European Union

SEDE organised a public hearing on 'European Space Security and Defence: What action at EU level to address militarisation of space and race for resources?' on Tuesday 12 November 2019, from 09.00 to 10.30hrs in room ASP 3E2, with external experts.
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Programme
Poster
Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

AMENDMENTS 1 - 61 - Draft opinion Conclusion of the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Isabel Wiseler-Lima

Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

AMENDMENTS 1 - 41 - Draft opinion Investment Protection Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, of the other part
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Isabel Wiseler-Lima

Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

DRAFT OPINION on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2018, Section III - Commission and executive agencies
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Vangelis Meimarakis

Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

AMENDMENTS 1 - 398 - Draft report Implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy - annual report
Committee on Foreign Affairs
David McAllister

Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

DRAFT OPINION on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2018, Section X - European External Action Service
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Vangelis Meimarakis

Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

HMS Prince of Wales, second Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carrier for the Royal Navy will be formally commissioned on December, 10 2019.

Tag: HMS Prince of Wales

Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

The Atomium, one of the symbols of Brussels. View from the Mini-Europe, a miniature park, showing famous European monuments on a scale 1 to 25. Photo by Tatyana Bajenova

Tatyana Bajenova

In the recent article Rescaling expertise in EU policy-making: European think tanks and their reliance on symbolic, political and network capital (Bajenova 2019) that appeared in the Globalisation, Societies and Education Journal, Tatyana Bajenova has examined the strategies which think tanks (TTs) employ to influence EU decision-making. Unlike some recent studies of European TTs, this paper analyses both Brussels-based and member-state TTs through the examples of the symbolic value of the ‘TT’ label, their ‘expert’ role, as well as their locational and networking strategies.

 

The Label Which Speaks for Itself

The ‘TT’ label itself possesses symbolic capital which is related to three dimensions of their public image. The first is the ‘TT’ generic name, which attaches to the organisations, using it in their self-description or associated with it in the public discourse. It helps to explain their mission abroad: in positioning themselves in transnational TT networks or international TT rankings. The second dimension is the function of research, which is one of the elements of their academic capital. TTs regardless their particular organisational structure or legal form are seen as groups of experts that produce ideas and recommendations for policy-makers. This ‘scientific’ approach differentiates them from lobby groups or NGOs aiming to influence policy decisions which promote values or special interests.

 

The third dimension consists in their simultaneous location in different social fields involving use of academic, publicity and political forms of capital, which distinguishes them from other types of knowledge providers. As distinct from universities, TT is perceived as a research group, engaged in networking with policy-makers and popularising their research among general public and the media. Although this activity is quite similar to advocacy, TTs successfully elude to be seen as ‘lobbyists’.

              

The Expertise which Meets the Selection Criteria

TTs provide expertise to the EU institutions on both ad hoc and contractual basis. Regardless the character of cooperation providers of expertise should meet certain criteria of credibility. Although TT credibility can be strengthened thanks to the quality of their research products, the academic background of their researchers, the soundness of their research methodology, and reputation in the academic realm, many TTs claim a higher level of policy-relevance of their research products in comparison to those produced in universities. However, the representatives of the EU institutions consider that universities can also produce policy relevant research without pursuing a particular policy agenda, while underscoring well-timeliness and practicality of TT reports and frequent exchange of research staff between TTs and universities.

 

Nevertheless, the quality of expertise for EU institutions assumes not only the quality of research team and research capabilities of its providers, but also their understanding of the EU policy-making process. This leads to increasing collaboration between the two types of organisation which aim to make use of their complementary skills, often encouraged by EU evaluation criteria that require academic excellence, policy impact and public outreach. At the same time, independence valued by TTs as guarantee of their credibility and public legitimacy is often sceptically perceived by EU officials, who consider transparency of TTs, which obviously have some kind of affiliation and certain sources of funding, a more important credibility factor in the selection of expertise providers.

 

Location in Brussels: to be, or not to be?

A physical presence in Brussels increases the visibility of Euro-oriented TTs and their access to EU policy-making. A Brussels location allows TTs to facilitate their collaboration with both EU and national officials through effective networking at various events. The leading positions of Brussels-based TTs in different lobbying channels prove successfulness of this strategy in approaching EU institutions.

 

However, the EU decision-making system offers national TTs opportunities for different locational strategies. TTs which are located outside Brussels try to achieve influence at a distance through occasional visits and e-mail contacts. In certain policy areas European policy can be shaped through influencing member-states rather than EU institutions. With increasing movement of the EU policy space online a strong social media presence can be also seen as an alternative strategy for those located in national capitals. Although high social media visibility gives more access to decision-makers, maintaining personal contacts with current or former EU officials is regarded as the most important element of political capital by European TTs regardless of their ‘presence’ strategies. A location in Brussels and European policy experience of their partners provide TTs with ‘insider’ status in the EU policy space.

 

The Multiplier Effect of Networks

The strategy of joining TT networks is widely employed by European TTs and is encouraged by the EU institutions. These networks involving both Brussels-based and national TTs can raise the research ‘quality’ in large comparative studies at EU level, adding both European and national perspectives in the policy recommendations for EU policy-makers. TT networks with their numerous members, including from new member states, can potentially deal with the exclusivity of the EU consultation process. Network coordinators frequently established in Brussels can facilitate dialogue between network members and EU institutions, undertaking for the administrative component of this cooperation. Networks also help to disseminate widely research through joint publications and events, using communication channels of both networks and their members.

 

The official EU documents regard the European NGO networks as furthering European integration and global integration of the EU. Considering these perceived benefits of European networks, the EU fund many of them through competition-based projects and institutional grants. This seeming mutually beneficial cooperation is however subject to the challenges of internal and external exclusivity where ‘weaker’ network members, seen as “amateurs’ in the EU policy space can be content with their ‘dormant’ role, while the most visible ‘insider’ Brussels-based network coordinators and the EU institutions seeking to reinforce their political legitimacy profit by the social capital accumulated due to the formal network representativeness.

 

Overall, this paper determines the EU-specific features of TTs as boundary organisations showing how they strategically use different forms of capital accumulated at European level to increase their legitimacy, credibility, visibility and influence in the Brussels policy-making scene.

 

This study was funded by the European Commission FP7 People programme: Marie Curie Initial Training Network UNIKE (Universities in Knowledge Economies) under the Grant Agreement number 317452.

 

Dr. Tatyana Bajenova (https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Tatyana_Bajenova) is Lecturer at the Westminster International University in Tashkent. She was previously Marie Curie Fellow in the EU-funded project Universities in the Knowledge Economy (UNIKE). She holds a Doctoral Degree in Political Sciences from the Ecole Normale Supérieure de Lyon (France), a Master’s Degree in Law and Management from the Jean Moulin Lyon 3 University (France) and a Master’s Degree “The EU and Central Asia in the International System” from the Institut für Europäische Politik and the Centre international de formation européenne, Berlin (Germany).

 

Reference:

Tatyana Bajenova (2019) Rescaling expertise in EU policy-making: European think tanks and their reliance on symbolic, political and network capital, Globalisation, Societies and Education, 17:1, 61-77, DOI: 10.1080/14767724.2018.1540926

The post Rescaling a Think Tank Model at European Level appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Regulation (EU) No. 2016/1624 and the recently adopted Regulation (EU) No. 2019/1896 represent the third and fourthlegislative revision of FRONTEX’ mandate and functions since the Agency was established. The adoption of Regulation (EU) No. 2016/1624 was extraordinarily fast since it did not take a year between its proposal by the Commission on 15 December 2015 and its publication in the Official Journal on 16 September 2016. Less than two years after the adoption of Regulation 2016/1624, the president of the European Commission announced in his speech on the 2018 State of the Union made on 12 September, the Commission’s intention to “to further strengthen the European Border and Coast Guard to better protect our external borders with an additional 10,000 European border guards by 2020”. On the same day, the Commission put forward an updated version of the recently adopted EBCG. Again, in record-time, Regulation 2019/1896 was published in the Official Journal of the EU on 14 November 2019.

Regulations 2016/1624 and 2019/1896 aim to develop a EU integrated management of the external borders by addressing both the existing deficiencies at the national level and responding effectively to exceptional and sudden migratory flows. This blog post centres on comparatively analysing the new operational powers conferred by Regulations 2016/1624 and 2019/1896 to the new EBCG when supporting the Members States.

 

1.     The EBCG’s Supervisory Role

Art. 3 para. 2 Regulation 2016/1624 conferred a monitoring role to the EBCG in order to guarantee a common strategy for the management of the European external borders. While FRONTEX also conducted supervisory activities to a certain extent, the EBCG may now deploy its own liaison officers in the Member States with the aim of fostering cooperation and dialogue between the Agency and the competent national authorities (art. 12 para. 3 Regulation 2016/1624). These responsibilities have been further detailed in art. 31 para 3 Regulation 2019/1896.

The information that the liaison officers gather contributes and facilitates the preparation of the EBCG’s vulnerability assessments. At least once every three years, the Agency shall monitor and assess the availability of the technical equipment, systems, capabilities, resources, infrastructure, and adequately skilled and trained staff of Member States for border control (art. 32 para. 2 Regulation 2019/1896). In turn, Member States are required to collaborate with the EBCG in elaborating the vulnerability assessment.

Source: Frontex

The recommendatory powers conferred to the EBCG are reflected in art. 32 para. 10 Regulation 2019/1896, which signals that if the recommended measures are not implemented in a timely fashion and in an appropriate manner by the concerned Member State, the EBCG’s Executive Director shall refer the matter to the Management Board and inform the European Commission. The Management Board shall then make a decision, based on the original proposal of the Executive Director, describing the necessary measures to be taken by the Member State and the time limit within which such measures shall be implemented. Importantly, art. 32 para. 10 Regulation 2019/1896 explicitly declares that the decision of the Management Board is binding on the Member State.

While it is still early to assess to what extent Regulation 2019/1896 improves the functioning of the vulnerability assessment and the swift deployment of liaison officers, a novel mechanism of impact levels to external border sections has been designed. Arts. 34 and 35 Regulation 2019/1896 state that the EBCG, in agreement with the Member State concerned, may declare three different impact levels and reactions with the aim of swiftly addressing at a given border section a crisis situation.

• Firstly, when the EBCG declares a low impact level, the competent national authorities shall “organise regular control (…) and ensure that sufficient personnel and resources are being kept available for that border section” (art. 35 para. 1 cl. a).
• Secondly, if a medium impact level is established, the concerned Member State shall “ensure that appropriate control measures are being taken at that border section” (art. 35 para. 1 cl. b).
• Thirdly, where a high impact level is declared the national authorities are encouraged to request operational assistance from the EBCG (art. 35 para. 1 cl. c).
• The EBCG may temporarily determine at a given border section a critical impact level, which shall be communicated to the European Commission. Under this scenario, the EBCG’s Executive Director will recommend the Member State concerned to request the EBCG’s operational assistance through the initiation of a joint operation or a rapid border intervention (art. 41 para. 1 Regulation 2019/1896).

While the obligations for the national border authorities under the low, medium and high impact levels are quite vague, under the critical scenario the Member State concerned shall respond, providing justifications for its decision, to the recommendation of the Executive Director within six working days (art. 41 para. 2). According to art. 42 Regulation 2019/1896, should the Member State ignore the EBCG Executive Director’s recommendation, the Council, on the basis of a proposal from the European Commission, may adopt a decision by means of an implementing act, identifying measures to mitigate those risks and requiring the Member State concerned to cooperate with the Agency in the implementation of those measures.

 

2.     The EBCG’s Expanded Operational Tasks

The EBCG continues to provide operational assistance to the Member States, as did FRONTEX, through the coordination of joint operations and rapid border interventions and through the deployment of teams on the ground (art. 37 Regulation 2019/1896). For the first time, Regulation 2016/1624 regulated the technical and operational capacity of the EBCG in the hotspots, where the national authorities face a sudden and disproportionate migratory pressure according to the 2015 Migration Agenda. In particular, pursuant art. 18 para. 2 Regulation 2016/1624, “the executive director, in coordination with other relevant Union agencies, shall assess a Member State’s request for reinforcement and the assessment of its needs for the purpose of defining a comprehensive reinforcement package consisting of various activities coordinated by the relevant Union agencies to be agreed upon by the Member State concerned”.

In this regard, art. 40 para. 1 Regulation 2019/1896 now details that in the hotspot areas migration management support teams, composed of experts from the relevant Union Agencies, will be deployed upon request of a Member State subject to large inward mixed migratory flows. The EBCG’s teams deployed in the hotspots are in charge of reinforcing the technical and operational assistance by “screening of third-country nationals arriving at the external borders, including the identification, registration, and debriefing (…) and, where requested by the Member State, the fingerprinting (…)” (art. 40 para. 4 Regulation 2019/1896). Notwithstanding that the hotspot approach has been incorporated in Regulation 2016/1624 and 2019/1896, which in turn reveals that the approach constitutes a EU long term measure to tackle extraordinary migratory pressures, there is to date no specific legal framework clarifying the functioning, powers and responsibility of the EBCG in the hotspots.

Furthermore, with the objective of reducing the dependence of the EBCG on the Member States’ technical equipment, art. 38 Regulation 2016/1624 stipulated that the Agency may acquire its own technical equipment to be deployed during joint operations, pilot projects, rapid border interventions and return operations. In this regard, art. 63 para. 4 Regulation 2019/1896 points out that where the EBCG acquires or co-owns equipment such as aircrafts, helicopters, service vehicles or vessels, the Agency shall agree with a Member State the registration of the equipment as being on government service. Regulation 2019/1896 aims to provide the EBCG with technical and human resources that are immediately and flexibly available to be deployed, with the goal of filling in the operational gaps that continuously afflicted FRONTEX. However, Regulation 2019/1896 does not design a clear framework of the EBCG’s responsibility, and continues to be highly questionable whether the Member States will authorise the registration of equipment that is beyond their control.

Lastly, a key operational power introduced by Regulation 2016/1624 was the establishment of a Rapid Reaction Equipment Pool, consisting of technical equipment to be deployed in rapid border interventions within 10 working days from the date that the Operational Plan is agreed upon by the Executive Director and the host Member State. In accordance with art. 20 para. 5 Regulation 2016/1624, the competent national authorities shall make available a minimum of 1,500 border guards to the EBCG for their immediate deployment in joint operations and/or rapid border interventions.

While the establishment of a Rapid Reaction Pool of 1,500 was a positive measure for emergency situations at the external borders, Regulation 2016/1624 did not manage to overcome the insufficient pooling of Member States’ border guards for concrete locations and concrete periods in regular joint operations. For this reason, Regulation 2019/1896 centres on designing a permanent, fully trained and operational Standing Corps of 5,000 Border Guards by 2021 and 10,000 by 2027 based on the distribution key set out in Annex I to Regulation 2019/1896.

Pursuant art. 54 para. 1 Regulation 2019/1896, the Standing Corps is composed of four categories of border guards:

• 1) operational staff members of the Agency (art. 55)
• 2) operational staff seconded from Member States to the Agency for a long-term deployment (art. 56)
• 3) operational staff from Member States ready to be provided to the Agency for a short term deployment (art. 57)
• 4) operational staff from the Member States ready to be deployed for the purpose of rapid border interventions (art. 58).

The main novelty is not so much the establishment of the Standing Corps, but rather the fact that the Standing Corps deployed as team members (category 1) are conferred executive powers (art. 54 para. 3 Regulation 2019/1896) such as verifying the identity and nationality of persons, authorising or refusing of entry upon border check, stamping of travel documents, issuing or refusing of visas, patrolling or, registering fingerprints (art. 55 para. 5 Regulation 2019/1896). Importantly, art. 82 para. 2 Regulation 2019/1896 states that the performance of executive powers by the EBCG’s operational staff members shall be subject to the authorisation of the Member State that is hosting the operation.

As the Meijers Committee and the European Council on Refugees and Exiles rightly noted, conferring executive powers to the EBCG’s operational staff members may breach the primary law provisions that regard the Member States as ultimately responsible for their own internal security and external border management. While the European Commission considers that art. 77 para. 2 cl. d TFEU provides the legal basis to bestow upon the EBCG’s staff members executive tasks if they are clearly defined to match the objective of the establishment of an integrated management system for external borders, art. 77 para. 2 cl. d TFEU shall also be read in light of arts. 72 and 73 TFEU.

 

3.     The EBCG’s Operational Power to “Intervene”

The new EBCG’s capacity to intervene led to considerable rejection by the Member States during the negotiations of Regulation 2016/1624. Currently, art. 8 para. 2 Regulation 2019/1896 specifies that “the multiannual strategic policy for the European integrated border management shall set out how the challenges in the area of border management and returns are to be addressed in a coherent, integrated and systematic manner (…)”. That is, the national authorities in charge of border management shall conform to the strategy adopted by the EBCG (art. 3 para. 3 Regulation 2016/1624 and 8 para. 6 Regulation 2019/1896).

The EBCG is thus conferred a supervisory and intervention role, which allows the Agency to adopt quasi-binding measures for the Member States and to directly intervene in the territory of the Member State if such measures are not effectively implemented (art. 18 Regulation 2016/1624 and 42 Regulation 2019/1896). In the event that a Member State neither adopts the measures recommended in its vulnerability assessment, nor requests/takes necessary actions in the face of disproportionate and sudden migratory pressure, the EBCG shall ensure a unified, rapid, and effective EU response so as not to jeopardise the functioning of the Schengen area. In this situation and according to art. 42 para. 1 Regulation 2019/1896, “the Council, on the basis of a proposal from the Commission, may adopt without delay a decision by means of an implementing act to identify measures to mitigate those risks to be implemented by the Agency and requiring the Member State concerned to cooperate with the Agency in the implementation of those measures”.

Since the Council decision is adopted, the EBCG’s Executive Director shall, within two working days, draft an operational plan and submit it to the Member State concerned (art. 42 para. 4 Regulation 2019/1896). Once the operational plan is submitted, the Agency’s Director and the Member State concerned shall agree on concrete actions to be adopted, including the deployment the necessary operational staff from the European Border and Coast Guard standing corps, for the practical execution of the measures identified in the Council’s decision.

Art. 42 para. 8 Regulation 2019/1896 requires the Member State concerned to comply with the Council decision by cooperating with the EBCG and taking the necessary actions to facilitate the implementation of the Council’s decision and the Agency’s operational plan. However, these obligations are tempered when art. 42 para. 10 Regulation 2019/1896 indicates that the European Commission may authorise the reestablishment of border controls in the Schengen area, provided that the concerned Member State neither executes the decision adopted by the Council, nor agrees with the EBCG’s Operational Plan within 30 days. Ultimately, the Member State concerned subject to the EBCG’s “intervention” shall expressly consent and agree with the Agency in regards to the operational support that will be provided in its external borders as to ensure the functioning the Schengen area (art. 42 para. 5 Regulation 2019/1896).

 

CONCLUSION

In the aftermath of the “refugee crisis”, the transformation of FRONTEX into the EBCG, as well as the need to promote a shared management of the European external borders emerged as a top political priority for both the EU and the Member States. Regulations 2016/1624 and 2019/1896 introduce the new EBCG as a guarantor of an integrated management of the European borders. In the European Commission own words, “by setting new standards and imbuing a European culture within border guards, the European Border and Coast Guard will also become a blueprint on how EU border management should be implemented”.

Both Regulations 2016/1624 and 2019/1896 clearly strengthen the EBCG’s autonomy since the Agency will depend to a much lesser extent on the specific operational secondments and support of the Member States. The EBCG should finally have its own equipment and operational personnel for its immediate deployment in joint and rapid operations. However, the most controversial, significant and novel operational powers included in Regulations 2016/1624 and 2019/1896 consist in introducing the Agency’s capacity to “intervene” and granting executive powers to the Agency’s staff members respectively.

Regulation 2019/1896 confers executive powers to the EBCG’s standing corps deployed as team members. While these executive powers may ensure a more effective, integrated and supranational administration of the European external borders, these activities also entail a significant, and difficult to control, degree of discretion that excessively stretches the Treaty provisions establishing the Member States as ultimately responsible for their own internal security and external border management.

However, it is still early to conclude whether we are only facing another revision of FRONTEX’ initial mandate as a reaction to an unprecedented migratory pressure or, on the contrary, Regulations 2016/1624 and 2019/1896 constitute the definitive step that will facilitate in the future the establishment of a European Corps of Border Guards with full executive, implementation and decision-making powers in the management of the European external borders.

The post Regulation 2019/1896 on the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX) appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Solemn undertaking before the Court of Justice of the European Union by two new Members of the European Court of Auditors

Foreign Affairs MEPs questioned the Hungarian Commissioner-designate for the Neighbourhood and Enlargement portfolio on Thursday morning.
Committee on Foreign Affairs

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Deutsche Umwelthilfe
COAD
According to Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe, imprisonment cannot be used against the public officials responsible, including the Minister-President, in order to compel them to introduce traffic bans on diesel vehicles in Munich

Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

On Thursday, 14 November, the three new Commissioners-designate Olivér Várhelyi, Adina-Ioana Vălean and Thierry Breton will face three-hour hearings in the EP.
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection
Committee on Industry, Research and Energy
Committee on Transport and Tourism

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Length of video : 172'
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Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

Length of video : 139'
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Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

Commission v Ireland (Parc éolien de Derrybrien)
Environment and consumers
Ireland is ordered to pay pecuniary penalties for failing to comply with an earlier judgment of the Court which required, in particular, that an environmental assessment be carried out in respect of a wind farm

Haqbin
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
An applicant for international protection guilty of serious breaches of the rules of the accommodation centre in which he or she is hosted or of seriously violent behaviour cannot be sanctioned by a withdrawal of material reception conditions relating to housing, food or clothing