Ideas on Europe Blog

MPs debated a petition on Monday 10 September to withdraw Article 50 if Vote Leave broke electoral laws. But hardly any MPs turned up.

The petition, which had almost 200,000 signatures, requested:

‘If Vote Leave has broken any laws regarding overspending in 2016 EU referendum then Article 50 should be immediately withdrawn and full EU membership continued.’

Of course, we all now know that Vote Leave did break electoral rules, with allegations of fraud currently being investigated by the police.

But Tory and Labour frontbenchers rejected the calls to withdraw Article 50 over Vote Leave’s overspending.

Some MPs complained that the debate, in Westminster Hall, clashed with another debate in the main House of Commons chamber on the same afternoon on ‘Legislating for the Brexit Withdrawal Agreement’.

When I Tweeted a photo of the debate in Westminster Hall with hardly anyone there, many Tweeters expressed their fury.

• “Absolutely disgraceful, what has happened to MPs supposedly representing their constituents?” Tweeted @NotWhatIBelieve.
• “This image is a clear demonstration of how little our politicians care about the fact that Vote Leave cheated,” Tweeted @JayPatrol
• “How far has UK democracy sunk, that cheating is dismissed with a shrug of the shoulder,” Tweeted @julian_rowden.
• “Shows how grossly irresponsible and cowardly most MPs are being over Brexit,” Tweeted @ChristophBennet.
• “Outrageous,” Tweeted @Akinsey08
• “This is such a joke. Incompetent government, useless opposition, upholding the result of a fraudulent referendum. Democracy is dead; there is no integrity left in British politics,” Tweeted @audrymaeve.
• “If anyone remains in any doubt as to the democratic credentials of both Tory and Labour parties this should  clarify. This Country is mired in corruption,” Tweeted @MichaelMandb01.
• “I despair. MPs not doing their job. Democracy dead. Corruption admired. Fascist britain looms,” Tweeted @Jennie_Pawson.
• “That is our MPs for you.  Only interested in themselves and their own advancement,” Tweeted @Johnantifas.
• “If it was about a pay rise it would be standing room only,” Tweeted @ASupermum.

Many directly Tweeted their MPs to demand to know why they were not at the debate.

• “@ChrisRuane2017 As my MP and someone who claimed to support Remain in the 2017 GE, where are you in this picture? If you weren’t there, why not?” Tweeted @wible1
• “@DLidington as one of your constituents can you please advise me why it’s ok for politicians to break the law?” Tweeted @KatherineRoe
• “Did you attend this important debate @JDjanogly? If not, why not, when @vote_leave broke electoral law?” Tweeted @amandarandall5
• “@alexsobel did you attend this?” Tweeted @AngryRemainer.

Alex Sobel, Labour Co-op MP for Leeds West, and a strong anti-Brexiter, was one the only MPs to respond.

• “I was in the main chamber for the Legislating the EU Withdrawal Bill debate. Here is my contribution http://bit.ly/2CGgJF8 It was a big mistake to timetable two Brexit debates at the same time,” he Tweeted back.

Today, Mr Sobel emailed me the following comment:

“The Government knew there was a Westminster hall debate that day, triggered by many thousands of signatures. They then chose to put down their own Brexit debate on the same afternoon in the commons chamber, the houses premier debating chamber.

“It is regrettable that many MPs had to make the choice about which debate to attend. If the public are to trust that petition debates are valued, scheduling must be done better.”

Tonight I have asked Andrea Leadsom, Leader of the House of Commons, to respond. After all, it’s her job to announce every Thursday the timetable for Commons proceedings for the following week.

When Ms Leadsom announced that there would be a debate in the House of Commons on the afternoon of Monday 10 September, she already knew that the Commons Petitions Committee had also scheduled the debate on the petition to rescind Article 50 on the same afternoon.

(I will report back here if I receive a reply from Ms Leadsom).

During the debate about the petition in the empty Westminster Hall, the Brexit minister Chris Heaton-Harris said that while the government “respects the views and wishes” of those who signed the petition, the referendum result was one that “cannot be ignored”.

And Labour’s shadow Brexit minister Paul Blomfield said the law did not provide for overturning referendum results for cheating.

The government’s formal response to the petition stated:

‘The British people voted to leave the EU and the Government respects that decision. We have always been clear that as a matter of policy our notification under Article 50 will not be withdrawn.’

The response added:

‘The British people voted to leave the EU, and it is the duty of the Government to deliver on their instruction. There can be no attempt to stay in the EU.

‘The result of the referendum held on 23 June 2016 saw a majority of people vote to leave the European Union. This was the biggest democratic mandate for a course of action ever directed at any UK Government.

‘Following this, Parliament authorised the Prime Minister to trigger Article 50, passing the EU (Notification of Withdrawal) Act.

‘In last year’s General Election, over 80% of people then voted for parties committing to respecting the result of the referendum.

‘It was the stated policy of both major parties that the decision of the people would be respected. The Government is clear that it is now its duty to implement the will of the electorate.

‘This was not a decision made after just a few weeks of campaigning, but one that came after a debate that had taken place both in Parliament and across the country for decades.’

The statement added:

‘The British people can trust this Government to honour the referendum result and get the best deal possible. To do otherwise would be to undermine the decision of the British people.

‘The premise that the people can trust their politicians to deliver on the promises they make and will deliver them in Parliament is fundamental to our democracy.’

But the statement, by the Department for Exiting the European Union, made no reference to the cheating by the Vote Leave campaign and did not answer the premise of the petition, that Article 50 should be rescinded in the event that Vote Leave broke electoral laws.

The government’s statement concluded:

‘It is the Government’s duty to deliver the will of the people and reach a desirable final outcome.’

So, it appears the government believes that promises made by their politicians need to be ‘honoured’, even if those promises are based on lies, and the campaign to win the EU referendum was based on cheating. So much for democracy and fair elections.

But even if Westminster Hall had been filled to the rafters with MPs, it would not have made any difference. Although almost 200,000 people signed the petition for the Article 50 notice to be withdrawn if Vote Leave cheated, petitions carry no weight in Parliament.

Petitions debated by MPs in Westminster Hall cannot directly result in a change to legislation or policy. The only motion that can be voted on is that ‘This House has considered the petition…”

Of course, the vote can only be ‘Aye’: the petition has been considered by MPs. But it’s meaningless. Petitions to Parliament are meaningless. Democracy in the UK is becoming meaningless.

• Watch the video of the debate:

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National Technical University of Ukraine ‘Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute’ Photo credits: Oksana Turysheva

Myroslava Hladchenko

During the last decades, the development of the knowledge economy in Western societies has significantly changed both the roles played by universities and the relationship between the university, industry and government, resulting in the emergence of the Triple Helix (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000) as one of the global models of world society (Meyer 2010). The main idea behind the Triple Helix lies in the expansion of the role of knowledge in social development more broadly and of the university in the economy more specifically (Etzkowitz 2002). The university is expected to extend its traditional missions of knowledge transmission (teaching) and production (research) to include economic and social development (Pinheiro et al. 2015; Benneworth et al. 2015).

 

Similar to other global models of world society, the Triple Helix originates and has been applied in the context of developed or mature economies, but less developed countries have also made attempts to implement this global model into their specific national contexts. Meanwhile, the specific national context as an institutional environment can be characterised by a high degree of institutional complexity caused by means-ends decoupling at the state level (Hladchenko and Westerheijden 2018; Hladchenko et al. 2018). Means-ends decoupling (Bromley and Powell 2012) at the state level implies that policies and practices of the state are disconnected from its core goal of creating public welfare. Such means-ends decoupling occurs, for instance, in oligarchic economies, where the state is captured by exploitative, rent-seeking oligarchies in business and politics. This bleak picture describes numerous post-communist countries, one of which is Ukraine.

 

In a recent article ‘Implementing the Triple Helix model: Means-ends decoupling at the state level?’, co-authored with Romulo Pinheiro we explore how means-ends decoupling at the state level affected the implementation of the Triple Helix model in Ukraine. The data emanate from personal interviews with the senior managers of four universities and science parks established within them who were directly involved with the pursuit of public policy geared towards promoting the implementation of the Triple Helix in Ukraine. For our research we selected the science parks located in universities with different disciplinary profiles: Technical University, Classical University, University of Economics and University of Life Sciences.

 

Means-ends decoupling at the state level

Decoupling is one of the main concepts of sociological institutionalism. Bromley and Powell (2012) distinguish between policy-practice and means-ends decoupling. The former refers to a gap between policy and practice, the classical object of implementation studies. The latter refers to a gap between practices and outcomes (Bromley and Powell 2012), that is, policies are executed according to plan yet intended outcomes are not achieved. It occurs because the implemented practices are compartmentalised from the core goals of the actor in question, e.g., state, organisation, individual (Bromley and Powell 2012). Consequently, means-ends decoupling entails an “efficiency gap” (Dick 2015) and the diversion of critical resources (Bromley and Powell 2012). Means-ends decoupling at the state level results in institutional complexity for organisations when they confront incompatible prescriptions emanating from a single or multiple institutional logics, thus experiencing institutional complexity (Meyer and Höllerer 2016). Meanwhile, institutional complexity promotes organisations in applying means-ends decoupling to attain legitimacy (Bromley and Powell 2012).

 

Backdrop to the Case: Means-Ends Decoupling at the State Level in Ukraine

Following the fall of the Soviet Union, Ukraine was established as an independent state in 1991 which also involved the transition to a market economy.  However, state policies aimed at lustration, de-Sovietisation and decommunisation were not adopted and civil society remained underdeveloped. Moreover, inconsistently implemented privatization allowed a post-Soviet oligarchy consisting of the Soviet political elite and actors from the Soviet shadow economy to emerge. Drawing on our theoretical framework, in the Ukrainian case, means-ends decoupling was sustained at the state level, as the policies and practices of the state were disconnected from its core goal of creating public welfare. It resulted in inconsistencies within the institutional logic of the state, leading to a high degree of institutional complexity experienced by organisations and individuals that did not belong to the privileged group of so-called “rent seekers”.

 

Diffusion and Implementation of the Triple Helix in Ukraine

The diffusion of the Triple Helix model in the Ukrainian context was initiated by the National Technical University of Ukraine ‘Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute’, acting as an institutional entrepreneur. In the period 2004–06, KPI participated in the EU’s TEMPUS project together with European higher education institutions. As a result of this collaboration the first Ukrainian science park (Kyivska Polytechnika) was established in 2006. In 2009-2010, in the context of implementation of the Triple Helix model in Ukraine, the government awarded the status of ‘research university’ to 13 flagship universities. However, the implementation of the Triple Helix in Ukraine turned into means-ends decoupling at the state level due to the rent-seeking behaviour of the powerful actors from the governmental institutions. Urgent domestic reforms to foster the knowledge economy were not undertaken while the research universities lacked funding for infrastructure.

 

Means-ends decoupling at the state level – the cause of the diversion of intellectual capital

Means-ends decoupling at the state level, caused by the rent-seeking behaviour of business and political oligarchies, led to the implementation of the Triple Helix model in Ukraine also reflecting a case of means-ends decoupling. Consequently, contradictions within the institutional logic of the state resulted in a high degree of institutional complexity experienced by the science parks established at the case universities. What is more, means-ends decoupling at the state level causes the means and ends of the organisational actors to be also decoupled due to the institutional complexity that they confront. That is, institutional complexity triggers means-ends decoupling at the organisational level, as claimed by Bromley and Powell (2012). In addition, the more senior managers of the university and the science park maintain the logic of confidence in practices that deviate from the Triple Helix model, the greater rent-seeking and means-ends decoupling at the organisational level.

 

One of the many negative consequences of means-ends decoupling at the state level and rent-seeking behaviour of powerful actors in governmental institutions is the loss of intellectual capital through brain drain. Thus, the longer means-ends decoupling and rent-seeking will persist both at the state and organisational levels, the further will Ukraine move away from the so-called ‘world society’ and its corresponding institutional arrangements.

 

Myroslava Hladchenko is an associate professor at the University of Life and Environmental Sciences of Ukraine.

 

References

Benneworth, Paul, Harry de Boer, and Ben Jongbloed. 2015. Between good intentions and urgent stakeholder pressures: Institutionalizing the universities’ third mission in the Swedish context. European Journal of Higher Education 5(3): 280–296.

Bromley, Patricia, and Walter Powell. 2012. From smoke and mirrors to walking the talk: Decoupling in the contemporary world. The Academy of Management Annals 6(1): 483–530.

Dick, Penny. 2015. From rational myth to self-fulfilling prophecy? Understanding the persistence of means-ends decoupling as a consequence of the latent functions of policy enactment. Organization Studies 36(7): 897-924.

Etzkowitz, Henry, and Loet Leydesdorff. 2000. The dynamics of innovation: From national systems and “Mode 2” to a Triple Helix of university–industry–government relations. Research Policy 29: 109–123.

Hladchenko, Myroslava, and Romulo Pinheiro. 2018. Implementing the Triple Helix Model: Means-Ends Decoupling at the State Level? Minerva First Online: 7 July 2018.

Hladchenko, Myroslava, Don Westerheijden, and Harry de Boer. 2018. Means-ends decoupling at the state level and managerial responses to multiple organisational identities in Ukrainian research universities. Higher Education Research & Development: 1-14

Hladchenko, Myroslava, and Don Westerheijden. 2018. Means-ends decoupling and academic identities in Ukrainian university after the Revolution of Dignity. European Journal of Higher Education 8(2): 152-168.

Meyer, John. 2010. World society, institutional theory, and the actor. Annual Review of Sociology 36: 1–20.

Meyer, Renate, and Markus Höllerer. 2016. Laying a smoke screen: Ambiguity and neutralization as strategic responses to intra-institutional complexity. Strategic Organization 14(4): 373-406.

Pinheiro, Rómulo, Patricio Langa, and Attila Pausits. 2015. One and two equals three? The third mission of higher education institutions. European Journal of Higher Education 5(3): 233–249.

 

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Publication resulting from the UACES Graduate Forum Conference 2018

The personalities of the High Representative (of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security within the European Union [EU]) have fascinated journalists and academics since the position was created. Michaela Korsch argues we should move pass the gossip and introduce rigour and method in our understanding of an individual who is pivotal in translating the preferences of twenty-eight member states into a consistent foreign policy.

© kasto/AdobeStock

For the next High Representative, leading experts already dream of a job advertisement that sounds something like this: ‘Candidates that will be considered must be well-known, highly respected, and experienced politicians in foreign policy with agreeable strategic objectives in international politics. And most importantly make sure you have a ‘bright and shiny’ personality!’

When considering media coverage on the personalities of the High Representatives, it appears that having the best dirt raises your status: Federica Mogherini, currently the High Representative, was attributed a nerdy personality when Brussels started to think of her as a successor to Catherine Ashton (the first holder of the position from 2009-2014).

Well, if ‘nerdy’ is referring to Mogherini’s degree in political science and her knowledge of three languages, things could be worse.

In comparison to Catherine Ashton, the former Italian foreign minister got off lightly. At the beginning of her term Ashton was referred to as ‘Lady Who’, a not exactly flattering comment on her appearance. It became even worse when Rod Liddle attested Ashton had the ‘charisma of a caravan site on the Isle of Sheppey’. Wait, does a caravan site have a personality? Anyway.

Academic literature on EU foreign policy has noticed these expressions about the High Representatives, as those mentioned above. However, I suggest that what (possibly) works for a journalist, might not work as well for a political scientist.

So here is my claim: less chatter, more methodology!

Let us find the means to thoroughly investigate the personalities of the High Representatives instead of only quoting ‘gossip’; to understand a personality is more than a reflection of superficialities (speaking of ‘nerdy Federica’) or picking up chitchat from London (‘Lady Catherine Who’). It can shed light on how the EU as a foreign policy actor sees the world and subsequently acts.

Foreign Policy Analysis, a subfield of international relations, offers valuable insights for this. The operational code approach addresses the beliefs of foreign policy actors on their context of action as well as their preferred strategy to achieve goals. To investigate the leadership style of an actor the leadership trait analysis is a well-known tool within the field. Media coverage will of course still work to stress certain ideas.

Why (of all foreign policy actors out there) investigate the High Representative? Of course, the position’s influence is limited (compared to the national foreign minister of, e.g., Germany or France), but calling it ‘more an embarrassment for the EU than a support’ falls short of an explanation. It is time to take the personalities of the High Representatives seriously (credits for this ‘evergreen’ quote go to Andrew Moravcsik).

Both Ashton and Mogherini have shown they are able to enhance the EU’s foreign policy. In 2015, Mogherini negotiated (with international partners and based on Catherine Ashton’s groundwork) the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran. Ashton stood out for reaching an agreement between Serbia and Kosovo in 2013 which normalized their relationship, just one of serval of her successes. A ‘charisma free zone’ certainly looks different.

Having said this, note that like other EU offices the choice for a High Representative is the result of a horse trade – just in case you are waiting for the next incumbent to be the glorified person identified by our leading experts. Twenty-eight member states take part in a system of unanimous voting while insisting on their preferences and facing different challenges in international relations. Of course, they also seek to protect their national sovereignty.

What the EU needs is a High Representative with a personality able to translate this ‘horse trading mentality’ into a more consistent EU foreign policy. Arguably this is the best solution for a Union still waiting to act on a global scale. I doubt that there is room for an ‘EU foreign minister’ being a leader like a national foreign minister can be. The key is to adjust the expectations of what the High Representative is expected to be and how.

So, it is time to ask what the ‘bright and shiny’ personality of the High Representative looks like in scientific terms – it is a safe bet that the answer would be more elaborate and rigorous than what we currently know and how it influences EU foreign policy. Perusing the literature on the EU’s foreign policy shows there is a glaring gap to be filled.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Graduate Forum, UACES or JCER.

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Michaela Korsch (Catholic University of Eichstaett-Ingolstadt) is a political scientist and external PhD candidate investigating the personal influence of the High Representatives Catherine Ashton and Federica Mogherini.

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On this week’s BBC Question Time, Prisons Minister, Rory Stewart, said we couldn’t have a new ‘People’s Vote’ on the final Brexit deal because, basically, it’s too complicated for a referendum choice.

When QT presenter, David Dimbleby, asked the minister if the government would put the final Brexit deal to an election, Mr Stewart replied that the Chequers deal “involves 17 different components. It’s not appropriate for a referendum choice.”

So, we were asked a simple question in 2016 on whether or not we should remain a member of the European Union. But now we’re not allowed any say on the complicated answer. How democratic is that?

If the terms of us leaving are too complicated to be decided by a referendum, then the same argument can be applied to the original question of whether we should remain in or leave the EU.

Because the decision about our membership of the EU doesn’t involve just ’17 different components’. It involves tens of thousands of components.

Mr Stewart talked of the Chequers deal as if it is a done deal. But the rest of us know that it’s a dead deal.

Many MPs – both Remainers and Brexiters – say they won’t vote for it. More crucially, the European Union say they won’t accept it.

So what deal will we get? Nobody knows, but a no deal, which would be catastrophic for all our lives, is increasingly looking likely.

We must have a democratic say on this. It’s vital.

The problem is that binary choices don’t work. Not in our own lives, and not in politics.

• Do you say a simple yes or no to a holiday? No, you also need to know where you’re going, when, and how much.
• Do you say a simple yes or no to a new job? No, you also need to know what the job entails, the salary, and the conditions of employment.

When we know the actual final details of the Brexit deal or no deal, the electorate needs to have a say on it.

It’s no good giving us a yes or no choice to a complicated question, and then telling us we can’t have any say on the detailed answer.

We need another referendum, or another snap general election.

We cannot allow incompetent government ministers to decide the future of this country, and all our lives, without any further input from us, the people.

Mr Stewart proclaimed on Question Time that:

“If we don’t leave the European Union, there will be a political crisis that will tear this country apart for the next 50 years.”

No, Mr Stewart.

Most of us can now see the exact opposite: leaving the European Union will tear this country apart for the next 50 years.

Give us a say on our future. That’s democratic.

The government’s view is that they can go ahead and decide our future for us, without any say by us.

That’s not democratic. That’s dictatorship.

• Watch the 90-second video of the Prison Minister saying that the Brexit deal is not appropriate for a referendum choice:

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
• Follow my Stop Brexit campaign on Facebook: Reasons2Remain

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'Brexit deal is too complicated for a referendum'

→ 1-minute video: Freudian slip by the prisons minister – Please share'FINAL BREXIT DEAL IS TOO COMPLICATED FOR A REFERENDUM'Last night on BBC Question Time, Prisons Minister, Rory Stewart, said we couldn’t have a #PeoplesVote on the final Brexit deal because, basically, it’s too complicated for a referendum choice. When QT presenter, David Dimbleby, asked the minister if the government would put the final Brexit deal to an election, Mr Stewart replied that the Chequers deal “involves 17 different components. It’s not appropriate for a referendum choice.”So, we were asked a simple question in 2016 on whether or not we should remain a member of the European Union. But now we’re not allowed any say on the complicated answer. How democratic is that?If the terms of us leaving are too complicated to be decided by a referendum, then the same argument can be applied to the original question of whether we should remain in or leave the EU. Because the decision about our membership of the EU doesn’t involve just ’17 different components’. It involves tens of thousands of components.Mr Stewart talked of the Chequers deal as if it is a done deal. But the rest of us know that it’s a dead deal. Many MPs – both Remainers and Brexiters – say they won’t vote for it. More crucially, the European Union say they won’t accept it.So what deal will we get? Nobody knows, but a no deal, which would be catastrophic for all our lives, is increasingly looking likely. We must have a democratic say on this. It's vital.The problem is that binary choices don’t work. Not in our own lives, and not in politics.Do you say a simple yes or no to a holiday? No, you also need to know where you’re going, when, and how much. Do you say a simple yes or no to a new job? No, you also need to know what the job entails, the salary, and the conditions of employment.When we know the actual final details of the Brexit deal or no deal, the electorate needs to have a say on it. It’s no good giving us a yes or no choice to a complicated question, and then telling us we can’t have any say on the detailed answer.We need another referendum, or another snap general election.We cannot allow incompetent government ministers to decide the future of this country, and all our lives, without any further input from us, the people.Mr Stewart proclaimed on Question Time that, “If we don’t leave the European Union, there will be a political crisis that will tear this country apart for the next 50 years.”No, Mr Stewart. Most of us can now see the exact opposite: leaving the European Union will tear this country apart for the next 50 years. Give us a say on our future. That’s democratic. The government’s view is that they can go ahead and decide our future for us, without any say by us.That’s not democratic. That's dictatorship.• Words and video compilation by Jon Danzig• Please re-Tweet, and follow Reasons2Remain on Twitter:twitter.com/Reasons2Remain/status/1040609288090214400• This video is now available on the Reasons2Remain YouTube channel. Please share, and follow our channel. https://youtu.be/kMzoo14K_qI Before commenting on the Reasons2Remain campaign page, please read our new Rules of Engagement: Rules.Reasons2Remain.com********************************************► Watch Jon Danzig's 50-minute video: 'Can Britain Stop Brexit?' Go to CanBritainStopBrexit.com********************************************• To follow and support Reasons2Remain just ‘like’ the page, and please invite all your friends to like the page. ********************************************• Please recommend Reasons2Remain in the reviews section. Here's the link: facebook.com/Reasons2Remain/reviews/********************************************• Follow Reasons2Remain on Twitter: twitter.com/reasons2remain and Instagram: instagram.com/reasons2remain/********************************************• Explore our unique Reasons2Remain gallery of over 1,000 graphics and articles: reasons2remain.co.uk********************************************• Reasons2Remain is an entirely unfunded community campaign, unaffiliated with any other group or political party, and is run entirely by volunteers. If you'd like to help, please send us a private message.********************************************• © Reasons2Remain 2018. All our articles and graphics are the copyright of Reasons2Remain. We only allow sharing using the Facebook share button. Any other use requires our advance permission in writing.#STOPBREXIT #EXITBREXIT #PEOPLESVOTE #FINALSAY

Posted by Reasons2Remain on Friday, 14 September 2018

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Publication resulting from the UACES Graduate Forum Conference 2018

The process of European integration has always faced challenges, but the complexities in which the European Union finds itself today are unprecedented, Karlis Bukovskis reflects. Following his participation at the UACES GF 2018 Conference, Bukovskis offers a conceptualisation of the recent wave of populism and trends in integration, in order to contemplate Europe’s institutional future.

© Jakub Jirsák/Adobe Stock

Challenges and crises are part and parcel of the European integration process. Indeed, they have often been a driving force for deeper integration, with countries delegating sovereign-decision making power to supranational institutions to address them.

Even when a member decides to leave the European Union (EU), overall integration deepens; in the case of Brexit, we have seen the emergence of European defence structures, an area previously less integrated than the economic, foreign policy, or even the justice and home affairs sectors.

The EU has been in a prolonged self-evaluation process — a process initially caused by the sovereign debt crisis and then exacerbated by the migration crisis and Brexit. Together with a slow recovery of the economy, the recent surges of populism and Euroscepticism, the EU project is undoubtedly yet again in a complex situation.

What, then, does the future hold for the EU, in relation to populism and its institutional developments?

Populism in Form / Populism in Substance

Populism – broadly, the appeal to anxieties of the masses – has been part of the political process and rhetoric since the dawn of politics.

We can distinguish two sides of the recent populist wave in democratic countries. On the one side: populism in form, which seeks to address as many voters as possible via all means possible. On the other: populism in substance, aimed at destroying existing policies, multilateral and economic ties by appealing to anti-globalisation and anti-Europeanisation.

The first is a product of modern technological developments putting a world of information at one’s fingertips. The consequent changes to the political process and voter mobilisation have been monumental; Facebook heroes, Twitter warriors and television are performing the function of mass electoral mobilisation — previously the domain of mass party politics and political ideologies.

Ad-hoc issues and topical matters dominate the political rhetoric and electoral process. Differences in values, policies, historical interpretations, regimes and policies – traditionally an endless well for political rhetoric – will continue to be used by both marginal and mainstream politicians exercising and promoting populist rhetoric: this is populism in form.

Populism in substance is exemplified in modern foreign policy through oversimplified positions and solutions. For example, the utilisation of EU-Turkey relations in domestic political debates and the maximising of the rift between the positions of current administration of the United States of America and the EU by politicians seeking popularity points. Similarly, the developments in the Visegrad group countries and those in Western European countries are used as political vehicles by fellow member states.

In spite of the results of the Dutch national elections and Emmanuel Macron’s victory in last year’s French presidential elections, Euroscepticism still finds ears among voters. It is largely due to the towering complexity of the EU to the everyday voter and the European Commission’s lost reputation as neutral arbiter since J.-C. Juncker’s rule.

Brexit and the emergence of internal opposition, especially in the form of the Visegrad group countries, signify the EU’s re-entry into an era of inter-governmentalism after prolonged periods of de facto federalisation. A willingness to see the EU’s supranational institutions as instruments for the promotion of national interests has been around since its birth.

Today, Visegrad elites are balancing the revival of national self-esteem and the wish to remain in the EU, resulting in harsh rhetoric and shattered relationships.

Evidently, after being subjected to prolonged periods of conditionality, transition and transformation, the post-communist countries are now ready to be treated as equal partners, not only by their fellow member states, but also by the supranational institutions. And this wish plainly sells among voters.

The Institutional Future of the EU

The prolonged reality of the multispeed Europe is principally due to the federalism/inter-governmentalism debate. Different intensities of integration between countries are based on their national interests, economic exposure and political views of particular ruling elite or even individual politicians. The Schengen area, the Eurozone, the PESCO are just some examples of enhanced cooperation advancing and reshaping, and thereby making more complex, the institutional structures of the EU.

Moreover, every opt-out has been a chance for countries and their societies to put their foot down and say ‘no’ to EU integration without impeding overall integration. As a result, not only does the current shape of the EU allow various levels of collaboration, but the same stands also for engagement levels with third countries.

It is no longer just about membership of the EU. DCFTAs, FTAs, FTAs+ are free trade area formats that provide an opportunity for the EU to secure permanent cooperation and Europeanisation of countries that will never be part of the EU, and especially not part of the EU core.

Meanwhile, the EU core and the Banking Union are becoming more and more distant not only from the already existing EU member states, but also from membership aspirers. As the EU core becomes more homogenous, it also becomes more demanding to semi-core and periphery countries of the EU.

As a result, countries championing EU membership will have to go to much greater lengths and delegate much more sovereignty than countries of previous enlargements. For instance, further European Monetary Union integration makes EU accession a much greater leap for nation states.

It is evident that domestic integration problems will dominate the agenda at least until 2025 with the EU’s internal structure becoming increasingly complex. This will weigh heavily on relations both inside and outside the EU.

Already incomprehensible to a non-professional audience, the EU and its institutions will be further estranged from its population.

In external relations, the EU will become more complex to deal with and more complicated to integrate into. At the same time, however, new formats of association and engagement with the EU will allow flexibility in relations towards the third countries.

The EU is now debating its future, domestically, at the European Parliament, and in the Council regarding the finalization of the Economic and Monetary Union. This is an opportunity for the member states and their leaders to express their wishes and fears regarding the EU. The pertinent question remains, however, of the extent to which the non-professional audience will be able to participate, both in comprehending and in shaping, this “ever complex Union”.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Graduate Forum, UACES or JCER.

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Karlis Bukovskis

Karlis Bukovskis is the Deputy Director and a researcher at the Latvian Institute of International Affairs (LIIA), the author of numerous articles, and the scientific editor of several books. Bukovskis is a lecturer on global political economy, international financial system and the EU integration at Riga Graduate School of Law and Riga Stradins University.

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How did the European Union respond to the Ukraine crisis? Maryna Rabinovych considers the EU’s approach as a development exercise and suggests how its policy can be improved in the nearby future.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Kiev © Natalia Bratslavsky/AdobeStock

The 2013 Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine, followed by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the subsequent aggression in Eastern Ukraine posed a complex challenge to EU’s policy vis-à-vis Ukraine. The Union’s foreign policy response to the Ukraine crisis involves three key aspects: sanctions and diplomatic pressure on Russia; selective engagement with Russia and, finally, the intensification of development cooperation with Ukraine. Following the logic of the Comprehensive Approach to Conflicts and Crises (presently converted into the Integrated Approach), the EU managed to develop a large-scale multi-aspect development response to the Ukraine crisis, disposing of a rich toolbox.

However, since this response was conducted outside the realm of EU’s development policy and related assessment instruments, it is useful to reconsider the EU’s ENP to post-Euromaidan Ukraine as a development exercise. Such analysis is highly relevant for improving EU’s development engagement with Ukraine, given the ENP’s declared pivotal role in the EU’s general effort to implement Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Moreover, an insight into the development aspect of the ENP is crucial for conceptualizing the joint Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument in terms of the 2021-2027 EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework.

Policy’s Comprehensiveness and Systemic Response

Apart from constituting a major threat to Ukraine’s territorial integrity, the conflict in Eastern Ukraine exacerbated the economic and financial situation in Ukraine, absorbing around 20% of the country’s GDP annually. It also brought to the surface systemic military, political and institutional issues within Ukraine, involving inter alia corruption, the absence of checks and balances and a dysfunctional judicial system. The complexity of these issues as well as the trend towards a comprehensive EU external action (stemming from the adoption of the Agenda 2030 and the stipulation of general policy objectives in Art.21 (2) TEU) have determined the comprehensiveness of EU’s development response to the Ukraine crisis.

The EU’s policy towards post-Euromaidan Ukraine can be considered as comprehensive in several regards. First, the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (AA) that fully entered into force in 2017 is perceived as “the most advanced agreement of its kind ever negotiated by the European Union”. Of particular significance is the parties’ creation of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), directed to “Ukraine’s gradual integration to the Internal Market”. Moreover, the implementation of the AA is reinforced by ‘overarching’ technical support projects (e..g, “Association4U”) and projects on individual DCFTA disciplines (e.g., state aid, public procurement).

Second, parallel to the implementation of the AA, the EU has been conducting an ambitious state-building programme in Ukraine since 2014, based on macro-financial assistance and budget support. The 2014 State-Building Contract for Ukraine followed an OECD ‘menu’, involving multi-aspect reforms (e.g., public finance management, civil service and electoral law reforms). Third, the comprehensiveness of EU response is exemplified by its sector-specific blends of macro-economic and technical assistance projects, involving civil society support.

Despite the comprehensive scope and rich toolbox of the above engagement, the integration and state-building axes lack a common conceptual prerequisite (such as the sustainable development concept) and encourage few synergies. Furthermore, although there is an engagement with SDGs (e.g., Goal 8 “Decent Work and Economic Growth” and Goal 16 “Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions”), the development-related targets and indicators are absent and no link is made to Ukraine’s own efforts to achieve SDGs. These drawbacks lead us to the problem of policy coherence in the Union’s development response to Ukraine.

Donor Coordination and Policy Coherence

The Agenda 2030 and the new European Consensus on Development distinguish several aspects of coherence: donor coordination, goals’ integration (focus on cross-cutting themes), and horizontal policy coherence/Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development. According to DG Development and Cooperation, donor coordination platform should have been established in Ukraine to conduct multi-donor projects and measure progress. The emphasis on “Mobilization, coordination and disbursement of assistance” (to be exercised by the EEAS/DEVGO and Ukrainian Government) was also made in the 2014 Agenda for Reform.

However, no such platform was created internationally. This testifies to the EU’s failure to engage other donors into a truly comprehensive effort to promote Ukraine’s development, thereby juxtaposing it to Russian aggression. Moreover, Ukraine’s national foreign aid coordination project “OPENAID” project ceased to exist in 2017, following the notorious dismissal of its coordinator Olena Tregub. This raises additional concerns regarding the transparency of large aid flows Ukraine presently gets and aid effectiveness. Hence, so far, the positive examples of EU-led donor coordination in Ukraine remain sector-specific, and include “U-LEAD” project (involving German GIZ, Swedish SIDA, Polish Aid and Swiss SDC) and “PRAVO-Justice” (involving authorized bodies of France, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Germany), targeting decentralization and the rule of law, respectively.

Next, the integrated approach to reforms or the introduction of cross-cutting areas were barely distinguished in EU’s aid delivery to Ukraine. Some cross-cutting fields (e.g., gender and human rights) are distinguished in the 2015 Special Measure to Ukraine (focusing on decentralization). The link between the “deep” disciplines of the DCFTA and the economic dimension of the rule of law (promotion of legal certainty, transparency and accountability standards) remains highly underestimated. The single positive example of integrated approach to economic and political goals is the can be found in the “PRAVO-Justice” focus area “Property Right Protection and Ease of Business”.

As opposed to development policy, horizontal policy coherence is seldom mentioned in the ENP context, largely due to the fact that ENP is often viewed as “internally coherent by default”. An additional reason is the lack of a single unifying concept, such as development or sustainable development, as stipulated in the Agenda 2030 and EU development policy documents.

Conclusion

The analysis demonstrates that the EU managed to develop a comprehensive development response to the Ukraine crisis in terms of the ENP and State-Building Contract for Ukraine, addressing various reform fields through creative blends of development instruments. The continuation of the Union’s development engagement with Ukraine can benefit from building bridges between the “association” and “state-building” axes of aid; strengthening the role of “sustainable development” in the ENP; expanding the opportunities for donor coordination; strengthening of Ukraine’s domestic dimension of aid transparency and aid effectiveness, as well as promoting horizontal policy coherence.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Graduate Forum, UACES or JCER.

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Maryna Rabinovych

Maryna Rabinovych works as a Global Community Manager at the Ukraine Democracy Initiative, based in Sydney. She also pursues a PhD research that focuses on the legal aspects of the EU’s rule of law promotion via free trade agreements in the Eastern Neighbourhood and beyond.

 

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In this piece, Samuel D. Schmid, Andrea C. Blättler, and Joachim Blatter summarise the key findings from their winning article of the JCMS 2017 Best Article Prize: ‘Democratic Deficits in Europe: The Overlooked Exclusiveness of Nation‐States and the Positive Role of the European Union’ (Vol 55, Issue 3), available here.

State parliament (Landtag) in Berlin © Matyas Rehak/Adobe Stock

The European Union, many believe, has a democratic deficit. The sovereign nation-state is seen as democratically superior. Even more, it is often argued that the EU undermines the functioning of national democracies, compounding this alleged democratic deficit.

In our article we show that when it comes to the electoral inclusion of immigrants, nation states suffer from a democratic deficit and the EU plays a democracy-enhancing role. European democracies are much more exclusive than they should be according to normative standards derived from democratic theory. The EU has been key to mitigating the exclusiveness of democracies. By requiring its member states to enfranchise non-national EU citizens on the local level, it pushes one of the currently most relevant “frontiers of democracy” in the right direction.

Why should democracies include long-term immigrant residents?

Normative theorists of democracy, whether they are liberals, republicans, or communitarians agree that democracies should – in order to retain full legitimacy – grant voting rights to all adult, legal and long-term residents. The same goes for Robert Dahl, one of founding fathers of empirical democracy measurement. He defined inclusive suffrage accordingly when he introduced his concept of polyarchy.

Currently, the most significant group often excluded in this definition of the demos are long-term immigrant residents. They far outnumber disenfranchised resident citizens (e.g. criminal convicts, the mentally disabled). In the article, we deduce a strong normative demand that immigrants have to be included into the demos after five years of continuous residence. Democracies can opt to do so either by allowing immigrants to naturalize or by providing them with alien voting rights.

Constructing the Immigrant Inclusion Index (IMIX)

Taking this position as a benchmark, we construct an evaluative assessment tool: the Immigrant Inclusion Index (IMIX). It has two constitutive dimensions. The de facto dimension contrasts the number of people who are actually included with the number of people that should be included with regard to both mechanisms of inclusion. The de jure dimension assesses the laws regulating the immigrants’ access to citizenship and alien enfranchisement in light of the normative demands.

The details of measurement, normalization, and aggregation are elaborated in the article. We draw on extensive original data collection and established resources such as the electoral rights indicators (ELECLAW) and the citizenship policy indicators (CITLAW) provided by the GLOBALCIT Observatory based at the European University Institute.

The exclusiveness of 20 European democracies – and the positive role of the EU

Having selected the 20 most established democracies with stable territorial boundaries among all EU member states[1], the first and main result of our study is the stark discrepancy between the laws and practice of electoral inclusion in these established European democracies and the ideal of ‘universal suffrage.’ In Figure 1 below, ‘universal suffrage’ equates a value of 100 on our IMIX scale. Even Sweden, the most inclusive country in our sample, is far from reaching this standard and suffers from a notable democratic deficit.

Figure 1: How 20 EU democracies fare in immigrant electoral inclusion – and how Switzerland compares

Legend: Figure 1 shows the scores on the IMIX scale for the 20 EU member states evaluated, plus the scores for Switzerland, as case for which we estimate a hypothetical “EU support” in a later study. Data clusters around 2010. Blue is the IMIX score without “EU support”. Yellow is the proportion attributable to “EU support”. We talk about “EU support” and not about an “EU effect” because we do not claim a causal role for the EU in each country, but a functional role as a safeguard in all countries.

The second main insight is the positive function of EU membership. According to EU law, EU members must grant voting rights to non-national EU citizens in local legislative elections. This EU norm plays a supportive role for the electoral inclusion of immigrants and reduces the democratic deficit of member states. This became also very visible when we added Switzerland to our sample in a further study . Currently, Switzerland is one of the most exclusive countries in Europe. Membership in the EU would make a huge difference since it would allow the many immigrants from EU countries to have a vote at least on the local level (which is currently only the case in a very limited number of cantons and municipalities).

Not only the least inclusive European democracies (could) get a boost in inclusiveness through EU membership. Almost all countries that fall into the ‘fairly inclusive’ category are greatly aided in achieving this label by applying EU law. For instance, Belgium’s de facto score is 34 percent due to enfranchised non-national EU citizen residents; and only Sweden would remain in the ‘fairly inclusive’ category if ‘EU support’ was subtracted from the IMIX score. We thus conclude that the EU plays an important democracy-enhancing role when it comes to immigrants’ electoral inclusion in EU Member States.

Avenues for supranational and postnational citizenship – and democracy measurement

In times when the EU faces an unprecedented legitimacy crisis and when there are claims that the EU continues to suffer from structural democratic deficits and produces such deficits on the national level, it is important to highlight existing shortcomings within national democracies. These democratic deficits within EU Member States do not reduce the democratic deficits of the EU per se; however, they put into perspective the often-proclaimed superiority of national democracies. Moreover, our analysis shows that the EU plays an important role in reducing this democratic deficit.

In contrast to most indices in the field of immigration, integration, and citizenship, the IMIX uses an approach grounded in the tradition of democratic theory and democracy measurement. As we show in our working paper, new democracy measurement tools represent major steps forwards in aligning methodology to theory and practice. Nevertheless, regarding the fundamental dimension of electoral inclusion there is still a gap between measurement tools, theoretical discourses, and practical struggles. The aspect of inclusion was side-lined in almost all significant democracy indices in the 20th century, supplanted by the notion of participation (of those already included). It is only taken up on the margins of the two most recent and sophisticated democracy measurement tools, the Democracy Barometer and the Varieties of Democracy Project.

Therefore, we hope that the IMIX also inspires democracy measurement projects to better capture one of the currently most important “frontiers of democracy” – that is, to include inclusion in an adequate way.

[1] We exclude the Baltic states because of the second criterion. Our concern about their territorial integrity is further connected to the fact that they have large non-citizen Russian-speaking minorities, which – if fully included – may undermine the autonomy of these polities.

This piece is based on the winning article of the JCMS 2017 Best Article Prize: ‘Democratic Deficits in Europe: The Overlooked Exclusiveness of Nation‐States and the Positive Role of the European Union’ (Vol 55, Issue 3) available here.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of  Ideas on Europe, JCMS or UACES.

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Samuel D. Schmid is a graduate of the University of Lucerne and a current PhD Researcher at the Department of Political and Social Sciences at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. His thesis investigates the association between the openness of borders and the inclusiveness of citizenship across 20 Western democracies from 1980 to 2010. Twitter: @samdschmid

 

Andrea C. Blättler graduated with a BA from the University of Lucerne and is currently completing joint master’s degree in political theory at Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main & Technische Universität Darmstadt and spent a DAAD-funded term at The New School for Social Research, New York. She works at the intersection of political and social theory on questions of power and social stratification.

 

Joachim Blatter is professor of Political Science at the University of Lucerne. He wrote his Habilitation at the University of Konstanz, and has been a research fellow at Harvard, the Australian National University, and the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB). His current research focuses on dual citizenship, the transnationalization of national democracies, and on the migration of migration policies.

 

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The president of the European Commission, in his letter of intent accompanying the September 2015 State of the Union speech, announced that the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), the Dublin System, and Easo would be comprehensively reviewed. From May to July 2016, the Commission put forward a wide-ranging European Asylum package, which reformed the Regulations of Dublin and Eurodacas well as the Reception Conditions Directive, and which proposed the establishment of a common asylum procedure in the EU,a Qualification Regulation, a Union Resettlement Framework,and a European Union Agency for Asylum(EUAA).

While the Council and the European Parliament reached an agreement on 28 June 2017 on all twelve chapters of the regulation on the future EUAA, “an overall agreement will only be possible once the linkages with the other legislative proposals in the CEAS package have been resolved”. That is, the final adoption of the new EUAA Regulation will not take place until the whole asylum package is finalized (Italy, Spain, Greece, Cyprus and Malta aim to strike a difficult deal by June’s summit of European leaders). However, since negotiations are already well advanced, the core provisions of the Regulation on the EUAA will not substantially differ from the text partially agreed between the Council and the Parliament. This blog post thus zooms in on the key operational novelties of the text, which was partially agreed upon by the Council and the Parliament on 28 June 2017, and analyzes what changes these novelties would bring to the current mandate of Easo.

Although the EUAA will not be mandated to set out a comprehensive strategy of asylum, the agency, through guidance on the situation in third countries of origin, shall “ensure greater convergence and address disparities in the assessment of applications for international protection” (Proposal for a EUAA, COM(2016) 271 final, 04.05.2016, p. 7). The EUAA shall “develop a common analysis on the situation in specific countries of origin and guidance notes to assist Member States in the assessment of relevant applications” (article 10(1) partial agreement EUAA). Importantly, as soon as the EUAA’s Management Board endorses the guidance notes, accompanied by the common analysis, the Member States shall take them into account when examining applications for international protection, without prejudice to their competence for deciding on individual applications (article 10(2a) partial agreement on the EUAA).

The new monitoring role of the EUAA will also indirectly shape a common strategy of asylum in the EU. A key difference between Easo and the future EUAA will be its monitoring role in order to guarantee that the national authorities are sufficiently prepared to manage exceptional and sudden pressure in their asylum and reception systems. Should the EUAA’s information analysis raise serious concerns regarding the functioning or preparedness of a Member State’s asylum or reception systems, the agency, on its own initiative or at the request of the European Commission, may initiate a monitoring exercise (article 14(2) partial agreement EUAA).

The Member State concerned will receive the findings of the monitoring exercise and the draft recommendations of the EUAA’s Executive Director for comments. As soon as the agency takes the concerned Member State’s comments into account, the EUAA’s Management Board shall, by a decision of two-thirds of its members with a right to vote, adopt those recommendations (article 14(3a) partial agreement EUAA). As with the EBCG’s vulnerability assessments (article 13 Regulation 2016/1624), the future EUAA will be conferred a recommendatory power in order to put forward measures to be adopted by the national authorities. Nevertheless, Member States will still maintain indirect control of the EUAA’s recommendations (see, here) through the enhanced majority that is required in the Management Board.

Whereas the Commission did not initially propose that the EUAA’s Executive Director be able to appoint experts from the staff of the agency to be deployed as liaison officers in Member States, the provisional text agreed on 28 June 2017 indicated that liaison officers “shall foster cooperation and dialogue between the Agency and the Member States’ authorities responsible for asylum and immigration and other relevant services” (article 14a(3) partial agreement EUAA). Like the EBCG’s liaison officers, the EUAA liaison officers will facilitate the monitoring role of the agency by reporting regularly to the Executive Director on the situation of asylum in the Member States and their capacity to manage their asylum and reception systems effectively (article 14a(3) partial agreement EUAA).

The EUAA will thus be in charge of monitoring “the operational and technical application of the CEAS in order to prevent or identify possible shortcomings in the asylum and reception systems of Member States and to assess their capacity and preparedness to manage situations of disproportionate pressure so as to enhance the efficiency of those systems” (article 13(1) partial agreement EUAA). With this aim, the agency shall namely assess the national procedures for international protection, staff available and reception conditions (i.e. infrastructure, equipment or financial resources) on the basis of the information provided by the Member State concerned and by relevant intergovernmental organizations or bodies,as well as information analysis on the situation of asylum and on-site visits that the agency may undertake (article 13 (3) and (4) partial agreement EUAA). This new monitoring task of the EUAA shall ultimately contribute to the effective and harmonized implementation of the CEAS by the Member States (see, here, here and here).

The second substantial novelty that the EUAA will bring is the possibility of making an emergency intervention if the functioning of the CEAS is jeopardized due to the insufficient action of a Member State to address the disproportionate pressure on the asylum and reception systems in a Member State (article 22(1)partial agreement EUAA), the refusal of the competent national authorities to request or accept assistance from the EUAA (article 22(1)partial agreement EUAA), or the unwillingness of a Member State to comply with the Commission’s recommendations to implement an action plan intended to address serious shortcomings identified during a monitoring assessment (article 14(3a)partial agreement EUAA).

The procedure set out in article 19(1) Regulation 2016/1624 of the EBCG regarding situations at the external borders requiring urgent action will be, to a more limited extent, replicated for the EUAA. While the proposal for a Regulation on a EUAA originally stated that the Commission would be the EU institution in charge of adopting a decision by means of an implementing act to be taken by the agency to support the Member State concerned, the provisional text finally states that the Council shall be the authority responsible for adopting such an implementing act.

Three days after the Council adopts its implementing act, the EUAA’s Executive Director shall draw up an Operational Plan and determine the details of the practical implementation of the Council’s decision (article 22(2) partial agreement EUAA). Subsequently, the Member State concerned will have three days to reach an agreement with the Executive Director on the Operational Plan and will immediately cooperate with the agency to facilitate the practical execution of the measures put forward (article 22(4) partial agreement EUAA). The Regulation of the EUAA under negotiation does not yet include a similar provision as article 19(10) Regulation 2016/1624, which indicates that if within 30 days a Member State neither executes the decision adopted by the Council nor agrees with the EBCG’s Director Operational Plan, the European Commission may authorize the re-establishment of border controls in the Schengen area.

The third novelty of the future EUAA in comparison to its predecessor Easo will be its involvement in the examination of international protection applications. Several provisions of the EUAA mention that the agency will assist or facilitate the Member States in examining the applications of international protection submitted to their asylum systems. Firstly, among the operational and technical assistance that the EUAA shall provide to Member States, the agency shall facilitate the examination of applications for international protection (article 16(2)(b) partial agreement EUAA) to the competent national authorities. In this regard, the Asylum Support Teams (ASTs) “should support Member States with operational and technical measures, including (…) by knowledge of the handling and management of asylum cases, as well as by assisting national authorities competent for the examination of applications for international protection and by assisting with relocation or transfer of applicants or beneficiaries of international protection” (recital 16 partial agreement EUAA).

Secondly, the operational plan that the Executive Director of the EUAA draws up shall also include organizational aspects such as the assistance of the agency to the Member States in examining applications for international protection, without prejudice to the competence of the national asylum systems to decide on individual applications (Article 19(2)(i) partial agreement EUAA). Lastly, the EUAA in the hotspots will be competent to not only register the applications for international protection, but to also examine such applications if the concerned Member State requests so (article 21(2)(d) partial agreement EUAA).

The Regulation does not yet specify to what extent the EUAA may assist or facilitate the competent national authorities in examining applications for international protection. The negotiations regarding the final text of the recital 46 of the EUAA’s Regulation reveal the tensions for regulating and limiting the “examination powers” of the agency. The text put forward by the European Commission for the recital 46 states that “the competence to take decisions by Member States’ asylum authorities on individual applications for international protection remains with Member States”. The Commission clearly establishes that the EUAA cannot be conferred decision-making powers. The European Parliament, however, adds that this limitation should not preclude “the joint processing of applications for individual protection by a Member State and the Agency at the request of the Agency and within the framework set out in an operational plan agreed between the host Member State and the Agency”. Lastly, the Council considers that “the competence of Member States’ asylum authorities to take a decision on individual applications for international protection should remain unaffected”.

The question to be answered is whether the EUAA will be able to jointly process applications for international protection, and if it cannot, to what extent the agency may support the processing of asylum applications. In 2013, the Commission adopted a study in which the concept of “joint processing” was defined as “an arrangement under which all asylum claims within the EU are processed jointly by an EU authority assuming responsibility for both preparation and decision on all cases, as well as subsequent distribution of recognized beneficiaries of international protection and return of those not in need of protection” (p. 114).

The 2013 study of the European Commission on joint processing put forward four options that progressively move from supporting the Member States in processing asylum applications, to designing a centralized EU authority with decision-making powers and responsible for all asylum processing. Currently, the Member States are solely competent to adopt decisions concerning the admissibility and applications for international protection and Easo is mandated to operationally support the competent national authorities in preparing and reaching such decisions.

The next level of European integration would consist in introducing the mechanism of joint processing in situations where a Member State is subject to an extraordinary number of asylum applications. Joint processing teams of Easo would be deployed and make recommendations on asylum cases to the requesting Member State, which would continue to have exclusive decision-making powers. The ASTs of Easo deployed in the Greek hotspots are in practice adopting recommendations on the admissibility of the international protection applications, recommendations that the Greek officials largely rubberstamp when adopting a final decision (see here, here and here). Precisely, the future EUAA, upon the request of a concerned Member State, will be formally conferred the power to examine applications for international protection in the hotspots, as well as the task to facilitate the examination of such applications not necessarily under the hotspot approach to the competent national authorities.

However, the EUAA will be very far from processing and deciding every asylum application within the EU. Instead, the future Regulation on the EUAA opts for reinforcing the operational tasks of the agency and maintaining the Member States as the exclusive decision-making authorities. Although centralizing the asylum decision-making process would ensure a full harmonization of the national procedures and foster a consistent evaluation of the protection needs, this option would demand a “major institutional transformation” and “substantial resources” than can only be envisioned in the long-term. In other words, the transformation of Easo into an agency with decision-making powers to process all the applications for international protection in the EU is still a rather hypothetical scenario since the Member States’ sovereignty would be challenged, a complete overhaul of Easo and all CEAS legislation would be required, and a specialized court or board would need be created.

There are also doubts as to whether article 78(2) TFEU is a sufficient legal basis for conferring the power to exclusively adopt binding decisions on all asylum claims to a EU authority. Pursuant article 78(2) TFEU, the EU shall ensure: “(…) common procedures for the granting and withdrawing of uniform asylum or subsidiary protection status”. On the one hand, TSOURDIbelieves that a EU-level processing scenario in which decisions are taken entirely by a EU authority instead of the Member States is legally impossible under article 78(2)(e) TFEU “which envisages that ‘a Member State’ is ultimately responsible for the examination of an application”. On the other hand, the 2013 Commission’s study on the feasibility of joint processing of asylum applications in the EU considered that article 78(2) TFEU, read together with articles 78(1) and 80 TFEU, represent an adequate legal basis and open up the possibility for a completely harmonized, EU-based approach for joint processing of asylum applications within the EU.

Hence, as is the case with the EBCG that does not establish a European System of Border Guards with autonomous enforcement powers to exclusively manage the European external borders (see here, here, here or here), the future EUAA will not be directly conferred decision-making powers in asylum matters either, but rather will be given an assistance role in examining applications of international protection (see here). It remains to be seen whether the EUAA will openly interpret its new and vaguely regulated examination prerogative, and to what degree the agency will examine the applications for international protection and exert an indirect impact on the final decisions that the national asylum systems ultimately will adopt.

To conclude, although the Commission refers to the future EUAA as a fully-fledged agency for asylum matters in the EU, the agency will neither be conferred decision-making powers regarding asylum applications, nor executive tasks on the ground. As with the mandate of Easo, the tasks to be conferred to the future EUAA are limited to “facilitate and improve the proper functioning of the CEAS and to assist Member States in implementing their obligations within the framework of CEAS, the European Union Agency for Asylum should provide Member States with operational and technical assistance(…)” (p. 15).

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It’s turning into a bit of a tradition.

I go to a UACES conference, talk with a range of European Studies colleagues, then write a long post, usually with a sweary title.

This year it’s Bath, and whereas London in 2016 I was angry (twice) and in Krakow in 2017 I was despairing, this time I’m going to be all about not just taking it.

That feeling comes re-reading those pieces and finding that we still have the same basic issues we had back then – a lack of strategic planning, compromised political leadership and a lack of comprehensive scoping of what’s involved – but also a growing appreciation that the incompleteness of things also generates an opportunity for our own agency.

That was brought home to during a roundtable yesterday, where that opportunity got tackled from a range of perspectives.

The question that discussion generated – for me and which I asked the panellists about – was simply one of how much have we already travelled down any particular road, be that on the form of Brexit, on the practice and notion of democratic debate or on the reformation of gender regimes.

And now, because I blog, I’ve reduced that to the more provocative title you see above (and which might have brought you here).

Fundamentals

Reflexively, I get the impression that it’s easier for academics to talk about the past than the future, because of our proclivity for evidence. Indeed, those who become politicised (in the most general of senses) and advocate future paths are often treated with a degree of scepticism: isn’t our job to help people understand their situation, rather than to advance our preferred change? Especially if that change isn’t directly in our field of research?

As a result, we often fixate on how we got here and on what costs have been sunk.

My thought, however, is that in so doing, we sometimes fail to consider how much isn’t locked in or set in stone.

Personally, that grates, if only because I have a real problem with the notion of inevitability in political settings: the point at which we declare that there’s nothing to be done, is the one at which we secure whatever latent agency we might have.

More importantly, it’s also the point at which we find ourselves having things done to us, by those who feel that things aren’t inevitable (or are inevitably going their way). And that’s not a healthy situation, especially in a democratic setting.

Therefore I always ask people to consider what they can do, because there is always something.

The openness of Brexit

And in the case of Brexit there is very much indeed that can be done, by all of us.

As I listened to that roundtable, I tried to note what was already fixed and I struggled.

Certainly, the invoking of Article 50 in March last year is a decision that is not easily changed, grounded as it is in the referendum of the year before, so in very many ways it is locked into the political environment. Those who would challenge its status still have yet to find a line of argument that resonates sufficiently with public opinion to seriously reopen the matter, although if I stick with my line of reasoning then it’s in their interests to keep trying.

But beyond that, there’s not much.

the Withdrawal Agreement – as seems to be forgotten all too often – isn’t a plan for a new EU-UK relationship, but a wrapping up of the old one. Its content focus on tidying up liabilities and providing mechanisms to bridge to the future situation.

That’s worth stressing, for two reasons.

Firstly, it means that what needs to be locked into that document in the next couple of months is a much more manageable list than all of ‘Brexit’. The Irish dimension is crucial here, but so too governance issues.

Secondly, the British obsession with future models – Canada, Norway, Jersey, etc – means that there’s less political attention or heat on the list of things to be done now. Cynically, I might wonder whether that’s intentional – distract from the coming compromises on Ireland by fighting about future customs models – but that bangs up against another of my basic assumptions, namely that it’s almost always cock-up rather than conspiracy.

In any case, there is still space to input to the WA debate, without loosing one position to get into that future relationship debate.

And that’s a debate that will roll on for a good long time yet.

If one makes a working assumption that the UK is leaving next March, then you have all the reason you need to go and try to shape what might come next, because that isn’t on a clear track to anywhere.

And, importantly, it’s even less clear how Brexit rolls back into the domestic arena and shapes the entirety of the body politic. All week, I’ve found myself talking with colleagues who see wide open spaces where “policy area X in the light of Brexit”  debates might be happening. A lot of people seem to be waiting for more clarity on the WA and on the future relationship, thereby letting opportunities to set agendas and promote ideas now.

Your agency

To come back to the title, it’s a provocation, because it implies that are indeed fucked*, which communicates a particular view on Brexit.  It’s worth saying now that that view is one that’s focused on the poor pursuit, rather than the notion in general. It’s not that it’s happening, but that it’s happening so chaotically.

In that, I find that I’m joined by more and more colleagues. Yes, there’s still a block that wants it to just go away and not to have happened. But as Heraclitus noted, we can never step in the same river twice: there is no status quo ante option here, because things have moved on.

And more basically, it can’t be enough to just stand there and hope things will change, however it is that you want them to change.

We have to work to secure it. You have to work for it.

The micro-personalisation of economic activity means that – for a price – you can get what you want, how you want it. But politics doesn’t work like that: it depends on us, as citizens, engaging with each other, to find ways forward towards our idea of the good life. And if we don’t do that, then others will do it for us, and not necessarily in a good way.

So I will leave this conference determined to encourage you all to make the most of the many opportunities for contribution that Brexit still contains. And that will be part of my own contribution.

All of which is to say that we’re only fucked if we let ourselves be, which might not be the grandest of sentiments, but then I’m not a very sentimental type.

 

* My working assumption as ever is that our social media people will assume I asterisked all the way through, not just the title. We’ll see.

The post So, just how f*cked are we? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

‘The Politics of Higher Education, Research and Innovation’ Standing Group @ ECPR 2018 in Hamburg. Photo credits: Mari Elken

Martina Vukasovic

This year’s ECPR (European Consortium of Political Research) General Conference took place at the University of Hamburg (Germany) August 22-25. The conference included 520 panels on a wide array of topics and representation from more than 2,000 academics from around the world. The ECPR Standing Group on the Politics of Higher Education, Research and Innovation, for the seventh time in a row (following Oslo 2017,  Prague 2016, Montreal 2015, Glasgow 2014, Bordeaux 2013 and Reykjavik 2011) organised a section with a total of six panels covering various themes related to knowledge policy governance.

 

European integration in the area of higher education and research continues to be in focus, and this year one panel explicitly focused on differentiated integration, specifically (1) the varied nature of policies and instruments on the European level, and (2) the varied national and institutional adaptation to these instruments. The panel opened with the presentation by Natalia Leskina on several overlapping initiatives in the post-Soviet countries aiming at establishing the Eurasian Higher Education Area and how European integration initiatives (specifically the Bologna Process) have been used as a model by the post-Soviet countries. Simona Torotcoi took the domestic side of differentiated integration as her point of departure and explored compliance and implementation of recommendations concerning two Bologna Process aspects – quality and social dimension – in Portugal and Romania. This was followed by Tim Seidenschnur and Jens Jungblut who identified four distinct narratives – concerns, hopes, beliefs and silent opportunism – that permeate German higher education perspectives on what the consequences of Brexit might be for, among others, student mobility (and in particular mobility of students preparing to be language teachers) and research cooperation. Brexit was also the topic of the paper by Amelia Veiga, who juxtaposed the reflections of academics from 10 European countries (Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Republic of Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Switzerland, United Kingdom) concerning Brexit with the European Commission’s scenarios for 2025. Finally, Mari Elken and Martina Vukasovic discussed the European side of differentiated integration in higher education, in particular the implications of the existence of several overlapping policy arenas at the European level, how EU initiatives get diluted over time (shifting from big political aims to rather technocratic considerations) and what is the role of regional level integration (e.g. within the Nordic region) in the overall process of European integration.

 

The second panel went beyond Europe and explored issues of global knowledge governance. Meng-Hsuan Chou focused on recruitment of academics globally, specifically analysing, on the one hand, the policies and incentives developed in Singapore to attract more academics and, on the other hand, the rationales and motivations of academics themselves to choose Singapore as their academic home. Tero Erkkilä discussed the ideational linkages between the rise of numerical governance (i.e. governance by global indicators) and knowledge based competitiveness, stressing the role international organizations have in promoting these policy scripts. Janja Komljenovic presented her paper (co-authored by Eva Hartmann) on the role of global private actors in governing higher education, with a specific focus on graduate employability and skills and what are the actual practices and measures used by higher education institutions to mediate the transition of students into employment. These global private actors were also discussed by Miguel Antonio Lim, who highlighted how companies and individuals involved in the business of university ranking build their expertise and legitimate themselves and their products to a global audience, specifically positioning themselves as weak experts.

 

The next panel was dedicated to neo-institutional approaches to analysis of higher education, research and innovation. Jens Jungblut explored the diffusion of innovations from universities to pharmaceutical industry and hospitals and translation challenges that exist both between sectors characterized by different institutional logics as well as between different countries. Georg Krücken and Tim Seidenschnur presented their analysis of why management consultancy projects in universities are not particularly successful, in particular the role of different actors and communities within universities in ascribing or denying legitimacy to management consultants. Emma Sabzalieva presented her review of the concept of major institutional change in higher education, utilizing both the more generic literature on the topic and the higher education specific insights, and exploring the extent to which these perspectives can be utilized beyond its original Western context, e.g. in relation to the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and implications this had for higher education systems and institutions. Alexander Mitterle focused on whether and how neo-institutional approaches can be used not only to study similarity, but also stratification in higher education, specifically contrasting several approaches to field theory, in particular how Bourdieu’s and Fligsten/McAdams’ concepts of fields can be enriched by a more phenomenological perspective to actorhood.

 

The fourth panel focused on a major intersection of science and politics – distribution of funding for research and innovation and is a follow up to a previous panel on research executive agencies in Oslo. Four papers were presented. Stefan Skupien discussed choices and tensions concerning asymmetrical research collaborations, such as the one concerning European cooperation (supported by both public and private partners) with African partners in the field of renewable energies. Thomas Palfinger and Peter Biegelbauer compared 12 innovation agencies operating in Europe and their 18 programmes, specifically discussing legitimacy of their funding decisions in relation to how evaluators are selected, what is their role, what project selection criteria they use, how are projects ranked and what are the decision-making procedures. Emina Veletanlic and Creso Sá focused on the Canadian largest research-funding agency (The Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council) and how the shifts away from support for basic research and towards targeted programmes affects basic research in these fields. Thomas König and Sarah Glück concluded the panel with an exploration of agencification of EU research policy, specifically what is the relationship between European executive agencies and (1) the European Commission, (2) other EU institutions and (3) national administrative agencies and ministries involved in research and innovation.

 

Nicolas Rüffin presenting at the panel on Politics of Big Science and research infrastructures. Photo credits: Mari Elken

The fifth panel continued the focus on research, namely the politics of Big Science and research infrastructures. It was organised by recently launched Big Science and Research Infrastructures Network that brings together researchers and practitioners interested in large-scale research facilities and international scientific collaboration. Nicolas Rüffin presented his research on unanimity in decision-making at two large intergovernmental science organizations – CERN and European Space Agency. Isabel Bolliger in turn compared research infrastructure policies in Switzerland and Sweden demonstrating differences in development of their national research infrastructure roadmaps. Finally, Inga Ulnicane discussed political and scientific changes in research infrastructures highlighting that in addition to ‘good old’ intergovernmental large-scale facilities such as CERN new types of digital platform infrastructures are emerging according to differentiated integration approach that involves a number of EU member states as well as associated countries.

 

The final panel highlighted the normative power of Europe in shaping higher education and science policy environments, as well as the complex relationships between instruments and institutions in higher education, research and innovation. Que Anh Dang addressed theoretical and empirical challenges in using the ‘normative power’ approach for analysing developments in Asia. Specifically, she addressed the roles EU and China played, in particular the differences between a rather high-level promotion of European approaches and the people-to-people exchange policy within China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Claudia Acciai compared developments in innovation policy in France and Italy, primarily addressing the heterogeneity of actors and the implications this has for choice of policy instruments and the overall policy design. Elizabeth Balbachevsky highlighted the nested character of science as an institution, the implications this has for the institutional resilience of the University and what are the similarities and differences in how University of Sao Paulo in Brazil and University of Tampere in Finland responded to environmental expectations.

 

Standing Group meeting. Photo credits: Mari Elken

Apart from lively discussions within panels, the Standing Group also had its annual meeting focused on planning future activities, including ECPR 2019, which will take place in Wroclaw. The meeting was also marked by the Award for Excellent Paper from an Emerging Scholar to Olivier Provini for his paper “Transnational circulations of university reforms: the policy-making of the LMD in Burundi”. ECPR 2018 was another successful year for our Standing Group, gathering researchers currently based on three continents (Asia, Europe and North America). See you at the next ECPR General Conference in Wroclaw in September 2019!

 

The post ECPR 2018 – Politics of higher education, research and innovation appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Last week, the pound briefly jumped 1% against the US dollar when the EU’s Chief Negotiator, Michel Barnier said, “We are prepared to offer Britain a partnership such as there never has been with any other third country”.

His comments boosted hopes that a Brexit deal can be struck after all – maybe even along the lines of Theresa May’s beleaguered Chequers plan.

Under that plan, the UK would benefit from a kind of cherry-picked, quasi-access to the EU’s Single Market for our traders in agricultural and industrial goods only, along with a friction-free customs border.

But the reality soon dawned when Mr Barnier gave more details in an interview with the German radio station Deutschlandfunk. He told the station:

“We have been willing to form a strong relationship from the beginning.

“Twenty-seven heads of state and government, including Angela Merkel and the French president and other heads of state, have proposed a unique partnership with the United Kingdom.”

The new arrangement between the EU and the UK could be unprecedented, he said, in that it went further than just an agreement on tariff-free trade.

The new arrangement could also take in areas from “aviation to university and research cooperation, to internal and external security and foreign policy”.

And then came Barnier’s big BUT:

“It cannot be built to the detriment of who we are. The internal market, the home market, is indeed our most important asset…

“We respect all the red lines of the United Kingdom. They do not want to abide by the rules of the court of justice, they do not want to follow our legal framework, they do not want to pay, they do not want freedom of movement.

“All of these are the cornerstones of the single market and the EU.

“So we have to preserve and protect what makes us.”

This should come as no surprise. At the beginning of August, Mr Barnier already explained at a press conference that Theresa May’s proposals for a new customs arrangement and trade in goods represented a threat to the integrity of the EU.

Essentially, Mr Barnier forensically tore apart the Prime Minister’s white paper into little pieces – and in doing that, he has the solid and unanimous backing of all the other EU27 countries (of course he does: he was appointed by them and works for them).

So where does that leave Mrs May’s Chequer’s proposal?

It’s ‘dead’, wrote Daniel Boffey in The Guardian, their Brussels bureau chief. ‘The zombie white paper just doesn’t know it yet,’ he added.

There are others who don’t know it yet, most especially Theresa May herself. Writing for today’s Sunday Telegraph, she insisted that she will, “not be pushed into accepting compromises on the Chequers proposals..”  The Telegraph ran the headline:

‘Theresa May declares she won’t surrender to Brussels over Chequers plan’ 

That approach was reflected last week in a speech in France by David Lidington, Theresa May’s ‘de facto’ deputy Prime Minister, who warned EU leaders to accept the Chequers plan, or face the UK leaving the EU without any deal.

The Guardian ran the headline:

‘No-deal Brexit is only alternative to Chequers plan, says Lidington’

Reported The Independent: ‘His speech marked part of a concerted effort by the UK government to persuade EU member states to back the Chequers plan despite opposition from officials in Brussels.’

During the summer, the Prime Minister sent her cabinet ministers across the EU to sell her Chequers Brexit plan, but it really was to no avail.

What our government – and many Brexiters – simply don’t get, or don’t want to get, is that it’s pointless going around the backs of the EU Commission officials to try and do a side-deal with the heads of EU states.

That’s because the Commission is the servant of the EU, not its master. Their masters are the EU27 (along with the European Parliament) – so whatever the stance of Michel Barnier, it’s what the EU27 have instructed.

This was confirmed earlier last week by French President, Emmanuel Macron, when he gave a speech to a gathering of French ambassadors from around the world. Mr Macron told the diplomats:

“Brexit is a sovereign choice which must be respected, but it is a choice which cannot be made at the expense of the European Union’s integrity.

“It is what the British people have chosen for themselves, not for others, and France would like to maintain a strong, special relationship with London, but not at the cost of the European Union breaking up.”

He added:

“…we have to defend the integrity of our values, of our foundations and of the European Union.”

(All accurate, except for two key points:

Brexit is NOT the ‘sovereign choice’ of the UK – our Parliament in Westminster has never actually debated, or voted, on the specific question of whether the country should leave the EU.

 Brexit is NOT “what the British people have chosen for themselves”. Most voters in the UK did not vote for Brexit – only a minority of voters chose ‘Brexit’ for Britain).

So, here’s the bottom line (which I have written many times before, and post it here again, because nothing, absolutely nothing, has changed):

Last May in Parliament, Theresa May, summed up her promises for Brexit: “no hard border on the island of Ireland” and “as frictionless trade as possible with the European Union”.

Of course, we already have that now. And of course, this cannot be delivered after Brexit.

The Brexit promised by Theresa May and her government – to offer the same benefits of EU membership as an ex-member – is impossible to deliver

The EU27 are not going to allow an ex-member to have the same or better benefits as themselves (something that Theresa May actually said before the referendum).

Their Union, their Single Market, their customs union, that took decades to create, is more important to them than it is to us. And that’s something many people in Britain, especially Brexiters, simply don’t understand.

The only countries that enjoy frictionless trade with the EU are those countries that are EU members, or part of the EU Single Market, or in its customs union.

The EU has already stated from the start that the UK cannot cherry pick.

If the EU allowed the UK frictionless access to its market, without being subject to all the EU rules and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (all red lines of the government), it would unravel the entire raison d’être of the European Union, and put at risk all its existing agreements with other ‘third countries’.

It’s not going to happen.

Of course, the UK could have a free trade agreement with the EU similar to the ones it signed recently with Canada and Japan. The EU has already offered us that.

But those agreements don’t include frictionless access to the EU’s cherished Single Market, and those agreements don’t cover all the goods that go between the UK and the EU, and they don’t cover services, or free movement of people.

All vital to tens of thousands of British businesses and hundreds of thousands of British jobs.

It begs the question as to why we are leaving, as clearly we already have the best deal now, as a full member of the EU.

So, let’s repeat it, and shout it loudly. EU membership is best.

It’s not too late for Britain to agree to a democratic U-turn on Brexit. All we need is a #PeoplesVote.

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The post Michel Barnier’s big BUT appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Es ist 6 Uhr morgens in Boston. Ich bin seit über einer Stunde wach. Jetlag. Zeit, um eine Replik auf “Das Ende der Geduld” von Dr. Hannah Bethke – selbst Politikwissenschaftlerin – in der FAZ zu schreiben. Eine Replik mit Blick auf unser Fach und die Natur von wissenschaftlichen Großkonferenzen wie die ECPR.

Ich bin in Boston auf dem Jahrestreffen der American Political Science Association (APSA). Getagt wird, nicht wie bei der ECPR-Konferenz, die in dem Beitrag kritisiert wird, in Universitäten in ganz Europa, in den gleichen Räumen wo auch Studierende tagtäglich lernen und wo Kolleginnen und Kollegen normalerweise lehren. Getagt wird hier stattdessen in einem überdimensionierten Tagungszentrum zwischen zwei Konferenzhotels. Aber das weiß man, bevor man hierher kommt.

Ähnlich ist es mit der ECPR-Konferenz, wie sie gerade in Hamburg stattgefunden hat. Man weiß, was man bekommt, bevor man hinfährt, außer man fährt zum ersten Mal hin. Man kann trotzdem, wie Hannah Bethke, das Format und die Größe und den Rhythmus der Konferenz kritisieren. 10-Minuten-Vorträge zu spezifischen Forschungsthemen, zum Teil fünf an der Zahl, dazu eine Diskussion durch eine Fachkollegin, und dann noch ein kurzes Q&A, alles in knapp über 1 1/2 Stunden, sind eine Zumutung.

Sie sind aber auch eine Chance. Die Chance, nicht nur ein Duzend Kolleginnen und Kollegen zu treffen wie auf einem klassischen Workshop, versteckt in den kleinen Nischen unserer Forschungsfelder. Hier trifft sich das weitere Forschungsfeld und die Profession. Auf Empfängen lernt man neue Kolleg*innen kennen, oder trifft diejenigen, mit denen man an anderer Stelle mal gearbeitet hat und wo sich die Wege in den verwobenen akademischen Karrieren verlaufen haben.

Eine Großkonferenz ist dabei von ihrer Natur her auf den ersten Blick wie das Fastfood in der Shopping-Mall des Wissenschaftsbetriebs.

Genauso, wie ich manchmal einen vegetarischen Döner zu mir nehme, höre ich mir da auch gerne Vorträge in Forschungsfeldern an, in denen ich vielleicht nur lehre aber nicht forsche. Als Ideen-Happen für zwischendurch. Aber auch um mir über neue Methoden Gedanken zu machen, denn Innovation lebt davon, dass man über den eigenen Tellerrand guckt. Dann sind die Happen weniger Fastfood als die Gänge in einem Gourmet-Restaurant, wo ich auch nicht verstehe, wie der Koch das macht und ich trotzdem das Ergebnis mit einem Bissen genießen kann.

Aber die ECPR-Konferenz ist auch nicht das einzige Format, in dem wir Wissen austauschen. Allein bei der ECPR gibt es das Konzept der “Joint Sessions“, eine jährliche Multi-Workshop-Konferenz, in der man bis zu einer Stunde Zeit pro Forschungspapier hat. Dazu zig Spezialist*innen-Workshops. Aber selbst auch ohne diese Alternativen und ohne die Fastfood-Metapher ist der Blick von Bethke auf die ECPR zu eng.

Gleiches gilt für die Kritik, unser Fach wolle nur “quantitativ orientierte Sozial-, nicht ideengeschichtlich fundierte Geisteswissenschaft sein.”

In unserer Sektion “21st Century International Bureaucracy” mit acht Panels, die an zwei der drei Tagen der ECPR-Konferenz stattfanden, gab es quantitative Studien genauso wie ethnographische Forschung; es wird auf die Ideen von Max Weber genauso verwiesen wie auf Modelle, die hier in den USA als “formal theory” bezeichnet werden; es gab extrem kurze Vorträge von unbekannten Kolleg*innen, die nur kurz da waren, aber auch detaillierte Nachgespräche mit Kolleg*innen, mit denen man seit Jahren zusammenarbeitet, lose oder eng, in Deutschland, Europa und darüber hinaus.

Das ist keine “kalte Wissenschaft ohne Herz – und manchmal auch ohne Verstand” wie Bethke schreibt.

Es ist liebevolle Politikwissenschaft zwischen ehrlicher und konstruktiver Kritik, auf der Suche nach Lösungen für schwierige Forschungsfragen, mit Zeitknappheit ringend, aber das beste daraus machend. Wir schreiben uns nach der Konferenz Emails und bedanken uns für gute Kritik, machen Pläne für neue Forschung und freuen uns auf das Wiedersehen.

Das hat nichts mit Methoden zu tun, die warm oder kalt sind, es hat etwas mit einem modernen Wissenschaftsverständnis zu tun, wo die meisten von uns wissen, dass bei allem Wettbewerb wir nur arbeitsteilig Wissen sammeln können – da ist die Politikwissenschaft nicht anders als die Physik oder die Linguistik oder die Humanbiologie.

In unserer Sektion zu internationalen Verwaltungen – wie in vielen anderen Sektionen auch – zeigt sich dabei über alle Panels hinweg die Vielfalt der modernen Politikwissenschaft, die sich nicht in ein Korsett von “Quanti“ oder “Quali”, und in alte Debatten zwischen “Ideengeschichte ohne Methode” oder “ideenlosem Methodenfetischismus” drängen lässt.

Klar gibt es Grabenkämpfe und Wagenburgen, Begriffsstreitigkeiten und Methoden-Kleinklein. Einzelne Vorträge sind besser als andere. Manche sind innovativer, kreativer, eingängiger, andere sind es nicht.

Aber selbst hier, auf einer amerikanischen Großkonferenz, wo die quantitative Politikwissenschaft noch mehr Gewicht hat als in Europa, könnte ich vier Tage lang nur auf ideengeschichtliche oder stärker geisteswissenschaftlich orientierte Panels gehen und gibt es Panels, wo ein quantitativer Survey mit syrischen Flüchtlingen im Libanon genauso in 12 Minuten präsentiert wird wie handgezeichnete ethnographische Karten von Post-Konflikt-Gemeinden in Burundi.

Das einzige Lob für die ECPR-Konferenz in Hamburg, das Bethke einfällt, richtet sich ausgerechnet auf den Plenar-Vortrag von Rainer Forst. Forst stelle “im einzig langen Vortrag der Konferenz die alte Frage neu, wie die Politikwissenschaft die Kluft zwischen ihrem normativen und ihrem empirischen Selbstverständnis überwinden kann“.

In diesem Vortrag zitierte Forst über 45 Minuten nur tote weiße Männer aus Europa und Amerika, knapp 15 an der Zahl. Keine einzige Frau wurde erwähnt, keine Idee ausgeführt, die die vielfältigen Erkenntnisse und Perspektiven der modernen empirischen und normativen Politikwissenschaft aufnahm, deren Erkenntnisse es über Weber und Foucault hinaus geschafft haben. Kein signifikanter Verweis auf Ideen von außerhalb des Westens.

Wer sich nach Alte-Weiße-Männer-Ideengeschichte sehnt, ist aus meiner Sicht in der modernen Politikwissenschaft noch nicht angekommen.

Meine Politikwissenschaft ist vielfältiger, mit tollen Kolleg*innen, die zwischen intersektionalem Feminismus und quantitativen Großstudien zu Krieg und Gewalt gegen Frauen keine Barriere sehen. Ich sehe Kolleg*innen, die sich für ein halbes Jahr in eine eine internationale Organisation begeben, um den Zynismus der dortigen Mitarbeiter zu erleben, während andere Kolleg*innen mit statistischen Daten zu verstehen versuchen, wie postkoloniale Machtverschiebungen in den Vereinten Nationen passieren oder warum an mancher Stelle immer noch das Verhältnis von Globalem Süden und Globalem Norden aufrecht erhalten wird. Andernorts wird die (Ideen-)Geschichte populistischer Politik genauso analysiert wie der Wahlerfolg rechtspopulistischer Parteien.

Das heißt nicht, dass Politikwissenschaft in 2018 keine Probleme hat. Dass es nicht hunderte Baustellen gibt, an denen wir tagtäglich arbeiten sollten. Dass es keine Verteilungskonflikte oder keine seltsamen Moden oder keine schlechten Arbeiten gäbe.

Aber Politikwissenschaft ist eben auch nicht das, was man auf 1-2 Tagen ECPR-Konferenz bekommt, schon gar nicht, wenn man nicht sieht, dass ein 10-Minuten-Vortrag einer jungen, innovativen Kollegin – mit einem prekären Vertrag – mehr Gehalt und Veränderungspotenzial haben kann als 45 Minuten philosophisches Namedropping von einem Professor, der das Privileg des Plenarvortrags nicht für Veränderung sondern nur zur Reproduktion der bestehenden Verhältnisse nutzt.

Und noch eine letzte Anmerkung: Etwas kulturpessimistisch wird im Beitrag von Hannah Bethke der Blick auf das Smartphone oder den Laptop während der ECPR-Vorträge  kritisiert. Den Beitrag “Zum Ende der Geduld” habe ich auf Facebook gefunden, geteilt durch eine Kollegin aus München. Gelesen hab ich ihn während der Konferenz hier in Boston. Auch Wissenschaftskommunikation findet in 2018 nicht nur physisch im Raum sondern auch digital statt. Deswegen teile ich diesen Blogpost jetzt auch auf Twitter und hoffe auf viel Kritik. Oder Ignoranz.

Es ist jetzt 7:30 Uhr in Boston. Um 8 Uhr beginnt der zweite von vier Konferenztagen der APSA-Konferenz. Ich freue mich drauf. Genauso wie auf den DVPW-Kongress Ende September in Frankfurt.

NB: Die aktuelle Fassung ist im Vergleich zur ersten Version um einige Rechtschreib- und Grammatikfehler ärmer.

The post Replik auf “Das Ende der Geduld” (FAZ): Ein anderer Blick auf die ECPR-Konferenz und moderne Politikwissenschaft appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Publication resulting from the UACES 2018 Graduate Research Conference

Russia and the European Union (EU) emerged as twin products of the end of history, writes Daniel Matthews-Ferrero. Arguing that the return of history is exemplified in both domestic politics (through the decomposition of liberal democracy, best expressed through the rise of populism) and in international relations (increasing multipolarity, best expressed through the Ukraine Crisis with Russia), he analyses the latter case and the challenge it poses for the EU.

Geopolitical concept of the Ukraine military conflict © kirill_makarov/Adobe Stock

Russia and the EU emerged as twin products from the end of history. The EU was a product of liberalism’s global victory, while Russia was the product of the defeat of the revolutionary ideas behind the Soviet state.

With the Leninist extinction, it was supposed that liberal democracy would gradually extend across the globe, with world history on autopilot. However, this conception has suffered increasing setbacks.

There are two exemplary cases of the resulting return of history. One arises in domestic politics: through the decomposition of liberal democracy, best expressed through the rise of populism. The other arises in international relations: through creeping multipolarity, best expressed through the Ukraine Crisis.

In domestic politics, liberalism’s global victory entailed shackling democracy domestically through a withering away of politics (i.e. policy subject to popular contestation). Politics is the inevitable task of any state applying bureaucratic discretion to the distribution of scarce resources among determinate social groups.

With the victory of our global liberal path dependency, the possibility for mass publics to alter the direction of their national democracies has become increasingly remote, giving rise to political apathy and declining turnouts. Once the financial crises necessitated political opposition, the lack of institutionalised possibilities gave rise to Western populism.

The illiberal turn with the rise of Western populism represents the return of history in domestic politics. History has also marked its return in international relations, however.

Europe’s economic instability and political turmoil have accelerated the reemergence of an assertive Russia. Its transition to democracy is looked back on as a humiliating phase of kowtowing to Western interests. It has consequently asserted its national sovereignty through authoritarianism. This has resulted in a classic nation-state, contrasting with a post-modern transnational EU.

Yet, both polities have come to resemble one another in their domestic politics more than is commonly admitted. Managed democracy has taken hold in both polities through a de-politicised administration of things.

The paths followed towards this destination differ, but the end result is similar: In the EU we find democracy without sovereignty, in Russia sovereignty without democracy.

Ukraine, as the borderlands between these polities, has come to mark the external limits of the end of history.

The groundwork for Ukraine’s nation-building were laid by its dominant Russian Other under Bolshevik nationalities policy, later complimented by quasi-genocidal repression under Stalin. The contradictory results, with nation-building on the one hand and Siberian gulags on the other, represent the conflicting dual legacy Ukraine confronted when deciding its post-Soviet future.

Independent Ukraine thus faced a choice between two competing spheres of influence. The EU denies the existence of such a logic, yet even the shape of its neighbourhood policy would be arbitrary were it not for EU strategic interests. The mutual incompatibility of economic integration into Russia and the EU’s trade agreements gave the game away.

The EU’s historically oscillating treatment of Ukraine also betrays a realist logic. The EU’s “Russia first” policy sees Ukrainian EU accession efforts relegated behind Turkey’s, with this policy eventually giving way to more aggressive expansionism. Such changes would be inexplicable without a sense of the EU tactically and tacitly manoeuvring around spheres of influence.

Yet, Ukraine violated realist expectations when it chose to de-nuclearise in the early 1990s. This is because foreign policy cannot be the automatic product of some realist formula; it must be constructed as a choice, after subjectively surveying available options.

Ukraine’s internally constructed policy to de-nuclearise ultimately relegated the nation to a bystander to its own national crisis, with other great nuclear powers tussling over its territorial sovereignty in realist fashion.

Given the interpretative, constructivist basis of internal foreign policy formulations, when it comes to preventing crises, communication between great powers is vital. This is how they come to understand the likely reactions arising from different policy options.

In this context, what has been described as the EU’s “autistic disorder” becomes particularly problematic. After all, it made it possible to muddle into war.

The explanation for this troubling situation can be found in the structure of the post-Cold War unipolar world order, with the US as global hegemon. Detached from hard power considerations by the institutional division of labour with NATO and member states while nestled comfortably under the US security umbrella, it became natural to survey the surrounding international scene with a rosy tint.

If, as the EU claims, each nation has a right to choose its foreign policy alignments irrespective of great power strategic interests, why did the West not make more forceful overtures towards Ukraine when it was still a part of the USSR? The reality of Soviet power precluded it, of course.

The vacuum eventually brought about by Soviet collapse was exploited by the West and EU. The liberal theories used to justify this are only now catching up to the creeping multipolar reality. They are evidently struggling to adjust, with the end of history slamming into a brick wall with the Ukraine Crisis.

For now, the EU continues to deny basic realism and the possibility for other powers to defend strategic interests that impinge on any country’s supposed right to choose its foreign policy alignments ex nihilo. It is as if the EU’s economic magnetism were an insignificant factor compared to the attraction of its norms and values in the global extension of liberalism through an end of history logic.

By maintaining such delusions, further conflicts are only made more likely for the liberal order externally. Internally, doubling down against populism through an entrenchment of de-politicising liberal policy frameworks will only accelerate the current disintegrative spiral of liberal democracy.

In this way, the unfolding of liberalism’s own internal logic since the end of history has given rise to a domestic and an international crisis.

The survival of the EU, the intellectual product of liberal triumphalism at the end of history now depends on its ability to adjust to the realities of the return of history.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Graduate Forum, UACES or JCER.

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Shortlink for this article: http://bit.ly/2PmvO0i

Daniel Matthews-Ferrero | @MatthewsFerrero

Daniel completed a BA in European Studies at the University of Kent, UK and an MA in European Interdisciplinary Studies at the College of Europe, Poland. He is due to start a PhD at the University of Aberdeen from October, on the POLITICO programme on political concepts in the world. His primary research interest is in populism.

The post Russia, the EU and the Return of History appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

On 12-13 July 2018, forty postgraduate and early career researchers gathered at KU Leuven in Belgium to present and receive feedback on their work on contemporary Europe and the European Union.

The theme of this year’s conference was ‘An Actor on Multiple Stages: the EU as a Local, Regional and Global Power’, introduced by Kolja Raube (KU Leuven) in his keynote lecture.

When we speak about EU's legitimacy, we should focus not only on internal legitimacy (from within the EU) but also the external dimension – @raube_kolja @UACESgf #UACESgf18

— Diāna Potjomkina (@DianaPotjomkina) July 12, 2018

"The EU is not just an organisation but a community… and we need to explain why this community matters." says @raube_kolja in his #UACESgf18 keynote.

— Anna Wambach (@AnnaWambach) July 12, 2018

Five research sessions took place over the next two days, with presentations by delegates from a range of countries and disciplines in the social sciences and humanities. They examined the different stages on which the EU is present, and how these are reflected in the challenges it is facing: e.g. Brexit, Russia’s awakening, the future of the eurozone.

The final plenary session, chaired by UACES Graduate Forum Committee member Kamila Feddek, featured Nisida Gjoksi European Commission and academic and Katja Biedenkopf (KU Leuven). Their fascinating discourses were focused on the power of the European Union and its challenges in specific areas.

Katja Biedenkopf discussed EU external governance and diplomacy in the fields of environmental protection and climate change, global environmental and climate governance, while Nisida Gjoksi delivered a presentation on the EU’s enlargement policy and the role that the European Commission plays in this area, and also, on the policy towards the Western Balkans and the specificity of this enlargement wave. Nisida Gjoski emphasised the EU’s significant power towards this region which somehow contrast the view that the EU is losing power and Katja Biedenkopf focused on the historical evolution of EU climate leadership and presented four scenarios for its future based on her recent published research.

Nisida Gjoski

Both presenters initiated thought-provoking debate and they answered several questions related to constantly changing and complex role that the European Union currently plays on local, regional and global stage.

The conference was co-funded by the Erasmus+ programme of the European Union. Thank you to all the speakers, the Graduate Forum Committee and past committee member Thibaud Deruelle, our hosts Kolja Raube and Daan Fonck, and to the staff members at KU Leuven who chaired the research sessions.

• View Twitter Story 
• View Flickr photos
• View Facebook photos

The programme and papers are available here.

Over the next few months, we’ll be publishing blog posts on Crossroads Europe, videos and podcasts arising from the conference. Follow and like @UACESgf to stay notified.

Blog posts:

• ‘Russia, the EU and the Return of History‘ – Daniel Matthew-Ferrero

Very happy to be attending this year's UACES graduate conference, which kicked off with an inspiring keynote by @raube_kolja, followed by an even more inspiring discussion. Exiting times are ahead of us as a future generation of EU studies scholars! #UACESgf18 https://t.co/Cw9lLBCkUj

— Vladimir Bogoeski (@bogoeskiv) July 12, 2018

A pleasure to chair a panel and lively debate on #Euroscepticism and #EUpoliticalparties at #UACESgf18 @UACESgf https://t.co/cQxu6rvAXQ

— Alex Andrione-Moylan (@AndrioneMoylanA) July 12, 2018

Hello from our Chair @AnnaWambach during the 1st day of #UACESgf18!

Learn more about our #PhD & #ECR #europeanstudies conference and view the programme at: https://t.co/us7exFmL77 pic.twitter.com/AHEWmJOFeJ

— UACES Graduate Forum (@UACESgf) July 12, 2018

 

Report by Kamila Feddek and Helena Cicmil

To take advantage of future UACES events and opportunities:

• Become a UACES Student Member
• Join us for the 2018 Doctoral Training Academy
• Follow @uacesgf on Twitter and on Facebook
• Join the EuroResearch mailing list

The post UACES Graduate Forum Conference 2018 | KU Leuven appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The new reform of EU drone regulation is likely in order to establish a precise common framework for drone operations, at least in the civil field, taking into account both the Riga Declaration on Remotely Piloted Air Systems: Framing the future of aviation, of 6 March 2015[1], and the Resolution of the European Parliament on the safe use of remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS), commonly known as UAVs, in the field of civil aviation (2014/2243(INI)) (October 20, 2015) that followed (hereinafter, REP of 20 October 2015)[2] as well as the proposal by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) to establish common rules for drone operation in Europe from September, 2015[3], developed and materialized in a recent Proposed Amendment (NPA) first published in 2017[4] and after that adopted as Regulation (EU) 2018/1139  which will entry into force on 11 September 2018[5].

While Regulation 216/2008 refers to aircraft and drones within this group in a general way, it also therefore does so for unmanned aircraft regardless of whether they are remotely controlled or not (automated aircraft that include a flight program), the REP of October 20, 2015 refers specifically to RPAs, that is, to remotely controlled drones. Moreover, this REP differentiates between two different categories of RPAs according to their nature, which should then be subject to different requirements within the EU regulatory framework: those for professional use and those for recreational use.

In addition, the REP of 20 October 2015 is clear in its anticipation of the need to “develop a clear, harmonized and proportionate European and global regulatory framework”, removing the 150 kg threshold, and “replacing it with a regulatory framework for the EU that is coherent and comprehensive”, on the basis “of a risk assessment that avoids the imposition of disproportionate regulations for companies, which are likely to undermine investment and innovation in the RPAs sector, while at the same time providing appropriate protection for citizens and helping to create sustainable and innovative jobs” (statements 20 and 21).

This is the main of the new EU common rules (Regulation (EU) 2018/1139)  which include drones within the scope of more ambitious general civil aviation regulation in the European Union which principal aim is “to establish and maintain a high uniform level of civil aviation safety in the Union” (article 1(1) Regulation (EU) 2018/1139) and the “Single European Sky airspace” (article 40) which is based on a risk-based approach and the principle of proportionality (statement 27), and therefore attending “to the nature and risks associated with the different types of aircraft, operations and activities” (statement 12).

It is important to note that the New common rules include “unmanned aircrafts”, i.e. drones, not only RPA, meaning “any aircraft operating or designed to operate autonomously or to be piloted remotely without a pilot on board” (article 3(30) Regulation (EU) 2018/1139). There are doubts regarding the application of the new regulation for drones used indoors, in fact De Molina suggests that the EU regulation is based on the Single European Sky airspace and therefore “still only applies to outdoor drones” and therefore the solution is ethics (de Molina et all, 2018)[6].

The specific regulation for drone technology is in the Section VII of the Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 “Unmanned Aircraft”, articles 55 to 58, based on a certification system to be implemented by the Commission.

Of course at national or local level, the possibility of domestic regulation is determined by European regulation (Sarrión Esteve, Benlloch Domènech, 2017: 123) and the new EU common rules although being a general regulation leaves EU member States the competence for regulate drone carrying out military, customs, police, search and rescue, firefighting, border control and coastguard or similar activities and services undertaken in the public interest by or on behalf public authorities and the personnel and organisations involved in these activities (article 2(3a) Regulation (EU) 2018/1139). Nevertheless, Member states can consider – due to safety, interoperability or efficiency gains grounds- preferable to apply instead of their national law the EU regulation (statement 18 and article 2(6) Regulation (EU) 2018/1139)[7].

But although the EU regulation is also open to a degree of flexibility “taking into account various local characteristics within individual Member States, such as population density” (statement 27 new EU common rules) it not allows EU Member States to except the application of the regulation to the design, production, maintenance and operation activities of unmanned aircrafts (article 2(8) Regulation (EU) 2018/1139)[8].

Nevertheless, the new EU common rules stipulate that EU Member States have the possibility to “lay down national rules to make subject to certain conditions the operations of unmanned aircraft for reasons falling outside the scope of this Regulation, including public security or protection of privacy and personal data in accordance with the Union Law” (article 56(8) Regulation (EU) 2018/1139).

Therefore, National Legislation can introduce more requirements for drone operations under public security or fundamental rights protection issues in accordance with the EU law[9].

Acknowledgements. This post has been developed thanks to the Independent Thinking UNED Research  project Actual challenges for the regulation of the civil use of drones (DroneLawChallenges).

I will present my paper Actual Challenges for fundamental rights protection in the use of drone technology” in the upcoming UACES Annual Conference, Bath, at the Panel 408: UACES Research Network: Advances in Unmanned-Vehicle Research in a European Security Context  

More about dronelawchallenges:

De Miguel Molina, M., Santamarina Campos, V., Carabal-Montagud, M.A., De Miguel Molina, B. (2018). Ethics for civil indoor drones: a qualitative analysis, International Journal of Micro Air Vehicles, 2018. Available at: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1756829318794004

Sarrión Esteve, J. (2014). Actual Trends and Challenges of the Constitutional Fundamental Rights and Principles in the ECJ Case Law from the Perspective of Multilevel Constitutionalism. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2656394  or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3014376

Sarrión Esteve, J. (2017). El régimen jurídico de la utilización de los drones. Una aproximación multinivel a la legislación europea y española. Revista de la Escuela Jacobea de Postgrado, 12, 103-122.

Sarrión Esteve, J. Benlloch Domènech, C. (2017). Rights and Science in the drone era. Actual Challenges in the civil use of drone technology. Rights and Science: R&S, 0, 117-133. Available at https://rightsandscience.juri-dileyc.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2017/10/J.-Sarrio%CC%81n.-C.-Benlloch.-Rights-and-science-in-the-drone-era.pdf

Sarrión Esteve, J. (2018). Actual Challenges for Fundamental Rights Protection in the Use of Drone Technology (August 27, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3239562

[1] Riga Declaration on Remotely Piloted Air Systems: Framing the future of aviation, 6 March 2015, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/news/doc/2015-03-06-drones/2015-03-06-riga-declaration-drones.pdf (Accessed 25 August 2018)

[2]  European Parliament resolution of 29 October 2015 on the safe use of remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS), commonly known as UAVs, in the field of civil aviation (2014 / 2243 (INI)), available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-2015-0390+0+DOC+PDF+V0//ES (September 27, 2016)

[3] EASA. European Aviation Safety Agency, Proposal to establish common rules for the operation of drones, presented firstly on September 2015, available at: https://www.easa.europa.eu/download/ANPA-translations/205933_EASA_Summary%20of%20the%20ANPA_ES.pdf (Accessed 27 September 2016)

[4] EASA. European Aviation Safety Agency, Notice of Proposed Amendment 2017-5 (A) Introduction of a regulatory framework for the operation of drones, available at: https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/NPA%202017-05%20%28A%29.pdf (Accessed 25 August 2018)

[5] Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2018 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Union Aviation Safety Agency, and amending Regulations (EC) No 2111/2005, (EC) No 1008/2008, (EU) No 996/2010, (EU) No 376/2014 and Directives 2014/30/EU and 2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Regulations (EC) No 552/2004 and (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91. OJEU L 212/1 (August, 22, 2018).

[6] However, the EU new common rules introduce an open concept of unmanned aircraft and if one reads article 2 It is not so clear that it only applies to outdoors drones, it seems to me that the Regulation covers in general drones.

[7] In particular a Member State may decide to apply concrete EU rules in the activities of national competence “where it considers that, considering the characteristics of the activities, personnel and organisations in question and the purpose and content of the provisions concerned, those provisions can be effectively applied”. This decision must be notified to the Commission and the Agency with all relevant information (art. 2.6 New common rules).  It is a revocable decision.

[8] It is interesting because EU Member States may decide to exempt from the EU regulation several categories of aircrafts: aeroplanes, helicopters, sailplanes, powered sailplanes with some requirements, but not for unmanned aeroplanes, unmanned helicopters, unmanned sailplanes, unmanned powered sailplanes.  There is a general presumption of more risk in unmanned vehicles that in human drived ones.

[9] There is a map with national regulation development at DroneRules.eu, Dronerules consortium, Facilitating Access to Regulation for Light Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS), http://dronerules.eu/en/recreational/regulations [Accessed 25 August 2018], and UAV Coach Master List of Drone Laws, https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws/ [Accessed 25 August 2018].

The post The new EU drone regulation: some remarks appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

So today sees the publication of the first tranche of ‘no-deal’ preparedness notices from the British government.

I’m writing ahead of this, so maybe this’ll be out of date within a few hours, but let’s see what we can piece together so far.

The basic issue for the government is that it’s now caught on the horns of a dilemma.

On the one hand, it wants to demonstrate that ‘no-deal’ is a viable option for the UK to pursue, in order to given credibility to the ‘no deal is better than a bad deal’ line that has been poo-pooed for so long by observers. In so doing, it might be able to leverage more concessions out of the EU in the Article 50 process.

On the other, it doesn’t want to make ‘no-deal’ look too unproblematic, for the simple reason that the government recognises that it would be very substantially worse than any likely agreed deal. Detoxifying ‘no-deal’ might encourage backbench pressure to actively pursue that route.

Add in much talk about (another) resurrection of ‘project fear’, plus the negative reaction to the impact assessments finally released earlier this year, and it’s not hard to see why this element of the process has been one the government might not be particularly enthused about.

And yet, pursue it, it must.

Just as the EU has been working on its own contingency planning, it was always necessary that the British government do the same.

In purely abstract terms, it is necessary both to know what your alternative to a negotiated outcome might be and to prepare for it, just in case. That’s necessary because a negotiation is definitionally not only in your hands, but also in the hands of others: if they falter, for whatever reason, then you have to be covered.

In the case of Brexit, that fundament is very much more important for a number of reasons.

Firstly, the structure of Article 50 means that the critical decision has already been taken at the point of notification, which means that the default outcome is the UK’s exit from the EU without a deal next March: only an active decision and agreement by both sides will change that.

Secondly, the novelty of the process raised the likelihood of difficulties in negotiating.

And finally, the lived experience of Article 50 has further raised the chance of problems, with the exciting mixture of a lack of British strategic intent and a repeated willingness to lose negotiation time to domestic political battles.

As a result, not only should we expect preparation for ‘no-deal’, but we should have been more concerned if that preparation didn’t take place.

Of course, there’s preparation and there’s preparation.

Here, the track record doesn’t look so good for the government. The impact assessments were cursory and successive White Papers have been largely devoid of the level of detail required to operationalise a contingency plan.

That said, the volume of notices – some 80 in total – suggests more work has gone into this round of work. So the bigger challenge is how to handle the uncertainty of what will be what come 30 March.

This is really the weakness of going ‘no-deal’: the fundamental uncertainty about what will hold and what will give.

From the limited leaks so far, the government appears to be suggesting unilateral maintenance of pre-exit rules and regulation in many areas, plus some short-term emergency stock-piling to get through the critical first weeks. That suggests a model of emergency talks with the EU to resolve critical systems, before a much longer-term reconstruction of relations.

Put like that, it rather makes sense: don’t frighten the horses any more than they already are, while working on a fix in the background.

But this model runs in various problems. Most crucially, while it might address internal activity within the UK, it cannot fix cross-border activity, again for the reason that the EU’s actions will be in the hands of the EU, not London.

Keeping pre-exit rules in place is one thing, but it doesn’t – and can’t – mean that the EU (or anyone else) has to extend the same regime, or accept UK compliance, which would be operating on a unilateral basis.

So even before we get into businesses’ concerns about supply-chain disruption (or even the possibility of stockpiling in the first place), there’s a big question mark over the entire approach.

All of which brings us back to the dilemma.

While contingency planning is to be welcomed, it shouldn’t be taken as a mark of the British government giving up on securing a deal on the Withdrawal Agreement. The costs, and the uncertainties about the costs, of ‘no-deal’ are already generally understood in both economic and political terms, and have already pushed the UK towards a much more robust pursuit of an agreement.

Sadly, pursuits don’t always succeed, so the better we are prepared for the alternative, the better.

The post Giving up on Article 50? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

So far fears that Brexit would lead to the unravelling of the EU have proved unfounded. Nevertheless, the effect of the UK’s withdrawal on the future of European integration remains open to much debate and speculation. Whether Brexit spell boom or doom for European integration was the topic of a recently published report for the European Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs. The report’s editor, Tim Oliver, sets out some of the report’s key findings. 

Britain’s relationship with the EU and European integration has rarely been smooth. Britain’s decision to leave might, therefore, free the Union of what Sheffield University Professor Stephen George, in his 1990 book, termed ‘an awkward partner’. But note the word ‘might’. As with any Member State, the extent to which the UK has shaped European integration is difficult to accurately measure and assess. Britain might be described as ‘an awkward partner’ but that doesn’t mean it’s ‘the awkward partner’. Other Member States have also been awkward and Britain’s own contributions can often be overlooked in favour of a focus on when it has been difficult.

Nevertheless, with Britain headed towards the exit, the EU needs to assess how it will be changed by the departure of its third largest Member State. Before the UK’s referendum, views were expressed that a vote for Leave could bring about significant changes to European integration. On the one hand stood the prospect of the EU unravelling, with the UK’s vote triggering similar referendums elsewhere in the EU, perhaps even provoking the Union’s disintegration. On the other hand, there was the possibility that the UK’s withdrawal could lead to the strengthening of the Union by facilitating further integration. As of the summer of 2018, fears that the UK’s withdrawal would lead to the unravelling of the EU have proved unfounded. Nevertheless, the effect of the UK’s withdrawal on the future of European integration remains open to much debate and speculation.

To assess what the full effect might be, the European Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs commissioned a report into the topic that was released recently. ‘The Impact of the UK’s Withdrawal on EU Integration’ was edited by myself and with contributions from Catherine Barnard, Steven Peers, Matthias Matthijs, Linda Hantrais and Garvan Walshe. We approached the question by looking back at the UK’s positive and negative effects on European integration in several areas. From this, we drew up an assessment of how the UK’s withdrawal would affect future European integration. The areas chosen were the internal market, social policy, justice and home affairs, the Eurozone, and foreign, security and defence. These areas were chosen because they cover the EU’s political economy (internal market and the Eurozone), society (social policy), and Europe’s security and international standing (the area of freedom, security and justice, and foreign, security and defence cooperation). Each of these areas has seen varying degrees of integration both historically and more recently. The UK’s involvement also varies in each area, due, for instance, to its non-membership of the Eurozone contrasting with its central role in the internal market and its ambivalent role in defence and security policy.

The full report – which can be found here – was presented to the AFCO committee by Garvan Walshe at a special workshop on 11 July. The report shows that in some areas the UK has delayed or blocked European integration, making it more of an awkward partner in European integration than most other Member States have been. The UK’s opposition to European integration stems from the UK’s domestic politics, where, in contrast with the situation in other Member States, British politicians have rarely if ever pursued anything more than a transactional approach to EU membership. The UK’s departure could, therefore, be an opportunity for the remaining EU to integrate further.

However, it should not be overlooked that, often, the UK’s delaying and blocking tactics have been bypassed. One famous example is in the Eurozone, where Britain’s opposition to the Fiscal Compact led other Member States to establish the agreement outside the EU. The UK’s withdrawal is also not a short-term process; as it continues there is a risk that the UK could become a non-EU alternative that appeals to Eurosceptics in the remaining EU Member States. Furthermore, other Member States have also been awkward partners. Their awkwardness is now likely to play out in a process of differentiated integration, where some Member States integrate more quickly in some areas compared to others.

While the EU is unlikely to disintegrate because of the UK’s withdrawal, the report notes that significant systemic challenges remain, not least within the Eurozone and in facing a range of international pressures. This means the effect of Brexit on European integration will be determined by a balance between two effects. First, the UK’s success or failure outside the EU and how this is perceived within the remaining Member States. Second, the EU’s ability to overcome its systemic challenges, and so continue to demonstrate to EU citizens that, compared to other options, it can respond to their political demands and provide effective solutions to the problems they face.

This article first appeared on the Loughborough University London blog. 

The post Does Brexit spell boom or doom for European integration? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Susan Robertson

‘Making & Doing Technoscientific Futures Better’ was the title of the sixth CPERI (The Changing Political Economy of Research and Innovation) workshop that took place on the 23rd and 24th July in Lancaster (UK), just before the European Association for the Study of Science and Technology EASST 2018 conference. CPERI presents itself as ‘a unique global forum for the exploration of scholarship regarding the political economy of research and innovation (R&I), and hence at the intersection of STS [Science and Technology Studies], political economy and multiple other cognate disciplines, including geography, sociology, politics, law, education, medicine, engineering, computing & philosophy’. Previous CPERI workshops have taken place in Lancaster (2012), Toronto (2013), San Diego (2015), Liege (2016) and Boston (2017).

 

What is political economy of research and innovation or technoscience? Kean Birch defines the political economy of technoscience by ‘the ways that the economy is ethically, socially and politically organized and configured and how this shapes technoscience and is constituted by technoscience in turn’ (Birch 2013: 49; see also Tyfield et al. 2017). His proposed research agenda ‘is based on the claim that STS needs to take account of contemporary economic and financial processes and how they shape and are shaped by technoscience. This necessitates understanding how these processes might impact on science, technology and innovation, rather than turning STS gaze on the economy’ (Ibid).

 

The 2018 CPERI workshop in Lancaster brought together some 30 established and emerging researchers from around the world. Among them were those who have already attended one or more CPERI workshops as well as newcomers to this growing community. Topics discussed during these two days included technoscience and biomedical futures, responsible research and innovation, platform capitalism and its impact on universities.

Discussion chaired by Janja Komljenovic

 

Responsibility in science, technology and innovation

Discussion of responsible research and innovation futures addressed broader issues of responsibility in science, technology and innovation as well as more specific concept of ‘responsible research and innovation’ (RRI) that in the last ten years has been promoted by a number of research funders in Europe (De Saille 2015; Rip 2016). Stevie de Saille raised important questions for implementation of the RRI concept such as ‘can society really modify the direction of a research agenda, let alone say STOP once a trajectory is in motion?’ and ‘what constitutes ‘responsibility’ in a global field, and how might that change not just in place or time, but in light of other developments along the value chain?’ The workshop participants were particularly interested in her concept of ‘responsible stagnation’ that she defines as a particular configuration of change guided by restraint and living gently and where ethics matters more than growth (see also De Saille and Medvecky 2016). Inga Ulnicane applied ideas of responsibility to dual use research and technology. She argued that ‘responsible dual use’ approach becomes particularly relevant in the context of changing security and research funding landscape in the European Union (EU) where in addition to traditional support for civilian research in the Framework Programme, the EU is also allocating funding for dual use research and developing support for defence research.

 

Overall discussion of RRI touched upon the potential future of this concept considering that current discussions on EU research policy are dominated by concepts such as ‘missions’ and ‘three Os’ of Open Innovation, Open Science and Open to the World. In the long-term, concepts and framings in research and innovation policy tend to change presenting old ideas in novel ways, as it has happened with many ideas before such as ‘triple helix’ or ‘Mode II’ knowledge production (Ulnicane 2015). Recently Arie Rip has suggested that ‘RRI will disappear as a Brussels thing, not at the level of member states and organizations. It might change its acronym’ (Calvert and Rip 2018: 193).

David Tyfield

 

Platform capitalism, academic capitalism & digital knowledge capitalism

One of the main topics of the workshop was the development of platform capitalism and impact of digital platforms on universities. Janja Komljenovic analysed the case of Linkedin demonstrating how it has been strategically targeting higher education sector and building digital market place for skills (Komljenovic 2018). In her keynote ‘The University in an Age of Platform Capitalism’, Susan Robertson set out an innovative research agenda to study different kinds of platforms in the academy. Her approach to comparing platforms focused on the purposes and processes of knowledge production, for example, curating, publishing and learning. By looking at platforms as infrastructures, she asked major questions about what kind of futures are being created and do these new infrastructures create and make ‘better futures’ for whom.

 

Further changes in academic capitalism were discussed by Elena Simukovic in her presentation on politics and realities of facilitating open access and their impacts on the science system. Tereza Virtova’s talk on chronopolitics in experimental physics focused on implications of project work in contemporary academia. Mark Carrigan’s keynote discussed the institutionalisation of social media use in the higher education sector. Ismael Rafols presented his approach to help pluralising decision-making in science policy and aligning research priorities to societal needs. Luca Marelli discussed the EU General Data Protection legislation as a novel tool for biomedical research. David Tyfield argued for a new social contract for university in the times of digital knowledge capitalism. After the workshop, the Institute for Social Futures and the Centre for Higher Education Research & Evaluation hosted a public debate between Phil Mirowski and Steve Fuller. They debated if neoliberalism is a threat or an opportunity for the future of universities.

 

Debates and talks of the workshop sketched out some of the most urgent questions in contemporary political economy of research and innovation as well as many ideas for making and doing tehnoscientific futures better would it be by moving to open and responsible knowledge platforms or to new social contract for research and innovation.

 

References:

Birch, K. (2013) The political economy of technoscience: An emerging research agenda’ Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science 7(1):49-61.

Calvert, J. and A.Rip (2018) “Things Can Be Done Here That Cannot So Easily Be Done Elsewhere”. Jane Calvert Talks with Arie Rip. Engaging Science, Technology, and Society 4: 183-201.

De Saille, S. (2015) Innovating innovation policy: the emergence of ‘Responsible Research and Innovation’. Journal of Responsible Innovation 2(2): 152-168.

De Saille, S. and F.Medvecky (2016) Innovation for a steady state: a case for responsible stagnation. Economy and Society 45(1): 1-23.

Komljenovic, J. (2018) Linkedin, platforming labour, and the new employability mandate for universities. Globalisation, Societies and Education. Published online 2 August 2018.

Rip, A. (2015) The clothes of the emperor. An essay on RRI in and around Brussels. Journal of Responsible Innovation 3(3): 290-304.

Tyfield, D., R.Lave, S.Randalls and C.Thorpe (eds) (2017) The Routledge Handbook of the Political Economy of Science. Oxon: Routledge.

Ulnicane, I. (2015) Broadening Aims and Building Support in Science, Technology and Innovation Policy: The Case of the European Research Area. Journal of Contemporary European Research 11(1): 31-49.

The post Making and Doing Technoscientific Futures Better appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Last May in Parliament, Prime Minister, Theresa May, summed up her promises for Brexit in just 15-seconds: no hard border on the island of Ireland, and as frictionless trade as possible with the rest of the EU.

Of course, we already have that now. And of course, this cannot be delivered after Brexit.

The Brexit promised by the government – to offer the same benefits of EU membership as an ex-member – is impossible to deliver

The former Brexit Secretary, David Davis, promised a trade and customs agreement with the EU “that will deliver the exact same benefits as we have.” Of course, he could not deliver that. That’s probably why he walked away.

Prime Minister, Theresa May, also said that Brexit can have “the same benefits” as we have now for free trade with the EU. It’s pie in the sky.

Also promised by the government:

• an agreement with the EU that’s fully negotiated by March next year;
• no payment for access to the EU market;
• a complete end to EU rules and regulations;
• converting around 40 EU trade agreements with 65 countries into UK bespoke deals “one second after midnight” on 30 March 2019.

Promises, promises, promises.

And the truth? These promises cannot be delivered. Brexit cannot work.

Last month, Jacob Rees-Mogg, indicated that it could take 50 years before the benefits of Brexit were fully realised.

He told Channel Four news:

“We won’t know the full economic consequences for a very long time, we really won’t.”

He added:

“The overwhelming opportunity for Brexit is over the next 50 years.”

50 years? Is he having a laugh?

Many people reading this will be dead and buried before then. We should instead bury Brexit. It’s dead. It cannot be revived, because it was never a viable living entity in the first place.

Because it’s now obvious that Brexit cannot work and cannot be delivered, Brexiters are starting to blame the EU for its obvious and impending failure.

• It’s the EU’s fault that Britain cannot keep membership benefits as an ex-member!
• How dare the EU turn Britain away, such an important country!
• We saved Europe from two world wars, don’t you know!
• We used to have an Empire that ruled half the world, don’t you know!
• For goodness sake, we even invented eggs and bacon for breakfast!
• The rest of Europe clearly needs us more than we need them, with their stupid rolls and jam for breakfast!
• You wait, you just wait, at the last minute the EU will cut us a deal, they will give Theresa May everything she wants, because it would be cutting off their noses not to.

But the EU won’t.

Their Union, their Single Market, their customs union, that took decades to create, is more important to them than it is to us. And that’s something many people in Britain, especially Brexiters, simply don’t understand.

The only countries that enjoy frictionless trade with the EU are those countries that are part of the EU Single Market or in its customs union.

The EU has already stated from the start that the UK cannot cherry pick.

If the EU allowed the UK frictionless access to its market, without being subject to all the EU rules and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (all red lines of the government), it would unravel the entire ‘raison d’être’ of the European Union, and put at risk all its existing agreements with other ‘third countries’.

It’s not going to happen.

Of course, the UK could have a free trade agreement with the EU similar to the ones signed recently with Canada and Japan. But those agreements don’t include frictionless access to the EU, and those agreements don’t cover all the goods that go between the UK and the EU, and they don’t cover services or free movement of people.

It begs the question as to why we are leaving, as clearly we have the best deal now, as a full member of the EU.

That is just one of many reasons why Reasons2Remain is campaigning for a democratic reversal of Brexit.

Last month, Prime Minister, Theresa May, told the House of Commons Liaison Committee that the UK could have frictionless borders with the EU, without being in the Single Market or the EU customs union.

SNP MP, Angus MacNeil, told the Prime Minister that her plans were “pie in the sky”.

Not only is he right, but Theresa May knows her Brexit plans are pie in the sky.

Before the referendum, Mrs May said clearly and persuasively:

“It is not clear why other EU member states would give Britain a better deal than they themselves enjoy.”

Yet that’s exactly what Mrs May now wants. She says she aims to achieve a new trade agreement with the EU that’s unique to us, that no other country in the world has ever achieved.

Of course, it’s not going to happen. Of course, it’s not going to work.

What’s the point of a club if you are going to allow non-members to enjoy the same or better benefits as members? What club allows that?

The EU most certainly will not accept Mrs May’s pie in the sky proposals.

► So, here’s the bottom line:

• Britain needs frictionless trade with the EU.
• We need free movement of goods, services, capital and people for our country not just to survive, but to thrive.
• We need to continue with the status quo: the arrangement we have now.

  ► And yet:

• We’re leaving all the benefits of the EU, only to desperately try and get back as many of those benefits as we can after we’ve left.
  
• We are leaving for no good reason, not one.
  
• We are paying around £40 billion (money the UK has agreed we owe to the EU) to settle our debts with the EU, to enable us to have an inferior deal.
  
• We will be poorer, and with less sovereignty, fewer rights and protections, restricted trade, and diminished power after we’ve left.

What’s the point? There’s no point.

There is no pie. There is no cake. There is no Brexit dividend. There is no Brexit that can work. It’s all built on sand.

Has this sunk in yet?

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
• Follow my Stop Brexit campaign on Facebook: Reasons2Remain

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• Join and share the discussion about this article on Facebook:

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Brexit is built on sand

→ 1-minute video: Brexit is built on sand – Watch and shareWHY BREXIT WON’T WORK Last May in Parliament, Prime Minister Theresa May summed up her promises for Brexit in just 15-seconds: no hard border on the island of Ireland, and as frictionless trade as possible with the rest of the EU. Of course, we already have that now. And of course, this cannot be delivered after Brexit.The Brexit promised by the government – to offer the same benefits of EU membership as an ex-member – is impossible to deliverThe former Brexit Secretary, David Davis, promised a trade and customs agreement with the EU “that will deliver the exact same benefits as we have.” Of course, he could not deliver that. That’s probably why he walked away. Prime Minister, Theresa May, also said that Brexit can have “the same benefits” as we have now for free trade with the EU. It’s pie in the sky. Also promised by the government: an agreement with the EU that’s fully negotiated by March next year; no payment for access to the EU market; a complete end to EU rules and regulations; converting around 40 EU trade agreements with 65 countries into UK bespoke deals “one second after midnight” on 30 March 2019.Promises, promises, promises.And the truth? These promises cannot be delivered. Brexit cannot work.Last month, Jacob Rees-Mogg, indicated that it could take 50 years before the benefits of Brexit were fully realised.“We won’t know the full economic consequences for a very long time, we really won’t,” he told Channel Four news. He added, “The overwhelming opportunity for Brexit is over the next 50 years.”50 years? Is he having a laugh?Many people reading this will be dead and buried before then. We should instead bury Brexit. It’s dead. It cannot be revived, because it was never a viable living entity in the first place. Because it’s now obvious that Brexit cannot work and cannot be delivered, Brexiters are starting to blame the EU for its obvious and impending failure. • It’s the EU’s fault that Britain cannot keep membership benefits as an ex-member!• How dare the EU turn Britain away, such an important country!• We saved Europe from two world wars, don’t you know! • We used to have an Empire that ruled half the world, don’t you know! • For goodness sake, we even invented eggs and bacon for breakfast!• The rest of Europe clearly needs us more than we need them, with their stupid rolls and jam for breakfast!• You wait, you just wait, at the last minute the EU will cut us a deal, they will give Theresa May everything she wants, because it would be cutting off their noses not to. But the EU won’t. Their Union, their Single Market, their customs union, that took decades to create, is more important to them than it is to us. And that’s something many people in Britain, especially Brexiters, simply don’t understand.The only countries that enjoy frictionless trade with the EU are those countries that are part of the EU Single Market or in its customs union.The EU has already stated from the start that the UK cannot cherry pick. If the EU allowed the UK frictionless access to its market, without being subject to all the EU rules and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (all red lines of the government), it would unravel the entire ‘raison d'être’ of the European Union, and put at risk all its existing agreements with other 'third countries'. It's not going to happen.Of course, the UK could have a free trade agreement with the EU similar to the ones signed recently with Canada and Japan. But those agreements don't include frictionless access to the EU, and those agreements don't cover all the goods that go between the UK and the EU, and they don't cover services or free movement of people.It begs the question as to why we are leaving, as clearly we have the best deal now, as a full member of the EU. That is just one of many reasons why Reasons2Remain is campaigning for a democratic reversal of Brexit.Last month, Prime Minister, Theresa May, told the House of Commons Liaison Committee that the UK could have frictionless borders with the EU, without being in the Single Market or the EU customs union.SNP MP, Angus MacNeil, told the Prime Minister that her plans were "pie in the sky". Not only is he right, but Theresa May knows her Brexit plans are pie in the sky. Before the referendum, Mrs May said clearly and persuasively:“It is not clear why other EU member states would give Britain a better deal than they themselves enjoy.”Yet that’s exactly what Mrs May now wants. She says she aims to achieve a new trade agreement with the EU that’s unique to us, that no other country in the world has ever achieved.Of course, it’s not going to happen. Of course, it’s not going to work.What’s the point of a club if you are going to allow non-members to enjoy the same or better benefits as members? What club allows that?The EU most certainly will not accept Mrs May's pie in the sky proposals.► So, here’s the bottom line. Britain needs frictionless trade with the EU. We need free movement of goods, services, capital and people for our country not just to survive, but to thrive. We need to continue with the status quo: the arrangement we have now.► And yet: We’re leaving all the benefits of the EU, only to desperately try and get back as many of those benefits as we can after we’ve left. We are leaving for no good reason, not one. We are paying around £40 billion (money the UK has agreed we owe to the EU) to settle our debts with the EU, to enable us to have an inferior deal. We will be poorer, and with less sovereignty, fewer rights and protections, restricted trade, and diminished power after we’ve left.What’s the point? There’s no point.There is no pie. There is no cake. There is no Brexit dividend. There is no Brexit that can work. It’s all built on sand.Has this sunk in yet?• Article and video compilation by Jon Danzig• Please re-Tweet, and follow Reasons2Remain on Twitter:twitter.com/Reasons2Remain/status/1028734556369838080********************************************► Watch Jon Danzig's 50-minute video: 'Can Britain Stop Brexit?' Go to CanBritainStopBrexit.com********************************************• To follow and support Reasons2Remain just ‘like’ the page, and please invite all your friends to like the page. ********************************************• Please recommend and review Reasons2Remain. Here's the link: facebook.com/Reasons2Remain/reviews/********************************************• Follow Reasons2Remain on Twitter: twitter.com/reasons2remain and Instagram: instagram.com/reasons2remain/********************************************• Explore our unique Reasons2Remain gallery of over 1,000 graphics and articles: reasons2remain.co.uk********************************************• Reasons2Remain is an entirely unfunded community campaign, unaffiliated with any other group or political party, and is run entirely by volunteers. If you'd like to help, please send us a private message.********************************************• © Reasons2Remain 2018. All our articles and graphics are the copyright of Reasons2Remain. We only allow sharing using the Facebook share button. Any other use requires our advance permission in writing.#STOPBREXIT #EXITBREXIT #PEOPLESVOTE

Posted by Reasons2Remain on Sunday, 12 August 2018

The post Brexit is built on sand appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

University of Burundi. Photo from http://www.ub.edu.bi/

Olivier Provini

The main focus of the paper ‘Transnational circulations of university reforms: the policy-making of the LMD in Burundi’ is to question public policy processes in so-called “fragile” states. Indeed, my research deals with policy analysis in non-western contexts with a special focus on African case studies. Analysing public action in the majority of African contexts raises a certain number of questions given that analytical frameworks are mostly based on empirical and sectorial experiences from studies conducted in North America and Europe. Moreover, institutional and social capacities in Africa are sometimes so low that the very concepts of the state or policies could be problematic. The category of “fragile” states would question several results of the literature on policy science, especially on policy transfer studies. In “fragile” states, the policy process would be delegated to external agents, who would implement internationally manufactured and projected models into national and local policy sectors. The specific aim of my research is to discuss the relation between the dependence of international aid and the circulation of public policies. Therefore, I use the empirical example of the implementation of the European higher education model LMD (“Licence-Master-Doctorate”) at the University of Burundi in Africa.

 

What is the LMD model at the University of Burundi about?

Since 2007, the Burundian higher education sector has been involved in a reform process which is financed by the French cooperation. Through the implementation of the PARES programme (“Projet d’Appui au Renforcement de l’Enseignement Supérieur”), the Burundian government, with the assistance of the French donors, has organised a new tertiary system, which has been widely destructured through the Burundian civil war (1993-2006). The aim of the French cooperation and the Burundian government has been to implement the LMD reform throughout the whole territory including the private institutions in order to improve the recognition of the university community. The reform is structured into several steps: i) the creation of a steering group to supervise the reform; ii) an overview of the situation of the sector after the civil war; iii) and an audit of the university curricula and different classes to develop new programmes at the University of Burundi. The making of new curricula and classes for the University of Burundi is achieved by imitating the programmes offered in European universities, where most of the Burundian experts, lecturers and professors have pursued their university education. A Burundian expert explains this copy-and-paste practice:

“First, there is the task of doing literature research. Which means, for instance, at the Faculty of Law [of the University of Burundi], we use the example of the Faculty of Law of [the French University of] Nanterre. And we study the structure of the organisation of the teaching units, the included teaching elements, and after that, depending on the needs and the priorities of the country, we then see which courses we have to adjust and which one we pick. That is the way we proceed. We do not invent the wheel which is turning”[i].

 

How can policy-makers (re)negotiate the policy process in Burundi?

The making of the university curricula and classes implicates discussions on numerous technical aspects, which are widely depoliticised in Burundi. Given this technical nature of the policy, experts play a major role in the reform process which can also explain the top-down circulation of the external engineering. Nevertheless, some elements of the LMD reform aggregate critical challenges, which involve political stakeholders and issues. In the paper, I show that the transfer of the LMD model in Burundi presents an opportunity for political and academic stakeholders to reshape the system of elite formation and to reconsider the delicate balance between Hutu and Tutsi in the administration, which is one of the core questions of the higher education system in the Burundian post-conflict situation.

 

For instance, the debates on the Law on Higher Education of November 2011 question the norms regulating the appointment process within the university administration regarding the ethnic balance between Hutu and Tutsi occupying higher positions of political responsibility or in the public administration. During an interview, one of the policy makers reveals that the debates in the Burundian Parliament are essentially related to the issue of the appointments of Deans based on ethnic criteria rather than on technical aspects of the implementation of the LMD in the private and public institutions:

“The law was not well understood by the Assembly. I have to say that our Parliament is not like yours, the quality of debates is very poor [he is laughing]! […]. We could see that the tendency was rather to consider only political aspects rather than academic and scientific aspects. The debates were related, for instance, to the appointment of Deans, it was rather that: of which ethnicity and of which political party must the Deans come from?”[ii].

 

What are the impacts for the theoretical debate?

The case study of the LMD reform in Burundi reveals several insights to the theoretical debate:

– First, the empirical study of the circulation of the LMD reform highlights two contrasting results. When focussing on the technical aspects of the reform, like the establishment of the curricula offered at the University of Burundi, we observe a top-down transfer. The local administrators of the institution imitate, copy and paste the programmes offered in European universities. However, by shifting the focus on the voting process of the Law of November 2011, my paper highlights new and diverging results. The transfer of the LMD model in Burundi presents an opportunity for political and academic stakeholders to transform the system of elite formation and power-sharing between Hutu and Tutsi, which constitutes one of the core question of the higher education system in the Burundian post-conflict situation.

 

– Second, the study confirms broader results of the scientific literature on policy transfers in Western contexts about the (re)negotiation of policy models. Even in a “fragile” state, which heavily depends on the financial support of donors and international organizations, policy circulations are shaped by bargaining and compromising between international, national and local actors.

 

– Finally, we can discuss, through the theoretical framework of policy analysis, the adjectives describing and categorizing the capacities and attributes of states (as “fragile”, “failed”, “ghost”, “neopatrimonial”, “liberal” or “developing”). By using concepts of policy analysis, this paper questions the category and the nature of “fragile” states. I demonstrate to what extent policy analysis highlights the multifaceted nature of the state rather than restricting its shape to one characteristic.

 

 

This blog post is based on the paper “Transnational circulations of university reforms: the policy-making of the LMD in Burundi”. This paper won the 2017 Award of Excellent Paper from an Emerging Scholar from the ECPR Standing Group ‘Politics of Higher Education, Research and Innovation’. The paper was presented at the International Conference on Public Policy in Singapore in 2017.

 

Olivier Provini is an Assistant Professor of political science at the University of La Reunion (France) and an affiliate member of the Legal Research Center (CRJ, University of La Reunion). In his PhD he dealt with the circulation of higher education reforms in East Africa, by comparing reform processes in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Burundi. His scientific interest lies in public policy analysis, state building and higher education reforms. He currently coordinates the research programme “Making public policies in Africa” (FAPPA) at Sciences Po Bordeaux (France). He is the editor of a special issue dealing with public policies in Africa published in the French review “Gouvernement et action publique”. He has also published a comparative study on the marketization of higher education reforms in Kenya and Tanzania in the journal Higher Education.

 

[i] Interview with a Burundian expert (27/03/2013, Bujumbura).

[ii] Interview with a policy maker (27/03/2013, Bujumbura).

The post What we can learn about policy circulation by using non-western case studies appeared first on Ideas on Europe.