If the lesson from Emmanuel Macron’s first-round win in the French elections was that an ardently pro-European campaign can be waged successfully in a large member state, it does not seem to have been absorbed by Matteo Renzi.
The energetic former Italian prime minister is bidding for a comeback as leader of the centre-left Democratic party in the wake of the December referendum defeat, which he hopes to use as a springboard for success in the national elections in 2018.
Read moreOn 29 March 2017, the European Council received the notification by the United Kingdom of its intention to withdraw from the European Union and Euratom. This allows for the opening of negotiations as foreseen by the Treaty.
European integration has brought peace and prosperity to Europe and allowed for an unprecedented level and scope of cooperation on matters of common interest in a rapidly changing world. Therefore, the Union's overall objective in these negotiations will be to preserve its interests, those of its citizens, its businesses and its Member States.
The United Kingdom's decision to leave the Union creates significant uncertainties that have the potential to cause disruption, in particular in the United Kingdom but also, to a lesser extent, in other Member States. Citizens who have built their lives on the basis of rights flowing from the British membership of the EU face the prospect of losing those rights. Businesses and other stakeholders will lose the predictability and certainty that come with EU law. It will also have an impact on public authorities. With this in mind, we must proceed according to a phased approach giving priority to an orderly withdrawal. National authorities, businesses and other stakeholders should take all necessary steps to prepare for the consequences of the United Kingdom's withdrawal.
Throughout these negotiations the Union will maintain its unity and act as one with the aim of reaching a result that is fair and equitable for all Member States and in the interest of its citizens. It will be constructive and strive to find an agreement. This is in the best interest of both sides. The Union will work hard to achieve that outcome, but it will prepare itself to be able to handle the situation also if the negotiations were to fail.
These guidelines define the framework for negotiations under Article 50 TEU and set out the overall positions and principles that the Union will pursue throughout the negotiation. In this context, the European Council welcomes the resolution of the European Parliament of 5 April 2017. The European Council will remain permanently seized of the matter, and will update these guidelines in the course of the negotiations as necessary. Negotiating directives will be adjusted accordingly.
I. Core principles1. The European Council will continue to base itself on the principles set out in the statement of Heads of State or Government and of the Presidents of the European Council and the European Commission on 29 June 2016. It reiterates its wish to have the United Kingdom as a close partner in the future. It further reiterates that any agreement with the United Kingdom will have to be based on a balance of rights and obligations, and ensure a level playing field. Preserving the integrity of the Single Market excludes participation based on a sector-by-sector approach. A non-member of the Union, that does not live up to the same obligations as a member, cannot have the same rights and enjoy the same benefits as a member. In this context, the European Council welcomes the recognition by the British Government that the four freedoms of the Single Market are indivisible and that there can be no "cherry picking". The Union will preserve its autonomy as regards its decision-making as well as the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
2. Negotiations under Article 50 TEU will be conducted in transparency and as a single package. In accordance with the principle that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, individual items cannot be settled separately. The Union will approach the negotiations with unified positions, and will engage with the United Kingdom exclusively through the channels set out in these guidelines and in the negotiating directives. So as not to undercut the position of the Union, there will be no separate negotiations between individual Member States and the United Kingdom on matters pertaining to the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the Union.
3. The core principles set out above should apply equally to the negotiations on an orderly withdrawal, to any preliminary and preparatory discussions on the framework for a future relationship, and to any form of transitional arrangements.
II. A phased approach to negotiations4. On the date of withdrawal, the Treaties will cease to apply to the United Kingdom, to those of its overseas countries and territories currently associated to the Union, and to territories for whose external relations the United Kingdom is responsible. The main purpose of the negotiations will be to ensure the United Kingdom's orderly withdrawal so as to reduce uncertainty and, to the extent possible, minimise disruption caused by this abrupt change.
To that effect, the first phase of negotiations will aim to:
The European Council will monitor progress closely and determine when sufficient progress has been achieved to allow negotiations to proceed to the next phase.
5. While an agreement on a future relationship between the Union and the United Kingdom as such can only be finalised and concluded once the United Kingdom has become a third country, Article 50 TEU requires to take account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union in the arrangements for withdrawal. To this end, an overall understanding on the framework for the future relationship should be identified during a second phase of the negotiations under Article 50 TEU. We stand ready to engage in preliminary and preparatory discussions to this end in the context of negotiations under Article 50 TEU, as soon as the European Council decides that sufficient progress has been made in the first phase towards reaching a satisfactory agreement on the arrangements for an orderly withdrawal.
6. To the extent necessary and legally possible, the negotiations may also seek to determine transitional arrangements which are in the interest of the Union and, as appropriate, to provide for bridges towards the foreseeable framework for the future relationship in the light of the progress made. Any such transitional arrangements must be clearly defined, limited in time, and subject to effective enforcement mechanisms. Should a time-limited prolongation of Union acquis be considered, this would require existing Union regulatory, budgetary, supervisory, judiciary and enforcement instruments and structures to apply.
7. The two year timeframe set out in Article 50 TEU ends on 29 March 2019.
III. Agreement on arrangements for an orderly withdrawal8. The right for every EU citizen, and of his or her family members, to live, to work or to study in any EU Member State is a fundamental aspect of the European Union. Along with other rights provided under EU law, it has shaped the lives and choices of millions of people. Agreeing reciprocal guarantees to safeguard the status and rights derived from EU law at the date of withdrawal of EU and UK citizens, and their families, affected by the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the Union will be the first priority for the negotiations. Such guarantees must be effective, enforceable, non-discriminatory and comprehensive, including the right to acquire permanent residence after a continuous period of five years of legal residence. Citizens should be able to exercise their rights through smooth and simple administrative procedures.
9. Also, the United Kingdom leaving the Union will impact EU businesses trading with and operating in the United Kingdom and UK businesses trading with and operating in the Union. Similarly, it may affect those who have entered into contracts and business arrangements or take part in EU-funded programmes based on the assumption of continued British EU membership. Negotiations should seek to prevent a legal vacuum once the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom and, to the extent possible, address uncertainties.
10. A single financial settlement - including issues resulting from the MFF as well as those related to the European Investment Bank (EIB), the European Development Fund (EDF) and the European Central Bank (ECB) - should ensure that the Union and the United Kingdom both respect the obligations resulting from the whole period of the UK membership in the Union. The settlement should cover all commitments as well as liabilities, including contingent liabilities.
11. The Union has consistently supported the goal of peace and reconciliation enshrined in the Good Friday Agreement in all its parts, and continuing to support and protect the achievements, benefits and commitments of the Peace Process will remain of paramount importance. In view of the unique circumstances on the island of Ireland, flexible and imaginative solutions will be required, including with the aim of avoiding a hard border, while respecting the integrity of the Union legal order. In this context, the Union should also recognise existing bilateral agreements and arrangements between the United Kingdom and Ireland which are compatible with EU law.
12. The Union should agree with the United Kingdom on arrangements as regards the Sovereign Base Areas of the United Kingdom in Cyprus and recognise in that respect bilateral agreements and arrangements between the Republic of Cyprus and the United Kingdom which are compatible with EU law, in particular as regards safeguarding rights and interests of those EU citizens resident or working in the Sovereign Base Areas.
13. Following the withdrawal, the United Kingdom will no longer be covered by agreements concluded by the Union or by Member States acting on its behalf or by the Union and its Member States acting jointly. The Union will continue to have its rights and obligations in relation to international agreements. In this respect, the European Council expects the United Kingdom to honour its share of all international commitments contracted in the context of its EU membership. In such instances, a constructive dialogue with the United Kingdom on a possible common approach towards third country partners, international organisations and conventions concerned should be engaged.
14. The withdrawal agreement would also need to address potential issues arising from the withdrawal in other areas of cooperation, including judicial cooperation, law enforcement and security.
15. While the future location of the seats of EU agencies and facilities located in the United Kingdom is a matter for the 27 Member States to settle rapidly, arrangements should be found to facilitate their transfer.
16. Arrangements ensuring legal certainty and equal treatment should be found for all court procedures pending before the Court of Justice of the European Union upon the date of withdrawal that involve the United Kingdom or natural or legal persons in the United Kingdom. The Court of Justice of the European Union should remain competent to adjudicate in these procedures. Similarly, arrangements should be found for administrative procedures pending before the European Commission and Union agencies upon the date of the withdrawal that involve the United Kingdom or natural or legal persons in the United Kingdom. In addition, arrangements should be foreseen for the possibility of administrative or court proceedings to be initiated post-exit for facts that have occurred before the withdrawal date.
17. The withdrawal agreement should include appropriate dispute settlement and enforcement mechanisms regarding the application and interpretation of the withdrawal agreement, as well as duly circumscribed institutional arrangements allowing for the adoption of measures necessary to deal with situations not foreseen in the withdrawal agreement. This should be done bearing in mind the Union's interest to effectively protect its autonomy and its legal order, including the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
IV. Preliminary and preparatory discussions on a framework for the Union - United Kingdom future relationship18. The European Council welcomes and shares the United Kingdom's desire to establish a close partnership between the Union and the United Kingdom after its departure. While a relationship between the Union and a non Member State cannot offer the same benefits as Union membership, strong and constructive ties will remain in both sides' interest and should encompass more than just trade.
19. The British government has indicated that it will not seek to remain in the Single Market, but would like to pursue an ambitious free trade agreement with the European Union. Based on the Union's interests, the European Council stands ready to initiate work towards an agreement on trade, to be finalised and concluded once the United Kingdom is no longer a Member State.
20. Any free trade agreement should be balanced, ambitious and wide-ranging. It cannot, however, amount to participation in the Single Market or parts thereof, as this would undermine its integrity and proper functioning. It must ensure a level playing field, notably in terms of competition and state aid, and in this regard encompass safeguards against unfair competitive advantages through, inter alia, tax, social, environmental and regulatory measures and practices.
21. Any future framework should safeguard financial stability in the Union and respect its regulatory and supervisory regime and standards and their application.
22. The EU stands ready to establish partnerships in areas unrelated to trade, in particular the fight against terrorism and international crime, as well as security, defence and foreign policy.
23. The future partnership must include appropriate enforcement and dispute settlement mechanisms that do not affect the Union's autonomy, in particular its decision-making procedures.
24. After the United Kingdom leaves the Union, no agreement between the EU and the United Kingdom may apply to the territory of Gibraltar without the agreement between the Kingdom of Spain and the United Kingdom.
V. Principle of sincere cooperation25. Until it leaves the Union, the United Kingdom remains a full Member of the European Union, subject to all rights and obligations set out in the Treaties and under EU law, including the principle of sincere cooperation.
26. The European Council recognises the need, in the international context, to take into account the specificities of the United Kingdom as a withdrawing Member State, provided it respects its obligations and remains loyal to the Union's interests while still a Member. Similarly the Union expects the United Kingdom to recognise the need of the 27 Member States to meet and discuss matters related to the situation after the withdrawal of the United Kingdom.
27. While the United Kingdom is still a member, all ongoing EU business must continue to proceed as smoothly as possible at 28. The European Council remains committed to drive forward with ambition the priorities the Union has set itself. Negotiations with the United Kingdom will be kept separate from ongoing Union business, and shall not interfere with its progress.
VI. Procedural arrangements for negotiations under Article 5028. The European Council endorses the arrangements set out in the statement of 27 Heads of State or Government on 15 December 2016.
The Informal meeting of Foreign Affairs ministers takes place on 28 April 2017 in Valletta.
Despite the European Union ensuring more than 60 years of peace in Europe, the EU struggles to sell its story. Most Europeans see it as boring, and often do not understand what is happening in Brussels.
In recent years the EU has spent a lot of time and money on communicating with its citizens, explaining its policies and its purpose. But this communication has been high on jargon and low on impact.
Many factors contribute to inefficient EU communication: the lack of leadership, the absence of a shared vision and a common European public sphere, poor knowledge of the EU, a hostile media, EU red tape, unethical practices in politics, the ‘blame game’ on European issues, multilingualism, scandals and austerity. All contribute to the EU’s incapability to communicate its policies and achievements in a transparent and clear way.
Today, audiences are central to the success of an organisation or a project. People no longer accept being “talked at”. But EU communication is too often based on one-way information, not genuine dialogue.
Inside the EU, communication itself is often considered as a secondary, administrative task – and is often subjected to administrative procedures. Communication projects are focused on management; they are too self-centred. To be successful, this needs to change: the European message needs to be interesting to the media and understandable to citizens.
“Despite the European Union ensuring more than 60 years of peace in Europe, the EU struggles to sell its story”
The Parliament, the Commission and the Council often express diverging and even contradictory views, resulting in a cacophony. “Europe can only work if we all work for unity and commonality, and forget the rivalry between competences and institutions. Only then will Europe be more than the sum of its parts,” said Jean-Claude Juncker in his 2016 State of the Union speech.
How can we make the failing communications of the EU succeed? I provide several key recommendations in my recently-published book, Rebranding Europe, that may help the EU find its voice and connect with citizens.
First, communicate Europe at both EU and national levels. Communicating in true partnership is paramount. It needs to be based on common values, political will, transparency and honesty. The key players should operate on an equal footing. An innovative and sustainable public-private partnership would help; involving the EU institutions, member states, civil society, the media, political parties and the private sector. They would commit to presenting the EU as a useful brand, an entity that is seeking to collaborate with the citizens and make a meaningful difference in their daily lives. The message should be adapted to the local identity of each country.
Second, go local. Over-centralisation of the communication process in Brussels is counterproductive. Local and regional authorities should be given more responsibility and be considered as key partners in providing communication aimed at building bridges between the EU and its citizens. Engaging at the grassroots level can help people in different countries to understand that they are not as different from their neighbours as they think. Success can start with a cause that people can support, such as a specific goal that European economic, social, political and cultural cooperation would facilitate.
Third, make things easier for journalists. Quality media and press independence play an important role in communicating Europe. The EU should provide better support for media reporting, as the information distributed to the press is very technical and not always easy to understand. Adapting press releases to the specific contexts of the member states or groups of citizens and creating a helpdesk for journalists seeking background could be solutions. In addition, the EU should encourage, organise and fund specialised training for journalists in all EU countries, since there is an urgent need for training that enables the local press to communicate the relevance of the EU in an understandable manner and explain it in a clear language. Funds from the Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme and the social funds could be used for this purpose.
“Taking a more serious approach to the EU communication could stimulate the engagement of citizens and restore public approval”
Fourth, make EU communication a strategic priority. Strategic communication planning is a powerful management activity for identifying issues, setting priorities, defining strategies, and determining performance benchmarks as well as expectations. Unfortunately, only the first Commission of José Manuel Barroso, from 2004 to 2009, gave communication priority and a dedicated commissioner.
Fifth, send out a message of unity and recovery: the EU should show that it is coming out of the crisis and focusing on what matters to the people ‒ employment, education, security, and so on. The EU institutions have been too slow to react and not creative enough in their efforts to show local populations why a united Europe is relevant and beneficial.
Last, forget the fluff. Good communication is like good journalism: it creates transparency by making important things clear and relevant to stakeholders. Good communication helps create dialogue and is the basis of beneficial decision-making. It is necessary to make messages coherent, clear, concrete and jargon-free, and to connect them to particular human needs and expectations. Speaking with one voice at all levels ‒ EU, local and regional ‒ is fundamental.
The increase of Eurosceptic and nationalist parties in Europe, populism, Brexit and the antipathy towards institutions and politics in general are all alarm bells that should jolt us into taking immediate action. Brexit alone should have been a huge wake-up call to inspire better communication. If that is not clear to the EU leaders now, they have not understood what is happening and the EU will implode, just like the Soviet Union did.
Nevertheless, Brexit may turn the tide towards a better Europe. History, especially during periods of constant change like the one we are living in, is often shaped by random events. Taking a more serious approach to the EU communication could stimulate the engagement of citizens and restore public approval. There is no time to waste.
IMAGE CREDIT: CC/Flickr – European Parliament
The post The EU fails to communicate ‒ how to make it succeed? appeared first on Europe’s World.
The EU and Chile signed an ambitious Association Agreement on 18 November 2002. In the framework of the Association Agreement several Association Councils, Association Committees and EU-Chile Summits took place since 2003, as well as several political dialogue meetings.
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Viktor Orban has declared 2017 to be “the year of revolution”, predicting the “defining dynamic” will be his confrontation with Brussels. The firebrand Hungarian premier, described by one former US ambassador as a “bare-knuckled street brawler,” came to the European Parliament on Wednesday to do battle with his many detractors.
Read moreFollowing the United Kingdom's notification of withdrawal from the European Union, we will meet on Saturday for the first time as the formal European Council of 27 to adopt guidelines for the upcoming Brexit negotiations.
Let me highlight one element of our proposed guidelines, which I believe is key for the success of these negotiations, and therefore needs to be precisely understood and fully accepted. I am referring to the idea of a phased approach, which means that we will not discuss our future relations with the UK until we have achieved sufficient progress on the main issues relating to the UK's withdrawal from the EU. This is not only a matter of tactics, but - given the limited time frame we have to conclude the talks - it is the only possible approach.
In other words, before discussing our future, we must first sort out our past. We need to secure the best guarantees for our citizens and their families. Guarantees that are effective, enforceable, non-discriminatory and comprehensive, and which should be accompanied by simple and smooth administrative procedures. We should also agree with the UK that all financial obligations undertaken by the EU of 28 will be honoured also by the UK. Finally, in order to protect the peace and reconciliation process described by the Good Friday Agreement, we should aim to avoid a hard border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland.
Only once we collectively determine in the European Council that sufficient progress has been made on all these issues, will we be in a position to hold preparatory talks on the future relationship with the UK. I would like us to unite around this key principle during the upcoming summit, so that it is clear that progress on people, money and Ireland must come first. And we have to be ready to defend this logic during the upcoming negotiations.
Our meeting will start at 12.30 with an exchange of views with the President of the European Parliament. Following this exchange, we will gather for a working lunch, where we will adopt the guidelines and have a broader debate on Brexit to help inform the future negotiations. Given the constructive attitude that you have shown during our preparations, I expect that we will be able to conclude by 16.00.