Ideas on Europe Blog

The UK’s Government is wrapped in a contradiction on Brexit. On the one hand, Theresa May states that no deal is better than a bad deal. On the other hand, the Conservative Manifesto also states that getting the Brexit negotiations right will define “our economic security and economic prosperity”.

Since the Lancaster House speech earlier this year, Theresa May has been consistently and repeatedly stating that the UK would be prepared to walk away from the Brexit negotiations. What only became clear during the election campaign is that the UK Government directly links the future prosperity of its citizens to the outcome of the UK negotiations with the EU.  This is important because for the Conservative Party to argue that “getting the Brexit negotiations right is central to everything – our economy, our finances, our position in the world. Get Brexit wrong and we get everything else wrong. From looking after our elderly to educating our children, everything depends on getting Brexit right”, fundamentally contradicts the rationale for no deal. Indeed, underlying that the UK needs to “get the Brexit negotiations right” to secure its future security and prosperity implies that no deal is in itself the bad deal.

During last week’s BBC Leaders Special on Question Time David Dimbleby asked the PM “what is a bad deal? People are very confused, you talk all the time about a bad deal which you won’t accept. Can you explain what in your mind would be a bad deal?”. In her response Theresa May said the following: “Well yes. I think on the one hand, David, you have got politicians in Europe, some of whom are talking about punishing the UK for leaving the EU, I think what they want to see in terms of that punishment would be a bad deal, and secondly, you have got politicians here, in the United Kingdom, who seem to be willing to accept any deal, whatever that is, just for the sake of getting a deal, and I think that the danger is they would be accepting the worse possible deal at the highest possible price”. A few minutes later, a member of the audience asked the PM to “quantify in billions of pounds what is a good deal” regarding the so-called Brexit bill. The Prime Minister’s answer: “well the… I am not going to give you a figure on that . . . because we need to go through very carefully what as part of the negotiation what rights and obligations the United Kingdom has”.

The PM’s response further confirms her ambiguity in defining what a bad deal is and the rationale to walk away from the negotiations with no deal. In her response to the member of the audience, Theresa May seems to accept that there will be a Brexit bill to be agreed (which depends on agreeing the rights and obligations of the UK in the EU). However, in her response to David Dimbleby, the PM states that the “punishment” (the Brexit bill) is a bad deal and therefore no deal would be a better outcome. Paradoxically, in another response to a member of the audience, May also states that “several EU politicians want to get on with trade talks very quickly”. This reinforces the view that when May talks about the “punishment” that European politicians want to inflict on the UK she is not referring to the possibility of the talks on the trade deal to collapse but, rather, to what the EU will demand for settling the UK/EU accounts on previously agreed commitments (the Brexit bill). What is important to note here is that the EU has stated that this financial settlement must precede and be agreed before any trade talks begin. As such, the refusal of the PM to quantify what the UK is willing to accept paying suggests either the UK Government has not given much thought about the issue (in fact, the possibility of a Brexit bill was not even mentioned during the EU referendum campaign), or that its intention is to use the Brexit bill as a reason for walking away from the negotiations with no deal.

But when  ”sufficient progress” regarding the Brexit bill (as well as on EU/UK citizens rights) has been achieved, which will allow the negotiations to proceed to the next stage, then the question is what constitutes a good (“right”) and a bad (“wrong”) Brexit deal? Interestingly, the UK Government is somewhat clear on what it seeks from the Brexit negotiations. As it is stated in Theresa May’s Article 50 letter, the goal of the UK is to establish a “new deep and special partnership” with the EU “in both economic and security cooperation”. In economic terms, “getting Brexit right” means, in the words of David Davies (Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union), retaining the “exact same benefits” of membership of EU membership of the Single Market  By the same token, “getting Brexit wrong” means getting a Brexit deal where these exact same benefits are not guaranteed. Crucially, as a no deal will put the UK and EU trading under WTO rules those tariff and non-tariff access will be lost. As such, accordingly to the UK’s Government own terminology, no deal also means “getting Brexit wrong”. In other words, no deal is also a bad deal. Therefore, the open question is which outcome is worse – no deal or a deal that does not deliver the “exact same benefits” of EU membership?

An important caveat here: walking away from the Brexit negotiations table with no deal will not prevent the EU from taking action against the UK in international courts. That is, the financial accounts between the UK and EU will have to be settled regardless whether the UK leaves the negotiation table or not. As such, no deal is the worst possible deal for it not only does not avoid the Brexit bill, it also prevents a (soft) Brexit deal on trade, security and on UK/EU citizen rights deal with the EU to come about, and finally, it also breaks a key pledge of the Leave campaign – a comprehensive free trade agreement with the EU. One thing is certain though: the Conservative Party’s threat of walking away with no deal (the hardest form of Brexit) is incompatible with the same Conservative Party’s goal of “getting the Brexit negotiations right”.

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Blogs are increasingly relevant to researchers and, for those starting out in contributing to them, it can be useful to reflect on the differences with other outputs, writes Anthony Salamone. He sets out some suggestions on how to approach writing for an academic blog, including how to gain the most from the experience.

Inga Ulnicane

View from Exhibition ‘The Vulgar: Fashion Redefined’. Photo from Belvedere http://www.winterpalais.at/

Tackling Grand societal global challenges has become a popular goal of knowledge policies and governance including many science, technology, innovation and higher education strategies and initiatives. Over the past 15 years, the European Union, many international organizations, national governments, private foundations, scientific societies and universities have declared their priority to address societal challenges in the areas such as environment, energy and health. Why and how does the Grand societal global challenges concept have become such a popular idea? Where does it come from and what kind of change does it involve? In my recent article ‘Grand Challenges’ concept: a return of the ‘big ideas’ in science, technology and innovation policy? (Ulnicane 2016), I trace the origins of this concept and its global diffusion and analyse it in the context of a long-term evolution of science, technology and innovation policy.

Origins and global diffusion of the Grand challenges idea

The Grand Challenges concept became popular in 2003 when Bill Gates announced his Grand Challenges in Global Health programme to fund research on diseases affecting people in the developing world. He presented the Grand Challenges idea as based on a century-old model referring to the famous 1900 speech by German mathematician David Hilbert, in which he formulated 23 unresolved mathematical problems that influenced mathematical research in the 20th century. Soon after the Gates announcement, the idea of Grand Challenges started to spread globally being taken up by governments, universities and scientific societies in particular in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom (see Box 1). Popularity of the Grand societal challenges idea increased during the times of economic crisis when the need to increase legitimacy and impact of science, technology and innovation and present them as sources of future sustainable growth and wellbeing increased.

1900 Hilbert’s speech Mathematical Problems

1988 Wilson’s speech ‘Grand challenges to computational science’

2003 The Gates Foundation: Launch of Grand Challenges in Global Health

2007 Grand Challenges initiatives of University College London and Princeton University

2007 European Research Area Green Paper: focus on identifying societal challenges     requiring research efforts beyond national capacity

2008 (February) National Academy of Engineering: 14 Grand Challenges for Engineering

2008 Expert report on Grand Challenges in European Research Area

2009 (July) Lund Declaration ‘Europe must focus on the Grand Challenges of Our Time’

2009 (September) A strategy for American innovation: focusing on Grand Challenges

2010 European Institute of Innovation and Technology launches Knowledge and Innovation Communities to address Grand Challenges

2010 (May) Grand Challenges Canada launched

2010 (October) ICSU Earth System Science for Global Sustainability: Grand Challenges

2010 (October) Europe 2020 flagship initiative Innovation Union

2011 The Royal Society ‘Knowledge, networks and nations’ report

2012 The OECD ‘Meeting Global Challenges through Better Governance’ publication

2014 EU Horizon 2020 launched with societal challenges as one of three priorities

2015 The Lund revisited declaration on tackling Grand Challenges

Box 1 Chronological list of examples indicating global diffusion of Grand Challenges concept (Ulnicane 2016)

In the European Union research and innovation policy the idea of Grand societal challenges started to appear at the same time as in other regions, namely some ten years ago in 2007 and 2008. The major step in establishing the Grand Challenges idea as a key priority for EU research and innovation policy was the Lund Declaration ‘Europe must focus on the Grand Challenges of Our Time’ adopted during the Swedish Presidency in 2009. This declaration played a key role in preparation of the current EU research and innovation programme Horizon 2020 in which societal challenges along with excellent science and industrial leadership are the key priorities. The societal challenges priority in the Horizon 2020 has been allocated the highest amount of funding of approximately 30 billion Euros of initially planned almost 80 billion Euros for the whole program. This funding is dedicated to seven broad societal challenges:

• health, demographic change and well-being;
• food security, sustainable agriculture and forestry, marine, maritime and inland water research, and the bioeconomy;
• secure, clean and efficient energy;
• smart, green and integrated transport;
• climate action, environment, resources efficiency and raw materials;
• Europe in a changing world – inclusive, innovative and reflective societies; and
• secure societies – protecting freedom and security of Europe and its citizens.

Grand societal challenges: change or continuity in science, technology and innovation policy?

Although the Grand societal challenges concept has become popular and widely used around the world, the way that it is taken up in different contexts can vary considerably. Nevertheless, some typical features of this idea can be identified: tackling Grand Challenges usually involves addressing real-life problems that request boundary spanning collaborations across different scientific disciplines, sectors and countries involving heterogeneous partners from research, engineering, business, policy-making and civil society.

Are these characteristics new? Taking a long-term view on the evolution of science, technology and innovation policy since its emergence after World War II, a number of similar earlier ideas can be recognized. Already in his 1939 book on the social function of science Bernal argued that science has to assist human needs. More recently similar ideas can be found in Mode 2 approach focusing on knowledge production in the context of application, transdisciplinarity, heterogeneity, reflexivity, social accountability and quality control as well as in the ideas about the third mission of university arguing that in addition to the two traditional missions of teaching and research universities also have to contribute to social and economic development. Similarly, the need for collaborations and interactions among heterogeneous partners is well known for example from triple helix approach emphasising university-industry-government interaction. Furthermore, international collaboration has been well established research practice (Ulnicane 2015) already for a long time.

Thus, in the case of the Grand societal challenges concept it is possible to see important continuities of earlier ideas and established practices. At the same time, the concept also presents a novel combination of earlier ideas and established practices by focusing on tackling global real-life problems through boundary spanning collaborations among heterogeneous partners. For a better understanding of this new combination of different features it would be necessary to study how and by whom ‘real-life’ problems to be tackled are defined (as ‘real-lives’ can differ considerably), what motivates different partners to contribute to boundary spanning collaborations, how local, national and global concerns are addressed in such collaborations, etc.

Grand societal challenges concept: Just a fashion or a paradigm shift as well?

Popularity of the Grand societal challenges concept suggests that it has become a new fashion in knowledge policies similar to earlier fashions such as Mode 2 knowledge production in the 1990s and the term Big Science in the 1960s (Rip 2000). As earlier fashions in science policy, the Grand societal challenges concept captures a feature of science that has become more relevant and creates an occasion for policy-making (Rip 2000: 29). Additionally, two types of response identified in the cases of earlier fashions can be seen: some policy makers, analysts and enterprising scientists embrace the new fashion, while others especially from the old elite and spokespersons for established science reluctantly accommodate ongoing changes (Rip 2000: 31). At the moment, the Grand societal challenges concept is only one of fashions in knowledge production; other – similar and contrasting – contemporary fashions include scientific excellence, impact, open science and responsible research and innovation.

Being a fashionable policy concept does not require that it is a completely new idea. The same way as the latest fashion collections can draw their inspiration on art and traditions from earlier decades and centuries, also fashions in science policy build on earlier (and sometimes forgotten) ideas and practices. (Exhibition ‘The Vulgar: Fashion Redefined’ demonstrates how renown contemporary fashion designers use elements from the Greek mythology, the portraits of the Dutch Golden Age, post-revolutionary France etc.)

But how deep and far-reaching are the policy changes brought by the fashionable Grand Challenges concept? Is this just a new label for incrementally changing policy ideas and practices or does it present a paradigm shift in science, technology and innovation policy? Does the Grand Challenges concept present a new policy paradigm, i.e. ‘a framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing’ (Hall 1993: 279)? To assess the magnitude of the changes, a systematic study and comparison of earlier and recent science, technology and innovation policies would be necessary addressing questions such as, e.g. If and how the hierarchy of policy goals and the nature policy problems have changed? How are these changes translated into new policy instruments? Are some old policies discontinued? Does the focus on societal challenges lead to the radically new ways of defining, implementing and evaluating policies? Or is the current fashion of Grand Challenges rather a ‘normal policy-making’ (Hall 1993: 279) with some broad continuities and some changes in policy instruments and their settings?

Dr. Inga Ulnicane (University of Vienna, Austria) undertakes research and teaching on global and European science, technology and innovation policy. Her research has appeared in Science and Public Policy, Journal of European Integration, Journal of Contemporary European Research and International Journal of Foresight and Innovation Policy. She has completed a commissioned study on the European Research Area and knowledge circulation for the European Parliament. She is one of conveners of the ECPR Standing Group ‘Politics of Higher Education, Research and Innovation’ bringing together more than 170 researchers from around the world.

References:

Hall, P. (1993) Policy paradigms, social learning, and the state: the case of economic policymaking in Britain. Comparative Politics 25(3): 275-296.

Rip, A. (2000) Fashions, Lock-ins and the Heterogeneity of Knowledge Production. In: M.Jacob and T.Helstrom (eds) The Future of Knowledge Production in the Academy. Buckingham: SRHE and Open University Press, pp.28-39.

Ulnicane, I. (2015). Why do international research collaborations last? Virtuous circle of feedback loops, continuity and renewal. Science and Public Policy, 42(4), 433-447. doi:10.1093/scipol/scu060

Ulnicane, I. (2016). ‘Grand Challenges’ concept: a return of the ‘big ideas’ in science, technology and innovation policy? International Journal of Foresight and Innovation Policy, 11(1-3), 5-21. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/IJFIP.2016.078378

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Emmanuel Macron’s entry on the diplomatic scene – from the NATO and G7 summits last week to the meeting with Vladimir Putin on Monday – may already be regarded as a positive and very encouraging achievement, but everybody, in France and elsewhere, agrees that the new President’s real and primordial challenge is the capacity to carry out the domestic reforms. In a country that has the hard-earned reputation to be unreformable, the realisation of his economic and social agenda is what Macron will ultimately be judged upon. He has one unsuspected ally: a large part of the French public has fully understood that the retirement age needs to be adapted, that fiscal policy needs a serious overhaul, and that a stronger influence on the EU comes only with respect of the deficit rules and evidence of new growth potential. And many of them have also realised that French labour law and labour relations result in a kind of societal contract that serves everybody well, except the unemployed and job-creators. Some have named the determination with which different stakeholders protect the status quo of manifold vested interests, ‘the collective choice for unemployment’. The result is a mixture of extreme reluctance by small and medium-sized enterprises, even at times of entrepreneurial success, to hire new employees on a permanent basis (the highly protected Contrat à durée indéterminée), and the simultaneous incapacity of the system, to avoid large layoffs and social plans in the wake of the country’s continuing de-industrialisation. If all attempts at reforms aiming at making the labour market more fluid have failed over decades, the reason has been a strong popular resistance fueled by the logic of class struggle. Each time the trade unions have managed to reactivate the fear of the dismantling of the ‘French social model’ – the French emotional knee-jerk equivalent of the ‘NHS’ – and each time the government in place has been unable to overcome the discrepancy between radical ideological principles and practical economic constraints, between the desirable (in the absolute) and the feasible (within the social-democratic, but capitalistic default setting of contemporary Europe). This time around, the key will lie once again with the trade unions. Unlike their German counterparts, the French unions have always been characterised by ideological pluralism rather than unitary organisation according to industrial sectors. This automatically results in fierce competition for membership among them, which in turn leads to rhetoric grandstanding in negotiations and over-bidding each other in drwaing ‘red lines’. Trade unionism has always been a minority movement in France, but it has successfully claimed the moral right and duty to speak for the ‘unenlightened’ majority (and take the entire country hostage in their fight).

Class struggle staged by ‘Force Ouvrière’ at the time of the ‘Amiens Charter’

The ideological roadmap of French trade unionism was graved in stone in 1906 in the so-called ‘Charter of Amiens’ (the capital of Picardy which, in a nice coincidence, happens to be Macron’s birthplace and the theatre of one of weirdest moments of the recent election campaign around the aptly named Whirlpool factory). This manifesto whose radical anti-capitalism has never really been put into question has deeply impregnated the language of French social relations. Its major semantic component is distrust. Managers and even self-made entrepreneurs are by definition class enemies. A company’s overarching goal can only be profit maximisation by ruthless exploitation of workers. Compromise is treason. Accordingly, German style co-determination practices are looked upon with defiance. Which is understandable, given all the negative connotations conveyed by the vocabulary in vigour. Unlike the German ‘Arbeitgeber’ (= ‘providers of work’), the French term ‘patronat’ reduces this specific social group to its purely hierarchical dimension of domination. The etymology of ‘patron’ reveals of course its religious, medieval roots, inevitably smelling of pre-industrial authority structures and inducing neo-feudal perception and behaviour patterns. Not exactly what you would call ‘social partnership’.

‘Hang all the bosses under the Avignon Bridge.’ French semantics with charming smiles.

These are no doubt the reasons why in 1998 the French employers’ federation changed its name from CNPF (where ‘P’ stands for ‘Patronat’) to MEDEF (where it is replaced by ‘Entreprises’). Unfortunately, its representatives have had trouble changing their own rhetoric accordingly, and their internal power struggles often lead to the same kind of stupid over-bidding as on the trade union’s side. Their current president, Pierre Gattaz, is no exception to this rule, regularly missing excellent opportunities to just shut up for a while. In a lovely compendium on French-German stereotypes and contrasts published twenty years ago, Ingo Kolboom very rightly recalled in his contribution about labour relations in both countries that ‘words are more than just designations; they are complex interpretations of reality, transformations, repressions, and projections, the support of desires and social strategies’ (R. Picht et al., Fremde Freunde, Munich, 1997, p. 268). France offers a linguistic and cultural environment in which trade unions simply have no choice but systematically base their actions on an unwavering presumption of contempt (‘mépris’) with regard to employers’ attitudes towards employees. Which in turn explains that strikes or similar radical actions, rather than being the ultimate means of struggle once negotiations have failed or justified requests have remained unanswered, are in fact a pre-condition of negotiation. They are called with the aim of increasing bargaining power and they inevitably raise the face-saving stakes on all sides by lifting discussions from pragmatic deal making to the level of moral indignation. Such is the minefield that Emmanuel Macron has chosen as his first area of reform. The speed with which he and his new Prime Minister Edouard Philippe have already invited each single trade union leader for long, individual dialogues to both the Elysée and Matignon give evidence to their determination, whatever the outcome of the legislative elections.

Holding out a hand to the trade unions: Emmanuel Macron and Philippe Martinez from the CGT.

Surprisingly, what clearly has been a suicide mission for any government of the last twenty years, all of a sudden does not even seem out of reach any more. Listening to the very careful wording of the trade unionists these days, one cannot help but find they are somehow aware that the new President has managed to install a ‘now-or-never feeling’ in the country over the last weeks. They seem to feel that ‘the times they are a-changin’ and for the time being, they don’t want to be the ones that ‘stand in the doorways’ and ‘block up the halls’. Macron’s tightrope walk is the most passionate political endeavour this country has seen for a long time. It’s more than a reform. It’s full-size cultural change in the making. If he manages to shift the semantics of labour relations from the lexical field of class struggle to a Monnet-inspired new vocabulary of common interest and joint effort, he will have achieved more in a few months than others over their entire mandates.

Albrecht Sonntag @albrechtsonntag

This is post # 23 on the French 2017 election marathon. All previous posts can be found here.

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This Tuesday, while most of us where thinking of other things, I was at the Social Market Foundation, talking about Brexit and euroscepticism.

In the course of questions at the end, I was asked whether British pro-Europeans displayed the same range and variety of positions as sceptics, to which I noted mobilisation hadn’t really happened. A bit more harshly, I said that a lot of pro-EU activity consists of going a demo in London, followed by lunch at Pizza Express, which probably wasn’t enough.

As a general rule, if I’m going to be snippy, then I feel I should explain myself, so you can judge better whether it’s warranted or not.

In essence, pro-Europeans have faced two interlinked issues, one on the supply side and one on the demand side.

Demand: a lack of fundamental challenge

If we consider mobilisation around the issue of European integration, then identity plays an important role. For sceptics, the threat to a core part of their social identity – their nationality – has endlessly been used to move people to action: we often focus on the control part of “let’s take back control”, but we also need to consider the half-hided ‘us’ too. National identity is taken as natural and eternal, a bedrock on which we act out our daily lives and our sense of community: the Manchester attacks demonstrate that all too well.

As such, eurosceptics have always had a strong identificational base from which to work. If you want to take that to a more extreme position, then all euroscepticism might be conceptualised as nationalism, dressed in either the language of the left or the right: I hesitate to go that far, but the point is well-made.

By contrast, pro-Europeans lack the same depth of emotional belonging. Very few people indeed consider themselves just ‘European’ and those that do are typically the sort of people I mentioned in my talk: cosmopolitan types, who see the EU as part of a bigger package of European-ness. In broad terms, these are people who will have the resources and the inclination to be able to continue their Anywhere-ish lifestyles post-Brexit. Thus, the loss of EU membership is painful, but not necessarily critical in the same way that national identity is for sceptics.

This isn’t to suggest that the substantial volumes of people who have turned out (and continue to turn out) for pro-EU demonstrations don’t really care, but rather that they have more space to adapt their identification politics and so less incentive to translate action on the streets into concerted political activity.

Supply: the costs of dominance

On the other side of the equation is the paradoxical over-supply of broadly pro-EU policy outcomes. Once EU membership was secured, the political and economic establishment moved to take that as a given. Certainly, there were many issues and problems with the specifics of that membership, but the broad thrust was one of participation, that being the best way to change the things one didn’t like.

Seen in this light, pro-Europeans had no strong incentive to create specific political organisations, partly because so many others seemed to be doing that for them, partly because the issue was so environmental and structural as to make action for membership per se appear rather ridiculous. This is underlined by the sole mobilisation that did take play, namely among federalists, who were the only ones not served by the array of groups already out there.

This is true across the EU, where groups specifically devoted to promoting the EU are few and far between. If there is a difference in the British case, then it is that in the UK there was never really the same attempt by groups to turn European positions into more pro-active ones, or to integrate more fully the European with the national: instead, the British line has been very instrumental, both for politicians and economic agents.

None of this is to say that pro-EU mobilisation is impossible, but rather it will face persistent difficulties, even as the UK moves towards departure from the organisation. While there will logically be an associated shift in the establishment to a non-member status, this will not address the identificational issue, which will be made all the more complicated should there be very limited barriers to access. That membership was tried, and failed, is something that will cast a long shadow on those that would have the UK join once more.

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Brexit Secretary, David Davis, has said that Britain won’t hold ANY Brexit talks unless the EU drops its demands for €100bn in payments it claims are due.

It’s now more than likely that Britain will leave the EU without any agreement in place, which of course will be disastrous. Unfortunately, David Davis has shown he knows little about the art of negotiating.

Quite a handicap when you’re the Brexit Secretary. Refusing to talk is the way to end talks, and walking away from talks will make it very difficult to return to those talks. The Sunday Times quoted a senior Brussels negotiator as saying of Davis’s latest announcement:

“Once you walk away, you need a major concession to come back to the table and we are simply not able to provide any.”

Just as unfortunately, David Davis has shown he knows little about the EU and how it functions. Quite a handicap when you’re the Brexit Secretary. In 2012 Mr Davis gave an anti-EU speech in which he claimed that the European Commission was responsible for the laws of the EU.

“That is fundamentally undemocratic,” he said. But as he should know, the European Commission has no power to pass laws.

Only the directly elected European Parliament, in concert with the EU Council, comprising the ministers of democratically elected governments, can pass laws in the EU. Mr Davis also claimed that the EU’s foundational principles and acquis could not be changed, and that was essentially undemocratic.

But that’s not correct either. The EU is a democracy, and can be anything that all its members unanimously agree it can be. If that was not the case, there would not have been so many EU treaty changes – all of which were debated and passed by our Parliament in Westminster.

During last year’s EU referendum campaign, Mr Davis claimed that Britain would be able to negotiate individual trade deals with each of the EU’s member states. He appeared to be completely unaware that one of the main basic features of the European Union is that EU countries cannot negotiate individual trade deals and instead do so as a bloc of all its members.

Then, after Mr Davis was appointed to be the new Brexit Secretary, he boasted that Britain would be able to secure free trade areas “10 times the size” of the European Union. Liberal Democrat MEP, Catherine Bearder, had to point out that this would be 1.5 times bigger than the planet’s entire economy.

There’s only one way to ensure that David Davis doesn’t mess up the Brexit talks with the European Union. Vote Theresa May’s Conservative Party out of office on 8 June. 

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This week the Conservative Party tweeted Theresa May’s statement: ‘Sturgeon’s plan to leave the UK – Scotland’s biggest market – would mean economic chaos.’

The Prime Minister doesn’t seem to get it, does she? Exactly the same arguments also apply to her plan to leave the EU as well as its Single Market – the UK’s biggest market – which would also mean economic chaos.

Last March Mrs May made similar comments in a keynote speech giving all the reasons why the Union of the United Kingdom should remain intact. But yet again, all her arguments could just as easily and logically apply to keeping the Union of Europe intact.

Mrs May said:

“One of the driving forces behind the Union’s creation was the remorseless logic that greater economic strength and security come from being united. Our wholly integrated domestic market for businesses means no barriers to trade within our borders.”

Yes, the exact same reasons apply to the European Union – reasons that Mrs May extolled before the Referendum, but abandoned after the Referendum in exchange for the trappings of high office.

Mrs May also said about our Union of the United Kingdom:

“The fundamental strengths of our Union, and the benefits it brings to all of its constituent parts, are clear.” 

Yes, the strengths of the European Union are also clear – that Union is the world’s largest free trading area.

Mrs May also said:

“We must take this opportunity to bring our United Kingdom closer together. Because the Union which we all care about is not simply a constitutional artefact. It is a union of people, affections and loyalties.” 

Indeed, as is the European Union.

The Prime Minister continued:

“Together we form the world’s greatest family of nations. But the real story of our Union is not to be found in Treaties or Acts of Parliament. It is written in our collective achievements, both at home and in the world.”

Actually, the European Union is the world ‘s greatest family of nations. And its collective achievements have been huge, not least of which is the achievement of presiding over the longest period of permanent peace in our continent’s history.

Doesn’t Mrs May realise that all the arguments for keeping the Union of the United Kingdom intact, are the exact same reasons for keeping the European Union intact? Undoing our Union with Europe could directly lead to the undoing of our Union of the United Kingdom.

Of course, Mrs May knows that. In April last year, when she was Home Secretary, she gave one of the most powerful pro-Remain speeches of the entire referendum campaign.

Then, Mrs May advised against Brexit because it could prove ‘fatal’ both to the Union of Europe as well as the Union of the United Kingdom. She said then:

“..if Brexit isn’t fatal to the European Union, we might find that it is fatal to the Union with Scotland. The SNP have already said that in the event that Britain votes to leave but Scotland votes to remain in the EU, they will press for another Scottish independence referendum. 

“And the opinion polls show consistently that the Scottish people are more likely to be in favour of EU membership than the people of England and Wales.

“If the people of Scotland are forced to choose between the United Kingdom and the European Union we do not know what the result would be. “But only a little more than eighteen months after the referendum that kept the United Kingdom together, I do not want to see the country I love at risk of dismemberment once more. 

“I do not want the people of Scotland to think that English Eurosceptics put their dislike of Brussels ahead of our bond with Edinburgh and Glasgow. 

“I do not want the European Union to cause the destruction of an older and much more precious Union, the Union between England and Scotland…

“We should remain in the EU.”

Do you really want  Theresa May as our Prime Minister, when she supports Britain’s membership of the EU one month, then changes her mind the next? Are you happy for Tories to be running the country, and ruining our partnership with the European Union and its Single Market, as well as potentially our Union with Scotland?

The General Election is on 8 June.

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A bit of a quiet week this week: British politicians are launching their manifestos, Macron’s naming his first administration, Trump’s Trump.

Rather than get sucking into the usual hot-take approach, I want to step back and think about the notion of awkwardness in the EU.

The UK is, famously, the ‘awkward partner’ (in George’s phrase) and so much of our understanding of awkwardness is coloured by that British experience.

However, this does tend to blind us to all the other awkward partners that are out there: it’s one of the reasons that some commentators think the EU will be much more efficient and effective post-Brexit, and one of the reasons they will be wrong.

The prompt for this is that nice M. Macron, the new liberal hope. Like those other liberal hopes, Obama and Blair, he arrives with great expectations on his shoulders, expectations that are likely not to be met.

In part that’s because politicians have less agency than most people suppose: even American or French presidents still have to answer to someone and have limits on their powers, as The Donald has been discovering this week.

But it’s also because their views are not always in line with their colleagues/partners/counterparts. And Emmanuel Macron is very much a case in point. For all that he brings new vigour and potential to the Elysée, he also comes with a set of policies that sit somewhat askew with the priorities of Berlin or Brussels.

The case for treaty reform is a good demonstration of this. Macron has sensibly talked up the need for French domestic reforms as an essential part of making the Eurozone work better, with changes to EU bodies running in parallel. However, the presentation of this as ‘unblocking’ treaty reform is – at best – disingenuous, given the deep lack of interest from German ministers to get drawn into another round of negotiations that might end up either putting them in a tricky position on debt mutualisation or resulting in cosmestic changes.

Likewise, it’s been instructive to watch EU officials first greet Macron as the saviour of France/Europe from Marine Le Pen and then to worry about ideas such as ‘buy European’ preferences.

Put differently, Macron might be a liberal hope, but he’s also very much in line with previous French leaders.

And so back to awkwardness.

France’s role in the European integration process has been one marked as much by strife as by leadership: consider de Gaulle and his empty chair, Mitterrand worrying about German unification, Chirac chiding the new member states, Hollande doing…well, not much.

The reason that France has done as well as it has been that even as it pushes for domestic advantage, it also talks up European cooperation, pushing and proposing all the time, engaging and interacting with other members. The Franco-German relationship is the strongest expression of this, but it’s also true in other dealings, as French politicians and officials try to set the tone.

And even France is not that exceptional in its approach: a quick cast around the rest of the Union will find not-dissimilar models, as countries seek to defend their interests while wrapped in a cloak of participation.

One might see this as evidence of the duplicity of European integration: saying one thing, meaning another. But if it’s true of the EU, then it’s also true of all other political systems. Wherever you look there is misdirection and considered presentation.

This is not to excuse such behaviour, but rather to remind that it is endemic. At the very least, we need to be reminded that it exists and that just because the squeaky wheel has been oiled (or taken off, in the UK’s case), that does not mean that all problems have been solved. The EEC had issues before the UK arrived, and the EU will have them once it’s left: what matters is that we keep thinking about who’s using who to their advantage.

The post How to be awkward in the European Union appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

For over forty years, since Maurice Duverger coined the expression in 1974, ‘The Republican monarchy’ has no doubt been the most frequently used metaphor for the Fifth Republic. In countless books, essays and articles, the presidential system and all its corollaries –power, pomp and protocol – have been portrayed as a legacy of pre-Revolutionary, absolute monarchy. It is not by accident that yesterday’s ceremony of transfer of power between François Hollande and Emmanuel Macron was spontaneously referred to as ‘enthronement’ (‘intronisation’).

It is true that the French presidency is more than a political job description. As pointed out on these pages last December, the capacity of ‘incarnation’ or ‘embodiment’ of the function is a primordial asset among the check-list of qualifications required for the job. (A quality Marine Le Pen worked hard to obtain over years before throwing everything away in a particularly misguided fortnight between the two election rounds).

Emmanuel Macron, if only for his age and the narrative of pragmatic, liberal revolutionary he has created from scratch, seems to be predestined to be a different kind of Republican monarch. But unlike other candidates, like Jean-Luc Mélenchon for instance, Macron has never publicly promoted the idea of a Sixth Republic. Not only because he has identified more urgent reforms to carry out, but also because he owes the system a great deal: it is only the hyper-personalised campaign mode of the presidential election that made it possible for him in the first place to overthrow the entire political spectrum in record time without the backing of an established party and a network of local office holders across the country. In a full parliamentary democracy like Germany he would hardly have succeeded in achieving a similar upheaval (or ‘coconut shy’, as Laurent Fabius so nicely said yesterday in his official, and yet very personal, proclamation speech).

‘At the same time’ (to use Macron’s favourite conjunctive adverb), he has repeatedly announced that, if elected, he would interpret the presidential function in a very Gaullist manner, situating himself above party politics, defining the overarching political objectives, and letting the prime minister and his government do the nitty-gritty work.

That leaves us with an institutional framework, where everything remains in place and the only major factor of change may be the style in which the functions are ‘embodied’. In other words: the manners and behaviour of the president, the frequency and tone with which he addresses his citizens, the kind of personalities he chooses for top positions (starting with his first Prime minister today), the leadership style with which he manages his collaborators, the dignity of his private life.

Much has been written over the decades about the behavioural legacy of the court society in contemporary France, and much of it is perfectly pertinent. Whoever took the time to go through Norbert Elias’s painstakingly detailed, seminal analysis of The Court Society dating from the 1930s or Alexis de Tocqueville’s retrospective account of social interaction in L’ancien regime et la revolution (1856) can only be bewildered by the many behaviour patterns shaped in Versailles, which have survived all the disruptions and caesuras since 1789.

In resigned exasperation.

More recently it has become increasingly common to link the persistence of the court ‘habitus’ in French social and political culture to the shortcomings of the Fifth Republic. Former Prime minister Dominique de Villepin theorised, in a quickly drafted, somewhat disappointing little book, about ‘The Court Spirit’, which he considered to be ‘the French malediction’ (2010). More recently, the renowned political journalists Thomas Legrand and Ghislaine Ottenheimer invested significantly more in-depth field work, only to come to a similar conclusion, shaking their heads in disbelief over the enormous mismatch between what the country needs and what it is stuck with. The respective titles of their books nicely sum up their quiet exasperation with the Republican monarchy: ‘Let’s stop electing presidents!’ (2014) for the former; ‘Presidential poison’ (2015) for the latter.

Diarists of the court: Saint-Simon and Patrick Rambaud.

No one, however, dealt with the phenomenon in a funnier and more revealing manner than Patrick Rambaud. A well-known author, laureate of the Prix Goncourt and accomplished master in pastiche and parody, Rambaud has been the 21st-century ‘chronicler of the court’ since the ‘enthronement’ of King Nicolas I in 2007. What started, according to the author, as a ‘therapy against the depression’ into which Sarkozy’s election had thrown him, finally became a series of a total of eight ferocious, hilarious, and at the same time desperate diaries of the Fifth Republic’s own kind of court decadence, covering the entire two quinquennats of Sarkozy and Hollande. Lovers of classical French literature could take great delight in the wonderful imitation of the Duke of Saint-Simon’s lucid and indiscreet ‘Memoirs on the reign of Louis XIV’; others could simply marvel at the incredible human pettiness of today’s sycophants and toadies humming around his  mediocre majesty in the Elysée.

A hilarious series of eight chronicles. Not to be continued.

Over ten years Rambaud offered a most welcome cathartic laughter about the ridicule of French democracy and its wildlife populated by cynical spin doctors and vain careerists, dangerous ideologists and ruthless populists, evil corrupters and stupid corrupted (which are of course species for which France may be the best biotope, but of which is certainly does not have a monopoly).

Given the remarkable ease with which Emmanuel Macron responded to behavioural expectations during the long ceremonial liturgy yesterday, while bringing a whole new freshness and sincerity to the mandatory coronation rituals, chances are that Patrick Rambaud will have no reason to continue his chronicles. He may even be able to come off his anti-depressants.

One of the most interesting aspects of the next quinquennat will thus be to observe whether this atypical, visibly determined president will be able to change the style of the Republican monarchy from within or whether the function will inexorably impose its ‘habitus’ under the weight of tradition, apparatus, and decorum. In other words: will the new King modify the behaviour of the court, or will the court culture, slowly but mercilessly, tame the new King?

Style is not nothing. Eliminating the ridicule from the top-tier of French politics was not an official programme point in the electoral platform of En marche! It would, however inject an unexpected new stability into a ramshackle system, and shift the focus away from form to substance, open the minds for renewal. Although non-quantifiable, it would be one of the new monarch’s most outstanding and lasting achievements.

Albrecht Sonntag
@albrechtsonntag

This is post # 22 on the French 2017 election marathon.
All previous posts can be found here.

The post France 2017: The end of ridicule? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Britain’s Prime Minister, Theresa May, has pledged to take the country out of the European Union. But before last year’s referendum on 23 June, Ms May was a firm advocate against Brexit and for Britain remaining in the EU.

Can we trust a prime minister whose principles blow so easily in the wind? Is this really the sign of a ‘strong and stable’ leader?

The previous Prime Minister, David Cameron, felt compelled to resign after he urged the country to vote ‘Remain’ but the electorate voted instead to ‘Leave’.

But former Home Secretary, Theresa May, felt no similar compunction to go, despite the fact that she too urged the country to ‘vote remain’.

In a speech in April last year, Mrs May spoke firmly against Brexit and in favour of Britain’s continued membership of the EU.

She said then:

“My judgement, as Home Secretary, is that remaining a member of the European Union means we will be more secure from crime and terrorism.”

And as for replacing the trade we do with the EU with other markets, she asserted that this would be an unrealistic route. She said:

“We export more to Ireland than we do to China, almost twice as much to Belgium as we do to India, and nearly three times as much to Sweden as we do to Brazil. It is not realistic to think we could just replace European trade with these new markets.”

And there were other serious risks too.

“If we do vote to leave the European Union, we risk bringing the development of the single market to a halt, we risk a loss of investors and businesses to remaining EU member states driven by discriminatory EU policies, and we risk going backwards when it comes to international trade.”

And other risks too.

“Outside the EU, for example, we would have no access to the European Arrest Warrant, which has allowed us to extradite more than 5,000 people from Britain to Europe in the last five years, and bring 675 suspected or convicted wanted individuals to Britain to face justice.”

And leaving the EU, she said, could lead to the disintegration of the EU, resulting in “massive instability” with “with real consequences for Britain.”

In addition, Brexit might prove fatal to “the Union between England and Scotland“, which she did not want to happen.

And if Britain left the EU, she argued, we might not be successful in negotiating a successful divorce settlement.

Explained Mrs May:

“In a stand-off between Britain and the EU, 44 per cent of our exports is more important to us than eight per cent of the EU’s exports is to them.”

She added:

“The reality is that we do not know on what terms we would win access to the single market.

“We do know that in a negotiation we would need to make concessions in order to access it, and those concessions could well be about accepting EU regulations, over which we would have no say, making financial contributions, just as we do now, accepting free movement rules, just as we do now, or quite possibly all three combined.

“It is not clear why other EU member states would give Britain a better deal than they themselves enjoy.”

In summary, Mrs May said just a year ago:

• “Remaining inside the European Union does make us more secure, it does make us more prosperous and it does make us more influential beyond our shores.

• “I believe the case to remain a member of the European Union is strong.

• “I believe it is clearly in our national interest to remain a member of the European Union.”

But as Prime Minister, Theresa May has completely changed her tune. She will now willingly take the country out of the Union and the EU Single Market, without even a glance back, and against her own advice.

Mrs May, who moved to 10 Downing Street less than a year ago, now says:

• “Brexit means Brexit and we’re going to make a success of it.”

• “There will be no attempts to remain inside the EU.”

• “There will be no attempts to re-join it by the back door; no second referendum.”

• “As Prime Minister I will make sure that we leave the European Union.”

• “The people have spoken, we will deliver on that.”

And in a complete turnaround from her position prior to 23 June, Mrs May announced:

• “Leaving the EU presents us with a world of opportunities and I’m determined to seize them.”

How is it possible for Theresa May to take Britain in a direction which only a year ago she advocated was most definitely not in the country’s best interests?

After all, nobody forced her to be the gung-ho Brexit Prime Minister, did they?

But on 8 June, the electorate has an opportunity to force two-faced Theresa and her Tory regime out of office. 

___________________________________________________

• All aboard for Brexit?
• Brexit Secretary, David Davis, gets 5 stars for double standards
• 70% of Mrs May’s cabinet wanted Britain to remain in the EU
• List of the latest articles by Jon Danzig

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As that wise old owl of eurosceptic theorising, Dr Richard North, once observed, there are no Brexit experts, for the simple that Brexit hasn’t happened. It’s good to be reminded of this from time to time, if only to reflect on the variety of opinion that’s out there.

The past weeks have served up two fine examples of this.

Firstly, the central claim of Theresa May that she needs a larger majority in the Commons to strengthen her mandate in Article 50 negotiations: despite this claim not standing up to any inspection, it remains at the heart of her campaigning in this snap election.

Secondly, Emmanuel Macron’s victory in the French presidential election on Sunday has prompted numerous pieces on the impact on Brexit: from none (here) to some negative (here) to some positive (here).

In this pile of comment, we can pick out a number of basic observations:

1. Macron’s agency is going to be much limited by how successful he is in the legislative elections next month: without a working majority, he will not be able to push through the domestic agenda on economic reform and social inclusion that forms the core of his political project. Even at this stage in proceedings it is impossible to see how this will play out, given the febrile nature of the centre-left and centre-right these days;
2. At the same time, the French presidency does have a domaine réservée in foreign policy, so he is not completely hamstrung. However, the EU has become increasingly intertwined with domestic policy, so it is hard to pursue much in the way of independent action;
3. Macron’s EU focus has been primarily on the future of the EU, rather than Brexit per se. He sees the Union as vehicle for pursuing and embedding domestic reform, with neo-Gaullist echoes in the buy European ideas. In this, he stands very clearly in the same line as all his Fifth Republic predecessors: “Faire l’Europe sans défaire la France.” For many across the Union, the return of a more active France will be welcome, but at the price of getting a more active France [sic].

Thus, Macron will be limited in both his desire and his ability to focus on Brexit: for him, the key priorities are reinvigorating the French/Eurozone economy and putting the Eurozone crisis to bed. The UK’s departure is thus tangential, rather than central.

The only caveat to this comes with the specific opportunities that Brexit offers France. The most obvious part of this the status of the Le Touquet treaty, on location of border controls. Both Macron and Le Pen had said they would revisit the treaty, and Macron might see this as a way to demonstrate that he understands the concerns of those around Calais, and that he stands solidly with the EU, plus it’s a bilateral commitment so he’s not got to get caught up in the broader Article 50 process. Of course, there are any number of problems linked with doing this, but for a President looking to make a quick mark, it’s not the worst option on the table.

But there’s another side to all this, namely the EU.

Recall that May’s majority is not a determining factor in the negotiations, for the simple fact that Article 50 is driven by the EU, not the departing member state. So too, the process is the result of a bargained position between the EU27: one of the most striking aspects of the process to date has been the consistency of that position and the complete lack of defection by any member state (read this excellent series of posts by David Allen Green).

In short, France is important, but it is not determinant in Article 50. Indeed, there is nothing in the European Council mandate that obviously causes problems for Macron, so the working assumption has to be that France will not push for changes to that mandate. Thus all the articles about Macron being ‘tough’ on Brexit tend to neglect that France was always going to be tough, and in a pretty consistent way.

If you like, Brexit is a process that is in no one body’s control. It has an emergent quality that comes from the interaction of numerous actors. This gives it some stability, but also highlights the limits of agency available to any one involved. The only real question at this stage is how happy is everyone to go with the flow.

The post Brexit à la française appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Earlier this year, leaders from the European Union (EU) gathered to mark the 60th anniversary of the 1957 Treaty of Rome, a treaty which first laid the foundations for an ever closer union – shaping the future of the EU in the process.

In principal, the idea of ever closer union has never offered the EU any particular competencies, nor a legal basis to forge closer political ties amongst its member states. However, the case has been different in practice. In reality, the European integration project has always been centred on deepening political and economic ties, driven from the top. Take, for example, research of EU lawyer and legal theorist Gunnar Beck, who found the European Court of Justice (ECJ) regularly referred to adhering to the ‘spirit’ of EU treaties in its court cases i.e. achieving an ever closer union – an objective “regarded as the master value of the EU legal order”.

This underlying objective, which has driven EU behaviour, has been viewed by certain member states as the EU unjustifiably imposing itself. This desire – seen in the UK as overreaching and overbearing technocratic influence – was one of the drivers of Euroscepticism, wide scale disapproval of the EU institutions, and in turn Brexit too.

What is clear is that although the EU has made momentous progress towards deeper economic and political integration over the past 60 years – whether that be through the introduction of the euro, the creation of the European Single Market, and/or ensuring the freedom of movement, for example – hurdles have continuously prevented the EU from making further strides towards an ever closer union.

For example, there is irony in that one of the EU’s greatest achievements, the euro, has in the past decade caused turbulence and deep divisions within the union. The global financial crisis (2008), shortly followed by the European debt crisis of (2009 – present) began to fray the ties binding the EU member states. Now, to this day, some of the Northern member states still hold hostility towards the South, for their alleged lack of commitment and discipline to maintain budgetary stability.

Elsewhere, a lack of compassion and cooperation in dealing with the migrant crisis has heightened tensions between member states, too. Although funding has been arranged to support settling refugees from the Middle East and Africa, member states have looked to each other to take the lead in hosting refugees on their own soil – something possibly only a handful of European countries can claim to have done willingly. Instead, member states have sparked a war of words over who, and how many refugees each state should support – raising doubt over free travel across the Schengen area. Look no further than elected French president Emmanuel Macron’s recent remarks towards Poland – insisting that the Eastern partner should face sanctions for refusing to host refugees.

More recently, as the French Presidential election and British referendum have shown, the European integration project may well continue to be constrained by strong right-wing populist and nationalistic pressures. For example, despite Macron having gained over 65% of the electorate vote, right-wing extremist Marine La Pen’s campaign illuminated the deep divisions within the country on key topics such as immigration, security and EU membership itself. These are not ideologies and viewpoints that will disappear overnight, that’s for sure.

Add to this, a flagging Italian economy, with a growing Eurosceptic political party in the Five Star Movement – one which is likely to cause serious threat to Italy’s EU membership, should they govern the country after the next national election – and then Poland and Hungary – both shifting in an entirely different direction to their western counterparts, veering towards an anti-democratic, illiberal model. It is this ideological divergence, and flailing display of European solidarity, which threatens the entire European integration project.

The European integration project outlined its goal of ever closer union in the Treaty of Rome, but with rising internal tensions and growing nationalist agendas, it seems as if the Lisbon Treaty signed 50 years later in 2007 may be the last attempt – in the foreseeable future at least – to pursue deeper integration. This may give impetus to the two tier integration model, or may be an indication that a new approach is needed all round, if the EU is to dampen the voice of its opponents.

The post The troubled road to ever closer union appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Emmanuel Macron had no chance of winning the presidential election. Every textbook on French politics or contemporary history will tell you so. He had no chance, and he seized it.

After his first large-scale rallies, in Strasbourg in October 2016 or in Paris in December, all serious commentators indulged in gentle mockery. Partly because his voice went shrieking like a radio football reporter at the 1998 World Cup final, partly because of his vocabulary. At that time, he tended to describe his ideas as ‘disruptive’, an adjective borrowed from the current Silicon Valley discourse.

It turns out that now that he does no longer use the word, he has indeed become a major ‘disruption’ in the long history of French democracy. So many rules that seemed graved in stone need to be erased from the textbooks.

1. A French president can only be hard-boiled veteran politician toughened by numerous election campaigns, having earned his ‘presidentiability’ over a long period of time in major functions. Persons under 40 who never stood for any election on any level should refrain for fear of being ridiculed.

2. Within the framework of the electoral system of the presidential election under the Fifth Republic and the resources that are required for a successful election campaign, it is only possible to envisage a candidacy in earnest with the backing of an established party, firmly rooted in constituencies across the nation. ‘Exotic’ candidates from outside the party spectrum may be tolerated to amuse the audience in the first round before being ejected when serious things start.

3. The left-right dichotomy – which he French invented in the first place – is so fundamental to French political culture that even smart, sympathetic and widely appreciated centrists like Jean Lecanuet or François Bayrou may only create an ephemeral illusion, but are condemned to fail eventually.

4. Because of a massive and irreversible semantic shift over a significant period of time, a candidate wishing to build a presidential majority shall by no means use the adjective ‘liberal’ to describe his or her fundamental beliefs or economic orientations. In case the label is conferred by the media, he or she shall consistently deny it. There is no majority for liberal values.

5. Due to the Gaullist dogma of national sovereignty, the tendency of each and every successive French government to blame economic failure on ‘la Commission de Bruxelles’, and the refusal of French mainstream media to engage with Europe, this most boring of all possible topics, there is no way to lead a successful nation-wide election campaign with and explicit and ostensible commitment to the European Union, European symbols and underlying European values.

Of course, as all the French papers I had the opportunity to consult today at Charles Gaulle airport (of all places!) pointed out in their rather well-balanced and pertinent analysis of yesterday’s disruption, Emmanuel Macron benefitted tremendously from unforeseeable, unprecedented circumstances.

Of course, the entire squad of his major rivals all were either ousted before even being able to run – Juppé, Sarkozy and Valls in their respective primaries – or kind enough to sabotage themselves irremediably – Hollande with his stupid revelations book in the crucial phase last autumn, Fillon through the Penelope affair and even more through his handling of it, and Marine Le Pen in a surrealistic television debate.

And of course, many of the votes he obtained were only given to him with the aim of barring Le Pen. Not to mention the incredibly high number of ‘active abstentions’ in the form of 4 million so-called ‘blank votes’, which indicates that his programme and the reforms he envisages are not very likely to have the support of 66% of the French citizens.

All this is true. Still, he did it. As Nathalie Kosciusko-Morizet frankly acknowledged on television last night: ‘it is impossible to remain insensitive to his achievement’.

There is, however, no time for admiration, since the historical feat will not be worth much if Macron does not succeed in repeating the same accomplishment over again. He does not have any real power so far, and the legislative elections, as argued earlier in this blog, may well turn him into a ‘fake president’, eclipsed by a more or less hostile parliamentary majority. The latter will be formed after a highly intensive five-week campaign during which he will face staunch resistance from all established parties who are eager to put him back in his place.

Let’s face it: it is not possible to win 289 seats in the parliament from zero, with a bunch of mostly unexperienced candidates. It would be a major disruption. He has no chance whatsoever to obtain a majority. Every textbook will tell you so!

Albrecht Sonntag
@albrechtsonntag

This is post # 21 on the French 2017 election marathon.
All previous posts can be found here.

The post France 2017: Disruptive appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

To say that the past week has been a poor one for Article 50 would be something of an understatement: the fall-out from last Wednesday’s ‘Brexit-supper‘ culminated yesterday with Theresa May holding a press conference in front of Number 10, claiming that some Europeans were deliberately interfering in the General Election.

It would be easy to say that this is the world gone mad, but as ever, I think we have to assume that things like this do not happen lightly, but with thought and consideration.

First then the EU. The leaking of the Brexit-supper to FAZ was actually the second step of the Commission’s response, after Juncker had called Merkel next morning, leading to her comments about British ‘illusions’. But the FAZ piece was not a full-scale fingers-up: it was only available in German and in print, and took some days to filter through. This is not to say that there wasn’t intent behind it: the butter-wouldn’t-melt responses from the various Commission individuals present at the meal during this week only underline that.

Instead, it comes across as an attempt to a) demonstrate the Commission’s willingness to exploit its powers within the process, and b) nudge the British to adjust their positions to fit better with the architecture of the negotiations that the Commission has been building. If you’re being benign about it, the Commission worries that the UK hasn’t understood how things are and needs to shift itself. But that overlooks the manner in which it was done.

And this brings us to May. Even the casual observer would know that May is very flexible in her positions, at least rhetorically (see Simon Cox’s excellent thread) and that she certainly doesn’t respond well to this kind of pressure. Again, assuming the Commission knew this, then we might need to consider that they were trying to goad her into a retaliation. Which they then got.

May essentially had two options: de-escalation or ramping-up. The former would mean laughing off the matter (the ‘we don’t recognise this/Brussels gossip’ approach), but looking like she had been out-played: The latter  would mean damage to the relationship, but potential gains.

My thinking here is that May feels she might be able to disconnect the public and the private rhetoric. Recall that there are no substantive talks right now and won’t be until 9 June: note also that today – 4 May – is polling day in the UK, so TV and radio coverage of this issue is not happening, providing a natural firebreak. May gets her headlines this morning – polling morning – while she opens her back channels to Brussels to say something on the lines of “you don’t mess us about and we won’t mess you about”. Tough public rhetoric, more constructive private negotiation.

It’s a calculated risk.

Whether it works is another matter. If the past week has told us anything, then it is that these will be very public negotiations, so the disconnect will be minimal, especially once the substantive issues pile up. as Jonathan Portes points out, the matter of UK/EU nationals is now set up as another bear trap for the UK, and many more will follow.

The prognosis at this stage has to be that the process has been compromised by Brexit-supper-gate (as no-one is calling it), so the key question is how much do the different sides want to make it work. Here, the assumption still remains that no one really gains from failing to reach a deal – consider May’s comments at the end of her presser on the need to avoid an economically disastrous exit – so someone’s going to have to cede substantive ground at some point in the not-too-distant future.

Of course, there still remains the abyss option. I know it remains unlikely, but there is an outside chance that May is pushing hard on making Brexit highly problematic, precisely to derail it: we hang by our fingernails over the abyss, to be gratefully rescued by a passing strong and stable leader. Oddly, May’s recent behaviour has put this back in my mind: she appears to feel so unconstrained that she might consider what would be a political play to last down the ages. Maybe that bank holiday walk produced more than one bright idea.

The post May’s rhetorical Brexit trap appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

It’s the first thing the French check out when they’re back from their summer holidays and ‘La Rentrée’ – that fateful moment when normal life resumes in early September – is looming again: on what day of the week will the national holidays fall in the forthcoming school year? 1st and 11th November (All Saints and the 1918 Armistice Day respectively) are only worth a quick look – the weather won’t be too enticing anyway. The days who really count are the ‘Bridges of May’ (‘Les ponts du mois de mai’): Labour Day on the 1st, and Victory Day on the 8th. If they fall on a Sunday, you’ll feel like you’re cheated on by some dark forces; but in a good year, when they fall on a, say, Tuesday or Thursday, everything is set for some lovely ‘ponts’, which consist of slipping just one paid vacation day between the weekend and the holiday and enjoying the pleasure of a prolonged spring break. Or two. Or three, actually, since Ascension Day (courtesy to the Catholic Church) is guaranteed to fall on a Thursday.

Some serious economists and exasperated business leaders have repeatedly suggested shutting down the entire country for the entire month of May. Which, true enough, would make things clearer for both international business partners and French HR departments. But France would no longer be itself without the Bridges of May – they will most likely end up on the UNESCO cultural heritage list.

Rarely has the ‘bridge’ metaphor been more fitting than in 2017. Both 1st and 8th May are indeed bridges, pathways from A to B, where the river to cross stands for the presidential election and ‘B’ stands for ‘Unknown Territory’. Whoever wins next Sunday, the Fifth Republic will no longer be the same, and the sudden awareness of the great uncertainty that lies ahead is dawning on the French since the 1st-round results flashed up on their TV screen.

The 1st of May 2017 is the bridge to an unprecedented campaign week, with Le Pen’s hate speech dictating the agenda and the news channels her hypnotised prey, shuddering with excitement at the slow converging of the poll curbs, as if they were witnessing a football cup final where the underdog pushes the favourite towards extra time (and we all know that in penalty shoot-outs, everything is possible, don’t we?).

The 8th of May 2017, rather than a day of relief that the campaign is finally over, is likely to be a day of collective breath-holding: ‘And now? What next?’ A one-day bridge that leads to the next campaign, just as tense as the previous one, and even more unpredictable. How many of the 577 constituencies will be shaken by a major upheaval, no one can tell.

Anti-FN demonstrations on 1st May 2002.

Fifteen years ago, things were so much clearer. The shock of seeing Jean-Marie Le Pen’s grandfatherly smile on the campaign poster for the second round was deep, but it occurred in a familiar setting, with perfectly predictable reactions – massive demonstrations all across the countries over the 1st-May bridge – and outcome: the election of Chirac, and a return in no time to party politics business as usual, as if nothing had happened.

For many French – especially those who had sanctioned Lionel Jospin in the first round because he had not been ‘left enough’ – there was even some kind of self-gratifying redemption in the opportunity to demonstrate against the Front National and defend democracy. Plantu even adapted the ‘bridges’ metaphor to the situation in one of his cartoons for Le Monde. In a rather naïve manner, it seems to me (unless there is some hidden, grave irony that is lost on me).

Plantu cartoon for Le Monde (May 2002)

Le pont d’Avignon

This year, no one knows where the bridge is leading to. A new frontier, full of opportunity? Or a rather scary place, where old landmarks provide no orientation anymore? Or nowhere at all, like the beautiful, but useless Pont d’Avignon? The legislative elections will be a passage to a very complicated summer, with shady majority-building manoeuvres and murky arrangements rather than light-hearted sunbathing. If the country is lucky, some kind of half-baked solution will have been found by the end of August, when ‘La rentrée’ is looming again. If not, the best possible quantum of solace will be the yearly calendar check: 1st and 8th May will be Tuesdays! And Ascension Day will be on Thursday 10th! Who needs a stable government over autumn and winter, when you have perspectives like this for next spring?

Albrecht Sonntag
@albrechtsonntag

This is post # 20 on the French 2017 election marathon.
All previous posts can be found here.

The post France 2017: The Bridges of May appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

MedienHafen Düsseldorf possible location for business exiled from the UK by Brexit ©Jolyon Gumbrell 2016

One of the consequences of Brexit is that companies and organisations – which have head offices in the UK – are now looking to relocate their business premises to other European countries. Brexit is all about risk because the UK will be giving up the safety of the European Single Market, when the country finally leaves the EU in March 2019. The UK on its own will pay high tariffs to access global markets including the markets of non EU countries as the UK loses its protection of the European trading block. Life is going to become very difficult for any company located in the UK, which depends on trade in goods and services with clients outside of the UK.

One organisation that understands risks is Lloyd’s of London, which intends to set up an insurance subsidiary in Brussels in 2019. Lloyd’s of London came into existance in a London coffee house in the 17th century, where men used to meet as brokers and underwriters in the business of shipping insurance. Today as well as marine insurance Lloyds of London sells insurance policies that cover some of the following areas: accident & health, crime, cargo, casualty, employers liability, energy, fine art, motor, space, and terrorism. Although the Lloyds insurance market has done business from London for well over 300 years, the prospect of Brexit has made it take out its own insurance by opening a Brussels branch, against being excluded from European insurance markets. This is hardly surprising as according to the Lloyd’s of London’s website under the question: “How much of Lloyd’s business comes from European markets?” it said: “In 2015, the EEA accounted for £2.93 bn or 11% of Lloyd’s Gross Wrtten Premium.”

Organisations located in London that belong to or work for the EU will have to move because of Brexit. According to reports in the media, both the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Medicines Agency (EMA) will be moved from the UK to another EU member state. This will result in around 1000 jobs being lost in London. Both EBA and EMA at present occupy office space at Canary Wharf in London. How much office space in Canary Wharf will become vacant when EBA and EMA move out?

The EBA has offices on “Level 46″ of the office building at One Canada Square. According to the website of the Canary Wharf Group, the 50 storey building at One Canada Square has a floor area of around 27,583 sq ft (2,563 sq m) per level or storey. The amount that the EBA pays for its office space each year is not in the public domain, but if one considers that the rental of a square foot of office space including rates and services charges could be as much as £66 per annum, then the rent for the entire space used by EBA could be around £1,820,600 per annum.

The EMA which has a postal address at 30 Churchill Place in Canary Wharf: is located in the office building referred to on the Canary Wharf Group’s website as 25 & 30 Churchill Place. The amount of office space that EMA rents at this location can only be estimated, but according to media reports the EMA employs around 900 people in London. Therefore if the EBA is employing 100 people at a nearby location in Canary Wharf, by multiplying EBA’s estimated floor area by 9 one could guess that the EMA uses at least 248,265 sq ft (23,064 sq m) of office space at Churchill Place. If we use the figure of £66 per square foot, then it could be estimated that the EMA pays £16,385,490 per annum for the use of office space in London.

Making an estimation from the above figures, then the joint loss of EBA and EMA from Canary Wharf would cause 275,850 sq ft (25,626 sq m) of office space to become vacant. This would represent a gross loss of more than £18.2 million per annum for the Canary Wharf Group caused by Brexit. While business moves out of London because the UK is leaving the EU, then there will be great demand for office space in the towns and cities of other European countries.

Düsseldorf in Germany is one city that could benefit from the Brexit business exodus, as international companies leave the UK, in order to maintain their place in the European Single Market. Düsseldorf has its own version of Canary Wharf in the form of the MedienHafen. Both Canary Wharf and the MedienHafen are similar in that they were developed on former dockland, and now provide office space for financial and media industries. At the time of writing a new office development is being built at the MediaHafen, which could become a safe haven for business exiles from the UK.

Sources

https://www.duesseldorf-tourismus.de/en/sights/medienhafen/

https://www.findalondonoffice.co.uk/toolbox/office-space-calculator/

http://group.canarywharf.com/available-office-space/one-canada-square-available-space/

http://group.canarywharf.com/construction/completed-projects/25-30-churchill-place/

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/eu-leaders-to-strip-britain-of-valued-european-medicine-and-banking-agencies-within-weeks-a7685811.htmlhttp

https://www.lloyds.com/lloyds/about-us/what-do-we-insure/what-lloyds-insures

https://www.lloyds.com/news-and-insight/press-centre/press-releases/2017/03/lloyds-to-open-eu-insurance-company

https://www.lloyds.com/news-and-insight/lloyds-plans-in-europe

http://www.wharf.co.uk/news/local-news/canary-wharf-could-lose-european-12909644

©Jolyon Gumbrell 2017

The post The Brexit business exodus appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

It is with more of a whimper than a bang that the first week of campaigning in the 2017 General Election begins. On the one side, a Prime Minister who feels herself to be in such a position of strength that she doesn’t need to explain herself or her plans. On the other, the other parties hurriedly trying to get their acts together, while smiling brightly and talking up their (meagre) chances.

At the heart of this is Brexit: the decision to call the vote most makes sense in the context of Theresa May having now submitted formal notification under Article 50 to withdraw and the opportunity to simultaneously strengthen her position in the Commons and run the entire Brexit process under a single administration.

Much of the discussion so far in the campaign has therefore been about the differing visions for that process, albeit in very different ways.

May is presenting Brexit as a fait accompli, in which the only question is who is best placed to provide ‘strong and stable leadership’ to see it through. There has not been, and will not be, any unpacking of specific negotiation points or preferences beyond the vagueness of the White Paper.

The Liberal Democrats are doubling-down on their profile as the party of the 48%, albeit now with a shift from opposing Brexit completely to opposing a hard Brexit. Buoyed by their by-election successes since last June, they see this as a viable political base on which to rebuild after the disaster of 2015.

For the SNP, Brexit and the General Election is an opportunity to nail down the message that May (and Westminster more generally) doesn’t care about Scotland, to help reinforce the momentum for a second independence referendum.

Which leaves Labour, riven and confused. Even as Keir Starmer presented his party’s more developed plans for Brexit on Tuesday, gaping holes were being picked in it from all sides, quite apart from it being different again from the various ideas that have been floated before. Most damningly, the policy looks like one that would have made much more sense to be used prior to the Parliamentary votes in March, where Labour appeared to cede the floor to the government in running negotiations.

Seen in the round, two observations are most striking.

The first is that there has been very little discussion about how Brexit fits into a bigger picture of the future of the country. Important as it is, leaving the EU is not the be-all and end-all of British politics, and it can be given shape and direction if there is broader conceptualisation of which kind of role in the world is foreseen and aimed for.

The second is that there has also been scant debate about the detail of what Brexit might entail.

The generous interpretation of this is that everyone has recognised that Article 50 is not a process in which the UK gets to have much of a say. Instead it will be the choices made by the EU27 and the European Parliament about what to offer that really matter. As David Allen Green is helpfully illustrating, the EU institutions have taken a very consistent and clear line since the day after the referendum on how things will proceed, driven by the legal requirements of Article 50 and the common interests of the remaining member states. Thus it makes little sense for parties to commit themselves to substantive positions that might have to be overturned as negotiations develop.

The slightly-less generous interpretation is that even if this power imbalance is noted, then the best response is to try to frame one’s statements so that it looks like the EU is coming around to one’s position, when it is actually the reverse. At times, Theresa May has looked close to this, as with her decisions to avoid an unwinnable clash over separating freedom of movement of people from the rest of the single market, or to accept that the Court of Justice will have to play a role in overseeing any final agreement. Indeed, there is no example of May to date advancing a position that the EU has subsequently moved towards.

If this seems a rather pessimistic take on matters, then it is as much a commentary on the long-run failure of British policy towards European integration. The fundamental problem has been that there has – almost without exception – been only one frame within which European-level decisions have been taken, namely that of domestic politics. This General Election is a case in point: the government will gain no material advantage in negotiations as a result, and has indeed further tried the patience of interlocutors as another delay in substantive negotiations is introduced.

However, things are as they are, so how best to proceed?

One area that remains particularly neglected to date has been the dynamic nature of the future relationship with the EU. While much attention has – rightly – been given to day-one issues, such as the rights of EU nationals in the UK or the potential introduction of border and customs controls, almost none has been devoted to all the days that follow.

The EU nationals issues provides a good illustration. These individuals fall into three categories. The first are those currently in the UK: do they retain their current rights and assess to public services? This has been the predominant question that politicians have discussed and not reached a conclusion on, even as they all claim that it deserves immediate resolution. But there are those individuals who currently reside in the UK, who might leave – for shorter or longer periods – and then return: do they retain the same position as those who remain, or is there some reset cut-off? And, most significantly, what about those EU nationals who are not currently in the UK, but who might want to move in future?

So too with market regulation. While the Great Repeal Bill makes much of incorporating the acquis into British law, so that there is no regulatory gap, this will only last as long as it takes the EU to produce a new piece of regulation, which it does on a daily basis.

Among the many flaws in the British debate has been this conceptualisation of Brexit as an event; a day on which we leave and that’s it, done and dusted, when ‘Europe’ will disappear as an issue and a problem.

Instead, it will be a long and drawn-out process. Yes, there will be a day when the UK ceases to be a member, but everything points towards an extended period of working towards a new stable relationship. Divorce is an unhelpful metaphor, but we might note that the day one gets the decree absolute is not the day that every aspect of one’s marriage is tied up.

The sooner that all parties recognise this, the more likely it is that sustainable solutions can be found.

This post originally appeared on the PSA’s Insight Plus blog.

The post The recurring Brexit problem appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

‘France has voted like it never did before’, was the headline of Spiegel Online on Monday morning, and many other foreign observers expressed similar views on the manner in which the traditional parties of the Left and Right were kicked out of the competition by an overwhelming desire of renewal of the political class.

The old new fault line.

But once the dust has settled on this shake-up and on the performance of Emmanuel Macron, who may well be the most surprising shooting star French politics has ever seen, it will become clear that the basic voting patterns of the French electorate have hardly changed at all over the last quarter of a century.

It suffices to compare the map below published by Le Monde yesterday with the maps of the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in September 1992 and the referendum on the European Constitutional treaty in April 2005. In an excellent post-referendum booklet named ‘The Day France said No’, edited by the Jean Jaurès Foundation and published by Plon (2005), demographer Hervé Le Bras (see his 2017 analysis here, published yesterday on the nouvelobs site) very convincingly demonstrated to what extent ‘The memory of the territories’ determined electoral behaviour over time. And Sunday’s first election round is a compelling confirmation of his findings, despite the undeniable progress of the Front National in the North, the South and the East, including the Alsatian region (though not in the urban centres Strasbourg and Colmar).

Which provides once again striking evidence for the thesis that the deepest fault line across French society is the one between what Christophe Guilluy famously named ‘peripheral’ France and what I would (less famously) call ‘participating’ France, a dichotomy which is not exactly synonymous to ‘rural’ and ‘urban’, but which is in certain ways well rendered by the maps above. It’s the dichotomy of openmindedness and opportunity-seeking as opposed to the withdrawn, reproachful, self-fulfilling pessimism that the French themselves sum up in the well-known sigh ‘Tout fout le camp!’ (‘Everything’s going down the drain’). If it did not sound so simplistic, I would simply refer to it, beyond economic indicators, as ‘happy’ and ‘unhappy’ France.

And the most dividing issue, the one which crystallises it all, is … Europe, and everything that it stands for: globalisation and free markets, open borders and multiple cultures, shared sovereignty and common currency. Grossly simplified, last Sunday’s results suggest that half of the French population – the 50% who voted for Macron, Fillon and Hamon – is pro-European, with considerable variations in enthusiasm – and the other half of the electorate (including extreme right, extreme left, and fringe candidates) is resolutely against the European Union, even if their motives and the manner in which they voice their discontent vary.

What is new and different, however, is the explicit salience of the old fault line. Emmanuel Macron took three major symbolic risks in his fundamental ideological layout of the En marche! movement. Not only did he decide to be resolutely positive and optimistic in a country haunted by pessimism, but he also boldly set out to give the adjective ‘libéral’ a new meaning outside the semantic dogmas of the Socialist Party. And last but not least, he was unapologetic about being enthusiastically European, bringing together his personal conviction and the firm belief, as MEP Sylvie Goulard pointed out to Politico, that a rather silent majority of French citizens were profoundly attached to the ‘acquis communautaire’ of cooperation and friendship, especially with Germany.

Emmanuel Macron in Nantes, 19 April.

In marketing terms, European enthusiasm was Macron’s ‘unique selling point’ – and what seemed to be a niche market has turned out to be a rather large, untapped market share, whose potential was reinforced by the lucky circumstance of having the likes of Farage, Trump, Wilders, Putin and Erdogan reminding everybody in a timely manner that the EU may actually be worth defending. Surprisingly, Macron even managed to underpin his pro-EU arguments with a symbolic renewal. Following Le Pen’s demand of removing the European flag – tenderly nick-named ‘your oligarchic rag’ by the FN’s No. 2, Florian Philippot – for a television interview, he turned his rally in Nantes into a genuine profession of faith, waving the European flag and having the audience sing the Ode to Joy. Totally surrealistic for everyone who has followed the political debate in France since … 1992.

The post-election TV debates on Sunday evening already foreshadowed that Europe and the Euro will be used by both remaining candidates as one of the major ‘key differentiators’ over the next two weeks. It will no doubt also be one of the central issues of the television showdown scheduled for 3 May.

Needless to say: whatever the result of the second round of the presidential election and the looming legislative elections, the fault line will remain. The polarisation of society has not yet reached American levels, but it will take a person of outstanding negotiating and compromising skills to bridge this deep divide. European leaders – most of all the next German government – would be well advised to help Macron make European integration (and everything that it stands for) acceptable again to the 50% of the French population who have so vigourously voted against it last Sunday and who have been hardened in their opposition by the insistent rhetoric of the populists and the efficient frustration machine that the Fifth Republic has become.

Albrecht Sonntag
@albrechtsonntag

This is post # 19 on the French 2017 election marathon.
All previous posts can be found here.

The post France 2017: Old fault lines, new salience appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

‘Pschitt!’ is – at least in colloquial French – the disappointing sound of flat champagne, a deflating balloon, or a damp firecracker.

It is also a good description of the feeling that many French voters will inevitably have on Sunday evening in front of their television screen. With an unprecedented degree of uncertainty, with virtually millions of people who will take their last-minute decision in the silence of the voting booth, with pollsters that are helplessly hoping their curves will not have been too far from the final results, and with four frontrunners who find themselves – to refer once more to colloquial French – ‘within a handkerchief’, the big looming question is: who is going to ‘Pschitt’?

Will we really see the French electorate neatly sliced into five equal parts – roughly 20% for each of the leading candidates and 20% for the seven others – or will the temptation to sacrifice one’s own conviction on the altar of the ‘useful vote’ suddenly suck the air out of one the candidates’ balloon?

The most obvious nominees for a miserable ‘Pschitt!!’ are Jean-Luc Mélenchon and Emmanuel Macron. The former, whose poll ratings were pushed by his rhetoric skills and his successful hi-jacking of the true gospel of the Left, already underwent a similar deflation in 2012, when he was credited with a much bigger share of the votes than the 11% which he finally obtained. The latter might suffer on the finishing line from what made his strength and attractiveness in the first place: the desire to shove the left-right dichotomy in the dustbin of history. It could be too early to do so: no one can tell with certainty how strong the gold old partisan reflexes still are in face of the ballot paper on Sunday.

François Fillon already had his ‘Pschitt!!’ moments. The post-primary sparkling wine already opened for what looked like an unlosable election has turned into flat champagne in the wake of the scandals that have ruined his credibility for many. For him, the question is rather whether beyond his die-hard supporters, who seem to grant him a minimum of 18%, he has the potential to make some bubbles again. Difficult, though not impossible. As for Marine Le Pen, her aggressive nervousness and imprudence of recent days seems to suggest that after having led the polls for so long, she seriously starts to envisage the possibility that the promised bonfire may go damp by Sunday night.

Beyond the candidates’ fates, however, there is another, more intense and more depressing, ‘Pschitt!’ feeling.

If this campaign feels like a never-ending one, it’s because it actually was. For five long years, a good deal of media discourse has been entirely dedicated to who would run in 2017. Right from the first moments of François Hollande’s ill-fated presidency, virtually everything was interpreted with regard to his possible re-election. Every result of every intermediate vote – be it European, regional or municipal – was seen in the light of jockeying for position for the one election that really counts.

Never has the stranglehold in which the presidential election keeps French political life been as tight as over these last five years. This election ‘drives them all crazy’, as Daniel Cohn-Bendit once famously put it. He referred to politicians with oversized egos, but the ‘them’ necessarily also includes the entire Parisian media bubble, with its morbid fascination for narratives of ‘greatness’ and tales of ‘rise and fall’, its grateful drooling for any piece of verbal venom in the corridors of the palaces, and its lustful craving for every small sign of treason and disgrace.

Hollande almost seemed to take a masochistic pleasure in throwing them scandalous bits to chew, and he offered them a long-term narrative by linking, very early on, his own fate to employment and growth rates. Sarkozy fed them by preparing his great return in the shadows, positioning himself as the providential solution of last resort. All the while Juppé was surfing on his scores of popularity, basking in the delight of the man who knows that his time has finally come.

The billboards currently exposed in the streets of France give striking evidence to the vanity of all the speculations, rumours and conjectures. Among the eleven faces, there is no Hollande, no Sarkozy, no Juppé. If that’s not a ‘Pschitt!’ feeling, what is?

Bouchemaine, Western France, April 2017

How often did we listen over these five years to a news programme on whatever TV or radio channel, wondering whether there were really no other, more pressing, issues than the 2017 presidential race? Will the next five years be any different?

Perhaps. If the rather radical reconfiguration of the political spectrum is confirmed on Sunday, it is not impossible that the sudden importance of the legislative elections brings about a re-education of the French political class. There were some unexpected signs of enlightenment in the aftershock the 2015 regional elections, and the effective implementation of the law against the ‘accumulation of mandates’ may indeed renew the France’s representative assemblies in an unprecedented scope.

Perhaps not. The system is remarkably resilient. It has shaped, through its engrained values and unwritten rules, the socialisation of political actors, the professional habitus of Parisian journalists, and the often unconscious expectations of voters, even among those who declare themselves definitely disillusioned with everything.

As much as I dislike this overused expression, 2017 is a ‘crossroads’ moment in French politics. It may be remembered as the moment when all the accumulated pressure of frustration with the system finally made the cork of change pop out of the Champagne bottle. The end of the ‘Pschitt!’ feeling? It would be almost too good to be true.

Albrecht Sonntag
@albrechtsonntag

This is post # 18 on the French 2017 election marathon.
All previous posts can be found here.

The post France 2017: That ‘pschitt!’ feeling appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The lovely thing about long walks is that they give you time to think, to join your physical movement with metaphysical wanderings through the things that occupy your life. It’s often a time when you have a bright idea, that makes sense as the sunlight filters through the leaves and warm air of spring fills your lungs.

And this general election has very much the feeling of an idea that Theresa May has had on her walking break in North Wales. It’s easy to imagine her chatting with Philip about the pros and cons of calling a vote, exploring the highways and by-ways of it all as the vistas unfurl before them, and the security detail think back fondly to those barbeques in Witney.

It’s not that the election is a bad idea, but there is no immediately obvious, compelling reason to hold it: all of the basic parameters have been in place as long as May has occupied Number 10.

This leads to the most obvious conclusion about this decision, namely that it is driven by domestic political calculation rather than anything to do with Brexit. This is important to keep in mind both because it echoes the long-term pattern of British European policy, but also because it reminds us that May continues to entertain the idea that her premiership will not just be shaped by the departure from the EU.

This said, it is useful to consider the relationship between general election and Brexit, because the two will have to bump alongside each other and there will be effects by each on the other, especially given the rather specious reasoning given by May for calling the election, namely the division in Westminster.

In procedural terms, the election will not result in any major delay in Article 50 negotiations. Recall that at present everyone is awaiting the 29 April summit of the EU27 to confirm the negotiating brief and the basic schedule for talks. Then there will be another week until the second round of the French presidential elections and some weeks after that when Commission’s mandate will be finalised, which puts us within spitting distance of 8 June. At the same time, it does mean another month lost for substantive negotiations, which will prove problematic when it comes to working through the extended agenda that May has in mind.

Once again, the key point to keep in mind here is that Article 50 is driven by the EU, not the UK, so in this initial phase, the focus will be on what the other member states can agree to offer to the UK, rather than what the UK might ask for. Incidentally, this also highlights the vapidity of the Tory position that an enlarged majority for May will somehow strengthen her hand:  ever country has voters and it will be their own domestic pressures that change their positions more than how many MPs the British government can count on.

If there is a procedural bonus, then it is that the resetting of the electoral clock means that by the time the next general election has to be called, in June 2022, not only will the Article 50 negotiations be well past, but so too will much of the mooted 2-3 year transition period, which makes it even harder for any new government to overturn the process: Brexit will indeed mean Brexit.

Much of the procedural questions at this stage will be largely technical – schedules of meetings and the like – and can continue unabated during the campaign but the general election will raise an interesting personnel issue.

General elections are often opportunities for Prime Ministers to reshuffle portfolios, especially if there is the prospect of an influx of new faces. However, May will be a bit of bind over whether to do this. On the one hand, some of her front bench have been less than impressive, either politically or managerially, so this is a chance to have a second bite of the cherry.

However, on the other hand, the current Cabinet have been in place for a relatively short period of time and there was a clear presentation of the choices made as a conscious strategy: put Leavers in key roles to own the subject.

To replace any of the three main Brexit ministers – Davis, Fox or Johnson – now might lead to improved performance, but at a price of calling into question May’s judgement in appointing them in the first place (and recall that all three came with big question marks over their heads). As was clear at the time, while it’s useful to have a front row to soak up the problems, it is ultimately on May’s shoulders that they succeed.

The final potential impact of the election will be on substantive policy goals in Article 50.

Here we have to be careful to unpick the dynamic that has already emerged of a softening of May’s stance in and around notification. Gone are the more improbable goals on CJEU jurisdiction and no transitions, in reflection of the growing awareness of the intricacies involve in unpicking the UK from the EU. None of that happening in anticipation of this election, but potentially the election will give more cover to May.

Consider the most likely outcome on 8 June: an increased majority for May. Let’s also assume that Central Office is able to have a relatively big say in candidate selection over local associations, given the time constraints. This suggests that the specific weight of any sub-grouping within the new parliamentary party will be reduced and that the group as a whole will be more beholden to May’s leadership.

Put differently, neither the pro-EU rump nor the hard Brexiteers will be as able as now to hold the Parliamentary majority to hostage, so May will be in a stronger position to pursue her own agenda in negotiations and then to get the results approved at the end of Article 50.

This underlines one of the more unmentioned truths of the Brexit process, namely that Theresa May does not obviously know her own mind on what the post-membership relationship should look like. The studied ambiguity of her public pronouncements will continue throughout the campaign, as she seeks to find a solution that looks viable, rather than one that follows any detailed ideological positioning.

Seen in this light, the general election is set to offer little new light on how Brexit will unfold and will do little to shape what happens. Unless, of course, there is some major upset on 8 June: and if recent history has taught us anything, then it is that we should always keep the unexpected in mind.

This post originally appeared on the UK in a Changing Europe website.

The post What the 2017 General Election means for Brexit: procedure, personnel and policy appeared first on Ideas on Europe.