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There could be up to 5m fewer votes this year compared to 2012. History shows that a low turnout increases uncertainty about who will make the final run-off. It lowers the threshold required to qualify, which makes a François Fillon or Jean-Luc Mélenchon-shaped upset more likely.

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‘Pschitt!’ is – at least in colloquial French – the disappointing sound of flat champagne, a deflating balloon, or a damp firecracker.

It is also a good description of the feeling that many French voters will inevitably have on Sunday evening in front of their television screen. With an unprecedented degree of uncertainty, with virtually millions of people who will take their last-minute decision in the silence of the voting booth, with pollsters that are helplessly hoping their curves will not have been too far from the final results, and with four frontrunners who find themselves – to refer once more to colloquial French – ‘within a handkerchief’, the big looming question is: who is going to ‘Pschitt’?

Will we really see the French electorate neatly sliced into five equal parts – roughly 20% for each of the leading candidates and 20% for the seven others – or will the temptation to sacrifice one’s own conviction on the altar of the ‘useful vote’ suddenly suck the air out of one the candidates’ balloon?

The most obvious nominees for a miserable ‘Pschitt!!’ are Jean-Luc Mélenchon and Emmanuel Macron. The former, whose poll ratings were pushed by his rhetoric skills and his successful hi-jacking of the true gospel of the Left, already underwent a similar deflation in 2012, when he was credited with a much bigger share of the votes than the 11% which he finally obtained. The latter might suffer on the finishing line from what made his strength and attractiveness in the first place: the desire to shove the left-right dichotomy in the dustbin of history. It could be too early to do so: no one can tell with certainty how strong the gold old partisan reflexes still are in face of the ballot paper on Sunday.

François Fillon already had his ‘Pschitt!!’ moments. The post-primary sparkling wine already opened for what looked like an unlosable election has turned into flat champagne in the wake of the scandals that have ruined his credibility for many. For him, the question is rather whether beyond his die-hard supporters, who seem to grant him a minimum of 18%, he has the potential to make some bubbles again. Difficult, though not impossible. As for Marine Le Pen, her aggressive nervousness and imprudence of recent days seems to suggest that after having led the polls for so long, she seriously starts to envisage the possibility that the promised bonfire may go damp by Sunday night.

Beyond the candidates’ fates, however, there is another, more intense and more depressing, ‘Pschitt!’ feeling.

If this campaign feels like a never-ending one, it’s because it actually was. For five long years, a good deal of media discourse has been entirely dedicated to who would run in 2017. Right from the first moments of François Hollande’s ill-fated presidency, virtually everything was interpreted with regard to his possible re-election. Every result of every intermediate vote – be it European, regional or municipal – was seen in the light of jockeying for position for the one election that really counts.

Never has the stranglehold in which the presidential election keeps French political life been as tight as over these last five years. This election ‘drives them all crazy’, as Daniel Cohn-Bendit once famously put it. He referred to politicians with oversized egos, but the ‘them’ necessarily also includes the entire Parisian media bubble, with its morbid fascination for narratives of ‘greatness’ and tales of ‘rise and fall’, its grateful drooling for any piece of verbal venom in the corridors of the palaces, and its lustful craving for every small sign of treason and disgrace.

Hollande almost seemed to take a masochistic pleasure in throwing them scandalous bits to chew, and he offered them a long-term narrative by linking, very early on, his own fate to employment and growth rates. Sarkozy fed them by preparing his great return in the shadows, positioning himself as the providential solution of last resort. All the while Juppé was surfing on his scores of popularity, basking in the delight of the man who knows that his time has finally come.

The billboards currently exposed in the streets of France give striking evidence to the vanity of all the speculations, rumours and conjectures. Among the eleven faces, there is no Hollande, no Sarkozy, no Juppé. If that’s not a ‘Pschitt!’ feeling, what is?

Bouchemaine, Western France, April 2017

How often did we listen over these five years to a news programme on whatever TV or radio channel, wondering whether there were really no other, more pressing, issues than the 2017 presidential race? Will the next five years be any different?

Perhaps. If the rather radical reconfiguration of the political spectrum is confirmed on Sunday, it is not impossible that the sudden importance of the legislative elections brings about a re-education of the French political class. There were some unexpected signs of enlightenment in the aftershock the 2015 regional elections, and the effective implementation of the law against the ‘accumulation of mandates’ may indeed renew the France’s representative assemblies in an unprecedented scope.

Perhaps not. The system is remarkably resilient. It has shaped, through its engrained values and unwritten rules, the socialisation of political actors, the professional habitus of Parisian journalists, and the often unconscious expectations of voters, even among those who declare themselves definitely disillusioned with everything.

As much as I dislike this overused expression, 2017 is a ‘crossroads’ moment in French politics. It may be remembered as the moment when all the accumulated pressure of frustration with the system finally made the cork of change pop out of the Champagne bottle. The end of the ‘Pschitt!’ feeling? It would be almost too good to be true.

Albrecht Sonntag
@albrechtsonntag

This is post # 18 on the French 2017 election marathon.
All previous posts can be found here.

The post France 2017: That ‘pschitt!’ feeling appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

With days to go before the first round of the 2017 French presidential election, Emmanuel Macron, the frontrunner since March, has seen his commanding lead cut sharply.

Whilst still ahead in the latest polls, on a par with far-right candidate Marine Le Pen, only four points now separate him from the right-wing François Fillon and Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the hard left candidate who has been rising fast in the last few weeks.

With one-third of voters still undecided and with the usual margin of error inherent to any poll, this rollercoaster of an election is clearly heading down to the wire. Can Macron hold on to his lead and reach the second round?

Macron certainly has strengths, but they might well turn into weaknesses. The reason for his appeal largely lies in the political positioning of his competitors. Unlike in previous elections, the main candidates have not sought to woo moderate voters. Instead, they are representing the ‘hard’ version of their party, leaving open a wide boulevard in the middle.

By claiming to be beyond the right and the left, by having a programme designed to appeal, broadly speaking, from the centre-right all the way to the right wing of the Socialist Party, and by being the only candidate from the centre, Macron has gained supremacy over the vast expanse of land between Fillon on the Republican right and Benoît Hamon on the Socialist left.

As the only openly pro-European candidate and with a programme mixing social liberalism, social democracy and moderate economic liberalism, Macron also stands starkly apart.

“If Macron does succeed in clearing all the obstacles facing him, he will truly deserve his moniker of the ‘wonder child’ of French politics”

However, in a country where the left and the right are still strong markers, Macron’s pretension of being neither has left him vulnerable to accusations of being ideologically flimsy and lacking coherence. Macron’s first presidential challenge, to reach the second round, has therefore become much tougher and no one at this stage can predict whether he will be able to clear this hurdle.

Assuming that Macron does succeed in the first round and then goes on to win the second round, his next challenge ‒ gathering a parliamentary majority ‒ will be no less daunting. To have any real power, a French President needs the support of a majority of members of the National Assembly. Hence the customary appeal of all newly-elected presidents to ask the French electorate to do the ‘right’ thing and vote for ‘their’ candidates in the subsequent parliamentary election. But for Macron, who has no established party, this is likely to prove a huge challenge. His movement, ‘En Marche’, has no experience of fighting what is, in effect, 577 micro-elections in each parliamentary constituency.

When you consider that centrist François Bayrou in 2007 and Marine Le Pen in 2012 each won 19% of the vote in presidential election but only managed to win three and two MPs respectively, the scale of the task Macron is faced with becomes clearer. It is true that the French electorate does tend to do the ‘right thing’ ‒ most famously in 1981, after François Mitterrand became the first Socialist president of the Fifth Republic, much to the bemusement of political commentators who thought a majority was out of his reach.

So Macron does have a point in saying that “if the French want […] change, they will vote for me and will confirm it in the parliamentary elections“. But in all previous elections the president has had a strong and well-organised party or coalition of parties behind him, which is not the case with Macron.

“This rollercoaster of an election is clearly heading down to the wire”

If Macron fails to gain a majority, he will have to engineer one ‒ either through a coalition or through ad hoc pacts on any given law. Considering that many politicians will undoubtedly see Macron’s presidency as an opportunity for their own political careers, such a majority might well be engineered, but solidity and loyalty will not be guaranteed. Macron might well end up in the situation of two former presidents, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and Mitterrand, who for parts of their presidencies lacked the full support of a majority and had their ability to run the country curtailed.

Assuming that the majority challenge is passed, the final one will be for Macron to implement his new style of presidency, which he has dubbed ‘Jupiterian’. He summarised this slightly cryptic conception of power as “a President who presides […], a Government that governs“. By focusing on setting out long-term objectives in six areas (growth, taxation, pensions, education, security, cleaner politics), whilst leaving the government to deal with the day-to-day running of the country, Macron intends to break away from the ‘hyper-presidentialisation’ that was the theory of Nicolas Sarkozy and the practice of the current president, François Hollande.

Macron finds the habit of both men to comment on every event as demeaning to the role of president. So it becomes clear that he is seeking to forge a certain mystique around the Presidency through a less involved and more aloof way of presiding. In an age of constant media attention, Macron’s ability to transform the idea of the presidency may well turn out to be his stiffest challenge.

If Macron does succeed in clearing all the obstacles facing him, he will truly deserve his moniker of the ‘wonder child’ of French politics. But with such a tight finish to the presidential race, it would take a very brave person to bet on any of this happening.

And yet, who would bet against this topsy-turvy campaign to deliver such a final twist?

IMAGE CREDIT: CC/Flickr – Mutualité Française

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Marking the 40th anniversary of the start of their dialogue ASEAN and the EU have agreed to work towards establishing a strategic partnership. While trade has always been the cornerstone of the relationship - ASEAN is the EU’s third largest trade partner - the EU’s ambition to expand its role as a global actor demand increased engagement. Both sides face common challenges that can only be addressed through joint responses that involve all stakeholders. To be strategic the partnership must embrace all aspects, from trade to energy, from climate change to security issues, from human rights to sustainable development. Deepening and enhancing relations between one of the most dynamic region in the world and the largest and most affluent market will bring important benefits to both European and ASEAN citizens. The last years have seen an increase in contacts but the many challenges faced today by the EU, internally and in its close neighbourhood, risk to require all attention and put the EU-ASEAN relations at risk. Finally the study argues that strengthening the parliamentary dimension of the relationship would, besides supporting representative democracy in Southeast Asia, contribute to maintaining the momentum launched in 2012.
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

The lovely thing about long walks is that they give you time to think, to join your physical movement with metaphysical wanderings through the things that occupy your life. It’s often a time when you have a bright idea, that makes sense as the sunlight filters through the leaves and warm air of spring fills your lungs.

And this general election has very much the feeling of an idea that Theresa May has had on her walking break in North Wales. It’s easy to imagine her chatting with Philip about the pros and cons of calling a vote, exploring the highways and by-ways of it all as the vistas unfurl before them, and the security detail think back fondly to those barbeques in Witney.

It’s not that the election is a bad idea, but there is no immediately obvious, compelling reason to hold it: all of the basic parameters have been in place as long as May has occupied Number 10.

This leads to the most obvious conclusion about this decision, namely that it is driven by domestic political calculation rather than anything to do with Brexit. This is important to keep in mind both because it echoes the long-term pattern of British European policy, but also because it reminds us that May continues to entertain the idea that her premiership will not just be shaped by the departure from the EU.

This said, it is useful to consider the relationship between general election and Brexit, because the two will have to bump alongside each other and there will be effects by each on the other, especially given the rather specious reasoning given by May for calling the election, namely the division in Westminster.

In procedural terms, the election will not result in any major delay in Article 50 negotiations. Recall that at present everyone is awaiting the 29 April summit of the EU27 to confirm the negotiating brief and the basic schedule for talks. Then there will be another week until the second round of the French presidential elections and some weeks after that when Commission’s mandate will be finalised, which puts us within spitting distance of 8 June. At the same time, it does mean another month lost for substantive negotiations, which will prove problematic when it comes to working through the extended agenda that May has in mind.

Once again, the key point to keep in mind here is that Article 50 is driven by the EU, not the UK, so in this initial phase, the focus will be on what the other member states can agree to offer to the UK, rather than what the UK might ask for. Incidentally, this also highlights the vapidity of the Tory position that an enlarged majority for May will somehow strengthen her hand:  ever country has voters and it will be their own domestic pressures that change their positions more than how many MPs the British government can count on.

If there is a procedural bonus, then it is that the resetting of the electoral clock means that by the time the next general election has to be called, in June 2022, not only will the Article 50 negotiations be well past, but so too will much of the mooted 2-3 year transition period, which makes it even harder for any new government to overturn the process: Brexit will indeed mean Brexit.

Much of the procedural questions at this stage will be largely technical – schedules of meetings and the like – and can continue unabated during the campaign but the general election will raise an interesting personnel issue.

General elections are often opportunities for Prime Ministers to reshuffle portfolios, especially if there is the prospect of an influx of new faces. However, May will be a bit of bind over whether to do this. On the one hand, some of her front bench have been less than impressive, either politically or managerially, so this is a chance to have a second bite of the cherry.

However, on the other hand, the current Cabinet have been in place for a relatively short period of time and there was a clear presentation of the choices made as a conscious strategy: put Leavers in key roles to own the subject.

To replace any of the three main Brexit ministers – Davis, Fox or Johnson – now might lead to improved performance, but at a price of calling into question May’s judgement in appointing them in the first place (and recall that all three came with big question marks over their heads). As was clear at the time, while it’s useful to have a front row to soak up the problems, it is ultimately on May’s shoulders that they succeed.

The final potential impact of the election will be on substantive policy goals in Article 50.

Here we have to be careful to unpick the dynamic that has already emerged of a softening of May’s stance in and around notification. Gone are the more improbable goals on CJEU jurisdiction and no transitions, in reflection of the growing awareness of the intricacies involve in unpicking the UK from the EU. None of that happening in anticipation of this election, but potentially the election will give more cover to May.

Consider the most likely outcome on 8 June: an increased majority for May. Let’s also assume that Central Office is able to have a relatively big say in candidate selection over local associations, given the time constraints. This suggests that the specific weight of any sub-grouping within the new parliamentary party will be reduced and that the group as a whole will be more beholden to May’s leadership.

Put differently, neither the pro-EU rump nor the hard Brexiteers will be as able as now to hold the Parliamentary majority to hostage, so May will be in a stronger position to pursue her own agenda in negotiations and then to get the results approved at the end of Article 50.

This underlines one of the more unmentioned truths of the Brexit process, namely that Theresa May does not obviously know her own mind on what the post-membership relationship should look like. The studied ambiguity of her public pronouncements will continue throughout the campaign, as she seeks to find a solution that looks viable, rather than one that follows any detailed ideological positioning.

Seen in this light, the general election is set to offer little new light on how Brexit will unfold and will do little to shape what happens. Unless, of course, there is some major upset on 8 June: and if recent history has taught us anything, then it is that we should always keep the unexpected in mind.

 

This post originally appeared on the UK in a Changing Europe website.

The post What the 2017 General Election means for Brexit: procedure, personnel and policy appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

As from 15 June, mobile users travelling to other countries in the EU will be able to call, text or surf the net without paying any extra charges. The last requirement for abolishing mobile roaming fees was met today with the adoption by the Council of the legal act that limits how much operators may charge each other to allow roaming across Europe.

"Today's final vote in the Council clears the path for free roaming," said Dr Emmanuel Mallia, the Maltese Minister for Competitiveness and Digital, Maritime and Services Economy. "When Europeans go on holiday this summer, they can enjoy the freedom of being able to stay in touch and use the internet as if they were at home. The EU is making our lives easier in very practical ways."

Roaming without paying surcharges, or "roam like at home", is for those living in Europe and who travel to other EU countries for work or leisure. It will also be introduced in Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway shortly after 15 June.

"Roam like at home" is meant to make communicating while travelling easier. It is not intended to allow permanent roaming where a customer would take out a subscription in the cheapest possible country and use it to roam in his home country.

Special rules apply to phone plans with unlimited data and pre-paid cards. For information on these and other practical questions, see the Commission's FAQ (link below).

The reform of EU wholesale prices adopted today was a practical and legal prerequisite for the end of roaming as laid down in the roaming regulation from 2015. New wholesale caps were needed to help ensure that operators are able to offer surcharge-free roaming to their customers without increasing prices at home.

Since the European Parliament already approved the wholesale regulation on 6 April, today's go-ahead from the Council is the last legal step before the text is signed by both institutions in mid-May and published in the EU Official Journal by the end of May. It will then enter into force three days after its publication. This means that the 15 June 2017 deadline will be met and "roam like at home" can begin.

For more information on the wholesale reform and the agreed wholesale caps, see our press release of 31 January 2017 (link below).

The Council today adopted a decision which will ensure the release of high-quality airwaves for wireless broadband services in all EU member states in order to boost mobile connectivity and drive the roll-out of 5G technology. The coordinated use of the 700 MHz band, which offers high speeds and excellent coverage, will allow for faster and better internet connections across Europe. This will reduce the digital divide and make it possible to develop and offer new innovative digital services such as connected cars or eHealth, not just in urban but also in rural and remote areas. 

As a result of this decision, mobile operators will obtain exclusive access to the 700 MHz band (694-790 MHz) by 30 June 2020. This timeframe coincides with the expected deployment of 5G networks in Europe. Member states may, however, delay this reallocation by up to two years, but only in duly justified cases set out in the decision.

The 700 MHz band is part of the 470-790 MHz range that is currently widely used for digital television broadcasting and wireless microphones at various events. To ensure that there is adequate spectrum available for the audio-visual sector even after the upper part of the range has been repurposed, broadcasting services will stay a priority in the sub-700 MHz band (470-694 MHz) at least until 2030, based on national needs. Member states will have the option of using this range for other purposes, including mobile internet services, as long as this is compatible with broadcasting needs.

All EU countries must set out an implementation plan for this reassignment by the end of June 2018.

"Opening the 700 MHz band for mobile internet helps ensure top-quality connectivity throughout Europe and can really transform many people's lives - let's think for example of the use of telemedicine in remote areas," said Dr Emmanuel Mallia, the Maltese Minister for Competitiveness and Digital, Maritime and Services Economy. "It also represents a major step in the industrial shift to 5G, which is essential for the future competitiveness of the EU."

Next steps

This final vote by the Council concludes the procedure at first reading. The European Parliament voted on 15 March 2017. The legal act will be signed by both institutions in mid-May and published in the EU Official Journal on 30 May. It will enter into force 20 days after its publication.

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For the upcoming negotiations, the size of Mrs May’s majority in the House of Commons is of little concern when it comes to the EU27. Britain’s prospects during the Article 50 talks remain the same.

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Discussion in Europe about the legitimate limits to religious expression in secular states has become increasingly hysterical in recent years.

Two unreasonable strands of opinion have emerged in debates ‒ on the one extreme, a demand that even religious expression that is harming no one should be suppressed on the grounds that it is offensive to traditional culture; on the other extreme, a demand that all expression should be allowed on the grounds that the right to practice a religion trumps all others. Most people are between these two positions but, in the context of a mainstream media that ignores nuance, it may be hard to hold this middle ground.

This difficulty was made clear by the reaction to the recent European Court of Justice (ECJ) decisions regarding employer rules on religious symbols in the workplace. Despite the ruling, which was made on employment equality law, being held up as a victory for the far right and a defeat for the left, the ECJ did not allow employers to ban religious symbols in the workplace. The Court did not make a final decision on the case but said it was up to the French and Belgian courts to ultimately decide.

Indeed, the ECJ ruled only that a blanket ban on religious symbols does not constitute direct discrimination on equality grounds (which is correct), but made no final decision on indirect discrimination.

Even if the French and Belgian courts decide that such a ban does not constitute unlawful indirect discrimination on equality grounds, the case still only pertains to equality law. Human rights law also legally protects employees. In the Eweida case in 2013, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that an airline employee, Nadia Eweida, should be able to wear a cross round her neck, and that uniform is not a good enough reason to prevent this. In other words, such an approach to banning religious symbols constitutes indirect discrimination under the European Convention on Human Rights.

“Europe is becoming more diverse, and at a time of such increasing diversity, misguided media debates are extremely unhelpful”

So the widespread media headlines stating that the ECJ has ‘allowed employers to ban headscarves’ was completely inaccurate. This was also the conclusion of the United Kingdom’s national human rights institution, the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), but it was completely at odds with the general media take on the case.

Part of the issue comes from the ECJ’s press release on the subject, which was extremely confusing. Nowhere does it explain the difference between direct and indirect discrimination. It starts off making clear that such a ban on religious symbols ‘does not constitute direct discrimination’. It gets to indirect discrimination only at the bottom of page two. So it is not surprising so much of the media got it wrong.

Europe is becoming more diverse, and at a time of such increasing diversity, misguided media debates such as this one are extremely unhelpful.

Those concerned with growing anti-Muslim sentiment understandably took the misleading headlines as a sign of further intolerance against Muslims, while those on the far right used it to continue to disparage Muslims and their visibility in society. In other words, the headlines unhelpfully caused polarisation on all sides.

Several steps should be taken to avoid the problems we now face.

First, specifically regarding legal rulings, courts need to work to ensure that any summaries of their decisions are clear and do not use undefined jargon that some journalists may misunderstand. European courts could consider sharing their decisions with trusted national human rights institutions ahead of their announcement so that these bodies can help ensure that any decisions are properly understood and interpreted in the diversity of domestic contexts that exist around Europe.

“Those concerned with growing anti-Muslim sentiment understandably took the misleading headlines as a sign of further intolerance against Muslims”

Second, the media should ensure that they have expert legal input before rushing to print, and that staff have proper training in equality and human rights legislation.

With respect to the UK, the EHRC has published a five-point plan – ‘Healing the divisions: a positive vision for equality and human rights in Britain’ – that emphasises the need to avoid rolling back our equality and human rights framework. We must also work to ensure that through education and the media, people come to better understand the range of religious and non-religious beliefs that are common in the UK today. While people may disagree with others’ religions or beliefs, and seek to limit the manifestation of such beliefs when they cause harm to others, this should not extend to prejudice or hatred of different individuals because of those beliefs.

An unfortunate consequence of the Brexit vote has been that a minority of people have since then been using it as an excuse to exercise prejudice against others, with official statistics showing a jump in hate crime in recent months. Even going beyond that, the vote has caused wider division between ‘Leavers’ and ‘Remainers’, and there are concerns that the UK’s departure from the EU could lead to our equality and human rights legal framework coming under threat.

If we work hard, together, we can seek to ensure that the United Kingdom and the European Union continue to uphold equality for all ‒ regardless of religion or belief ‒ in an increasingly pluralistic, yet secular, society. This is an end we all need to commit to.

IMAGE CREDIT: Angelstorm/Bigstock

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DRAFT REPORT - Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 230/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing an instrument contributing to stability and peace
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Arnaud Danjean

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

It was a tricky result. Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan scraped a narrow victory – 51.4 per cent – in a referendum to hand himself more powers, amid concerns over the veracity of the vote.

European leaders faced walking a diplomatic tightrope in their responses over the Easter break. After all, Mr Erdogan is still a crucial Nato ally and a keystone in the bloc’s response to the migration crisis. Turkey is, ostensibly, still a candidate to join the EU (but for how long, we do not know).

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OPINION on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council providing macro-financial assistance to the Republic of Moldova
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Petras Auštrevičius

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

By 2050 the world’s population will grow by 40%. There will be an additional 2.5 billion people requiring food and fuel. During the same period global energy demand is likely to double. The world is facing a tremendous challenge: how to supply two very basic needs to a growing population in a context where decarbonisation is a necessity.

To respond to these huge but basic demands we have no choice but to use our finite resources more efficiently. It’s a journey Brazil started some forty years ago. In the 1970s Brazil imported almost 80% of its total oil consumption. Now the country is virtually energy independent and a leader in renewable energy (more than 40% of Brazil’s energy comes from renewable sources – the global average is less than 15%).

Brazil is the world’s largest sugar producer and exporter, but it is also a pioneer in the use of sugarcane ethanol as a motor fuel. Sugarcane ethanol and bioelectricity produced from leftover fibres make sugarcane the largest source of renewable energy in Brazil. It provides around 17% of the country’s total energy needs – second only to oil, and ahead of hydroelectricity. More than 40% of the country’s petrol needs have been replaced by sugarcane ethanol.

Brazilian policy promoting ethanol as a fuel started during the oil shock of the 1970s. But sugarcane ethanol’s popularity really took off in 2003 with the introduction of flexible-fuel vehicles (FFVs) that run on either gasoline blends or pure ethanol. FFVs give Brazilian consumers a choice at the pump when they fuel their cars, and most are choosing sugarcane ethanol for its price and environmental benefits. Due to consumer demand more than 90% of new cars sold today in Brazil are FFVs, and these vehicles now make up about 70% of the country’s entire light vehicle fleet – a remarkable accomplishment in only a decade. 16 car manufacturers offer more than 242 models of FFVs in Brazil.

“Over half of sugarcane expansion would occur on degraded pastures where cultivation would improve the land’s carbon balance”

Most of Brazil’s bioethanol production is absorbed by the domestic market, where it is sold as either pure ethanol fuel or is blended with gasoline at levels of between 18 and 27.5% ethanol. This flexibility is an important element of the food-energy integration nexus: the government decides the blending rate depending on harvest conditions, and it can be lowered when there are tensions in the agricultural market. This mechanism has been successfully used many times over the past ten years.

Free trade in biofuels is essential to guarantee adequate supply and avoid market disruption. For instance, thanks to the absence of import restrictions, the United States could import large quantities of Brazilian ethanol in 2012 and 2013 when the US was hit by a record drought, with no impact on its corn exports or fuel supply.

Brazil has emerged as a leader in providing both food and energy from its diversified and efficient agricultural sector. In the past 20 years the volume of sugarcane harvested and processed in Brazil has almost tripled to meet rising demand for sugar, ethanol and bioelectricity. During that time there has been no drop in Brazilian food production; in fact, Brazil’s grain production doubled over the last decade. Meanwhile, quality of life for many Brazilians has improved, with 36m people lifted out of extreme poverty between 2002 and 2014 as a result of government programmes aimed at eradicating hunger. Besides sugar and ethanol, Brazil is one of the world’s leading producers and exporters of beef, coffee, corn, orange juice, pork, poultry and soybean. The country is not just feeding itself but also much of the world with its high-productivity agriculture.

Over the next decade Brazilian sugarcane production is estimated to double. The country’s agro-ecological zoning regulations, passed in 2009, limit the amount of land to be used for sugarcane to 64.7m hectares, or about 7.5% of Brazil’s land mass. Still, the area available for sugarcane expansion in Brazil is almost nine times larger than what is currently under cultivation. More than half of this future expansion would occur on degraded pastures where cultivating sugarcane would actually improve the carbon balance of the land.

“More than 40% of Brazil’s petrol needs have been replaced by sugarcane ethanol”

On top of that, technological advances continue to increase productivity and yield, achieving more ethanol from the same area of land. Enhanced sugarcane varietals have already improved ethanol production by increasing sucrose levels by 20%. Productivity is expected to rise by one-third using new cellulose hydrolysis technology to make ‘second-generation’ ethanol. In this process, energy is extracted from by-products of traditional ethanol extraction methods: sugarcane straw and bagasse, which is the pulpy residue that remains after juice extraction.

Research and innovation continue to unleash the full potential of sugarcane. Brazil has the world’s largest plant for biopolyethylene, a cane-derived bioplastic used by many household names including Coca-Cola, Ecover and Toyota. In addition there are two commercial plants producing second-generation ethanol, which is promoting the vertical expansion of the industry.

But there is more to come. Tests with renewable sugarcane-based jet fuel and cane-derived diesel are extremely encouraging, as is the development of pellets from bagasse and biogas from vinasse, the final by-product of the ethanol distillation process.

The world’s growing population and the urgent need to decrease our carbon emissions create new equations, with agriculture at the centre. Smart and innovative policies can support the smooth development of both food and energy production.

In today’s world, where resources need to be maximised, we should look to countries such as Brazil, think creatively, and develop smart and sustainable alternatives.

IMAGE CREDIT: paulovilela/Bigstock

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A 2017 OECD report, ‘Tackling Wasteful Spending on Health’, warns that one-fifth of health expenditure makes no or minimal contribution to good health outcomes. It’s alarming news – especially at a time when public budgets worldwide are under pressure. Governments could spend significantly less on healthcare and still improve patients’ health.

Inappropriate use of antimicrobial medicines is both wasteful and one of the biggest threats to clinical care, as it encourages the development of antimicrobial resistance (AMR). Many of the achievements of modern medicine, including surgical procedures and the care of premature new-borns, are intrinsically based on our ability to prevent and cure infections. All these medical achievements may be swept away by AMR if action is not promptly taken. From 2014 to 2016 the United Kingdom carried out a comprehensive and independent AMR review. The review panel, chaired by economist Jim O’Neill, estimated that up to ten million people worldwide may die by 2050 due to six common diseases whose resistance is growing.

AMR also puts healthcare budgets and the whole economy under stress. Patients developing resistant infections are more difficult to treat. Each patient costs up to an additional US$40,000 due to increased medicalisation and additional time spent in hospital. This figure is likely to double once indirect costs such as absence from work are considered.

So where are we going wrong? Microorganisms can learn how to withstand attacks by drugs. By using antimicrobials incorrectly, we are helping them to do this more quickly. Fundamentally, we are making two mistakes.

“Since 2000, only five new classes of antibiotics have been put on the market ‒ none targets the deadliest bacteria”

First, our consumption of antimicrobials is largely ineffective. In some countries we consume too many antibiotics – the largest category of antimicrobials – and often for the wrong reasons. About half of all the antibiotics prescribed by healthcare facilities in OECD countries do not meet medical prescription guidelines. The extensive use of antibiotics in agriculture sustains the growth of AMR: worldwide, up to 70% of antibiotics are given to animals, often for no other reason than to make them grow more quickly. Conversely, some less wealthy countries consume too few antimicrobials because people cannot afford to buy them when needed. About 600,000 children under five are estimated to die of pneumonia in low- and middle-income countries because they do not have access to effective antibiotics.

To promote the effective use of antimicrobials, alternative interventions are needed. They include those triggering behavioural changes (such as stewardship programmes and educational interventions) and organisational changes (the use of diagnostic tests or delayed prescriptions), as well as economic incentives (like pay-for-performance schemes). Countries should strengthen their efforts and upscale successful local actions to the national level.

Second, the way in which we give incentives for research and development (R&D) into new antimicrobials is flawed, creating a huge threat for the future. The last major new class of antibiotic was discovered in 1987 but the approval of novel therapies has fallen eight-fold since then. Since 2000 only five new classes of antibiotics have been put on the market. None targets the deadliest bacteria.

This lack of innovation is largely due to market failure that also triggers ineffective use: the (wrong) incentives to make large use of antimicrobials. Industry seeks adequate return on investment, so has an interest in selling a lot of pills, thereby triggering ineffective use, or increasing the price, which limits access and affordability. Any newly-developed drug would need to be restricted to prevent diseases from becoming resistant to the new antimicrobials. For the pharmaceutical industry, this means that investment in other therapeutic categories is far more appealing. Innovation in antimicrobials suffers as a result.

“Up to 70% of antibiotics are given to animals, often for no other reason than to make them grow more quickly”

We need to identify innovative economic approaches to address the lack of sufficient investment in the antimicrobial R&D pipeline, from the early research phases to the commercialisation of the final product. New incentives to promote an effective use of newly-developed antimicrobials are also badly needed. This means ensuring that access to the drug is granted when and where it is needed and that we have in place strong actions to prevent ineffective use.

The good news is that the world has woken up to the challenge. It is now widely recognised that there is no time to waste: we need to step up global efforts to tackle AMR before it becomes uncontrollable. At the Elmau and Ise-Shima summits in 2015 and 2016, G7 countries committed to tackle the issue, as did G20 leaders in Hangzhou in 2016. Leaders called on the OECD, the World Health Organization, the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization, and the World Organisation for Animal Health to support them.

Health ministers from the 35 OECD countries and their counterparts from Colombia, Costa Rica, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Peru, Saudi Arabia and South Africa met in January in Paris under the chairmanship of the UK’s Secretary of State for Health, Jeremy Hunt. They discussed AMR as part of the broader agenda of tackling ineffective spending in healthcare systems and managing the innovation process in medical technology. Together with other international organisations, the OECD is working to support G20 countries in tackling the issue.

Breaking the vicious circle that has led to the emergence of AMR will be crucial. It will require action in many ways, including rational use and good surveillance in the animal and human sector, and in promoting the development of new antimicrobials. We cannot afford to put off the issue much longer. The stakes are high: the benefits of success and, crucially, the risks of failure are enormous for our economies and societies.

IMAGE CREDIT: kadmy/Bigstock

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Ready to welcome the fake president.

Oops – they did it again! They made us believe that the Fifth Republic provides its president with a particularly wide array of prerogatives, little constrained by checks and balances, and reigning well above the heads of a weak parliament. And with all the hype around the presidential election, this highly personalised ‘encounter of a man with the people and the circumstances’, as the oft-quoted Gaullist saying goes, the illusion of ‘power’ has been nurtured again over several months.

And we seem to swallow it against better knowledge! If the last thirty years have taught us anything about the functioning of this strange Republic, it is that the perceived weight of the presidential election, with its ideological theatricality, its heroic destinies, and its absoluteness in the refusal of compromise, is inversely proportional to the capacity of the office holder, once elected, to bring about change.

The notorious powers of the French president are a myth. And the axiomatic weakness of the French parliament is not a structural one, but depends strongly on the configuration. Paradoxically, the Assemblée nationale is particularly paralysed when the newly elected president is provided with a stable majority in the legislative elections, as it was the case in 2007 and 2012. All of a sudden, the centre of power shifts towards the Elysée, the Prime minister becomes a ‘collaborator’ (i.e., a lightning rod) fired or maintained at will, and the only possibility for members of parliament to exert their control function is to become ‘frondeurs’, a job description that mainly consists of extensive, ostentatious sulking. Which the prime minister then mutes by invoking the famous no-confidence article 49-3.

Joint summit appearances. The joys of cohabitation.

On the other hand, as three different periods of ‘cohabitation’ have shown in 1986-88, 1993-95 and 1997-2002, when the president, following legislative elections, is obliged to choose a prime minister from the opposite part of the political spectrum, he stands very quickly very naked, a mere by-stander of governmental decision-making, trying to save face by attending European summits and G7 meetings, as well as holding a 14 July garden party and pronouncing New Year’s wishes. While Lionel Jospin was in office, between 1997 and 2002, Jacques Chirac tried very hard, but in vain, not to be a side-lined head of state, helplessly watching how, for instance, the 35-hour week was introduced by the leftists of His Majesty’s own Government.

Chances are matters will get even worse in 2017. Whoever will win the presidential contest on 7 May is likely to inaugurate a new era of ‘fake presidents’. None of the front-runners can seriously hope to be given a full-fledged majority in June. But all of them are avoiding the issue!

Emmanuel Macron, to name just one of them, simply repeats on television and Twitter something vague about the French citizens being ‘very coherent’ and certain to provide him, should he be elected, with a stable majority one month later. I am not sure that we live in an age where the coherence of voting behaviour is a safe bet. And most of his yet-to-be nominated candidates, many of them newcomers to politics, will face in their constituencies some staunch resistance by incumbents of all sorts.

So what are the realistic options? Is there a textbook for the aspiring president on how to run a democracy held hostage by a constitution that simply does not fit reality?

Ruling by decree? That may be in the textbook for ‘How to become even more unpopular than Sarkozy and Hollande in only three months’. Building a stable coalition in a fragmented parliament? An exercise for which the Fifth Republic provides no textbook at all (and which is somewhat delicate after a highly antagonistic presidential battle that requires massive and repetitive discrediting of all possible partners). Building ad-hoc coalitions for each and every one of the needed reforms? Well, there are many textbooks dating from the Fourth Republic, and perhaps some to be translated from Italian, but one may have doubts about their efficiency.

The only way out seems to be a regime change in all but name. Putting the proportional vote on the Elysée table as early as mid-May and making it clear to the French that they are going to vote in June for an Assemblée nationale that will have a life expectancy of no more than, say, 18 months, before new elections under the new electoral system will be called. This would at least put an end to the disastrous effect of the ‘quinquennat’ reform of 2000, which welded the presidential and legislative elections together in their current counter-productive sequence.

This will take some courage. And the road towards the new Republic is going to be very bumpy. But it would allow the new tenant of the Elysée to be more than a ‘fake president’ and give a very unexpected second life to François Hollande’s ‘fake slogan’ of 2012: ‘Le changement, c’est maintenant!’

Albrecht Sonntag
@albrechtsonntag

This is post # 16 on the French 2017 election marathon.
All previous posts can be found here

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Borussia Dortmund and AS Monaco have played a day later the match that was cancelled after the attack on a bus carrying players of the German team. Three explosions severely damaged the bus on Tuesday evening. Investigators suspect a terrorist attack. Commentators praise the fans for their calm reaction and the players for their courage in defying terror.