European Union

Organisation juive européenne and Vignoble Psagot
Approximation of laws
Foodstuffs originating in the territories occupied by the State of Israel must bear the indication of their territory of origin, accompanied, where those foodstuffs come from an Israeli settlement within that territory, by the indication of that provenance

Junqueras Vies
Privileges and immunities
According to Advocate General Szpunar, MEPs’ Parliamentary mandate is acquired solely from the electorate and this cannot be conditional on the completion of any subsequent formality

 Photo by Aaron Burden on Unsplash

 

This blog entry is a follow-up to the research agenda published last month. It presents further details of the research project. It captures the evolving complexity of the research project since the most recent reflections on Bourdieusian influences in the EU studies have encouraged embracing not just one of the overall three taxonomies of science diplomacy, but two of them. More importantly, this blog entry further clarifies the conceptual modalities via a display of two schematic visualisations of the overall theoretical model and interrelations of the selected components.

In general, science diplomacy comprises three taxonomies: diplomacy for science, science for diplomacy and diplomacy in science. First selected taxonomy ‘diplomacy for science’ for the research project “is mainly about the facilitation of international scientific collaboration. Here, classical tools of diplomacy are put in use to support the scientific and technological community. It is about using diplomacy to establish cooperation agreements at the government and institutional level. The goal of diplomacy for science actions is to benefit from foreign science and technology capacity to improve the national capacity.” (Berton et al., 2016, p. 27) In line with one of the three suggestions made by Luk Van Langenhove, this research project examines the EU “science and technology contributions towards enhancing regional security in its neighbourhood” (Berton et al., 2016, p. 29). Namely, as it was argued in the first outline of the research project (Šime, 2019), in the EU Southern Neighbourhood it is pursued via efforts directed towards stabilising an area affected by volatilities.

Earlier it has been identified that the key documents governing the overall EU Southern Neighbourhood Policy do not explicitly prioritise cooperation in higher education, research, science and innovation as the key defining thematic strands (Šime, 2019). Thus, the research project is presented with full acknowledgement that the examined phenomenon is implicit science diplomacy – collaborative ties which correspond to the selected taxonomy of science diplomacy but are not defined as such by the policy-makers and are not positioned in the key policy documents as having a pivotal role. However, as elaborated earlier (Šime, 2019), such positioning does not mean that cooperative ties in higher education, research, science and innovation have a limited role in contributing to the overall goals of the EU vis-à-vis its southern neighbours. One of the leading EU science diplomacy thinkers – Luk Van Langenhove – concisely describes this less visible but no less important role of scientists and researchers in shaping the international ties or being encouraged to engage in collaborations with their foreign colleagues to attract more minds to “the EU’s own scientific world” (Berton et al., 2016, p. 29):

“First, it is often said that the ‘invisible colleges’ of scientists across state-borders can contribute to building trust between nations or cultures. Secondly, it is also argued that the language of science can contribute to pointing to technical solutions for political problems. One can thus distinguish between science and technology relations that occur without government intervention and science diplomacy when governmental officials try to shape and stimulate relations to advance national interests.” (Berton et al., 2016, p. 27)

This quote guides to the second selected taxonomy ‘science for diplomacy’ which is understood as “science used as a tool to build and improve relations between states” (Van Langenhove, 2017, p. 8). These are good basic conceptual grounds for an examination of the EU relations with Southern Neighbourhood due to the interdependence factor which Luk Van Langenhove raises when explaining this particular taxonomy of science diplomacy in certain situations “where there are tensions in relations between certain states or when states are faced with common problems that they cannot solve on their own” (Van Langenhove, 2017, p. 8). This taxonomy was neglected in the initial scoping of the theoretical framework of the research project (Šime, 2019). However, while dwelling in more detail in the classical works of Pierre Bourdieu and its inspired more recent scholarly reflections on the evolving diplomatic practices in the EU setting, it became clear that the empirical examination of the field via interviews with EU funded project managers based in the EU mirrors this dimension of science diplomacy.

 

Graph no. 1: Hierarchical Relations of Science Diplomacy Inspired by the Practice Theory

‘Diplomacy for science’ is the upper hierarchical dimension which is defined and its policies maintained by the selected EU institutions – European External Action Service (EEAS) responsible for the EU Global Strategy, Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (DG RTD) steering the EU Framework Programme “Horizon 2020”, Directorate-General for Education and Culture (DG EAC) responsible for the Erasmus+ Programme, Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR), former DG ELARG (until the end of 2014) (Schumacher et al., 2017, p. 129),  managing the EU-Morocco (MA) and EU-Tunisia (TN) Annual Action Programmes as integral parts of the European Neighbourhood Instrument 2014-2017 (Šime, 2019). One of the reasons for such a comprehensive approach in the selection of the EU instruments for further examination is the absence of a clear-cut definition of what science diplomacy is. Earlier approximations of science diplomacy entail “support to academic exchange, networking and international cooperation, the exploitation of scientific networks for non-research purposes, the provision of scientific advice to foreign policy, etc.” (Rungius, 2018, p. 3). Since all of the identified institutions offer support for activities which can have a direct influence on the shaping and development of science, all of them are treated as relevant to a broad understanding of the implicit science diplomacy dynamics.

‘Science for diplomacy’ is embodied by the EU-based project managers who following the EU guidance and funding regulations are responsible for a successful implementation of the projects. ‘Science in diplomacy’ as the third taxonomy of science diplomacy is displayed in graph no. 1 without a bold outline because it is not covered by the research project. ‘Science in diplomacy’ stands for the use of “scientific knowledge in foreign policy decisions. The goal is to improve foreign policy actions through the use of scientific knowledge.” (Van Langenhove, 2017, p. 8) This taxonomy has a more pronounced relation to the science advisory services, which is a whole field subject to the intricacies of the multi-level governance system (Adler-Nissen, 2014, p. 179). Since the research project is not aimed at examining EU science advisory systems and whether or in what form the EU funded projects serve as sources of science advice for EU policies, the theoretical scope is limited to a two-dimensional approach to science diplomacy analysis focusing solely on the ‘diplomacy of science’ and ‘science for diplomacy’ taxonomies.

Overall, a study dedicated to the EU’s evolving science diplomacy is a fresh perspective looking beyond the EU’s unfolding novel diplomatic practices focused on the intergovernmental dynamics captured by Adler-Nissen’s ‘late sovereign diplomacy’ – “the intense integration of national representatives who adhere to an ever closer union, producing legislation that challenges the sovereignty of their own nations” (Adler-Nissen, 2014, p. 175). Likewise, the research project bears in mind but is not preoccupied with the EU intergovernmental dynamics of certain countries aiming at using “the EU as a power multiplier” and “a clear vehicle for uploading national interests” (Spence et al., 2015, p. 261)  such as the acclaimed decades’ long Spain’s foreign policy aspirations (Bremberg, 2010a, p. 132) to promote a “shared Mediterranean sensibility” and country’s efforts to upload the Southern Neighbourhood-related matters to the supranational (EU) level (Schumacher, Bouris, & Olszewska, 2016, pp. 266-267). Instead, the research project is tailored to offer more room for examination of the role of higher education and science cooperation managers as a component shaping the overall EU’s external relations in an intermestic setting.

Reproduction of a certain repertoire stemming from the basic conditions shaped by the expert-level project-driven science and higher education domain as a habitus (Bigo, 2011, p. 242) is placed in the limelight. The ‘regulated improvisations’ (Bigo, 2011, p. 242) facilitated by the higher education and research-oriented projects and project Coordinators and Lead Partners as their most informed witnesses hold a potential to show the formal or substantial role science plays in reaching the EU’s overarching goals towards the EU Southern Neighbourhood.  Bourdieu’s logic is as follows: “Official relationships which do not receive continuous maintenance tend to become what they are for genealogist: theoretical relationships, like abandoned roads on an old map.” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 38, 1990, p. 35) Slightly paraphrasing, the research project is aimed at dissecting whether the engagement of MA&TN institutions in the EU funded projects results in ad-hoc or fragmented formal interactions resembling Bourdieu’s “theoretical relationships” or these projects spark “continuous maintenance” and substantial improvement of higher education and science potential in both selected countries.

 

Graph no. 2: The patterns of (potential) interaction

The theoretical underpinnings elaborated in the earlier sections and remarks on the EU focus published earlier (Šime, 2019), clarify that the research project is crafted to explore the EU framework positions, offered tools and cooperation opportunities to institutions in two selected Southern Neighbourhood countries. In such a manner the EU institutions and EU actors – represented by the Lead Partners or Coordinators of the projects funded by one of the earlier indicated EU programmes – are viewed as the objects offering insight into the subjects (graph no. 2) which shape the overall landscape of the science and higher education domains in the EU Southern Neighbourhood in general and two selected countries in particular.

The author of the research project does not ignore that there might be a multiplicity of additional interaction patterns. Such awareness is mirrored in the diversity of communication arrows indicated in graph no. 2. Likewise, the research project is crafted keeping at the back of the author’s mind the other consultative processes which potentially bear an imprint on those interactions which are selected for a more scrutinised analysis in the scope of the research project. Among such influencing factors might be the dominating perspective of the EU Member States, especially the so-called ‘patron’ Member States (Schumacher et al., 2017, pp. 119, 125) with a keen interest in shaping the EU’s approach adopted towards the EU Southern Neighbourhood. Instead, it primarily explores the key policies and their supporting funding measures EU institutions have established to structure their relations with the MA and/or TN in particular or the EU Southern Neighbourhood as a whole. Furthermore, the assessment of the EU project Lead Partners and Coordinators about their cooperation with the MA and/or TN institutions are prioritised to acquire an expert-level assessment what benefits do the European higher education and research initiatives provide to the capacity building and internationalisation efforts of the MA&TN higher education and research institutions. Overall, the arrows directed horizontally from EU side towards the MA&TN side describe the prevailing perspective and selected interactions to be examined during the research project to find out how content-rich or formally plain is the EU science diplomacy in the Southern Neighbourhood.

All in all, this blog entry is not a comprehensive update on the overall earlier outlined research project. Instead, it offers further nuances about one theoretical strand – science diplomacy. It is prepared to place so-to-say more meat on one sector of the bones in a manner which renders the latest thinking on the EU science diplomacy easily accessible to all interested thinkers.

 

 

Bibliography

Adler-Nissen, R. (2014). Opting Out of the European Union: Diplomacy, Sovereignty and European Integration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107337916

Berton, B., Ekman, A., Schmidt, J., Selleslaghs, J., Stang, G., & Langenhove, L. Van. (2016). The EU Global Strategy: Going Beyond Effective Multilateralism? (B. Ujvari, Ed.). Brussels: Egmont/European Policy Centre. Retrieved from http://www.egmontinstitute.be/eu-global-strategy-beyond-effective-multilateralism/

Bigo, D. (2011). Pierre Bourdieu and international relations: Power of practices, practices of power. International Political Sociology, 5(3), 225–258. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2011.00132.x

Bourdieu, P. (1977). Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from https://www.hf.uio.no/ikos/english/research/news-and-events/events/phd/2017/reading-list-power-and-authority-Bourdieu.pdf

Bourdieu, P. (1990). The Logic of Practice. Stanford: Stanford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00680104

Bremberg, N. (2010). La política exterior española hacia el Magreb: Actores e intereses. The Journal of North African Studies, 15(1), 132–134. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629380903310217

Rungius, C. (2018). State-of-the-Art Report: Summarizing Literature on Science Diplomacy Cases and Concepts. Retrieved from https://www.s4d4c.eu/s4d4cs-state-of-the-art-report-on-science-diplomacy/

Schumacher, T., Bouris, D., & Olszewska, M. (2016). Of policy entrepreneurship, bandwagoning and free-riding: EU member states and multilateral cooperation frameworks for Europe’s southern neighbourhood. Global Affairs, 2(3), 259–272. https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2016.1216230

Schumacher, T., Exadaktylos, T., Cebeci, M., Haukkala, H., Elsuwege, P., Kostanyan, H., … Delcour, L. (2017). The Revised European Neighbourhood Policy : Continuity and Change in EU Foreign Policy. (D. Bouris & T. Schumacher, Eds.). London: Macmillan Publishers. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-47182-6

Šime, Z. (2019). The EU’s Diplomacy for Science in the Southern Neighbourhood: Setting a Research Agenda. Retrieved October 16, 2019, from https://europeangovernance.ideasoneurope.eu/2019/10/15/the-eus-diplomacy-for-science-in-the-southern-neighbourhood-setting-a-research-agenda/

Spence, D., Bátora, J., Adler-Nissen, R., Onestini, C., Helwig, N., Murdoch, Z., … Duke, S. (2015). The European External Action Service: European Diplomacy Post-Westphalia. (D. Spence & J. Bátora, Eds.). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Van Langenhove, L. (2017). Tools for an EU science diplomacy. Luxembourg. Retrieved from https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/e668f8cf-e395-11e6-ad7c-01aa75ed71a1/language-en

 

The post EU Science Diplomacy in the Southern Neighbourhood with a Bourdieusian Twist appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

Length of video : 72'
You may manually download this video in WMV (817Mb) format

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

This article is set to be published in the Hertie School’s student magazine, The Governance Post.  Teaser

The European Central Bank’s (ECB) policy meeting in September was strained by dissent over the decision to launch another monetary easing package. Governing council members disagreed on the economic outlook, interest rates, and, most notably, new bond purchases. The spate of dissent over the institution’s latest monetary stimulus highlights the conflict between monetary doves and hawks at the ECB and reflects some deeper tensions between Member States as core Eurozone countries resisted Draghi’s bid.  More than that, it also points to the fact that monetary policy is approaching its economic and political limits in bolstering Eurozone economic growth.

Introduction

In Oscar Wilde’s play, The Importance of Being Earnest, Miss Prism prompts her student, Cecily, to do her readings in Political Economy while she is away. The patroness advises her young student to omit the chapter on the Fall of the Rupee as it is somewhat too sensational, remarking that “even these metallic problems have their melodramatic side”. How right Miss Prism was. Last month’s contentious meeting of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) Governing Council was nothing short of melodramatic. The ECB became engulfed in its biggest public spat in years. It seems people in Europe are not only divided by weather, religion and cuisine, but also by monetary policy. The current economic slowdown has prompted a larger debate about the reorientation of economic activity across the Eurozone, causing disagreements between policy makers and Member States over the right course of action and pitting conflicting interests against each other. 

Last month the ECB pushed interest rates further into negative territory and revived its €2.6tn bond-buying programme. This was followed by a fierce backlash from members of the ECB’s Governing Council, with Germany’s representative on the institution’s Executive Board, Sabine Lautenschläger, quitting in protest. Dissent is coming Austria, the Netherlands, Estonia, and other usual suspects that oppose quantitative easing (QE) when it was launched back in 2015 as well. Nowhere is opposition towards the ECB’s monetary stimulus package stronger than in Germany where senior figures have been accusing the bank of expropriating money from the country’s savers in order to bailout profligate southern states. 

Bundesbank president, Jens Weidmann, has been the leading opponent of the ECB’s bond-buying programme since it was launched back in 2015. While recent tensions stem from the personal preferences of those who make up the Governing Council, they also highlight the fact that the ECB is not a normal  bank. It is the only central bank to serve a confederation of countries and we can expect their conflicting interests to be embedded in its decision-making processes. We then assume that, at least to a certain degree, central bank presidents also vote for monetary policies that correspond with their respective countries’ national preferences.

Hawks and Doves

First of all, the rift at the ECB reflects the long-standing conflict between monetary hawks and doves. In general, hawks are members who want a tighter monetary policy in order to temper inflation and growth, while doves encourage a looser monetary policy to support growth and inflation. Historically there has been no shortage of dissent in the ECB’s Governing Council between the two sides, but the intensity of the ongoing rift has prompted Carsten Brzeski, Chief Economist at ING Germany, to dub the latest spat a “War of the Roses”.  

A notable difference right now is that members who have previously taken a more dovish stance, such as Benoit Coeuré, have shifted to a more hawkish position in response to restarting ECB bond purchases reasoning that the timing is unwarranted. Similarly, members who have taken a more hawkish position in the past, such as Yves Mersch, have shifted to a more dovish stance now. 

The map below depicts where central bank governors and Executive Board members stand on the issue of the ECB’s monetary loosening measures as per last month’s meeting of the Governing Council based on country of origin. Full support refers to those who unequivocally support the measures. Partial Support refers to those who expressed doubts but ultimately agreed to back the package, such as Yves Mersch and Luis de Guindos. Partial Disagreement refers to those who do not oppose the stimulus on principle, but disagree on timing or technicalities. Full Disagreement refers to those who oppose it on principle, such as Jens Weidemann and Sabine Lautenschläger, both hailing from Germany. It is worth noting, however, that members of the ECB’s Governing Council sit as individuals and not as national representatives, and formal votes are rare.

Opponents of the ECB’s monetary stimulus say the measures are disproportionate given the already low bond yields and negative interest rates. Others warn about the adverse effects the stimulus has on financial markets, all while downplaying the risk of deflationary pressures. ECB doves support last month’s measures by pointing towards the surprisingly prolonged low inflation in the Euro area and the need to ward off the threat of deflation and economic slowdown.

The Economic Divide in Europe

However, these arguments go beyond mere technicalities. The ECB is also driven by conflicting national interests that are embedded in its decision-making processes.  More so, the strife at the ECB reflects wider Eurozone conflicts between the fiscally conservative member states and those which are opposed to fiscal retrenchment. The conflict also presents elements of the North-South divide and Core-Periphery dynamics. More than a decade after the the financial crisis, conflicts within the bloc reflect the divergence of interests between the northern “core” and the southern “periphery”. 

It’s already well established that there’s a North-South divide in the interest rate preferences of Member States, which is mirrored by the relative strength of their economies, as well as their specific growth models, employment, and inflation. Different economic contexts reflect, to a certain degree, the clash of interests among Eurozone Members States. Until fairly recently, the threat of deflation in Germany was low, with core inflation (excluding energy, food, alcohol and tobacco) at almost 1.5% per year. Countries like the Netherlands and Estonia are nowhere near deflation either, with core inflation over 2%. On the other hand, the Eurozone as a whole is experiencing an excessively low rate of inflation and there’s little prospect of it picking up anytime soon. Member States such as Italy, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Ireland and France hover around or below the Euro area average. A more severe downward shock could push these countries into deflation.  

Since inflation rates differ, real interest rates (inflation-adjusted) are also different across countries in the monetary union. Lower real interest rates encourage consumption and investment because they greatly help borrowers, while high real interest rates tend to slow economic growth and inflationary pressures because they tend to favour savers. This can have an effect on national preferences for euro area interest rates. For example, expected inflation in Germany is higher than in southern Europe, thereby driving a large gap in real interest rates. Countries with low inflation and higher real interest rates should, in theory, show stronger support for monetary stimulus. The opposite should be true for countries with higher inflation and lower real interest rates. 

This can explain the position of some frugal countries that stand by their savers. After cutting rates further into negative territory, Germany’s Bild accused ECB president Mario Draghi of “sucking dry” the accounts of Germany’s savers, while the Dutch government has spoken out against the latest stimulus measures arguing that negative interest rates are disproportionately affecting Dutch pension funds.

There have been numerous claims, emanating from the financial and political circles of the Eurozone’s surplus-based, export-led economies – such as Germany and the Netherlands – that the ECB makes policies in favour of southern member states.  Just last week, a group of former senior European central bankers, most of them known for having a hawkish view on monetary policy, have accused the ECB of the monetary financing of government spending. They also hold that the intent of these measures is to “to protect heavily indebted governments from a rise in interest rates…” The graph below shows the level of public debt of individual countries based on the level of support for the ECB’s stimulus.

Accusing the ECB of catering to the bloc’s debt-ridden southern states may be a bit of a stretch. While the bloc’s most indebted members have been generally supportive of the resumption of QE, they are certainly not alone in this. It is true that highly indebted countries have benefited a lot from the ECB’s loose monetary policy due to their large stock of eligible bonds. However, lower debt-service costs have been beneficial to countries with lower levels of public debt as well, including Germany. 

Not long ago, excess savings in the North were matched by excess spending in the bloc’s southern and peripheral members. However, fiscal and structural reforms after the European debt crisis have turned them into savers as well. Yet, it’s hard to imagine those countries have a strong appetite for another round of austerity measures and structural reforms anymore. 

The only area in which the ECB’s Governing Council found agreement was fiscal policy. All members agreed that monetary policy is not the only game in town anymore and governments with fiscal space should do more to pull their weight and loosen their purse strings. The current rift at the ECB highlights the fact that monetary policy is approaching its economic and political limits in dealing with sluggish growth in the Eurozone. Mario Draghi said the ECB could still do more to boost inflation, but the current stimulus will last a long time and be less effective in the absence of fiscal policy efforts to stimulate growth in the Eurozone. Countries like France, Italy and Spain don’t have much room to spend, but the pressure is mounting on Germany and the Netherlands, both from institutions and other Member States.

With the ECB divided over the merits of further monetary stimulus, the key question is if Draghi’s successor, Christine Lagarde, will be able to manage the vested interests involved in the ECB’s decision-making processes. Besides this, she will also have to convince governments with fiscal space to spend more. Hopefully that will happen before Europe is caught up in the midst of another crisis.

The post The European Central Bank’s War of the Roses: A Deep Rift Within the Eurozone’s Most Important Institution appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

By Michael Breen, Dermot Hodson, Manuela Moschella

Scholars often look at international organizations, such as the European Union (EU), in splendid isolation. Over the last decade, however, researchers have paid more attention to how international organizations interact and what this means for international cooperation.

The regime complexity approach is a pioneering attempt to understand the multiple, overlapping institutions and rules that often govern different issue areas. Originally applied to the governance of plant genetic resources, this approach has been used to understand a wide range of policy areas, including human rights, migration and democratization.

Incoherence matters in regime complexes, this literature tells us, because it complicates and potentially weakens the credibility and effectiveness of cooperation. It becomes easier for a state to challenge one international organization when another asks something different of it. In spite of much theoretical and empirical work on this subject, there remains a basic lack of understanding of how to measure incoherence in regime complexes and what drives it.

We explore the drivers of incoherence in regime complexes by looking at the specific case of international economic surveillance. In particular, our analysis seeks to understand whether and why two key organizations in this regime complex  – the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the EU – impose conflicting obligations on the same states.

The EU and IMF offer a laboratory for studying regime complexity not only because of their overlapping membership and central role in international economic surveillance but also because they have frequently clashed over the euro crisis.

Empirically, our article is the first study of regime complexity to use sentiment analysis to measure incoherence in a regime complex. One of several methods of quantitative text analysis but one with hitherto underexploited potential for students of international relations, sentiment analysis is used to analyse the coherence of over 400 IMF and EU surveillance documents between 1997 and 2014. Analyzing these documents as a whole rather than the recommendations within them, we treat differences in the tone of the language used within as a proxy for measuring policy coherence.

Figure 1. Median Pessimism in Surveillance Assessments

Our results show that EU member states were pulled in different directions by the EU and IMF before and after the global financial crisis. Before the crisis, a typical IMF assessment contained 34 per cent more pessimistic language than an EU assessment. Since the crisis, EU assessments have contained 53 per cent more pessimistic language. Although the EU has moderated its language since 2010, it remains more pessimistic than the IMF.

Using linear and panel regression analysis, we explain such incoherence not by differences in the distribution of power within the EU and IMF but by differences in the discretionary authority that the two organizations enjoy in performing surveillance.

When the rules underpinning EU and IMF fiscal surveillance bite and reduce these organizations’ room for discretion, each institution tends to be more pessimistic. But the two organizations are responding to different rules with differing degrees of intensity and from different starting points, leading to incoherent assessments of member states’ economic policies. EU surveillance is influenced, in particular, by compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact.

Our analysis is also relevant for wider debates in EU studies and international relations. The methodology and findings of our article respond to calls for a deeper study of regime complexity and institutional interaction, particularly as it relates to the role of non-European actors in European integration and governance. Within the wider international relations literature, our findings may help to refine explanations of why some regime complexes enhance the effectiveness of international cooperation while others do not.

This piece draws on the article Incoherence in Regime Complexes: A Sentiment Analysis of EU-IMF Surveillance in the Journal of Common Market Studies.

Please note that this article represents the views of the authors and not those of Ideas on Europe, JCMS or UACES.

Comments and Site Policy

Dr. Michael Breen @mbreen3

Associate Professor of International Political Economy

Dublin City University, Ireland.

 

 

Prof. Dermot Hodson @dermot_hodson

Professor of Political Economy

Birkbeck College, University of London, UK.

 

 

 

 

Dr. Manuela Moschella @ManuMoschella

Associate Professor of International Political Economy

Scuola Normale Superiore, Italy.

 

The post Why International Organizations Disagree appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The tenets of Derrida’s deconstruction has been considered as a viable ground for feminism by majority writers like Nancy Holland, Gayatri Spivak etc. but there has been not so feminist instances in Derrida and one is the case when he talks about Europe.
The binaries created in Western Metaphysics like male/female, present/absent, self/other also has an underlying politics of the other. Presence is preferred over absence, self over other and maleness is privileged over feminine. The western metaphysics gives precedence to maleness, female is taken as complete other of male.
To indicate Freud’s obsession with phallus Ernest Jones coined the term phallocentrism, Derrida used logocentrism (fixation of Western Metaphysics with word or origin) and phallocentrism and created neologism phallogocentrism: the privileging the phallus over female and logocentrism, the hierarchy of logos as the untouchable. Through this Derrida showed that phallus had always been the key signifier in the western discourse.
Phallogocentrism: An Attitude
Ross Benjamin and Heesok Chang writing their treatise on Derrida, elucidate how Derrida saw the European authority as having masculine strength. He perceived the Imperial epoch of Europe as exemplifying that masculinity. He asserted that the reason Europe has had leverage was because Europe has been gifted by a geographical space that is on the margins of continent, with a jutting headland and phallic promontory. Additionally, Europe has always captained the journey of mankind with an ordered style, which is often done by the man in charge. Derrida talked about Europe in gendered terms, seeing it as male entity dominant over his past colonial subordinates.
In The Other Heading, commenting on the text of “Congress of European Cultures,” Derrida mentioned that there was a quote that France must guard its “avant-garde” stature. Derrida said that alongside being quite attractive this word depicted to have symbolism with the figure of projectile, prow or of phallic, quill which is advanced forward and portray guard or memory. Derrida interpreted that quote as France has to look for itself like a man.
He scribbled that Europe always reach towards other, as it has been its practice, mostly towards America (West), while towards East, Europe makes advances, “and promotes itself as an advance, and it will have never ceased to make advances on the other: to induce, seduce, produce, and conduce, to spread out, to cultivate, to love or to violate, to love to violate, to colonize, and to colonize itself.”
Also, Jacques Derrida in the Other Heading took Paul Valery as the scholar who might be considered as a prophet for European Integration. He mentioned that how Valery saw Europe as submissive to United States of America. Valery warned that it is quite evident that Europe wants US to rule and dictate terms, and as a consequence Europe will be punished. Valery furthered that Europe is so much enthusiastic of getting rid of its past memories that it will gladly let the “happy people” rule over them. Valery sarcastically used the term happy people for the Americans who don’t have any past memory of their own and will gladly let Europe forget its own.
Margaret Heller commenting on the above quoted phrases of Valery in Derrida’s The Other Heading emphasized that Derrida does not dichotomize the relation of US and Europe as such explicitly. But still she mentions that Valery is working on the notion of ‘rape of Europa’. Several Books and pieces have come out in this accord. Slavoj Zizek pointed out how Europe has been abducted now and again. He wrote how culture of Europe was ruined by Romans and Christianity was done the same by barbarians. He evoked that does not again recently Europe has been abducted by US who are setting standard for Europe and acting as if Europe is its province. Zizek also dichotomized the relation of US and Europe on the basis of masculine and feminine respectively. Despite Derrida’s phallogocentric references and his desire that Europe should increase its military might against hegemonic act of US, Europe does not yet seem to able to dictate its terms to US.
Politically speaking Derrida himself has outlined others for Europe, the orient or its past colonies as lesser other and US as the wholly other. And we will also evaluate its relationship with US on gendered terms, although Derrida never himself used such explicit jargon for Europe’s relation with US but he disliked Europe being used by US in its war on terror endeavors and sees US acting as a dominant male over Europe.
The Gendered Relations of Europe
Derrida has mentioned how politics have eradicated the figure of female from its discourse. Politics, Derrida reminded us, is male centric. In Politics of Friendship Derrida emphasized that politics by virtue of it is conjoined with masculine virility and consequently politics seems incapable of justly dealing with the concept of women and their equality and alterity at the same time.
Additionally, Derrida has always emphasized that western metaphysics has always been phallogocentric. Making Derrida’s own arguments as basis, for the phallogocentric politics, there has been a lot of works on gendered descriptions of nations like that of Rada Ivekovic, Yasmeen Abu Laban, and Tamar Mayer etc. on the question of gendered identity of Europe there has been a lecture series conducted by EU, among others. A sex-gender system is universal, while nations and nationalism are politically always masculine. Ernest Gellner asserted that the dominant rhetoric of nations defines their gender. Today, to establish dominance; gender is often used in the political dialogue. Gender-discourse basically affects our habit of evaluation and study of every facet of life. Gender thus becomes an important tool in our study of Europe.
Even Derrida’s works shows orient as subordinate of Europe, Europe the masculine figure who is responsible for orient; while he knew that US is “hegemonic” indicating the authoritativeness of US over Europe like a male figure.
In the colonial rhetoric, Edward Said asserts, the Europeans have always described Orient/East as passive, seminal, feminine and even silent.
Europe’s relation with the Orient
Engin F. Isin, in We, the non-Europeans asked us to evaluate Derrida’s problem of Europe through Edward Said’s works which described Europe through Europe’s wholly other –Derrida’s own term for the orient.
According to Isin for both Derrida and Said the main problem of Europe is its incapability to fully acknowledge the non-Europeans, it’s other. Although the debate on other might have been initiated by Freud but Said saw Freud’s interpretations were only informed by a European critique which was majorly Greco-Roman and Hebrew.
Analyzing Freud’s Moses and Monotheism, which establishes a European identity, Said wrote that this work lack the most important fact that the founder of Jewish (supposedly European) history was actually a non-European Egyptian. Said emphasized that identity cannot be simply taken stock on its own, it needs to be evaluated through its “radical originary break or flaw”.
The identity of orient is created through the western discourse; orient is seen as a feminine figure. Although Derrida is himself adamant of the fact how politics ostracize and belittle women, he himself is guilty of the same error while talking about Europe and its relation to the orient. In the other heading when he asked Europe to be responsible for its past colonies –his tone created a European (male) figure looking over its dependent (female) orient. Derrida is thus culpable of same habit Said showed is present in European writers. That is a feminine portrayal of east. Textually there have been various portrayals of orient one as a female submissive orient, others, E. Said adds as, “linguistic orient, a Freudian orient, a Spenglerian orient, a Darwinian orient and a racist orient” but never as a true Orient.
As Said has shown, orient is an extension of European identity; Derrida also has pictured orient as dependent on Europe. But there is another side of European identity which mostly claims can only be argued in the context of American identity. Likewise Derrida saw US a dominant figure in the politics and shaping of EU and aspired for an independent Europe not taking orders from US
Europe’s relation with US
Iver B. Neumann traced the anthropological field of study on the question of European identity. He said that he only found one work by Stacia Zabusky an American who articulated that only in relation to herself (an American) her employees labeled themselves as Europeans, which she phrased as “making Europe over Lunch.” While Chris Shore and Annabel Black, cite one of their employee during their anthropological field work as claiming that there is no cultural basis for Europeanism. The Europeans feel like Europeans only when they are confronted with an American or go to USA.
Hannah Arendt in 1950’s also saw the figure of America as creating a ‘European’ sense in the Europe’s inhabitants in response to US’s presence. The notion of European identity Iver believe is created by excluding US and not taking it in.
This can be seen from Derrida and Habermas coalition too there works are miles apart from each other. But when US initiated war on terror, they both wanted Europe to get away from influence of US. They wanted to combine all European countries and stand against hegemonic authority of US. Derrida hoped for Europe to be able to be an authoritative power.
The authoritative power and decision-making capability of Europe, Derrida dreamt of, was tested at the initiation of Iraq War in 2003. On March 19, 2003, American president George Bush announced that they are declared the fight against ‘the axis of evil’ and asked the world to support them. Germany and France wanted to give more time to UN inspectors, if war was avoidable and Iraq could be cleaned up with International pressure and under UN auspices it would have been better.
Dominique de Villepin, who was the French foreign minister at that time, addressed UNSC, on 5 February 2003 and dubbed war as acceptance that the world has failed (Guardia). It was the same meeting that Collin Powel US Secretary of Defense informed that Iraq is developing WMD’s.
Former German foreign minister Hans Dietich Genscher, in an interview to Deutschlandfunk radio in August of 2002 aired Europe’s concern in its neighbor, because what happens in Middle East will have more effect on Europe than US (Rippert and Schwarz).
But they were only two countries, vocally against US’ invasion. Other Europeans countries favored US on the very first instance. Soon an open letter was published by the leaders from Czech Republic, Denmark, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Spain which stated that they were all in to support US in the war, and the reason they stated was that they did not wanted Europe’s and US’ relation to turn bad due to Iraq war. Due to France and Germany’s stance against the war, these countries were not invited by the European countries to endorse the letter and Greece was kept out deliberately. Similarly German president Jacques Chirac flippantly stated those countries as ‘Villainous 10’ and said that those nations have shown that they were badly brought up. France and Germany were trying to be man enough to counter US but other countries quick attempt to please US was evident of the fact that they knew what they have to look up to.
It was the time the European Unity learned a lesson, that co-operation in Europe cannot be achieved by going against US policies. Donald Rumsfeld actually showed who the boss is, by his remarks that Germany and France was a little nuisance but others countries complied with US without delay. Such a remark by Rumsfeld showed superiority of US over Europe.
This entire event showed a lack of that authoritative decision-making that Derrida envisioned for Europe. Writing at that time with Jurgen Habermas, Derrida also hinted that what Europe lacked a collective stance at that moment of decision. Although Derrida complimented the stance of France and Germany of trying to stop or lest slow U.S. down but he said that the cohesiveness of Europe needs to be addressed. Despite any claims made the unity of Europe is not there.
Derrida wanted Europe to take stand and increase its military might so that it will be able to negotiate matters of strategy with the “technological, economic and military bully, the United States of America.” Derrida wanted Europe to take a masculine stand against the US because in political terms nations with military power are taken as masculine.
But the narrative of newspapers and media that was to follow took Europe as a feminine, who the masculine US has to tag alone. Derrida demanded Europe to get away from hegemonic acts of US and don’t jump into the war. The French and German authorities tried to sneak away from vicious cycle of initiating war. But in US media it was portrayed as anti-masculine to go against war, and one pro-war American declared on National Public Radio (NPR) on 21 April 2002 that ‘the EU is a bunch of worthless wimps—they’re not good for anything, you can’t take them seriously; they’re not valuable partners. Likewise the reason why Europeans tend to back away from initiating military ordeal is explained as Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus. Frequently opinions like “Venus–Mars disconnect over Iraq” made their way in New York Times.
The articles and news items were laden with descriptions of gendered supremacy of US over Europe. But Derrida also wished that Europe becomes a military might and stop its dependency on NATO. He flirted with an idea that Europe needs to make a common defense system and foreign policy. In this way Europe would be at position to dictate its own terms, other than being told so by “military bully” US. A need for a security policy by a combined Europe was not only felt by Derrida but also EU. The member countries already have an agreement which states that all signatories must support EU’s security policies in cohesion, and must not act individually that might hamper any possibility of making EU a unified authority in world politics. And in December 2003 EU came together to work on a security strategy.
The purpose of this strategy was to create a space for EU to discuss their collective strategies, to work out differences among the EU nations and between EU and US, and an act to show equal military status of EU with US.
The strategy was accepted by all the members and the readiness of everyone to sign it was probably result of a desire to write a comparable document with 2002 National Security Strategy of the US.
Getting back on the main thesis of this section, Europe always tends to create its own identity when its sees US presence and the military strategy was also a hasty step just to act like US.
The strategy read “a secure Europe in better world”, specifying that Europe is not threatened by its own members and have turned Balkans a peaceful place but has threat from places other than Europe. ESS discussed proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorist threats and Al-Qaeda. But to be up to the criteria of strategy paper, it has to fulfill some standards.
Looking at this piece of paper called ESS, strategically, it can hardly be called a strategy. A strategic paper has to draw its policy about every possible event, like use of military, what circumstances can allow a military intervention in neighboring country. It has to write down the purpose and the ethical means it can use).
For critics, ESS can only be called a hazy sketch. And with the difference present among the member countries, it is evident that EU would not be able to bring out a combined force for battles so these references have been avoided.
Toje asserted that these European countries lack a strategic culture, though France and UK want to use defense force, Germany sides with UN resolutions, and with 27 the probability for a consensus on a military effort drops down. While NATO was created by one hegemonic power US which defines strategy and tag other members along. ESS 2003 was unable to fulfill standards of strategy.
Looking at NSS and ESS at a deeper level, there is a clear difference. NSS says that it will keep in check the “rogue states” and if there is a possibility that they might attack US and its friends, US will use force before these rogue states are able to. While ESS also talks about rogue states and their threat, it asserts that it will look into various factors present there like presence of terrorism leading to high violence, if they have potent threatening weapons, a weakened country with coordinated violence and private militia. An even then the ESS states that “we could be confronted with a very radical threat indeed.” But there is no mention of clear cut strategy in what grounds EU will use force and when, like a strategy paper needs to do.
In 2003, EU could not create a strategy worthy of its name, in 2008 there were voices to work on ESS 2003 and update it, but because of the fear that Georgia-Russia war which was going on might separate the member states in two groups it never occurred. In 2011, a report was published asking member states for a revived strategy –that is need of time –for EU to survive. Again in 2012 a need for a common strategy for Europe was reinforced, but its actual implementation seems a distant idea.

The post Hey Feminists! Derrida wasn’t one, (especially about Europe) appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Activity Report of the work of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence 2014 - 2019 (8th legislature)
Full text
Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

Activity Report of the work of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence 2014 - 2019 (8th legislature)
Further information
Full text
Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

A delegation of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Subcommittees on Security and Defence and on Human Rights will go to the 74th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York and to Washington D.C. on 27-31 October 2019. The mission will aim to, amongst other things, assess the implementation of EU priorities by the UN General Assembly, discuss new priorities for the UNGA, and look into possible ways to further uphold multilateralism in the current political and security context.
Further information
EU Fact Sheets: External relations
Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

MEPs strongly condemned the unilateral Turkish military intervention in northeast Syria, urging Turkey to withdraw all of its forces from Syrian territory.
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Security and Defence

Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

Today the Council appointed Johann Sattler as EU Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He will also take over the role of the Head of the European Union's Delegation in Sarajevo.

The EU reiterates its strong commitment to promote and fight for indigenous languages and cultures.

The EU issued a declaration on Libya demanding that all Libyan parties commit to a permanent ceasefire and return to a UN facilitated political process.

President Donald Tusk congratulated Boris Johnson on his appointment as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

President Donald Tusk, and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau met in Montreal for the 17th Canada-European Union summit and they agreed on a joint declaration.

During the 17th EU-Canada summit in Montreal, President Donald Tusk and PM Justin Trudeau discussed how to reinforce EU-Canada cooperation on global challenges and the implementation of the CETA.