European Union

The so-called “refugee crisis” revealed the urge to ensure the functioning of the Schengen area and the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), the need to operationally assist those Member States most affected by the sudden and extraordinary arrival of mixed migratory flows, and the need to effectively and uniformly implement the EU measures adopted in regard to migration, asylum and border management matters. Against this background, the decentralized EU Agencies, Frontex, EASO and Europol, have emerged as key actors, not only in providing emergency operational assistance to the frontline Member States, but also in implementing the hotspot approach. The expansion of the operational role, multilateral cooperation, presence on the ground and institutional significance within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) of Frontex, EASO and Europol, is now unquestionable. Hence, this book entitled “EU Migration Agencies: The Operation and Cooperation of Frontex, EASO and Europol” comparatively analyzes the evolution of the operational tasks and cooperation of Frontex, EASO and Europol. Special attention is paid to the expansion of the legal mandates of these AFSJ agencies, the reinforcement of the activities they undertake in practice on the ground and to what extent a gap exists between these two dimensions.

The evolution of the operational tasks of Frontex, EASO and Europol is analyzed and two trends are highlighted. Firstly, while the Regulations of these AFSJ agencies continue to stress that their operational role is limited to providing the competent national authorities with the technical assistance they may require, the tasks of Frontex, EASO, and to a more limited extent, Europol, have an operational nature on the ground. Secondly, Frontex, EASO and Europol are increasingly involved in guaranteeing the effective and uniform implementation of EU migration, asylum and border management measures, as well as ensuring that the concerned Member States do not jeopardize the functioning of the Schengen area or the CEAS. These two emerging trends are discussed in turn.

In this book is pointed out that Frontex, EASO and Europol closely accompany the frontline Member States in the implementation of EU migration, border management and asylum policies. These agencies focus on operationally supporting the competent border, asylum and law enforcement national authorities in effectively implementing EU law. The expansion of EU competences in AFSJ matters has gone hand-in-hand with the reinforcement of their administration, which no longer falls exclusively on the Member States, but rather, on a conundrum of diverse actors, among which Frontex, EASO and Europol play a prominent operational role. The growing integration that the AFSJ is experiencing has led to a Europeanization of its administration. It is necessary to ensure a uniform and effective implementation of EU border management, asylum and migration laws. The long-standing notion of administrative and implementation power in AFSJ matters is therefore progressively shifting. The deepening of the operational powers and cooperation of Frontex, EASO and Europol is eroding the exclusive procedural autonomy that Member States previously enjoyed, when implementing EU law. These AFSJ agencies increasingly steer and shape the effective and uniform implementation of EU migration, asylum and border management laws and policies at the national level.

Furthermore, the extent of the operational functions of Frontex, EASO and Europol may theoretically range from merely coordinating and providing technical assistance to the Member States, to developing full-fledged enforcement and coercive powers. Since Frontex, EASO and Europol do not have independent executive competences, their tasks can no longer be described as merely technical or supportive. Despite the lack of transparency and the vague legal provisions regulating the activities that Frontex, EASO and Europol undertake in practice on the ground, their tasks do have an operational nature. The issue is that the legal frameworks of Frontex, EASO and Europol lag behind the real operational powers that these agencies exercise on the ground, which creates legal uncertainty.

The reinforcement of the legal mandates and inter-agency operational cooperation of Frontex, EASO and Europol thus reveal a trend, under which these AFSJ agencies are mandated to increasingly develop operational and implementation activities. The operational and implementation role of Frontex, EASO and Europol has followed a constant and linear progression since their respective establishment. While Europol, due to its still markedly intergovernmental nature, is starting to operationally assist the national law enforcement authorities in their national investigations about illegal migrant smuggling, Frontex and EASO already conduct significant operational tasks on the ground and ensure the implementation of the adopted European measures at the national level. Whereas the current tasks already represent an erosion of the operational powers and implementation prerogatives of the Member States, none of these AFSJ agencies have been bestowed centralized, fully autonomous operational and enforcement powers on the ground.

The reinforcement of the operational tasks and implementation role of Frontex, EASO and Europol is not in itself an issue. What is problematic is the broad formulation of these AFSJ agencies’ legal bases and the lack of transparency surrounding their operational activities and cooperation, rendering the task of determining the degree of discretion they enjoy difficult. The key challenge involves determining the degree of discretion that Frontex, EASO and Europol enjoy and whether the institutional balance in the EU is respected. In this light, and despite the fact that Frontex, EASO and Europol have not been vested with strictly delegated powers, this book followed the CJEU’s non-delegation doctrine as useful guidance to analyze the legality of these AFSJ agencies’ operational functions under EU constitutional law. The CJEU, in Short-Selling, updated and relaxed its initial Meroni doctrine, by no longer confining delegation to clearly defined executive powers, but rather to powers precisely delineated and amenable to judicial review in the light of the objectives established by the delegating authority.

Unlike in the case of Short-Selling, the operational powers of Frontex, EASO and Europol are neither circumscribed by well-detailed conditions that limit their discretion, nor clearly detailed in a legal framework or their Regulations. These AFSJ agencies’ operational tasks are not restricted to merely providing technical support to the frontline Member States, but rather, they develop expanding cross-agency operational cooperation and activities on the ground. These agencies’ tasks entail the exercise of discretional prerogatives that are not narrowly delineated or clearly conditioned in any national or EU legal instrument. For instance, Frontex and EASO played a strong recommendatory role in the hotspots, which in principle, is compatible with the non-delegation doctrine, since the concerned Member States are not bound by Frontex and EASO’s recommendations. Nonetheless, the national authorities, subject to extraordinary migratory pressure, may decide to rubber-stamp the recommendations put forward by the agencies. Frontex’s influence over the Greek officials in determining the nationality of the arriving migrants, Europol’s advice and operational support to the national enforcement authorities to dismantle migrant smuggling networks, and EASO’s admissibility assessment of the asylum applications or the detection of vulnerable applicants encompass in practice discretional and political choices. In these cases, the responsibilities of the agencies are blurred, since the national authorities adopt a final decision based on the assessment of the agencies.

Although fully autonomous enforcement and coercive powers are not possible under the current Treaties and would breach the non-delegation doctrine, the ambiguity and lack of transparency surrounding the operational tasks that Frontex, EASO and Europol undertake on the ground challenge the determination of their discretion and whether they actually make policy choices. In the author’s view, the main limitation and control of Frontex, EASO and Europol’s distinctive operational and implementation role comes from the Member States. While it is true that Frontex, EASO and Europol assist the Member States in matters closely linked to their national sovereignty prerogatives, the competent national authorities that vote at the management boards tightly control their recently reinforced operational, implementation and supervisory functions. Only two representatives of the European Commission have voting rights in Frontex and EASO’s management boards and this figure falls to just one representative in the case of Europol. The presence of the European Parliament in Frontex, EASO and Europol’s management boards is non-existent. Member States also exert their influence over the appointment and supervision of the executive directors, who lead the governance, management and daily administration of Frontex, EASO and Europol.

Member States’ reluctance to fully abandon their well-established bilateral practices, share information and operationally cooperate with Frontex, EASO and Europol in core national sovereign matters, like border management, asylum or migration, is especially reflected in these AFSJ agencies’ management boards. The Member States will thus maintain control of the strategic decisions and the daily management of Frontex, EASO and Europol. While centralizing on the executive, decisional and enforcement powers of Frontex, EASO and Europol will ensure a fully effective and harmonized implementation, it is important to bear in mind that these agencies represent an institutional trade-off or a common ground between intergovernmentalism and communitarization in the AFSJ. That is, Member States do not wish to relinquish further sensitive competences to the EU Institutions; but at the same time, they increasingly need supranational operational assistance regarding matters that can only be effectively managed in an integrated manner at the EU level. For this reason, whereas Europol, Frontex and EASO have been conferred upon significant operational tasks, none of these agencies are vested with full decisional, enforcement or coercive powers, which remain as an exclusive competence of the competent national authorities.

Hence, this book makes four main contributions. First, it maps Frontex, EASO and Europol as EU decentralized agencies, which are clearly distinguished by their operational powers and by the possibility to directly assist the competent national authorities on the ground. In particular, the establishment and early operational functions conferred on Frontex, EASO and Europol are studied. Second, it comparatively analyzes the reinforcement of the operational tasks vested on Frontex, EASO and Europol, as well as the extent of their assistance on the ground and influence on the implementation prerogatives of the national authorities in the aftermath of the “refugee crisis”. Third, it explores the bilateral and multilateral inter-agency cooperation between Frontex, EASO and Europol. Specifically, the expanded multilateral and operational cooperation that takes place in the hotspots is studied. Fourth, the limitations to the reinforced operational activities and cooperation of Frontex, EASO and Europol is analyzed. The constitutionality and legal bases of these AFSJ agencies, as well as the degree of discretion that they enjoy according to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) non-delegation doctrine, is examined. The internal administrative organization and governance of Frontex, EASO and Europol is also studied as to determine the influence and real control that the Member States and civil society may exert over the increasing operational powers these AFSJ agencies have been conferred on.

The post EU MIGRATION AGENCIES: THE OPERATION AND COOPERATION OF FRONTEX, EASO AND EUROPOL appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

It was one year ago today that Britain left the European Union, and one month ago that we also left the EU’s Single Market and customs union.

So far, NOT so good.

Putting up costly and complicated barriers to trade with our most important customers and suppliers in the world is causing enormous headaches and losses for our businesses, without any apparent benefits.

Also today, the government announced that the UK is applying to join a trade bloc thousands of miles away – the Asia-Pacific free trade pact, or CPTPP, of 11 countries.

Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, said:

“One year after our departure from the EU we are forging new partnerships that will bring enormous economic benefits for the people of Britain.”

But in the EU, we already enjoyed comprehensive free trade agreements with three of the big economies in the CPTPP – Canada, Japan and Singapore.

And in any case, our exports to the CPTPP countries only account for around 8% of UK exports – tiny, compared to the 43% of all our exports that go to the EU, more than any other destination in the world by far.

 MISSING THE POINT Anyway, all this misses the point.

Being a member of the European Community was never just about trade. It was always about peace, first and foremost.

And attempting to increase trade with countries thousands of miles away also misses the point.

Most countries do most of their trade with their neighbouring countries – for good, practical reasons.

Also, in a world attempting to tackle global warming, doing more trade with countries thousands of miles away isn’t going to help. It will make the problem much worse.

 BREXIT AND VACCINES Today, some Sunday newspapers are attempting to justify Brexit because of the EU’s failure to secure vaccines in time, compared to Britain’s success.

Supply problems, especially with the AstraZeneca vaccine, have indeed hampered the EU – which was slower than the UK in securing contracts with pharmaceutical companies.

That was a serious mistake, as was the European Commission’s knee-jerk reaction on Friday to invoke Article 16 of the Brexit agreement, which would have put a border on the island of Ireland specifically for vaccine exports.

But within hours, the Commission realised its error and rapidly climbed down from its threat of invoking Article 16 (which, incidentally, Boris Johnson also threatened to invoke just two weeks ago).

If only our government was more willing to promptly acknowledge its errors of governance, that have resulted in over 100,000 Covid-19 deaths, the worst in Europe and close to the world’s worst, and contracts worth hundreds of millions of pounds going to mates of government ministers, without any proper tendering process or accountability, and resulting in the NHS either not getting PPE, or else receiving unusable PPE.

Vaccine supply problems in the EU, although of course a gravely major setback, will be resolved soon.

And as I explained in my feature article yesterday, the EU’s model of purchasing vaccines as a bloc for 27 countries, will probably have to become the model for the planet’s acquirement of vaccines in future global pandemics (as for sure, more are on the way).

The UK is proud to have, so far, vaccinated more people than any other country in Europe.

But as the World Health Organization pointed out yesterday, ‘vaccine nationalism’ will only prolong the pandemic.

Until all the world becomes vaccinated, rather than just richer countries, there is the danger, says WHO Director-General, Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, that:

“the faster the virus will take hold, the potential for more variants will emerge, the greater the chance today’s vaccines could become ineffective, and the harder it will be for all countries to recover.”

So, the only way to beat the global pandemic is for countries to work together, not apart, and to ensure that treatments, tests, and vaccines are equitably and widely distributed to all countries world-wide.

 UK NATIONALISM Countries working together is also the way to ensure peace, prosperity, and security for our continent of Europe – the very reason that the European Community was established in the first place.

In the long run, UK nationalism – of any kind – is not going to work. We need to be a part of our European family of nations, and not apart.

No longer having any say in the running and future direction of our continent represents a loss of British sovereignty.

In time, the country will discover that Brexit means going backwards, not forwards. We will need a new democratic opportunity to reconsider Brexit, although that may be some years away.

In the meantime, please share the 8½-minute video embedded below as widely as you can. You might already have seen it, but many haven’t.

The video explains why Britain joined the European Community in the first place. The very same reasons why Britain is likely to want to join the EU again, one day in the future.

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
• My campaign page on Facebook: Reasons2Rejoin
• And LinkedIn

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• Join the discussion about this article on Facebook:

The post It was never ‘just about trade’ appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

OPINION on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2019, Section X – European External Action Service
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Nikos Androulakis

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

On Thursday, Parliament and Council reached a provisional agreement on the EU Social Fund+ that contributes to social inclusion, job opportunities and fighting poverty.
Committee on Employment and Social Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

Ministers outlined the priorities of the Portuguese Presidency of the Council of the EU to parliamentary committees, in a series of meetings.
Committee on Constitutional Affairs
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development
Committee on Culture and Education
Committee on Development
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety
Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality
Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection
Committee on International Trade
Committee on Industry, Research and Energy
Committee on Legal Affairs
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs
Committee on Fisheries
Committee on Regional Development
Committee on Transport and Tourism
Subcommittee on Security and Defence

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

Ministers outlined the priorities of the Portuguese Presidency of the Council of the EU to parliamentary committees, in a series of meetings.
Committee on Constitutional Affairs
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development
Committee on Culture and Education
Committee on Development
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety
Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality
Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection
Committee on International Trade
Committee on Industry, Research and Energy
Committee on Legal Affairs
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs
Committee on Fisheries
Committee on Regional Development
Committee on Transport and Tourism
Subcommittee on Security and Defence

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

Ministers outlined the priorities of the Portuguese Presidency of the Council of the EU to parliamentary committees, in a series of meetings.
Committee on Constitutional Affairs
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development
Committee on Culture and Education
Committee on Development
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety
Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality
Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection
Committee on International Trade
Committee on Industry, Research and Energy
Committee on Legal Affairs
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs
Committee on Fisheries
Committee on Regional Development
Committee on Transport and Tourism
Subcommittee on Security and Defence

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

OPINION on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2019 - European Commission
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Nikos Androulakis

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

By Bjarke Refslund, Aalborg University, Department of Sociology and Social Work

The impact of European Union legislation varies across different policy fields and across countries. Some policy areas like competition rules are highly, and directly affected, while other areas like social policies and labour market policies are only indirectly affected. Moreover, the member states varies in terms of compliance with European legislation. Some scholars and observers argue national policy actors are severely limited in their ability to regulate policy areas strongly influenced by Europeanisation, in particular Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) case law (what has been called judge-made law. National policy-makers, nevertheless, appear to have more political room for manoeuvre than often portrayed in the literature and in public debates, as I show along with my co-authors Jaehrling, Johnson, Koukiadaki, Larsen and Stiehm in our recent article in JCMS.

In the article, I and my co-authors investigate how public procurement policies have developed over the recent years in Denmark, Germany and the UK in the light of the prominent impact of Europeanisation within this policy field, in particular the 2008 CJEU Rüffert (C346/06)-ruling. Drawing on qualitative data, mainly interviews, from a comparative European project on precarious employment and social dialogue, the results show enduring national policy variation and how national actors, despite legal uncertainty utilise public procurement to endorse their own policy goals. Sometimes the actors directly challenge the case law, or at least utilise the legal uncertainty to further their own national policy agenda.

Public authorities are prominent buyers of goods and services in areas like cleaning and construction, but the procurements spans widely, and at EU level 14 per cent of GDP is spent on public purchase of services, works and supplies according to the EU commission. Following this the role of state, regional and local public entities such as municipalities and hospitals as ‘socially responsible customers’ has been increasingly discussed. In particular how public buyers balance social (like fair wages and working conditions) and economic (low prices which in turn often result in low wages and poor working conditions) implications of public spending. While the role of public procurement has historically been debated, the Rüffert-ruling caused great commotion and uncertainty, as it appeared to severely limited national polities ability to promote social goals with public procurement. However, more recent rulings like the RegioPost ruling combined with the new Procurement Directive has given renewed prominence to the social dimension of public procurement. Nevertheless, in most national settings legal uncertainty remain.

Policy-makers may have different goals with public procurement. For example, some national and local authorities are highly inclined to curb labour market precariousness and securing decent working conditions (and other social goals) when procuring, whereas other policy-makers are more inclined to secure the lowest prices, which in turn may result in poor wages and working condition for the affected workers. The contradictions between these two legitimate goals underlines the inherent discussion of the ‘social dimension’ of European integration, where it has often been argued that the social consequences receive only secondary prominence compared to the economic freedoms in the Single marked as argued by for instance Fritz Scharpf. The tension has been further reflected in recent discussion on the Social dimension in particular the ‘EU social pillars’.

The findings in our research show how both national authorities, but equally important local governments for instance in municipalities, use procurement policies to achieve social goals such as certain wage levels and issues related to working conditions. Hence, some policy-makers are actively promoting social goals with their public procurement policies through labour clauses or legislation enforcing labour clauses that define certain wages and working conditions that suppliers must meet. Our results additionally highlight how political differences are important for how the political actors behave, which has also been shown by other researchers. The results show that governments (local as national) that are dominated by Social democrats or other left-parties are more inclined to apply e.g. labour clauses and promote social goals via public procurement. However, centre-right parties are also actively utilising public procurement to reach social goals, although to a lesser extent.

Although the overall policy implications of Europeanisation are quite similar in the three countries, there is significant variation in the policy trajectories on public procurement. These differences reflect the traditions for wage setting and the historical role of public procurement. Danish legislators at the national level and their German peers in some Länder are more prone to utilise social clauses, whereas their UK peers mainly rely on voluntary agreements. Overall, this illustrates how national policy-makers themselves defines the room for national ‘push-backs’ against Europeanisation for instance through policy innovation and through defining new regulatory measures.

In sum, our article illustrates that despite increasingly Europeanisation of national policies due to the influence of the CJEU, there is still a lot of leeway for national actors to shape policy decisions. These policy decisions may even act against overall Europeanisation. This active contestation is reinforced by the ambiguity of the EU legislation and case-law, which some national actors utilise to promote their own policy goals, whereas others are more reluctant for political reasons or out of fear of the risk of infringing EU law. We also show that public procurement is used as a tool to promote social goals, as in particular the experience from some German Länder and Denmark shows, where the institutional contexts is also more favourable for this than in the UK, where labour clauses remain voluntary. This illustrates overall how the impact of Europeanisation remains uneven across Europe, and how national policy-makers actively challenge Europeanisation, when it runs counter to their own policy goals.

 

This blog draws on the JCMS article Moving in and Out of the Shadow of European Case Law: the Dynamics of Public Procurement in the Post‐Post‐Rüffert Era

 

 

Bjarke Refslund is associate Professor in Industrial Relations and working life studies, Department of Sociology and Social Work, Aalborg University. His research focus on industrial relations, comparative employment relations and political economy and industrial sociology.

 

 

 

The post National policy makers have the final say on the extent of Europeanisation appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Differentiated integration is a political reality in the European Union. However, public opinion remains divided, both across countries and among individual citizens. This fact highlights important challenges for the workings of the Conference on the Future of Europe.

Prime Ministers Viktor Orbán and Mateusz Morawiecki stood by each other when faced with the EU’s rule of law requirements. Photo: Czarek Sokolowski/AP/NTB

During the recent tense and aggressive debate on the EU budget and the COVID-19 relief fund, Prime Ministers Mateusz Morawiecki (Poland) and Viktor Orbán (Hungary) threatened to veto the budget if the EU did not abolish the fund’s requirements on the rule of law. At this point, it seemed a real possibility that the fund would be set up excluding these two countries. In response, Morawiecki staunchly repeated his (and Orbán’s) long-held belief that such a ‘two-speed’ EU is both undesirable and unnecessary. Possibly, this is because they believe that such “differentiated integration” would relegate their countries to the periphery of the Union.

Differentiation in half of all integrated policy areas

Nevertheless, differentiated integration has indeed become a reality in multiple policy fields. While the number of member states has increased, the Union has become more heterogeneous. The most prominent cases of differentiated integration are, of course, the Schengen agreement and Euro currency, in which not all EU member states participate. More generally, however, we know that almost half of all integrated policy areas contain some form of differentiation (Leuffen et al. 2013).

At the same time, EU matters have become increasingly politicized and affect not only supra-national, but also national elections. We observe a polarization of debates and a higher frequency of referenda on EU policies, as well as a rise of Eurosceptic parties across member states (see, for example, Börzel and Risse 2018 and Schimmelfennig 2018).

Integration gridlock

An extreme consequence of this sort of dissatisfaction is the threat of disintegration. This problem is exemplified by the gridlock during the budgetary negotiations in light of the COVID crisis. The situation exposes the more general dilemma related to differentiated integration.

This is because public support for integration in the South is linked to the demand of moving forward, towards deeper integration. However, the Eastern states block deeper integration because they oppose the linkage of a social deepening to a normative deepening.

The very same states that brought about the gridlock in the first place also oppose differentiated integration.

The solution to this would be differentiated integration as an alternative to uniform deepening. But it is the very same states that brought about this gridlock in the first place that also oppose differentiated integration – at least in what concerns redistribution. This shows how sensitive the issue is. The increasing politicization of the matter makes it even more important to widen our understanding of how citizens feel about differentiated integration.

Divided public

In an article recently published in the Journal of European Public Policy, we use survey data to shed light on how individual-level preferences for differentiated integration are formed. A first look at how public opinion on differentiated integration evolved over time shows that, nowadays, a slim majority of respondents support differentiated integration – specifically, the general idea of a “two-speed Europe”.

There is some fluctuation over time, but public opinion is mostly two-fold: about half of the respondents oppose differentiated integration (DI), the other half supports it. However, support of DI reached a significant low in 2015. This stands in stark contrast to general support for the EU, which increased rather steadily from just below 50% in 2011 to almost 60% in 2017.

North vs South, left vs right

Taking a closer look at the individual level, the data suggest that social dispositions play an important role in citizens’ preferences for differentiated integration. More specifically, when it comes to explaining citizens’ support for differentiated integration, socio-demographic variables seem to matter very little compared to attitudinal variables. This is in contrast to what explains general support for the EU (see i.e. Andersen & Reichert 2009).

For example, we find evidence that support for differentiated integration correlates with liberal economic values. This means that there is support amongst citizens that also support free trade and a market economy, while there is scepticism amongst those with concerns about equality. Additionally, citizens in the political right are more supportive of differentiated integration than citizens in the centre or the left.

At the country level, our analysis reveals important variation in levels of support for differentiated integration across the EU. For example, citizens of the Northern and Eastern member states are more prone to support differentiated integration, and citizens of Southern member states are markedly more prone to oppose it.

Debate on legitimacy

A possible explanation supported by our evidence points to the negative (and still prevalent) repercussions of the Eurozone crisis, which mostly affected the south of Europe. To some citizens, differentiated integration might mean an attempt to dilute EU solidarity and to further divide the more prosperous from the less prosperous states. In other words, their opposition to differentiated integration might pertain to what they believe it implies for their member states.

To some citizens, differentiated integration might mean an attempt to dilute EU solidarity and to further divide the more prosperous from the less prosperous states.

Our findings should be taken seriously by the Conference on the Future of Europe. A substantive amount of EU citizens, especially those with strong preferences for equality (as well as those in the South), seem to think of differentiated integration as a process of discrimination and a threat against EU solidarity. If the attempt is to change their minds, or to reconcile their views with what those in favour of differentiated integration see as the correct way forward for the EU, then public debate must include convincing arguments about why and under which circumstances it is legitimate and fair.

The post Differentiated integration meets a divided public appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Europe and Africa must move away from a donor-recipient relationship, said the Development Committee, outlining its vision for a relationship between the two continents.
Committee on Development

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

As we move into the new phase of Brexit – ‘long Brexit’ as I find I’m thinking about it – it’s useful to cast an eye back on one of the more obvious difficulties that the UK government faced during 2020: trying to do two things at once. While this shouldn’t be in the same ballpark as an individual “walking and chewing gum”, there’s good reason to treat it as if it is. At the heart of it is the notion of opportunity costs and finite resources. Doing something (anything) means you can’t do something else, and using your capacities for one purpose ties them up should you want to use them for a different purpose. For a person, that’s very clear: I’m sure we can all think of people who try to juggle too much at once, often resulting in them being unable to properly achieve any one thing. Something’s gonna give, somewhere. With a state, this should be less of an issue. There are many individuals and (relatively) huge resources, with scope to increase these in a way that one person cannot. Indeed, states spend their time doing lots of things simultaneously. But even here, we can notice that in the usual run of things, there are priorities to be made and focus to be made. Governments typically concentrate their efforts on specific things, leaving the rest to tick over. And that gives us a clue as to the issue here. 2020 was not ‘the usual run of things’ but rather a highly atypical coincidence of two huge events: Brexit and Covid. Each alone would have represented a massive challenge for a government. In particular, each has had profound effects across public policy, the economy and society, and so could not be contained within the usual structures of government. Moreover, in each case there was a necessity to translate policy decisions into effective action by economic and social agents: businesses needed to change processes for importing and exporting to the EU; everyone needed to work to reduce transmission of the virus. This, in of itself, need not have been a problem, since the kind of policy and implementation in each case did not necessarily have to pull in different directions. Working for home is not incompatible with working out EORI numbers, for example. But problems of interaction did still occur. Firstly, the need for the highest-levels of government to be closely involved in both Covid response and negotiations on the future relationship meant that neither one had the undivided attention of those concerned. I won’t speak of the Covid side of things, but it was certainly evident that Number 10 took a somewhat erratic path through the negotiations. Notwithstanding their model of backloading the process to increase pressure on the EU to make concessions, the decision to introduce the Internal Market Bill reads like the product of a hastily-assembled gambit that wasn’t thought through at anything like sufficient length. Likewise, the historic unwillingness of Boris Johnson to get across the fine print cannot have been aided by the need to deal with the sharp rise of Covid cases in December, leaving him unable to provide anything more than emotional support to the negotiators in the room and making any political breakthrough in his discussions with Ursula Von Der Leyen or Charles Michel more convoluted. Secondly, the political choices made during 2020 increased the difficulty of the next steps. Central in this was the decision not to seek an extension to the transition period ahead of the June deadline: While it made sense in terms of the narrative of ‘getting Brexit done’, it ensured that the hot end of negotiations would occur during the already-anticipated second wave, and that there would be the economic disruption of the post-transition arrangements stuck on top of the economic disruption of Covid. Thirdly, the overlapping of the two events means that we enter 2021 with the conditions for increased dissatisfaction with the outcome of negotiations (again, I can’t speak on Covid, other than to note the relatively poor comparative performance on cases and deaths). Already in 2020 we saw the dangers of such disconnection and discontent: the rhetoric of the meaninglessness of the Withdrawal Agreement, followed by that Internal Market Bill, was the feeding ground for those who wish to propagate a framing of being stabbed in the back. The prospect of a UK Dolchstoßlegende opens up the prospect of not only continuing instability in EU-UK relations, but also scope for instability around the Johnson administration; an administration that has never looked the most robust, even with its big majority. The absence of scrutiny, let alone involvement in the formulation of the Trade & Cooperation Agreement means that the political threshold to reopen – or reject – it is relatively low. This might well have been a problem even without Covid – the ‘renegotiation’ of the Withdrawal Agreement by Johnson is a case in point – but again it is plausible to argue that riding both horses at once exacerbated the issue. Of course, we can’t always chose when things happen, but maybe when we can we should bear in mind that the more we can focus on one thing at a time, the better for all involved.

The post The perils of riding two horses appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Legal Affairs Committee MEPs pave the way for a new EU law that requires companies to comply with human rights and environmental standards within their value chains.
Committee on Legal Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP

Radicalisation is a growing cross-border threat. But what is it, what are the causes and what is the EU doing to prevent it?

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

ClientEarth v EIB
Environment and consumers
Curtis project in Spain: The EIB must accept ClientEarth's request for an internal review

The EU needs clear policy objectives to achieve a carbon-neutral, environmentally sustainable, toxic-free and fully circular economy by 2050 at the latest, say MEPs.
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

This paper looks at how the COVID-19 pandemic has directly and indirectly affected European security and defence. It documents how missions and operations of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) were directly impacted. It finds that COVID-19 has accentuated already recognised capacity shortfalls of the CSDP, such as strategic airlift, secure communications and command and control. Defence spending through EU instruments, and to a lesser extent at national level, has come under pressure although it may still escape post-2008 style cuts. The pandemic revealed the vulnerabilities of Member States’ infrastructure and supply chains, and the limited competences of the EU in supporting Member States’ management of public health emergencies. COVID-19 tends to act as a threat multiplier and source of instability, particularly in low-income countries already affected by socio-economic imbalances and governance problems. The pandemic is likely to accelerate existing trends, including the declining share of the US and the EU in the world economy compared to Asia, intensifying concerns about China’s growing assertiveness, growing attention to IT security and cyber capabilities, and the interconnection between conventional and unconventional security risks. This analysis also looks at which lessons the EU should learn in order to better manage and prepare for such crises. At a strategic level, the EU needs to invest in lesson learning exercises with the European Parliament playing a key role in making the learning publicly accessible. It should also be proactive in shaping international discourses about international governance and the role of the EU post COVID-19. Furthermore, the paper elaborates 19 short and longer-term recommendations, for instance, on how CSDP missions can become more resilient in public health emergencies and which capability shortfalls need addressing most; how defence spending can be made more efficient and better targeted; or how the EU can help to better coordinate military support to civilian authorities. Finally, it advocates investment in health intelligence and better managing the biosecurity risks arising from growing access to dual-use technologies. The EU should forge a preventive approach to future pandemics and associated risks and embrace a comprehensive approach to security and resilience. Yet, one should not lose sight of the distinctive function of the CSDP and what it can currently deliver.
Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

MEPs will discuss on Wednesday the situation on the Greek islands and the plans to establish a new reception and identification centre on Lesvos.
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP