Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Turkey’s new Presidential System has failed to realise the goals that it was said to achieve with its introduction despite the disapproval of half the population.

Contrary to the ruling party’s claims in favour of the new governance system, two and a half years after its introduction, parliament is weaker, separation of powers is undermined, the judiciary is politicised, institutions are crippled, economic woes are mounting and authoritarian prac­tices prevail.

Despite the almost unlimited and unchecked power that the new system grants to the President over institutions, his space for political manoeuvre is, surprisingly, narrower than it was in the parliamentary system.

Providing the otherwise divided opposition a joint anchor of resistance, the Presidential System unintentionally breathed life into the inertia of Turkey’s political party setting.

The formation of splinter parties from the ruling party, primarily address­ing the same conservative electorate, alongside the changing electoral logic with the need to form alliances to win an election, poses a serious challenge to the ruling party and its leader – the President.

Despite the oppositional alliance’s electoral victory in 2019 local elec­tions, it is at the moment unclear whether the forming parties share a common vision for steps towards democratic repair.

Together with the institutional havoc caused by the Presidential System, the blurry outlook of the opposition requires caution about an easy and rapid positive transformation. While the European Union should be realistic in regard to expectations towards democratic reform, it should also strike a balance between cooperation in areas of mutual benefit and confronting Ankara when necessary to protect the interests of the Euro­pean Union and its member states.

Mit dem ersten »Fünfjahresplan über den Aufbau von Rechtsstaatlichkeit (2020–2025)« konkretisiert Chinas Führung ihre Vision eines kohärenten, genuin chinesischen Rechtssystems. Im Mittelpunkt steht dabei der Begriff »sozia­listische Rechtsstaatlichkeit chinesischer Prägung«. Bis 2035 soll sie im Wesentlichen etabliert sein. Marxistisch-leninistische Rechtskonzepte bleiben funda­mental. Durch das Recht als Instrument soll der Staat effizienter werden. Willkür bei der Rechts­findung soll für den Großteil der Bevölkerung reduziert werden, unter anderem mit Hilfe von Hoch­technologie. In ausgewählten Teilbereichen, zum Beispiel bei pro­zessualen Fragen, lässt sich Beijing für den Aufbau der chinesischen »Rechtsstaatlich­keit« vom Westen inspirieren. Eine unabhängige Justiz und das Prinzip der Gewaltenteilung aber lehnt die Parteistaatsführung weiterhin strikt als »fehlerhafte west­liche Gedanken« ab. Beijing geht es explizit darum, auch international für Chinas Rechtsvorstellungen zu werben, Standards zu etablieren und Interessen mittels des Rechts durchzusetzen. Daher sollten Berlin und Brüssel ihr besonderes Augenmerk auf chinesische Rechts­vorstellungen richten. Vertiefte Kenntnisse darüber sind zwingend notwendig, um die strategischen Implikationen von Chinas Rechtspolitik zu erfassen, die Hand­lungs­logik besser zu verstehen und adäquat darauf zu reagieren.

The discussion paper investigates what effects cash-for-work (CfW) can have on local economic development (LED). It is based on the hypothesis that CfW, which is targeted provision of jobs to vulnerable households, affects LED directly (through employment and income for workers and the creation of public goods) but also indirectly (through multiplier and investment effects as well as better social cohesion). The article builds on quantitative and qualitative research conducted in Jordan in 2019, Jordan being a particularly interesting case for the topic: Here, different foreign donors have set up a whole bunch of different CfW programmes after 2016 to support Syrian refugees along with vulnerable Jordanians. The results confirm that CfW has an indirect impact on LED through multiplier effects since CfW participants spend most of their income locally. In addition, CfW programmes in Jordan improve the skills and employability of their participants. This upgrading does not transform into higher employment rates, however, because the Jordanian labour market is extremely tight. Finally, the programmes empower women; they open new doors to the labour market and contribute to a – however not irrevocable – change of traditional gender roles. Our suggestion is thus that other refugee host countries set up CfW programmes as well, covering both refugees and low-income nationals.

The discussion paper investigates what effects cash-for-work (CfW) can have on local economic development (LED). It is based on the hypothesis that CfW, which is targeted provision of jobs to vulnerable households, affects LED directly (through employment and income for workers and the creation of public goods) but also indirectly (through multiplier and investment effects as well as better social cohesion). The article builds on quantitative and qualitative research conducted in Jordan in 2019, Jordan being a particularly interesting case for the topic: Here, different foreign donors have set up a whole bunch of different CfW programmes after 2016 to support Syrian refugees along with vulnerable Jordanians. The results confirm that CfW has an indirect impact on LED through multiplier effects since CfW participants spend most of their income locally. In addition, CfW programmes in Jordan improve the skills and employability of their participants. This upgrading does not transform into higher employment rates, however, because the Jordanian labour market is extremely tight. Finally, the programmes empower women; they open new doors to the labour market and contribute to a – however not irrevocable – change of traditional gender roles. Our suggestion is thus that other refugee host countries set up CfW programmes as well, covering both refugees and low-income nationals.

The discussion paper investigates what effects cash-for-work (CfW) can have on local economic development (LED). It is based on the hypothesis that CfW, which is targeted provision of jobs to vulnerable households, affects LED directly (through employment and income for workers and the creation of public goods) but also indirectly (through multiplier and investment effects as well as better social cohesion). The article builds on quantitative and qualitative research conducted in Jordan in 2019, Jordan being a particularly interesting case for the topic: Here, different foreign donors have set up a whole bunch of different CfW programmes after 2016 to support Syrian refugees along with vulnerable Jordanians. The results confirm that CfW has an indirect impact on LED through multiplier effects since CfW participants spend most of their income locally. In addition, CfW programmes in Jordan improve the skills and employability of their participants. This upgrading does not transform into higher employment rates, however, because the Jordanian labour market is extremely tight. Finally, the programmes empower women; they open new doors to the labour market and contribute to a – however not irrevocable – change of traditional gender roles. Our suggestion is thus that other refugee host countries set up CfW programmes as well, covering both refugees and low-income nationals.

Reaching net-zero greenhouse gas emissions is a critical goal of climate policy. Across the world, growing numbers of governments are introducing targets and plans to achieve net-zero around the middle of this century. Alongside this, leading banks and investors are committing to align their portfolios with net-zero by 2050. As guardians of the financial system, central banks and supervisors also need to introduce explicit strategies to support the transition to net-zero as the next stage in confronting the risks of climate change. This report is a first attempt to examine the role that central banks and financial supervisors could play in supporting the transition to net-zero.

Reaching net-zero greenhouse gas emissions is a critical goal of climate policy. Across the world, growing numbers of governments are introducing targets and plans to achieve net-zero around the middle of this century. Alongside this, leading banks and investors are committing to align their portfolios with net-zero by 2050. As guardians of the financial system, central banks and supervisors also need to introduce explicit strategies to support the transition to net-zero as the next stage in confronting the risks of climate change. This report is a first attempt to examine the role that central banks and financial supervisors could play in supporting the transition to net-zero.

Reaching net-zero greenhouse gas emissions is a critical goal of climate policy. Across the world, growing numbers of governments are introducing targets and plans to achieve net-zero around the middle of this century. Alongside this, leading banks and investors are committing to align their portfolios with net-zero by 2050. As guardians of the financial system, central banks and supervisors also need to introduce explicit strategies to support the transition to net-zero as the next stage in confronting the risks of climate change. This report is a first attempt to examine the role that central banks and financial supervisors could play in supporting the transition to net-zero.

This article investigates and empirically tests the link between climate change and sovereign risk in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian countries are among those most heavily affected by climate change. The number and intensity of extreme weather events in the region have been increasing markedly, causing severe social and economic damage. Southeast Asian economies are also exposed to gradual effects of global warming as well as transition risks stemming from policies aimed at mitigating climate change. To empirically examine the effect of climate change on the sovereign risk of Southeast Asian countries, we employ indices for vulnerability and resilience to climate change and estimate country-specific OLS models for six countries and a fixed effects panel using monthly data for the period 2002–2018. Both the country-specific and the panel results show that greater climate vulnerability appears to have a sizable positive effect on sovereign bond yields, while greater resilience to climate change has an offsetting effect, albeit to a lesser extent. A higher cost of debt holds back much-needed investment in public infrastructure and climate adaptation, increases the risk of debt sustainability problems, and diminishes the development prospects of Southeast Asian countries.

This article investigates and empirically tests the link between climate change and sovereign risk in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian countries are among those most heavily affected by climate change. The number and intensity of extreme weather events in the region have been increasing markedly, causing severe social and economic damage. Southeast Asian economies are also exposed to gradual effects of global warming as well as transition risks stemming from policies aimed at mitigating climate change. To empirically examine the effect of climate change on the sovereign risk of Southeast Asian countries, we employ indices for vulnerability and resilience to climate change and estimate country-specific OLS models for six countries and a fixed effects panel using monthly data for the period 2002–2018. Both the country-specific and the panel results show that greater climate vulnerability appears to have a sizable positive effect on sovereign bond yields, while greater resilience to climate change has an offsetting effect, albeit to a lesser extent. A higher cost of debt holds back much-needed investment in public infrastructure and climate adaptation, increases the risk of debt sustainability problems, and diminishes the development prospects of Southeast Asian countries.

This article investigates and empirically tests the link between climate change and sovereign risk in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian countries are among those most heavily affected by climate change. The number and intensity of extreme weather events in the region have been increasing markedly, causing severe social and economic damage. Southeast Asian economies are also exposed to gradual effects of global warming as well as transition risks stemming from policies aimed at mitigating climate change. To empirically examine the effect of climate change on the sovereign risk of Southeast Asian countries, we employ indices for vulnerability and resilience to climate change and estimate country-specific OLS models for six countries and a fixed effects panel using monthly data for the period 2002–2018. Both the country-specific and the panel results show that greater climate vulnerability appears to have a sizable positive effect on sovereign bond yields, while greater resilience to climate change has an offsetting effect, albeit to a lesser extent. A higher cost of debt holds back much-needed investment in public infrastructure and climate adaptation, increases the risk of debt sustainability problems, and diminishes the development prospects of Southeast Asian countries.

Frankreichs Präsident Emmanuel Macron hat das Ziel ausgegeben, die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen zu revitalisieren und eine »neue Partnerschaft« zwischen Paris und Berlin zu begründen. In der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik sowie in Teilen der Europapolitik konnte dieser Anspruch jedoch selten eingelöst werden.

Hauptgrund hierfür sind strukturelle Veränderungen in den internatio­nalen Beziehungen, auf die Frankreich und Deutschland unterschiedlich reagieren: Paris sucht neue Wege, seine verteidigungspolitische Handlungsfähigkeit zu erhalten und das strategische Vakuum zu füllen, das entstanden ist durch das nachlassende Interesse der USA an Europa und seiner Peripherie. Berlin setzt auf die Weiterentwicklung von Nato und EU als grundlegenden Organisationen deutscher Außenpolitik.

Zudem erschweren nationale Alleingänge, Desinteresse und ein ungenügender Erfahrungsaustausch einen bilateralen Interessen­ausgleich.

Eine neue Intensität der bilateralen Zusammenarbeit setzt erstens voraus, dass sich Paris und Berlin in ihren bestehenden außen- und sicherheits­politischen Kooperationsformaten einer Gesamtschau der internationalen Gemengelage stellen. Sie müssen ihre jeweilige Betroffenheit sowie ihre Interessen offen besprechen und aus ihnen konkrete Maßnahmen ableiten.

Zweitens müssen sie sich darauf verständigen, dass nationale Alleingänge unterbleiben und ein Desinteresse an den außen-, sicherheits- und europa­politischen Druckpunkten des Partners nicht geduldet wird. Die Deutsch-Französische Parlamentarische Versammlung sollte die Exekutiven beider Länder dazu anhalten, den Élysée-Vertrag wie den Vertrag von Aachen zu erfüllen.

Zu diesen Ergebnissen kommen die sechs Fallstudien zu Libyen, zur Gemeinsamen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik, zur Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion, zu Russland, zur Nato und zur Türkei.