European Union

More than ever, the European Union finds itself in a legitimacy crisis. The need for change is crystallising, and so the EU has embarked on a new debate on the future of Europe.

The big challenges the European continent faces are well known: migration; unemployment and the economy; the future of the euro; climate change; Brexit; relations with the United States.

Failure to deliver responses to these challenges risks destroying the remaining trust citizens have in the EU’s ability to bring together a community of nations to solve common problems.

But even delivering adequate responses to these major challenges is unlikely to be enough. The EU’s challenge is not only that it needs to convince voters that it is still relevant in addressing the big problems. That will be the minimum requirement.

The EU’s key challenge is to prove that it can deliver on the promise of a Europe that works for citizens.

These days, the EU displays a startling weakness: too often, its upbeat rhetoric does not match reality. The EU needs to match citizens’ belief in the power of the EU to improve their lives and demonstrably deliver on its promise of a European ‘Union’.

We have come a long way. In many areas we do have a common market (although in others, we do not). Freedom of movement is real. Real successes exist.

But in too many areas, official rhetoric often creates the impression that we have come (or will soon go) further than is the case. Ironically, these shortfalls are most often discovered by precisely those who see the real benefits of the EU for themselves – those who try to cross borders to work, study or take a holiday, or who shop online from a different member state.

“We have come a long way: real successes exist”

These people’s expectations for a functioning ‘Union’ are high. But when they set out to take advantage of the EU’s purported achievements in real life, Europeans far too often find a reality that is below their expectations.

This is something that is far more damaging to the EU than you may think. These are the experiences of people who actively wish to make use of the EU’s advantages, who can see the concrete benefit the EU can bring to their lives. If they are disappointed, the most likely advocates for the European project will be lost. If they are not convinced that the EU keeps its promises, nobody else will be.

Apart from the very important fundamentals of the four freedoms, from which citizens moving across borders very obviously benefit, numerous other mundane encounters with the EU suggest the Union under-delivers in real life.

For example, Belgian residents (including citizens of other EU member states) are banned from driving cars that do not have a Belgian licence plate. If you live in Antwerp and you borrow your mother-in-law’s car from Brussels, that’s fine. But if your mother-in law lives in the Dutch city of Breda and you drive her Dutch-registered car in Belgium, you risk a fine and immobilisation of the car. There are a few small exceptions to this rule – one, interestingly, being for employees of the EU institutions.

Another example: if you have an EU driving licence, it is genuinely valid in all member states. If you change your country of residence, local authorities may encourage you to exchange it for a local one. If you follow that advice (which you are not obliged to), you discover that it is not enough to just hand in your old licence. You also need a certificate from the original issuing authority that specifies that the licence is still valid and what, if any, restrictions are attached to it. Most of the restrictions are codified in an EU directive so that the numerical codes can be easily cross-referenced.

But the certificates are not standardised – so that a German certificate which also shows the explanation of the codes (in German) causes the Belgian authorities to request an official translation of the certificate (at a cost of €250). A genuine European effort to make life simpler fails miserably in practice.

There are many other examples. Non-UK residents, unfazed by Brexit talks, can open a basic bank account in the UK thanks to an EU directive, but they cannot use the bank’s smartphone app because they do not have a UK mobile number. Erasmus students registering their residence in their temporary new home country may find that they need to get their multilingual international birth certificates transcribed into an equivalent local document that looks the same.

“The rhetoric of the EU institutions almost never matches the reality, and that is now rapidly becoming a problem for the EU’s legitimacy”

And of course, there are numerous accounts of hospitals refusing to accept the European Health Insurance Card, leaving tourists with high medical bills to pay. Even if reimbursements can be claimed later, people ask themselves what the EHIC is there for in the first place.

All these experiences send one clear message: the EU doesn’t deliver what it promises.

The failure must lie with an EU decision-making structure that appears to be less concerned with citizens’ experiences and more with accommodating the status quo. In doing so, the institutions have collectively created a huge credibility gap. The rhetoric almost never matches the reality, and that is now rapidly becoming a problem for the EU’s legitimacy.

So what should be adjusted – the rhetoric or the reality?

Changing the reality won’t be easy – resistance to change is strong. But changing the rhetoric to reflect the reality is also unattractive at a time when it is more crucial than ever to demonstrate the value of the EU.

Both options can work, but a choice needs to be made if citizens are to continue to believe in the European project. Changing reality require a hard and honest look at how the existing intended benefits for citizens are delivered in practice, and how this delivery can be improved.

There is much work to be done – and it is work that genuinely needs to be done.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC/Flickr – European Council

The post The EU’s real problem is over-promising and under-delivering appeared first on Europe’s World.

Fidenato and Others
Environment and consumers
According to Advocate General Bobek, Member States can adopt emergency measures regarding genetically modified food and feed only if they can establish, in addition to urgency, a clear and serious risk to health and the environment

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A detailed letter was not strictly necessary. One diplomat explained that “We’re triggering Article 50 – suck it” would have sufficed. But the formal notification shed light on Theresa May’s strategy and expectations going into negotiation.

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DRAFT REPORT on corruption and human rights in third countries
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Petras Auštrevičius

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

AMENDMENTS 5 - 168 - Draft opinion Establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast)
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

General : The Conference of Presidents endorsed a motion for a resolution drawn up by the leaders of four political groups and the Constitutional Affairs Committee, in which they set out their conditions for a final approval by the European Parliament of any withdrawal agreement with the United Kingdom. The draft resolution will be debated and voted on by the full house next Wednesday.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Today’s an important one in the Brexit saga. With the submission of formal notification to begin Article 50 negotiations, the UK has crossed an important threshold that cannot be easily crossed, whatever the legalities.

It also matters because it represents the final opportunity for the UK to shape the agenda of that process. This cannot be underestimated, even if it’s been largely ignored in the UK debate: Article 50 is about the EU decided what to offer a departing member state, not about that state choosing what to keep or bin.

Oddly, both the Lancaster House speech and the subsequent White Paper offered little of substance, something that was perhaps shaped by a desire to keep the powder dry until the last moment, so that there wasn’t an immediate out-manoeuvring by the EU27. However, the suspicion that the government simply didn’t have a plan in the first place has been hard to shake off.

The notification letter (available here) is thus vitally important in putting down a marker.

How does it do?

To the government’s credit, this is a concise and focused letter. With rumours of a 100-page version floating around, the danger always was that one might throw in everything into the mix, to lay down markers and set up red lines. However, that is also a recipe for stasis and endless unintended consequences.

Instead, the approach has been one that fits with good negotiating practice, namely to focus on principles rather than specifics. The seven principles set out are directed at creating a positive framework, within which the parties can find mutually-acceptable outcomes. Put differently, if you focus on underlying interests then you’ll see that there are different ways of skinning the proverbial cat. That’s true for any negotiation, but especially one as complex as this.

At the same time, it’s worth noting that of the seven, there is only one focused squarely on substance, rather than process. And all of them point strongly towards the desirability of reaching an agreement: there is an echo of ‘no deal is better than a bad deal’, but only an echo. Indeed, the tone is conciliatory rather than bombastic, again reflecting the looming dynamic of the discussions.

This does still leave the question of what the UK wants: there has been a lot about what it doesn’t want, but not much of the flipside.

Here, the letter does not give much direction. It talks of a ‘deep and special relationship’ and ‘a bold and ambitious Free Trade Agreement’ that is comprehensive in scope, but this is not fleshed out into areas of activity. Even free of movement – such a central part of May’s rhetoric to date – is notable more by its absence than anything: the UK doesn’t want to be part of the single market, but that’s as far as it goes. The avoidance of CJEU control is completely dropped, much to the relief of all involved, one imagines, given that the court will have to have powers any final agreement.

Indeed, it is only the Northern Irish issue that makes it into the text; a plea to recognise the particular relationship with the Republic, couched in language of maintaining the peace process. No solutions to this most intractable of problems is offered.

And this is perhaps the most lasting of impressions. This is a letter from a government that still hasn’t articulated a strong and clear sense of what it seeks: yes, there are fine words about the need to ‘advance and protect our shared European values’ – language that might stick in the throats of some eurosceptics – but this doesn’t point to a way forward in determining what should be the tools for building a new relationship post-exit.

As far as it, it’s about as much as could be expected. Whether that is enough to set the two years of negotiation off with a fair wind remains very much to be seen.

The post Moving determinedly towards the door: the UK’s Article 50 notification letter appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

https://tvnewsroom.consilium.europa.eu/uploads/council-images/thumbs/uploads/council-images/remote/http_7e18a1c646f5450b9d6d-a75424f262e53e74f9539145894f4378.r8.cf3.rackcdn.com/6598efb4-145b-11e7-aec9-bc764e093073_1.46_thumb_169_1490777052_1490777051_129_97shar_c1.jpg

UK Brexit notification (article 50)

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On 29 March 2017, the Council's Permanent Representatives Committee backed a proposal to increase EU support for regions affected by earthquakes, floods, droughts and other natural disasters. The EU share in the costs of reconstruction would raise to up to 90%. This would almost double the EU financial contribution for some regions from the current level of 50%. Today's decision allows the Maltese Presidency to start negotiations with the European Parliament. 

"Anybody who has seen at first hand the effects of a natural disaster knows what a devastating impact it can have on people's lives. Whilst we cannot prevent natural disasters, we can offer support to affected regions and help them in the task of reconstruction. That's why we have taken this decision today".

Ian Borg, parliamentary secretary for EU funds of Malta and President of the Council

The increase of the EU financing rate would apply to payments from the European fund for regional development (ERDF). The total volume of the EU financed part of the ERDF of around €196.4 billion for the period 2014-2020 would remain unchanged.

The increased EU financing rate from the ERDF would complement the financial assistance that the EU already provides through its solidarity fund. The solidarity fund can be mobilised for an amount of up to €500.0 million per year to help member states to cope with natural disasters.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

The UK should revise its trading powers following Brexit

One of the major drawbacks for the United Kingdom, of remaining in the European Union was the single currency market and the regular billion pound payments annually, which were required from the state to the European Union. Following only as recent a paying off Second World War’s loans as late 2006, and the recovery from multiple national recessions it does not seem like a wise idea to count additional payments for the United Kingdom as a necessity simply because of a European Union membership. Two of the underlying principles of Brexit should, to that end, be about securing a better future for the United Kingdom than before, through a mercantile approach to the national economy and by addressing the big migration question.

Migration to the United Kingdom

Despite the United Kingdom’s longstanding multicultural outlook, proof of which can be seen in the nation’s demographics – approximately 217,000 British citizens were born in Bangladesh, most of the migration happens from countries such as Spain, China, India, and Pakistan. When Brexit happened, ‘freedom of movement’ for EU citizens was expected to be curbed because what is nationally desired is a balanced control on net migration numbers, and as per demand for both low-skilled and high-skilled labour. Only last year, did migration numbers balloon into Leeds’ population and there have also been wage cuts for low-skilled workers, in job sectors such as catering for increased migration rates and these workers do not have a large income to begin with.

Britain’s economy is naturally in want of labour from overseas and some trade areas are already too reliant on such migratory labour. However, workers from the EU might now require a work permit to get a job in the United Kingdom, and there is also worries about a brain-drain situation occurring for Eastern Europe and how EU citizens’ access to the welfare state might bear down too much on the British public purse. Meanwhile, one of the primary reasons for high migration rates was possibly joblessness in the rest of Europe, and this is inclusive of poor European states, since migration could act as a problem solver for many migrants from Europe to the United Kingdom. If Brexit could provide better access to public goods for British people, it would resolve a major migration problem.

Mercantile and the United Kingdom

Brexit is offering that rare opportunity to carve out better trade channels with Commonwealth member states, such as Australia, Singapore, Canada, Bangladesh, India and Malaysia. The nation’s imperial past can never be erased and the significance of understanding its important place in United Kingdom’s society, politics etc. is crucial to creating a better national economy. The country use to be a great trading nation, not so very long ago, and through effective diplomacy and trade ideals, post-Brexit, trade with former British colonies can be a surplus. Already in 2015, 16percent of exports to the EU came from Commonwealth states, and trade routes inbetween the Commonwealth and the United Kingdom is both strong and had also in 2015, seen an increase in earnings. Meanwhile, trade with other important nations, for example China, Israel, Saudi Arabia and UAE should be considered, alongside maintaining better ties with the United States of America, a world-leading military and economic powerhouse, which could makeup for any lost momentum of power for United Kingdom, following Brexit.

The post Brexit Issues: Migration and Mercantile appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

General : The UK government will announce today it is invoking article 50 of the Treaty of the EU, which serves as formal notification of its intent to withdraw from the Union. Starting today the UK and the EU have two years to negotiate a withdrawal agreement. In addition the two will need to start determining the future trade relations, though this is expected to take significantly longer. Read on to find out more about the procedure and the role played by Parliament.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

So, here it is, six pages: the notification from Prime Minister Theresa May, triggering Article 50 and formally starting the negotiations of the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union. There is no reason to pretend that this is a happy day, neither in Brussels, nor in London. After all, most Europeans, including almost half the British voters wish that we would stay together, not drift apart. As for me I will not pretend that I am happy today.

But paradoxically there is also something positive in Brexit. Brexit has made us, the community of 27, more determined and more united than before. I am fully confident of this, especially after the Rome declaration, and today I can say that we will remain determined and united also in the future, also during the difficult negotiations ahead.

This means that both I and the Commission have a strong mandate to protect the interests of the 27. There is nothing to win in this process, and I am talking about both sides. In essence, this is about damage control. Our goal is clear: to minimise the costs for the EU citizens, businesses and Member States. We will do everything in our power - and we have all the tools - to achieve this goal. And what we should stress today is that, as for now, nothing has changed: until the United Kingdom leaves the European Union, EU law will continue to apply to - and within - the UK.

Finally, I would like to say that we have just released an official statement by the European Council, in which leaders stress that we will act as one and start negotiations by focusing on all key arrangements for an orderly withdrawal. On Friday I will share a proposal of the negotiating guidelines with the Member States, to be adopted by the European Council on 29 April.

I will refer to this and I will comment on our proposals on Friday during our press conference with Prime Minister Joseph Muscat in Malta.

What can I add to this? We already miss you.

Statement by the European Council 1

Today, the European Council received a letter from the British Prime Minister, Theresa May, notifying the United Kingdom's intention to leave the European Union. This notification follows the referendum of 23 June 2016 and starts the withdrawal process under Article 50 of the Treaty. We regret that the United Kingdom will leave the European Union, but we are ready for the process that we now will have to follow.

For the European Union, the first step will now be the adoption of guidelines for the negotiations by the European Council. These guidelines will set out the overall positions and principles in light of which the Union, represented by the European Commission, will negotiate with the United Kingdom.

In these negotiations the Union will act as one and preserve its interests. Our first priority will be to minimise the uncertainty caused by the decision of the United Kingdom for our citizens, businesses and Member States. Therefore, we will start by focusing on all key arrangements for an orderly withdrawal.

We will approach these talks constructively and strive to find an agreement. In the future, we hope to have the United Kingdom as a close partner.

President Tusk has convened the European Council on 29 April 2017.

 1 Following the notification under Article 50 TEU, the member of the European Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the discussions of the European Council or in decisions concerning it.

Over the last twelve months the Greens have had quite a few celebrations across Europe: Winfried Kretschmann was re-elected as minister-president of Baden-Württemberg in March 2016; in December Alexander von der Bellen succeeded in stopping the rise of the Austrian populists in the presidential elections, and in the Dutch general elections, Jesse Klaver quadrupled the seats of his GroenLinks party in the parliament.

So will the French ‘Verts’ be next? Not exactly. In a campaign of many uncertainties, we can be sure of at least one thing: the green candidate will not do well for the simple reason there is no green candidate anymore. Although environmentalist movements have presented a candidate in each French presidential election since 1974, the winner of the Green Primary, MEP Yannick Jadot, credited with a potential of 2% of the vote, decided to step down and (with the blessing of primary voters) to endorse the PS candidate Benoît Hamon.

But that does not mean Green ideas have entirely disappeared from the campaign. It is true: the latter has been polluted by ‘les affaires’ of Fillon and Le Pen and the shake-up of the party spectrum with Les Républicains and the Parti Socialiste threatened by post-electoral implosion. And the entire media attention for the Left seems to be focused on counting how many PS officials finally back Macron rather than their own party’s primary winner. And yet there is, in both Mélenchon’s and Hamon’s programmes, a discreet, arguably very positive, change unfolding. The French left is slowly but surely weaning itself off their traditional productivist beliefs and embracing political ecology. The Greens may not be on the ballot anymore, but their ideas have percolated. Never has Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s socialism been greener, while Hamon has rather credibly argued he’s left the ‘cult’ of economic growth.

This is a profound change. The French left has long been a staunch supporter of nuclear power and oversized public infrastructure projects. The shift towards an ecological perspective is all the more surprising as it comes after five years of a left-wing government with a decidedly mixed environmental record.

In terms of policies, François Hollande’s Presidency earned external recognition for the Paris 2015 agreement on Climate Change, which was heralded as a diplomatic victory for France. Internally, that same Presidency’s environmental record is much more questionable. It has been marred by stubborn local opposition to two controversial infrastructure projects. On the site of an irrigation dam in Sivens (South West) protest ended tragically in the death of a young ecologist, killed by a gendarme’s grenade in October 2014. Since then, the courts have sided with protestors and development of the dam has stopped.

Notre-Dame-des-Landes : long-running soap opera with many episodes.

Then there is the never-ending story of the new airport in the West in Notre-Dame-des-Landes (close to Nantes). This 50-year old saga, which sees opponents to the project occupy the airport’s planned location has all the hallmarks of a political soap opera, with repeated cliff-hangers. Would the courts side with the government? (They did). Would the ad-hoc local referendum support or oppose the airport project? (It supported it). Will the European Commission get involved? (Watch the next episode!). All this bears strong echoes of the occupation of the Larzac plateau in the 1970s and 1980s.

The Notre-Dame-des-Landes debacle is a case study of non-decision making, with the Government trying to distance itself from the project, through commissioning further studies or organising a local referendum. Similar dithering is at work at the Eastern end of the country, in dealing with Fessenheim, France’s oldest nuclear power station, close to the German border. Closing Fessenheim – indeed closing eventually 24 nuclear reactors! – was part of Hollande’s political agreement with the Greens ahead of the 2012 election. Needless to say that not a single reactor was closed during his 5 years in the Elysée.

Yannick Jadot, MEP.

Five years which have been hard on the Greens (currently labelled ‘Europe Ecologie Les Verts’), especially with regard to maintaining a coherent political organisation. Their high-water mark was the 2009 European Parliament election. Since then, it has been down-hill. Want another soap opera? They joined government in 2012 despite a very low election score, but left it in 2014 citing irreconcilable policy differences, before some of its figure-heads were poached by Hollande and came back into government in 2016 (without the support of their party). The party’s disaffection with the Valls government erupted in its November 2016 primaries which opposed 3 MEPs with a former minister (until 2014), with the minister, Cécile Duflot, kicked out in the first round already. And a winner, Yannick Jadot, who unlike many other candidates, listens to reason rather than his ego and joins forces with Hamon.

Green policies largely ignored by successive governments, the party in disarray – how does that fit with the assertion that green ideas are stronger than ever? Doubts are legitimate, but it is just as legitimate to claim that the future of the French Left is green. Hamon’s deal with Jadot has led to shared public speaking, raising the profile of environmental policies. And while Hamon and Mélenchon still continue to disagree, their divisions centre on the EU and international policy much more than on the environment or the French energy mix.

Neither is likely to make it to the second round, though. And, as usual, the environment has not, so far, featured highly in the television debates. The presidential election, however, is not all there is. In the case of a victory by Macron or Le Pen, the parliamentary elections in June will become a very complicated matter, since none of them seems able to gain an outright parliamentary majority. Coalition building will be necessary, a very un-French exercise, and especially Macron will have to woe the Green electorate and prove he has integrated some environmental red lines. Chances are he will not even have to force himself: beyond the surface, the greening of the Left and Centre may have already progressed further than what is visible in a superficial presidential campaign all focused on personalities rather than issues and policies.

This is post # 15 on the French 2017 election marathon.
All previous posts can be found here.

The post France 2017: Where have all the flowers gone? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

29 March 1967: 50 years ago, Le Redoutable, first French SSBN to ensure the permanence of nuclear deterrence, was launched in the presence of General de Gaulle in France, single autonomous nuclear military power in Europe. Nuclear deterrence is designed to protect people against any aggression of state origin against our vital interests, wherever it may come from and whatever form it may take. Strictly defensive, its use is conceivable only in extreme circumstances of self-defense.

Following the Second World War, France, wants to make nuclear the keystone of the energy and strategic independence of the country. In 1958, the French military nuclear program was formalized by General de Gaulle. By mastering this technology France ensures a place alongside the American and Soviet superpowers. In the 1960s, it was decided to equip the navy with a nuclear launching submarine. On March 29, 1967, Le Redoutable was launched ..

A step is taken. But that activity still to be deployed before the presentation to the tests planned for 1969! The outer shells and thick shells are finished, but the access chambers, flaps of the torpedo tubes, the hydroreactors intended to stabilize the SNLE during the firing of the missiles must be mounted and the breach of the machined reactor compartment.

The gateway, the platforms and the incorporated boxes are installed at 90%. But the partitions are installed only 70% and the carlingages, the crossings of hull, the definitive ballasting to 35%. As for the sailing shelter with its ailerons, too high, it can not be mounted before the launch. For the propulsion, tank, exchangers and pressurizers were embarked, the primary circuit was tried, but clutch, turbo-reducer group, condensers and cradles of the turbo-generator group are being lineed. The main cable layers have been fitted, but the circuit-breaker cabinets are just embedded.

This launch seems modest at a time when the US nuclear submarine fleet is hosting its 41st SSBN and the Soviet fleet already has twenty such units. But with the completion in May of the construction of the Pierrelatte isotope separation plant, which is essential for the enriched uranium of the reactors, and the continuation of the experiments to reach the H-bomb, a major step is taken. "An additional and costly illustration of a ruinous, dangerous and inefficient military policy", according to L'Humanité, or "a capital day for our navy, our defense and, hence, our independence", according to General Le Redoutable does not leave indifferent.

Source

Tag: SSBNLe RedoutableFrance