Ideas on Europe Blog

For most of our five decades in the EU, Britain was broadly pro-European. In the 1975 referendum, every part of the UK voted decisively to remain, with a huge 35-point margin. Pro-Europe sentiment remained strong for years. Polls in 2014 and 2015 showed Remain support at 56% and 61% respectively – well ahead of Leave.

The 2016 referendum was the anomaly. The Leave win was narrow – just 4% – and only 37% of the total electorate voted for it. Two of the UK’s four nations, Scotland and Northern Ireland, voted clearly to remain.

This was not a national consensus. Unlike in 1975, when the public voted with knowledge of the terms of membership, the 2016 referendum was held before any exit deal was known – and no confirmation vote followed.

Today, the British people have seen the consequences.

The economy is weaker, exports are down, and British citizens have lost their freedom to live, work and love across the continent. Promised benefits never materialised. Instead, businesses struggle with red tape, and farmers and fishers feel betrayed.

Now, poll after poll confirms what most of us feel: Brexit was a mistake. According to YouGov, 55% of Britons now say the nation was wrong to vote to leave the EU in 2016, with the same proportion saying they would support rejoining. Just 11% believe Brexit has been more of a success than a failure.

And now, a new poll this month reveals that a clear majority of UK voters want the government to prioritise rebuilding trade ties with the EU, rather than seeking a new economic deal with the US. Voters see Europe as key to future prosperity and security.

There’s also a new urgency. With Donald Trump back and threatening global trade with new tariffs, American democracy is under strain and no longer a stable ally. The UK must secure its future by aligning more closely with Europe – our neighbours who share our values, our economy, and our security interests.

Britain’s natural home is in the EU, among partners who respect international law, uphold democratic norms, and work together to face global challenges – from climate change to military threats.

We must stop pretending Brexit was a done deal. In a democracy, no decision is forever. When the facts change, when the people change their minds, when the nation suffers – there must be a democratic way forward.

It’s time to ask the British people again. Not out of bitterness, but because the country deserves better. The Brexit experiment has failed. Let’s restore our place in Europe – and our future.

Sources

• Ipsos poll  (2014)
• Ipsos (2015)
• YouGov ‘Few Britons think Brexit was good for anything’
• National Institute of Economic and Social Research: Revising the effect of Brexit
• The Guardian ‘Voters want Keir Starmer to focus on rebuilding trade ties with EU, poll reveals’ 

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by Matti Ylönen (Academy of Finland Research Fellow; Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Helsinki)

A few years ago, the idea of the Brussels effect took the European Union (EU) circles by storm as an exciting new framework for understanding the global exemplary impact of the EU rules. Now, it faces tumultuous waters as Donald Trump has returned to the White House, bringing with him Elon Musk and the backing from the emerging American tech oligarchy. They portray the EU more as an adversary than an ally, being irked by the major Acts and competition policy measures that the EU has introduced to reign in the power of large online platforms, digital gatekeeper firms, and large language models.

To grasp the challenge that the new world political situation poses for the Brussels effect, we must start by revising its original definitions. Anu Bradford devised the Brussels Effect in the 2010s to understand how the stalemate in global governance and American politics had given an outsized role for the EU as a global rule-maker. The big breakthrough of this concept came with her 2020 book The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World. In this blog post, I summarize my reconceptualization of the Brussels effect, recently published in JCMS.

Bradford envisioned the de facto effect encompassing Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) adjusting their global conduct to the EU rules. The de jure effect involved third countries adopting EU-style regulations for legislative simplicity, for enticing MNEs, or through policy diffusion via ‘economic and political treaties and via international organizations and governmental networks’. I illustrate Bradford’s original theory with Figure 1 below.

Figure 1. The original Brussels Effect

Bradford’s theory was a welcomed expansion from the theories of ‘Europeanization’, ‘market power Europe’ and ‘normative power Europe’, but its one-directionality and its focus on EU rules (instead of institutions) hindered its applicability in situations where the EU policy faces significant lobbying efforts or resistance. Moreover, the original definitions of de facto/jure effects lacked analytical tools for understanding how such effects may evolve over time. These are some of the key issues that I address in my reconceptualization of the Brussels effect.

Accordingly, Figure 2 below receonceptualizes the Brussels effect with systematic definitions of instrumental/structural power drawn from the International Political Economy (IPE) literature. (In key role here are two IPE articles: How does business power operate? A framework for its working mechanisms, and Structural power and bank bailouts in the United Kingdom and the United States.)

Whereas instrumental power means the power of A over B to make B to do something they otherwise would not do, structural power concerns the power to shape and determine the structures of the global political economy. It can be divided into two aspects. First, automatic capacities can be exemplified with the power that the control over the US dollar supply wields to the United States, given how decisions over the US monetary policy influence other jurisdictions. Second, structural power can manifest in agents’ strategic mobilization of resources that derive from their structural power.
Figure 2. The reconceptualized Brussels Effect

The ability of the de facto effect to make MNEs use EU requirements as a yardstick for their global operations essentially involves structural power as an automatic reaction to EU rules. Such adaptation is automatic in a sense that it does not require active involvement from the EU – companies adopt rules modeled after the EU because they want to avoid multiple overlapping reporting systems.

In the reconceptualiztion of the original Brussels effect, the EU’s structural power also affects third countries as an automatic reaction – either through direct exemplary influence, or through the lobbying efforts multinational corporations. When mediated by private firms, this power can be either instrumental or structural, depending on the amount of leverage they have over particular governments.

Now that the two mechanisms of the Brussels Effect have been given unified definitions, opportunities emerge for a broader inquiry into the two-way power relations associated with this effect. First, we much consider how the Brussels effect has taken on a life of its own in the speeches and texts of prominent EU policymakers. This tendency is addressed in the middle of Figure 2 by highlighting the potential socializing role of the Brussels effect.

The successful mainstreaming of this effect can even turn it into a conscious policy goal for European policymakers, signaling its transformation from an automatic capacity to strategic mobilization of the EU’s resources in its external relations. Such tendencies also highlight the need to approach the EU as (a set of) institutions instead of defining the Brussels Effect merely as the global impact of the EU rules. Institutions (such as the Commission or the Parliament) may advance the Brussels Effect also in more indirect ways that what can be captured with the term ‘rules’ .

Second, Figure 2 tackles the attempts by MNEs and third countries to influence or even derail the Brussels effect across policy processes. Such advocacy efforts are captured by highlighting the power of these actors to influence EU rules in different stages of policymaking. This advocacy can signal either instrumental or structural power, depending on the power resources an MNE or a third country possess.

The top-right corner of Figure 2 also introduces the modified de facto effect. It involves situations where companies are lobbying for EU-styled rules in third countries in form, while aiming to dilute their contents. In my article, I argue that such dynamics have characterized, for example, the dynamics surrounding the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation.

The second part of my article addresses various forms that such advocacy can take across the EU’s policymaking cycle, building on the five background conditions that Bradford outlined for the Brussels effect to occur: market size, inelastic targets, regulatory capacity, stringent standards, and their non-divisibility. Two of them – market size and inelastic targets of regulation – are practically beyond influence for external actors. However, external actors can try to influence the remaining pillars. Figure 3 captures such dynamics.

Figure 3. Ways to undermine the necessary background conditions of the Brussels Effect

An important, novel starting point for Figure 3 is that the potential forms of the Brussels effect can change significantly as EU rules progress from the drafting stage to political, juridical and enforcement stages. If third countries copy EU-styled rules immediately after they have been ratified, they essentially mimic the political will of the EU. However, such policy diffusion can take very different forms after the EU rules have been tested in courts and enforced, possibly with significantly altered outcomes. This aspect has received insufficient attention in the literature.

Figure 3 also highlights how external actors can weaken regulatory capacity and the stringency of standards in various stages of policymaking. Regulatory capacity can be weakened through exerting ‘epistemic authority’ by flooding decision-making processes with misleading policy inputs. Poaching skilled policymakers from the EU institutions may also serve similar purposes. Stringency of standards, in turn, can be weakened for example by court cases with malicious intent. Finally, the non-divisibility of the EU rules can be weakened by weaponizing other policy fields (such as trade policy) to counteract the EU’s measures.

In conclusion, my reconceptualizon of the Brussels effect empowers this framework with the analytical tools for understanding the advocacy dynamics surrounding this effect in a pivotal situation where American tech executives are calling for Trump to counteract the EU’s competition and tech policy rules. Importantly, this contribution can also help policymakers to identify the weakest links in the EU policy processes for external influence. Such an understanding is crucial for strengthening the institutions that sustain democratic decision-making in the Union.

Matti Ylönen is an Academy of Finland Research Fellow at the University of Helsinki, acting as a Principal Investigator in a project “Seeing Like a Tech Firm: Advocacy in the Era of Platform Capitalism”. He has published extensively on the political roles of various private actors in global political economy.

The post Reconceptualizing the Brussels Effect amidst the looming tech oligarchy appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

His imposition of sweeping tariffs on most imports to the United States is provoking retaliatory tariffs on American exports – an economically self-harming spiral that will ultimately make everyone poorer, including Americans.

In stark contrast stands the European Union.

The EU Single Market offers free, frictionless trade among its members – benefiting businesses and consumers alike.

This system, rooted in cooperation rather than confrontation, has created the largest and most successful trading bloc in the world.

The EU’s model is so attractive that most countries in Europe are either members or are actively seeking membership. That includes:

27 full EU member states
10 countries formally applying to join the EU
4 non-member countries in the EU Single Market
3 negotiating to join the Single Market

That’s 44 out of 51 European countries committed in some way to the EU project.

The outliers? Belarus, Russia, and – uniquely – Britain, the only member-state to have left the EU.

And not only most European countries want to be in the EU.

Trump’s tariff regime and erratic international behaviour have alarmed America’s closest allies.

In a revealing March 2025 poll by Abacus Data, 44% of Canadians said they supported their government exploring EU membership if Trump continued down a path of economic nationalism and annexation threats, while only 34% were opposed and 23% were unsure.

While the EU currently restricts full membership to European nations, the idea of expanding its reach is gaining traction as a stabilising global force.

But Britain’s decision to leave the EU has brought economic pain, not prosperity.

The UK economy has underperformed compared to EU economies since 2016, with losses in trade, foreign investment, and labour force dynamism.

UK exports to the EU fell sharply post-Brexit, and supply chain frictions have become the norm.

Meanwhile, EU countries enjoy:

Tariff-free and frictionless access to one another’s markets
Shared standards and regulations that cut red tape
Collective bargaining power on the global stage
Freedom of movement for citizens and workers
Stronger security cooperation on everything from cyber threats to policing

This isn’t just about trade – it’s about belonging to a political and economic union that defends democratic values, environmental standards, and social protections.

In the face of rising authoritarianism and isolationism, the EU offers a platform for peace, prosperity, and shared sovereignty.

In 1948, Winston Churchill famously said:

“We cannot aim for anything less than the union of Europe as a whole.”

Churchill’s vision of a united Europe is nearly fulfilled.

Yet Britain now sits outside the EU – like Russia and Belarus. We oppose their actions, certainly, but do we really want to be grouped with Europe’s outsiders rather than its democratic partners?

While populist parties exist in most EU countries, none of the EU’s 27 members is seeking to leave.

Quite the opposite: membership applications and pro-EU sentiment are rising. In countries such as Ukraine and Moldova, joining the EU is seen not only as a route to prosperity but as a shield against authoritarian threats from Moscow.

Even in Britain, public opinion is shifting. Polls consistently show a clear majority now believe Brexit was a mistake.

The economic evidence is mounting – and so is the political will for change.

Trump’s tariff-driven nationalism may grab headlines, but the EU’s quietly successful model of cooperation is what delivers real, long-term benefits.

For Britain, the choice is clear:

Align with global protectionists and economic saboteurs
Or rejoin the most successful peace and trade project in human history

It’s time to liberate ourselves – not through tariffs, but through renewed European solidarity.

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Between 2018 and 2020, during President Trump’s first term of office, the United States launched a major trade confrontation by imposing widespread tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of imports.

The goal was to reduce the US trade deficit, revive domestic manufacturing, and pressure trade partners – especially China – to agree to more favourable terms.

Instead, the result was an economically damaging trade war with global consequences.

The tariffs began with steel and aluminium, then expanded to include a wide range of goods from China, the EU, Canada, and Mexico.

In response, these countries hit back with retaliatory tariffs on American exports, particularly agricultural products.

What followed was a surge in farm bankruptcies, particularly across the Midwest, where soybean and dairy producers lost key export markets almost overnight.

Meanwhile, the steel and aluminium industries – supposedly the intended beneficiaries – also suffered job losses. Although prices for domestic steel temporarily rose, the higher input costs hurt manufacturers that rely on imported components, from carmakers to construction firms.

The tariffs also failed in their central aim: reducing the trade deficit. By 2020, the US trade deficit remained largely unchanged, as importers shifted supply chains rather than returning production to the US.

For American consumers, tariffs acted as a tax. Prices increased on goods ranging from washing machines and electronics to canned beer and bicycles.

Studies by the Federal Reserve and academic institutions concluded that nearly the entire cost of the tariffs was passed on to US households and businesses.

The broader impact included uncertainty in global markets, reduced business investment, and strained diplomatic relations with key allies.

In short, the US tariff war from 2018 to 2020 caused disruption across multiple sectors, raised costs, and weakened trade relationships – without achieving its economic objectives.

When President Biden took office in 2021, many expected him to roll back the tariffs – but he largely left them in place.

Tariffs on over $300 billion of Chinese imports remained, along with duties on steel, aluminium, and other goods.

While Biden eased tensions with allies like the EU by converting some tariffs into quotas, he kept most of Trump’s trade policies intact.

Rather than reversing the tariff war, Biden focused on domestic industrial investment and supply chain resilience.

As Trump now moves to impose even broader tariffs on all imports to the United States, history offers a clear lesson: protectionism may offer the illusion of strength, but in reality, it brings economic damage, isolation, and long-term decline.

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Footnote: The 2018–2020 timeframe covers the core period when the US imposed sweeping tariffs and the most direct economic impacts were observed. After 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic significantly disrupted global trade, making it harder to isolate the effects of tariffs alone.

Sources of evidence:

• The Economic Effects of the 2018 U.S. Trade Policy: A State-Level Analysis 
• The impact of the 2018 trade war on U.S. prices and welfare 
• The U.S. Trade Deficit: How Much Does It Matter? 

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As trade tensions rise again in the US, we must remember one thing: no country in history has ever made itself better off by imposing blanket tariffs on all imports.

It has never worked – and it never will.

Just look at the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of the 1930s. It was supposed to protect American jobs during the Great Depression.

Instead, it sparked a global trade war, collapsed international markets, and deepened the economic misery.

World trade fell by more than 60%.

Or take Argentina, where protectionist policies in the 2000s caused runaway inflation, supply shortages, and long-term economic decline.

India, too, suffered from decades of self-imposed isolation until it opened up in the 1990s and began to grow.

The pattern is always the same. Broad import restrictions lead to rising prices, empty shelves, economic isolation, and weakened competitiveness.

There is not a single modern example of blanket tariffs making a country stronger or richer.

By contrast, open, rules-based trade works.

The EU Single Market, built on free movement of goods, services, capital and people, has delivered prosperity, growth, and geopolitical stability.

EU GDP has grown significantly since the development of the Single Market, with countries like Germany and the Netherlands thriving through trade.

China’s economic rise accelerated after it reduced tariffs and joined the WTO in 2001. Export-led growth fuelled rapid development – not isolationism.

Yes, the EU uses tariffs – but strategically and only when necessary, such as when a trading partner unfairly subsidises its industries. The goal is always fair trade, not retreat from it.

Free and frictionless trade doesn’t happen by accident. It requires shared rules, mutual trust, and political alignment.

That’s what the EU provides: a stable, democratic framework for trading cooperation and collective strength.

Compare that with President Trump’s closed-shop tariff policies, which failed during his first term in office – raising prices, hurting farmers and manufacturers, and doing nothing to reduce the trade deficit.

Now he promises even more tariffs, which risk even greater economic damage. It’s a race to the bottom.

The immediate market response underscores this risk.

Following President Trump’s “Liberation Day” announcement on 2 April 2025 of sweeping new tariffs – including a baseline 10% tariff on all imports and much higher rates on specific countries and products – global stock markets plummeted.

In the two days that followed:

• The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell by approximately 3,900 points, a drop of just over 9%.
• The S&P 500 declined by around 600 points, falling by almost 11%.
• The Nasdaq Composite dropped by roughly 1,900 points, marking a fall of more than 11%.

These were the most significant two-day losses for these indices in history, wiping out an estimated $6.6 trillion in global market value.

Major tech stocks were hit especially hard – Apple lost over $600 billion in market value in the two days following ‘Liberation Day’, while Nvidia’s market capitalisation fell by nearly $400 billion.

Other chipmakers also suffered steep losses amid fears of tariff-driven supply chain shocks and rising consumer prices.

International markets were hit just as hard.

• The FTSE 100 fell by over 6%, its worst two-day performance in five years.
• Japan’s Nikkei 225 dropped nearly 9% over the same period.

The global sell-off reflected deep investor alarm over the potential economic fallout of Trump’s blanket tariffs and growing fears of a full-scale global trade war.

Britain now faces a clear choice.

• Stay lost-at-sea, stuck between a failing US trade policy and a thriving EU.
• Or rejoin the bloc that shares our values and boosts our economy.

The EU offers Britain a future. Trump’s America offers only decline.

Let’s stop drifting. It’s time to come home.

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Sources of evidence:

• Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act and Its Impact on the Great Depression
• Argentina’s Protectionist Policies Leading to Economic Challenges
• India’s Pre-1990s Protectionism and Subsequent Economic Liberalization
• EU Single Market’s Contribution to Economic Growth
• China’s WTO Accession and Export-Led Growth

During his ‘Liberation Day’ announcement President Trump held up a chart claiming to list the tariffs that other countries charge for USA imports. But it was nothing of the sort. 

The figures in that graphic aren’t actual tariff rates. They refer to trade deficits, not the tariffs charged by each country on U.S. imports.

That’s been confirmed by independent fact-checkers, including Euronews, PolitiFact and BBC.

It’s a common confusion (and perhaps a deliberate one), but it’s important to distinguish between a trade imbalance and an actual import tax.

For example, in his chart Trump claimed that the EU charged the USA a tariff of “39%” on imports from the USA. But that isn’t an actual tariff. It refers to the trade deficit between the US and the EU – not the tariffs the EU charges on US goods. They’re not the same thing.

In reality, the EU’s average tariff on U.S. goods is around 1%, according to the European Commission – and many goods, especially under sector-specific agreements, already move tariff-free.

As for “reciprocal” tariffs, the US also imposes tariffs and non-tariff barriers, and uses subsidies in key industries like agriculture and steel.

A trade deficit simply means one country imports more than it exports. But that’s not the fault of the exporter – it reflects things like consumer demand, industrial focus, and competitiveness in the importing country.

As many economists have pointed out: if a country isn’t exporting enough, it should focus on improving its products, boosting competitiveness, or investing in innovation – not blaming its trading partners.

Also, it’s often overlooked that the U.S. runs a significant trade surplus with the EU in services, including finance, tech, and consultancy. But this isn’t reflected in the rhetoric or the “tariff charts” doing the rounds.

If we want a fair view of the EU–U.S. trade relationship, we have to consider goods and services. The EU isn’t “taxing” the U.S. unfairly – especially when actual EU tariffs average around 1%, and many sectors are tariff-free under WTO rules and bilateral agreements.

Reciprocity only makes sense when the whole picture is considered.

Putting up blanket tariffs may sound tough, but in reality, they often just raise prices for consumers, hurt exporters, and trigger retaliation. Long-term, it’s smarter to grow trade, not restrict it.

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• Related poster: Almost every European country is now in the EU or wants to be.

• Related video: The peace Brexit forgot

• Related video: What the UK has lost – the EU Single Market

The post Let’s liberate ourselves from Trump’s so-called ‘Liberation Day’ appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Myroslava Hladchenko

Global university rankings have got prominence in recent decades. Nation-states develop evaluation policies drawing on the assessment criteria of world rankings aiming their universities to take higher positions in these rankings (Salmi & Saroyan, 2007). QS Rankings is one of them. It is a profitable business that generated €46 m in revenue in 2019 (Shahjahan et al., 2022). Research assessment by QS Rankings takes the form of citations (excluding self-citations) per faculty indicator (Staff, 2021).

Since the 2010s Ukrainian media and the education ministry have traced the positions of Ukrainian universities in QS Rankings (Higher Education, 2011). However, since 2022, everyday survival has taken priority over research in the lives of Ukrainian scholars. The paradox of war is that, while life-threatening conditions, shelling, blackouts and economic recession are the part of everyday reality, work obligations and responsibilities remain the same as they were in pre-war life. This applies to all, including scholars. Despite the war, Ukrainian scholars continue to publish which deserves respect. As well, Ukrainian universities participate in QS Rankings 2025.

However, QS is a for-profit company the aim of which is not to contribute to societal well-being but to increase its profits. Elsevier which provides data for QS is another for-profit company the aim of which is also to increase revenue. The same concerns publishers issuing Gold Open Access journals, as many of them are oriented on publishing as many articles as possible to ensure profits.

The university is a key institution for social and economic development in a knowledge-intensive society (Mohrman et al., 2008). University performance is supposed to result in the quality of life, technological progress and social well-being of the nation. These are the ends that the university is supposed to achieve through research. Publications are just one of the means of achieving these ends. QS Rankings has turned the means of universities into their ends. The university’s position in the global ranking reflects, first, the economic development of the country. Second, the university position at the national level. A university cannot increase its position in the ranking, if there is no economic growth and beneficial conditions for science in the country. On the other hand, the university should contribute to economic growth at the national level.

The examination of the assessment of six Ukrainian universities in QS Rankings 2025, first, raise concerns regarding the mismatch between the faculty staff of universities announced on the QS Rankings website and the number of authors affiliated with the explored institutions in their research outputs. Second, it is unclear why the articles in the journals discontinued from Scopus are still in Scopus and correspondingly they are not excluded from the research output assessed by QS Rankings. Third, QS Rankings uses closed data. University managers do not have access to these data and cannot use them while developing research assessment policies. While developing the research assessment policies, universities mostly use SciVal provided by Scopus for a fee. However, there is a mismatch in data that shows SciVal and data that uses QS Rankings. First, QS Rankings normalises only by disciplines but SciVal normalises by year, discipline and document type. As conference papers are less cited than articles, normalisation by a document type results in a high FWCI shown by SciVal. Second, QS Rankings excludes self-citations but SciVal provides data including self-citations.

The IRN (International Research Network) index introduced by QS Rankings requires universities to increase the number of countries they collaborate with. It means that not academics but QS Rankings decides with whom they need to collaborate. Aiming to increase the IRN index, Sumy State University gives points if the article increases the number of collaborating countries. This is nothing else but means-ends decoupling.

The study findings resonate with the other studies that raise concerns about the ability of QS Rankings as well as other rankings to be a trustworthy assessment tool (Chirikov, 2023; Teixeira da Silva, 2024; Shahjahan, et al., 2021). In 2024, the University Zurich has withdrawn from the ranking published by Times Higher Education magazine. University announced that rankings create false incentives focusing on measurable output, forcing universities to increase the number of publications rather than prioritise the quality of content (Swissinfo, 2024). In 2023, Korean universities boycotted QS Rankings because of the IRN index (Jung & Sharma, 2023).

Six Ukrainian universities participating in QS Rankings 2025 have publications in discontinued from Scopus and MDPI journals. MDPI journals is a fast and easy way of publishing for a fee. The question is why academics from a country at war with underfunding science and low salaries are ready to pay an unaffordable APC (article processing fee). Arguably there is a high degree of international collaboration in articles in MDPI journals because Ukrainian academics are interested in finding a foreign co-author able to pay an APC. However, the question is who benefits from publications with a high APC except for publishers that make revenue? Academics publish at the cost of science because the money spent on APCs could be invested in science.

The findings highlight that articles (co)-authored by Ukrainian academics co-affiliated with foreign institutions or foreign academics have a higher impact than articles authored by only Ukrainian researchers. The share of articles authored by only Ukrainian authors ranges from 52.6% to 73.3%. Thus, Ukrainian academics have the space to strengthen collaboration with foreign colleagues.

To summarise, the research assessment criteria at the global, national and university levels must be oriented towards scientific excellence that results in economic growth and societal well-being. Ukrainian case shows that means-ends decoupling at the global, national and organisational levels results in diversion of critical resources, both financial and human. This negatively impacts on the development of society, the economy and the fulfilment of the talents of individuals in academia as well.

Myroslava Hladchenko is researcher in Kyiv, Ukraine. Her research focuses on higher education, universities and research assessment. This blog post is based on her recent article Hladchenko, M. (2025) Ukrainian universities in QS World University Rankings: when the means become ends. Scientometrics 130, 969–997. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11192-024-05165-2  

Acknowledgements

This project has received funding through the MSCA4Ukraine project, which is funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the European Union nor the MSCA4Ukraine Consortium as a whole nor any individual member institutions of the MSCA4Ukraine Consortium can be held responsible for them.

References

Chirikov, I. (2023). Does conflict of interest distort global university rankings?. Higher education, 86(4), 791-808.

Higher Education (2011). Ukrainian universities at first in the global rankings http://vnz.org.ua/statti/879-ukrayinski-vnz-upershe-v-mizhnarodnomu-rejtyngu-zadovoleni-ne-vsi

Jung, U., and Sharma, Y. (2023) Korean universities unite against QS ranking changes https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20230704195008557

Mohrman, K., Ma, W., & Baker, D. (2008). The research university in transition: The emerging global model. Higher Education Policy, 21(1), 5–27

Salmi, J., & Saroyan, A. (2007). League tables as policy instruments: Uses and misuses. Higher education management and policy, 19(2), 1-38.

Shahjahan, R. A., Grimm, A., & Allen, R. M. (2021). The “LOOMING DISASTER” for higher education: How commercial rankers use social media to amplify and foster affect. Higher Education, 1-17.

Shahjahan, R. A., Sonneveldt, E. L., Estera, A. L., & Bae, S. (2022). Emoscapes and commercial university rankers: the role of affect in global higher education policy. Critical Studies in Education, 63(3), 275-290.

Staff, W. (2021). Understanding the methodology: QS World University Rankings https://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings-articles/world-university-rankings/understanding-methodology-qs-world-university-rankings

Swissinfo (2024) University of Zurich withdraws from international university ranking https://education.am/abroad_en/tpost/48hm4eipi1-university-of-zurich-withdraws-from-inte

Teixeira da Silva, J. A. (2024). How are global university rankings adjusted for erroneous science, fraud and misconduct? Posterior reduction or adjustment in rankings in response to retractions and invalidation of scientific findings. Journal of Information Science, 01655515241269499.

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by Dr Caroline Emberson (Nottingham University Business School and the University of Nottingham’s Rights Lab)

New research, recently published in JCMS, examines the detection of labour exploitation within domestic care services. In the article, I identify a range of municipal activities including whistleblowing procedures; care-worker professionalisation; the expansion of employee’s roles and inter-agency data analysis. Yet my findings show that significant gaps still exist in the regulation of labour exploitation among domestic workers, particularly in relation to live-in care workers who are usually beyond the reach of national labour inspectorates.

I investigated municipal practices in four European countries: France, Italy, Sweden and The Netherlands. These countries allow paired comparison of practices in different welfare regime trajectory types. For example, long-term care in France and Italy has evolved from a tradition of conservative familialism – where the family is seen as the main support provider. Whereas in Sweden and The Netherlands, welfare services have followed universalist egalitarianism principles: where the state aims to provide access for all those in need.

In each of these different contexts, I asked: what actions have municipal government and other regional actors taken to mitigate the risks of labour exploitation among domestic care workers and what barriers remain?

These are important questions. Policy instruments such as Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings (ECAT) place human rights protections at the centre of European policymaking. Recent horizontal policy developments open up the possibility for the development of public procurement mechanisms to achieve these social policy aims. However, legal scholars have identified both risks and dilemmas for the state as it attempts to leverage its role as a ‘buyer’ to improve human rights. EU regional governments, sometimes in the guise of the local municipality, are important procurers and administrators of domestic care, a service which is, increasingly, delivered in the home. What role do these local municipalities play in guaranteeing the working conditions of these increasing numbers of domestic care workers?

My findings reveal a significant gap in labour enforcement regulation among domestic care workers. At the time of writing, in every case care workers’ conditions were beyond the scope of the respective national labour inspectorates, who are forced still to view the domestic setting as a private domain.

In addition, the governance activities that have emerged among regional state actors, particularly at the municipal level also warrant improvement. While initiatives to enhance individual agency are more commonly reported in traditionally familial welfare regimes, collective actions are described more frequently in countries with a more universalist approach to care provision. Importantly, my findings from the studies conducted in The Netherlands and Sweden do suggest that municipal roles to combat labour exploitation are starting to emerge. However, in France and Italy greater emphasis was placed upon enhancement of the agency of individual workers within an environment that placed significant cultural reliance upon a cohort of individualised domestic workers. Furthermore, in Sweden and The Netherlands, my informants placed greater emphasis on the collective response of municipal actors. These practitioners engaged with professionals in other national bodies to identify and eradicate labour malpractices.

In each of the countries I studied, my informants had no doubt that the phenomenon of exploitation was real. However, even where municipal engagement to address these problems was at its most extensive, collective action could be hampered by legacy legislation.

Two specific examples emerged at the time of the research. The Netherlands Regulations for Home Services prevented ratification of the ILO C189 Domestic Workers Convention, 2011, which aims to provide conditions for domestic workers that are no less favourable than those of other workers. My second example comes from the Swedish case study. Here, while much sophisticated gender-blind legislation is in force, my informants reported that labour enforcement legislation was still relatively immature and failed to recognise the most severe forms of labour exploitation, referred to in some third countries as modern slavery.

Despite these legislative gaps, findings from the studies conducted in The Netherlands and Sweden show that those in municipal roles are starting to change their practices to combat labour exploitation. This is an important and significant finding. In Amsterdam, specialist anti-trafficking coordinators have been appointed and the responsibilities of other front-line workers widened, including those in fire and building safety roles. Likewise, in Sweden specialist regional coordination roles have been introduced in the municipality of Jonkoping to support the gender equality aims of the Swedish Gender Equality Agency. Unfortunately, the regulatory gaps in labour inspection noted earlier mean that the enforcement activities of these role-holders remain focused predominantly on communal workplaces such as the factory. Scrutiny of the domestic sphere remains off-limits and this, coupled with resource limitations, continue to make it difficult for these municipal employees to uncover exploitation in the home.

The EU and its member states clearly have a duty not only to protect, but also to respect, human rights in the domestic care services that they fund. Municipalities with responsibility for the oversight of services of this type across the EU must act to ensure that the working conditions of domestic care workers are acceptable. To do this, the EU should consider how to address the regulatory loophole that precludes labour inspection within private households. Where legacy legislative regimes persist, EU members states should review and amend national legislation to provide equal rights for domestic care workers and work to ratify ILO convention C189. Where domestic workers’ contracts remain largely informal, as was the case in Italy, my informants suggest that member states should also consider the introduction of employer incentives to encourage formal contracting. As academics, we could usefully improve our understanding of the gendered nature of labour exploitation and, hence, appropriate labour standards enforcement actions.

Dr Caroline Emberson is Assistant Professor in Operations Management at Nottingham University Business School in the United Kingdom and a member of the University’s Rights Lab research group. Her research interests include modern slavery, especially in the supply chains of long-term care. She has consulted widely, giving evidence to UK Government and House of Lords Inquiries and the Canadian Government. Follow Dr Emberson on Twitter.

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by Dr Nicole Scicluna (Hong Kong Baptist University)

As we pass the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU continues to deal with the many challenges to which the conflict has given rise. An overarching challenge is that of maintaining unity of purpose and of action – a task that becomes more difficult as the Trump administration’s apparent animosity towards Ukraine and Europe threatens the EU’s Ukraine strategy from without and as recalcitrant national leaders seek to undermine it from within.

My recent contribution to JCMS deals with another aspect of the unity challenge; namely that of maintaining the coherence of the EU’s legal order. In particular, this challenge has manifested on the EU’s external borders with Russia and Belarus. One aspect of it is well known – what has been described as the ‘instrumentalisation’ of migration by the Russian and Belarusian regimes, which have encouraged and facilitated the movement of would-be asylum seekers and migrants across the EU’s Eastern frontiers. The response of the affected countries, particularly Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, has garnered much attention and consternation for the way in which it has prioritised the securitisation of borders over the human rights and humanitarian needs of vulnerable people. Criticism has extended to the European Commission for not only condoning non-compliance with existing EU asylum law, but actually making it easier for states to derogate from their legal obligations.

Yet, this is not the only respect in which the actions of countries on the EU’s Eastern border undermine the coherence of the EU’s legal order. The treatment of Russian nationals seeking entry to Europe also warrants attention. This is an issue that goes back to the early months of the war and to debates over the type, breadth and depth of sanctions that should be levied on Russia for its illegal and brutal aggression. As the EU was placing sanctions on individuals and companies directly associated with the Russian government or with connections to the war, there were suggestions from some quarters that restrictive measures should be extended to the Russian population as a whole, with a focus on Russian tourists in the Schengen area.

Then-Estonian prime minister and now-EU high representative, Kaja Kallas, for example, argued that travel to Europe was ‘a privilege not a human right’ and that the privilege should be withdrawn from Russians owing to the illegal war their government was waging on Europe’s borders. The question was put on the agenda of a meeting of EU foreign ministers in Prague in August 2022, at which the idea of a total ban on Russian tourists obtaining Schengen visas was rejected.

Nevertheless, on 8 September 2022, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland jointly announced that they would begin refusing entry to Russians holding Schengen visas issued by other member states. After some hesitation over the legality and viability of such an approach, Finland announced that it would also stop receiving visa applications in Russia and would deny entry to Russian holders of Schengen visas on 29 September 2022. Thus, the five EU member states bordering on Russia and/or Belarus (and which, therefore, account for the vast majority of Russians entering Schengen, given that the EU closed its airspace to flights originating in Russia at the outset of the war) effectively replicated among themselves the kind of Russian tourism ban that had been rejected by the Council.

The problem with this ‘regional solution’ is that it likely violates Schengen law, which does not allow for nationality-based bans on the granting of Schengen visas or entry at Schengen borders. And yet, the Commission has refrained from criticising these legally dubious policies, much less initiating any kind of enforcement action.

Would-be Russian tourists are not an obvious target for sympathy. But putting aside the substance of the dispute, the larger issue is that of creeping member state unilateralism and the Commission’s permissiveness towards it. Political agreement and legal obligation are the European Union’s lifeblood. When member states act outside the limits of what EU law permits, it is for the Commission, as ‘guardian of the treaties’, to take the lead in seeking redress. Yet, research has shown a steady decline in the number of infringements opened by the Commission over the past two decades. Moreover, the findings suggest that the proximate cause of this drop is not a fall in instances of probable non-compliance, but rather a growing preference inside the Commission for political solutions to legal compliance problems.

The Commission’s enforcement forbearance is especially evident when it comes to migration and borders. Aside from its deference to national prerogatives on migrant instrumentalisation, it has enabled – through both action and inaction – the widespread and prolonged reintroduction of internal border controls, seriously undermining one of the foundational principles of the Schengen area.

One may well understand why the Commission is reticent to lock horns with member states on matters of great political sensitivity. But at a moment when the prospective German chancellor, Friedrich Merz, wins an election campaigning on permanently reintroducing controls at all of Germany’s internal borders, the Commission’s tacit toleration of member state unilateralism seems to be contributing to an unravelling of foundational principles of EU legal order.

Dr Nicole Scicluna is an Assistant Professor in Government and International Studies at Hong Kong Baptist University. Her research and teaching interests include European and EU politics and law, and the relationship between international law and international politics. She can be contacted on Linkedin here and followed on X/Twitter here.

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EUHealthGov held its fifth Practitioner Perspective on 13 March 2025. We were delighted to host Sebastiano Lustig, Policy Coordinator for prevention, preparedness and response planning for medical countermeasures at the European Health Emergency preparedness and Response Authority (HERA). What follows is a summary of some of the key points addressed in the presentation. A recording is also available here.  

While the EU health security architecture predates COVID-19, the lessons learned from the pandemic, especially on the importance of coordination, have led this framework to be restructured and strengthened. Successful coordination during COVID, visible notably in mechanisms like joint procurement served as good examples to build on. However, the pandemic response was generally marked by a lack of coordination, which exposed fragmentation and vulnerabilities in supply chain of medical countermeasures (MCM). The new EU Health Security Framework aims to address this and represents the first pillar of the broader project to build a European Health Union announced by Commission President von der Leyen in 2020. The health security pillar includes the new Regulation on cross border health threats (replacing the 2013 Decision of the same name), strengthened mandates of the ECDC and EMA, and the creation of HERA. HERA deals specifically with MCMs, its mission is to strengthen the EU’s capacity to respond to future pandemics of other health threats, mainly by ensuring the provision of critical medical countermeasures. 

HERA’s work takes a so-called ‘end-to-end’ approach, covering each stage of the MCM from threat assessment (in partnership with the ECDC) through to stockpiling and everything in between. This approach was illustrated using the pandemic influenza case study, also pointing out that, at the R&D stage, HERA recently established a structure for coordinating clinical trials. The coordination role of HERA was also emphasised when outlining its interaction and collaboration with other EU institutions (in particular but not limited to the ECDC and EMA), industry and civil society stakeholder, and international actors to promote global health cooperation. 

HERA operates in two phases: preparedness and crisis. The activities and mechanisms of the crisis phase are set out in a separate emergency framework regulation. In addition to emergency measures aimed at accelerating the availability of crisis-relevant MCMs, the activation of the crisis phase triggers the set-up of a Health Crisis Board, composed of Commission officials, high-level member states representatives, and is the only structure within the EU health security framework that is co-chaired by the Council. 

Finally, the audience’s attention was drawn to two next steps: first, the upcoming release of a new strategy to support MCM against public health threats. Second, the assessment of national preparedness and response plan, a task undertaken by the ECDC, with the support of HERA.

You can watch the recording of the presentation here.

The post EUHealthGov with Sebastiano Lustig: The role of HERA in the EU Health Security Framework appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

It marked the birth of the European Economic Community, later known as the European Union. This ambitious new community emerged from the ruins of the Second World War, driven by a singular purpose: to secure lasting peace through unity.

The eleven founders of the European Union, including Britain’s wartime leader Winston Churchill, recognised that Europe’s brutal history of conflict demanded a new approach.

Twice in the 20th century, the continent had been devastated by world wars that began within its own borders.

To prevent history from repeating itself, these visionary leaders sought to create a social and political union of European nations – not merely a trading arrangement, but a commitment to coexistence, cooperation, and peace.

As articulated in the Treaty of Rome, the goal was “ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.” The achievement of six countries that had so recently been at war with each other was nothing short of remarkable.

Just months after the Treaty’s signing, Churchill delivered his final speech about Europe at London’s Central Hall, Westminster.

His message was clear:

“My message to Europe today is the same as it was ten years ago – unite. Europe’s security and prosperity lie in unity.”

This founding vision seems increasingly misunderstood in Britain.

Many Brexiters view the EU as a mere economic pact, overlooking its deeper purpose of fostering peace and unity.

Yet, on the continent, the importance of this community of nations remains widely understood and appreciated.

By severing ties, Britain has told its European allies that the remarkable EU project – built to safeguard peace and security – is less valuable to us than it is to them.

The question remains: Can our relationship with the rest of Europe ever truly heal?

• Anniversary of the Treaty of Rome: Watch this video and weep 



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In 2024 alone, drug companies reported 1,938 supply disruptions to the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) – a sharp rise from 1,634 in 2023.

The worst-hit medications include essential treatments for epilepsy and cystic fibrosis, leaving vulnerable patients at risk.

This disturbing trend has been highlighted by the Nuffield Trust health think tank, which obtained the data under freedom of information laws.

Their analysis reveals a grim reality: while medicine shortages are a global issue, the UK’s situation is deteriorating faster than that of other European nations due to Brexit.

The root of the problem is evident.

The UK’s import growth of medicines has been the lowest among G7 countries since UK’s import growth of medicines has been the lowest among G7 countries since 2010, with the total value of imports falling by almost 20% since 2015 – the year before the EU referendum.

The collapse of supply chains previously connected to the EU is undeniable. As HM Revenue and Customs data shows, this decline is sharply concentrated on imports from the EU, making Brexit-related trade barriers the most likely cause.

Furthermore, UK drug exports to the European Economic Area – the 27 EU states plus Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein – have plummeted by a third since the 2016 Brexit vote.

The EU is responding to supply challenges by strengthening its internal systems, sharing supplies, and increasing domestic production.

Meanwhile, the UK finds itself increasingly isolated.

Pharmacies are on the frontline of this crisis. A survey by the National Pharmacy Association found that all 500 of its respondents were unable to fulfil at least one prescription daily due to unavailable medications.

This leaves patients distressed and frustrated, while pharmacists struggle to provide safe alternatives despite having suitable options on hand.

The government’s response has been to claim investment of up to £520 million to bolster domestic production of medicines and diagnostics.

However, without seamless integration into European supply chains, these measures fall far short of what is needed.

The solution is simple: end the madness of Brexit.

Rejoining the EU would restore the vital medicine supply chains that have been so needlessly severed. Britain cannot afford to remain on this destructive path.

It’s time to put patients first and repair the damage by rekindling cooperation with our closest and most important trading partner.

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The recent plan by President Ursula von der Leyen of a €150 billion European joint debt to fund the purchase of arms under the name ReArm Europe has sent shockwaves across the continent and beyond. The press announcement, made on March 4th, followed the infamous Oval Office meeting between US President Trump and Ukrainian President Zelensky. The bullyish scene marked a further decline in the liberal international order established by the US and its allies after the Second World War.

Against this backdrop, European leaders were quick to act. Meetings in the Elysée under the aegis of President Macron, gatherings in London with the British Prime Minister Starmer, or the recent European Council meeting on security policy signal the importance of recent events. However, it was von der Leyen’s announcement that seems to have ushered in a new age of European defence and security, but is that so?

The announcement focused on economic means to achieve a security goal, not on security itself. The EU is proposing to put its market power behind an initiative that will contribute to the long-term stability of that market. This is why the proposal must be seen through the lens of geoeconomics, not just defence or security.

Europe’s geoeconomic turn is nothing new. Even during the first von der Leyen Commission the President vowed to create a more geopolitical Commission, it was actually focused on a geoeconomic one. Geoeconomics are, according to Blackwill and Harris, “the use of economic instruments to promote and defend national (or European) interests, and to produce beneficial geopolitical results; and the effects of other nations’ economic actions on a country’s (or the EU’s) geopolitical goals”. Thus, it is clear that many of the Commission’s initiatives fall under this concept. It is worth mentioning a few that may have a direct bearing on Europe’s security and defence.

The first geoeconomic tool with a defence application that comes to mind is sanctions. These have long been part of the EU’s institutional architecture and rely on the size of the single market to damage the enemy’s economy in the short and medium term. They can take the form of import and export restrictions, asset freezes, or visa bans. Although they are branded as “peaceful tools of diplomacy”, they fit perfectly into the definition of geoeconomic tools provided above.

Another geoeconomic tool that can be directly applied to European security policy is the Foreign Direct Investment Screening Mechanism (FDI SM). This mechanism was legislated after Member States saw a worrying increase in Chinese investment in Europe, especially in sensitive industries. The same FDI SM could be directly applied to foreign investment targeting the European defence industry, again relying on the EU’s market power.

A number of strategies also complement these tools by defining what the EU’s priorities should be in different areas, such as 5G, critical raw materials, or energy, to name a few. The common denominator of all these geoeconomic instruments is their reliance on the size of the EU market and its attractiveness to other global economies. The measure recently proposed by von der Leyen on joint debt to buy weapons follows the same line. It has more to do with geoeconomics than with security or defence. From the point of view of competences, it makes sense for the EU institutions to focus on the Common Commercial Policy or the proper functioning of the internal market to guide EU policy, regardless of the specific policy area. Ultimately, these are also power struggles between the EU institutions and the Member States. However, it is unlikely that purely security measures will be led by the Commission in the short term. The creation of a common European army or further decisions to relaunch security integration will have to be spearheaded by the Member States.

All in all, the von der Leyen’s announcement is to be welcomed. The borrowing limit enshrined in the neoliberal rules imposed on the Member States by Maastricht is arbitrary. Its temporary lifting and mutualisation, as was the case during the Covid19 pandemic, is now considered an emergency measure in response to the emergency situation created by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In the medium term, however, the repeated use of the same geoeconomic tool, the common debt, could become established. The only thing preventing the EU from unleashing its full economic power is the disagreement among member states on debt orthodoxy. It seems, as Monnet put it many years ago, that Europe is still built through crises and that it is indeed the sum of their solutions.

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It wasn’t the referendum.

The 2016 referendum, as explicitly stated in the Act of Parliament that created it, was advisory only and had no legal authority to decide Brexit. This was confirmed by the UK Supreme Court, which ruled that only Parliament could make the decision to leave the EU.

But Parliament didn’t make the decision either.

Following the referendum, MPs were never given the opportunity to debate and vote on the specific question of whether Brexit should happen. In January 2017, then-Brexit Secretary David Davis incorrectly told Parliament that a vote on the matter was unnecessary because ‘the decision’ had already been made by the referendum.

However, the Supreme Court had ruled that the referendum was not legally capable of making that decision.

In fact, the very reason the court case arose – thanks to Gina Miller’s legal challenge – was because Theresa May’s government had attempted to implement Brexit without any Parliamentary approval whatsoever.

David Davis advised MPs that since ‘the decision’ to leave had already been made, all Parliament needed to do was grant the Prime Minister the authority to notify the EU of an ‘intention’ to leave.

But an intention is not a decision. It’s not even binding.

The European Court of Justice later ruled that the UK could have cancelled Brexit at any time during the Article 50 notice period and remained an EU member on exactly the same terms. In other words, Brexit was fully reversible until 11pm on 31 January 2020, the date the UK formally left the EU.

In early 2017, Parliament was given one of the shortest bills in history – the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill. It simply stated:

(1) The Prime Minister may notify, under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union, the United Kingdom’s intention to withdraw from the EU.

(2) This section has effect despite any provision made by or under the European Communities Act 1972 or any other enactment.

Notably, this bill did not define the content of Theresa May’s Article 50 notification letter, which she unilaterally composed and sent to the EU. When Parliament passed the bill allowing May to notify the EU of an ‘intention’ to leave, the public was led to believe that MPs had voted to leave the EU.

Nothing of the sort had happened.

To reiterate: Parliament never debated or voted on the specific question of whether the UK should leave the EU.

This mystery was unravelled in June 2018 at a High Court hearing on the validity of Article 50. The court established that Theresa May, and Theresa May alone, made the decision to leave the EU.

Lord Justice Gross and Mr Justice Green ruled that the decision to leave was contained in the Prime Minister’s Article 50 notification letter to then-European Council President Donald Tusk on 29 March 2017.

In that letter, May wrote that ‘the people of the United Kingdom’ had made the decision to leave. But the Supreme Court had already ruled that the referendum had no legal authority to make any decision.

She also wrongly claimed that the ‘decision’ had been confirmed by Parliament, even though Parliament had only approved sending a notice of ‘intention’ to withdraw.

Article 50 requires a member state to trigger withdrawal from the EU “in accordance with its own constitutional requirements”. But the UK doesn’t have a codified constitution, and the advisory nature of the referendum complicated everything.

Would the written constitutions of other EU states have allowed an exit process based on just 37% of the electorate voting Leave? Unlikely.

Could the EU have rejected the Article 50 notice? Possibly. But it was politically expedient for the EU not to challenge Britain’s flawed decision.

The UK Parliament was denied the opportunity to properly debate and vote on Brexit.

Labour, however, could have legally challenged the process – right through to the Supreme Court or the European Court of Justice.

Instead, they complied with the flawed Brexit process and backed it, making it difficult for them to challenge it later.

After the advisory referendum, Parliament should have been asked the exact same question that was put to the British public:

Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?

Instead, MPs were only asked whether they would allow the Prime Minister to notify the EU of an ‘intention’ to leave – which was a procedural matter, not a substantive decision.

As a result, Parliament debated and voted only on the terms of Brexit, but never on whether Brexit itself should happen.

Boris Johnson campaigned on the slogan ‘Get Brexit Done’, negotiated the terms of the withdrawal agreement, and Parliament voted to accept them.

But again, MPs were never asked whether the UK should leave the EU – only whether they accepted the deal on offer.

Brexiters argue that the 2019 general election gave Johnson a democratic mandate for Brexit. But the full picture gives a different story:

• In 2019, most voters did not vote Tory.
• Most voters backed parties offering a second referendum.
• The Tories won an 80-seat majority with only a 1% increase in their vote share from 2017, when they lost their majority entirely.
• If the 2019 general election had been a referendum instead, polling suggested Remain would have won.
• The public was never given a vote on the Brexit deal itself.

All this exposed deep flaws in the UK’s electoral system.

We now urgently need a full public inquiry into Brexit. Such an inquiry should investigate:

1. How Brexit went ahead without the explicit approval of Parliament.
2. How only 37% of the electorate were able to dictate such a momentous constitutional change.
3. How the Leave campaign won through lies, cheating, and illegalities – including unlawful overspending and the misuse of personal data to manipulate voters.

Had the referendum been legally binding, the illegal conduct surrounding it would almost certainly have resulted in the courts annulling the result.

But since the referendum was only advisory, it escaped legal scrutiny – even though the government treated it as if it were binding.

Do you get the feeling that the country has been conned on an enormous scale?

• Join the discussion about this post on Facebook, LinkedIn, YouTube, Instagram, BlueSky (to follow)
• Related video: The moment the Theresa May government turned an advisory referendum into a binding vote, announced by Brexit Secretary, David Davis



• Related video: How referendums should be run properly – by former Brexit Secretary, David Davis (note: The EU referendum broke every rule)



• Related video: What Prime Minister, David Cameron, should have done after the referendum

• Why we need a new vote on Brexit



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Not so much a post as a list of links for you this time, as I’ve been working up from a thread on BlueSky to a graphic to a podcast.

The central theme here is how the UK-EU relationship is affected by the chaotic Trump administration in the US, particularly in the wake of his moves on Ukraine, Russia and NATO. Much as the EU had to respond to the UK’s stated willingness to break good faith during the Brexit negotiations, so too do the UK and EU now jointly need to respond here.

Of course, part of the problem with chaotic situations is, well, the chaos; you don’t know what’s coming next. Hence the title of this; circling the wagons to defend against the immediate threat, even as you want to continue on a longer journey.

As well as trying to work out some baseline assumptions, I also suggest what is in effect a holding model for the long-term relationship while the pressing needs around Ukraine can be addressed. I’ll not pretend it’s all that satisfactory, but we seem to be living in a world of less-than-satisfactory situations, so tough luck on that one.

Any way, back to the links.

We start with a first thread on BlueSky:

https://bsky.app/profile/simonusherwood.bsky.social/post/3liel7pudlx2y

This was essentially working through the unsustainability of UK hedging in the new context.

Then we move to a bigger thread:

https://bsky.app/profile/simonusherwood.bsky.social/post/3lijgqhoguf2e

This sets out the basics of my thinking, including discussion of the circling the wagons approach as a manifestation of a de-risking strategy. Particular mention needs to be made here of Nicolai von Ondarza’s work on security arrangements, which is excellent on the specifics of how the UK and EU could move to more institutionalised dealings. If you want more on de-risking, then I’ve worked off the EU’s European Economic Security Strategy.

If that’s all too much, then here’s a graphic form of the key bits:

PDF: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic137

And finally, if you just want to listen to me talk it out, then I’ve made an episode of A Diet of Brussels on all of this. Incidentally, I note I’m coming up to the tenth anniversary of the pod and I really didn’t think back then we’d be thinking about these kinds of things: I was right to think that we’d be banging on about Europe though.

Small victories, I guess.

And all of this is very much up in the air: would love to get your feedback on any or all of this as we proceed.

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1) Scholarly Interest in Russian Emigrees 

The immigration politics across Europe receive a greater actuality in the context of Russia’s full-fledged invasion in Ukraine.  The war prompted mass forced emigration not only from Ukraine, where the mass destruction takes place, but also from Russia, where repressions take various forms, as I demonstrated in my recently published books, first, “Diversity of Migrant Entrepreneurship in Varieties of European Capitalism. Post-Soviet Entrepreneurship in Austria, Spain, and Hungary” (Palgrave Macmillan, 2023), and second, “Global Crises, Resilience, and Future Challenges. Experiences of Post-Yugoslav and Post-Soviet Migrants” (Ibidem Press, 2024). Simultaneously, many of the European Union’s (EU) immediate responses to Russia’s full-fledged invasion in Ukraine were increasing restrictions in issuing visas for Russian citizens across Europe and increased controls at the EU – Russia borders. One of the questions that I address in my research is, how do immigration regimes shape Russians’ immigration in Europe? This question is conceptually situated in the scholarly discussions concerning the EU immigration and integration policies.

2) Recent Immigration of Russians in Serbia 

Building upon these findings, I embarked on an exploration of immigration politics towards Russian anti-war emigrees in the European Union (EU) candidate countries of the Western Balkans. Through my initial research in Serbia, I found that this country, which counts about 6 million population, received between 100000 and 400000 Russian immigrants since the beginning of the war in Ukraine. Thanks to UACES’ Microgrant, in January 2025, I made a short field trip to Serbia, where I met and conducted interviews Russian anti-war emigrees, and by using their services and by attending some of their events, I analyzed their motives to immigrate in Serbia and economic activities. Russians’ in-mass exodus to Serbia provides a certain political paradox: while majority of the Russians currently residing in Serbia represent young anti-war emigrants and Putin’s regime opponents, close ties between Russian and Serbian authoritarian political leaders provided them with visa-free access to Serbia.  

3) Are Russian Immigrants in Serbia Short-Term Phenomenon? 

As I noted in “Global Crises, Resilience, and Future Challenges”, “it is essential to distinguish between people and states, especially in non-democratic regimes, as they are very different units and actors.” My initial findings from Serbia confirm this statement: my interlocutors revealed that many of them – relokanty (migrants) as they refer to themselves – in the beginning of the war first moved to visa-free countries territorially closer to Russia, such as Georgia, Armenia, Kazakhstan and Turkey. However, for a variety of reasons, they decided to move forward to the EU. Coming to Serbia, many of them found it both culturally close and convenient for living. Most of them are under forty years old, and they initially were employed by Russian companies, which relocated their offices to Serbia, such as the Russian tech giant, Yandex. However, after spending sometime in Serbia, most of Russian immigrants quit their jobs in large Russian companies and founded their small businesses. Most of my interlocutors expressed intension to stay in Serbia for a long-term. Similarly, most of them expressed deep sympathy with the current Serbian students’ mass anti-corruption protests.   

4) Russian Immigrants’ Current Impact on Serbia  

Seemingly endless number of restaurants, cafes, and small shops with Russian titles, and Russian language heard on every corner of Belgrade, making the portrayal of the city vibrant as never before. Relying on the theory built in “Diversity of Migrant Entrepreneurship in Varieties of European Capitalism”, I also found that Serbia resembles dependent market economy of Visegrad Four group of post-socialist countries in the early 2000s, before they joined the EU. Some Serbia’s official sources demonstrated that Serbia’s remarkable economic growth in 2023-2024 is owing to the large number of Russian immigrants in Serbia. At the same time, Serbia’s immigration policy, which particularly resembles the process of Hungary’s immigration regime at the time of its’ emergence in 2010-2012, has not moved further from visa-free regime for these Russian citizens, with largely liberal political views. It remains a question, whether and to what extent will they be enabled to contribute to further economic growth and democratic reforms in Serbia, and the country’s EU integration. 

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Abstract 

This article revisits the productivity paradox in the context of the European Union’s (EU) digital transformation, exploring the intersection of responsible innovation (RI) and productivity growth. The analysis is guided by two pivotal questions: how regulatory frameworks promoting RI influence productivity in the digital economy, and whether traditional productivity metrics effectively capture RI’s broader impacts. By introducing key debates surrounding EU regulations, such as the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the Digital Services Act (DSA), the article highlights that while these frameworks may initially constrain conventional productivity measures, they also catalyse new forms of innovation and value creation. The exposition highlights the limitations of traditional productivity metrics in capturing RI’s societal benefits, calling for alternative frameworks aligned with the EU’s vision of sustainable, inclusive growth. 

Productivity and RI: Friends or Foes? 

In 1987, Nobel laureate economist Robert Solow famously observed, “You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics,” coining what became known as the productivity paradox. This paradox emerged during a time of rapid technological advancement, where innovations like personal computers and mainframes were transforming workplaces, yet productivity growth remained stagnant. Brynjolfsson and Hitt’s seminal 1998 research revealed that this apparent paradox stemmed from several factors: measurement challenges, implementation lags, redistribution of benefits, and mismanagement of technology. These insights prove remarkably relevant to today’s digital transformation challenges. Contemporary scholars continue to grapple with the innovation-productivity paradox, particularly in the context of the EU’s digital transformation (Fragkandreas, 2021). 

At the same time, as society faces the complexities of rapidly advancing technologies, the need for a responsible approach to innovation has also become increasingly significant. Awareness of environmental challenges, climate change, social inequality, and the broader impacts of technological advancements has shifted societal expectations of business activities. RI has emerged as an important framework for navigating the complexities of technological advancement, offering a structured approach to ensure that innovation aligns with societal values and sustainable development goals. 

RI, as defined by von Schomberg (2013), represents “a transparent, interactive process by which societal actors and innovators become mutually responsive to each other with a view to the acceptability, sustainability and societal desirability of the innovation process.” This definition, however, is just one perspective in a rich academic discourse. Building on this foundational definition, Owen et al. (2013) position RI as a powerful policy discourse that enables innovation processes to address societal challenges while acknowledging inherent uncertainties and ambiguities. Their work emphasizes that innovation must be guided not only by technological capabilities but also by ethical and societal implications, providing a flexible approach for responsible development. 

Expanding this theoretical framework further, Stilgoe, Owen, and Macnaghten (2013) developed four dimensions of RI: anticipation, reflexivity, inclusion, and responsiveness. Anticipation involves systematic thinking about potential impacts, both positive and negative. Reflexivity requires innovators to scrutinize their own assumptions and commitments. Inclusion demands meaningful engagement with stakeholders throughout the innovation process. Responsiveness ensures that innovation systems can adapt to changing societal needs and values. These dimensions of RI, while of great importance for ethical innovation, introduce new complexities into traditional productivity calculations. They require businesses to invest resources in stakeholder engagement, impact assessment, and adaptive management practices that may not yield immediate measurable returns. 

The EU’s regulatory approach to digital transformation exemplifies the complexities of embedding RI principles into governance frameworks, ensuring that technological advancements align with ethical and societal values. Yet, this framework also challenges traditional conceptions of productivity and innovation. This raises two critical questions: First, how do EU digital regulations that promote RI influence productivity growth? Second, can conventional productivity metrics effectively capture the broader value of RI? The next section addresses the first question by discussing the impact of these regulations on productivity, while the following section examines the adequacy of conventional metrics in reflecting the societal contributions of RI. 

EU Digital Regulations: Balancing RI and Productivity Growth  

The EU has established a framework of major regulatory initiatives in digital governance through four cornerstone regulations: the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act for comprehensive AI oversight, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) for data privacy standards, and the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and Digital Services Act (DSA) for platform governance and market competition. Recent academic literature highlights critical concerns about how these regulations, while aiming to institutionalize RI principles, affect productivity growth, market dynamics, and business performance, particularly for smaller firms navigating compliance requirements. 

The AI Act stands as the world’s first comprehensive AI regulation, employing a risk-based model to categorize AI systems by their potential societal impact. However, Meyers (2024) brings attention to the tension between implementing robust safeguards, such as transparency, robustness, and human oversight, and maintaining the flexibility businesses need to advance cutting-edge AI technologies. Meyers (2024) also highlights the Act’s singular rulebook approach, designed to ensure regulatory coherence across the EU, which could paradoxically lead to institutional complexity and fragmentation, complicating its implementation. This critique underscores the broader tension between establishing robust safeguards, such as transparency, robustness, and human oversight, and maintaining the flexibility businesses need to promote advancements in AI technologies.  

The GDPR provides a revealing case study of RI’s practical implementation challenges. Research by Chen et al. (2022) demonstrates significant disparities in the regulation’s impact across different business segments. Their findings reveal that enhanced data protection requirements led to measurable reductions in financial performance for companies targeting European consumers, with small technology companies experiencing nearly twice the negative impact on profits compared to industry averages. Also, Chen et al. (2022) point out that larger technology firms remained relatively unaffected, highlighting the regulation’s uneven economic impact. At the same time, despite these challenges, Bachlechner and van Lieshout (2020) note that the GDPR has catalysed innovation in privacy-preserving technologies, spurring the growth of new market segments in data security and encryption, user consent management, and more, thereby advancing the EU’s vision of a digital economy founded on accountability and trust.  

The varying impacts of GDPR implementation across different business segments illustrate a key challenge in measuring the productivity effects of RI-focused regulations. While traditional metrics might show decreased financial performance, especially for smaller firms, these measurements fail to capture the long-term value created through enhanced trust, improved data security, and the emergence of new privacy-preserving technologies 

The DMA and DSA further expand EU’s regulatory framework by addressing digital platform market power and content governance. While these regulations aim to foster a more competitive and ethical digital economy, scholarly analysis reveals potential limitations. Teese and Kahwaty (2021) critique the DMA’s Impact Assessment for applying outdated industrial-era tools to dynamic digital markets. Furthermore, Erixon et. al. (2022) present a nuanced perspective, acknowledging potential benefits from reduced network effects and increased trust in AI-based services while warning about indirect economic consequences. The scholars emphasize that even without direct compliance burdens, these regulations may introduce new costs and affect resource allocation throughout the economy, potentially reinforcing advantages for larger firms and economies. 

The EU’s regulatory approach to digital transformation illustrates both the potential and limitations of implementing RI at scale. While the regulatory frameworks establish important safeguards and foster trust in digital markets, they simultaneously reveal the inherent complexities of balancing innovation, competition, and broader societal benefits. The empirical evidence suggests varying impacts across different market segments, particularly for smaller enterprises, raising fundamental questions about the way in which productivity is measured and evaluated in the context of RI. This measurement challenge requires a deeper examination of traditional productivity metrics and their adequacy in capturing the full spectrum of value created through RI practices. 

Measuring Productivity in the Age of RI 

Traditional productivity metrics, focused primarily on labour and capital inputs versus economic outputs, increasingly fall short in capturing the multifaceted impact of RI. This limitation stems in part from significant measurement challenges, as many RI initiatives generate long-term societal benefits that extend well beyond the timeframe of conventional productivity statistics (Cunha, 2018). Moreover, “the variety of the social impact … is substantial and it is difficult to capture all kinds of impacts fairly or objectively,” admits the EU (2014). RI initiatives also create positive externalities that benefit the broader ecosystem rather than individual firms, making their value challenging to quantify through traditional firm-level measurements (Nieminen and Ikonen, 2021). The transformation of business models and organizational processes through RI also generates value that transcends traditional product and service measurements (Yaghmaei and van de Poel, 2021). 

In response to these limitations, new frameworks are emerging that strive to rflect the fuller scope of innovation’s impact. Porter and Kramer’s (2011) Creating Shared Value (CSV) theory offers a particularly compelling approach, demonstrating how businesses can transcend traditional socioeconomic trade-offs. The CVS framework shows how redefining productivity in the value chain through social and environmental innovations can simultaneously improve operations, reduce costs, and contribute to societal well-being without sacrificing corporate competitiveness (Dembek et al., 2016). This methodological innovation emphasizes the importance of considering both direct and indirect value creation, including improvements in supplier capabilities, local cluster development, and workforce development. 

The EU has embraced this broader perspective in its policy evaluation approach, developing impact assessments that integrate social, environmental, and ethical dimensions alongside traditional economic metrics. Such a shift is further exemplified by the growing adoption of Social Impact Measurement and Management (SIMM), which systematically evaluates an organization’s broader societal effects. SIMM enables a more nuanced understanding of long-term impacts and community well-being, fostering greater accountability and transparency while supporting more informed decision-making. 

The integration of CSV and SIMM approaches with traditional productivity metrics presents practical challenges, particularly in standardization and comparability across different contexts. However, these frameworks offer important insights into how regulatory compliance costs might be balanced against broader value creation, especially in the context of RI initiatives. 

Recent scholarly work has also highlighted the importance of considering network effects and innovation ecosystem impacts in productivity measurement. Digital platforms and RI initiatives often create value through network externalities, knowledge spillovers, and ecosystem development that traditional productivity metrics fail to capture. Additionally, the role of intangible assets, such as data, algorithms, and organizational capital, has become increasingly significant in the digital economy, requiring new approaches to value measurement. 

New measurement frameworks must move beyond financial returns to address environmental sustainability, social equity, and long-term resilience. Incorporating more comprehensive assessment dimensions aligns with the EU’s vision of a digital economy that integrates societal well-being with economic competitiveness. This is particularly important for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which often lack the resources to implement sophisticated measurement systems yet play a vital role in the digital economy’s transformation. The challenge ahead lies in developing governance frameworks that can effectively balance traditional productivity metrics with these broader value dimensions, while remaining accessible and practical for enterprises of all sizes. 

Conclusions  

In the EU’s pursuit of digital transformation, a complex interplay emerges between RI and productivity growth, challenging established paradigms of economic measurement. The implementation of RI frameworks introduces asymmetric productivity constraints across the business landscape, with SMEs bearing a disproportionate burden of compliance costs and operational adjustments. Nevertheless, these regulatory frameworks also catalyse innovation in unexpected ways, fostering new market opportunities and technological solutions. 

The EU’s comprehensive regulatory approach, exemplified by the AI Act, GDPR, DMA, and DSA, illustrates the intricate balance required between advancing RI and maintaining economic dynamism. This balance holds heightened significance for SMEs, which often lack the resources to effectively navigate complex regulatory requirements while maintaining competitive productivity levels. 

This discussion reveals a fundamental need to reconceptualise productivity measurement in ways that acknowledge both immediate economic impacts and broader societal benefits. While conventional metrics inadequately capture the positive externalities generated by RI, emerging frameworks like SIMM and CSV offer promising pathways forward. The challenge lies in developing measurement approaches that are both comprehensive enough to capture the full spectrum of value creation and sufficiently practical for implementation across enterprises of all sizes, ensuring that the transition to responsible digital innovation supports rather than impedes the competitiveness of Europe’s diverse business ecosystem. 

The post The New Solow Paradox? Responsible Innovation and Productivity in the EU Digital Age appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Britain does not have enough skilled workers to meet Labour’s ambitious target of building 1.5 million homes over the next five years.

This stark reality was highlighted on the front page of The Independent on 17 February 2025, yet Deputy Prime Minister Angela Rayner insists it’s no excuse. But excuses are irrelevant – facts remain facts.

Post-Brexit and post-Covid, Britain is suffering a chronic shortage of both skills and workers.

The construction sector is no exception.

Without a sufficient workforce, housing plans remain just that – plans. This is precisely why Britain now relies on millions of migrant workers to fill gaps in industries ranging from healthcare to agriculture and, crucially, construction.

The truth is, this crisis was avoidable.

When Britain was part of the EU, workers from our own continent could travel freely to meet labour demand. This fluid workforce ensured industries had the people they needed, when they needed them. But Brexit shattered that dynamic.

Now, in a desperate scramble to plug the gaps, the government – whether Tory or Labour – is handing out work visas to hundreds of thousands of people from countries thousands of miles away, including India, the Philippines, and Nigeria.

Yet, even with these efforts, it’s still not enough.

The result? A nation unable to house its people, spiralling construction costs, and projects stalled due to workforce shortages. This is the tangible cost of Brexit.

Had we remained in the EU, Britain wouldn’t be in this predicament.

European builders, engineers, and tradespeople who once came and went with ease are now entangled in red tape – or simply staying away. And with them, the possibility of meeting Britain’s housing targets disappears.

This isn’t an abstract issue.

The housing shortage is worsening the cost-of-living crisis, pushing homeownership further out of reach for millions, and deepening social inequality.

1.5 million homes aren’t just a political talking point – they are a necessity for a functioning, fair society.

There is a solution, but neither major party has the courage to embrace it.

Eventually, a government with foresight will emerge – one that understands the need to reverse the damage and bring Britain back to economic and social sanity.

That means rejoining the EU.

Britain doesn’t have to suffer needlessly when the remedy is clear. It’s only a matter of time before the electorate demands it.

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• Related video: Why Britain needs migrants

• Migrants are a boon, not a burden: BBC report from 2021 on post-Brexit shortage of construction workers



• • • Post Brexit blues: Video report from 2021 on the shortage of construction workers



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Since the 2016 EU referendum, evidence has mounted that Russian interference helped secure the narrow ‘Leave’ victory.

By weakening the EU and sowing division, Brexit played into Vladimir Putin’s hands while delivering no tangible benefits to Britain.

Putin has long viewed the collapse of the Soviet Union as a “major geopolitical disaster” and has consistently sought to weaken the EU while restoring Russian influence over former Soviet states.

Brexit was a significant strategic win for Moscow.

Reports from multiple sources, including The Guardian, The Times, and the UK Parliament, revealed that Russian-backed social media accounts posted tens of thousands of messages in the days leading up to the Brexit vote, overwhelmingly promoting Leave.

Research by Swansea University and the University of California, Berkeley, found that over 150,000 Russian-linked accounts suddenly pivoted to Brexit-related content, influencing millions of voters.

The UK Parliament’s Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee confirmed that these efforts aimed to increase tensions and undermine Britain’s democratic process. Committee chair Damian Collins MP warned this was likely “just the tip of the iceberg.”

Despite these findings, the British government repeatedly refused to launch a full-scale investigation.

Even after the Russia Report was published in 2020 by Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee, confirming systemic Russian interference in UK politics, no meaningful action was taken.

Successive UK governments have ignored the growing threat of Russian influence.

Oligarchs with Kremlin ties poured millions into British politics, particularly the Conservative Party, turning London into a hub for Russian money laundering – earning the nickname ‘Londongrad.’

Cross-party MPs, including Labour’s Chris Bryant and Green Party’s Caroline Lucas, repeatedly warned of the dangers, but their concerns were dismissed.

Even after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the UK was slow to freeze Russian assets and sanction oligarchs.

A new Labour government took power in 2024, raising hopes for a fresh approach.

However, despite mounting evidence that Russia played a key role in fueling and funding Brexit, Labour has not committed to investigating alleged interference in the EU referendum or other democratic processes in the UK.

Russia’s tactics in Britain were not isolated.

While many former Soviet bloc countries remain staunchly pro-EU and wary of Russian influence, some, notably Hungary and Slovakia, have taken a different path.

Under Viktor Orbán, Hungary has repeatedly blocked EU sanctions against Russia, maintained close economic ties with Moscow, and adopted a pro-Kremlin stance on key issues, including energy dependence.

Slovakia, following the election of Robert Fico as Prime Minister, has also signaled a more Russia-friendly position, reducing support for Ukraine and opposing further European intervention.

These shifts pose a challenge for EU unity, as Putin seeks to exploit internal divisions, weakening the bloc’s collective response to Russian aggression.

Moscow has also engaged in cyberwarfare, disinformation campaigns, and financial backing for far-right and nationalist parties across Europe to weaken EU cohesion.

By 2017, Russia had amassed 2,500 troops near Latvia and Estonia, heightening fears of aggression.

These concerns escalated further in 2022 when Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, despite having repeatedly denied any such plans.

The situation has become even more precarious with the return of Donald Trump to the US presidency in 2025.

Trump has made statements appearing to favour Putin over Europe, openly criticised NATO, and questioned US commitment to European security.

His wavering stance on supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression has emboldened Moscow and left Europe more vulnerable.

With the US no longer a reliable ally, the UK’s alliance with the EU is more crucial than ever.

The EU remains the strongest force resisting Putin’s expansionism, coordinating sanctions, military aid, and humanitarian support for Ukraine.

Britain must recognise that its interests align with Europe – not with an increasingly isolationist and unpredictable US administration.

Frustrated by the government’s failure to act, in March 2022 cross-party MPs Ben Bradshaw (Labour), Caroline Lucas (Green), and Alyn Smith (SNP) took the case to the  European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).

They argued that the UK’s refusal to investigate Russian interference violated democratic rights under the European Convention on Human Rights.

The UK government was given until April 2023 to respond. Predictably, it downplayed the allegations and offered no substantive counter-investigation.

The refusal to engage reflects a deeper unwillingness to acknowledge that Brexit – hailed as a victory for sovereignty – was, in part, manipulated by a hostile foreign power.

The ECHR ruling has yet to be delivered, and there is no indication of when it will be.

However, when it does, it is expected to be major news. The case remains a key moment in determining accountability for foreign interference in UK democracy.

Brexit was a strategic success for Putin but a devastating blow to Britain.

The economic, political, and social consequences are increasingly clear. The UK’s international standing has diminished, businesses have struggled, and trade with Europe has suffered.

But there is a way forward. The UK must:

• Acknowledge and investigate Russian interference in Brexit and UK politics.
• Strengthen ties with the EU, recognising the benefits of European collaboration in trade, security, and global influence – in other words, being back IN the the EU.
• Expose and counter Russian influence, ensuring that UK democracy is not for sale to the highest bidder.

The ultimate repudiation of Putin’s interference would be a national commitment to rebuilding Britain’s European partnerships – including rejoining the EU, at least in the longer term.

The damage caused by Brexit is not irreversible, but time is running out.

The UK must choose: stand with its European allies or remain a pawn in Putin’s geopolitical ambitions.

The clock is ticking.

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• Earlier versions of this post were published in February 2024, February 2023, March 2022, February 2022, and November 2017.
• Related article from 2013: Latvia: From Soviet Union to European Union

• Related video – Putin’s interference in UK democracy, as explained by British MPs (will be updated later in 2025)



• Related video: Boris Johnson and the Russian connection



• Related video: Message for Russian people



• Related video: Stanley Johnson (Boris Johnson’s father) and the Russian Connection

The post How Brexit played into Putin’s hands appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The EU is a democracy, run by elected politicians.

By comparison, the UK seems more like a quasi-democracy, with unelected decision-makers and undemocratic practises that would be considered despotic by EU standards.

The UK Parliament consists of 1,481 members across the Commons and Lords. However, while all 650 MPs in the House of Commons are elected, the remaining 831 members of the House of Lords were appointed and not elected.

Our Parliament has more unelected members than elected.

The number of members of the Lords often fluctuates due to new appointments, leave of absence, and disqualification. Voters have no say in this process.

The House of Lords is the upper chamber of the UK Parliament. It plays a key role in the legislative process, scrutinising government actions, and providing expertise on policy and law.

Although it has limited power compared to the elected House of Commons, for a Bill to become law it must be approved by both the Commons and the Lords except in certain circumstances. Ultimately, however, the elected Commons has the final say over legislation.

The House of Lords is the only upper house of any two-chamber parliament in the world to be larger than its lower house.*

[*Source: Alan Siaroff, Comparing Political Regimes]

By stark contrast, the European Parliament has 720 members, all elected.

Just look at other aspects of so-called British ‘democracy’ that would be considered alien in the EU:

 We have a legislative system whereby most laws are made by Statutory Instruments, drafted by the Civil Service, which cannot be amended by Parliament and most of which become law automatically, without a Parliamentary vote.

We have governments that can bypass Parliament with the use – and abuse – of arcane and ancient Royal Prerogatives and Henry VIII clauses.

We have an old-fashioned voting system of first-past-the-post resulting in governments that most people didn’t vote for. (In European Parliament elections, voting is by proportional representation).

We had a Prime Minister who could (until it was ruled unlawful by the Supreme Court) close down Parliament for an extended period at his will and without Parliamentary approval.

We had a Prime Minister who attempted to initiate Brexit without Parliamentary authority and spent considerable sums of public money in litigation defending her “right” to do so.

We had a government that gave lucrative contracts to their friends, bypassing usual procurement procedures and public accountability.

We had a referendum in which two out of the four nations of the United Kingdom, along with Gibraltar, voted strongly against Brexit, but the UK government went ahead with it anyway.

We have an unelected head of state (although the King has no real power to intervene on important issues).

None of these undemocratic situations would be acceptable in the EU.

But how many people in Britain truly know that the EU is a democracy?

For years, Brexit politicians and papers have been selling us the blatant lie that the EU is undemocratic, even a “dictatorship” and run by unelected bureaucrats.

Let me take this opportunity to explain why that is not the case.

In the EU, democratic governance is the number one requirement of European Union membership.

In 1962, the year after Britain first applied to join the EEC, Spain also applied.

The country was then governed by authoritarian dictator, Francisco Franco. Spain’s membership application was flatly and unanimously rejected by all members of the European Community.

The reason? Because Spain wasn’t a democracy.

Indeed, if the UK was applying to join the EU now, recent events could present questions over the validity of our application and whether our democratic governance is currently robust enough.

Remember, recent Tory governments wanted to scrap our Human Rights Act and also opposed the European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Conservative leaders have  also threatened to leave the European Convention on Human Rights. The current Tory leader, Kemi Badenoch, has said she was willing to consider leaving the Convention if she became Prime Minister.

Such a move would bar us from joining the EU, where a commitment to human rights is a strict membership requirement.

Before becoming a member of the EU, an applicant country must demonstrate that it has a stable government guaranteeing:

• Democracy
• The rule of law
• Human rights
• Respect for and protection of minorities
• The existence of a functioning market economy
• The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union

Most countries that applied to join the EU did not meet these strict membership requirements and so they needed many years to prepare for the process before their application could be accepted.

NOTE: The UK’s unelected House of Lords may be a barrier to the UK being accepted as an EU member if we apply to re-join. We may have got away with having an unelected second chamber when we first joined in 1973, but there is a question mark over whether our application would be successful again without deep constitutional reforms in the UK. 

Contrary to what many people in Britain understand, the EU is a democracy, democratically run by its members.

These comprise the democratically elected governments and Parliaments of EU member states, alongside the directly elected European Parliament.

All the treaties of the EU, upon which all EU laws must be compatible, and any new countries applying to join the EU, must be unanimously and democratically agreed by all the national parliaments of every EU member state, however large or small.

In some EU countries, according to their national constitutions, agreement must also be obtained by regional parliaments and national referendums.

All the EEC/EU treaties since Britain joined the European Community in 1973 were fully debated and democratically passed by our Parliament in Westminster.

Not once were any changes to our EU membership imposed upon us, and neither could they be, as the EU is a democracy.

In addition, every EU country has a veto on any treaty changes or any new country joining.

(Compare that to our referendum of 2016, when a majority of citizens in Scotland and Northern Ireland voted against Brexit, but it made no difference.)

The European Parliament is the EU’s law-making body, alongside the EU Council, also called the Council of Ministers, which comprises the departmental ministers of democratically elected governments of every EU country.

The Parliament is directly elected every five years by citizens in all EU countries. The latest European elections were held in June 2024.

There are 720 MEPs (we used to have 73 MEPs from the UK representing us in Europe; alas, no more).

Each European country is proportionally represented in the Parliament according to their size of population.

EU laws can only be passed by the European Parliament in concert with the Council of Ministers.

The Council shares law making and budgetary powers with the European Parliament. When voting on proposed EU laws, its meetings must be public.

Alongside the Council, the European Parliament has the democratic power to accept, amend or reject proposed laws and regulations.

According to extensive research at the time by VoteWatch Europe, over 97% of adopted EU laws in the 12 years to 2016 were supported by the UK.

There are proposals to give the European Parliament new powers to directly initiate legislation.

The European Commission is the servant of the EU, and not its master. Ultimately, the Commission is beholden to the European Parliament, and not the other way around.

The candidates for Commission President are proposed by a qualified majority of the European Council, which comprises the Prime Ministers or Heads of States of EU countries, taking account of the latest European elections.

Similarly, the Commission is composed of one member from each member state “suggested” by the national governments of each member state, but elected by a qualified majority of the European Council.

The Commission President must then be elected by an absolute majority of all MEPs (i.e. over 50% of them).

Indeed, Ursula von der Leyen could only become Commission President – for a second term – with the democratic backing of over half of ALL MEPs.

Each proposed Commissioner must also be democratically approved by the European Parliament in a strict vetting process. The Parliament has the democratic power to reject candidate Commissioners – as two were in in 2019.

After the 2024 European Parliament elections, European Parliament’s hearings, held in November 2024, involved rigorous evaluations of the Commissioners-designate. While no nominees were outright rejected, several faced intense scrutiny and challenges during their hearings.

The Parliament also has the democratic power to sack the entire Commission at any time during its five-year tenure.

The Commission is responsible for implementing the democratic decisions of the EU, upholding and enforcing democratically passed EU laws and treaties, and managing the day-to-day business of the EU.

The Commission also proposes new laws, but they only do this in close collaboration with the European Parliament and Council of Ministers, as only the Parliament and Council can pass laws.

The Commission has zero power to pass any laws.

Before the Commission proposes new laws, it prepares ‘Impact Assessments’ which set out the advantages and disadvantages of possible policy options.

The Commission then consults interested parties such as non-governmental organisations, local authorities and representatives of industry and civil society. Groups of experts also give advice on technical issues.

In this way, the Commission ensures that legislative proposals correspond to the needs of those most concerned and avoids unnecessary red tape.

Citizens, businesses and organisations also participate in the consultation procedure. National parliaments can also formally express their reservations if they feel that it would be better to deal with an issue at national rather than EU level.

The European Council consists of the democratically elected leaders of each EU country – their Prime Ministers and Presidents. It is the EU’s supreme political authority.

The Council does not negotiate or adopt EU laws, but it does democratically set the political goals and priorities of the European Union, including the policy agenda of the Commission.

The Council also democratically chooses candidates for the post of Commission President, which the European Parliament must then elect with an absolute majority of MEPs.

The Council President reports to the European Parliament.

During our membership, Britain democratically helped to run and rule the EU, and not the other way around. Whatever the EU is and has become, Britain helped to create it.

Indeed, the EU can become whatever all its members unanimously agree it can become. But of course, that only applies to EU members, and not to ex-members.

Outside of the EU, Britain can only watch as democratic decisions about our continent are decided without us, even though those decisions affect us just as much, whether we are a member or not.

Leaving the EU has meant a loss of sovereignty. We no longer have a say, votes, and vetoes on the running and future direction of Europe.

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• Related video: The BBC got it wrong, so this video explains how the EU functions as a democracy



• Related video: Why the UK joined the EU – and why we might join again for the same reasons

• Related video: Why Brexit is a colossal mistake, by former Prime Minister Sir John Major



The post The EU is more democratic than the UK appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

But now that Labour is in government, it doesn’t feel like Labour at all. It feels more Tory.

And I’m not the only one saying this. Many Labour voters, supporters, and even Labour MPs are openly questioning the party’s direction.

Just look at Labour’s policies since taking office – many wouldn’t have looked out of place in the Conservative government of just a year ago.

So, let’s examine how a more traditional Labour government might have tackled these issues differently.

– Current Labour Policy: Banning UK citizenship for refugees arriving via ‘dangerous routes’.

– Traditional Labour Alternative: A humane, fair approach – establishing safe and legal routes for asylum seekers, investing in faster processing systems, and working with international partners to manage migration effectively.

Instead of punishing refugees, Labour could crack down on traffickers and exploitative employers.

– Current Labour Policy: Removing the Winter Fuel Allowance from most pensioners to save £1.5 billion.

– Traditional Labour Alternative: Instead of cutting support, Labour could increase winter assistance, funded by a windfall tax on energy companies’ record profits.

– Current Labour Policy: Criticising NHS reliance on overseas doctors, implying a need for more UK-based recruitment.

– Traditional Labour Alternative: Instead of blaming NHS bosses, Labour should invest in training more UK doctors and nurses while improving pay and conditions to retain existing staff.

A Labour government should welcome migrant healthcare workers, ensuring they receive fair pay and working conditions.

– Current Labour Policy: Labour plans to monitor bank accounts of benefit claimants to detect fraud.

– Traditional Labour Alternative: Instead of targeting the poorest, Labour could focus on corporate tax evasion, which costs the UK billions more than benefit fraud.

A fair benefits system should be supportive, not punitive.

– Current Labour Policy: Large National Insurance tax hikes, impacting workers and businesses.

– Traditional Labour Alternative: Tax wealth, not work – higher taxes on corporations, high earners, and windfall profits, instead of squeezing working people.

A progressive tax system could fund public services without burdening low- and middle-income earners.

– Current Labour Policy: Removing inheritance tax exemptions for farms worth over £1 million.

– Traditional Labour Alternative: Instead of a blanket tax increase, Labour could target corporate farms and landowners, while protecting small family farms from financial hardship.

– Current Labour Policy: Labour has launched Great British Energy (GBE), a publicly owned clean energy company, and pledged home insulation improvements via the Warm Homes Plan.

However, green investment funding has been cut from £28bn to £14bn, and Labour is expanding nuclear power. Keir Starmer has also indicated he wants to go-ahead with a giant new oilfield, Rosebank off Shetland, continuing Conservative energy policies.

– Traditional Labour Alternative: Labour should reverse green investment cuts, expand public ownership of renewable energy, and prioritise fast-deploying renewables over costly and environmentally unfriendly nuclear projects and the Rosebank oilfield.

– Current Labour Policy: More police recruitment and expanded use of facial recognition surveillance.

– Traditional Labour Alternative: Tackle the root causes of crime – invest in youth services, education, and job creation.

Instead of increased surveillance, Labour should prioritise community policing and police accountability.

– Current Labour Policy: Labour has announced above-inflation pay rises for some public sector workers, including 5.5% for NHS staff and a 22% pay rise for junior doctors over two years.

– Traditional Labour Alternative: While better than nothing, true Labour values would ensure all public sector wages rise in line with inflation – funded by progressive taxation, not spending cuts elsewhere.

– Current Labour Policy: Labour plans to recruit 6,500 new teachers, modernise the curriculum, and ensure all new teachers are qualified.

– Traditional Labour Alternative: All well and good, but Labour should also increase school funding, reduce class sizes, and abolish tuition fees for higher education.

Rather than focusing on standardisation, Labour should prioritise investment and support to help all students succeed.

– Current Labour Policy: Labour rules out rejoining the EU, Single Market, or customs union, despite Brexit’s role in low growth, inflation, and workforce shortages – contributing to the £22bn economic “black hole”.

– Traditional Labour Alternative: Every Labour Prime Minister since 1957 has supported EU membership – except Keir Starmer.

Labour should face reality. If Starmer started making the case for rejoining, Labour could boost economic growth and help to secure a second term.

A Labour government true to its values would:

Increase taxes on wealth and corporations, not on workers.
Invest in public services instead of cutting support.
Ensure a humane, fair approach to refugees and benefits claimants.
Properly fund public sector pay and green investment.
Tackle corporate tax avoidance instead of bank surveillance on the poor.
Support EU membership, just like every Labour Prime Minister before Starmer.

Instead, Starmer’s Labour is adopting fiscally conservative, tougher-on-migrants, tougher-on-welfare policies while avoiding the Brexit debate – mirroring recent Tory approaches.

This isn’t New Labour. This isn’t even true Labour.

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• Related video: Keir Starmer stood for the Labour leadership promoting migration and Free Movement of People – but once he became leader, changed his mind.



• Related article: Labour’s reform-style rhetoric against migration simply won’t work

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I want the UK to rejoin the EU because I believe that to be in Britain’s – and Europe’s – best interests.

But that doesn’t mean to say I am starry-eyed about the EU, or more pertinently, the different people who are elected from time to time to run it (yes, contrary to popular mythology, they are elected).

The latest controversy involving European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen raises serious questions about accountability.

Investigative journalist Alexander Fanta reported in The Guardian that von der Leyen has gone to court to prevent the release of personal messages exchanged with Pfizer’s CEO, Albert Bourla, during critical Covid vaccine negotiations in 2021.

These messages could shed light on how the EU secured a €21.5bn (£17.9bn) deal for up to 1.8 billion Pfizer doses – raising concerns over pricing, procurement strategy, and whether millions of doses were wasted.

At the time, the EU was under immense pressure to secure vaccines, lagging behind the UK and Israel.

Amid production issues with Pfizer and AstraZeneca, it’s claimed that von der Leyen took personal charge of negotiations, reportedly leveraging direct text exchanges with Bourla, but this is strongly denied by the European Commission.

However, when Fanta filed an access request under the EU’s freedom of information law, the Commission refused, arguing that texts are “short-lived” and not subject to disclosure rules.

The secrecy surrounding these exchanges has led to a legal battle.

The New York Times and journalist Matina Stevis-Gridneff have also filed lawsuits in the European Court of Justice seeking access.

The EU’s legal team claims the texts are not “substantive” while simultaneously admitting they have never reviewed them – relying instead on von der Leyen’s staff assurances.

One exasperated judge even called the Commission’s testimony “bizarre.”

This lack of transparency extends beyond vaccine procurement.

The EU’s unprecedented €723bn (£600bn) Covid recovery fund, meant to boost digital and climate investments, remains largely unaccounted for.

When Fanta’s colleagues at ‘Follow the Money’ requested details, only the top 100 recipients per country were disclosed, leaving billions in spending unexplained.

Allegations of fraud linked to these funds have since emerged, with Greek authorities investigating €2.5bn in suspected misuse and Italian police probing a €600m fraud case.

Fanta argues that secrecy is embedded in the EU’s administrative culture. It is claimed that under von der Leyen, this has worsened, with key documents withheld for political reasons.

Outgoing European Ombudsman Emily O’Reilly has accused “powerful consiglieri” in von der Leyen’s cabinet of blocking crucial disclosures.

Despite her public stance against authoritarianism, von der Leyen’s resistance to scrutiny undermines democratic accountability.

Fanta warns that limiting transparency only strengthens the arguments of leaders like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, who use secrecy to justify their own undemocratic practices.

The ongoing court case may set new limits on von der Leyen’s secrecy, but real change requires sustained pressure from media, civil society, and the European Parliament.

Public trust depends on transparency – leaders must be held accountable, even when it makes governing, or texting, more complicated.

********************

I have now received a response from Stefan de Keersmaecker, Deputy Chief Spokesperson of the European Commission:

Many thanks for your message. This is what we can share with you:

The President had exchanges with the CEO of Pfizer, as she generally had with CEOs of other companies with a view to attracting companies’ interest to engage with the EU for the delivery of vaccines in accordance with the objectives and procedures of the EU’s COVID-19 Vaccine Strategy.

The President was not involved in negotiations of contracts.

There was a clear and transparent process in place for such negotiations. The EU Vaccine Strategy was a joint strategy: all contracts with vaccine developers had been negotiated jointly by the Commission and the Member States, taking into account vaccine needs of all EU countries.

Practically speaking, the negotiations were done by a negotiation team consisting of representatives of the Commission and of several Member States.

This team reported on a regular basis to a Steering Board, consisting of representatives of the Commission and all Member States. The role of this board was to set the mandate for the negotiators, identify the needs and steer the negotiations.

Before each vaccine contract was concluded, it was submitted to the steering board.  Member States were given the opportunity to opt out from the contract.

So all Member States are fully aware of all contractual terms and conditions, including on deliveries, that they negotiated with the companies.

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