I hadn’t fired the PPK/S variant in eleven years, so I wanted to get some refresher training on it.

Accordingly, I recently went to the excellent XCAL indoor shooting range facility in Ashburn, Virginia, to test out their rental PPK/S; this particular specimen had a stainless steel finish. To enable my evaluation, I purchased fifty rounds of Speer Lawman  95-grain Total Metal Jacket (TMJ) ammo and an XCal-2 anatomical silhouette paper target. I divvied the course into twenty-five rounds of headshots at 7 yards (with the first shot of each magazine fired in DA trigger mode, the remainder in SA mode) and twenty-five rounds of torso shots (all SA mode) at 25 yards, delivered from a Classic Weaver Stance.

Impressions?

It had decent accuracy, but my Kentucky windage adjustments had to go in polar opposite directions at the two distances, i.e., a 12 o’clock hold at 7 yards and a 6 o’clock hold at 25 yards. At the 7-yard mark, my first shot went low into the target’s jawline; after the appropriate adjustment, twenty-three rounds went into the ocular rectangular scoring box, but I overcompensated and pulled high into the forehead. At the 25-yard mark, my first shot gave me an unintended head hit, as it went way high into the target’s jawline area (right alongside my unintended too-low first shot from my 7-yard string of fire); after adjusting firing, I ended up with eight A-zone hits, twelve C-zone hits, and five rounds that either hit the peripheral non-scoring zones of the target or missed altogether. Meh.

Nobody ever accused the PPK series of having a smooth DA trigger or a crisp SA trigger. When I commented on this to the Range Safety Officer (RSO), he replied half-jokingly. “Yeah. But they go great in tuxedos.”

The sights were decent (red-painted dot sights, not to be confused with electronic red dot sights).

Reliability-wise, there was one instance—at the thirty-three-round count—where the slide failed to go fully into battery as a result of unlocking my wrist prematurely; any semiauto pistol should be fired from a locked wrist in order to prevent jamming, and this sense of urgency goes double for pocket pistols. Anyway, a quick smack on the back of the slide (as prescribed by self-defense guru Massad F. Ayoob) remedied the situation.

Last impression: .380 ACP ammo is freaking expensive!! 

Bottom line: It was a fun experience overall. But while I may purchase a PPK/S .380 somewhere down the road, both as a complement to my .32 PPK and for its own pop cultural significance, it’s simply not at the top of my wish list right now.

True Gun Value states that “A WALTHER PPK S [sic] pistol is currently worth an average price of $499.17 new and $368.52 used. The 12-month average price is $671.13 new and $504.40 used.” Walther’s official website lists an MSRP of $969.00 for both the black and stainless steel finish…unless you elect for the fancier walnut grips over the standard black plastic grips, in which case you pay thirty bucks extra.

Christian D. Orr is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch , The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security, and Simple Flying. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS). If you’d like to pick his brain further, you can ofttimes find him at the Old Virginia Tobacco Company (OVTC) lounge in Manassas, Virginia, partaking of fine stogies and good quality human camaraderie.

Image: Robert Sarnowski / Shutterstock.com

As my fellow firearms enthusiasts are all too well aware, ammo is expensive. Gone are the good old days when you could go into Wally World and purchase a Winchester Value Pack 100-round box of 9x19mm 115-grain full metal jacket (FMJ; aka “hardball” or just plain “ball”) practice ammo for roughly $10 (which equates to 10 cents per round); nowadays that same product will cost you around $28.50.

A large part of this is due to inflation, though ammo prices started spiraling since the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic. So then, that leaves gun hobbyists with this question: are we going to have to continue to bite the bullet, or are there alternatives? Luckily, there are, thanks to imports from non-Western ammunition manufacturers. Today, we’ll look at two such examples, namely BPS of Turkey and MaxxTech of Bosnia.

As per the manufacturer’s official website:

“BPS Balıkesir Patlayıcı Maddeler Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. [Balıkesir Explosives Industry and Trade Inc] established in 2014 to produce small arms ammunitions and shotgun cartridges in Türkiye at international standards, works with all its might to offer reliable, effective and innovative products with the production capabilities, capacities and technologies it has developed over the years.”

The Balıkesir portion of the name is in homage to the city where the company is headquartered. BPS was founded by Mehmet Akif Yavaşca and Müşteba Yavaşc. According to Ammo, BPS products have the pluses of not only being inexpensive—I’m guessing part of this is due to the exchange rate of the Turkish lira (TRY) to the U.S. dollar (USD)—but also “High quality brass [which] is great for reloading.” The minuses are the potential for hard primers and the fact that the brand’s only offerings are 9mm Parabellum and 12-gauge shotgun shells.

I obtained my BPS 9x19mm 124-grain hardball ammo from Royal Tiger Imports (RTI) (from whom, on a separate note, I also obtained really good deals on a 6.5mm Carcano rifle and ammo), headquartered in Melbourne, Florida. Currently, RTI has individual fifty-round boxes of the stuff for $12,99 and 1,000-round cases at $229.99.

MaxxTech by GH Ammunition was launched in 2002 and is made by Pobjeda Technology in the city of Gorazde, Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to Ammo, this company’s products have a good reputation for accuracy and reliability in addition to being affordable; like with the TRY-USD exchange rate, I imagine the favorable exchange rate of the Bosnian convertible mark (BAM) to the USD is a big help. The downside is the relative lack of variety of calibers (though they’re better than BPS in that regard), the lack of more self-defense-appropriate bullet configurations such as jacketed hollowpoints (JHPs), and complaints from some shooters of MaxxTech ammo being too dirty.

I bought my boxes of MaxxTech 9x18mm Makarov 92-grain FMJ at The Nations’ Gun Show in Dulles, Virginia. Truth be told, I don’t remember exactly what I paid for the stuff, but I do remember being quite pleasantly surprised with the price. For what it’s worth, GunMag Warehouse is currently advertising fifty-round boxes at $19.99, whilst Ammo To Go is selling 1,000-round bulk rate cases for $339.95 (averaging out to 34 cents per round).

I’m quite happy with the performance of both of these ammo brands through my personally owned handguns: in the case of the MaxxTech 9x18mm, we’re talking about my Bulgarian-made Pistolet Makarova (PM; Makarov Pistol), and in the case of the BPS 9x19mm (AKA 9mm Luger, 9mm Parabellum), I test-fired the round through my beloved Beretta 92FS, CZ-75B, Glock 26, and P-35 Browning Hi-Power (BHP).

All gave me sufficient accuracy for headshots at 25 yards and torso shots at 50 yards. The only hiccups from a reliability standpoint were one stovepipe (it felt and sounded like a squib load) and one extraction failure with the BHP; but then again, my BHP (which is of 1967 vintage) has been acting rather quirky as of late, so maybe I need to have a gunsmith look her over.

Christian D. Orr is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch, The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security, and Simple Flying. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS). If you’d like to pick his brain further, you can ofttimes find him at the Old Virginia Tobacco Company (OVTC) lounge in Manassas, Virginia, partaking of fine stogies and good quality human camaraderie.

Image: Shutterstock.

The United States Strategic Command has yet to make it official, but the organizers of the 136th Tournament of Roses Parade, which is held in advance of the annual Rose Bowl college football match-up on New Year's Day, have included a flyover of a U.S. Air Force Northrop B-2 Spirit bomber in the upcoming program.

It isn't a holiday surprise, however.

The flying wing aircraft, which are operated by the U.S. Air Force's 509th Bomb Wing, Whiteman Air Force Base (AFB), Missouri, have been a staple at the annual parade since 2005—with only a break in 2023 due to a safety stop following a crash weeks earlier. That resulted in a pair of Rockwell B-1B Lancer bombers from Dyess AFB, Texas, filling in before the B-2s returned this past January.

It would seem unlikely—barring another unfortunate incident—that the Air Force's B-2s would sit out what has become a fan-favorite tradition. It provides a rare opportunity for many to see the famed bomber in the skies overhead.

"We have enjoyed a long relationship with the city of Pasadena and are honored to bring the B-2 back to demonstrate Team Whiteman’s commitment to the American people," Col. Keith J. Butler, 509th Bomb Wing commander at Whiteman Air Force Base, said in a statement last year when announcing the Spirit's return to the famed parade.

Today, it is common at large sporting events for U.S. Air Force, U.S. Marine, and U.S. Navy aircraft to take part in a flyover. It is now expected—along with the National Anthem—at such events as the Rose Bowl, the Super Bowl, NASCAR races, and Major League Baseball's World Series.

Flyovers are not a new tradition.

It was more than ninety years before the B-2 began making its appearance at the parade that the first flyover at a sporting event occurred. According to Blue Sky News, it took place on September 15, 1918, during World War I—while the country was also dealing with the global influenza pandemic.

"60 military aircraft flew over Game 1 of the World Series at Comiskey Park in Chicago," Blue Sky News explained. "Nearly 20,000 fans looked in awe at the plane-filled sky, then watched with considerably less pleasure as the legendary Babe Ruth, pitching for the Boston Red Sox against the Chicago Cubs, threw a complete game shutout en route to Boston's fourth World Series win in six years."

No doubt the sight of so many aircraft fewer than twenty years after the first manned flight might have been even more memorable for many in the stands than seeing Ruth at the mound! In the century to come, the U.S. military has only served to offer even more impressive flyovers.

As Simple Flying reported, the impressive displays "represent the culmination of months of hard work by hundreds of dedicated individuals."

Planning takes months and involves coordination with the Department of Defense, the Federal Aviation Administration, and local authorities. But it can result in something truly special.

Such was the case in January 2021's Super Bowl LV in Tampa, Florida, which featured all three bombers that are currently in service: the Boeing B-52 Stratofortress, B-1B Lancer, and B-2 Spirit. It was the first such flyover of all three aircraft in such an event. The aircraft, from three different bases, rarely operate together but for the big game flew just 250 feet apart at 280 mph!

A year later, it wasn't bombers—but to mark the Air Force's 75th anniversary in 2022, Super Bowl LVI saw a P-51D Mustang, A-10 Thunderbolt II, F-16 Fighting Falcon, F-22 Raptor, and F-35 Lightning II conduct an impressive flyover!

Such displays—which require military precision that only the military can deliver—don't come cheap, but the Defense Department has a workaround.

"Since DODI 5410.19 also prohibits military aircraft from being hired or paid for an aerial display, most flyover hours come from the supporting unit's annual flight training budget. Their approval requires a healthy balance between the cost of operating the aircraft, the benefit of community engagement, and the training value associated with the event," Simple Flying explained.

Thus, while it can cost more than $100,000 per flight hour for the B-2 Spirit to take part in the Rose Parade and do a flyover of the stadium, the result is a truly priceless moment.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Matthew Munsell / Shutterstock.com

Could China Sink a U.S. Navy Aircraft Carrier in a War?

USS Parche: The Navy Submarine That Could Self-Destruct

Balancing partnerships in the Middle East is never easy, especially when it involves the sale of advanced military hardware. When it involves the most advanced stealth fighter, complicated doesn’t begin to describe the situation.

During President-elect Donald Trump’s first term, the White House sought to sell the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) after the Middle Eastern nation formalized relations with Israel as part of the Abraham Accords.

Israel had previously opposed the Arab nation’s acquisition of the fifth-generation stealth fighter but later withdrew its objections. The Jewish state’s security doctrine has long prioritized qualitative superiority over neighbors and possible rivals. Israel has sought out the most advanced military technology from the United States—or developed it domestically with some programs, such as its Merkava main battle tanks (MBTs)—while the Israel Defense Force (IDF) also would like to deny the same technology to adversaries (and potential adversaries). As a nation surrounded by hostility, Israel must acknowledge that today’s friends could be tomorrow’s enemies (Iran is such an example).

However, the deal was never closed, and the Biden administration didn’t move forward. That had seemed to be the end of it.

Then, last fall, there were reports that the UAE hoped to revive the multi-billion dollar deal if Trump won the 2024 presidential election—which he did, making the greatest political comeback in modern history. That could result in a significant reverse course yet again, as Abu Dhabi had this past spring indicated it could adopt the Chinese-made Chengdu J-20 Mighty Dragon, arguably the most successful fifth-gen fighter program after the F-35.

Beijing and Abu Dhabi have sought to expand cooperation through investments in the Pacific islands and Africa. The Gulf state is also considering increasing the use of China’s currency, the yuan, which offers China a low-risk gateway into the region. Washington may use the F-35 to earn renewed favor with the UAE.

NATO member Turkey was infamously expelled from the F-35 program for its adoption of the Russian-made S-400 Triumf air defense system. Options have been floated that could see Ankara return to the proverbial F-35 fold, but whether that occurs after Trump returns to the White House remains an unknown.

In the meantime, Turkey has sought to develop the domestically-built next-generation TF Kaan stealth fighter. To help fund its development, Ankara has sought foreign buyers—and among the countries that have expressed interest is Saudi Arabia.

As the F-35 was likely off the table for many of the reasons already stated, Riyadh has explored other options. The selection of the Turkish-made fighter would likely be met with more approval from Washington than alternatives from China (the J-20 Mighty Dragon) or, worse, Russia’s Sukhoi Su-57 (NATO reporting name Felon).

“A deal for 100 TF Kaans would similarly come without precedent and could give Turkey some much-needed investment in the ambitious aircraft project. Additionally, such a large Saudi order could help bring down the price per aircraft, which could, in turn, help Turkey win some additional foreign customers who would otherwise hesitate over the price tag,” Paul Iddon wrote for Forbes.

As Iddon also noted, the TF Kaan may not be a true “fifth-gen” fighter, but rather a “4.75-generation,” and “a notch above the Dassault Rafale and Eurofighter Typhoon but below truly fifth-generation stealth aircraft like the F-35 and F-22 Raptor.”

Such would be good news for Israel, which would maintain an edge even as the two countries inch closer to some formal recognition. At the same time, it would ensure Saudi Arabia could acquire the capabilities needed to deter Iran in a regional conflict.

In late November, reports first circulated that Morocco could be on track to become the first Arab and African nation to acquire the F-35. Rabat’s desire to operate the F-35 comes as its regional rival Algeria has sought the Russian Su-57.

The Algerian Air Force currently operates various Soviet-designed aircraft, including the Mikoyan MiG-29 and Sukhoi Su-24 from the late Cold War. In 2022, it ordered around a dozen Sukhoi Su-30sMKA. Moreover, Moscow has maintained close ties with Algiers since the Cold War, when the Soviet Union provided military, technical, and material support to Algeria during its war for independence from France.

In November, Morocco also reasserted ties with the Jewish state for the first time since the Gaza war began. Morocco is the sixth Arab League nation that has normalized relations with Israel.

Morocco’s acquisition of the F-35 could help bolster ties with the United States and Israel while maintaining a balance of power in North Africa. But like every other aspect of the F-35 in the Arab world, it will likely be complicated!

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites, with over 3,200 published pieces and over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image: WoodysPhotos / Shutterstock.com. 

Surprised and bloodied, the Israelis found themselves significantly on the backfoot following Hamas’ terrorist attacks on October 7, 2023. The Israel Defense Force (IDF) was tasked with hitting back against the terrorists—hard. Its responses were brutal but effective.

While the Israelis failed to get back most of the hostages that Hamas took on that fateful day, they sapped Hamas’ capacity to wage war.

A key reason why the IDF was so brutally effective in breaking the martial prowess of Hamas was due to the deployment of radical, dare I say even exotic, technologies. One of those rare weapons the IDF used with such effectiveness was the Israeli Maoz (aka, Spike Firefly) kamikaze unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).

This sky monster is described as a “coaxial rotor loitering munition drone” that was specifically designed for urban warfare. If I saw this thing at night or sundown, it might be easy to believe that little gray men from Zeta Reticuli were attacking rather than the IDF—that’s how bizarre this vertical, twin-bladed sky machine looks.

When the Israelis chose to move in force into the Gaza Strip, the overpopulated southern strip of territory along the Eastern Mediterranean Sea between the Sinai Peninsula and southern Israel, they ran smack dab into the dread of most modern militaries: urban warfare.

Built up and overflowing with people in varying states of poverty (and anger toward Israel), the IDF risked kicking over a veritable hornet’s nest going in there. But the Israelis persevered. And that was in large part due to the innovative tactics and technologies that the IDF employed against Hamas.

There is some dispute as to whether the Israelis did, in fact, deploy the Spike Firefly loitering munitions drone in Gaza. Although, one can assume that the system was used in the horrible fighting against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. What is known is that the drone has been spotted engaging in operations in another terrorist hotspot where Israel is often conducting military operations, the West Bank city of Jenin.

Israel’s Spike Firefly drone is part of Rafael Advanced Defense Systems’ SPIKE family of precision-guided munitions. With their Spike Firefly, the Israelis are again offering the world a masterclass in what the next round of major wars will look like.

Indeed, the Spike Firefly is a model for the kind of network-centric warfare that will undoubtedly define the next great power conflict. That’s because the Spike Firefly shares real-time intelligence it gathers with other IDF elements, giving greater situational awareness to those advancing IDF elements.

Spike Firefly carries a SPIKE NLOS (non-line-of-sight) missile and has a vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) capability. In terms of surveillance capacity, it offers its users “beyond-line-of-sight” (BLOS) attack modes. In other words, this thing can kill you up close or far away. Spike Firefly can get you by seeing you or simply detecting you with sensors. What’s more, it is a semi-autonomous system. Spike Firefly can operate on its own or with a human operator in control.

As for some of its more advanced surveillance systems, it has dual infrared and electro-optical (EO) sensors. Again, its unique shape and relatively small size allow for it to not just loiter above buildings—the drone can pursue an enemy target into a building. This is the stuff of nightmares. Think of the opening scene from the original Terminator film, when the hero fighting the machines in the future is chased by a tiny flying machine that is utterly relentless in its quest to end his life.

Weighing in at 6.6 pounds and built for silent killing, there is a compartment that can carry a .77-pound bomb or an extra battery. In fact, that’s the only likely weakness of this drone: It has a limited battery life of around fifteen minutes. But the extra battery can be used to extend operational life to around thirty minutes (for reconnaissance missions).

Rafael says that the Spike Firefly has a topflight speed of 37 miles per hour and a diving speed of 43 mph, meaning this thing can come up on you fast. Further, its small size and silent running means you would be unlikely to even know it was over you until it was too late.

Israel has been at the forefront of understanding the often-radical changes in warfare over the last thirty years. The Spike Firefly drone is a testament to this. It is one of the most promising systems in the world and should be embraced not only more widely by the IDF but also by the United States and its allies. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Shutterstock. 

As a new administration settles into Washington, the global chessboard is being reset. While Central Asia may not be occupying the top squares of that board, it remains a strategically vital region. For the incoming administration, the key to effectively engaging with this complex region isn’t a sudden spotlight or grand pronouncements but rather a commitment to consistent and well-defined engagement. Central Asia doesn’t need to be a top priority; it needs consistent attention.

No one expects Central Asia to be the administration’s immediate focus. Crises in Ukraine and the Middle East, as well as the ongoing challenges posed by China, will understandably dominate the headlines and agendas. However, the very fact that Central Asia is not likely to erupt into a major conflict demanding immediate military or diplomatic intervention is precisely why a steady, long-term approach is so crucial. The five nations of the region—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan—have a long history of navigating complex geopolitical landscapes and are unlikely to be swayed by fleeting attention or pronouncements that lack follow-through. They prioritize reliability over rhetoric.

The previous Trump administration deserves credit for recognizing this and formalizing a new United States Strategy for Central Asia 2019–2025. This strategy aimed to bolster the region’s independence, sovereignty, and resilience while emphasizing economic connectivity and reforms. However, the implementation of this strategy was often hampered by inconsistencies and a lack of sustained engagement. While the blueprint existed, the practical execution fell short. For instance, while the strategy highlighted the importance of trade diversification, few concrete initiatives were launched to facilitate U.S. business engagement beyond existing limited partnerships. 

Furthermore, outdated restrictions were sometimes used as political leverage, creating unnecessary complications. A prime example is the persistence of the Jackson-Vanik amendment for Kazakhstan, which prevents normal trade relations with the United States. Originally intended to target the USSR for restricting Jewish emigration, this legacy legislation continues to apply to post-Soviet states. Despite bipartisan agreement on its obsolescence, a recent CRS report highlights its continued use as potential leverage for promoting democratic governance. This demonstrates how upholding superficial limitations, ostensibly for values-based reasons, can undermine interest-based policy.

The C5+US summit on September 21, 2023, at the United Nations Headquarters in New York offered a glimmer of hope for renewed engagement. The dialogue was positive, and commitments were made on various fronts, from regional security to economic cooperation. However, the follow-up has been underwhelming. Where are the tangible investment plans spurred by the summit? Where are the concrete joint projects addressing water scarcity or border security that were discussed? The Critical Minerals Dialogue, established in February 2024 to address the critical issue of the region’s rare-earth reserves and the American need for secure supply chains, has yet to yield any publicly announced initiatives or agreements. This is despite the increasing urgency of the situation, with China becoming more willing to impose bans and restrictions on critical mineral exports. This gap between pronouncements and practical action is precisely what breeds skepticism in a region accustomed to navigating the long game.

What Central Asia truly needs from the United States is a competent, clearly articulated strategy that is consistently implemented at the ground level. The leaders of the regional states are pragmatic actors. They prioritize tangible, long-term cooperation that contributes to their economic development, strengthens their security, and respects their sovereignty without imposing undue conditions or forcing them to choose sides. This pragmatic approach aligns directly with crucial U.S. interests. Economically, Central Asia represents a significant, yet largely untapped, treasure trove of resources, including rare earth elements vital for both high-tech industries and the green energy transition. 

A prime example of this untapped potential, and a clear illustration of the current dynamic, is Kazakhstan. While possessing significant reserves, the country has seen a 3.8-fold increase in its rare earth mineral (REM) exports since 2020, in real terms. Kazakhstan is also among the few nations capable of producing gallium and indium, rare earth elements on which China currently holds a near-monopoly. Yet, China was the sole importer of these Kazakhstani REMs in 2023. For Washington to capitalize on this potential, the region requires targeted and strategic investments, technology transfer, personnel education, and comprehensive high-level exploratory work to map deposits effectively. Equally important are long-term commitments to import these products. This represents a mutually beneficial scenario: the United States gains a diversified supply chain, gaining a crucial edge in future geopolitical competition, while regional states benefit from new workplaces, increased budget revenue, and the ability to build their market share. 

Beyond economics, a consistent U.S. policy towards the region is crucial for fostering regional stability. Central Asian states have long played a constructive role as mediators in regional disputes, offering platforms for dialogue. The increasing connectivity facilitated by projects like the Middle Corridor creates economic interdependence, fostering a shared interest in peace and stability. The ongoing, albeit fragile, peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan are indirectly influenced by the growing importance of transit routes that benefit both nations, highlighting the power of economic incentives in promoting peace.

Shifting to another pressing challenge, Afghanistan presents a painful issue where Central Asian engagement can be particularly valuable. While direct engagement with the Taliban poses significant obstacles for the United States, it is evident to the countries of the region that ignoring the reality on the ground will not make the challenges disappear. In 2024, there have been significant efforts to normalize relations and engage in pragmatic dialogue with the Taliban, for example, in delivering humanitarian aid and ensuring border security. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has taken a leading role, consistently advocating at the UN for the establishment of the UN Regional Sustainable Development Goals Center for Central Asia and Afghanistan in Almaty, an idea that was realized this summer. As a follow-up, Kazakhstan removed the Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations and accredited a Chargé d’affaires from Afghanistan. Discussions are now underway to expand trans-Afghan railways further, opening trade routes for other nations in South and Central Asia, as well as the Middle East. By supporting these regional actors, the United States can contribute to preventing Afghanistan from becoming a breeding ground for instability and terrorism without necessarily endorsing the Taliban regime.

The new administration should understand that a consistent, well-defined, and diligently implemented strategy is the most effective path to engaging with Central Asia. It is crucial not to think about the region arena for winning a zero-sum game against Russia or China but rather as a space to build mutually beneficial partnerships that advance U.S. interests while respecting the sovereignty and agency of the Central Asian nations. By focusing on concrete, ground-level cooperation in areas like trade diversification, infrastructure development, and regional stability, the United States can cultivate lasting relationships that yield far greater dividends than sporadic bursts of high-level attention. A steady hand, guided by a consistent strategy, will secure America’s long-term interests in this region.

Miras Zhiyenbayev is the Head of the Foreign Policy Analysis and International Studies Program at MIND, the Maqsut Narikbayev Institute for Networking and Development, a university-based think tank at Maqsut Narikbayev University, Astana, Kazakhstan.

Image: Vladimir Tretyakov / Shutterstock.com.

In recent weeks, I have penned multiple articles on U.S. Armed Forces’ elite Special Operations units, from the Army’s Delta Force and Special Forces (SF, AKA “Green Berets”), to the Navy’s SEAL Team 6, to the Marine Raiders, and even the Air Force Pararescue Jumpers (PJs) and Combat Controllers (CCTs).

So now, in the interest of diversifying my special operations coverage, I am expanding my scope to some foreign elite units. Famous units like the British Special Air Service (SAS), French Groupe d'intervention de la Gendarmerie nationale (GIGN; affectionately nicknamed “Gigene”), and German Grenzschutzgruppe Neun (GSG-9) might seem like the obvious choices. However, as my instructors at both USAF Officer Training School (OTS) and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) exhorted my fellow trainees and me to “think outside the box,” I will now write about an elite foreign military unit that most of my fellow American’s have probably never heard of: South Africa’s Parachute Battalion, nicknamed the “Parabats.”

1 Parachute Battalion was founded on April 1, 1966, under the command of Lt Col (later Lt Gen) Willem Louw SSA SM; other noteworthy commanders of the unit included Brigadier M.J. du Plessis and Colonel Jan Breytenbach. Today, it is the only full-time paratroop unit in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF); during the infamous apartheid era—which officially ended in 1994—it was simply known as the South African Defence Force, and is currently commanded by Lt. Col. D. Mziki. The battalion’s proud motto is “Ex alto vincimus (We conquer from Above).”

The Parabats were first “blooded” in combat in 1966 during a counterinsurgency war in South West Africa (known nowadays as Namibia); indeed, these troops carried out the very first combat action of that war, whereupon they participated in a heliborne assault on an insurgent base. From there, the Battalion was embroiled in operations in SWA/Namibia, Angola, Zambia, Mozambique, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), and elsewhere on an almost constant basis for over twenty years.

In the post-apartheid era, the Parabats’ best-known combat ops were:

-The Battle for Bangui, Central African Republic (CAR) in March 2012, whereupon the unit—which was attached to a South African military assistance operation in the CAR—suffered thirteen killed in action via an ambush conducted by Seleka rebels; the following year, it was announced that 1 Parachute Battalion would receive Battle Honours for their sacrifice.

-In support of the United Nations Force Intervention Brigade mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2013, a single Parabat company under the command of Major Vic Vrolik fought a series of engagements.

I’ve been unable to get ahold of any Parabat veterans to garner their firsthand perspectives on life in that unit. So, I did the next best thing by pinging a couple of friends who were members of other SADF/SANDF units (and served on that same Iraq contract as I did) and, though they didn’t serve with the Parachute Battalion, they spent enough time working with them to provide me some useful information.

First, there’s my friend John Dovey, RD (Reserve Distinction), a South African army veteran with thirty-five years of service:

“To the foreign observer, the Parabats appear to be simple parachute qualified infantry. This is far from the case. The best comparison would be to [U.S. Army] Ranger Battalion or [USMC] Force Recon. Jump qualification is simply the initial barrier to entry and the selection is harsh and fierce. There are Green Berets I know who have said it’s a tougher selection than that to get into the Q course. The ‘Bats pride themselves on being tough for a simple reason; they are!”

From there, Dovey adds:

“The ‘PT Course’ is a grueling, vicious physical and mental event, initially running for two weeks, then changed to run for a full 72 hours without interruption. Those who make it through that initial test know that their comrades are some of the physically and mentally toughest soldiers it’s possible to have. That certainty is the beginning of the brotherhood that all ‘Bats share. The fierce pride of the Parabats is reflected in the reverence they accord to the earning and wearing of their ‘Maroon Beret.’ Touch a Parabat’s beret at your own peril.”

Then there’s my friend “Grunt,” to whom I’m assigning a pseudonym out of respect for his request for anonymity; “Grunt” served as an Olifant tank crewman, rising up the conscript ranks to troop sergeant before ascending to the commissioned officer ranks, ultimately leaving the service with the rank of “Lieutenant qualified to Major.” “Grunt’s” Parabat tidbit isn’t as detailed as John’s, but it is a good bit more comical:

“Armor and Para Bats had a strong rivalry. They used to try to steal our black berets. We used to have many fights in the streets of Bloemfontein where MPs [Military Police] would arrest everyone. I remember a huge fight in one of the night clubs where I came across an armour man lying in the toilet, beaten by Bats. We caught them in the streets and chased them into an alleyway, but just then the police released a K9 and the Bats were locked up.”

Baie dankie (“Thank you very much”), John and “Grunt!” As the title and opening line of South Africa’s national anthem says, “Nkosi Sikelele Afrika (God Bless Africa)!”

Christian D. Orr is a Senior Defense Editor for National Security Journal (NSJ). He is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch, The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security, and Simple Flying. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS). If you’d like to pick his brain further, you can ofttimes find him at the Old Virginia Tobacco Company (OVTC) lounge in Manassas, Virginia, partaking of fine stogies and good quality human camaraderie.

This article was inspired by my friend and former Iraq contracting comrade-in-arms , Craig de Villiers, a former Para Bat. Sadly, a few months ago, Craig lost his battle with lung cancer, and ergo I dedicate this writeup to him.

Image: Johan Nicolaas van Vuren / Shutterstock.com

During the holidays, gamers spend no shortage of time "gaming," but in recent years, some hardcore video game enthusiasts have also been too quick to spill military secrets. Just before the Christmas holiday, military secrets related to the Eurofighter Typhoon were shared on the forums for the popular free-to-play War Thunder simulation.

As in past incidents, the leaked documents came about after multiple gamers disputed key systems and the accuracy of the digital recreation in the War Thunder game. This time the spilled secrets involved the Eurofighter Typhoon, the 4+ generation multirole aircraft currently in service with the air forces of the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Spain.

Hungary-based Gaijin Entertainment, the game's publisher, has repeatedly asked fans of the game not to leak military secrets on the forums.

"[We] will take this opportunity to again remind everyone here, please do not, under any circumstances, try to post, share any sources unless you are 100% certain they are legally declassified and publicly safe for use. We will never handle or use them, and all it does is actively harm any possible future changes being possible by trying to use them. Do not do it. No good will ever come from it for you or the vehicle you are trying to post for," the company said in a statement, as first reported by PC Gamer.

The National Interest will not publish what content was posted online but will note that the gamer debate—which turned heated—had resulted over the reported scanning capabilities of the CAPTOR radar system. According to Simple Flying, around 600 aircraft are fitted with the CAPTOR-E, an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, which operates on the X-band.

"Discussions centred on comparisons between its mechanically scanning (CAPTOR-M) and electronically scanning (CAPTOR-E) variants, particularly the latter’s ability to reduce scanning times significantly. Players disagreed over the exact technical capabilities, prompting the ill-advised sharing of restricted data," the UK Defence Journal explained.

War Thunder was first released in 2013 and is widely considered to be the most "realistic" combat simulation currently available to the general public. It simulates more than 1,900 vehicles, and according to the company, has a base of around 60,000 active players from around the world.

The most serious players are known to spend thousands of dollars on advanced controls that better simulate the flying experience, while some gamers have also gone to great lengths to create an immersive experience for tanks and other vehicles. The hardcore following the game has received has in turn resulted in very heated arguments over "classified" details.

In the past few years, gamers have shared secrets related to the McDonnell Douglas F-15E Strike Eagle and General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon. The leak for the F-15E had come from Operational Flight Program (OFP) software manuals, including those for flight controls, navigation, targeting, and even weapons systems. However, the documents had apparently been published between 1998 and 2000 and pertained to OFP suite 3, which has been upgraded numerous times in the past two decades. The other posted information was from the F-16's flight manual, detailing the use of the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM).

Other classified information has been posted to the War Thunder forums involving the British Army's Challenger 2 main battle tank (MBT), and the French military's Leclerc Serie 2 MBT. In June 2022, a gamer from China shared data on the DTC10-125, an anti-tank round fielded by modern Chinese tanks. Though many of the details were already well known, it still marked the first time that any authenticating documentation had been seen outside of China.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image:  VanderWolf Images / Shutterstock.com

As an island vulnerable to frequent blackouts, Puerto Rico deserves a resilient and reliable power grid. Building such a grid starts with guaranteeing energy security for critical infrastructure, such as hospitals and storm shelters. Natural gas (NG) can help alleviate the island’s power grid challenges by providing backup redundancy, fuel diversification, and the other critical services (so-called ancillary services) that are required to maintain a reliable grid. If implemented successfully, NG distribution by trucks or storm-resilient pipeline networks would serve as a bridge to a stable grid and set the stage for the 100 percent renewable goal described in the Department of Energy’s PR100 report.

Puerto Rico needs additional power generation today to enable critical planned unit maintenance before another major storm devastates the island or grid failures cause irreparable harm to the local economy. Distributed NG generation is well-positioned to provide this rapid and effective support to both critical infrastructure and the grid at large through both backup and ancillary services. While large NG generators require extensive and expensive bidding and design processes, smaller generators are much easier to acquire and faster to install. They can also be combined to perform similar services at scale. NG generators are also better suited than diesel to operate when air quality is a concern.

Additionally, if done strategically, new NG generation is well suited to address Puerto Rico's net-zero energy goals. Onsite renewables and batteries can supplement energy generation. At the same time, a transition plan from NG to hydrogen, biogas, or green methanol would ensure a clear pathway to continue leveraging all generation assets in a net-zero future.

To maximize the utility of NG, the Puerto Rican government should task the Puerto Rico Energy Bureau (PREB) with establishing and overseeing the construction of a natural gas distribution network as a bridge to a resilient and reliable energy future. This strategy should lay out a plan for distributing NG from liquified natural gas (LNG) terminals to critical nodes, starting with critical infrastructure and expanding out to other regions that chronically experience generation shortages. There are examples of critical infrastructure—such as hospitals and other energy-sensitive industries—that are installing NG distribution and generation. PREB should also establish contracts for the NG generators to provide ancillary services when required by the power grid. Also, PREB should assess and plan for the necessary transition from NG to a carbon-neutral gas alternative.

Until such a transition plan is implemented, using the two existing LNG terminals in Puerto Rico will provide immediate benefits, as these terminals already have the capacity to provide cleaner fuel than the current fleet of emergency diesel generators. On the mainland United States, many utilities include rapidly deployable generation resources as an integral part of their 2050 net zero transition plans—for example, Xcel in Minnesota and Florida’s Duke Energy.

While PR100’s net zero by 2050 remains a worthy goal, and renewable power initiatives should continue, Puerto Rico can and must address more immediate needs. With NG, it can do that while also better positioning itself for the future. Natural gas will enable the island to increase its resilience, enable necessary grid repairs, and pave the way for a net zero-emission future.

Ismael Arciniegas Rueda is a senior economist at the RAND Corporation.

Andrew Star is an engineer at RAND. 

Frank Andujar Lugo is a technical analyst at RAND. 

Robert Jolly is a SkillBridge Research Fellow at RAND.

Image: Fahroni / Shutterstock.com. 

The rapid collapse of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s Ba’athist government is the culmination of a thirteen-year civil war. Key global trends fed into Syria’s suffering: ethnic and religious hostilities, migration, terrorism, militant Islam, and the return of great power politics, as meddling and interventions by Türkiye, Russia, and Iran only made matters worse. 

The United States, Europe, Türkiye, and moderate Arab nations must ensure that Syria does not revert to being a Russian and Iranian stronghold in the Eastern Mediterranean again. They must also guarantee that Syria will not serve as a base for future jihadist expansion led by ISIS and that reconstruction efforts include measures to secure equality for women and all ethnic groups, particularly the Kurds, who are American allies, allowing them to coexist peacefully. This will not be an easy task.

With the fall of the Assad regime (supported by Russian president Vladimir Putin and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei), the geopolitical balance of power in the Levant has shifted. The borders of Syria, initially drawn by the British Empire and France in the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement, may no longer exist. Türkiye and, to a lesser extent, Qatar emerged as clear winners.

For everyone else, the impact of recent events is more ambiguous. The Syrian people, the United States, and Israel will find out whether a transitional administration led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is to their benefit. The U.S. State Department still designates this rebel coalition as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO). Nevertheless, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken announced direct contact between Washington and HTS on December 15. A U.S. delegation led by Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East Barbara Leaf met with Ahmad al-Sharaa, the HTS Syrian leader, and the White House is reportedly contemplating lifting the Foreign Terrorist Organization designation from HTS.

To send a message to the new rulers in Damascus, Israel moved to secure a narrow buffer zone on the Golan Heights. In what may be a favor to the rest of the Middle East and the world, it also proceeded to methodically destroy Assad’s surface-to-surface missiles, chemical weapons, and other heavy weapons stored throughout Syria. With ISIS still active in the area, one never knows who could use these arms in the future or to whom HTS might sell them.

Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan gambled on supporting multiple rebel groups after Assad rebuffed his efforts to restore relations between Türkiye and Syria. Ankara deployed the Syrian National Army (SNA) to destroy the Syrian Kurdish-led, U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Northern Syria, and Turkey controls two large buffer zones there. Reports of executions of the wounded in hospitals and rape and kidnapping of Kurdish women by these Turkish proxies have shocked the world. Since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Türkiye has never exerted as much military and diplomatic power in the Middle East as it does now. Qatar also supported anti-Assad forces in Syria, and there is no doubt that officials in Doha are more pleased with current events than officials in other Gulf monarchies that were more conciliatory toward Assad (e.g., UAE, Oman).

Assad’s defeat weakens the geopolitical standing of both Tehran and Moscow. Russia spent tens of billions of dollars to keep the Syrian regime in power. For years, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah served as Iran’s leading force supporting Assad. Successful Israeli strikes against Hezbollah’s leadership this fall deprived the Syrian government of a vital ally. Russia may lose its naval port in Tartus, a Mediterranean city in northwestern Syria, and an air base in Khmeimim.

If calm ensues, reconstruction will be key. EU and American sanctions against the Assad regime targeted the dictatorship and the businesses and institutions aligned with it. Many Assad opponents now hope that Western countries can fully lift those sanctions. However, much will depend on whether and how much common ground can be found with the post-Assad regime. 

A continuous civil war or the creation of a Sharia-based terrorist state is unlikely to receive aid, much less investment. If there is chronic violence, or if the rights of women and ethnic minorities are not protected, the hundreds of billions of dollars necessary to rebuild the country and allow millions of Syrian refugees from the Middle East and Europe to come home may not materialize. 

Assad’s exile is worthy of celebration, but American leaders should not yet lift the FTO designation from HTS. In a diverse, war-torn country like Syria, post-revolutionary hatred runs deep. Ethnic and sectarian hostilities, especially fears among the Kurdish and Alawite minorities, are already mounting. The HTS-led government needs to prove that they will abandon jihad and are ready to fight ISIS. 

The defeat of Russian and Iranian forces in Syria presents an opportunity to re-establish American preeminence in the Middle East, particularly in preparation for confronting the Iranian nuclear threat. To achieve this, the United States and its allies must “get Syria right.” There is a lengthy to-do list. Washington must ensure that Russia withdraws its troops and closes its air and naval bases. HTS, the U.S., and Israel need to make sure that no Iranian resupplies reach Hezbollah via Syria.

The new Syrian leader, al-Sharaa, is projecting a pragmatic image and may be threatened by murderous radicals bent on removing the competition. He announced that it may take up to four years to hold elections in the country. This would be more than enough time to establish a Sharia-based regime. Despite the pro-Sharia regime statements by regime spokespeople, in particular, Ayshe al-Debs, the HTS Women Affairs Minister, in support of Hamas, jihad, and in favor of the limitations on women’s rights, Washington, along with our moderate Arab and European allies, must clearly communicate to HTS that a harsh, Sharia-based political system that discriminates against women, forces “conversion” on the Druze and Alawites to an extremist form of Sunni Islam, or reduces Christians to “Dhimmis” is entirely unacceptable; any attempt to do so will result in a cessation of all aid and isolation. In fact, the U.S. State Department did that, but not decisively. Thus, removing HTS’ FTO status may be premature.

For Syria to build a democratic, pluralistic, and peaceful nation dedicated to the return of its refugees, their safety and prosperity through economic development increasingly seems like a dream. Despite the immense suffering of the Syrian people, without the wisdom, patience, and tolerance of the factional leaders, there is a tragic possibility that a further phase of the war—and possibly more massacres—may still lie ahead.

Dr. Ariel Cohen is the Managing Director of the Energy, Growth, and Security program at the International Tax and Investment Center and a nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council. Follow him on X: @Dr_Ariel_Cohen.

Image: Shutterstock.com.

The Russian military has a serious issue with advanced munitions.

The demands of the war, coupled with chronic production issues, have left the Russian military without enough advanced munitions to sustain the necessary rate of fire for a large-scale conflict like the one in Ukraine.

Earlier in December, the Russian military launched a large-scale, combined arms offensive. To support its ground forces, the Russian military used advanced long-range munitions. However, in a single instance, Moscow used munitions that took months to produce.

“Overnight 12-13 December Russia conducted a large-scale multi-axis attack into Ukraine. As with the attacks that occurred in November and prior, it involved Russian Long Range Aviation assets and Russian fixed wing Tactical Aviation assets launching multiple types of air launched cruise-missile and air launched ballistic missile systems,” the British Military Intelligence assessed over the weekend.

“The air assets were supported by SAGARIS Land Attack Cruise Missiles launched by Black Sea Fleet assets, and One-Way Attack Uncrewed Aerial Systems (OWA UAS) were used from multiple launch sites,” the British Military Intelligence added.

All in all, the Russian military supported its large-scale offensive with approximately 180 suicide drones and ninety ballistic and cruise missiles.

The important thing to highlight is that the Russian military can afford to launch such attacks only every few months. Under the weight of international sanctions and the general production issues of the Russian defense and aerospace industries, Moscow can only produce a fraction of the advanced weapon systems needed to wage a modern war every month. As such, the Russian military has to time its large-scale offensives to match the arrhythmic Russian military production capacity.

“Since August 2024, it is highly likely Russia has chosen to take time to build stocks between strikes and then launch in larger, less frequent strike waves, rather than the more frequent smaller attack conducted earlier in the year,” the British Military Intelligence assessed.

The Russian military is so short on key components, such as semiconductors, that it has to scavenge consumer products like refrigerators, microwaves, and dishwashing machines for chips to put in missiles. Also, the Russian military has been using specialized munitions for the wrong missions—for example, anti-ship missiles against ground targets. The Kremlin is working with other countries to bolster its stocks of munitions. Iran, for example, has provided thousands of suicide drones and hundreds of missiles to Russia.

“The composition and target set of the 12-13 December attack was similar to previous attacks, focusing on Ukrainian Critical National Infrastructure and industry, whilst also attempting to suppress Ukrainian Air Defense and airfields by saturating them with OWA UAS,” the British Military Intelligence stated.

Importantly, the Russian military remains capable of launching missile and drone attacks against Ukrainian urban centers and critical infrastructure at a moment’s notice, even if such attacks can’t always be large-scale.

“However, Russia retains the ability and the stocks to allow such assets to be employed in smaller numbers, as a punitive measure, with little or no warning,” the British Military Intelligence concluded.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image: Shutterstock.