European Union

COVID-19 vaccines should be produced also in developing countries to overcome the pandemic, development MEPs told Commissioner Urpilainen on Thursday.
Committee on Development

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The €672.5 billion Recovery and Resilience Facility is the key tool in the EU's Covid-19 recovery plan to support reforms in response to the crisis.

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

Since 2018, Italy and Malta have restricted access to their ports for NGO migrant rescue vessels. While both countries have faced criticism for this policy, it should be noted that since the 1990s, most EU member states have erected barriers along their borders to prevent irregular migration. There is, therefore, a degree of hypocrisy in other EU states portraying Italy and Malta as Europe’s ‘black sheep’ over their approach to the issue.

Tensions within the EU over responsibility for migrants rescued at sea escalated in June 2018 when Italy and Malta effectively closed their ports to NGO migrant rescue vessels. Although the duty to rescue persons in distress at sea is a fundamental rule of international law, it is not clear which state is legally responsible for their disembarkation. In practice, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) stipulates that the master of a ship is obliged to rescue persons in distress at sea, yet it does not specify the procedures for disembarkation of such persons.

Migratory pressures are not distributed equally across the EU’s member states. Moreover, recent influxes of irregular migrants to the member states located on the EU’s southern borders have resulted in tensions between these states and other member states which are more protected against direct irregular entries. The former have long complained of the Dublin Regulation’s ‘first country of entry’ rule which puts an unfair ‘burden’ on them, as well as of the lack of solidarity from other member states to deal with a situation that is entirely due to their geographical position.

With regard to the Dublin rules, by establishing state responsibility for the processing of an asylum request, the assigned member state is required to grant reception conditions to applicants of international protection including housing, food, clothing, healthcare and education for minors. According to the OECD, the cost for processing and accommodating asylum seekers is estimated to be around ten thousand euros per application for the first year but can be significantly higher if integration support is provided during the asylum phase. Since the practice of providing international protection is costly, states have an incentive to discourage asylum seekers from seeking international protection in their territories and instead encourage them to do so in other EU member states with better conditions.

By accident of geography, member states located on the EU’s external southern borders stand at the forefront of irregular migration flows from Africa and Asia, thus carrying a disproportionate ‘burden’. Italy has become one of the primary host countries of the EU and the EU’s smallest member state, Malta, has had to deal with high per capita irregular arrivals in recent years. It could be argued, therefore, that the less affected member states ‘free-ride’ at the expense of the southern member states when it comes to the distribution of asylum seekers.

Despite widespread criticism of the Italian and Maltese governments’ decision to close their ports to NGO migrant rescue vessels, there is not one European government that currently stands out for its open immigration stance. In practice, all member states are protecting both their internal and external borders from irregular migration.

Hence the hypocrisy of portraying Italy and Malta as Europe’s ‘black sheep’ for having closed their ports when member states of the EU and the Schengen area have constructed almost 1,000 km of walls since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to prevent irregular migration. Ten member states (Spain, Greece, Hungary, Bulgaria, Austria, Slovenia, the UK, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania) have built such border walls, with a sharp increase during the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’ involving the creation of seven new barriers. As a result, the EU has gone from just two walls in the 1990s to fifteen by 2017.

Furthermore, following the outbreak of the crisis, several Schengen members resorted to reinstating internal border controls to prevent secondary movements of asylum seekers from other member states.

Table 1: ‘Temporary’ reintroduction of border control at internal borders

Note: Compiled by the author using data from the website of the European Commission

Although the Schengen Borders Code allows for the temporary reintroduction of border controls in the case of serious threat to national security, this was the first time they were reinstated for an extended period. Internal border checks have effectively been prolonged several times since 2015 and are set to expire on 12 November 2019. Rather than being reintroduced in exceptional circumstances, internal controls have become the political norm, justified on the grounds of migration control. This illustrates a lack of solidarity as well as lack of trust among EU member states, where precedence is given to national over shared interests.

Solidarity is one of the critical challenges facing EU asylum and migration policymaking and is becoming increasingly relevant as divisions and distrust persist among member states. As long as the principle of solidarity remains voluntary, it is unlikely that EU member states will pull together and agree on a long-term strategy, particularly one involving reform of the Dublin system to include a permanent relocation mechanism that would help member states facing disproportionate migratory pressure.

So what does the future hold for this policy domain? Will it continue to be dominated by the construction of walls and fences as well as permanent controls at internal borders? And could this lead to the end of Schengen, the most tangible success of European integration? There is a strong likelihood that EU asylum and migration policymaking will continue to be characterised by short-term ad hoc and unilateral measures since most member states perceive no benefits in developing long-term solutions.

This article was first published on the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) blog on European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) on 28 August 2019.

The post Italy and Malta are not the villains of Europe’s migration crisis appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The Foreign Affairs and International Trade committees will be assessing the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement today and on Friday.
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Committee on International Trade

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

The Foreign Affairs and International Trade committees will be assessing the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement today and on Friday.
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Committee on International Trade

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

On the eve of World Cancer Day, Parliament’s Special Committee on Beating Cancer (BECA) backs EU wide effort to beat cancer.
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety
Special Committee on Beating Cancer

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

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Find out about the EU’s circular economy action plan and what additional measures MEPs want to reduce waste and make products more sustainable.

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

On Thursday, the Development Committee will discuss with Commissioner for International Partnerships Jutta Urpilainen how developing countries can access COVID-19 vaccines.
Committee on Development

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

FIGC and Consorzio Ge.Se.Av.
Freedom of establishment
A national sports federation, such as the Italian Football Federation, may be subject to the rules on the award of public contracts if it pursues activities of general interest not having an industrial or commercial character

Fussl Modestraße Mayr
Freedom of establishment
The prohibition on broadcasting advertising only at regional level within the framework of German television programmes broadcast at national level could be contrary to European Union law

Commission v Hungary (Valeurs limites - PM10)
Environment and consumers
Hungary has infringed the rules of EU law on ambient air quality

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As we were racing fast to leave 2020 behind, 2021 came as a slap on the face as the COVID-19 mutations promptly popped up in different parts of the World, including in the UK, Brazil and South Africa, which have made the successful vaccination roll out across the globe all the more crucial. While all celebrated the arrival of vaccines for COVID-19, they did not expect the failures in producing and distributing these life-saving vaccines to cause another European Union crisis. Neither friction was envisaged among the EU and the Member States, nor between the United Kingdom and the EU. While the EU’s handling of this crisis highlighted the EU’s weakest spot: slowness, thoroughness and its non-complying MSs. However, its manoeuvrers to take control of the vaccine crisis meant differentiation through non-compliance, indifference to institutional forbearance and extension of substantial and non-ideological material for the Eurosceptics in the EU and the UK.

From the very beginning, the European Commission and MSs have agreed on joint action against COVID-19 at the EU level; later adopted a centralised EU approach to secure supplies and support developing a vaccine.

However, when the AstraZeneca, pharmaceutical company producing the Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine, began to suffer from manufacturing problems at one of its European factories and has declared that it will deliver less to the EU than it had planned in the coming months. Thus, the EU’s vaccine target-of 70 per cent of all adults by the summer- was put at grave risk. And from this moment onwards the EU’s common vaccine policy began to go downward spiral.

Chinese Sinopharm vaccine. Photographer: Zhang Yuwei/Xinhua/Getty Images

First, not known for its burden-sharing stance, but infamous for being the most non-compliant member of the EU, Hungary did not disappoint. The Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban criticised the EU’s vaccination efforts allegedly for being slow and ineffective.  Then broke ranks with the EU by licencing the Russian Sputnik vaccine and authorising the Chinese Sinopharm vaccine, ultimately disregarding the European Medicine Agency, which has not yet approved the use of these vaccines in the EU.

Second, when the EU was still drawing up its response to the COVID-19 pandemic in the mid-2020, the UK was still eligible to join the EU’s vaccine scheme, but the UK government opted out and pursued its vaccine strategy. The UK acted fast and decisively in concluding vaccine deals than the EU had done. We know now that the UK entered into a binding much robust contractual vaccine deal with AstraZeneca three months before the EU concluded its deal with the firm. However, the AstraZeneca’s manufacturing failures intersected the faith of the UK’s and the EU’s success in meeting their vaccine targets.

Following this crossing, the Commission’s rhetoric and positions have astonished those who thought that the EU is always the most cool-headed and sensible one in the room. The Commission first implicitly accused the AstraZeneca of giving preferential treatment to Britain in delivering its vaccine and asked some of the shortfalls to be made up with vaccine allotted for Britain and threatened that if AstraZeneca disagrees, supplies to Britain of other vaccines made in Europe may be affected.

However, it did not end here.

Just after publishing its redacted version of the vaccine contract with AstraZeneca on 28th of January and claiming that supply commitments within the deal are binding, on the same evening, the Commission briefly invoked the article 16 of the Brexit deal’s Northern Ireland protocol;  had they not retreated, border restrictions between the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland would have worked as part of the Commission’s efforts to clamp down on vaccine exports from the EU.

There are three interconnected points I like to make.

My first point covers Hungary’s non-compliance with the EU’s common vaccine policy. Professor Frank Schimmelfennig argues that bad-governance countries with lack of the functioning rule of law and weak administrative capacity, like Hungary if they do not like an EU rule or decision, do not have to negotiate with the EU and ask for a formal exemption.  This is because these MSs can always find a way around by non-compliance with that rule or aspects of a common EU policy, just like the Hungarian government did thorough exploiting the EU’s slow progress in vaccine suppliance, and overriding the EU’s EMA–hence the outcome was a differentiation in the EU integration through non-compliance. Therefore, the EU should have been better prepared to have its MSs with the traits highlighted by Schimmelfennig to refuse to comply with the regulation of the EU’s vaccine scheme. Additionally, the EU should have adopted a toolbox for those non-complying MSs to keep every other MSs united. However, what is more, alarming is how Hungary’s position could pave the way for the other MSs, with similar political traits to Hungary, to challenge the EU’s unity and solidarity–thumps-down to the EU.

My other point involves the EU’s attempt to invoke Article 16 of the Brexit deal. One can say that the Commission did this out of desperation since it has been a one long dark year for everyone, but it may have severe repercussions for the EU’s stance on the rule of law. By Institutional forbearance Steven Levitsksy and Daniel Ziblat’], in their now much celebrated book titled, How Democracies Die, means that elected officials cannot exercise legal action that intentionally privileges one group of individuals at the expense of another. This helps to comprehend how Commission’s brief invocation of Article 16 is alarming and what dire consequences it would have on the EU’s stance on the rule of law. Yes, the Commission was privileged to act in this way, but not exercising that legal right could have been more beneficial to the EU and its relationships with the UK. The EU now has set precedence; we do not know which side will invoke Article 16 next and its consequences.

My third point concerns how the EU’s position in the UK and the UK’s relatively successful vaccine scheme may contribute to Euroscepticism in the EU and the UK. Wolfgang Münchau sai:d “{F}or starters, the EU has just provided a hindsight argument in favour of Brexit. The UK would not have proceeded with vaccinations as quickly if it had subjected itself to the same policy.” Thus, the Eurosceptics in the EU did not escape praising Brexit. For instance, although the Hungarian PM Orban does not campaign for Hungary’s exit from the EU since Hungary benefits a greater deal from its membership of the EU both economically and politically, he applauded Brexit for swift vaccines authorisation, which meant he exploited the opportunity well enough for his Eurosceptic audience. Furthermore, I agree with Münchau who also said: “The last thing the EU ever wants to do is give people a rational, non-ideological reason for Euroscepticism.”, which is in line with what Professor Simon Hix  predicts that the UK public will become more Eurosceptic now that it has left the EU, and because the UK is a weaker partner in this relationship. Sadly, the current row between the UK and the EU over Oxford Astra-Zeneca vaccine and the Commission’s unfortunate attempt to invoke Article 16 is supplying the UK tabloids with lots of material feeding into the Eurosceptic sentiment of the UK public, as well as into the political parties’ rhetoric– once again thumps-down to the EU.

Let’s hope the EU will learn its lesson from this vaccine debacle and next time around it will be better prepared and organized to act swiftly and decisively in global emergencies such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Failure to do so undermines the entire premises on which this union was conceived and stands.

The post EU’s Vaccine Politics of Non-compliance, Institutional forbearance and Euroscepticism — thumbs-down to the EU! appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Alexei Navalny's detention is just the latest source of tension in EU-Russia relations. Find out about the reasons for the friction and about Parliament’s views.

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Consob
Freedom of establishment
Natural persons who are subject to an administrative investigation for insider dealing have the right to remain silent when their answers might establish their liability for an offence that is punishable by administrative sanctions of a criminal nature, or their criminal liability

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In a debate on Monday, Budget Committee Members questioned the Commission’s Health Director-General on vaccine availability and the use of the EU budget.
Committee on Budgets

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The AFET and INTA committees will hold a meeting under the joint committee procedure on 4 February, with all opinion-giving committees invited to present their positions on the draft EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement.
This will be followed by another joint AFET-INTA committee meeting on 5 February, where the co-rapporteurs, Ms Kati PIRI (AFET, S&D, NL) and Mr Christophe HANSEN (INTA, EPP, LU), will present their draft recommendation for consent.
Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP