Defence`s Feeds

The US Marine Corps (USMC) has contracted Northrop Grumman to provide an additional nine AN/TPS-80 ground / air task-oriented radar (G/ATOR) low-rate initial production (LRIP) systems.

The US Naval Surface Forces commander vice-admiral Tom Rowden has ordered engineering stand down and retraining for every littoral combat ship (LCS) crew.

The US Navy’s first Zumwalt-class guided missile destroyer, USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000), has successfully completed an engineering light off assessment and crew certification period at General Dynamics-Bath Iron Works.

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Australian F90 Assault Rifle

Americas

• The US Navy will field-test the latest Aegis Baseline 9.2C alongside the first intercept test for the SM-3 Block 2A interceptor next month. A new feature added to the software build is the “engage-on-remote” capability that will allow the SM-3 missile to target a ballistic missile during data derived from another sensor such as a satellite. However October’s test will not see that feature tested.

• Rockwell Collins debuted its new combat helmet-mounted Integrated Digital Vision System. The new gear combines mission data and multi-spectral vision into an advanced display system while offering a 24/7, hands-free, seamless transition from dark to light environments. Furthermore, it is the first hands-free, helmet-mounted display system that fuses incoming data from various sources such as a command center, other troops, or drones with multi-spectral vision.

Middle East & North Africa

• It’s been reported that Saudi Arabia has bought an unspecific number of Wing Loong UAVs from China. Modeled on the MQ-1 Predator, the UAV’s are able to carry two air-to-ground missiles as well as having their usual surveillance capabilities. So far, the drone has been sold to four nations with discussions underway with several more.

• Russia’s Izvestia reported that during a recent meeting between Egyptian and Russian defense ministers, both sides agreed to proceed with the training of Egyptian pilots on flying the Ka-52K naval attack helicopter. It’s believed that Egypt will now go back and formulate what training requirements are needed for the pilots. The attack helicopters will go toward operations tackling jihadists in the Sinai desert.

Europe

• Saab is to deliver two fully instrumented laser-based Tactical Engagement Simulation Systems (TESS) to Poland. The company said the systems are being supplied under an initial order for a two-year contract from the academy, and enable realistic combat training using small arms and anti-tank weapons laser simulators and evaluate the results of exercises.

• The Saudi foreign minister is to brief British MPs personally today to urge them not to ban UK arms sales to the Gulf kingdom. UK lawmakers have been put under increased pressure following UN claims that British weapons were used to conduct indiscriminate attacks on civilian targets in Yemen. According to the group Campaign Against the Arms Trade, the UK had licensed more than $4.4 billion worth of arms sales to Saudi Arabia since the bombing of Yemen began in March 2015.

Asia Pacific

• Progress has been made in talks between Pakistan and Russia over the purchase of the Su-35 fighters. Pakistani Ambassador to Russia Qazi Khalilullah called the talks “fruitful” adding that Islamabad “is considering different options of deepening cooperation with Russia.”

• As the leaders of the Group of 20 major economies held a summit in China over the weekend, North Korea launched three ballistic missiles which flew about 1,000 km (600 miles), hitting Japan’s air defense identification zone. The launch drew immediate condemnation from the United States, which described them as “reckless,” and diplomats said the UN Security Council has discussed them behind closed doors at Washington’s and Tokyo’s requests.

Today’s Video

Iran’s S-300 spotted at the Fordow nuclear facility:

Alligator, feet wet
(click to view full)

When Russia committed to a multi-year buy of Mi-28 attack helicopters in 2006, it appeared that the Mil design bureau’s Mi-28 (NATO code: Havoc) had eclipsed Kamov’s more radical Ka-50 (NATO code: Hokum) as Russia’s future attack helicopter. A critical loss in Turkey’s attack helicopter competition, and conflicting promises concerning the Kamov machine’s future in Russia, left the platform’s very future in doubt. Russia’s 2005 defense budget, for instance, was supposed to include 12 Ka-50 helicopters – until that funding was cut.

Fortunately for the VVS, growing Russian natural resource revenues, and the accompanying growth in Russian defense budgets, are creating new options. So, too, is a major investment in modernizing its manufacturers, which has put the Ka-52 into production.

The Ka-52 Alligator Ka-50 “Black Shark”
(click to view larger)

By 2009, just a handful of coaxial, single-seat Ka-50’s had been delivered to the Army Aviation Training and Conversion Unit at Torzhok. Some even saw action in Chechnya, where their high cruising speed (300 km/h), protection, and ability to carry either armaments or fuel tanks gained them respect as scout/ attack/ command helicopters.

Many countries would consider that an odd combination, but it works quite well with Russian doctrines that emphasize durable combat punch for scouts, and central on-site direction of all combat aviation.

The Ka-52 “Alligator” is a 2-seat version of the Ka-50, using a side by side layout common to transport helicopters instead of the front-and-rear layout common in attack helicopters. This changes the helicopter’s aerodynamics somewhat, reducing maximum speed from 310 km/h to 300 km/h (192 – 186 mph), and increasing fuel consumption slightly. On the other hand, this change is expected to make it easier for the helicopter crew to perform battlefield observation and coordination roles. The extra crewman in the Ka-52 forced some reductions in fuel, armoring, and gun ammunition; it carries 240 rounds for its fuselage-mounted 2A42 30mm cannon, instead of 470 in the Ka-50.

Even so, the Alligator’s main rival isn’t the Ka-50, it’s the more conventional Mi-28N attack helicopter that Russia is also buying. Based on published materials, photos, and several Russian sources, we’ve compiled a side-by-side comparison that also includes Boeing’s current AH-64D Apache Longbow as a reference point, and normalizes measurements to the same units:

Ka-52K
(click to view full)

Note that the Ka-52’s operational sensor fit is somewhat unclear, and a range of options have been tried that are not always present in photos. A nose turret can hold a laser range-finder and infrared sights, a small ball under the fuselage can hold optical sights, a FLIR system can supposedly be integrated with Zenit’s Shkval electro-optical sighting system in a ball mounted on top of the fuselage aft of the canopy, and mast-mounted sights have been reported. What is certain is that an effective modern scout helicopter requires a combination of zoom and infrared/FLIR cameras, and lasers capable of rangefinding or target designation. The most advanced helicopters add millimeter-wave radars, creating additional options in uncooperative weather, improving their awareness of what’s going on in the airspace around them, and providing targeting options for some missiles. A 2013 deal with French optronics leader Sagem (q.v. Aug 28/13 entry, below) may begin to add more clarity on this front.

The Ka-52K is a naval variant that will operate from Russia’s Vladivostok Class amphibious/air assault LHD ships. It adds folding rotors and folding stub wings, but not the folding tail found in some naval helicopters. A maritime radar in the nose has been mentioned, possibly a “mirror” radar that combines 2 bands for surface scanning and long-range search. So has the ability to carry Kh-35 medium-range anti-ship missiles, or even supersonic Kh-31s. Improved corrosion resistance is also a standard feature for naval helicopter variants, and the question is how far the Russians will go.

A Turkish-specific, NATO-compatible variant of the Ka-52 called the Erdogan was developed in cooperation with Israel’s IAI to compete in Turkey’s attack helicopter competition, but lost to Italy’s AW129T Mongoose.

Contracts and Key Events 2015 – 2016

Export Contract Paris Air Show

September 7/16: Russia’s Izvestia reported that during a recent meeting between Egyptian and Russian defense ministers, both sides agreed to proceed with the training of Egyptian pilots on flying the Ka-52K naval attack helicopter. It’s believed that Egypt will now go back and formulate what training requirements are needed for the pilots. The attack helicopters will go toward operations tackling jihadists in the Sinai desert.

August 10/16: Navalized versions of the Ka-52K are to be installed with a compact active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar. The radar operates in dual-band millimetric and centimetric wavelengths which allows the Ka-52K to detect large naval targets up to a range of 180 km. Initially developed for French-built Mistral-class vessels, the sale was cancelled by France after Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The helicopters already built are likely to be added to the air wing of the Project 11435 Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier.

July 20/16: Russia’s latest KA-52K Katran helicopters are to be tested in the field during upcoming military action in Syria. The helicopters will be on board the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov and will join the Syrian campaign from October 2016 to January 2017. Reasoning behind the deployment, according to Viktor Murakhovsky of Arsenal Otechestva magazine, is that it “is a test of the operational and technical capacity and ability of our air carrier strike group, since previously Russia has never used air carriers in real combat conditions.”

January 4/16: A deal has been reached which will see Egypt acquire forty-six of a navalized variant of the Ka-52 Alligator helicopter. The Ka-52K was developed to operate on the French manufactured Mistral class helicopter carrier that had been initially ordered for the Russian Navy. The $1.28 billion order went south amid sanctions placed on Russia over Ukraine in 2014. Egypt became the alternative purchaser of the warships after signing contracts in October so the acquisition of the helicopters originally developed for it is not surprising.

December 29/15: Egypt is to receive the President-S missile Approach warning system according to an official from the Russian Radioelectronic Technologies Group (KRET). Contracts for the purchase are currently being drafted with delivery of the system due to commence in the near future. The President-S system will provide protection to both military and civilian aircraft and helicopters from airborne missile threats, as well as those launched from ground and sea based defense systems. It can destroy and suppress the optical homing warheads of air and anti-aircraft missiles, including the homing warheads of man-portable air defense missile systems. The purchase of the system coincides with the procurement 50 Ka-52 reconnaissance and attack helicopters, with deliveries to be carried out between 2016-2018.

September 25/15: Egypt has signed an agreement for fifty Russian attack helicopters, seemingly confirming reports from August which indicated that the country would receive around fifty helicopters by 2019. The Egyptians are thought to be buying the navalized Ka-52K version of the Alligator scout/attack helicopter, most likely those intended to equip the Russian Mistral LHDs now also destined for Egypt following a contract earlier this week.

September 1/15: The Ka-52 helicopter export contract mentioned back in June at the Paris Air Show appears to involve Egypt’s acquisition of 50 of the attack helicopters.

2013 – 2014

Production and delivery; French optronics coming. Ka-52 “Alligator”
(click to view full)

Aug 5/14: +32. IHS Jane’s reports that Russia has ordered its 32 Ka-52K helicopters for use with its Vladivostok Class LHDs. The order isn’t a surprise (q.v. Oct 9/13, June 24/14), it was just a question of when the contract would be placed:

“Speaking to IHS Jane’s, a Russian defence industry source stated that the order included 32 Ka-52K helicopters. These will be built by Progress Aresenyev Aviation Company ‘Nikolai Sazykin’, a subsidiary of Russian Helicopters.”

Sources: IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, “Russia orders Ka-52K helicopters for Mistral-class LHDs”.

32 Ka-52Ks

Aug 4-5/14: Rostec subsidiary Russian Helicopters showcases its new military helicopter models at the Defence Ministry’s Innovation Day exhibition in the suburbs of Moscow. Displayed helicopters include the Ka-52K naval scout/attack helicopter, Mi-8AMTSh-VA armed transport helicopter optimized for polar regions, the upgraded Mi-26T2 super heavy-lift helicopter, and the Mi-38 successor to existing Mi-8/Mi-17 models. Sources: Russian Helicopters JSC, “Russian Helicopters presents new military helicopters at the Defence Ministry’s Innovation Day exhibition”.

June 24/14: During an inspection tour at Progress aircraft manufacturing company in Arsenyevsk, Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yury Borisov offers a production update:

“The plant is in a stable position and has a long-term contract on the delivery of 146 Ka-52 Alligator helicopters for the period up to 2020. Further plans include [the sale of] 32 ship-based helicopters…. Navy is expecting Ka-52 helicopters, which will be placed on board the Mistral-type ships currently under construction…. We paid great attention to import replacement issues, including as far as components received from Ukraine as concerned. These issues are not critical. They can be resolved quite painlessly.”

That last bit is especially important after Russia cut off its Ukranian supply chain by invading and annexing Crimea, then militarily supporting guerrilla movements that are trying to annex Eastern Ukraine as well. Sources: Voice of Russia, “Russian Defense Ministry plans to buy 32 Ka-52K helicopters for Mistral ships.

Dec 25/13: 2013 production. During a visit to Russian Helicopters’ Progress Arsenyev Aviation Company production plant, Lt. Gen. Victor Bondarev thanks them for producing 14 Ka-52s on schedule in 2013, as part of overall Russian deliveries of over 100 helicopters. Sources: Interfax/AVN, “Russian Air Force took delivery of over 100 new rotorcraft in 2013”.

Oct 9/13: Ka-52K. RIA Novosti quotes “a Deputy Defense Minister” as saying that Russia plans to order 32 Ka-52Ks, conditional on successful final helicopter testing in 2014.

That could become a tight schedule, since the Russian Navy is expected to take delivery of its 1st LHD in November 2015, and the Ka-52 will need some flying and testing time before it’s ready for service. Even if Russian Helicopters’ Progress Arsenyev division delivers 6 helicopters just a year after the order, the Vladivostok wouldn’t have anything like an operational Ka-52K wing for many months after delivery at least. It would appear that the new ship design and its key helicopters will be conducting their break-in period together, which has a way of making everything more difficult. Sources: RIA Novosti, “Russian Defense Ministry to Order 32 Shipborne Helicopters in 2014 – Official”.

Aug 28/13: Partnership. At MAKS 2013, Kamov and France’s Sagem Defense announce a partnership to add Sagem’s optronics and [the Franco-Russian] LINS 100 inertial navigation systems to the Ka-52, “which will address a requirement expressed by several countries… [the partners] plan to start integration of a new optronic system in early 2014.” The release specifically mentions leveraging Sagem’s experience as the supplier of the roof-mounted Strix surveillance and targeting turret on Airbus Helicopter’s EC655 Tiger HAP/ARH/HAD scout and attack helicopters.

So much for the direct information. What this release says indirectly, is that the Ka-52’s surveillance and targeting systems have been a hindrance to international sales, and need improvement. Otherwise, the outstanding requirement(s) would be addressed already. Sources: Sagem re: Strix | Sagem DS Aug 28/13 release.

Feb 22/13: RIA Novosti reports that the Southern Military District has received its 1st batch of Ka-52s, and is scheduled to start operations in March. RIA.ru [in Russian].

2011 – 2012

Full-rate production contract; Navalized Ka-52K confirmed; Crash. Ka-52 “Alligator”
(click to view full)

Aug 9/12: Ka-52K changes. Oboronprom confirms that Russia will build the navalized Ka-52K Alligator helicopter for its new Vladivostok Class amphibious ships, which also prompts speculation about the design changes involved. Past displays have shown folding rotor blades, folding wings, and the standard anti-corrosion treatments.

Navy Recognition says that the Ka-52K will also include a modified version of the MiG-35 fighter’s Zhuk-A AESA radar in the nose section, and will be able to carry Kh-31 Krypton or Kh-35 Kayak anti-ship missiles. Those missiles weigh in at over 600 kg/ 1,300 pounds each, however, which could make them challenging weapons for the helicopter to carry. It’s within the limits, but testing will tell. The level of Russian interest of these missiles was regarded as unconfirmed by the people we talked to.

Subsequent research indicates that the AESA radar was a contractor offer from Phazotron, not a military requirement. It would be useful, but it would also be expensive. The importance of Russia’s Vladivostok Class ships may justify that, but word is that Phazotron has a cheaper back-up upgrade offer: a more conventional dual-band phased array radar, with frequencies optimized for closer ground scans and long-range surface (naval) scans. Sources: Navy Recognition, “Special version of Ka-52K Helicopter with advanced radar and antiship missiles for Russian Mistral” | Voice of Russia, Russia to build helicopters for Mistral carriers” | DID interviews and discussions.

June 2012: Take-off magazine covers the Ka-52, and offers some production and deployment information:

“In May 2011, the delivery started to Chernigovka air base in the Russian Far East, where the Russian Air Force had activated its first full-ledged 12-ship Ka-52 air squadron by the end of the year. In 2012, Chernigovka air base took delivery at least five more Ka-52s. In addition, five new Ka-52s built by Progress by late 2011 were fielded with CTCC in Torzhok early in 2012.

Overall, over 20 production-standard Ka-52s were manufactured in the town of Arsenyev during 2012. 16 of them were fielded earlier this year with a second RusAF airbase, the one in Korenovsk, Krasnodar Territory. Their final assembly and check flights prior to the delivery to the air base had been handled by Rostvertol JSC, to which premises they had been brought in semi-assembled from Aresenyev-based manufacturing plant by RusAF airlifters.”

March 14/12: A Lenta report implies that the September 2011 contract reports may have referred to a multi-year contract aimed specifically at Ka-52 helicopters. From the Rus Navy translation:

“In 2011, Russian defense ministry tied a number of long-term aircraft procurement contracts; under one of them, the ministry purchased 140 attack helicopters Ka-52 Alligator, director of Oboronprom corporation Andrei Reus told Kommersant. Reus did not specify details of the contract only saying that “conditions were acceptable”.”

March 13/12: A Ka-52 crash, during a training exercise in the Tver region NW of Moscow, kills both pilots. It seems that the type’s unique ejection seats either didn’t save them, or weren’t triggered. While this is the 1st Ka-52 crash, there had been 2 crashes of the related Ka-50. Pravda | RTT News.

Crash

Sept 7/11: RIA Novosti offers a video tour of the Ka-52 factory, and says:

“In the next ten years, Russia’s Air Force will adopt 140 Ka-52 helicopters, a model better known as the Alligator. Dmitry Petrov, general director of the holding company Russian Helicopters, commented on a major contract that the aircraft manufacturer signed with the Ministry of Defense. Petrov spoke during a guided tour of Progress, the helicopter factory at Arsenyev, Primorye Territory, where the Alligators are assembled.”

While the report implies that the recent contract is entirely focused on Ka-52s, it should be taken with some caution. Russian Helicopters produces a wide variety of types. It is possible that the attribution could be a reporter error, or even a translation issue.

Sept 3/11: While discussing a $4+ billion Russian contract with state-controlled Oboronprom for 140 military helicopters by 2020 (no type breakdown), General Director Andrey Reus confirms that the 1st navalized Ka-52K Alligator attack/scout helicopter shipment for use on Russia’s new Mistral LHDs will finish by the end of 2012. RIA Novosti | Voice of Russia.

Ka-52 contract?

Feb 9/11: Itar-Tass reports that Russia will use 2 of the pending Mistral amphibious landing ships in the Pacific Fleet, including protecting the South Kurile Islands, which are disputed territory with Japan. As for the ships’ complement and design, Helicopters of Russia Holding Company Deputy Director-General Andrei Shibitov says that:

“Ship versions of the Ka-27K, Ka-29K and Ka-52K helicopters will be used. Their number on each ship will be determined by the Defence Ministry.”

Another Russian official states that using those coaxial rotor helicopters will require a slight elevation of the ship’s deck, to ensure enough clearance height in the hangars.

Jan 2/11: Buy in. Russian Defense Ministry official spokesman Col. Vladimir Drik says that they plan to start buying Ka-52 Alligator helicopters for the VVS (Air Force) in 2011. RIA Novosti.

2008 – 2010

Ka-52
(click to view full)

Dec 7/09: Industrial. Russian Helicopters JSC, which includes the Kamov, Mil, and Kazan design bureaus, announces a combined public and private investment of RUB 6 billion (about $200 million) to modernize manufacturing at the Arsenyev Aviation Company Progress plant, which makes the Ka-52. The “full scale technical overhaul” will take place from 2009-2015, and will improve production of the Ka-50 Black Shark and Ka-52 Alligator scout/attack helicopters, the new Ka-60/62 medium helicopter, and the new Mi-34C2 Peregrine light helicopter.

The first stage will overhaul foundry operations at Progress, beginning with a foundry production competence centre that is expected to open in early 2010. It will be followed by reconstruction and re-equipment of the composite and mechanical engineering sections with advanced control machinery that will reduce required space and personnel, an energy efficiency program, a “machine-working competence centre,” and the “introduction of modern digital and information technologies”. When discussing Phase 2 benefits, the firm points to the September 2008 introduction of the TruLaser 3530 laser cutting machine, which led to a saving of RUB 14.7 million (around $500,000) over 12 months with an 8-fold drop in labor intensity. The total economic impact of introducing new production machinery is expected to be as high as RUB 160 million ($5.3 million) initially, alongside RUB 40 million ($1.3 million) from installing cold solidifying mixture lines and low-pressure casting machines.

More investments may follow. These investments are being made pursuant to a wider Russian federal program titled “The development of the defense industrial complex of the Russian Federation in the years 2011-2020,” and Russian Helicopters COO Andrei Shibitov says that up to 70% of the Russian helicopter industry’s equipment is worn out.

Nov 27/09: During the FS Mistral’s visit to St. Petersburg, Russia, the amphibious assault ship holds a “cross deck” exercise with Russian Navy helicopters. They include landings by a Ka-29 utility helicopter with a French officer on board, as well as landings using a Ka-27 Helix anti submarine warfare helicopter and the first deck landing for the Ka-52 scout/attack helicopter, which also simulates a refueling on the flight deck. French Navy [in French] | DID: “Russia to Order French Mistral LHDs?.”

FS Mistral landings

Dec 26/08: RIA Novosti reports that the Russian government has approved the production of Ka-52 Alligator attack helicopters. They will be built at the Arsenyevsk plant, in the country’s Far East. Deliveries of the first 12 Ka-52s to the Russian Air Force will reportedly begin in 2009.

Approved

Nov 9/08: Various media reports now quote Russian Air Force chief Colonel-General Alexander Zelin, who says they will place a 2009 order for 12 Ka-52 “Alligator” helicopters, subject to successful completion of mandated testing. Col.-Gen. Zelin stresses that this is not a substitute for the Mi-28s, which are expected to begin arriving in 2009.

Meanwhile, Kamov indicates that they have been given the go-ahead for “full production,” and hope to complete 30 helicopters for Russia by 2012 while pursuing export orders. Avio News | Frontier India | RIA Novosti

Nov 10/08: Moscow News’ “Russian choppers on top” reports that the industry is being restructured, much as Russia has centralized the fixed-wing aircraft industry into the state-owned United Aircraft Corp.:

“But the industry has its specifics, Mikhail Kazachkov from the Helicopter Industry Association told RIA Novosti in an interview. Its bane is the lengthy production time: an idea to finished product takes, on average, 12 years. The authorities have decided to restructure the helicopter industry, to optimize its cash flows and make it more competitive. For that purpose they brought its separate branches under one umbrella, called Helicopters of Russia.”

Additional Readings The Ka-52

• Russian Helicopters JSC – Ka-52

• Army Technology – Ka-50 Black Shark Attack Helicopter, Russia

• Aviastar All the World’s Rotorcraft – Kamov Ka-52 “Alligator”

• RIA Novosti (Infographic) – The Kamov Ka-52 Alligator/ Hokum-B

• RIA Novosti – Ka-52 image gallery

• Take-off (June 2012) – Russian Army Aviation Ka-52 Fleet Growing

• Take-off, via AviaPort.RU (May 2012) – General Designer of the “Corporation” Fazotron-NIIR “Yuri Andrei – a helicopter category Enterprise. Discusses Ka-52 radar options in the course of the interview.

• RIA Novosti, via WayBack (Sept 7/11 video) – How the Ka-52 Alligator is made: A guided tour of the helicopter factory

• Russia Today, via WayBack (Oct 31/08) – Alligators to take the sky by storm

Related Items

• DID (July 23/12) – Reap the Whirlwind: Russia Buys Anti-Tank Missiles & Bails Out Kalashnikov. Most of these Vikhr missiles will be used on Ka-52s.

• DID – Thales’ Key Role in Russia’s Defense Industry. Includes cockpit components and forward looking infrared systems for the Ka-52.

• DID – Russia’s Military Spending Jumping – But Can Its Industry? The Arsenyev plant isn’t the only one with challenges.

The US Navy has successfully tested interoperability of an aircraft carrier strike group's (CSG) combat systems with surface and air assets during a demonstration at the cybernetic laboratory, USS Dahlgren.

BAE Systems has been awarded a contract to provide the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) with third-generation, improved anti-ship missile test capabilities.

The Indian Navy has taken delivery of the new water jet fast attack craft (WJFAC), Tihayu, from the Indian shipbuilding company Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE).

Recommendations and guidelines regarding the exposition to pulsed electromagnetic signals are very different depending on the organization which publish it (like it is the case for IEEE or ICNIRP). These discrepancies create some difficulties regarding which guideline to follow.

To have a better understanding on the effects produced by these electromagnetic fields, the European Defence Agency (EDA) has initiated the RFBIO project which was officially launched at a kick-off meeting on 1 September at the EDA premises.

At this stage, there are two EDA Member States contributing to this Category B project: Sweden, as the lead nation, and Germany. Additional Member States are expected to join later.

The RFBIO study is being carried out by the Karolinska Institute in Stockholm and the Bundeswehr Institute of Radiobiology in Munich.

Over the next five years, these institutions will analyze the biological effects of Electromagnetic Fields with specific characteristics which have not been completely characterized for the time being.

The duty of care for military personnel is the main driver behind this research project the results of which will benefit the armed forces of all EU Member States.

 

More information:

• Bundeswehr Institute of Radiobiology
• Karolinska Institute in Stockholm

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Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

On 5 September, the Subcommittee exchanged views on the outcome and main decisions of the NATO Summit in Warsaw with representatives from NATO and the EEAS. The Alliance is faced with an evolving complex threat environment. NATO reaffirmed that its countries are united in protecting and defending their indivisible security and common values by fulfilling effectively all three core tasks: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security.
At the same meeting the Presidents of the European Council and the European Commission, and the Secretary General of NATO have issued a joint declaration to give new impetus and new substance to the EU-NATO strategic partnership.
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Draft agenda and meeting documents
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On 5 September, the Subcommittee considered the draft report on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy by Ioan Mircea PAŞCU, S&D. The draft report advocates a thorough revision of the CSDP to better equip Europe in an increasingly unstable and volatile internal and external security environment.
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On 26 September, the Subcommittee will consider the draft report on the European Defence Union by Urmas Paet, ALDE. This draft advocates the progressive framing of the European Defence Union, with a view to its establishment under the next multiannual political and financial framework of the EU. It also elaborates on the process and the contents of the EU White Book on security and defence and describes preparatory activities which should be launched immediately.
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will take place on Monday 26 September, 15:00-18:30 in room Paul-Henri Spaak 5B001 in Brussels.

Organisations or interest groups who wish to apply foraccess to the European Parliament will find the relevant information below.

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watch the meeting live
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The recent public argument between Chief Executive Abdullah and President Ghani is more than an argument over appointments, management styles or how far government reforms should go. The core of the rift lies in the different views both sides have on why the National Unity Government (NUG) came into being and what this means for the balance of power and legitimacy within the partnership. This was brought to a boil in the face of the looming second anniversary of the NUG (on 19 September 2016) – considered by some to be its ‘expiry date’ – and a wish on the part of the Abdullah camp to revive rather than dissolve the political agreement. In this second dispatch, of two, AAN’s Martine van Bijlert dissects the speech that started the scuffle, explores the political context that led up to the fall-out and considers where we might go from here (with input from Ali Yawar Adili).

An earlier dispatch by AAN’s Ali Yawar Adeli and Lenny Linke revisited how the verbal sparring unfolded, how the various sides tried to defuse it and what has so far been agreed.

Abdullah’s 11 August 2016 speech: scathing and conciliatory

The argument between the president and the CEO kicked of on 11 August 2016, when Abdullah publicly accused President Ghani of constantly bypassing him (and others). Rather than simply a swipe at the president’s management style, the speech in which he called Ghani “unfit to be president” seemed to have had three main objectives. The first was to raise several specific grievances, in particular with regard to appointments (and replacements) that had angered him and his supporters. The second aim was to answer the critics in his own ranks and signal he would no longer accept the fact that the National Unity Government (NUG) had not delivered on any of the main commitments that had been negotiated at the time. The third objective was to force the president to engage with these grievances and demands, which included greater inclusion in decision-making and progress on the processes of elections, electoral reform, a Loya Jirga and amendments to the constitution that could allow the establishment of the post of executive prime minister. The speech seemed carefully calibrated to target several audiences – supporters, critics, the president’s camp and the opposition groups waiting in the wings. It was both scathing and conciliatory at the same time (see the annex to this dispatch for the full text).

Abdullah started the substantive part of his speech by defending his support of the NUG, establishing the sacrifice he had made in doing so, and describing the patience he had shown:

The National Unity Government is not the outcome of generosity of one person to another [referring to Ghani and himself], or from one group to another. It is the result of the big sacrifice which we [referring to his election camp, or possibly himself] made. This sacrifice does not mean that it was a deal with the aim of gaining access to a government post. This sacrifice was made to save Afghanistan. Imagine if, God forbid, the elections had led to a conflict, what would have happened in our country today?

He admitted that the government had not lived up to its commitments and pointed to the security situation as a main reason why electoral reform, the elections and the Loya Jirga had taken a back seat. He then discussed a series of concrete gripes related to the president’s lack of consultation: “Some say there are always tensions and disputes between us [Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani] over the distribution of government posts. However, let me tell you that we [Abdullah] have always emphasised on principles and key issues.” He then listed several examples where, in his opinion, the president had violated these principles and had failed to abide by the terms of the agreement (see below) and zeroed in on the president’s refusal to engage with him on the main fundamental issues:

Following a series of developments a few days ago, I phoned the president telling him that I would hold one fundamental meeting with him where we would discuss the bases of all issues. Why were electoral reforms not introduced? Was it my fault? I promised the people of Afghanistan to reform the electoral system. Dozens of other meetings are held, but when it comes to meetings on electoral reforms, one is held today and another four months later. They said they would hold a meeting this afternoon. I told them that I would no longer attend such general meetings unless the main issues facing people are discussed.

Abdullah emphasised that he did not intend to blow up or boycott the National Unity Government and clearly stated that he considered the duration of the national unity government to be “a full election term.”

I should assure everyone that we cannot boycott the government. Some say we should quit the government unless electoral reforms are introduced. [But] we formed this government just as we established the interim administration [in 2001]. We liberated Kabul and the far-flung areas of Afghanistan [from the Taleban]. How can you say we should quit this government?

Between the lines, he also indicated that he did not want to fatally derail communication with the president, but instead to jolt the dialogue into action:

From these men and women who have come here [today], to my political allies, they are all unhappy with me, asking why did you not insist on particular issues? I have showed patience and said that the work would be done with prudence. This is all I had to tell you here. God willing, I will hold talks on these issues with the president of Afghanistan on Saturday and I hope that common sense will prevail and the ground realities of Afghanistan will be understood. The time to deceive a person by giving him a piece of pastry is over. One can no longer deceive a person with mere words. The people of Afghanistan know the realities today. Two points: God willing, the NUG will remain intact. And we will continue with our work in the NUG by playing a fundamental role as required.

But at the same time the speech was clearly meant to rankle the president and to stir up of a sense of crisis and animosity, while portraying an attitude of prudence and patience on his side. This ‘crisis’ would then need to be defused and mediated, with the help of his supporters and assorted international diplomats and officials – a pattern that had also characterised the negotiations surrounding the electoral audit and the drafting of the political agreement that led to the establishment of the NUG in 2014.

What had been going on in the days before?

In the days immediately preceding Abdullah’s decision to annoy the president and to signal to his supporters that he would no longer accept being pushed around, there seem to have been at least four issues that were relevant to his decision.

The event that directly triggered the outburst was the appointment of former AIHRC commissioner and senior adviser to the president Nader Nadery as head of the Civil Service Commission on 9 August 2016 – an appointment that Abdullah had sought to block. Nadery replaced Ahmad Mushahed, a Jamiati and son-in-law of late former president Ustad Rabbani. His appointment, according to the Abdullah camp, represented another instance of ‘encroachment’ where the president’s side claimed as its own government positions that should have been divided equally. (1)

But Abdullah also mentioned other instances in his speech, including the introduction of AGO candidates whom he considered unfit (which seemed largely driven by his annoyance over the president’s refusal to appoint his candidate, former IEC chairperson Fazl Ahmad Manawi, to the position) and the awarding of a medal to the finance minister, whom he believes is being given far too many authorities and signs of appreciation. (2)

Secondly, there had been some suggestion of progress in the field of electoral reform and the distribution of the electronic ID cards in the days before. On 8 August 2016 Abdullah told the council of ministers that the new electoral decree was in its final stages. The local media further reported that Abdullah had proposed a compromise solution for the contentious issue of which personal details should be shown on the electronic ID (for background on the controversy, see AAN reporting here). (3) Real progress, however, was according to Abdullah bogged down by the failure of the president to engage (and meet with him). Abdullah now wanted to show that further delays should not be blamed on him.

Thirdly, there were hints that the ‘peace process’ with Hezb-e Islami was about to restart. On 8 August 2016, the Afghan press reported that a Hezb-e Islami delegation had travelled to Kabul to again “finalise the peace agreement” (see earlier AAN reporting here). This development was not referenced in Abdullah’s speech, but will have been watched with suspicion by some in Abdullah’s circle. Some see efforts to bring Hezb-e Islami and the Taleban into the government fold as an attempt to strengthen the Pashtun hand in a political field that is in many ways increasingly organised along ethnic lines (Pashtun/non-Pashtun). Also, relations between Jamiat and Hezb have been tense since the ‘jihadi’ times. (The ‘news’ that Hezb-e Islami is close to a deal was repeated again on 4 September 2016).

Fourthly, the weeks before Abdullah’s speech saw an increase in pressure, both on the government and on Abdullah himself, from the side of Jamiat-e Islami. The party that introduced Abdullah Abdullah as its presidential candidate during the 2014 elections started making public preparations (again) for an upcoming national congress (4). A Jamiat spokesman told Shamshad daily (8 August 2016) that they would discuss whether they should put pressure on the government to finally introduce the promised reforms, or possibly consider an alternative to the government altogether. Acting Balkh governor, and head of Jamiat’s executive council, Atta travelled to Kabul and stayed there. The various possible reasons for his visit – discussions around his possibly impending removal, the wish to put pressure on the government, and the fact that he may be eyeing the Jamiat leadership himself – could all be true at the same time.

In the meantime circles around the president continued to explore alternatives that involved him completing his term possibly without Abdullah, or in a different arrangement. Options that were reportedly discussed, other than making this format work despite its apparent problems, included giving Abdullah a new non-executive position (such as senior adviser, senior minister, head of the council of ministers, or even have him replace General Dostum as first Vice President) or getting rid of him all together. The fact that these options were still on the table will also have stirred Abdullah to signal the political price of such a move. Opposition groups, in the meantime, continued to challenge the NUG altogether, as it approached its two-year anniversary which its detractors see as the agreement’s ‘expiry date.’

The pressure on Abdullah – whether from the party of from the looming NUG ‘expiry date’ – has galvanised a greater cooperation between the chief executive and his erstwhile backers, at least for the moment. Apart from focusing on the specific of who gets to decide what inside the government, there also seems to be a concerted effort to force the president to now seriously engage with the demands included in the NUG agreement: elections, electoral reform, Loya Jirga and the possibility of a prime ministerial position. The desire for these processes to take place may be genuine, despite the immense practical and political difficulties involved in each of them. But the push is also aimed at changing the discussions that surround the NUG’s upcoming two-year anniversary in an effort to use the date to revive rather than dissolve the agreement.

What went on in the days after the NUG ‘crisis’?

After Abdullah and Ghani exchanged barbs and refused to meet, prominent Jamiat members – respectively former water and power minister Ismail Khan, current foreign affairs minister Salahuddin Rabbani and Atta Muhammad Nur – met with the president where they spoke in support of Abdullah’s stance. High-level US and other diplomats sought to mediate between the two men. When the two leaders finally agreed to meet – the first of several meetings was on 17 August 2016 – sources within the palace, rightly or wrongly, indicated that the president would take the opportunity to review the NUG agreement to see what shape it should take beyond its two-year mark.

Since then, public communication has been dominated by the chief executive’s office. It has released a string of statements indicating that the two leaders have agreed on the full implementation of the NUG agreement (including clauses that had so far been left unfulfilled, such as the establishment of a commission to draft amendments to the constitution) – just as Abdullah had demanded. The palace has however been silent. According to deputy presidential spokesperson Zafar Hashemi, it was agreed that Abdullah’s office would brief the press, but the reason is not immediately clear. It may have been a concession to Abdullah to allow his office to frame the discussions the way it wants to, but it is more likely that the president has simply chosen to refrain from comments until it is clear what the outcome of the discussions is. This also means that the president has, up till now, in no way publicly committed to any of the agreements the two leaders may have reached. Whatever the case, for the moment we have been spared the conflicted messaging that has accompanied much of the electoral reform process, and similar negotiations, in the past.

In the meantime pressures on the president increased. An increasing chorus, in the media and in his own circles, complained about his management style and tendency to micromanage. Also politically he is currently bearing the brunt of much of the pressure the government is under.

The Enlightenment Movement continues to call on the president, rather than the joint government, to heed their demands: the rerouting of an industrial-grade electricity line through Bamyan (for background see here) and the conducting of a proper investigation into the 23 July 2016 terrorist attack on the movement’s mass demonstration. Activists have threatened to “try the president in the court of public opinion” if he fails to do so. In the week preceding 2 September 2016, the 40th day after the attack that left over 80 people dead and hundreds injured, the president sought to ease tensions and preempt large-scare demonstrations by visiting Bamyan to inaugurate several projects (most of which had already been inaugurated in the past). The visit was overshadowed by protests and reports that activists had been detained in an attempt to prevent the demonstrations (see also this Human Rights Watch report). As an attempt to placate the Hazaras and prevent further mobilisation, it seems to have backfired. There is a concern that the diaspora branches of the Enlightenment Movement may seek to publicly embarrass the president while he is in Brussels (as was done during the president’s visit to London). (5)

Although the Enlightenment Movement is not related to the Abdullah campaign – several of its prominent members are former Ghani supporters – there is potential for common cause. Among Hazaras, but also other non-Pashtun groups, there is a latent suspicion that Ghani’s unilateralism, rather than representing a personal leadership style, in reality stems from an unwillingness to share power based on a Pashtun nationalist outlook. There is also a strand among Tajiks and Hazaras (although among Tajiks seemingly more limited to the political elites than among the Hazaras) that views the current period as a unique historical opportunity to finally establish a political system in Afghanistan where Pashtun rule is not an automatic given.

The Hazaras are politically the most organised group. They can, despite in-fighting when it comes to their leaders, count on a sophisticated volunteer network, financial support from the diaspora and a base of supporters that can be mobilised around substantive demands and grievances.

A second pressure point was the reburial of the remains of former king Habibullah II aka Habibullah Kalakani and a number of his supporters that were summarily executed in November 1929, on the 87th anniversary of this event – an issue Abdullah had already raised in his 11 August speech. The act was obviously symbolic and the timing was poignant. Other than Ustad Rabbani in the early 1990s, Habibullah is the only non-Pashtun ruler Afghanistan has had. The demands for reburial and greater respect coincided with the re-energised demands by Abdullah and his supporters that the electoral and government system be changed in ways that could create space for a non-Pashtun head of state. The event itself was chaotic and difficult to control and the fact that the streets of Kabul were full of armed un-uniformed men, reminiscent of the days of Kabul’s civil war, will have escaped nobody. When the ceremony moved from the hastily assigned burial ground to where they had initially meant to bury the former king, a shoot-out ensued between supporters of the reburial and security forces linked to first Vice President General Dostum. The proceeding provided was an opportunity to portray a show of force and to send the kind of implied threat that has by now become familiar.

Where do we go from here?

Although there is no mention of an expiry date in the NUG agreement, some take the clause that calls for a Loya Jirga within two years – “to consider the post of an executive prime minister” – to mean that the current set-up was supposed to be dissolved after this date (rather than the event). Some in Ghani’s circle would like to argue that beyond 19 September 2016 (6) they no longer need to share the government with Abdullah and his supporters. Opposition voices argue that the expiry of the deadline means the whole government should be replaced, either through new elections, a ‘traditional’ (as opposed to ‘constitutional’) Loya Jirga and/or an interim administration. US State Secretary John Kerry sought to lay the matter to rest during his visit in April 2016 (for more background, see AAN reporting here), but did not fully manage. But although the issue has not been definitively settled, it is unlikely there will be serious sustained calls for the government to step down for this reason. This is particularly the case as the international donors have been clear that this is the government and set-up they support – a position that will be reiterated at the international donor conference on 5 October 2016 in Brussels.

For now the crisis between the two leaders seems to have been a successful political tactic by Abdullah to reposition himself vis-à-vis the president and the critics among his own allies. It was also a way for his supporters to try to strengthen their hand at a time when the international community could be counted upon to rush to the rescue in the face of an upcoming international donor conference. It is however not clear to what extent they will have succeeded in the long run, as the president has so far shown little indication of how he views the talks that have come out of the crisis. (7) So far, the president seems to have maintained the status quo in which Abdullah is the demanding party and the president decides how much he will give or give in.

And although the direct ‘crisis’ has been averted and the two leaders are expected to work with each other again, going forward, the fundamental issues remain: a deep disagreement over how the elections went, why the NUG came into being and what this means for the balance of power and legitimacy within the partnership – complicated by the (ebbing and waning) conviction that the other side is not acting in good faith. (8)

 

(1) The appointment of Nadery had been part of a complex negotiation between the two camps that involved several interlinked moves, including the possible swapping of ministries between the two sides (Finance and Foreign Affairs) and the removal of Atta Muhammad Nur as acting governor of Balkh. One of the reasons Abdullah opposed Nadery’s appointment was that,  according to him, it represented another instance where government agencies (in this case the independent organs) that should have been equally divided between the two sides, were being taken over by the president. In this view, the president already had the National Directorate for Security (NDS) and the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG), had recently also taken the Attorney General’s Office and the Supreme Court, and was now claiming the IARCSC too.

Abdullah had this to say about Nadery in his speech: “When someone who has not [even] worked in a government agency for four days is appointed as head of the whole administrative reform of the country, we definitely [should] have a say in that. This is not because of rivalry or for the sake of our election team. It is because we made promises to the people.” Nadery, who had earlier also been given the title of Ambassador for Freedom of Expression, replaced Ahmad Mushahed, an Abdullah ally, who had headed the Civil Service Commission since the early Karzai years, presiding over an organisation that was accused of rampant corruption and nepotism. Mushahed was subsequently appointed presidential adviser for administrative reform on 12 August 2016.

An earlier appointment that had also represented a ‘takeover’ by the president’s camp and that had angered Abdullah was the recall of Ambassador to Spain Massud Khalili, a Jamiati and former confidante of Ahmad Shah Massud (who was injured in the attack that killed Massud). As an added irritant Khalili was replaced by IEC Chair Yusuf Nuristani in July 2016, whom the Abdullah camp hold responsible for the 2014 “fraudulent election.” The appointment of Nuristani as Ambassador to Spain had been rumoured ever since he resigned as IEC Chair in March 2016 (although Nuristani at the time vehemently denied he had been promised a position). The appointment was widely seen as a reward for services delivered. Abdullah, however, did not refer to this in his speech – it may have been too long ago.

(2) With regard to the Finance Minister Eklil Hakimi Abdullah said, “We know where the problems are and what has caused them. Ministries are paralysed by nepotism. A minister was conferred the medal of Wazir Akbar Khan. The question is whether he really deserved it or not. The cabinet must discuss whether that minister has truly achieved something.” Hakimi, who received the medal on 7 August 2016 for “outstanding services,” is a close confidant to president who is often tasked with responsibilities that exceed his position as minister. Abdullah, irritated by the ‘special treatment’ Hakimi and other ministers that are appointed and trusted by Ghani receive, referred to the finance minister again in his speech when he said, “Most ministries are being run by acting ministers and a minister does not have the authority to even appoint an acting official. Once it was said that the minister of finance should appoint the heads of the finance departments of all ministries, but later it was realised that this was against the Afghan Constitution.”

(3) The compromise solution involved registering the person’s ethnicity on the chip of the electronic ID without printing it on the card itself. The person would then receive a printout of all the registered data (described in the media as “mentioning a person’s ethnicity on a separate document.”) The proposal was criticised by both Mandegar and Shamshad, two media outlets that are on opposites sides of the controversy.

(4) The Jamiat congress should, strictly speaking, have been held years ago, as the party’s constitution called for the election of a new permanent leader within a year after the assassination of its original leader Burhanuddin Rabbani in September 2011. His son, foreign minister Salahuddin Rabbani, has in the meantime been acting as head.

(5) In their statement (no 32) released on 2 September 2016, 40th day of the attack, the Enlightenment Movement announced 27 September 2016 as the starting date for another round of “indefinite demonstrations” across the country and internationally in front of the offices of the United Nations. By that time the political agreement will have completed its second anniversary (19 September 2016), but the international donor conference in Brussels, on 5 October 2016, may be affected.

(6) There has been some confusion over the date, but generally 29 Sonbola 1395 (which is 19 September 2016), ie two years after the original agreement was signed is considered to be the two-year anniversary – or, alternatively, the end date – of the agreement.

(7) President Ghani, however, did seem to refer to the arguments with Abdullah and others, in his – eloquent – address to the Joint Coordination and Management Board (JCMB), a high-level meeting that met on 4 September in Kabul to prepare for the Brussels conference:

The wounds of our bloodshed, displacement, and conflict are ever-present and they are important. But our population is reformist. They are looking for hope. They hate the bad press our country gets for corruption, for narcotics, and, I am sorry to say, for the fighting amidst our elites. And, here I do not exempt myself and our administration‫.. … Turning the thing of shreds and patches into a powerful set of instruments for ending poverty was never going to be an easy task. Replacing fragmentation with coherence was always going to bring with it broken eggshells and wounded egos. But we will not be stopped. … Pulling the civil service out from the spoils system is going to be a difficult and painful challenge. There will be howls of protest and pain as the noose against corruption grows ever tighter. Ignore them. We cannot afford a civil service of arrogant appointees who do not know their job, do not come to office, and do not show the Afghan people that service to the community is their right and obligation.

(8) According to Ghani’s people, they were the real winners of the election. They moreover argue that the president heads the NUG and that, of the two leaders, he is the only one whose position is constitutionally mandated. Abdullah’s people on the other hand believe that they were the winners of the election, that the outcome was stolen from them through fraud facilitated by a partisan electoral administration, that it was their sacrifice and willingness to compromise that prevented the country from spiraling out of control and that this should be acknowledged and rewarded. To complicate matters, the two sides do not trust each other to be of good faith. Ghani’s side sees (or portrays) the Abdullah camp as interested mainly in positions and privileges, while Abdullah’s camp does not trust that the circles around the president are serious when it comes to safeguarding the security of the country, particularly (but not exclusively) in the Northern non-Pashtun areas.

 

Annex. Text of CEO Abdullah’s speech on 11 August

Below are excerpts from Abdullah’s remarks at a function on World Youth Day in Kabul broadcast on private Tolo News TV on 11 August. The text is based on a translation by BBC Monitoring, with minor amendments for clarity.

[Passage omitted: Abdullah talks about the importance of the youth in rebuilding Afghanistan, the efforts of his government to tackle youth unemployment, the increasing role of educated Afghans in different walks of life, and the government’s commitment to deal with security and economic challenges.]

[Abdullah continues] I would like to shed light on a few other points which are linked to your lives, destiny and the days and night you pass.

First – about the National Unity Government [NUG]. You hear comments that the term in office of the government is two years and will expire within a week or two. You know that NUG has been formed as a result of election, despite the fact that the ballot had its own particular problems later. Our young brothers and sisters played a major role in this. The NUG represents the votes of all the people of Afghanistan. We made a lot of commitments to the people of Afghanistan.

Of course there were shortcomings as well during these nearly two years, which I will point out now.

The term of the national unity government is a full election term. The next presidential elections will be held in the fifth year of the current government. Under the accord, commitments were made, such as holding parliamentary elections. Commitments were made to first introduce electoral reforms and then hold parliamentary elections and call a Loya Jirga in line with the Constitution to confirm the post of the chief executive officer as the executive prime minister. I mean under the NUG accord the post of the chief executive officer would change to an executive prime minister after amending the Constitution in a constitutional Loya Jirga. Until the Loya Jirga is held, the CEO post cannot change to an executive prime ministerial post. We had hoped that the elections would be held on time followed by the constitutional Loya Jirga. This is because, without the election, the constitutional Loya Jirga could not be held. Unfortunately, we have fallen short in this area, maybe mostly because of the security problem. The enemies of Afghanistan thought that last year would be the year of Afghanistan’s collapse and the full return of the Taleban and terrorist groups. If you look at the issue from the viewpoint of priority, the most important priority was to rescue of Afghanistan and to safeguard its survival. [applause]

Since the elections have not been held yet, the constitutional Loya Jirga cannot be held on the planned date. So, all our efforts should be focused on holding the elections so that the entire terms of the NUG accord could be implemented, God willing. I just wanted to shed light on the essence of NUG. This is because a lot of debates are held and comments are made on the accord and some knowingly or unknowingly comment on it.

The second point is about the nature of the work of NUG. The NUG is not the outcome of generosity of one person to another, or from one group to another. It is the result of the big sacrifice which we [referring to his election camp] made. [applause] This sacrifice does not mean that it was a deal with the aim of gaining access to a government post. This sacrifice was made to save Afghanistan. Imagine if, God forbid, the elections had led to a conflict, what would have happened in our country today – while fighting was continuing after 2014 and terrorists mobilised all their forces and launched attacks with the idea of overthrowing the government in 2014 and 2015. What would have happened if we [the two election camps] had entered into another conflict? God forbid, Afghanistan would have faced a crisis with no path to survival. What would have happened to the fate of millions of people, both women and men, who had made sacrifices for the sake of relative peace and stability, and for the fate of the country? This was the situation when the NUG was formed. It was formed based on an accord and the commitment to this accord is mandatory and necessary.

Let me refer to a couple of points. Some say there are always tensions and disputes between us [Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani] over the distribution of government posts. However, let me tell you that we [Abdullah] have always emphasised on principles and key issues. We claim that we believe in meritocracy and that competent people should be appointed in government posts. So, if a person who has not even worked in the government for four days is appointed to be responsible for reforming the entire administration of Afghanistan, we [should] definitely have a say in that [applause]. This is not because of rivalry or for the sake of our election team. This is what we promised to the people. Reforms were our main promise. When reforms are undermined under the pretext of reforms, we must take a stance and express our opinion. Unfortunately, these points sometimes cause concern to our people.

Let me assure you that the NUG has never been engaged in any dispute over supreme national interests, such as national defence, protection of the territorial integrity of the country, restoration of nationwide peace and public welfare. But, as I told you earlier, problems do emerge sometimes when it comes to decision-making. This government has been formed and a person has become the president whom we call the president of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan based on a political accord, meaning that we have proven our commitment to the accord from the very outset and we will continue to do so. We consider it the achievement of Afghans and the outcome of their sacrifices. But when a person becomes the president of a country, one must also remember that the accord as other terms as well. If all terms of the accord had been implemented as agreed, we would have had fewer problems today. For example, a mayor was appointed in a province without our knowledge where up to 400,000 people had voted for us. He was appointed without us being informed and without people being consulted. But, today his case has been referred to the prosecution department for questioning. As a result, people of the province had to miss one year. Our insistences are because of our past and current commitments to reforms. There are many other examples of this. Someone, who could not define the duties and responsibilities of an attorney-general was referred to me for this post. The referral letter is in my hand. I was told that he was more experienced and professional than every other candidate interviewed so far. I conducted a simple interview with him in the presence of the serving chief justice and the second vice-president. But, if we insist that such appointments are a serious betrayal of the legal and judicial department, it is then said that this is a two, three or five-headed government [applause]. We have promised to the people and the international community about [reforms].

Tomorrow [ie in the near future] we will go to the Brussels conference where we will have to talk about the commitments. It is very easy to write on a piece of paper that we have done the following things. But it is futile unless they are fulfilled. The essence of a government calling itself democratic is to keep its promises with the people and to respect the views of people. Millions of people are behind the state and the NUG. We have included them in the government and are here to support them. We are not regretting it, as this was a very informed rather than an emotional decision. And it was not made under any pressure. We made this decision in the light of the situation at the time, we decided what we would do then and in the future. The main reason for the nationwide stability when we came to power was the fact that millions of people lent their ear to our calls, from Herat to Torkham and from Spin Boldak to Faryab. Noone should underestimate this. No one should take it lightly. [It is wrong] to consult only a few irresponsible persons with no roots and bases in this country who have come here with the idea of turning Afghanistan into the scene of their selective approach. [It is wrong] to consult those, who do not have a star in the sky and nothing on earth. He has ignored the views that represent the views of millions of people. I very clearly speak to the people of Afghanistan.

Following a series of developments a few days ago, I phoned the president telling him that I would hold one fundamental meeting with him where we would discuss the bases of all issues. Why were electoral reforms not introduced? Was it my fault? I promised the people of Afghanistan to reform the electoral system. Dozens of other meetings are held, but when it comes to meetings on electoral reforms, one is held today and another four months later. They said they would hold a meeting this afternoon. I told them that I would no longer attend such general meetings unless the main issues facing people are discussed [applause]. We must remain committed to the people rather than saying at meetings in the palace that everywhere in Afghanistan the situation is rosy. We have a deep knowledge of the problems facing our people and Afghanistan. We know where the problems are and what has caused them. Ministries are paralysed by nepotism. A minister was conferred the medal of Wazir Akbar Khan. The question is whether he really deserved it or not. The cabinet must discuss whether that minister has truly achieved something [applause]. There are dozens of other such issues. Actually, ministers are not allowed to have a say at meetings. We have witnessed this and we will carry forward the state affairs with patience and prudence.

We will continue to exercise patience. The responsibility we have before the people is not easy to fulfil. This is an extremely huge and historic responsibility. Hundreds of thousands of people are discontented with us thinking that we have struck a deal and have forgotten their wishes. [But] we have dedicated the entire time of our lives to the people, the past one and a half years was little compared to that. [But] more needs to be done. There are many fundamental issues. The government is paralysed. Actually, cabinet ministers are not allowed to have a say. [The president] lectures the cabinet meeting for over an hour. He should also give a minister 15, 30 or at least 10 minutes to have a say to lend an ear to his problems. Most ministries are run by acting ministers and a minister does not have the authority to even appoint an acting official. Once it was said that the minister of finance should appoint the heads of finance departments of all ministries, but later it was realised this was against the Afghan Constitution.

Coming back to the electoral reforms, the question is whether we should again hold the same election. Do you call that an election? Are we satisfied with the previous election? No one is satisfied. [But] I should assure everyone that we can not boycott the government. Some say that we should quit the government unless electoral reforms are introduced. [But] we formed this government just as we established the interim administration [in 2001]. We liberated Kabul and the far-flung areas of Afghanistan [from the Taleban]. How can you say we should quit this government? Our leader Ustad [Burhanuddin Rabbani], who was the head of the state for 10 years [1992-2002] and who suffered serious problems following the martyrdom of [Ahmad Shah Massud], did not enter the presidential palace. Instead, he established his office in another building and said he did not come to build a government of his own again, but a government representing everyone. He said the enemies of Afghanistan had deprived the country of such a chance in the past and had imposed a war, but the international community would again focus its attention on Afghanistan. So, he said, he would do other work instead.

[Passage omitted: Abdullah says partner countries and donors at the recent Warsaw summit praised the two Afghan leaders for working together in the NUG. He says he has shown a tremendous amount of patience so far and that he vowed not to comprise the aspirations of the people. He says electoral reforms must take place. He blames the president for delay in the electronic ID card project and vows not to allow anyone to undermine the project. He says he will also hold talks with the president on the people’s request to rebury the remains of former king Habibullah Kalakani].

Well, should we allow the NUG to be challenged? I said that I was the first one who gave legitimacy to the government. I signed the paper saying Mohammad Ashraf Ghani is the president of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. I was the first person who did this. That was the beginning of the legitimacy of the current system. As to what happened after that, I should say debates and discussions happen even in governments which are not coalition governments or which have a different background.

[Abdullah jokes and laughs after receiving a letter] These guys sometimes cause disturbances. They said it would be better if I mentioned one issue. [He continues] Debates and arguments do take place in a government and this is normal. However, if a person does not have the patience for a discussion, he is also not fit for the presidency. [applause] If a person does not have the patience to listen to someone, he will not listen even to the language and literature that I use when raising issues. I do not say that they should listen to everything I say. [Passage omitted: A quote from former President Hamid Karzai]. With all due respect, the presidential position is a respected position. I have respected the president and I want him to be respected by the Afghan people. But respect is not thing that is given as a gift [just] on paper.

[Passage omitted: Abdullah accuses Ghani of failing to win his and the people’s trust and praises several senior security officials for joining the frontlines in Helmand amid escalating conflict.] We are facing such a situation in our country, but our leaders are interested in something else, as if nothing is happening here. We are fighting terrorism and facing dozens of other challenges, such as narcotics, the problem of refugees, poverty, unemployment. Today I sought the views of a person who has a specialisation in financial affairs. He said the country’s GDP and per capita income has declined. This is unfortunate. In such a situation, we must pay attention to our problems and priorities. We must try to properly use our time, energy and ability. Is it worth to call into question the entire NUG and the accord by making decisions without consultation? Is this what the people expect of us? If the NUG accord does not mean vetoing the president’s order, it also does not mean acting arbitrarily. [applause]

From these men and women who have come here, to my political allies, they are all unhappy with me, asking why did you not insist on particular issues? I have showed patience and said that the work would be done with prudence. This is all I had to tell you here. God willing, I will hold talks on these issues with the president of Afghanistan on Saturday and I hope that common sense will prevail and the ground realities of Afghanistan will be understood. The time to deceive a person by giving him a piece of pastry is over. One can no longer deceive a person with mere words. The people of Afghanistan know the realities today.

Two points: God willing, the NUG will remain intact. And we will continue with our work in the NUG by playing a fundamental role as required. If we look at the opportunities our people have, I really regret the current situation. The people of Afghanistan have very good opportunities, but they face very big challenges as well. [Passage omitted: He talks about youth unemployment, violence against women and gives an overview of his lifetime activities]

Source: Tolo News 11 August 2016 in Dari

 

Just weeks before the upcoming donor conference in Brussels on 5 October 2016, the two leaders of Afghanistan’s National Unity Government (NUG) erupted into a fierce, public argument. Chief Executive Abdullah accused President Ghani of unilateralism and called him “unfit” for his office; the president hit back implying that the rival camp was merely trying to block government reforms. The core of the argument, however, was a last minute push by the Abdullah camp to put the full implementation of the 2014 NUG agreement back on the agenda, in the face of discussions on its possible imminent ‘expiry.’ In this first dispatch, of two, AAN’s Ali Yawar Adili, Lenny Linke and Martine van Bijlert revisit how the verbal sparring unfolded and how the various sides tried to defuse it.

In an upcoming second dispatch, AAN’s Martine van Bijlert will dissect the speech that started the scuffle, explore the political context that led up to the fall-out and consider where we may go from here.

How it began

The recent public crisis between CEO Abdullah and President Ghani kicked off on 11 August 2016 when, during a gathering to celebrate International Youth Day, Abdullah publicly criticised the president. He criticised the president’s unilateralism, raising issues such as appointments made and merits awarded without consulting him. He in particular blamed Ghani for not making time to meet with him one-on-one to discuss “fundamental issues,” leading into his most stinging comment that a person who “does not have the patience for a discussion, also is not fit for the presidency.” He then defended his participation in the NUG and discussed the challenges facing the country and how they had, in his view, stopped the government from implementing the NUG agreement. He stressed the need for elections, electoral reform and a Loya Jirga that would decide on whether to turn his position into an executive prime ministerial position. Towards the end of his speech he said that, despite his patience and prudence, the time to be deceived by mere words was over and that he hoped these issues could be addressed in his upcoming meeting with the president and that “common sense” and “an understanding of the realities” would prevail. (Full video, in Dari, here. Highlights here.)

President Ghani responded in kind, publicly, during another Youth Day celebration on 12 August 2016, hitting back that: “I too do not trust those who do not trust me because of their negative interests … [because] whenever I take action against corruption, part of a faction which has taken hundred of millions [not clear whether this referred to dollars or Afghanis] raises its voice to say that the president monopolises all power.” (1) His public reaction was followed by a terse palace statement that stressed the importance of unity and described Abdullah’s remarks as not in line with “the norms and spirit of governance.” The statement did not refer to Abdullah as “Chief Executive,” addressing him instead as mohtaram Dr Abdullah Abdullah, a generic prefix that means “esteemed.” The statement described the National Unity Government as having patiently worked for almost two years “under the leadership of the president.” The statement ended by saying that the National Unity Government would continue to move ahead “as a whole” and would soon conduct “serious and effective discussions about his [Abdullah’s] remarks.”

So although both sides made sure their grievances were loudly heard, neither side gave an indication of wanting to irreparably damage or destroy the partnership. They were, however, playing a risky game, given the precarious security situation in several parts of the country, the political tensions over issues such as the terrorist attack on the 23 July 2016 Enlightenment Movement demonstration in Kabul and the reburial of former king Habibullah II, aka Habibullah Kalakani, and the expectations of the donors and the public that the government would focus on presenting a unified, professional and well-prepared stance at the upcoming Brussels conference.

Joining in

Abdullah’s speech was speedily endorsed by several prominent supporters who at the same time sought to emphasise what, according to them, the main points of the speech had been, most prominently acting Balkh Governor Atta Muhammad Nur, who had come to Kabul in preparation for an upcoming political congress of Jamiat-e Islami (he heads the party’s executive council) and former NDS head Amrullah Saleh, a former Jamiati who now heads his own movement, the Green Trend. Nur said Abdullah had “categorically voiced the people’s demands and ideals” and called on the president and his team to pay due attention to the fact that the National Unity Government was the outcome of a political agreement between two sides and that all decisions should thus be taken jointly.

Saleh announced his “firm support” for Abdullah’s demands which according to him consisted of the “implementation of real reforms, respect for the political agreement and the implementation of all its clauses, amendment of the constitution, reform of the electoral system, the distribution of electronic ID cards and an end to the personalisation of the government’s system and agencies.” He echoed Abdullah’s criticism of the president’s attempts to concentrate all political power in his own hand, adding that “the real problem is that one faction thinks they won the elections; [but] they did not win the election. There was huge fraud in the elections. What legitimises the government is the signing of the political agreement. … [But] they try to consolidate their personal power and the price that they are willing to pay is to damage the national unity of Afghanistan. They have concentrated authorities in one point, they treat the ministers unequally and their definition of meritocracy is imbued with prejudices and factionalism.”

On 13 August 2016 Abdullah met with a large number of senior allies to show that his stance was widely supported (see here and here). Apart from Atta and Saleh, these included his deputies in the NUG Muhammad Khan and Muhammad Muhaqeq, Foreign Minister Salahuddin Rabbani (also acting head of Jamiat party), former defence minister Bismillah Muhammadi, minister of justice Abdul Basir Anwar, head of the commission for overseeing the implementation of the political agreement Muhammad Nateqi and Nangarhar MP Mirwais Yasini. They expressed support for the position of the CEO and “insisted on the unconditional implementation of the political agreement.”

Escalation

The president, in response, cancelled the one-on-one meeting Abdullah had referred to in his 11 August speech and that had been scheduled for 13 August 2016 before the tensions arose (details here, in Dari). The tit-for-tat and abrupt cancellation of the meeting alarmed western diplomats and resulted in a steady stream of visitors and invitations in an attempt to advise and defuse. The US ambassador for instance invited Abdullah for a closed-door meeting and the following day, on 14 August 2016, the UN and the EU special representatives as well as the Indian ambassador went to meet Abdullah in his office in the Sapedar Palace, where he, according to the statements released by his office, again “emphasised his position on the implementation of the political agreement.”

On 14 August 2016, Abdullah sought to further mobilise his allies in an address to a large gathering of political leaders who had backed him in the 2014 presidential elections. He apologised for failing to fulfil the promises made to them over the last two years, defended his decision to accept the NUG arrangement as “a way to rescue Afghanistan from crisis” and justified his recent public criticism: “What I said on Thursday was not driven by sentiments, emotions, anger or personal demands, and it was not an exaggeration, but rather [reflected] the reality that exists. The people have to know where the problems lie.” He then sought to portray a tough stance, announcing that he would change his ways and show “a new face” – because the people “can no longer bear the situation” – while reiterating his demand that the NUG political agreement be implemented in full.

During the gathering, governor Atta, according to his own Facebook page, raised the issue of what Abdullah would do if his new attitude would not lead to the desired results when he asked: “What is your red line and what is the deadline? If your rival [i.e. president Ghani] crosses this line, what will we do next?” If the issue was indeed raised, it did not appear to have been answered.

Abdullah’s escalation was followed by several mediatory attempts to de-escalate. High Peace Council Chairman Pir Ahmad Gailani offered to mediate (but was not taken up on the offer), while the US government, through Elizabeth Trudeau, Director of the Department of State’s Press Office, sought to downplay the affair in a 15 August press briefing saying: “I would say we’ve seen the comments. We believe the Government of National Unity has made significant progress in Afghanistan. We believe that that’s the path forward and we continue to support it.” (2) On 19 August US State Secretary Kerry called both leaders to stress “the importance to move forward with political and economic reforms.”

The opposition weighs in

The various opposition movements that have sprung up since 2015 and that regularly criticise the NUG, or openly call it illegitimate, unsurprisingly, weighed in as well. Among the most outspoken was the New National Front of Afghanistan, led by former minister Anwar-ul-Haq Ahadi. He reiterated the front’s position on 12 August 2016, mildly at first, and then more explicitly on 25 August, when it said in a statement that:

The National Front believes the legitimacy crisis in Afghanistan is very deep. The best way to address this crisis is fresh presidential elections. … In the short run, the National Front proposes the end of the National Unity Government and the formation of a participatory and broad-based government whose members enjoy professionalism and political weight. … The National Unity Government formula, whether its leaders are at loggerheads or in unison, is not a good formula for governance. As it completes its two years, it is time for Afghanistan to have a new start, let the failed experience be history and [let us] start experiencing a new government that enjoys both professionalism and public support.

Former President Hamed Karzai, in an interview with Radio Azadi, as usual, emphasised the need for a Loya Jirga: “If a Loya Jirga is not convened, it will cause problems for our country and increase discontent. … I am sure that the traditional Loya Jirga will not only approve and renew the legitimacy of the system but will also find a way out of the existing problems. This is in the interest of the country and of our two brothers who lead the government and of the people of Afghanistan.”

Sayyaf’s Council for Protection and Stability, on the other hand, was rather silent. Its spokesman told AAN it would clarify its stance in a press conference. When on 30 August 2016 the press conference was finally held, spokesman Massud Tarashtwal said, “we believe Afghanistan is greater and more important than both the president and the chief executive. Therefore, the Council for Protection and Stability sees Afghanistan as the content and the rifts between the two honourables as form and we are never ready to sacrifice the content for form. Our stance is the stance of the people of Afghanistan and [we want them] not to keep the nation in frustration anymore.”

A string of meetings

When talks between the two sides restarted, rather than speaking with Abdullah himself, President Ghani first met individually with a few of Abdullah’s prominent supporters, including former water and power minister Ismail Khan, Rabbani and Atta (who, according to his Facebook page said that “Abdullah and his allies would not back down on this issue even one inch”). It was then agreed that the two leaders would have three rounds of meetings. One where Abdullah would lay out his demands, a second where the president would respond and a third where the two would seek to reach an agreement on the main issues.

During this meeting Abdullah presented a list of demands that was immediately leaked to the press and printed in Mandegar newspaper. His demands focused, first of all, on the full implementation of the political agreement, which included “purposeful and honest” participation and representation; joint decision making and effective cooperation; the delegation of duties to the post of executive prime minister and non-interference in his affairs; full participation of the chief executive in the process of proposing and approving appointments on different levels and equitable participation in the appointments process of high ranking government officials; the establishment of a commission towards amending the Constitution; expediting the process of electoral reform; address the “time-wasting” that has prevented the start of the e-tazkera distribution; a timeline for the implementation of the political agreement.

Other demands addressed how the president managed the government and called for an end to the creation of parallel government institutions [under the president] and (3) the over-centralisation of decision making and micromanagement; an end to the executive authorities of [presidential] advisers; an end to discrimination in decision-makings and the double-standard in the treatment of ministers, ambassadors and directors of independent bodies; an end to the arbitrary and extra-legal activities and decision-making of bodies associated with the Secretariat of the National Security Council and sub-bodies of the president’s office; an end to unilateral decisions [by the president] on issues such as foreign policy, the removal of Taleban names from the sanctions list and the granting of medals, and a complete review of the appointments of the last few months.

The meeting was described as “cordial” in a palace statement that further said that the president would now “review the chief executive’s demands during upcoming meetings.”

On 22 August 2016 the worst seemed to be over when Abdullah participated in the cabinet meeting – even though he had earlier vowed he would not do so until his “disagreements” with the president were settled. But this meeting was an important one, as the cabinet was set to approve the new electoral law (a draft had already been discussed on 20 August 2016, see this palace statement). On 22 August the electoral law was indeed approved, but only “in principle.”

Omid Maisam, a deputy spokesman for the chief executive, told AAN that Abdullah had participated “for the sake of the supreme interest of the country,” but Abdullah probably also wanted to make sure he could not be blamed for further delays in a process that he was now insisting on. The draft law itself – which included a shift to single-member-constituencies and the merging of the two electoral commissions – has hit some obstacles, as Vice President Danesh, who was the main point of contact for the reform from the side of the president, and others, opposed the changes (see forthcoming AAN analysis).

On 23 August 2016, Mujib Rahimi, the spokesman for the chief executive, sought to ratchet up the heat again, telling a meeting with media figures that Abdullah would have all options on the table when meeting Ghani again: “This time the stance is very clear: full implementation of the agreement. Otherwise, we have all other options on the table which, if the meetings fail to yield results, we will put into effect, after consultation with our allies and the people.” He did not specify what these options were.

The second meeting took place on 25 August 2016 was meant as an opportunity for the president to respond to Abdullah’s demands, and to present his own stance, but instead the two men reportedly discussed confidence-building measures. The CEO’s office released a statement, again describing the atmosphere as “cordial” and saying that “the president had expressed his views” and “both leaders agreed to discuss the effective conduct of affairs within the framework of the political agreement in joint meetings next week.”‫ Abdullah, keen to keep his promise that from now on he would consult the members of his team, briefed Muhaqeq, Atta, Rabbani, Yasini, Saleh and others in his office.

After the third meeting on 28 August 2016, the CEO’s office released a statement saying the two leaders had reached agreements on the electoral system, the distribution of electronic ID cards, the establishment of a commission to amend to the constitution and the appointment of new members to the committee to oversee the implementation of the political agreement. (The current 11-member commission, headed by Muhammad Nateqi, was entirely appointed by the chief executive, as the president had at the time refused to introduce his members.) The details, according to the statement would be officially announced in the following week.

An additional meeting focusing on ‘practical issues’ took place on 31 August 2016. A statement on the CEO’s Facebook page describes it as having focused and agreed on exactly everything Abdullah had demanded. (4) It is however important to note that the palace, since its first statement on 17 August 2016, has not yet provided any reading of how all the meetings went and what kind of agreements may have been reached. (5)

On 3 September 2016, in a meeting with the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, where they discussed the political developments, the electoral reform process and the meetings between the NUG leaders, Abdullah seemed to announce the end of the rift when he said, “we adhere to reforms, working together with a new spirit and joint commitment.” And on 5 September 2016, in his opening remarks at the weekly meeting of the council of ministers, Abdullah painted an optimistic picture of the remaining three years of the National Unity Government’s term, when he said they were “witnessing an improvement to the situation … with a clarity for the next three years [in terms of] working and planning. … [Although] we foundered on our two year commitments and we should be able to explain to the people why we have had these failures, the next three years will be the three years in which the main foundation of Afghanistan will be developed.”

 

(1) This has become the common reaction by the president and his supporters to complaints by the Abdullah camp. The president said something similar again on 2 September 2016 during the inauguration of a new township when he said that “those who are making noise, are no longer able to make billions of dollars, I do not concentrate on their noise.” He added that government is not a milking cow that everybody can use for their personal interest.

(2) The spokesperson struggled to avoid saying that the US government was concerned (edited for clarity):

QUESTION: Thank you. As you know nowadays there’s conflicts or rifts between Dr. Ghani and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah [and it] has become quite bad. Do you have any comment about it? And also, do you think that the U.S. needs to send some delegation to Afghanistan to solve their problem in this sensitive time? It’s a big problem.

MS TRUDEAU: So we’ve seen Chief Executive Abdullah’s public remarks regarding President Ghani and the Government of National Unity. We remain supportive of a government of national unity, and we encourage both President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah to work together to pursue these common goals.

QUESTION: Hold on a second. This was one of – what Secretary Kerry points to as a big achievement, not just of his but for the Administration as a whole, engineering this kind of president and chief executive agreement. Is there a concern in this building [the State Department] that that is unraveling?

MS TRUDEAU: No. We – there’s not. We still think that there’s work to be done, but there has been concrete and significant progress in Afghanistan since the Government of National Unity. We do remain in touch with the Afghan Government and we will remain in touch as they move forward.

QUESTION: Yeah, I know. But you’re – really, there’s no concern at all that the progress is in danger?

MS TRUDEAU: I wouldn’t say that at all, Matt. I would say we’ve seen the comments. We believe the Government of National Unity has made significant progress in Afghanistan. We believe that that’s the path forward and we continue to support it.

QUESTION: These are the comments where he basically threatens to pull out of the government?

MS TRUDEAU: Yeah. We’ve seen those.

QUESTION: And you’re not concerned about it?

MS TRUDEAU: We remain in close touch with them on these particular comments as well as the future of the government.

QUESTION: So you are concerned that there might be a problem?

MS TRUDEAU: I’m not going to characterise it as concern, Matt. What I’m going to say is we think that there’s a lot of work to be done, but we believe a lot of progress has been made.

(3) The “creation of parallel government institutions” refers to the criticism that the president has monopolised all substantive executive discussions and decisions by establishing a slew of inter-ministerial committees and councils, often under his own chairmanship.

(4) The statement said the meeting had focused on “appointments based on the political agreement, principles of consultation, national participation, fair representation, meritocracy, honesty and commitment to the National Unity Government’s reform programmes, avoiding double standards and full participation of the chief executive in the proposing of individuals fit for senior government posts. While emphasising the implementation of the agreement articles, cooperation, differentiation of responsibilities and authorities of the president and the chief executive and strengthening of the pillars of the National Unity Government, agreements were reached.”

(5) The only indication that something may be moving was an announcement by Second Vice President Sarwar Danesh on 5 September 2016 that the electoral decree would be finalised “in the next few hours.” This looked like an attempt to still issue the decree before the parliament returns from its summer recess (scheduled to end on 6 September 2016).

The president also introduced National Security Adviser Hanif Atmar to a committee that is tasked to review the e-tazkera process. Abdullah introduced former NDS head Amrullah Saleh and his senior adviser Mustafa Mastur (who is also deputy finance minister). But, so far, there have been no public decisions or decrees yet related to what is supposed to be a more rigorous implementation of the political agreement.

Key Points The 11 m ARCIMS USV is able to accommodate a variety of modular payloads AQS-24B combines a synthetic aperture sonar and an optical laser line scan sensor ATLAS ELEKTRONIK UK (AEUK) and Northrop Grumman have partnered to demonstrate the unmanned minehunting capability of AEUK's ARCIMS

Americas

• Two former executives of Brazil’s Forjas Taurus SA have been charged with selling weapons to a well known arms trafficker to Yemen. The indictment charges that the executives oversaw the shipping of 8,000 handguns in 2013 to Fares Mohammed Hassan Mana’a, an arms smuggler active around the Horn of Africa, which were first sent to Djibouti and then redirected to Yemen. Yemen has been in the grips of a civil war between Houthi rebels and a Saudi-led coalition supporting Yemeni president, Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi.

• The USAF are to reset their Bell Helicopter UH-1N replacement program with a new request for information and a draft system requirements document to be issued on September 9. Under the long-awaited program, the new acquisition will replace the 62 Vietnam-era UH-1N Huey helicopters that support the service’s nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile bases in Wyoming, Montana and North Dakota. The service had previously wanted to sole-source 41 UH-60Ms to replace the 62 UH-1Ns, but they have now elected to open the competition to other manufacturers.

• Israel’s Space Communication Ltd may seek either $50 million or a free flight from SpaceX, following the destruction of a Spacecom communications satellite last week by an explosion at SpaceX’s Florida launch site. The failed launch has had a profound impact on Spacecom with its equity expected to decline by $30 million to $123 million following a 9% dip in its share price on Thursday, followed by a further 34% drop when trading resumed. SpaceX said on Friday that it would shift flights to a second launch site in Florida, which is nearing completion and which was last used to launch NASA’s space shuttles.

Middle East & North Africa

• Qatar has signed a deal with MBDA for the purchase of a coastal missile system that uses two types of missiles. The system will deploy the Marte ER (the Extended Range version of the Marte missile) and Exocet MM40 Block 3, and can work autonomously or data-linked to a coastal surveillance network. Further details of the sale remain unknown, but follow a deal signed in June to supply missiles for new naval vessels recently procured from Fincantieri.

• PKL Services have been awarded a $495 million USAF contract for work on the Royal Saudi Air Force’s F-15 fleet. The indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract covers maintenance, upgrade, and training of the Saudi Strike Eagle S- and SA-type fighters. Saudi Arabia has been flying the F-15SA since 2013, and features include improved performance and increased survivability at a lower life-cycle cost as well as two additional wing stations for increased payload and capability.

Europe

• With their own new shiny weapons soon to be delivered as part of its NATO upgrade, Lithuania is passing on their older ammunition to embattled neighbor Ukraine. Over 150 tons of Soviet ammunition, mainly AK-47 cartridges, are been sent from their old munitions stocks as part of a 2014 commitment to support Ukraine’s operations against a Russian-backed insurgency in eastern Ukraine. So far NATO, primarily the US, has been reluctant to directly support non-NATO member Ukraine with offensive military equipment, limiting its support to “non-lethal” aid.

Asia Pacific

• An export version of the Kalibr cruise missile may be sold to India, according to Russian media. Due to provisions of international agreements that prohibit the export of missiles with a greater flight distance, the distance of the export models could be curtailed to to less than 300km. The Kalibr has seen battlefield testing during Russia’s support for the Syrian government through their ongoing civil war with several launches targeting groups such as the Islamic State and former Al-Qaeda outfit, Jabhat Fatah al Sham (previously known as the Al Nusra Front).

• Philippines are to request a 14% defense budget increase in order to enhance maritime security and tackle Islamist militants. Large budget increase jumps are fast becoming a trend for south and east Asian governments, as many aim to counter both an increasingly assertive China and domestic security issues. With these funds, President Rodrigo Duterte has vowed to “destroy” the Islamic State-linked Abu Sayyaf, responsible for a spate of kidnappings in the country’s Muslim majority south, and also linked to last Friday’s bombing in Davao City.

Today’s Video

A CH-47 Chinook assisting an Apache stuck in a muddy Texas field :