European Union

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

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The presidency updates ministers on the state of play on a draft regulation simplifying the rules governing the European structural and investment funds - the so-called Omnibus regulation. Ministers discuss how cohesion policy can be brought closer to European citizens. They also adopts conclusions on making cohesion policy more effective, relevant and visible to citizens. The Council is also expected to adopt conclusions on the implementation of EU macro-regional strategies.

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MEPs beefed up rules to ensure that buyers of goods or services from another EU country are treated like local customers in a committee vote on Tuesday.
Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

MEPs beefed up rules to ensure that buyers of goods or services from another EU country are treated like local customers in a committee vote on Tuesday.
Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Key products and services, like phones, e-book readers, operating systems and payment terminals, will have to be made more accessible to people with disabilities, under draft EU rules amended in committee on Tuesday.
Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Key products and services, like phones, e-book readers, operating systems and payment terminals, will have to be made more accessible to people with disabilities, under draft EU rules amended in committee on Tuesday.
Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Children should have the same protection whether they are watching TV, a web-shared video or a web-streamed film, said committee MEPs on Tuesday.
Committee on Culture and Education

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Children should have the same protection whether they are watching TV, a web-shared video or a web-streamed film, said committee MEPs on Tuesday.
Committee on Culture and Education

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Manuel Valls, France’s former prime minister, did not mince words about the paltry 6.36 per cent score achieved by his party’s candidate Benoît Hamon. The outcome was “bruising,” he told France Inter radio. “It is the end of a cycle, the end of a story.”

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Plenary session and committee meetings, Brussels

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Asylum seekers should be able to work in the EU no later than two months after applying for asylum, instead of the current nine months, said Civil Liberties Committee MEPs on Tuesday.
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Asylum seekers should be able to work in the EU no later than two months after applying for asylum, instead of the current nine months, said Civil Liberties Committee MEPs on Tuesday.
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

MEPs will look at how EU rules to prevent sexual abuse and exploitation of children have been implemented by EU countries in a committee hearing on Tuesday afternoon.
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

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The Informal meeting of Environment Ministers takes place on 25 and 26 April in Valletta.

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On 25 April 2017, the Council adopted a regulation on the anthropogenic emissions and releases of mercury and mercury compounds into the air, water and land. 

Mercury is a very toxic substance which constitutes  a serious global  risk to human health and the environment, including through the presence of its compound methylmercury in fish, seafood, ecosystems and wildlife.

The new regulation will provide a high level of protection and limit the pollution generated by activities and processes related to mercury.

To this end, the regulation establishes measures and conditions at an EU level to control and restrict: 

• the use and storage of and trade in mercury, mercury compounds and mixtures of mercury;
• the manufacture and use of and trade in mercury-added products;
• the use of mercury in dental amalgam;
• and to ensure the appropriate management of mercury waste.

Activities such as mercury mining, the use of mercury in products and industrial processes, artisanal and small-scale gold mining, coal combustion and the management of mercury waste,  can be the source of emissions and releases of this hazardous substance resulting in environmental and health risks. 

Background and next steps 

The Commission presented its proposal, which also repeals Regulation (EC) No 1102/2008, on 2 February 2016. 

On 14 March 2017, the European Parliament adopted its position at first reading. Now that the Council has approved this position, the Regulation can be published in the Official Journal of the European Union, once both the President of the European Parliament and the Council have signed the act, and will enter into force 20 days after publication. 

The new rules provide greater legal clarity and transparency and will apply from 1 January 2018 replacing Regulation (EC) No 1102/2008.

International scope: Minamata Convention

Mercury can travel long distances once emitted and released into the air or water. That is why the EU cannot on its own guarantee the protection of its citizens against the negative health effects of mercury. Mercury pollution must also be tackled at an international level. 

The new regulation addresses this issue by setting out   provisions which will allow the Union and its Member States to approve, ratify and implement the Minamata Convention on Mercury. It will also ensure that EU law is in line with the Convention.

The Minamata Convention, adopted in Kumamoto (Japan) on 10 October 2013, is a legally binding treaty providing a regulatory framework for the reduction of mercury pollution globally. The Convention is currently being ratified by signatory states and regional organisations. The EU and its member states are committed to ratification, and the necessary measures are underway to ensure this happens.

The United Kingdom’s momentous decision to leave the European Union will have long-lasting consequences for Australia’s relationship with both the EU and the UK. Will Brexit result in reinvigorated ties between Australia and the UK and the EU, or will it disrupt current and future engagement?

Brexit will cause much uncertainty in the coming years, but it also marks an opportunity for a revitalisation and recalibration of Australia’s European partnerships. Australia will need to continue to nurture and intensify its relationship with the EU, and at the same time develop a strategy to engage with the UK post-Brexit.

To avoid a reduction in the level and quality of engagement, Australia will need to take a pragmatic rather than nostalgic approach towards future relations with the UK. Australia must also avoid pursuing its relationship with the UK at the expense of its relationship with the EU, and creating a zero-sum dynamic.

The UK and Australia have a long and robust relationship: they share a common heritage, parliamentary traditions and the Commonwealth. But historical links and nostalgia cannot override the political and trade realities. Commonwealth ties may help recalibrate Australia-UK relations, but this Commonwealth heritage cannot replace Australia’s diversified political and trade links, especially within its own Asia-Pacific region.

The UK is the world’s fifth-largest economy, Australia’s fifth-largest trading partner and leading trade partner within the EU region. It is a valuable trade interlocutor for Australia.

But within Australia’s broader trade context, the UK accounts for only 4.1% of Australia’s total two-way trade. Compare that with the combined trade share of Australia’s four leading trade partners (China, the United States, Japan and South Korea), who collectively make up 47.4% of Australia’s two-way trade (22.7% with China alone) and the UK represents a small market for Australia. Australia (and New Zealand) accounts for less than two per cent of the UK’s two-way trade.

“There is no need for Australia to make a choice between the UK and the EU-27”

A key challenge for Australia will be to ensure that the UK gives it priority. The successful conclusion of free trade agreements (FTAs) will be a priority for the British government in the period immediately following its formal withdrawal from the EU, so Australia will need to persuade the UK to focus on Australia at a time when British resources and capacity will be pushed to their limits dealing with a plethora of deals and negotiations.

Fortunately for Australia, it finds itself in a position of strategic advantage in strengthening its economic ties with the UK: it has two years to prepare for Australia-UK trade negotiations.

Australia is not in a position of exclusive dependence on the UK as it has other trade partnerships, particularly in Asia. When it comes to negotiation strategies and preferences, Australia has extensive trade negotiation experience in comparison to the UK, as trade negotiations have been an EU competence since 1973 when the UK joined the European Economic Community.

But the significant challenges that Brexit poses for Australia cannot be ignored. It will result in the loss of access to the UK market as part of the EU, and Australian companies have already begun reconsidering the feasibility of continuing to use the UK as a base or gateway to the EU. Brexit may also lead to possible changes, restrictions or loss of access to the UK for skilled Australian workers ‒ or amendments to the numbers to be admitted.

There is no need for Australia to make a choice between the UK and the EU-27. Australia can ill afford to shift its focus to the UK at the expense of the rest of Europe, and the Australian government must ensure that Brexit will not adversely affect the progress it has made in its relations with the EU. Australia-EU engagement is far more than an extension of Australia’s relationship with the UK, and has indeed advanced from the period of Australian critiques of the EU in the areas of agricultural trade.

“Australia will need to balance ideological imperatives with practical realities, and complement values with material interests”

After decades of tension, the relationship has immeasurably improved, to the extent that the largest agreement ever signed between Australia and the EU ‒ a Framework Agreement ‒ was successfully concluded after some years of negotiation in 2015. An FTA is set to follow this accord, and a scoping exercise has just been completed, paving the way for formal negotiations.

With Brexit, Australia will lose a like-minded state on trade and will likely face a very different EU trade negotiator. But Australia’s Trade Minister Steven Ciobo has sought to ensure that the pursuit of an Australia-UK deal will not threaten an Australia-EU trade agreement. The fact that the UK will not be able to enter into its own trade negotiations until it has left the EU should help Australia focus on an EU-Australia trade deal for the next few years, without neglecting preparations for Australia-UK negotiations.

Forging political relations with an altered EU and the UK will need to be top priority for Australia in the coming years. Australia’s relations with the EU should, as much as possible, follow a ‘business as usual’ tactic amid the unusual business of Brexit. The UK’s departure from the Union should not be allowed to negatively influence the progress made in EU-Australia relations. Holding steady will be a crucial task for the government as trade agreements with both the EU and the UK are crucial to Australia’s national interests and preferences.

Within the context of British Prime Minister Theresa May’s proclamation that “Brexit means Brexit”, Australia must now face this reality head-on by preparing how it will advance and strengthen its relations with the UK, as well as the EU.

It will need to balance ideological imperatives, which often stem from history rather than present-day truths, with practical realities, and complement values with material interests.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC/Flickr – European Council President

The post Brexit seen from Australia: pragmatism should trump nostalgia appeared first on Europe’s World.

On 25 April 2017, the Council adopted a directive on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons, which revises and complements existing directive 91/477/ECC. 

“The new Firearms Directive provides for more rigorous controls on the acquisition and possession of firearms, in particular so that legitimate channels and regulatory set-ups for the acquisition and possession of firearms are not abused by criminal groups or terrorists. The directive is therefore an important step forward, particularly since it balances security concerns with the need to preserve legitimate activities. It is however, vital for the EU and its member states to continue working towards shutting off illegal channels for the acquisition of firearms by criminal groups and terrorists.”

Carmelo Abela, Maltese Minister for Home Affairs and National Security

The amendments address risks for public safety and security, and focus on:

Enhanced traceability of firearms

The revision strengthens the rules on the marking of firearms, by including, among other things, a new obligation to mark also all their essential components. Harmonizing the rules for the marking of firearms and establishing the mutual recognition of marks between member states will improve the traceability of firearms used in criminal activities, including those which have been assembled from components acquired separately. 

This information also has to be recorded in national data-filing systems. For this to happen, member states will now have to ensure that dealers and brokers register any transaction of firearms electronically and without any undue delay. 

Measures on deactivation and reactivation or conversion of firearms 

The rules on the deactivation of firearms have been strengthened, not least through a provision requiring the classification of deactivated firearms under category C (firearms subject to declaration). Until now, deactivated firearms have not been subject to the requirements set by the directive. 

The revision also includes a new category of salute and acoustic weapons, which were not covered by the original directive. These are live firearms that have been converted to blank firing ones, for example, for use in theatres or television. In the absence of more stringent national provisions, such firearms could be purchased freely. This posed a risk, given that their reconversion to live ones was often possible with limited efforts (they were for example used in the Paris terrorist attacks). The new wording of the directive ensures that these weapons remain registered under the same category as the firearm from which they have been converted. 

Stricter rules for the acquisition and possession of the most dangerous firearms 

The most dangerous firearms, classified in category A, can only be acquired and possessed on the basis of an exemption granted by the relevant member state. The rules for granting such exemptions have now been significantly strengthened. Possible grounds for exemption, such as national defence or the protection of critical infrastructure, are now set out in a limited list and exemptions may only be granted where there is no risk to public security or public order. 

When a firearm of category A is required for  sport-shooting, it can only be acquired according to strict rules which include proven practice recognised by an official shooting sport federation. 

Article 7 para 4a provides the possibility of confirming authorisations for semi-automatic firearms (new point 6, 7 or 8 of category A) legally acquired and registered before the directive comes into force. 

Banning civilian use of the most dangerous semi-automatic firearms 

Some dangerous semi-automatic firearms have now been added to category A and are therefore prohibited for civilian use. This is the case for short semi-automatic firearms with loading devices over 20 rounds and long semi-automatic firearms with loading devices over 10 rounds. Similarly, long firearms that can be easily concealed, for example by means of a folding or telescopic stock, are also now prohibited. 

Improving the exchange of relevant information between member states 

The new rules enable the Commission to propose the establishment of a system for the exchange of information electronically between member states. The information would cover cases where the transfer of a firearm to another member state has been authorised as well as where the acquisition and possession of a firearm has been refused. 

The directive sets out minimum rules and does not prevent member states from adopting and applying stricter rules. 

Next steps 

The Council and the European Parliament now need to sign the adopted directive. The signed text will be published in the EU Official Journal and will enter into force 20 days later. 

Background 

Council directive 91/477/EEC on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons was originally designed as a measure to balance internal market objectives and security imperatives regarding "civil" firearms.

The amending proposal was submitted by the European Commission on 18 November 2015 against the backdrop of a series of terrorist acts that took place in Europe and which revealed gaps in the implementation of the directive. The current review is a continuation of the 2008 revision and also aligns EU legislation with the provisions on the UN Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms.

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Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

‘France has voted like it never did before’, was the headline of Spiegel Online on Monday morning, and many other foreign observers expressed similar views on the manner in which the traditional parties of the Left and Right were kicked out of the competition by an overwhelming desire of renewal of the political class.

The old new fault line.

But once the dust has settled on this shake-up and on the performance of Emmanuel Macron, who may well be the most surprising shooting star French politics has ever seen, it will become clear that the basic voting patterns of the French electorate have hardly changed at all over the last quarter of a century.

It suffices to compare the map below published by Le Monde yesterday with the maps of the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in September 1992 and the referendum on the European Constitutional treaty in April 2005. In an excellent post-referendum booklet named ‘The Day France said No’, edited by the Jean Jaurès Foundation and published by Plon (2005), demographer Hervé Le Bras (see his 2017 analysis here, published yesterday on the nouvelobs site) very convincingly demonstrated to what extent ‘The memory of the territories’ determined electoral behaviour over time. And Sunday’s first election round is a compelling confirmation of his findings, despite the undeniable progress of the Front National in the North, the South and the East, including the Alsatian region (though not in the urban centres Strasbourg and Colmar).

Which provides once again striking evidence for the thesis that the deepest fault line across French society is the one between what Christophe Guilluy famously named ‘peripheral’ France and what I would (less famously) call ‘participating’ France, a dichotomy which is not exactly synonymous to ‘rural’ and ‘urban’, but which is in certain ways well rendered by the maps above. It’s the dichotomy of openmindedness and opportunity-seeking as opposed to the withdrawn, reproachful, self-fulfilling pessimism that the French themselves sum up in the well-known sigh ‘Tout fout le camp!’ (‘Everything’s going down the drain’). If it did not sound so simplistic, I would simply refer to it, beyond economic indicators, as ‘happy’ and ‘unhappy’ France.

And the most dividing issue, the one which crystallises it all, is … Europe, and everything that it stands for: globalisation and free markets, open borders and multiple cultures, shared sovereignty and common currency. Grossly simplified, last Sunday’s results suggest that half of the French population – the 50% who voted for Macron, Fillon and Hamon – is pro-European, with considerable variations in enthusiasm – and the other half of the electorate (including extreme right, extreme left, and fringe candidates) is resolutely against the European Union, even if their motives and the manner in which they voice their discontent vary.

What is new and different, however, is the explicit salience of the old fault line. Emmanuel Macron took three major symbolic risks in his fundamental ideological layout of the En marche! movement. Not only did he decide to be resolutely positive and optimistic in a country haunted by pessimism, but he also boldly set out to give the adjective ‘libéral’ a new meaning outside the semantic dogmas of the Socialist Party. And last but not least, he was unapologetic about being enthusiastically European, bringing together his personal conviction and the firm belief, as MEP Sylvie Goulard pointed out to Politico, that a rather silent majority of French citizens were profoundly attached to the ‘acquis communautaire’ of cooperation and friendship, especially with Germany.

Emmanuel Macron in Nantes, 19 April.

In marketing terms, European enthusiasm was Macron’s ‘unique selling point’ – and what seemed to be a niche market has turned out to be a rather large, untapped market share, whose potential was reinforced by the lucky circumstance of having the likes of Farage, Trump, Wilders, Putin and Erdogan reminding everybody in a timely manner that the EU may actually be worth defending. Surprisingly, Macron even managed to underpin his pro-EU arguments with a symbolic renewal. Following Le Pen’s demand of removing the European flag – tenderly nick-named ‘your oligarchic rag’ by the FN’s No. 2, Florian Philippot – for a television interview, he turned his rally in Nantes into a genuine profession of faith, waving the European flag and having the audience sing the Ode to Joy. Totally surrealistic for everyone who has followed the political debate in France since … 1992.

The post-election TV debates on Sunday evening already foreshadowed that Europe and the Euro will be used by both remaining candidates as one of the major ‘key differentiators’ over the next two weeks. It will no doubt also be one of the central issues of the television showdown scheduled for 3 May.

Needless to say: whatever the result of the second round of the presidential election and the looming legislative elections, the fault line will remain. The polarisation of society has not yet reached American levels, but it will take a person of outstanding negotiating and compromising skills to bridge this deep divide. European leaders – most of all the next German government – would be well advised to help Macron make European integration (and everything that it stands for) acceptable again to the 50% of the French population who have so vigourously voted against it last Sunday and who have been hardened in their opposition by the insistent rhetoric of the populists and the efficient frustration machine that the Fifth Republic has become.

Albrecht Sonntag
@albrechtsonntag

This is post # 19 on the French 2017 election marathon.
All previous posts can be found here.

The post France 2017: Old fault lines, new salience appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

La politique européenne de sécurité et de défense commune : "Parce que l'Europe vaut bien une défense"
par André Dumoulin et Nicolas Gros-Verheyde
Editions du Villard (3 avril 2017)

Pour tout comprendre à l’Europe de la défense, il y a enfin une solution. Un manuel complet sur la « politique européenne de sécurité et de défense commune », le premier d’une longue série, publié aux éditions du Villard.

Une vraie « bible » sur l’Europe de la défense

C’est une première car il n’existe aujourd’hui, aucun ouvrage en français, à jour, faisant le tour de toutes les questions que pose l’Europe de la Défense, de façon claire et pédagogique. Ce qu’on appelle la « Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense commune » (PSDC) reste encore un no man’s land, bourré de fantasmes et largement méconnu.

Une politique encore méconnue

Née dans les Balkans, cette politique européenne devenue commune a évolué par à-coups. Certains la rêvent comme une « armée européenne » ou une alternative à l’OTAN. D’autres vilipendent sa faiblesse ou sa lenteur. La PESD devenue PSDC n’a ni ces ambitions ni ces tares. Au contraire ! Et elle recèle des avantages, mal connus. C’est tout l’enjeu de cet ouvrage : savoir comment fonctionne réellement l’Europe de la Défense.

Un ouvrage à quatre mains

Cet ouvrage est rédigé à quatre mains, par un universitaire et un journaliste, qui ont allié leur commune expertise : André Dumoulin (chargé de cours à l’université de Liège et professeur à l’Institut royal militaire – belge) et Nicolas Gros-Verheyde (rédacteur en chef de B2, ancien auditeur à l’IHEDN, correspondant de Sud-Ouest auprès de l’UE et de l’OTAN). Le premier apporte le recul historique pour comprendre, le second donne une mise en relief de l’actualité.

En savoir plus

Tag: PSDCAndré DumoulinNicolas Gros-Verheyde