The National Interest

The Russian Ministry of Defense announced that it had succeeded in downing a Ukrainian Sukhoi Su-27 (NATO reporting name Flanker). The ministry further claimed to have shot down multiple High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) rockets and several dozen drones since the start of the New Year.

In a statement posted on the Telegram social messaging app, the Kremlin put Kyiv's tally of battlefield losses at 651 fixed-wing aircraft, 283 helicopters, and 39,144 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV).

"Air defense systems shot down a Su-27 aircraft of the Ukrainian Air Force, six rockets of the U.S.-made HIMARS multiple launch rocket system, and ninety-seven aircraft-type unmanned aerial vehicles," the ministry said in its social media post but did not state where or how the advanced multirole was shot down.

Kyiv has not acknowledged the loss of the Soviet-era fighter or confirmed the total losses. Moscow's claims have been previously seen as exaggerated.

The Su-27 in the Crosshairs

The first designs of what was to become the Su-27 began in the Soviet Union in the early 1970s, and the aircraft was initially envisioned as an air superiority fighter/interceptor, in essence, Moscow's answer to the F-15 Eagle. However, development of the warplane was slow going, and the prototype didn't make its maiden flight until May 1977. Moreover, in its initial form, the T-10 prototype aircraft displayed several serious deficiencies – so much so that a complete redesign was required.

It only reemerged as the radically reworked T-10S-1 in 1981.

The aircraft finally reached series production in 1982 as a single-seat multirole fighter, receiving the designation Su-27 (NATO reporting name Flanker-B). A two-seater variant, the Su-27UB (NATO reporting name Flanker-C), was introduced two years later. By the end of the Cold War, around 400 Su-27s in both versions were produced for service with the Soviet Air Force. It was believed it would be suited to engaging U.S. Air Force B-52 and B-1 bombers.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991, the Su-27 remained the backbone of the Russian Air Force throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, with many of the aircraft undergoing mid-life upgrades and enhancements, which transformed them into the re-designated Su-27SM.

Despite being touted as one of its most capable warbirds in the latter stages of the Cold War, Moscow opted not to deploy the Su-27 to Afghanistan.

As Brent Eastwood previously wrote for The National Interest, "The Su-27, surprisingly, has seen little combat. Export models have flown in the Angolan civil war and the Ethiopia-Eritrea civil war, both sides of the current Ukrainian frozen conflict, and in Syria. The air-to-air combat happened during the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict when an Ethiopian Su-27 downed an Eritrean MiG-29."

Until the war in Ukraine, the Su-27 had zero air-to-air combat losses – proving if you don't use it, you won't lose it!

Ukraine's Su-27 – How Few Remain?

At the start of the war nearly three years ago, it was believed that the Ukrainian Air Force had around fifty Su-27s – inherited following the dissolution of the Soviet Union – still in service. That number is reported to be down to just a couple dozen now.

Kyiv has gone to great lengths to keep its Su-27s flying, cannibalizing parts from damaged or otherwise non-airworthy fighters, while it recently modified the aircraft to carry American-made GPS-guided glide bombs. According to David Axe, writing for Forbes.com just last month, multiple Su-27s were used in the Kursk Oblast to lob the ordnance onto Russian positions. However, the tactic, also seen in a post on social media, involved the fighters flying at a low altitude before dropping the bomb and immediately banking to avoid Russian air defenses.

That could explain the loss of one of the fighters on Thursday.

"This method­ to fly low, climb, release bombs, and retreat ­minimizes a warplane's exposure to enemy fire without seriously constraining a bomb's range. Released from high altitude, a GPS-guided GBU-39 might travel farther than sixty miles under its pop-out wings. But flying high in the plan [sic] view of enemy radars is dangerous for all but the stealthiest aircraft. A Su-27 isn't stealthy at all," wrote Axe.

Even with minimal exposure, one pilot's mistake and/or luck from the forces on the ground can result in a downed aircraft. That may have been the case with Ukraine's Flanker.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

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The Iranian-backed Houthi militant group in Yemen claimed on Monday that it had launched an attack on the United States Navy's Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75). It is the most recent claim that it had carried out a strike on a U.S. carrier in the region.

"Our forces conducted a special operation targeting the U.S. aircraft carrier USS Harry Truman with two cruise missiles and four drones in the northern Red Sea as the US enemy was preparing to launch a major aerial attack on our country. The operation led to the failure of the attack," Houthi spokesperson Yahya Saree said in a statement, as reported by Maritime Executive.

The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) did not respond to the comments made by the Tehran-supported group, but acknowledged it has worked with partner forces to conduct operations in Iraq and Syria from December 30, 2024, to January 6, 2025.

In a statement on Monday, CENTCOM announced that as part of the ongoing Defeat ISIS (D-ISIS) campaign, U.S. and "Iraqi forces conducted multiple strikes in the Hamrin mountains of Iraq, targeting known ISIS locations. The operations served to disrupt and degrade ISIS' ability to plan, organize, and conduct attacks against civilians in the region, as well as U.S. citizens, allies, and partners throughout the region and beyond."

According to the reports, an ISIS attack cell leader was captured in Syria.

Business as Usual for USS Harry S. Truman

The Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group (HSTCSG) has been operating in CENTCOM's area of responsibility since December 14. The warship departed Naval Air Station Norfolk in September of last year, and while it was announced it would be deployed to the Middle East, the HSTCSG first took part in joint NATO operations in the Arctic before heading to the Mediterranean and then transiting the Suez Canal.

The carrier is supported by Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) 28, which includes the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Gettysburg (CG 64); and the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers, USS Stout (DDG 55) and USS Jason Dunham (DDG 109).

HSTCSG was last deployed to CENTCOM's area of responsibility in March 2020, but the U.S. Navy has continued to rotate its nuclear-powered supercarriers to the region since October 2023 – in response to the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza and to deter aggression from Iran and its regional proxies. The situation has gotten increasingly complex since the fall of the Syrian regime under Bashar al-Assad.

On High Alert

The U.S. Navy's warships remain on high alert while deployed to the region. None of the service's vessels have taken damage, but in October 2023, the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Carney (DDG-64) engaged in a 10-hour battle with Houthi militants, marking the most intense combat by a U.S. Navy vessel since World War II.

The intensity of the deployment has resulted in some mistakes being made. Last month, a U.S. Navy Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornet was shot down in a "friendly fire incident" involving USS Gettysburg. The aircraft was preparing to land on the carrier, and another fighter recorded a near miss.

A War of the Words

In addition to countering Houthi missiles and drones, the U.S. Navy has had to counter an ongoing misinformation campaign directed by the group. It claimed it had shot down the F/A-18 Super Hornet last month, but also made repeated allegations that it had struck—and even seriously damaged—U.S. carriers.

In June, the Houthis announced it had successfully carried out a missile and drone strike that seriously damaged USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) in the Red Sea. The group further declared victory after the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) departed the region and returned to the United States in November.

The Pentagon has attempted to counter the false narratives presented by the Houthis, but their claims are regularly reported as factual in the Middle East, and even more ominously, further abroad. While it is almost expected that Iranian state media would report on the Houthi claims, it should be noted that this week, Chinese media outlets, including the Xinhua News Agency, have also run stories that cited the media statements from the Houthis.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.
Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

In the last seven months of war, the Russian forces have lost nearly as many men as they did in the prior two years combined.

Under a new attritional strategy, the Russian military, paramilitary units, and pro-Russian forces have lost around 300,000 men killed or wounded. To make up for the losses, the Kremlin is offering generous incentives to prospective recruits.

Incentives for Military Recruits

“In late November 2024, Russia passed a law that would allow personnel who signed up after 01 December 2024 to have their loan debt written off,” British Defence Intelligence stated in its latest estimate of the conflict.  

This write-off would cover debt of up to 10 million rubles, or around $94,500, and would be applicable to the spouses of Russian troops. But this isn’t the only financial incentive geared to prospective military recruits.

“This is in addition to the loan repayment holidays for the Russian servicemen program. The independent Russian media organisation Mediazona reports that 411,000 repayment holidays for mortgages and personal loans have been taken up since October 2022,” the report stated.

These generous incentives have one goal: bolster the ranks of the Russian military without forcing the Kremlin to launch another mobilization that could hurt the credibility of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

“Russia’s financial incentives to military recruits are almost certainly intended to secure sufficient replacements for their steadily increasing casualties, now totaling over 760,000 killed and injured, and averaging 1,523 a day in November 2024. The incentives are also almost certainly intended to reduce the potential for Russia to have to enact further mobilisations, which are seen by Russian leadership as both damaging public support for the war, and raising the risk of further detrimental large-scale emigration,” British Defence Intelligence assessed.

When the Russian government commenced the first round of mobilization since the start of the war in the fall of 2022, approximately one million Russian males of military age fled the country to avoid being called up.

300,000 Losses in Seven Months

As we have analyzed here at The National Interest, the Russian military is pursuing an attritional strategy that hinges on large numbers of troops, and, consequently casualties. As Russia lacks the troop quality, maneuver warfare capability, or necessary advanced weapon systems, the Russian military leadership has opted to fight simply by hurling hundreds of thousands of troops against the Ukrainian defenses.

The strategy has been paying off. In recent months, the Russian forces have advanced several miles into Ukrainian territory, capturing important battlefield points in the process, including Chasiv Yar, Vuhledar, and Kurakhove. However, the cost has been high. From May to the present, Russian forces lost almost 300,000 men killed or wounded. From February 24, 2022, when the large-scale invasion began, to May 2024, the Russian forces had lost approximately 500,000. So, in about seven months, and under the new attritional strategy, the Russian military lost almost as many troops as it had lost in over two years of fighting.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

North Korea’s threat to their neighbors to the south, indeed much of the rest of the region, is often closely associated with their nuclear weapons program. If we’re lucky, some analyst will remind us that North Korea’s biological and chemical weapons program is far older, more complex, and expansive than the North Korean nuclear weapons arsenal.

But perhaps an even more significant—indeed, persistent and growing—threat to South Korea comes from North Korea’s immense artillery.

Specifically, North Korea's Koksan M-1989 170mm Self-Propelled Howitzer cannon is a serious threat to the safety of South Korea. With the world’s largest artillery network arrayed just across the border from South Korea, Western analysts had better start sounding the alarm about North Korea’s artillery far more than even Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program.

Understanding the Koksan

The M-1989 Koksan is an evolution of an earlier North Korean artillery model, the M-1978. The Koksan features a 170mm gun-mounted on a tracked chassis, enhancing both the maneuverability and operability of the weapon system across the hilly and overall rough Korean terrain. The gun itself features a gigantic 8-meter barrel, which holds a record as one of the longest barrels of any self-propelled artillery system in the world.

Standard ammunition shells for the Koksan can reach as far as 25 miles away. North Korea’s Koksan, however, can fire rockets as well as conventional artillery shells. These rockets can reach 37 miles away.

One of the key drawbacks to this system is its relative slow rate of fire. It can only launch one to two rounds every five minutes due to the large size and complexity of the ammunition involved. Of course, this weakness is surmounted by the fact that North Korea has a layered network of heavy artillery systems deployed to make up for the slow rate of fire of systems like the Koksan. Further, the M-1989 carries 12 rounds of ammunition onboard.

Like so much North Korean weapons technology, the M-1989 Koksan is based on old Soviet technology from the Cold War. Notably, the Soviet-made ATS-59 artillery tractor forms the basis of the Koksan. Although, the Koksan modified the old Soviet system to better handle the weight and recoil of the Koksan’s massive 170mm gun.

Some have even speculated that the Koksan was inspired by much older Soviet systems from the 1950s, with others going as far to say that Pyongyang may have adapted the system from old German Wehrmacht artillery, as North Korea did with when they copied the old Wehrmacht 17cm Kanone 18.

Another downside to the M-1989 is its open configuration, which makes the system vulnerable to direct attacks. Most artillery systems in use in the world have some level of protection for the system itself and the crew manning it. But that is not the case for North Korea’s M-1989.

What would one expect from a regime, such as North Korea, that holds one of the world’s lowest rankings in terms of human rights?

The M-1989 Koksan Combat History

The Koksan has seen combat in different hotspots around the world, notably by the Islamic Republic of Iran in its bloody war with Iraq in the 1980s. North Korea’s Koksan provided long-range bombardment for the Iranians, who were fighting to stop Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi Army from conquering Iran. 

Iran used this system for counter-battery fire at extremely long ranges, placing it well beyond the reach of enemy artillery, giving the Iranian military an advantage over the otherwise more advanced Iraqi Army.

Interestingly, as part of their close association, the Koksan has been deployed to Russia for use in their war against neighboring Ukraine. The unique 170mm caliber of the Koksan presents logistical challenges for Russia, since the weapon does not align with standard Russian artillery calibers, meaning that North Korea must supply large quantities of specialized ammunition for the Koksans in Russia.

Then again, that works to the favor of the North Koreans, who make gobs of money off selling the M-1989 Koksan and its special ammunition to Russia as well as get to perfect their defense industrial base.

South Korea Needs to Be Prepared for the Koksan

The M-1989 Koksan and its unique capabilities prove that the North Korean artillery threat to the South is real. At a moment’s notice, these systems could be activated and used to decimate major South Korean cities. The loss of life would be catastrophic. 

Despite some of its weaknesses, this is probably one of North Korea’s most important weapons—and the South Koreans had better quickly develop countermeasures for this system before it’s too late. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Last month, the People's Republic of China appeared to have leapfrogged the United States in military aviation technology, as a previously undisclosed aircraft recently made its maiden flight. The aircraft in question has been described as a "next-generation" or "sixth-generation" fighter. Though no official designation is known, military analysts have dubbed it the J-36.

"BIG: China's next-generation (6th-gen) fighter jet made its first flight today," the open-source military hardware analyst Clash Report wrote on X on December 26, while sharing images of the large tail-less aircraft.

A video, recorded near the Chengdu Aircraft Corporation's (CAC's) headquarters in Chengdu, Sichuan province, and shared online showed the three-engine aircraft being trailed by the fifth-generation Chengdu J-20 Mighty Dragon stealth fighter.

China's Fifth-Gen Leap Forward

Beijing typically holds its cards close to its chest, but in November offered a flight demonstration of its fifth-generation Mighty Dragon at the 15th China International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition in Zhuhai (aka Airshow China) and unveiled the two-seat variant, the J-20S. That latter is the only twin-seat fifth-gen fighter currently in service.

In addition, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense released teaser images on social media of the Shenyang J-35A, its carrier-based fifth-generation fighter, in advance of the airshow. The twin-engine, all-weather, stealth fighter aircraft on social media took part in a brief aerial performance. It was a short debut for the highly-anticipated fighter, and the demonstration certainly left the audience (and analysts) wanting to see more.

With both the J-20 and the J-35, China has become only the second country after the United States to operate two distinct stealth fighters.

The J-36: What We Know

The appearance of the J-36 would suggest China has made a great leap forward with its military aviation program.

The fact that the video was purportedly recorded near CAC's HQ seems to narrow down the maker. Yet, the capabilities and even function of the aircraft are simply unknown.

As The Diplomat reported, "The leadup to the J-36's emergence holds uncanny similarities to the emergence of the J-20, nearly 14 years ago to the day, showing that history does indeed rhyme. Both were preceded by significant periods of credible rumors and increasingly granular predictions by the Chinese language PLA watching community," adding, "Some have remarked that the date for the J-36's maiden flight might seek to commemorate the December 26 birthday of Mao Zedong, the founder of the People's Republic of China."

Though other milestones indeed occurred on that day, it must be noted that if the aircraft were to be met with disaster such as a crash, it wouldn't be a good day for it to occur. That could put into question whether this was in fact the maiden flight of the J-36 or perhaps simply its first public flight.

The Sixth-Generation Race is Well Underway

The United States Air Force has acknowledged that it has conducted test flights of its Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) manned fighter, one component of the sixth-generation system of systems that could also include unmanned drones that serve as loyal wingmen. However, earlier this year, the U.S. Air Force had suggested it would press pause on the NGAD due to cost concerns and fears the technology could be outdated too quickly.

Even as the Air Force has taken a breather, the U.S. Navy's F/A-XX program is now reported to be moving forward.

There are multiple other six-gen programs in the works – including the Global Air Combat Programme (GACP), a joint partnership between the UK, Italy, and Japan; and the Franco-German-Spanish Future Air Combat System (FACS).

Russia's PAK DP – sometimes described as the MiG-41 – is also believed to be in the works, but as previously reportedly by Stavros Atlamazoglou for The National Interest, "skepticism surrounds the project due to past failures like the Su-57 Felon and T-14 Armata tank, both plagued by production and operational issues."

China may be on track to overtake Russia in aircraft design, which should be seen as a worry for Washington as well as its Indo-Pacific allies.

"The successful flight of China's 6th-gen fighter jet represents a new chapter in the global arms race," Army Recognition reported. "As other nations scramble to develop their own next-generation aircraft, the competition for air superiority is poised to intensify."

Meanwhile, tech entrepreneur Elon Musk has claimed drones are the future when he suggested on social media only "idiots" are building manned fighters like the F-35. He may not be wrong, but it does appear that the military aviation world is still thinking about manned fighters right now.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image: Weibo / Creative Commons.

Ded Moroz, Russia's version of Father Christmas, generally delivers presents to children on New Year's rather than Christmas – and the Kremlin actually may have received its best gift from Uralvagonzavod. The producer of Russia's T-90M and T-72B3M main battle tanks (MBTs) announced last week that it delivered new batches of the vehicles to start the New Year.

"According to tradition, the tank builders decorated the vehicles from each batch in a New Year's style: a Russian flag was installed on the T-90M Proryv, and a New Year's tree was installed on the 'seventy-two'. Calendars with children's drawings dedicated to the upcoming 90th anniversary of the Uralvagonzavod trade union organization were also included in the tanks," the Russian state-owned conglomerate stated.

The firm further claimed that "production increased from month to month," while last November saw significant output of vehicles."

Upgraded Models

Uralvagonzavod further announced that the latest batch of MBTs have been upgraded based on experiences learned in the ongoing fighting in Ukraine. In total, more than one hundred "changes were made" to the tanks, and each has been outfitted with anti-drone nets, and equipped with "rubber-reinforced protection" – which were previously reported to be mats that cover the gaps between the turret and hulls.

The effectiveness of the mats has been questioned, but both sides have taken desperate measures to add protection from the first-person view (FPV) drones. However, the head of Uralvagonzavod has praised the modifications.

"A tank from early 2022 and a tank from late 2024 are, one might say, two different combat vehicles. For example, if we talk about the protection system, it did not anticipate many of the challenges that we faced literally from the first days of the Second Military Operation," explained General Director of JSC Concern Uralvagonzavod Alexander Potapov. "The corresponding modifications were immediately adopted, the designers worked day and night, and the plant workers promptly made changes to the products that were already being assembled in the workshop. This painstaking and responsible work of the plant workers was recognized by the eighth state award – the Order 'For Labor Valor.'"

Production Fails to Keep Pace With Losses

The Russian-based Uralvagonzavod did not announce how many respective T-72 and T-90s were delivered in the recent batches, but military analysts have questioned whether the production of new tanks can replace those lost on the battlefield.

According to a June 2024 report from the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 13 batches of T-90Ms had been delivered by that point.

"Reports from the Russian defence sector and think tanks suggest that company-sized batches of between 11–15 tanks are being delivered," IISS explained, putting the number "as high as 267 if all batches included 15 tanks." Obviously, additional batches have been delivered since that report was written, but if we conservatively round up the number to 300 T-90s, it still seems unlikely the production can keep pace with the current rate of attrition.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) wrote earlier this month, "Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed or damaged over 3,000 Russian tanks and almost 9,000 armored vehicles in 2024 as Russia continues to accrue vehicle losses that are likely unsustainable in the medium-term."

ISW added, "Russia's current armored vehicle and tank production rates indicate that such losses will likely be prohibitive over the longer term, particularly as Russia continues to dip into its Soviet-era stocks."

Those stockpiles are being depleted, while the antiquated tanks – notably the T-62s and earlier models – have shown to be ill-suited to the modern battlefield.

Thus, the latest batch of new MBTs should be seen as a much anticipated and appreciated gift to start the New Year, but whether a couple of dozen tanks (if even that many) will make enough of a difference for the Russians in 2025.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

The next two United States Navy Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers – both of the Flight III – have officially been given names. USS Intrepid (DDG-145) and USS Robert Kerrey (DDG-146) will be respectively the 95th and 96th vessels of the class of destroyers, and both will be built at Huntington Ingalls Industries' Ingalls Shipbuilding in Pascagoula, Mississippi.

In August 2023 the service announced it would acquire the next nine Flight III warships with the costs spread across fiscal years 2023 to 2027. In addition, the contracts with Ingalls Shipbuilding, for six of the vessels, and three for General Dynamics' Bath Iron Works, could be expanded as the Navy sees fit.

The Backbone of the U.S. Navy's Surface Fleet

According to the U.S. Navy, each Arleigh Burke-class destroyer has been "built around the Aegis Combat System," and the vessels continue to be "the backbone of the U.S. Navy's surface fleet providing protection to America around the globe."

The Arleigh Burke class was developed at the tail end of the Cold War to replace the aging Charles F. Adams-class destroyers. Each of the guided-missile warships in the class has an overall length of 500 to 510 feet and a displacement that ranges from 8,230 to 9,700 tons.

The destroyers can operate independently or as part of Carrier Strike Groups, Surface Action Groups, and Expeditionary Strike Groups. As multi-mission surface combatants, the warships are capable of conducting Anti-Air Warfare (AAW), Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), and Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW). The DDG 51 Flight III upgrade was designed to be centered on the AN/SPY-6(V)1 Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) system that provides vastly increased capability over Flight IIA ships. The AMDR has enabled Flight III ships to simultaneously perform AAW and BMD, which satisfies the U.S. Navy’s critical need for an enhanced surface combatant Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) capability.

The New USS Intrepid

Last Friday, Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro officially named DDG-145 the future USS Intrepid while aboard the retired Essex-class aircraft carrier that shares its namesake. Preserved as the Intrepid Museum in New York City, the former carrier (CV/CVA/CVS-11) is just one of four maintained as a floating museum ship.

"It is deeply meaningful to stand aboard USS Intrepid – the fourth vessel to bear the name, and whose proud legacy continues to inspire and remind so many visitors of the courage, resilience and sacrifice that define the U.S. Navy – and it is with profound respect that we also look to the future of our Navy from these decks," said Secretary Del Toro. "It is my pleasure to announce that the fifth vessel named Intrepid will be an Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer, DDG 145, USS Intrepid, in honor of her past namesakes and the courageous service of all our Sailors globally from the South China Sea to the Red Sea."

The future Arleigh Burke-class destroyer will be the fifth U.S. Navy vessel to bear the name.

The first was an armed ketch that was actually captured by Commodore Stephen Decatur during his mission against the Barbary pirates in North Africa to destroy the captured USS Philadelphia. Originally named Mastico, Decatur and his men took control of the ketch in December 1803, and renamed her Intrepid. She was employed as a fire ship in Tripoli harbor in September 1804 but exploded either prematurely or perhaps to stop a boarding party. Thirteen U.S. sailors were killed. An admiring Admiral Horatio Nelson of the Royal Navy described the feat as "the most bold and daring act of the age."

The second was an experimental steamship, while the third was a receiving and barracks ship. The most famous former USS Intrepid is the famed aircraft carrier.

Her keel was laid down just six days before the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, and upon completion, she immediately headed to the Pacific where she was greeted by a baptism of fire when she took part in the invasion of the Marshall Islands in January 1944. By the end of the war, USS Intrepid suffered a total of four kamikaze attacks as well as a torpedo strike, yet she survived.

The carrier remained in service until 1973, taking part in combat operations during the war in Vietnam, and recovering several NASA space capsules.

"We know this namesake ship will serve our Navy and our nation proudly as the former USS Intrepid did and continues to do, and we couldn't be more thrilled that it begins its proverbial journey today at the Intrepid Museum," said Intrepid Museum President Susan Marenoff-Zausner. "For all of its missions, the entire Museum team wishes the ships and its crew safety and success."

The future USS Intrepid's sponsor will be Betty Del Toro, wife of Secretary Del Toro and a "lifelong supporter of the Navy and a steadfast advocate for Sailors and Marines."

Meet the USS Robert Kerrey

On Saturday, Secretary Del Toro also named the future DDG-146, the USS Robert Kerrey – the first U.S. Navy vessel to be named for the former United States senator, Nebraska governor, and Medal of Honor recipient. A day earlier, Del Toro met with Kerrey in New York City and shared the news that the 96th vessel of the class would be named in his honor.

"My sincere thanks to President Biden, Secretary of the Navy Del Toro, and the United States Navy that gave me the opportunity to serve my country for three of the best years of my life," said Senator Kerrey. "I am very grateful for this recognition."

Senator Kerrey was awarded the Medal of Honor for service as a United States Navy SEAL in 1969. According to the service, on March 14 of that year, "he led his team on a mission to capture important Viet Cong political leaders who had set up a base of operations on an island in the bay of Nha Trang. The platoon scaled a 350-foot cliff and were descending from a ledge overlooking the enemy camp when a grenade exploded at Kerrey's feet, severely injuring his right leg and propelling him backward onto jagged rocks. Immobilized by his multiple wounds, Kerrey nonetheless continued directing his team in securing the enemy camp and finding an extraction site for helicopter evacuation."

Kerrey lost his lower leg during the action, and in 1970, became the first SEAL to receive the nation's highest decoration. He served as governor of the Cornhusker State from 1983 to 1987, and represented Nebraska as a U.S. senator from 1989 to 2001.

"One of the great privileges I have as Secretary of the Navy is to name ships, and it is my honor to name the future USS Robert Kerrey (DDG 146)," said Del Toro. "This will be the first Navy vessel named in his honor, and it is most appropriate we do so, for his actions in Vietnam and his continued service to this country well beyond his Naval service."

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

“What Happens In Vegas, Stays In Vegas.”—Official Las Vegas advertising slogan

It turns out that that slogan is not only applicable to more risqué and naughty nocturnal activities. Thanks to a totally awesome venue known as Battlefield Vegas, the truism also applies to the opportunity to rent and shoot antique firearms that are extremely difficult if not downright impossible to find anywhere else in the country (unless you’re filthy rich and can afford to actually purchase your own).

As luck would have it, during the final week of 2024, Yours Truly happened to be in “Sin City” to witness my beloved USC Trojans win the Las Vegas Bowl, so as one of my pre-Game Day activities, I decided to mosey on down to Battlefield Vegas and take advantage of the opportunity to shoot two antique, historically significant semiautomatic pistols: the Imperial German “Broomhandle” Mauser on the late 19th century and the WWII-era Type 14 8mm Japanese Nambu.

C96 “Broomhandle” 7.63 mm Mauser History & Specifications

Movie buffs will recognize the iconic “Broomhandle” Mauser as the template for the BlasTech DL-44 blaster that Han Solo uses in the Star Wars film franchise.

But this gun’s real-world history is even more remarkable. Patented in 1896 (hence the alphanumeric designation), it was the first military semiautomatic pistol to prove itself both rugged enough and reliable enough for field use. Moreover, it saved the life of none other than a young Winston Churchill during the Battle of Omdurman on September 2, 1898

Dimensions included a barrel length of 5.5 inches, an overall length of 12,3 inches, a weight of 2 pounds 8 ounces, a standard internal magazine capacity of 10 rounds, and firing an original 7.63x25mm Mauser (AKA .30 Mauser) cartridge.

Type 14 8mm Japanese Nambu History & Specifications

The Type 14 Nambu entered production in 1926, an updated version of the Type A Nambu pistol developed in 1902 by Lieutenant General Kijirō Nambu. It was designated the Type 14 because 1926 was the 14th year of the reign of Emperor Taisho (Yoshihito).

Interestingly, the Nambu wasn’t the *official* issue sidearm of the Imperial Japanese Army, as IJA officers were expected to purchase their own pistols.

The gun had such a poor reputation for reliability – due in part to weak magazine springs and weak striker springs – that at least two of my colleagues at The National Interest, Peter Suciu and Kyle Mizokami, include the Nambu on their all-time Worst Guns lists. Also, various test-fire sessions with the Nambu on YouTube are plagued with malfunctions.

As for the 8x22mm cartridge, it’s a rimless bottleneck cartridge with a diameter of  0.320 inch, generating a muzzle velocity of 1,030 feet per second and 242 foot-pounds of muzzle energy with a 102-grain bullet. These ballistics put the 8mm Nambu round roughly on par with the .380 ACP round (which has an 0.355 inch diameter).

Range Report and Shooting Impressions

Battlefield Vegas’s rental Nambu will cost you $25.00 USD for shooting five rounds and $40 for firing ten rounds; their rental C96 Mauser will cost you 29 and 40 bucks respectively for those same round counts. Now, that might sound excessive, even with the cost of more conventional handgun ammo being what it is nowadays. However, from a business standpoint, these prices make perfect sense; after all, these are antique firearms for which spare parts are extremely difficult to come by in case something breaks, so naturally Battlefield Vegas is going to want to maximize their profit margin for each shot fired. (I suppose you could call that “getting more buck for your bang” as opposed to vice versa.)

The shop’s Nambu specimen was the following mini-history:

“This Japanese pistol was brought back to the United States by a US Marine when World War 2 ended and is a genuine piece of world history.”

So then, how did these classic pistols shoot for me?

Well, naturally I had to purchase the 10-round options for each gun in order to do at least a semi-proper evaluation. The ammo for the 7.63mm Mauser was PPU (Prvi Partizan) 85-grain full metal jacket (FMJ), whilst the 8mm Nambu ammo was a generic (no manufacturing specs listed anywhere on the box) 106-grain FMJ.

I was provided a single B-27 silhouette target for both pistols. For both guns, I divvied the eval into five rounds of head shots at 7 yards and five rounds of torso shots at 25 yards, “When in Rome, do like a Roman,” as the saying goes, so for the 7-yard stage, I used the old-school one-handed pistol shooting stance that was universally taught to soldiers before the late great Col. Jeff Cooper revolutionized two-handed handgun shooting in the 1950s and 60s; at 25 yards, I reverted to my preferred two-handed Classic Weaver Stance.

Both pistols had tolerable ergonomics and trigger pulls, much better than might be expected of mil-spec pistols; the Type 14’s didn’t have excess slack or creep, whilst the C96’s pull felt rather surprisingly like that of a newer vintage traditional double-action (TDA) pistol . The Japanese gun had the cruder sights of the two, whilst the German gat had tangent sights that could hypothetically (and rather optimistically) be adjusted for accurate fire at hundreds of meters.

Both guns enabled me to connect on all of my head shots, although surprisingly the 8mm gave me the tighter groups. At 25 yards, the Nambu gave me one 10-ring hit (just shy of the tie-breaking X-ring), two low-right in the 9-wing, one low-right in the 8-ring…and one flier way off to the extreme right periphery of the 7-ring. The Mauser gave me the tighter group at the farther distance, printing high-right, with one round just barely clipping the 10-ring and the rest taking the 9-ring.

The “Broomhandle” gave me flawless reliability, whist, unsurprisingly, the Type 14 had a failure to feed at Round #8.

Overall, a fun though all-too-brief range session getting to shoot these two pieces of history. Many thanks/Vielen dank/Domo arigato gozaimasu, Battlefield Vegas!

Christian D. Orr is a Senior Defense Editor for National Security Journal (NSJ). He is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch , The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security, and Simple Flying. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS). If you’d like to pick his brain further, you can ofttimes find him at the Old Virginia Tobacco Company (OVTC) lounge in Manassas, Virginia, partaking of fine stogies and good quality human camaraderie.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

According to the International Energy Agency, China’s investment in manufacturing has increased by about 600 percent since 2005, and its share of value added in global manufacturing has almost tripled. As a result, China now generates one-third of global value added in manufacturing and has become the top trade partner of over 120 countries; trade to and from China makes up 45 percent of all dry bulk shipping and 30 percent of all container shipping.

China’s role is especially visible—but not limited to—products like solar panels, electric vehicles, and batteries—in addition to essential manufacturing inputs like steel and aluminum. Over 40 percent of all jobs in the world’s nuclear industry are now in China. This poses great and growing challenges for the United States and its allies, especially its economically advanced allies in Europe and Asia. Has China truly peaked, or does it still possess the resources and political structure to sustain its rise? Can the United States under a second Trump administration be counted on as a reliable ally for Japan? And what collective strategies might rival Beijing’s global economic reach?

On January 6, the Center for the National Interest hosted a virtual discussion on “Countering China’s Economic Might” with Mr. Tatsuya Terazawa, Chairman and CEO of the Institute of Energy Economics, Japan (IEEJ). Terazawa is the author of a recent article in The National Interest, “Five Ways to Counter China’s Economic Might.” Prior to his appointment as Chairman and CEO at IEEJ in 2021, he had a long and distinguished career in Japan’s government, including as Vice Minister for International Affairs in Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry and as Executive Secretary to former Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, in the wake of the massive 2011 earthquake and tsunami that devastated portions of eastern Japan. He holds a law degree from the University of Tokyo and an MBA from Harvard University.

Jacob Heilbrunn, editor of The National Interest, moderated the discussion.

Image: Prasit Rodphan / Shutterstock.com.

It should come as no surprise to anyone who has been paying attention that President Joe Biden issued an order prohibiting the acquisition of Pittsburgh-based U.S. Steel Corporation by Tokyo-based Nippon Steel Corporation. The corporate offices of both companies have “condemned” Mr. Biden’s decision. President-elect Trump has indicated that he would treat the transaction with similar scrutiny as well. The saga of this once-great steel giant can be traced through the twentieth century. The U.S. government, on multiple occasions, extended a life preserver to this iconic brand, which is synonymous with the American industrial revolution itself.

Yet by 2023, more than a century after it was founded, U.S. Steel sought to be acquired by another firm to save itself. Potential offers from other domestic steel companies were not as attractive, and potential antitrust issues were raised after extensive past consolidation in the industry. Enter Nippon, hailed by proponents of the deal as a savior that poses no national security threat because it is from Japan, an American ally. Nonetheless, Mr. Biden’s order explicitly details the perceived national security concerns raised by the merger. 

The financial reality remains, however, and U.S. Steel needs a solution. That white knight could come in the form of American private equity (PE), the competencies of which include takeover and turnaround. Certainly, the magnitude and complexity of such a proposal should not be underestimated. However, if carefully crafted, a PE transaction could achieve the outcomes of both keeping the company operating and maintaining domestic control, the desired goal of U.S. officials.

The proposition poses the question of why a PE firm would be financially motivated to engage in such a transaction. Tax benefits and policy measures have both been deployed previously to shore up American steel firms. In 1981, President Ronald Reagan reduced the business tax burden on U.S. Steel, enabling it to recover capital investment costs in a faster time frame. He also instituted a government policy on steel, providing a limited solution for the industry, which included surge protection and identification of unfair foreign trade practices. Critics argued that  U.S. Steel executives used cost savings for measures other than the viability of steel production.

Turning to the present situation, tax benefits would incentivize investment by a domestic PE firm or a group of them. They are more than capable of paying the quoted $14.9 billion (cash and debt) cost. The incoming Trump administration could work with Congress to develop a strategic investment credit. Similar to tax credits given to other industries to modernize production, these credits would motivate acquisition and subsequent transformation. In order for steel production to become viable and sustainable in the long term, a greater leap into the digital age will be required. A potential PE firm acquisition should not be viewed simply as a crutch to get to the next crisis of finance for U.S. Steel. It would have to be a restructuring of the operation done in conjunction with the workers who are the backbone of the industry. It could then be presented as a going private alternative to the shareholders for consideration. 

Financial firms have made profits all over the world. A U.S. Steel turnaround would be an opportunity to return goodwill to the domestic workforce while also making a return on investment. Incoming Trump administration officials have extensive experience in PE. They could usher in a new era for domestic steel. Every single industry is on the precipice of existential change pending the imminent integration of technologies like artificial intelligence and quantum computing. As steel develops a new incoming workforce, domestic technology training and capacity need to be part of the incipient strategy.

Only a bold approach can keep U.S. Steel under U.S. oversight. The resources of PE firms were not a comprehensive option in the 1980s or 1990s when steel continued to seek government solutions. Now, however, the U.S. private sector has the resources to solve an immediate predicament and can be motivated to find a longer-term pathway. Nippon is a globally trusted name and the fourth-largest producer of steel in the world. It will survive a potential break-up of this transaction. If U.S. Steel can be transformed into an updated, future entity, it can work with partners around the world like Nippon to mount a strong competitive advantage against the threat of Chinese state-owned steel.

Manisha Singh is Principal at Sunstone Strategy Group and former Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs at the U.S. Department of State.

Image: Shutterstock.com. 

The twenty-first century will be defined by the great power competition between the United States and China. The winner of that competition will likely be the nation that dominates the tech sector. During his first term, President Donald Trump defeated Communist China’s effort to control the global 5G market by installing Huawei as essentially the world’s sole telecommunications provider. 

Huawei did not take its loss lying down. The company took advantage of four years of Biden administration weakness to reconstitute as an Artificial Intelligence (AI) enterprise. Now, like it attempted to do with 5G, China seeks to make the rest of the world reliant on Huawei’s AI technology. As the great Yogi Berra once said, “It’s Déjà Vu all over again.”

President-elect Trump is about to take office again with a plan for an unprecedented era of American economic prosperity. But on its way out the door, the Biden administration is trying to hamstring Trump while giving Communist China a gift in the form of the Interim Final Rule on “Export Control Framework for AI Diffusion.” This proposed rule would create a global export control regime on AI and related hardware that has been on the market for years. This regime would restrict free commerce by preventing U.S. companies from freely selling mainstream AI hardware and software to American partners and allies abroad.

The consequence of the rule will be that Huawei fills the AI supplier void. China would thereby control the market for the most important technology of this century. Huawei would have the global monopoly it wanted for 5G in the more important AI sector.

The hardware and software that power AI and are targeted by Biden’s rule-making are at the heart of the transition in computing from a CPU-based model to a GPU-based model. This transition is designed to speed up the work of computers while reducing costs, such as those for energy. It is an area where we still lead China.

Instead of controlling “frontier AI,” the most advanced AI applications, the new Biden rules would allow frontier AI to be developed and sold unchecked by Chinese companies such as Huawei. American technology firms, with vastly diminished global markets, would be relegated to second-tier status. If U.S. companies are prevented by their government from meeting the demand for AI hardware and software, then Chinese companies will step in to meet this demand. There is little doubt that China will subsidize these firms and support their sales efforts diplomatically.

In addition to hobbling cutting-edge American technology companies, the new rule would exacerbate the worst elements of the outgoing administration’s Green New Deal and the so-called Inflation Reduction Act by allowing bureaucrats to pick winners and losers among U.S. companies. The next big breakthrough in tech will not be decided by the free market but rather by an unelected bureaucrat in Washington who claims to “know better” if Biden’s rule is allowed to stand.

In November, the American people decisively rejected an era of American weakness and chose President-elect Trump to reassert American economic might. The Biden administration is attempting a last-minute sabotage of President Trump’s second term by preventing American companies from leading and winning the race for AI and modern computing. This Biden endeavor must be rejected.

Robert C. O’Brien served as the twenty-seventh U.S. National Security Advisor under President Trump from 2019-2021.

Image: Shutterstock.com. 

In a historic moment for Mexico, Claudia Sheinbaum has become the country’s first female president. She inherits a landscape filled with challenges, ranging from emboldened criminal organizations to strained relations with Mexico’s top trading partner, the United States. Sheinbaum’s national security strategy, which contrasts sharply with that of her predecessor, focuses on reviving bilateral cooperation while navigating the complex demands of Donald Trump’s incoming administration.

The tone of the bilateral relationship was set early in Sheinbaum’s first call with President-elect Donald Trump. Trump announced that Sheinbaum agreed to stop the flow of migrants to the United States and to close the U.S. southern border. Sheinbaum clarified that her country’s position is to build bridges between governments, not shut down borders. Despite their differing accounts of the call, Mexico has expressed a willingness to address pressing issues on the bilateral agenda, including migration and drug trafficking.

Yet, the future of U.S.-Mexico relations looks grim. President-elect Donald Trump has proposed a possible renegotiation of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) and the imposition of a 25 percent blanket tariff on all Mexican imports if Claudia Sheinbaum’s government fails to reduce the flow of fentanyl, organized crime, and migrants to the southern border of the United States. Despite the challenges, Sheinbaum’s proposed security strategy offers a glimmer of hope for the strengthening of bilateral relations. With her apparent understanding of the interconnectedness of migration, security, and trade, she has unveiled a bold national security plan that prioritizes combatting transnational criminal organizations. Unlike former President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s (AMLO) controversial “hugs, not bullets” strategy, which focused on addressing the root causes of violence over direct confrontation, Sheinbaum’s approach emphasizes investigation and intelligence gathering, inter-agency coordination, and targeting high-profile criminals in the country’s six most violent states. 

Central to this effort is Omar García Harfuch, Mexico’s new Secretary of Security and Civilian Protection. García Harfuch is a seasoned police officer who previously served as Sheinbaum’s police chief during her tenure as mayor of Mexico City and is credited for reducing the homicide rate in the nation’s capital by half. He is no stranger to the dangers of his work, having survived an assassination attempt by the Jalisco Nueva Generación Cartel in 2020. At a time when AMLO’s government turned its back on the U.S., García Harfuch collaborated closely with U.S. security agencies at the local level. His appointment by President Sheinbaum was well received by U.S. agencies, who are cautiously optimistic that bilateral security cooperation will be revamped under his leadership.

For U.S.-Mexico relations, the stakes couldn’t be higher. President Sheinbaum understands what lies ahead for the future of Mexico’s relationship with its top trading partner if her government fails to combat organized crime effectively. The incoming Trump administration has made it clear that failure to address the fentanyl crisis—which claimed over 100,000 American lives in 2022—will carry severe economic and political consequences for Mexico.

In recent weeks, Secretary Garcia Harfuch announced that over a ton of fentanyl pills were seized in Mexico, the largest in the country’s history. Sheinbaum’s security cabinet continues to double down on efforts in the battle-scarred state of Sinaloa, a move that signals a willingness to disrupt the operations of the Sinaloa and Jalisco Nueva Generación cartels, the primary suppliers of fentanyl to the United States. President Sheinbaum may not have traveled to Mar-a-Lago to meet with Trump, but her government has taken concrete actions to demonstrate its commitment to meeting U.S. demands.

However, it will be a difficult task to accomplish as bilateral security cooperation declined under AMLO’s presidency. From the outset of his administration (2018–2024), AMLO held a deep distrust of U.S. security agencies, calling for an end to the Merida Initiative, which sought to dismantle criminal organizations, strengthen Mexico’s rule of law, modernize the border, and help violence-ridden communities. Despite its shortcomings, the Merida Initiative was a blueprint for bilateral security cooperation that established an understanding of the shared objectives and challenges both countries faced. 

In 2021, the U.S. and Mexico laid out a strategy to restore faith in security cooperation efforts with the creation of the Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities. While offering a long-term vision for security cooperation, it lacks clear metrics to measure its success. Trump and Sheinbaum will have to determine whether the Bicentennial Framework will continue to guide security objectives going forward or whether a new plan will be needed. 

The two nations must first reestablish mutual trust between their respective security agencies. Events that occurred under AMLO’s government, like the arrest of former Secretary of National Defense Salvador Cienfuegos by DEA agents at Los Angeles International Airport and the detention and subsequent release of Ovidio Guzman, the son of notorious kingpin Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, marked major blows for bilateral security efforts. The tremendous show of force that the Sinaloa Cartel carried out after Ovidio’s arrest in Sinaloa proved evident that certain areas of Mexico are completely overtaken by criminal organizations powerful enough to challenge Mexican security forces.

The fallout from AMLO’s policies remains evident. He consistently argued that no country, particularly the United States, could intervene in Mexico’s internal affairs nor infringe on its sovereignty. What AMLO failed to understand is that the United States will go to great lengths to protect its national security interests, whether through joint actions with Mexico or, if needed, unilaterally. The strange series of events that led to the arrest of Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada, one of the founders of the Sinaloa Cartel, and Joaquin Guzman Lopez (another of “El Chapo’s” sons) in Texas earlier this year is evidence of the latter. The same will hold true under the incoming administration, which has threatened to designate Mexican cartels as terrorist organizations and touted the possibility of intervening militarily in Mexico.

In his final month in office, and after the governing party’s landslide victory in Mexico’s June elections, AMLO’s constitutional reform to place the National Guard under the Ministry of Defense (Sedena) complicated prospects for U.S.-Mexico security collaboration. Historically, Mexico’s military has been wary of working with U.S. counterparts, a stance that could impede joint efforts under Sheinbaum’s leadership.

Much hinges on the direction in which Sheinbaum takes her government. President-elect Trump’s threat of placing a 25 percent tariff on Mexican imports depends in large part on the ability of Sheinbaum’s security strategy to produce immediate results. By prioritizing collaboration and demonstrating a firm resolve against organized crime, her administration has an opportunity to reset the tone of U.S.-Mexico relations. The looming possibility of tariffs, mass deportations of undocumented migrants, and the upcoming USMCA 2026 review process will test the bilateral relationship. For now, both countries remain at a crossroads, with their leaders tasked with navigating one of the most consequential partnerships in the world. 

However, Sheinbaum’s security plan offers a cautiously optimistic path for improving bilateral security cooperation and restoring peace to Mexico. The coming years will reveal whether U.S.-Mexico relations will be a continuation of past struggles or a positive turning point for the two nations. 

Lila Abed is the Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute Director. She previously served as a correspondent for NTN24 and as a Public Policy Advisor at Covington & Burling.

Image: Israel Gutierrez / Shutterstock.com. 

As tensions between Washington and Beijing continue to mount, the race to produce the world’s first-ever sixth-generation aircraft is in full throttle. At the tail end of 2024, new images surfaced the internet depicting a Chinese-made stealthy, high-performance next-gen combat aircraft. While detailed information regarding the plane remains very limited, its overall design parallels what experts have already deduced about Beijing’s future aerial aspirations.

In videos published on social media outlets, the mysterious aircraft is seen flying alongside a Chengdu J-20S fighter jet. According to a War Zone report on the matter, the presence of the fifth-generation fighter suggests that this flight likely took place near the Chengdu Aircraft Corporation factory airfield. The aircraft’s tailless configuration has particularly stunned aviation buffs, as this design can significantly reduce the platform’s radar signature. The U.S. has also prioritized this structure as deploying airframes that are more difficult to detect is essential in the current threat climate.

As summed up by The War Zone, the mysterious Chinese aircraft features several advanced traits in addition to its tailless design: “It has a modified delta wing with chine lines extending all the way to the nose area, while its central fuselage section, at least the bottom of it, is loosely reminiscent of the J-20.” Additionally, the airframe appears to be designed with five trailing edge control surfaces per wing, including split flaps close to the wingtips. While no other information surrounding the aircraft has been divulged, Beijing’s progress toward achieving sixth-generation technology is worrisome.

China has been striving to introduce the world’s first-ever sixth-generation bomber for years. Its upcoming H-20 “Xi’an” bomber coincides with the PRC’s growing emphasis on nuclear deterrence and long-range offensive capabilities. In addition to stealth, experts believe that China’s new bomber could possess a range of more than 8,500 kilometers, which would allow Beijing to reach well into Japan, the Philippines and even the U.S. territory of Guam if not stopped. If a full-blown war between Washington and Beijing were to unfold, the H-20 could give the PLAAF the ability to strike U.S. bombers on the tarmac before they could take off. A 2018 Pentagon assessment also detailed how the development of a refuelable bomber would pose even greater risks for the United States. The PLAAF could “expand long-range offensive bomber capability beyond the second island chain” if a refuelable bomber were introduced to service. American analysts also believe that the H-20 will feature an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar.

While these specs and abilities are alarming, China is not the only nation working on next-generation aerial material. The U.S. Air Force’s Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program is being developed to counter China’s advancing abilities in the skies. The upcoming sixth-gen program is referred to as a “family of systems,” consisting of sixth-generation fighter jets and Collaborative Combat Vehicles (UAVs) that will accompany them. Considering the progress Beijing appears to be making on the sixth-gen front, the timely introduction of NGAD is essential.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. Carlin has over 1,000 articles published over the last several years on various defense issues.

The Yemen-based Houthi rebels have found a new backer: the People’s Republic of China. In a recent report published by i24 News, U.S. intelligence sources detail the undercover collaboration between Beijing and the Iranian-backed terror group which has perpetuated the ongoing instability in the Red Sea. While the Houthis have indiscriminately carried out attacks targeting warships and shipping vessels alike in these waters for years, the rebel group's maritime strikes have escalated following the October 7, 2023, massacre in Israel. According to the Israel-based news outlet, the Houthis are now using Chinese-designed weapons in their attacks. In exchange, the terror group will cease attacks on ships flying the Chinese flag. With a shared mutual contempt for the West, Beijing and Tehran’s collaboration in the region makes sense.

An overview of Red Sea barrages

 Iran has suffered significant blows over the last year. From the decimation of Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah’s leadership in Lebanon to the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, Tehran’s clout in the Middle East is rapidly deteriorating. Lacking the resources and weapons needed to continue its asymmetric objectives in the region, the regime has relied on China and Russia for support. The rogue allies are largely isolated from the international community and therefore lean on each other for arms, funds and even training at times.

According to i24 News, American intelligence services have uncovered a complex supply chain which provides the Houthis with the sophisticated components needed for their ballistic and cruise missiles. As detailed in the report, “Houthi leaders are reportedly planning to manufacture hundreds of cruise missiles capable of striking Persian Gulf states, using these same Chinese components. Washington has repeatedly passed on this information to Beijing since September, including detailed lists of Chinese companies involved in this arms mechanism.”

Chinese-Iranian collaboration is only expanding

The Houthis’ increased barrages targeting ships in the Gulf of Oman mark a dangerous escalation. Since roughly one-fifth of the world’s crude oil traded by sea passes through the Strait of Hormuz, these attacks hamper the flow of the global economy. The Houthis deploy lethal UAVs, missiles, rockets and other projectiles in their frequent barrages. From October 2023 to mid-2024 alone, the rebel group attacked more than five dozen vessels in the Red Sea. Clearly, the Iranian-backed Houthis depend on a constant influx of these weapons in order to keep up with this rate of attacks. Beijing’s delivery of the key components required by these aerial weapons to function enables the Houthis directly.

The Chinese-Iranian collaboration on this front coincides with the allies’ determination to establish a new international order based on their own rules. Beijing, Tehran, Moscow and even Pyongyang are increasingly working together to undermine the U.S. and Western power. The People’s Republic of China has also allegedly interfered in the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine by providing drones to Moscow. Now that U.S. intelligence services have uncovered China’s material support for a group perpetuating attacks against Israel, the U.S. and other Western nations, the depth of this collaboration is even more alarming.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. Carlin has over 1,000 articles published over the last several years on various defense issues.

Image: CENTCOM.

Military aircraft do not often cross over into mainstream popular culture. Rare instances of transcendence usually result from film. The Top Gun series, which centers upon naval flyers in the F-14 and F/A-18, put the Navy’s jets at the forefront of the American conscious. Otherwise, military aircraft mostly reside in the periphery – something that people are aware of, yet rarely pay much mind to. 

Last weekend’s Rose Bowl offered a rare reprieve, however: a moment in which a military aircraft was organically inserted into a moment of cultural prominence. Football flyovers are hardly rare; they occur regularly enough. But the impact is typically muted. The recent Rose Bowl, however, played between Oregon and Ohio State, was different for two reasons: one, the magnitude of the game; and two, the presence of the mighty, and rare, B-2 Spirit stealth bomber.

A rare sighting

The B-2 stealth bomber is exceedingly rare. Only 21 were ever built. Only 19 are still in service (one was retired in 2022; another was destroyed in a crash on Guam in 2008). By comparison, over 4,600 F-16s have been built, meaning one is exponentially more likely to encounter an F-16, or some other fourth-generation fighter, than the B-2. And of course, encountering a B-2 defeats the purpose. The B-2 is a stealth bomber, after all, designed to move about undetected behind enemy lines, quietly and unseen either to radar or the naked eye. So the B-2 is a counterintuitive choice for a gaudy flyover. Yet the rarity of the airframe—and its distinctive silhouette—help to give the Air Force a transcendent cultural moment.

For most of the people in attendance at the Rose Bowl, the B-2 flyover marked the first and last time they will ever see the stealth bomber. I myself have never seen a B-2, and don’t expect to before the platform is phased out in favor of the upcoming B-21 Raider.

Already outdated

The B-2 Spirit was the world’s first (and still to this day only) operational stealth bomber. The platform was an immediate strategic game-changer, giving the United States the coveted ability to operate a nuclear-capable aircraft behind enemy lines. Immediately, the B-2 allowed the US to deploy a credible, robust nuclear triad, complete with stealth options in air and sea. Even today, a generation later, no nation boasts the ability to deploy nuclear weapons from a stealth bomber.

Yet, times have changed; air defense systems have grown more sophisticated and sensitive. Resultingly, the B-2 is not as stealthy as it once was. Enter the B-21 Raider, the Air Force’s next-generation stealth bomber. Outwardly, the B-21 appears quite similar to the B-2, each with their distinctive flying wing design and dark grey paint job. But the B-21 is expected to feature a lower radar cross section (RCS) than the B-2, and hence should be stealthier. In theory, the B-21 will restore the strategic advantage that the B-2 once enjoyed when she first debuted.

The new stealth bomber isn’t ready yet; she’s still undergoing initial flight testing, with the expectation that she will join the Air Force in the next few years—at which point you may expect to find the B-21 conducting the occasional football flyover instead.

Harrison Kass is a senior defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image: Mariusz Lopusiewicz / Shutterstock.

The battlespace is changing. America’s adversaries are producing increasingly sophisticated systems, i.e. fifth-generation aircraft, advanced air defense systems, and hypersonic missiles, forcing American forces to adapt to enhanced threats. Yet, simultaneously, America’s adversaries are producing low-tech systems, particularly drones, which despite their humble nature, are requiring American forces to adapt.

Case in point: when F-22 pilot Lt. Col. Dustin Johnson was deployed to the Middle East last year, his squadron’s primary concern was not enemy aircraft, but rather enemy drones and cruise missiles.

“The dangers that most concerned Johnson and his Airmen included Iranian-designed drones and cruise missiles that Tehran and its proxies have employed during he most recent stretch of unrest in the Middle East,” Air & Space Forces Magazine reported.

“We were not necessarily worried about shooting down anybody else’s airplanes,” Johnson told Air & Space Forces Magazine. “We were primarily there to defend our ground forces against the threats that were being posed by the UAVs in the AOR, as well as the cruise missiles that we’ve seen become more prevalent, both from the Houthis as well as militia groups in the region.”

The fact that the vaunted, fifth-generation F-22 is being used to guard against relatively inexpensive, low-tech drones suggests that rebel forces in the region have devised a formula for mitigating America’s vast technological and financial advantages.

Emerging low-tech threats

Iran and their proxies have deployed their drones to disruptive effect. Last April, Iran deployed over 80 drones in an attack against Israel. American-supplied Israeli fourth-generation aircraft were used to engage the drones—a pairing that in and of itself represented a win for the Iranians. If an inexpensive platform like a drone can be used to divert the attention of a multi-million-dollar aircraft, that constitutes a profound resource imbalance.

Iran isn’t the only entity operating drones in the region. Iranian proxies, like Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, are also operating Iranian drones.

“It was a very fluid situation,” Johnson said. “Knowing exactly where threats were coming from and when is becoming exponentially more difficult to discern because the threat has just proliferated to the point that it can literally be one person from anywhere with a single UAV.”

Of course, the F-22 wasn’t designed to hunt and kill drones, which weren’t especially relevant during its design period in the 1990s. Rather, the F-22 was designed to be the world’s best air superiority fighter, edging out advanced Russian and Chinese fighters. And while drones don’t pose the same level of threat to the F-22 as an Su-57 or a J-20 would, drones do pose their own set of distinct challenges. Specifically, drones are small and slow, which makes them particularly hard to detect.

“It’s air-to-air, but it is a different type of air-to-air than we’ve ever really trained to before,” Johnson said. “[Drones] pose very significant identification problems.”

Despite the challenges of drone identification, American-made aircraft have adapted proficiently; The Iranian drone attack in April was countered successfully enough to deter Iran from deploying drones in their October attack against Israel, opting instead only to use ballistic missiles.

The F-22 “is both a strategic and tactical asset,” Johnson said. “That gives anybody pause to think about how capable their defenses are when that platform is in theater.” 

Harrison Kass is a senior defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

Paved runways and dedicated facilities are a luxury that the United States Air Force knows it can't count on in wartime. The service has explored how the fifth-generation Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II could operate from a remote roadway, but it recently conducted a test where an unmanned aerial system (UAS) didn't even need a road!

The U.S. Air Force's 1st Special Operations Mission Sustainment Team (SOMST) recently carried out tests at the Melrose Air Force Range in New Mexico, where an MQ-9 Reaper drone landed on a dirt strip and was quickly refueled and rearmed before heading back into the sky.

The entire time, the UAS was operated by an MQ-9 pilot and sensor operator based more than 1,100 miles away at Hurlburt Field, Florida, the service explained.

"The 65th Special Operations Squadron hosted Exercise Reaper Castillo Nov. 4 to Dec. 18, 2024 to sharpen mission-essential tasks and develop MQ-9 Agile Combat Employment (ACE) capabilities. The goal: create a lighter, leaner and more agile force," the SOMST team explained.

This test served to validate "the MQ-9's ability to conduct key operations in austere environments, including dirt-strip landings, refueling, rearming and rapid relaunch." That is noteworthy as the MQ-9 has typically required a well-established facility that includes a paved runway, a team of maintainers, and "extensive support functions."

The U.S. Air Force clearly understands that it may need to adapt accordingly and that it can't count on a major base of operations from which to service the Reaper.

"In the future fight, we assess we will no longer be able to rely exclusively on the main operating bases that have persisted," said the 1st SOMST flight commander. "Operating in austere environments anytime, anyplace and anywhere is critical. It enables commanders to have options - something critically needed in special operations forces."

The Air Force had previously conducted the first touchdown on a dirt landing zone in 2023, at the Nine Mile Training Center south of Fort Stockton.

The recent tests further highlight how the MQ-9 doesn't require major infrastructure or even a paved road.

"We have to break out of the mindset that we need a huge, paved runway with co-located launch and recovery aircrews," the mission commander added. "If we can free ourselves from the traditional mindset, it makes MQ-9 combat reach nearly limitless."

It was nearly a year ago that Airmen from the 50th Attack Squadron and Air National Guardsmen from the 163rd Attack Wing conducted a successful landing of a Reaper drone at Shaw Air Force Base (AFB) under satellite control.

Satellite-controlled landings are set to become standard practice for the MQ-9 community, replacing legacy processes that require additional ground control stations, aircrews, and maintenance support.

Historically, the MQ-9 had only taken off and landed via line-of-sight antennas, with aircrew members manually flying the aircraft. That satellite control test confirmed how the MQ-9 can literally take off and land from anywhere in the world.

Combined, these exercises highlight how the remotely piloted aircraft can operate from any location in the world, in line with its ACE capabilities.

"War games conducted by the U.S.-based Center for Strategic and International Studies in 2022 found a conflict with China around Taiwan could see Washington and its allies lose as many as 900 combat aircraft – with most of those losses occurring on the ground due to enemy missile attacks. The ACE approach is meant to diminish that risk, and is something the Air Force describes as 'crucial to unlocking the full potential of the MQ-9,'" Flight Global explained.

Designed as a follow-up to the MQ-1 Predator, the Reaper can carry a great deal of ordnance, which allows it to fulfill the "hunter" component of a hunter-killer drone. Reapers can carry double the amount of Hellfire missiles that the Predator can carry, while the MQ-9 can also carry up to 500 pounds of bombs.

The Reaper can also employ up to eight laser-guided missiles. The Air-to-Ground Missile-114 Hellfire possesses highly accurate, low-collateral damage, anti-armor, and anti-personnel engagement capabilities. Even as the U.S. Air Force seeks to develop more autonomous and capable drones, the MQ-9 has continued to be updated and enhanced.

"The MQ-9 is extremely relevant in today's fight and will be in the future as well," said a 65th SOS MQ-9 evaluator pilot and exercise mission commander. "It allows us to go places and do things that we cannot risk sending manned aircraft – such as high-threat environments."

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Mike Mareen / Shutterstock.com

President-elect Trump has taken an​​ opening shot at rewriting the global economic order with his threats of tariffs against Mexico and Canada, as well as China and other BRICS+ countries. While the announcements have triggered a fierce debate about the pros and cons of tariffs, the incoming president’s willingness to pursue both tariffs and deals creates an opportunity to rewrite international economics to put U.S. and allied national security at the center.

During his first term, President-elect Trump, though often portrayed as a unilateralist, demonstrated a willingness to strike trade deals and work with partners. These included the U.S.-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) trade deal, a digital trade agreement with Japan, and changes to the U.S.-Korea FTA. He built international coalitions to tackle security challenges posed by China, for example, persuading European governments to reduce their use of Chinese-made telecommunications equipment, making them less susceptible to espionage and cyber-attacks from Beijing. His administration also supported programs like the Three Seas Initiative to strengthen economic and security ties in Central and Eastern Europe.

President-elect Trump’s tariff threats give his team the opportunity to sit down at the negotiating table to pursue new types of deals that advance American and allied security interests. But rather than traditional FTAs that focus on opening up markets across all sectors, the incoming team should leverage the threat of tariffs to advance a U.S. economic security agenda that would strengthen supply chains, promote an allied economic block, and ramp up pressure on China.

A deal, for example, could strengthen cooperation in discrete sectors that are important to U.S. economic security. These could include sectors like semiconductors, medicines, critical minerals, and defense manufacturing. Here, the United States and its allies are all ramping up their own investments, but future success will depend on the availability of component parts and materials from other countries. Energy is another important sector where the United States and its allies could work to promote the deployment of future energy technology, like new types of high-tech nuclear reactors and geothermal power, while also guaranteeing each other steady access to hydrocarbon fuels.

Trade deals can also help keep China out. Countries could agree to cooperate on tariffs against Chinese products that are flooding global markets, like cars, by raising higher common tariffs against Beijing. Countries could also agree to reduce reliance on Chinese supply chains. For example, a car assembled in Southeast Asia that uses significant Chinese parts should be tariffed at Chinese rates rather than being given favorable deal treatment. These types of shared measures against China could help U.S. exporters because they will face less Chinese competition in third-country markets.

President-elect Trump has always been more willing than other U.S. leaders to see that national security and economic relations are no longer separate spheres but inextricably linked realms. Deals could increase cooperation on export controls and investment screening to limit the flow of advanced technology to China. Reducing our use of risky Chinese hardware and software is another area of cooperation. Beyond Chinese telecommunications gear, the Biden administration recently took steps to restrict the sale of Chinese cars in the United States, citing the risk that China could use internet-connected cars to engage in espionage. The European Union, meanwhile, is discussing a “trusted vendor” program that would address cybersecurity risks posed by non-European tech companies. This provides an opportunity to develop a trans-Atlantic trusted technology ecosystem that is open to U.S., European, and other allied tech companies while restricting risky Chinese products.

For deal-making to work, America’s allies need to understand that they cannot just wish away tariffs and tough negotiations. President-elect Trump and his advisors want a global trading order that is less focused on low-cost production and more focused on economic security, trade balance, and increased domestic manufacturing. They are not going to ignore trade imbalances by allies, including in Europe and Asia, and tariffs will be used to help U.S. producers of at least some key products. Allies shouldn’t derail cooperation on the broader set of economic security measures simply out of pique over the inevitable U.S. tariff increases.

Conversely, Trump officials should see tariffs as a scalpel. Targeted tariffs are an essential part of the economic statecraft toolkit. Broad, indiscriminate tariffs against allies would weaken the American Team against the Chinese while raising consumer prices. American national security imperatives call for economic statecraft to grow and strengthen the American Team while minimizing any infighting.

Allied economic engagement also has the potential to strengthen the West’s position in emerging markets like India, Indonesia, and Brazil. China has made inroads with many of these countries through its Belt and Road investment initiative, channeling hundreds of billions of dollars into infrastructure investment. While much of this investment comes with onerous financial terms and geopolitical conditions—so-called “debt trap diplomacy”—if the West does not provide alternatives, countries will take China’s offer.

During his first term, President-elect Trump worked to address this disparity by creating the U.S. Development Finance Corporation (DFC), which finances development projects in dozens of developing countries, and reauthorizing the Export-Import Bank (ExIm), which finances U.S. exports and can offer terms to help U.S. exporters match offers made by Chinese competitors. Both the DFC and ExIm, however, are set to expire next year. President-elect Trump and the Republican Congress have an opportunity to use the renewal process to push through needed reforms, like expanding work in middle-income countries and allowing better co-investments and co-financing activities with allied-nation counterparts, and prod DFC and ExIm to be better integrated into overall U.S. economic statecraft and national security measures.

As the world moves towards a much more divided global economy, with a U.S.-led bloc and a Chinese-led bloc, the United States and our allies need to ensure that our bloc is bigger and stronger and limit the spillover of technology, expertise, and capital to Beijing’s. President-elect Trump and his team have a generational opportunity to use deal-making, including targeted tariffs, to write the rules for a new geo-economic order.

Kaush Arha is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and previously served as the senior advisor for global strategic engagement at USAID and the G7 Sherpa for the Blue Dot Network during the Trump administration.

Peter Harrell is a nonresident senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and previously served as senior director for international economics with a joint appointment to the National Security Council and National Economic Council during the Biden administration.

Image: Anna Moneymaker / Shutterstock.com.

Numerology is a potent force in human affairs. So is a deadline—especially when it’s clear fateful consequences will come to pass once the cutoff date arrives. The wry English wit Dr. Samuel Johnson was on to something when he quipped that “when a man knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind wonderfully.”

But what happens if you talk yourself into believing a deadline is impending when it’s not? Maybe the executioner is not on a set timetable. An approaching date may concentrate your mind, as Johnson prophesied. And that can be a healthy thing. Deadlines are forcing events. They spur thought and action, compelling you to set aside indecision and sloth. But, perversely, a deadline might goad you into doing something rash—something with dire strategic and political import—in hopes of eluding the hangman’s noose. And then you’ll be stuck with the consequences of your actions—potentially, consequences of cataclysmic proportions.

Even though the hangman was never coming for you in the first place. Being decisive could be self-defeating.

Such are the dangers of a phantom cutoff date. Now to the news. Here are two numbers that have come to fixate officialdom in Washington, DC over the past few years: six and 2027. Both originated in a single committee meeting in Congress. In 2021, while testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, outgoing U.S. Indo-Pacific Command chief Philip Davidson reported that “Beijing is pushing across the globe to diplomatically isolate, economically constrain, and militarily threaten Taiwan.”

No kidding.

That was abundantly true then, and it had been for some time. Fully twenty years ago, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) magnates transcribed their threat to use arms into Chinese domestic law in the form of an “Anti-Secession Law.” The law set the conditions under which China would use force and made—surprise, surprise—CCP leaders the arbiters of whether those conditions had been met. Nor was this mere bombast on Beijing’s part. In the ensuing years, as Chinese military might has swelled, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has taken to deploying sea and air power around the island. As a matter of routine, PLA forces now practice amphibious landings, bombardment of key infrastructure, destruction of the Taiwan Navy and Air Force, and associated precursors to conquest.

The Anti-Secession Law has taken on an increasingly martial hue as China acquires the means to enforce it.

None of what Admiral Davidson told senators in his prepared testimony was especially novel, let alone radical. His prepared remarks were boilerplate. While fielding questions from the committee, though, he had this to say: “I worry that [the Chinese are] accelerating their ambitions to supplant the United States and our leadership role in the rules-based international order, which they’ve long said that they want to do ... by 2050. I’m worried about them moving that target closer. Taiwan is clearly one of their ambitions before then. And I think the threat is manifest during this decade, in fact in the next six years” (emphasis added).

That last became the tagline for the admiral’s remarks. 6 + 2021 = 2027. There’s your numerology. The threat posed by China had become plain enough by 2021. Threats are composed of intentions and capabilities, and by then, Beijing had loudly and often trumpeted its intentions while at the same time amassing fearsome capabilities. But when the threat might cascade into war, if ever, it remained abstract and ethereal. There was no proof that Johnson’s hanging had been scheduled or ever would be. Or maybe the execution would be postponed if it were on the docket. However imposing, the threat emanating from China fell short of wonderfully concentrating minds.

It was possible to dither. And that’s what human beings do best.

Davidson changed all that. He provided specifics. His six-year timeframe was almost instantly dubbed the “Davidson Window,” shorthand for an interval of maximum peril in the Taiwan Strait. The metaphor concentrated minds. Now, that being said, it remains unclear to me precisely why policymakers and opinionmakers locked onto 2027, the endpoint of the Davidson Window. Obsessing over 2027 implies that Taiwan, America, and regional allies still have a couple of years’ respite to get ready for a trial of arms.

No.

Davidson meant to broadcast a more alarming message than that. He meant to tell Congress that the allies had no leisure to prepare, even back in 2021. China could act against Taiwan at any time during his six-year timeframe—including the day he testified, or today, or tomorrow. This hangman is on no fixed timetable. The allies should make haste lest he show up unannounced—as well he might, according to Davidson. That there can never be too much deception in warfare is baked into Communist Chinese strategic culture.

General Secretary Xi Jinping is not about to telegraph the timing of a drastic move like an assault on Taiwan. This hangman hides his thinking.

Which is why it’s also unclear to me why so many influential folks seem to regard 2027 as a deadline. Such a view is not entirely unreasonable. Chinese vest great importance in anniversaries, and 2027 marks the centennial of the founding of the Red Army, the forerunner to today’s People’s Liberation Army. Pomp might warrant extraordinary measures. It is also true that Xi has instructed PLA commanders to have a military option ready by that year, in part to commemorate the centennial and in part because political and military leaders covet having plentiful options. That’s what a capable armed force provides.

But creating an option is not the same as executing it. Human choice remains.

So beware of 2027 mania. Look both left and right of that date. If it hasn’t been already, the Pentagon needs to be laying contingency plans to intervene in a China-Taiwan war should one erupt today. And it could. Not just Phil Davidson but Carl von Clausewitz says so. The sage of Prussia postulates a case in which a weaker contender “is in conflict with a much more powerful one and expects its position to grow weaker every year.” He goes on to ask rhetorically, “If war is unavoidable, should it not make the most of its opportunities before its position gets still worse?”

He concludes that the lesser contender “should attack.”

Apply that to East Asia. If Xi sees military, economic, demographic, or other trendlines turning against China—if he believes the correlation of military might will be worse in the future than it is now—then the CCP supremo might roll the iron dice. If today is as good as it gets, Clausewitzian logic suggests today is the prime time to act.

Opportunism and risk calculations could prod Xi to be a gambler.

And he could gamble at any time. But neither should we regard the 2027 centennial year as a graven-in-stone deadline. Deterrence has worked and could work. What the allies do could change Xi’s mind. Clausewitz observes that there are three ways to prevail in contests of arms, and only one requires a combatant to throw down its antagonist on the battlefield and impose terms. He maintains that “inability to carry on the struggle”—the swiftest and surest route to martial triumph—“can, in practice, be replaced by two other grounds for making peace: the first is the improbability of victory; the second is its unacceptable cost.”

The latter two mechanisms operate in peacetime as well as wartime. An antagonist can be disheartened by the military situation or by cost/benefit calculations. It could desist from aggression by being rational.

Bottom line, it would be a mistake to succumb to either complacency or fatalism in the Western Pacific. It remains possible to convince Beijing its position in the Taiwan Strait is untenable. If Xi believes the People’s Liberation Army stands little chance of prevailing in 2027, he should refrain from ordering Chinese forces into action because of some arbitrary date. Or if the allies can persuade Xi that the cost and hazards of conquering Taiwan are more than the island is worth to China—or beyond China’s means entirely—he should likewise relent.

The year 2027 is just a year. We should remain watchful as it approaches, lest the prophets of automatic warfare prove correct, but we should neither relax our guard in the meantime nor resign ourselves to a certain clash of arms. Let’s not give up on efforts to defeat Chinese aggression without fighting.

We have a say in whether Johnson’s hanging happens—and how we react to it.

James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and a Faculty Fellow at the University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs. The views voiced here are his alone.

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On Friday, President Joe Biden presented the highest military award for valor to seven U.S. Army soldiers at a ceremony at the White House. It marked the final time that Biden would award the Medal of Honor to a U.S. serviceperson.

Sadly, six of the awards were issued posthumously, for actions taken by the recipients during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The individuals included Pvt. Bruno R. Orig; Pfc. Wataru Nakamura; Cpl. Fred B. McGee; Pfc. Charles R. Johnson; Gen. Richard E. Cavazos; and Capt. Hugh R. Nelson Jr.

The seventh, Vietnam War veteran then-Private First Class Kenneth J. David, was present at the ceremony.

"I'm deeply privileged to honor seven American heroes," Biden said. "That's not hyperbole. These are genuine, to their core, heroes. Heroes of different ranks, different positions, and even different generations. But heroes who all went above and beyond the call of duty. Heroes who all deserve our nation's highest and oldest military recognition, the Medal of Honor."

The origin of the highest military decoration dates back to the American Civil War when Iowa Senator James W. Crimes introduced a bill to "promote the efficiency of the Navy" by authorizing the production and distribution of "medals of honor." Within months, a similar bill was introduced for an award for privates of the U.S. Army. The wording and nature of the bills changed, including that this award would be for soldiers of all services and all ranks.

On July 12, 1862, President Abraham Lincoln signed into law the authorization of the Medal of Honor. At the time, it was the only U.S. military decoration. As a result, a total of 1,527 medals were issued during the American Civil War.

The very first recipient of the Medal of Honor was Private Jacob Parrott of Company K, 33D Ohio Infantry, who was one of twenty-two men—later known as "Andrew's Raiders"—who penetrated nearly 200 miles south into enemy territory and captured a railroad train at Big Shanty, Georgia, in an attempt to destroy the bridges and track between Chattanooga and Atlanta. Captured during the raid and severely tortured, Parrott was later part of a prisoner exchange. Parrott continued to serve in the Union Army for the remainder of the war, earning a commission and rising to the rank of First Lieutenant.

With the introduction of other medals and awards in the latter half of the nineteenth century, by the Spanish-American War, the Medal of Honor became the supreme honor. In the more than a century and a half since it was first issued, it has been awarded to soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen who went above and beyond the call of duty.

"They're the finest military in the history of the world," Biden said of the seven recipients, but the words were true of all of those who have received the decoration. "Today we award these individuals a Medal of Honor. We can't stop here. Together as a nation, it's up to us to give this medal meaning, to keep fighting, to keep fighting for one another, for each other, to keep defending everything these heroes fought for and many of them died for: the ideals of America, the freedom we cherish, the democracy that has made our progress possible."

-Enlisted recipients of the Medal of Honor are entitled to a supplemental uniform allowance.

-Children of recipients are eligible for admission to the United States military academies without regard to the quota requirements.

-It is a federal felony to falsely claim to be a Medal of Honor winner. Under the Stolen Valor Act, it is also against the law to sell or buy a Medal of Honor.

-The Medal of Honor has been presented nine times where the circumstances are "unknown" or "classified."

-The term "Congressional Medal of Honor" is incorrect. The Medal of Honor is presented by the president on behalf of Congress, and the confusion may come from the Congressional Medal of Honor Society, which was formed by an act of Congress in 1958.

-A total of nineteen recipients have been awarded more than one Medal of Honor, and current regulations specify that an appropriate award device be centered on the ribbon. This is an oak leaf cluster for U.S. Army and Air Force medals and a gold award star for the Navy version.

-William "Willie" Johnston remains the youngest recipient, who at the age of thirteen served as a drummer boy in Company D of the 3rd Vermont Infantry during the American Civil War. His division was routed during the Seven Days Battles in the summer of 1862, and Johnston was the only drummer to return with his instrument—a fact that was noteworthy as many soldiers threw away their guns and equipment during their retreat.

-March 25 is "National Medal of Honor Day," which serves to "foster public appreciation and recognition of Medal of Honor Recipients." The date was chosen because it was on March 25, 1863, that the very first Medals of Honor were presented to six members of Andrews' Raiders during the American Civil War.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.
Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.