Ideas on Europe Blog

“That way”

It’s obviously alma mater time for me, as I find myself giving a talk today at LSE on Brexit, just a few days after being back in Bruges. As is usual, I will be blaming any shortcomings on my education.

The LSE talk aims to consider how Brexit plays out and I thought it’s useful to share the general ideas with you here now.

The starting point is that Brexit is a highly unusual event, in comparative political terms. Technically, it’s a withdrawal from an International Governmental Organisation, but with a scale and impact that far exceeds any other instance (remember all that hubbub about the UK leaving UNESCO in 1985? Exactly).

But it’s not like a secession: there’s no monopoly of force issue, nor a heightened chance of armed conflict.

It’s also not like a break-up of an empire, either territorial or colonial; there’s no coercive element and it remains a one-off event.

All of which is to say that the lack of useful points of comparison make it hard to judge quite where this is all going.

Some dynamics

With that in mind, we have to fall back on what we can see happening in practice, to work out if it indicates paths of likely development.

Perhaps the most glaring aspect – for me, at least – is the hardy perennial of this blog: the lack of a strategic direction. If you don’t know what you’re trying to achieve, it’s particularly hard to work out how to achieve it, or even to know if you can or have achieved it.

The focus here is very much on the UK, since the entire process rests on the country’s decision to withdrawal, which the EU has no choice but to accept, given the formulation of Article 50.

That Article, as we’ve heard many times, was written with the assumptions that a) it wouldn’t be used and, b) anyone actually using it would only do so after very careful consideration.

Oops.

The entire period since 23 June 2016 can be characterised as a political system trying to work out why it’s enacting the decision it was handed by the referendum, and what kind of place it wants the UK to become.

The failure to do that reflects on the fracturing of power and mutual-reinforcing blocks that each interest has over the others. No one is strong enough to impose a dominant narrative, but no one is weak enough not to matter.

Not unreasonably, that lack of direction points to a second key feature, namely the efforts to keep change to a minimum.

At each step so far, the government preference has been to avoid making big changes, especially in the short-run. Hence sticking with Article 50 itself, then pushing for a transition period, all the while talking up the desire to keep as comprehensive as possible a future relationship.

The big exception in all this is free movement of people, which has been the most durable of May’s policy preferences. But every around that is intended to stay as close as possible to the current arrangements under membership. Which is to say not very close.

The second consequence of lacking direction has been the willingness to break up the steps of decision-making.

The Article 50 process now reaching its conclusion is not ‘Brexit’; possibly not even close. Yes, it manages the end of UK membership, but the focus of the Withdrawal Agreement is about closing-off past liabilities, rather than setting out the agreed plan for the future.

Anyone who thinks this has dragged on long enough will be in for a rude awakening when they wake up on 30 March next year and find – whatever happens now – that they are still a very long way from the new stable end-state of UK-EU relations.

Finally, the vacillations of the UK over what to do have also contributed to the lack of trust in the negotiations.

That’s most evident with the backstop debate: profound Irish concern about whether any UK government might keep its word on any aspect of maintaining the Good Friday arrangements led very directly to the push for legally-binding commitments, just in case. It’s also why provisions for citizens (and for finances) are in the Withdrawal Agreement, while there’s the best opportunity to avoid future uncertainty.

So where then?

If we take those as our starting points, then three scenarios suggest themselves. As to their likelihood, I’ll say that the first strikes me as much more likely than the other two right now.

That first pathway is muddling-through.

We’ve had repeated moments of crisis in British politics around Brexit, with people resigning and confusion and all the rest.

But in each of those moments, the outcome has been essentially one of sticking with the programme. You saw it in the immediate aftermath of the referendum, after the 2017 general election, after the December 2017 Joint Report, after Chequers.

The commonality was simply that while there was extensive and profound unhappiness with the programme, there was no clear alternative consensus that people had rallied to.

Paradoxically, because May’s plans have been challenged from all sides, that has made it harder to build a single pole of opposition.

With that in mind, we might expect that – somehow – May gets the Withdrawal Agreement through Parliament, the UK leaves the EU next March, then has another crisis as everyone realises they can fight over owning the UK agenda for the future relationship talks, which then drag on to the end of transition, in time for another couple of crises about signing and ratifying that text.

I’ll accept two criticisms of this: firstly, I really don’t understand how May finds that majority now in Parliament, and; secondly, it all sounds a bit self-serving, given my work as a commentator (contact info in the sidebar).

So let’s think about the other possibilities.

One is the ‘Moment of madness’ model.

Essentially, this everyone in Westminster pretending they’re Bobby Ewing and it was all a dream (kids, ask your parents) and stopping the process of leaving the EU. Others can offer you models of how this could happen.

I find this very unlikely, for all that I’ve already said here. There are already so many sunk costs following the referendum, and so many who have staked their political futures on working with that decision, that it seems improbably even at the political level, quite apart from the popular one.

To be clear, this option contains costs, despite what some claim: the past two and a half years can’t be swept under a carpet, with the hope no one brings it up again.

Most importantly, it raises even more questions about the role of politics and politicians than the first scenario.

Which opens up a more troubling third model: Rupture.

The distinct failure of the political class (as I’ll style them here) to manage the ‘simple’ decision contained in the referendum does nothing for a system where disengagement and disillusionment are already rife.

The complexities of any negotiated deal, the difficulty of not making compromises on positions and the continued feeling of uncertainty about this thing that people might not fully understand, but know is important, all open up an opportunity for a new populist agenda.

“How difficult can it be? Well actually, it’s dead simple” would be the general refrain of some charismatic individual, promising to sweep all this old politics away and do things right.

I’m hazy on how they suggest doing that, but I’ll say for sure that it involves a really simple solution.

(pro tip: complex situations never have simple solutions).

But really, where?

None of this is set in stone, or even in a much softer material, for the opening comments: this is not like anything that’s come before it.

Most important then has to remain the message that there are choices to be made and if you don’t make them, then others will.

The post How’s this all going to end? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Like an irritating parrot, the Prime Minister Theresa May keeps repeating that she’s delivering the ‘people’s will’ and ‘there won’t be a people’s vote’.

The two phrases are incompatible. They oppose each other.

The irritating parrot may as well say, “Welcome to my home” and “Get out of my house”. Or, “I believe in democracy” and “Shut up! You’re not allowed another say.”

Theresa May may be described as a tough bird, but as far as facing up to us, the people, she’s a chicken.

She daren’t ask us what we now think about Brexit, because she knows the likely answer will be, “Get stuffed. We don’t want Brexit.”

Nobody knew what Brexit meant in the referendum, and in that referendum Mrs May herself advised the country that staying in the EU was in our best interests.

Parrot or chicken, she’s got some neck.

• Telling us on the one side of June 2016 that Brexit will harm the country, our trade, our economy, our security and the cohesion of the United Kingdom.
• Then on the other side of June 2016, telling us that she’s the one who’ll deliver all the things she told the country not to do.

Ever since then she’s been squawking what Brexit means. It means Brexit. It’s red white and blue. But her phrases meant nothing to no one. It was for the birds.

But now, over two years after that fateful day on 23 June 2016, Mrs May has delivered over 500 pages of what Brexit means (or at least, what the divorce settlement means – we still don’t know what our future relationship with Europe will mean).

And what do you know? Nobody wants it. Remainers don’t want it. Brexiters don’t want it.

Several of her Brexit ministers, their feathers ruffled by a Brexit that was not in their image, have flown the nest.

They’re now roosting in a furtive corner, plotting ways to oust Mrs May and re-arrange the pecking order of the government.

The rest of the government are in a flap, running around like headless chickens. They’re hoping to get their Brexit plan through on a wing and a prayer.

Of course, it’s doomed. Brexit is one big bad egg.

Last Thursday, Mrs May went to the House of Commons to explain her recipe for Brexit. But she was in for a roasting. MP after MP stood up to say they didn’t want it. Her Brexit plan, they said, was as dead as a dodo.

Oh yes, Mrs May certainly looked as sick as a parrot.

But she was defiant too. She’d see Brexit through. She was delivering the will of the people. And no, you can’t have a people’s vote. Parrot, parrot, parrot.

Ever since Mrs May started on the road to Brexit (a road she previously told us not to travel) she has wanted to thwart democracy.

No, Parliament couldn’t have a say on triggering Article 50, she said. The decision was made by the referendum.

But she lost that argument in the courts.

Both the High and Supreme Courts confirmed that the referendum was advisory only. Only Parliament has sovereignty in the UK, the courts ruled, and Parliament must have the final say.

Last year, when the government produced impact assessments on Brexit, Mrs May and her government refused to reveal what they were. Parliament had to force the government to reveal them.

And it’s been the same this week.

Mrs May’s government didn’t want to show Parliamentarians the government’s detailed assessments of her Brexit plan, agreed last week with the EU’s chief Brexit negotiator, Michel Barnier.

Jo Johnson, a transport minister in Mrs May’s government, who resigned last week because he couldn’t support that plan, has turned out to be quite a wise owl.

During the Commons debate on this issue last night he said:

“If we have learned anything from the chaos of the past 30 months, it is that facts are sacred. This debate has been characterised by falsehoods and misinformation from day one.

“It is extraordinary that we have now had to force the Government, at this relatively late stage, to publish the vital information necessary for an informed public debate. Some may say that this horse has long bolted, but I say it is better late than never.”

That’s a feather in your cap, Mr Johnson (Jo, not Boris).

Today, Mrs May lost yet another attempt to thwart democracy and justice.

The Supreme Court ruled against a government attempt to stop the European Court of Justice from ruling on whether the Article 50 notice could be unilaterally revoked by the UK.

A cross-party group of MPs, MEPs and MSPs, along with Jolyon Maugham QC, the director of the Good Law Project, had asked the Scottish courts to rule that the case should be referred to the European court in Luxembourg for an urgent ruling.

So, despite Mrs May’s attempt to stop the course of justice, the European Court of Justice will now hear the case on 27 November.

At every awkward step of Theresa May towards her cloud-cuckoo Brexit, she has tried to circumvent both democracy and justice.

To pass Brexit, she has attempted to bypass Parliament, and spent millions of pounds of our money on legal fees in what turned out to be a futile, and time consuming, journey through the courts.

To pretend that her Brexit was democratic, she has had to keep referring to ‘the will of the people’:

• despite the fact that the referendum is now over two years old;
• despite the fact that the win for Leave was wafer thin;
• despite the fact that Leave only won with a pack of lies;
• despite the fact that only a minority of registered voters voted for Leave (just 37%);
• despite the fact that the referendum has now been entirely discredited, with irregularities so serious that the referendum result cannot be considered safe,
• and, despite the fact that poll after poll now show that most people in the country want another vote on Brexit, and that in a new vote, Remain would win.

So, it’s clear that Brexit is not now the ‘will of the people’ (and probably never was – nobody really knew what it meant).

Mrs May thinks that those who are calling for a new vote are ‘the enemies of democracy’. But this is what psychologists call ‘projection’.

Psychological projection involves someone denying the existence of bad qualities in themselves while attributing them to others. (For example, a person who is habitually rude may constantly accuse other people of being rude.)

This is what Mrs May is doing every day. She is attempting to project on to us her crimes, so that we are blamed.

But it is her that is guilty. She is the enemy of democracy. She is the enemy of justice. She is the enemy of the people.

Her Brexit plan is bird-brained. Both Brexiters and Remainers want to kick it into the dust. The chances of it getting through Parliament are close to zero. It’s a dead duck.

Brexit is out of control. The Prime Minister can’t fix it. Parliament can’t fix it.

It’s time for us, the people, to come to the rescue. Ask us. Find out what is today’s will of the people, then act on that. Don’t chicken out.

 

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• Follow my Stop Brexit campaign on Facebook: Reasons2Remain

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The fantastic Brexit offered to the nation in 2016 was a mirage. It doesn’t exist. It never did. It can’t be delivered. It was a con-trick.

The ‘alternative’ Brexit now being fobbed off to the nation would never have won approval in the referendum. We don’t want it. Even Brexiters don’t want it. Nobody, absolutely nobody, voted for it.

So, said the Prime Minister Theresa May, it’s her Brexit deal, or no deal, or no Brexit.

Put that on a ballot paper, Prime Minister, and let us have a real choice on this, for the very first time.

(Article continues after 5-minute video).

This is our country. It’s our lives, and our futures, at stake.

How dare you, Prime Minister; how dare you government; how dare you opposition, for not allowing us, ‘the people’, the final say on this.

We demand a new vote. A new vote is entirely democratic. Another vote means more democracy, not less.

As I assert in my 5-minute video(above), in a true democracy, voters are allowed to change their minds.

Put your deal, or no deal, or no Brexit, to the country. Let us decide. Put your trust in the people.

If you don’t, this matter will never be settled. It will sit, like festering, fetid, faeces, smouldering forever in the pit of the nation’s stomach, never to be expelled.

You cannot do this to us.

Relieve yourself of the burden of responsibility for this entire mountain of shit that you and your lot have created.

Put the choice back to us, the people. Only dictators would do otherwise. Restore democracy to Britain. Give us a new vote on Brexit. And do it now.

*Latest polling shows that a majority of Britons now want another vote on Brexit, and don’t want Brexit.

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
• Follow my Stop Brexit campaign on Facebook: Reasons2Remain

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We demand a new vote

→ Britain demands a new vote on Brexit – Please shareVOTERS ARE ALLOWED TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS – 5-min videoThe fantastic Brexit offered to the nation in 2016 was a mirage. It doesn’t exist. It never did. It can’t be delivered. It was a con-trick. The ‘alternative’ Brexit now being fobbed off to the nation would never have won approval in the referendum. We don’t want it. Even Brexiters don’t want it. Nobody, absolutely nobody, voted for it.So, said the Prime Minister Theresa May yesterday, it’s her Brexit deal, or no deal, or no Brexit. Put that on a ballot paper, Prime Minister, and let us have a real choice on this, for the very first time.This is our country. It’s our lives, and our futures, at stake. How dare you, Prime Minister; how dare you government; how dare you opposition, for not allowing us, ‘the people’, the final say on this. We demand a new vote. A new vote is entirely democratic. Another vote means more democracy, not less. As Jon Danzig asserts in his 5-minute video, in a true democracy, voters are allowed to change their minds. Put your deal, or no deal, or no Brexit, to the country. Let us decide. Put your trust in the people. If you don’t, this matter will never be settled. It will sit, like festering, fetid, faeces, smouldering forever in the pit of the nation’s stomach, never to be expelled. You cannot do this to us. Relieve yourself of the burden of responsibility for this entire mountain of shit that you and your lot have created. Put the choice back to us, the people. Only dictators would do otherwise. Restore democracy to Britain. Give us a new vote on Brexit. And do it now.• Words and 5-minute video by Jon Danzig. Please share to the nation – before it’s too late.* Latest polling shows that a majority in Britain now want another vote on Brexit, and don't want Brexit. news.sky.com/story/majority-of-brits-now-against-brexit-and-back-second-eu-referendum-sky-data-poll-11555078• Please re-Tweet, and follow Reasons2Remain on Twitter:twitter.com/Reasons2Remain/status/1063342664601530369

Posted by Reasons2Remain on Thursday, 15 November 2018

 

The post Britain demands a new vote on Brexit appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Yesterday’s publication of the provisional final text of the Withdrawal Agreement (and associated Political Declaration) marks a crucial point in the process of Brexit, opening the door to an approval and ratification process and the first major step in establishing a new basis for UK-EU relations.

Weighing in at nearly 600 pages of text, it’s easy to get lost in the details, so what basic messages can we extract from it?

Most of this is about the past, not the future…

As the name implies, the Withdrawal Agreement is largely concerned with the ending of the UK’s membership of the EU. That means the tying off of existing arrangements and the creation of interim management structures and processes.

Hence a lot of the text is occupied with marking out what stops and what liabilities remain and require attention. In that latter camp we can find provisions on finances and on citizens (who have been a rather marginal concern in the negotiators’ scheme of things, it has to be said).

In that sense, the main thrust of this is backward-looking and points to the extent of the EU’s entanglement with the UK that now has to be unpicked: bear in mind that this document – lengthy though it is – is dwarfed by the pile of acquis that the UK will have to work through under the mechanisms of the Withdrawal Act.

This might be a source of frustration to the casual observer, who might be forgiven for thinking that all the debate might have produced light on the future direction than the rather bland Political Declaration.

…but what there is on the future will matter

However, that Declaration – with its commitments to work together to maintain cooperation in a wide range of areas – is not the only part of the text that concerns the future.

As has been discussed at very great length, the Withdrawal Agreement also contains provisions on the ‘backstop’ to the Irish dimension.

As anticipated, this now takes the form of a complex protection of the current open border between the two parts of the island of Ireland: should it not be possible to put into effect a comprehensive future trade deal by the end of transition, then a UK-wide customs arrangement will come into effect, with lots of regulatory alignment to ensure that border checks are kept to an absolute minimum. That alignment also reduces the risk to the EU of the UK exploiting its access to the single market by undercutting standards.

If this had been evident for some time, it is important to stress two aspects of this that were less so.

Firstly, the Political Declaration places this customs arrangement in a central position for the future relationship, forming the basis for that comprehensive cooperation. This is likely to cause many headaches for the hard Brexit opponents of the text, given the potential limiting of UK free trade agreements with other countries.

Secondly, while there is now a one-off extension to the transition period, this will still not be long enough to conclude the treaties envisaged in the Declaration. Indeed, it is telling that the published draft doesn’t actually say how long that extension will be (although it’s likely to be one year, given other references in the text), highlighting just how contentious this point will be.

The brevity of transition means that all of the backstop arrangements are very likely to come into effect, raising the stakes for all involved, despite Michael Barnier’s words on the intention never to have to use them.

There will be no simple model of Brexit

Often overlooked in all this is the fact that this stage of Brexit – the ending of UK membership – was always going to be the easier and more contained part. It’s been overlooked mainly because it has been so difficult and sprawling.

But the agenda was very limited in Article 50 negotiations and the options relatively constricted: there were only a small number of ways to handle each of the elements.

By contrast, the future relationship contains multitudes. Each paragraph of the Political Declaration contains possibilities that might run to many hundreds of pages of a future deal, all framed by the same legalese that we find in the current texts.

And this is not very transparent.

Possibly, it’s not meant to be: the burying of the specifics of the backstop is a case in point on the political exigency of not saying too explicitly what you mean.

But for a British public that already has low levels of confidence in the process and the outcomes, such obfuscation can only heighten their sense of disengagement.

It also raises the risks of individuals misrepresenting what this represents: a considered attempt to move to a new post-membership relationship.

It may not be pretty, but for now it is the only text on the table and it cannot and should not be ignored.

The post Three messages from the Withdrawal Agreement appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Workshop participants

How do new technological developments influence security in Europe? What role do drones, artificial intelligence and social media play in contemporary European society and security? And what to expect from recent trends in European Union’s (EU) security policy such as plans to fund defence research? These were some of the questions addressed at the workshop ‘Science and Technology Studies and the study of Europe’ that took place at University of Bath, UK on 6-7 November 2018.

 

This workshop was organized by the ‘INTERSECT: Technology-Security-Society Interplays in Europe’ research network that promotes academic research and public debate in this novel area on the interplays between technological developments, security practices, and societal changes in Europe. Its focus includes topics such as cybersecurity, surveillance, counter-terrorism and dual-use research and development. Launched in 2017, INTERSECT is one of research networks supported by UACES – The academic association for contemporary European Studies. The workshop was organized in cooperation with the Nordic Centre of Excellence for Security and Technologies and Societal Values (NordSTEVA). This was the second INTERSECT workshop following ‘Rethinking the Technology – Security Nexus in Europe’ last year in Malmö, Sweden.

 

The programme of this thought-provoking two-day workshop in Bath included a range of interrelated theoretical and empirical topics that explored changing technology and security interplay in Europe by combining insights from Science and Technology Studies (STS), European Studies, International Relations as well as other disciplines and research fields. These were presented and discussed by some 20 researchers from all over Europe in three sessions, a keynote address and a concluding roundtable.

 

In the first session, Derek Bolton discussed information warfare in the modern age, while Tom Hobson suggested to use STS concepts of co-production and socio-technical imaginaries to think more critically about relationship between technology and warfare. In light of EU’s recent developments of setting up defence research programme, Jocelyn Mawdsley asked some timely questions about what can be expected from EU defence research funding and what can be learnt from the United States in this respect.

Keynote by Professor Mireille Hildebrandt

In the second session, Brett Edwards presented his forthcoming book ‘Insecurity and Emerging Biotechnology. Governing Misuse Potential’ discussing ethical considerations and security dilemmas related to emerging technologies. Chantal Lavallée explored the EU’s support for the development of drone sector, while Raluca Csernatoni focused on power dynamics in another ‘hot’ dual use technology field, namely, Artificial Intelligence. In her broad-ranging keynote ‘Law, Science, Technology and Security (LSTS) Studies: Legal Protection by Design’, Professor Mireille Hildebrandt addressed numerous conceptual and empirical questions emphasizing the need to scrutinise security technologies and to involve those who will suffer the consequences.

 

In the third and final session, Inga Ulnicane presented on responsible dual use research and changing research funding landscape in the EU that involves support for civilian, dual-use and since recently also defence research. Two final presentations in the workshop showcased research from the European Research Council funded project ‘FOLLOW – Following the Money from Transaction to Trial’. Tasniem Anwar demonstrated how social media activities such as WhatsApp messages have become essential legal evidence in terrorism financing court cases. Her colleague Esmé Bosma explained her research on how private banks use transaction monitoring system to counter terrorism financing.

Inga Ulnicane talking about responsible dual use in the European Union

In the final workshop roundtable, André Barrinha, Kristofer Lidén, Karen Lund Petersen and Bruno Oliveira Martins took stock of and identified future directions in this highly interesting and relevant research and policy area. One of the themes that emerged was the importance of bringing in public in anticipating and evaluating future technologies, their ethical and legal aspects as well as their potential uses in security field. That would democratize and make the process of developing and applying security technologies more transparent. A number of exciting topics and questions for future research and debate were outlined including the need to overcome gendered nature of security and technology fields, to go beyond artificial distinction between politics and economics of technologies in international relations and to address dilemmas such as security versus academic freedom.

 

The post Making sense of changing relationships between technology, security and society in Europe appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

On Remembrance Sunday we commemorate the contribution of British and Commonwealth military and civilian servicemen and women in the two World Wars and later conflicts.

November 11, 2018 also marks the 100th anniversary since the end of the First World War, Armistice Day.

Of course, we must never forget those who gave their lives in service to our country. We especially owe a great debt to all those who helped to save this country – and the rest of Europe – from the terrible onslaught of the Nazi regime in the Second World War.

But as well as remembering all those who fought so hard and valiantly during times of war and conflict, we should also remember all those who worked so hard and valiantly to help to avoid wars and conflicts.

The European Economic Community – later to be called the European Union – was started in the aftermath of the Second World War with one purpose and one purpose alone: to avoid wars on our continent ever happening again. (Article continues after 4-minute video).

That was the passionate resolve of those who are regarded as the eleven founders of the European Union, including our own war leader, Winston Churchill.

After all, Europe had a long and bloody history of resolving its differences through war, and indeed, the planet’s two world wars originated right here, on our continent.

So the EU was never just an economic agreement between nations.

It was always also meant to be a social and political union of European nations to enable them to find ways not just to trade together, but to co-exist and co-operate in harmony and peace on many levels as a community of nations.

The goal, in the founding document of the European Union called the Treaty of Rome, was to achieve ‘ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’ (which is rather different to ‘ever closer union of nations’.)

Just one year after the Second World War, in 1946, Winston Churchill made his famous speech in Zurich, Switzerland in which he said:

“We must build a kind of United States of Europe. The structure of the United States of Europe, if well and truly built, will be such as to make the material strength of a single state less important.”

At the time Churchill did not envisage Britain joining the new Union of Europe, but he was later to change his mind.

In March 1957 the European Economic Community (EEC) was established by its six founding nations, France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg.

This was a remarkable achievement, considering that these countries only a few years previously had been fighting in a most terrible war, and four of the founding nations had been viciously subjugated by another of the founders, Germany, during their Nazi regime.

In a speech four months later in July 1957 at Westminster’s Central Hall, Churchill welcomed the formation of the EEC by the six, provided that “the whole of free Europe will have access”. Churchill added, “we genuinely wish to join a free trade area”.

But Churchill also warned:

“If, on the other hand, the European trade community were to be permanently restricted to the six nations, the results might be worse than if nothing were done at all – worse for them as well as for us. It would tend not to unite Europe but to divide it – and not only in the economic field.”

Maybe this is the point that many Brexiters simply don’t get.

Here in Britain we don’t seem to understand the founding purpose of the European Union – and on the rest of the continent, they don’t understand why we don’t understand.

The European Union isn’t just about economics and trade, and never was.

It’s about peace, and a community of nations of our continent working together for the benefit and protection of its citizens.

We are now rebuffing our allies in Europe, telling them by our actions and words that the precious, remarkable and successful post-war project to find peace and security on our continent isn’t as important to us as it is to them.

Will our friendship and relationship with the rest of our continent ever recover?

• Article and video production by Jon Danzig

• Photo: central Rotterdam on 14 May 1940 after the bombardment by German war planes. Around 900 people died and vast swathes of the city were destroyed in the bombing. Almost 80,000 people lost their homes when parts of the city became ‘a sea of fire’. Photo: German federal archives via Wikimedia Commons.

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The EU was started for peace

→ On Remembrance Sunday, let's also remember peace – Please shareTHE EU WAS STARTED FOR ONE PURPOSE: PEACE – Video 4 minsOn Remembrance Sunday we commemorate the contribution of British and Commonwealth military and civilian servicemen and women in the two World Wars and later conflicts.November 11, 2018 also marks the 100th anniversary since the end of the First World War, Armistice Day.Of course, we must never forget those who gave their lives in service to our country. We especially owe a great debt to all those who helped to save this country – and the rest of Europe – from the terrible onslaught of the Nazi regime in the Second World War.But as well as remembering all those who fought so hard and valiantly during times of war and conflict, we should also remember all those who worked so hard and valiantly to help to avoid wars and conflicts.The European Economic Community – later to be called the European Union – was started in the aftermath of the Second World War with one purpose and one purpose alone: to avoid wars on our continent ever happening again.That was the passionate resolve of those who are regarded as the eleven founders of the European Union, including our own war leader, Winston Churchill.After all, Europe had a long and bloody history of resolving its differences through war, and indeed, the planet’s two world wars originated right here, on our continent.So the EU was never just an economic agreement between nations.It was always also meant to be a social and political union of European nations to enable them to find ways not just to trade together, but to co-exist and co-operate in harmony and peace on many levels as a community of nations.The goal, in the founding document of the European Union called the Treaty of Rome, was to achieve ‘ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’ (which is rather different to ‘ever closer union of nations’.)Just one year after the Second World War, in 1946, Winston Churchill made his famous speech in Zurich, Switzerland in which he said:“We must build a kind of United States of Europe. The structure of the United States of Europe, if well and truly built, will be such as to make the material strength of a single state less important.”At the time Churchill did not envisage Britain joining the new Union of Europe, but he was later to change his mind.In March 1957 the European Economic Community (EEC) was established by its six founding nations, France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg.This was a remarkable achievement, considering that these countries only a few years previously had been fighting in a most terrible war, and four of the founding nations had been viciously subjugated by another of the founders, Germany, during their Nazi regime.In a speech four months later in July 1957 at Westminster’s Central Hall, Churchill welcomed the formation of the EEC by the six, provided that "the whole of free Europe will have access". Churchill added, "we genuinely wish to join a free trade area".But Churchill also warned:“If, on the other hand, the European trade community were to be permanently restricted to the six nations, the results might be worse than if nothing were done at all – worse for them as well as for us. It would tend not to unite Europe but to divide it – and not only in the economic field.”Maybe this is the point that many Brexiters simply don’t get.Here in Britain we don’t seem to understand the founding purpose of the European Union – and on the rest of the continent, they don’t understand why we don’t understand.The European Union isn't just about economics and trade, and never was.It’s about peace, and a community of nations of our continent working together for the benefit and protection of its citizens.We are now rebuffing our allies in Europe, telling them by our actions and words that the precious, remarkable and successful post-war project to find peace and security on our continent isn't as important to us as it is to them.Will our friendship and relationship with the rest of our continent ever recover?• Article and video production by Jon Danzig, a campaigning journalist and founder of Reasons2Remain.• Photo: central Rotterdam on 14 May 1940 after the bombardment by German war planes. Around 900 people died and vast swathes of the city were destroyed in the bombing. Almost 80,000 people lost their homes when parts of the city became ‘a sea of fire’. Photo: German federal archives via Wikimedia Commons.• Please re-Tweet, and follow Reasons2Remain on Twitter:twitter.com/Reasons2Remain/status/1061571453169082368• This video is now available on the Reasons2Remain YouTube channel. Please share to your friends who don't use Facebook: youtu.be/7CjzrmUjres Before commenting on the Reasons2Remain campaign page, please read our new Rules of Engagement: Rules.Reasons2Remain.com********************************************► Watch Jon Danzig's 50-minute video: 'Can Britain Stop Brexit?' Go to CanBritainStopBrexit.com********************************************• To follow and support Reasons2Remain just ‘like’ the page, and please invite all your friends to like the page. ********************************************• Please recommend Reasons2Remain in the reviews section. 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Posted by Reasons2Remain on Sunday, 11 November 2018

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In one of those “politics as cock-up not conspiracy” moments, this week saw the (aggressive) leaking of a document purporting to be the government’s plans for selling the Withdrawal Agreement.

I say aggressive, since the leaker pushed it out to several media outlets at once, so really wanted it out there, spelling mistakes and all.

The government has distanced itself from the paper, and the general view seems to be that – at most – it’s an early draft from someone not that central to the negotiations. Even the reflected glory of seeing the guy I work with get mentioned as a thought-leader doesn’t make it any more valuable than that.

But it does raise the question of how the government will go about selling whatever deal it gets.

In that, the leak does point towards a pretty credible direction.

Rather than trying to pretend it’s all hunky-dory, the suggestion is that it be presented as a “measured success”, where the UK has fought for its interests and done as well as could be expected in the circumstances. That allows defenders/promoters to deflect some of the criticism by saying that while there are indeed some parts that aren’t ideal, they are the price of getting concessions elsewhere and/or they were points that the EU absolutely couldn’t be bidded on.

From that starting point, the plan would then move to a twin-track approach: pushing the necessary legislation hard and fast through Parliament, while simultaneously gridding up media activity to get buy-ins from the great and the good. In essence, the momentum of all of this would be beneficial to getting things over the line, in terms of UK ratification.

But does this stand up?

In one sense, the government isn’t going to have much choice in the matter, since they cannot achieve an agreed text that gives them everything they want, because the EU will not agree to it. That means they have to accept that there are compromises, since it would be completely indefensible to pretend it was an unqualified success, leaving them open to the charge of being out of touch with the realities of the situation.

Given this, and assuming they don’t want to go down the route of pleading for mercy from the Tory backbench and Parliament – also not a hot look – they have to play the line of “we’ve done our very best and we’re pretty happy about it, generally speaking”.

The difficulty comes in whether this necessity can be transformed into a successful ratification.

The first issue will be that of timing: can the government move rapidly from a signed deal to a legislative proposal? Even if one assumes that there is a draft Withdrawal and Implementation Bill floating around, waiting for some Ctrl-C-V action, there will still be a number of delays. Any European Council agreement-in-principle will then need some times – probably weeks – to produce a legally-tight text for signing, just as the draft Bill will need work to review in light of the final deal.

Given the speed of modern politics, that’s a huge window in which opposition can mobilise on specific issues and own the debate.

Secondly, much of the potential support from outsiders is likely to be a bit ambivalent. Yes, a deal is good, for the certainty it provides into the transition period, but by necessity it doesn’t commit the parties to a particular form of future relationship, so there’s a lot of wait-and-see about it. So everyone with a preference about the future will be torn between stressing what they do like about the omens contained therein, and worrying about the bits they don’t like.

Put differently, the Withdrawal Agreement is about ending the UK’s membership, not setting out the future.

Finally, the plan relies on a relatively cohesive Cabinet, willing to go out and sell the deal. While the Chequers reshuffle of the summer removed the most problematic individuals on that front, it’s not hard to imagine further ructions as the grid swings around to the less-enthusiastic members. Any resignations will give an opportunity to opponents to switch the narrative to ‘Cabinet splits’, potentially freeing backbenchers from some of their sense of duty to support the party line (and encouraging opposition parties to prod the wound in the hope of forcing a motion of confidence and early elections).

But notwithstanding all these dangers, we come back to the earlier point: the government doesn’t have much choice in the matter. Right now, as staffers work to produce a similar-but-different version of the leaked document, the emphasis will have to be on how to manage and mitigate the risks that have to be run. And we’ll see how that goes sooner, rather than later.

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Before discussing any implications of Brexit for UK standards and regulations, let us remind ourselves what are standards and why are they important.  Standards are a range of powerful marketing and business tools for businesses and institutions of all shapes and sizes. They can be used to adjust performance and manage risks, while operating more sustainably and efficiently. They allow businesses and institutions to demonstrate the proof of quality for their products & services to potential customers and can assist to merge best practices into the corporate structure. Standards represent a range of very coherent ways of information sharing between governments and businesses about what should be considered as a norm.

The British Standards Institution, (aka BSI, which produces technical standards on a wide range of products and services, and also provides certification and standards-related services to businesses), has been appointed by the UK Government (HMG) to act as the UK National Standards Body (NSB). In this role, BSI is responsible for the structures that enable the UK to participate in national, European (please note – ‘European’, not EU) and international standards-making systems and for overseeing the range of these standards which are currently valid in the UK.

Through the BSI, the UK participates in the European  (please note again – ‘European’, not EU) Standardisation System, with BSI as a full member of CEN (European Committee for Standardisation), CENELEC (European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation) and ETSI, as well as in two international standards-making systems ISO and IEC.

This is a very important distinction. Although CEN, CENELEC and ETSI  develop European standards, not ‘EU standards’ (they include NSB from countries outside the EU, including Ukraine, and are not official agencies of the European Union but rather private members associations owned by their members  including BSI, are entirely private bodies, and therefore not part of the EU’s institutional framework), nevertheless, their standards are “EN” EU (and EEA) standards, according to EU Regulation 1025/2012.

Such ‘Single Standard model’ is valid among many industries and enables companies and individuals to work and trade in the EU single market. This principle is called reciprocity, to make business as smooth as possible across national borders.

The overwhelming majority of standards being in existence in the UK are international in nature (over 95%), while the number of UK-only standards is rather small. Over 1,500 of them are withdrawn annually (e.g. there used to be 160,000 British Standards, now reduced to 19,000 Single Standards).

However, some standards are conjoined with relevant EU regulations (less than 20% in Europe) and are known as ‘harmonised standards’ (we have discussed them briefly in a previous blog).

Immediately after the Brexit referendum in 2016, the British Standards Institution , has conducted a webinar on the Brexit implications for standards and regulations in the UK. This webinar was further endorsed/supported in 2018 by another BSI statement.

As regard CEN and CENELEC. the BSI’s continued membership should not accordingly be affected by Brexit. Some adjustment to the internal rules of CEN and CENELEC may be necessary to assure this and steps are in hand to bring this about. There are no such adjustments required in the case of ETSI.

If the UK does not maintain its full membership of CEN and CENELEC through BSI, British stakeholders would lose their influence over the content of the standards used in the 33 other member countries and British industry would face increased barriers to trade (BSI membership of the two international standardization organizations, ISO and IEC, will be unaffected by the UK’s exit from the EU).

In its position paper “European standards and the UK” the BSI raised a series of five principal questions:
1. What are standards and why are they important for industry?
2. What is the European Single Market?
3. What benefits do European standards bring to the European Single Market?
4. How are these benefits delivered?
5. What would be the impact of a UK exit from the EU in terms of UK participation in the European standardization system?

In the same paper the BSI attempted to offer some solutions, which in their opinion will be instrumental in maintaining the status quo. We will analyse some important points of this position paper in the subsequent blogs.

The post Possible outcomes of UK departure from EU and its implications for British standards and regulations appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Professor Amelia Hadfield and Chris Logie
Centre for European Studies (CEFEUS), Canterbury Christ Church University

For keen followers of US politics – and the very many beyond – yesterday’s mid-term elections provided the expected spills and thrills as the results flowed in from east to west. There was a general expectation that the outcome would produce a decent split between a House of Representatives reclaimed by the Democrats and a consolidated Republican Senate.

The House of Representatives: I told you so

© vchalup / Adobe Stock

After a wobble before 2am GMT where the House of Representatives looked close based on the earliest results, the Democrats pulled off a result that largely met expectations. The mid-terms represent the first US-wide elections since the surprise election victory of 2016 when Donald Trump not only assumed the Presidency, but Republicans claimed both branches of Congress.

While it was not precisely the kind of ‘shellacking’ bemoaned by Obama in the 2010 midterm when he lost 63 seats in a Republican wave, the Democrats gain of approximately 34 seats (they needed 23 to ensure a majority) still easily deserves the same ‘wave’ moniker and all the connotations it comes with. The 7% popular margin that the Democrats are estimated to have won with compares very favourably to other ‘Blue wave’-like elections, including 2014 (5.7%), 2010 (6.8%) and 2006 (9.0%). As such the Democratic take-back of the House of Representatives has dealt Trump a clear message from suburban U.S. voters in particular that they are displeased with the ‘toxic rhetoric’ that has characterized Trump’s governing ethos in the past 2 years, and which reached objectionable new heights during the final days of mid-term campaigning. In scooping up these 34 seats, Democrats appear to have been lifted by backlashes in suburban congressional districts, which contain voters who have largely swung back against Trump and the Republican Party from the original 2016 figures.

Indeed, Democrats performed best in districts carried by Mitt Romney in 2012, and Clinton in 2016. A good example of this is the surprise Democrat win in Oklahoma’s 5th district, which registers as 13.5% above the national average in terms of its Republican affiliation, but is also dominated by urban and suburban Oklahoma City, where a range of very different viewpoints helped dilute the overall Trump message. This particular win means that victor Kendra Horn will represent the area as a Democrat for the first time in 44 years. Another seat representative of this same trend is Texas’ 7th district, which voted for Romney by a whopping 21.3% in 2012 but swung dramatically towards Hilary Clinton in 2016, who won it by a mere 1.4%. This year, Democrat Lizzie Pannill Fletcher took the seat from incumbent Republican John Culberson by around 4.7%, which means that the seat has swung even further since 2016. Representing wealthy suburbs near Houston, this seat is something a microcosm of the seats where Democrats did best nationally.

House dynamics for the lower chamber look set to provide some drama. Early this morning, Trump rang Nancy Pelosi, the House Minority Leader to concede defeat. After eight years in the minority wilderness, Pelosi is now a strong bet to reclaim the speaker’s chair, which makes her the single most powerful Democrat in the US, at least until a viable presidential candidate is chosen. What Pelosi chooses to do with this power is key. Can she steer through a batch of new legislation? Or is she destined to be the figurehead of Democrat-instigated gridlock in a Democrat-controlled House, attempting to withstand “the growing pressure on her to step aside for a new generation of Dems”?

The House election was also characterised by the sheer variety of candidates, most notably female representation in Congress, which looks set to reach a record high. This is a trend primarily driven by the Democrats, who fielded more female candidates for congress than any other party has before. The 2018 mid-terms also heralded other exciting female firsts, with Sharice Davids in Kansas’ 3rd district beating the Republican incumbent, to become the first Native American woman in Congress. To this we can add Rashida Tlaib and Ilhan Omar, whose victories in solid Democratic seats are truly ground-breaking, as the first Muslim women in the House of Representatives. US veterans are also likely to do well in the House, with a number of Democratic vets successfully challenging Republican incumbents in seats such as Jason Crow in Colorado’s 6th district, as well as Mikie Sherill in New Jersey’s 11th district, Mike Rose in New York’s 11th district and Elaine Luria in Virginia’s 2nd district. While this representation is very different from 1971, when 73% of Congress was veterans, it is an upswing since 2017, when it was just under 19%.

The Senate: be careful what you wish for

On balance, the image of a Trump bloodied at the ballot box hasn’t precisely come to pass. The anticipated “blue wave” of Democrat support was simply not strong enough to erode key states in Senatorial or Gubernatorial areas, particularly in rural areas, as well as the crucial swing state of Florida. The result is that Republicans have retained control of the Senate. The outcome is nowhere near the blustering assertion by Trump that the entire outcome has been a “tremendous success” for his party (you’d expect him to say that, wouldn’t you), but there is a good chance of tremendous ideological impasses that could gum up American governance between 2018-2020.

The US Senate meanwhile represents a terrain in which the average battleground state was 16% more Republican than the US as whole, and unsurprisingly saw incumbent Democratic Senators in red states like North Dakota, Missouri, and Indiana ultimately swamped by basic partisanship. While some Democrats hoped that the moderate stances of these incumbents would ultimately go their way, what carried the day were the substantial margins in races which that were predicted to be far closer. Of the states carried by Trump in 2016 by double-digits (North Dakota, Missouri, Indiana, West Virginia, Montana), only Senator Joe Manchin in West Virginia and Jon Tester in Montana bucked the trend and held on; arguably testament to the strong personal brand of each candidate and their mastery of retail politics in what are relatively small states.

Democrats will also be bitterly disappointed with the loss of their Senate seat in Florida by the narrowest of narrow margins, along with their probable loss in Florida’s Governor race. Both results highlight clear Democratic underperformance in the Southeast, leaving Floridian Democrats scratching their heads wondering what went wrong.1 Interestingly, the one area where a clear return to base partisanship in the Senate has worked in the Democrat’s favour is Nevada, where challenger Jacky Rosen has beaten incumbent Republican Senator Dean Heller by wider margins than the polls had suggested in the only state with a Republican running for reelection in a state that Hilary Clinton won in 2016.

Meanwhile Arizona’s Senate race is also proving to be a close run thing with Republican candidate Martha McSally still slightly ahead of Democrat Kyrsten Sinema. All in all, Republicans look likely to extend expand on the current 51 Republican, 49 Democrat split in the Senate by around three seats, which is arguably near the higher end of their predictions, but within the bounds of what was expected.

In terms of trends, Democrats’ concentration of support in larger US states is becoming a key structural issue regarding their chances in the Senate, a pattern reinforced once again by these mid-terms. We need to bear in mind that while Donald Trump lost the popular vote in 2016, he won 30 states representing 60 seats in the US Senate. This kind of structural challenge is likely to provoke deep concerns among the Democrats regarding their future chances of achieving a Senate majority in the near future.

Of special note are the results from Texas, where charismatic Democrat Beto O’Rourke ran incumbent Ted Cruz in a surprisingly close race, with Cruz only winning by less than 3% (he won in 2012 by 16%) in what amounted to the most expensive Senate race in US history. Despite the outcome, O’Rourke’s narrow margin will give Democrats hope that Texas might at some stage be added to a future ‘blue splash’, with party members suggesting O’Rourke as a presidential contender for 2020.

Governors: Start your engines

At the gubernatorial level, Democrat expectations of a strong showing where largely borne out. Democrats successfully took Illinois, New Mexico, Michigan, Maine, Nevada, Wisconsin and Kansas out of Republican hands. By taking Wisconsin from Governor Scott Walker, Democrat candidate Tony Evers finally achieved what the party had been seeking to do in 2014 and in 2012, when Scott Walker won a rancorous recall election after being elected in the Republican wave of 2010. Meanwhile in Kansas, Democrats scored a real upset by handily beating Trumpian Republican Kris Kobach (who had beaten the incumbent Republican governor in the primary) by over 5%, in a state that Trump had carried by a whopping 20% in 2016. Democrats’ losses elsewhere proved sobering, including Ohio, Georgia and Florida, all of which were considered to be tight races. Democrats had high hopes in particular for Stacy Abrams in Georgia and Andrew Gillum in Florida, to whom recent polls had given a lead. With Ohio and Florida reinforced as 2020 key swing states, Democrats will be disappointed they could not bolster their chances by having incumbent Democratic governors helping drive those states.

Implications: Déjà vu?

Clearly, a Democrat-controlled House has the opportunity to cause major problems for Trump during the final two years of his term as president. This can take a number of forms: first, in general by blocking his legislative plans; second, and more specifically, by dominating key House committees from January onwards to redress legislative decisions in the previous two years, or refashioning policy ambitions between now and 2020; third, both ad hoc and Committee-based requests that are not primarily policy-specific, but aimed at either impeaching Trump, or making his final 24 months in office as uncomfortable as possible (e.g. using subpoenas to request the president’s unpublished tax returns, to insist on a more robust inquiry into Trump’s links with Russia, or any form of behavior deemed to be ultimately unconstitutional.

More broadly, for America as a whole, the results suggests yet more partisanship in Congress as a whole, and ongoing levels of social acrimony, particularly in closely-fought battleground states. Jody Avirgan from Nate Silver’s prediction website FiveThirtyEight for instance argued that “the election is reflecting just how divided we are — urban, rural, rich, poor, different education levels. That gulf continues to grow”. The key themes are ugly ones: anti-migration, anti-immigration, racism, sexism, corporatism, and even unconstitutional options all vie as leitmotifs capable of being boiled down into the reductivist idiocy that passes for Trump’s tantrum tweets. Any and all of these agendas were ushered into DC in 2016 and they have had precious little opposition from members of both houses. Failing to repudiate these narratives may seem a clever strategy helping to speed the Democratic Party’s suburban ambitions across America for the 2020 campaign, but they represent a dangerous blend of toxic populism that operates as blind nationalism at best and deliberate fascism at worst.

What Now?

For some, this is a wasted two years, with the Republicans destined to close ranks behind Trump, whatever their private opinions, increasing the likelihood of his re-election. For others, the race for 2020 is wide open, and the shopping list of both Democratic and Republican contenders is on. Post-election prognostication is a high stakes game, but some are keen to get the party started as early as possible, including Ohio Democratic Senator Sherrod Brown, whose victory speech focused on celebrating “the dignity of work, how we honor organized labor and all workers”, suggesting that Ohio’s message “is the blueprint for our nation in 2020.”

Facts and Trivia

• • Despite their Republican leaning, Idaho, Nebraska and Utah all voted to expand Medicaid access (US Federal health insurance), created by the Affordable Care Act, a.k.a. Obamacare.
  • In a surprise turn of events, Democrats took South Carolina’s 1st district from the Republicans: a seat 10% more Republican than the US as a whole. Incumbent representative Mark Sanford, who had been somewhat critical of President Trump, lost his primary to Trump-backed candidate Katie Arrington, making this loss something of a Republican own-goal.
  • In California’s Orange County-based 48th district, incumbent Republican Dana Rohrabacher lost his seat to Democrat Harley Rouda. Rohrabacher is notable for his strongly pro-Russian views, and referred to in some quarters as “Putin’s favourite congressman”.
  • Thanks to Max Rose’s upset victory in the pro-Trumpy Staten Island district of New York 11, Democrats now hold every single house district in New York City.

• The three states that lifted Trump to the Presidency in 2016 (Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Michigan), all have swung back and voted for both Democratic Senators and Governors this year.
• While West Virginia voted for Donald Trump in 2016 by a huge margin of over 40% in 2016 (making it the second most Republican state in the US) popular Democratic incumbent Senator Joe Manchin still managed to win his race by defeating his Republican opponent 49.5% to 46.3%.

1 Caveat Emptor: Due to the thin margins, as of late Wednesday, 7 November 2018, incumbent Democrat Bill Nelson has announced his campaign will request a recount. This is likely to be granted; it is however unlikely that the recount could swing the race by the required 35,000 votes.

The post The Blue Splash? Or Resurgent Red? Assessing the 2018 US Mid-Term Elections appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The Journal of Contemporary European Research (JCER) recently published a special issue on the role of civil society in European Union policymaking and democratisation. Editors Rosa Sanchez Salgado and Andrey Demidov explain how it constitutes an original account of what is happening in the member states, beyond the world of well-established organisations in Brussels.

© yuri4u80 / Adobe Stock

This special issue shows first that Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) play a significant role in EU policymaking in a few member states. Research on Sweden, Spain and Slovenia shows that many CSOs predominantly engage in advocacy activities at the national level to influence EU policymaking. Wealthy national CSOs that would have the means to lobby in Brussels still mainly engage in national advocacy when trying to influence EU affairs; they only seem more inclined to go directly to Europe when there are potential conflicts between the EU level and the national level, as can be the case when it comes to gender equality in Sweden.

When civil society beyond Brussels is taken into account, the picture of the role and functions of European Civil Society Organisations becomes much more diverse and nuanced. The Brussels’ bubble often appears as an elite-system of interest representation with a strong business bias, while CSOs are considered to play a small role in the democratisation of the EU. These findings are valid, but just for a relatively homogeneous context: the Brussels’ system.

When national CSOs in new and old member states and third countries are taken into account, the overall picture is much more nuanced. There is evidence that CSOs usually characterised as weak also take an active role in EU policymaking. Even if those CSOs rarely contact EU institutions directly, they are active members of EU umbrella organisations with regular interactions with national decision makers on EU affairs. These CSOs also play a relevant role in the process of implementation of EU policies by serving as communities that inform and educate their electorates. Further, EU-related topics and ideas are often picked up at the national level by social movements to mobilise citizens or increase the level of politicisation and therefore debate on vital matters, as was seen with the TTIP campaign in Spain.

National CSOs have also contributed to the democratisation of the European public space in ways that would be difficult to comprehend from the perspective of the Brussels bubble. Current studies assessing the democratic potential of CSOs focusing on Brussels-based mechanisms of consultation and participation, while interesting, tend to rely on high normative standards. The picture is very different when scholars actually take stock of current practices of participation or when they take into account how CSOs themselves understand their role in the democratisation of Europe. Thus, our work exposes the gap between normativity as rhetoric and normativity in action.

Many studies on the contribution of European CSOs to democratic governance conclude that EU-based CSOs do not sufficiently represent their members and supporters. This special issue contributes to this discussion with an in-depth examination of the relations between national CSOs and EU umbrellas. Different scholars cover environmental CSOs in Belgium, CSOs defending bi-national family rights in France and feminist CSOs in France and Belgium. These studies show that national CSOs’ expectations regarding EU umbrellas are very different from current normative standards. National CSOs value more the function and the effectiveness of CSOs than the degree to which they represent the view of their members. It therefore suggests that we need to refine or expand our views on what is significant in the minds of societal actors.

These studies also show that the degree of participation of national CSOs and their members depends on a variety of factors, including organisational and cultural factors, without neglecting the individual dimension. The level of internal representation is explained by a complex combination of factors including resources, organisational constraints and cultural specificities. Representation and participation is also related to individual personal and professional backgrounds, as well as the specific vision of Europe held by CSOs’ staff and members.

The same difference between high normative standards and perceptions of CSOs is found when the analysis focuses on CSOs’ functions, as is shown by research on CSOs in four central and eastern EU states and CSOs in two third countries (Georgia and Ukraine). While public officials and the EU seem to focus on input legitimacy, partnership and the representative function of CSOs, CSOs see themselves mainly as political watchdogs. The normative orientations of CSOs focus on increasing the transparency and accountability of the policy process and its deliberative quality.

All in all, the focus on national CSOs beyond Brussels shows the predominance of diversity. This requires original approaches to causality, including multiple causal pathways and openness to a plurality of perspectives regarding normative standards.

This article is based on the authors’ introduction to their co-edited special issue in the Journal of Contemporary European Studies (JCER) Vol 14 No 2 (available open-access here).

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Graduate Forum, JCER or UACES.

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Andrey Demidov | @anddemidov

Andrey Demidov is a scientific coordinator at the Institute for Advanced Study at Central European University in Budapest. His research interests include European governance, the role of civil society in EU public policy and participatory governance in Central and Eastern European countries. 

 

Rosa Sanchez Salgado

Rosa Sanchez Salgado is Assistant Professor of European Public Policy at the Department of Political Science of the University of Amsterdam. Her research focuses on European politics and civil society organisations and social movements.

The post Beyond the Brussels Bubble? National Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in the European Union appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Brexiters often claim that in Britain’s first referendum of 1975, voters were misled into believing that the Common Market – now called the European Union – was just about ‘free trade’. But that’s not correct. (Article continues after the 5-minute video.)

It was clear even before we joined the European Economic Community (as it was called then) that it was much more than just a free trading arrangement.

When we first applied to join in 1961, the then Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, told the nation:

“One thing is certain. As a member of the Community, Britain would have a strong voice in deciding the nature and the timing of political unity. 

“By remaining outside, we could be faced with a political solution in Europe which ran counter but which we could do nothing to influence.”

That’s hardly stating that the European Community was only about ‘free trade’.

When eventually we joined the Community in 1973, Prime Minister Edward Heath wrote for the Illustrated London News:

“The community which we are joining is far more than a common market. It is a community in the true sense of that term.

“It is concerned not only with the establishment of free trade, economic and monetary union and other major economic issues, important though these are — but also as the Paris Summit Meeting has demonstrated, with social issues which affect us all — environmental questions, working conditions in industry, consumer protection, aid to development areas and vocational training.”

Again, that’s hardly stating that the Community was only about free trade.

In 1975, two years after we joined, the new Labour government held a referendum on whether Britain wanted to remain in the European Community – the exact same referendum as we had in 2016.

The government’s pamphlet sent to every UK household for the referendum stated that the first aims of the Common Market were to ‘bring together the peoples of Europe’, to ‘raise living standards’ and ‘to maintain peace’.

The pamphlet made clear that as a member, Britain has a ‘say in the future economic and political development of the Common Market.’ If we left the Common Market, ‘Britain would no longer have any say’.

It could not have missed anyone’s attention at the time that the European Community was about much more than just free trade.

Even the Eurosceptics of the time claimed that membership of the Common Market went beyond ‘free trade’.

Their ‘NO’ campaign referendum literature, also distributed to every household, warned what they considered were the dangers of membership:

• To end a thousand years of British freedom and independent nationhood is an unheard of constitutional change.
• Do you want us to be a self-governing nation, or to be a province of Europe?
• Do we want self-government as a great independent nation, or do we want to be governed as a province of the EEC by Commissioners and a Council of Ministers, predominantly foreign, in Brussels?
• Do we want to lose the whole of our individual influence as a nation, which is still great, in order to enhance the status of Europe, which would then function largely outside our control?

Although in over 40 years of membership the fears and warnings of the 1975 ‘NO’ campaign have not materialised, their arguments haven’t changed. In fact, the 2016 referendum has simply regurgitated the same old arguments that took place in the first referendum.

There is little difference between the European Economic Community of 1975 and the European Union of today. They share the same foundational principles and aspirations.

Of course, in over 60 years since its foundation, the European Community has grown phenomenally, with more countries wanting to join. But that just demonstrates the success of the EU project.

The Conservative government under David Cameron could have saved a fortune by simply re-printing the 1975 referendum pamphlet and distributing it for the 2016 referendum.

Almost all the points and arguments remain the same. Nothing much has changed. Read the Labour government’s 1975 pamphlet and judge for yourself.

 

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Britain wasn't misled when we joined

→ Brexit Myth Breaker about 1975 (video: 5 mins) – please shareIT WAS NEVER JUST ‘FREE TRADE’: POSTER, VIDEO & ARTICLEBrexiters often claim that in Britain’s first referendum of 1975 voters were only told that the Common Market (now called the European Union) was just ‘free trade’. But that’s not correct. It was clear even before we joined the European Economic Community (as it was called then) that it was much more than just a free trading arrangement. One year before we joined, Prime Minister Edward Heath wrote for the Illustrated London News:“The community which we are joining is far more than a common market. It is a community in the true sense of that term. “It is concerned not only with the establishment of free trade, economic and monetary union and other major economic issues, important though these are — but also as the Paris Summit Meeting has demonstrated, with social issues which affect us all — environmental questions, working conditions in industry, consumer protection, aid to development areas and vocational training.”In 1975, two years after we joined, the new Labour government held a referendum on whether Britain wanted to remain in the European Community – the exact same referendum as we had in 2016.The government’s pamphlet sent to every UK household for the referendum stated that the first aims of the Common Market were to ‘bring together the peoples of Europe’, to ‘raise living standards’ and ‘to maintain peace’. The pamphlet made clear that as a member, Britain has a 'say in the future economic and political development of the Common Market.’ If we left the Common Market, 'Britain would no longer have any say'.It could not have missed anyone’s attention at the time that the European Community was about much more than just free trade. Even the Eurosceptics of the time claimed that membership of the Common Market went beyond ‘free trade’. Their ‘NO’ campaign referendum literature, also distributed to every household, warned what they considered were the dangers of membership: To end a thousand years of British freedom and independent nationhood is an unheard of constitutional change. Do you want us to be a self-governing nation, or to be a province of Europe? Do we want self-government as a great independent nation, or do we want to be governed as a province of the EEC by Commissioners and a Council of Ministers, predominantly foreign, in Brussels? Do we want to lose the whole of our individual influence as a nation, which is still great, in order to enhance the status of Europe, which would then function largely outside our control?Although in over 40 years of membership the fears and warnings of the 1975 ‘NO’ campaign have not materialised, their arguments haven’t changed. In fact, the 2016 referendum has simply regurgitated the same old arguments that took place in the first referendum.There is little difference between the European Economic Community of 1975 and the European Union of today. They share the same foundational principles and aspirations. Of course, in over 60 years since its foundation, the European Community has grown phenomenally, with more countries wanting to join. But that just demonstrates the success of the EU project. The Conservative government under David Cameron could have saved a fortune by simply re-printing the 1975 referendum pamphlet and distributing it for the 2016 referendum. Almost all the points and arguments remain the same. Nothing much has changed. Read the Labour government’s 1975 pamphlet and judge for yourself: www.1975pamphlet.reasons2remain.eu • Words and video production by Jon Danzig • Please re-Tweet and follow Reasons2Remain on Twitter:twitter.com/Reasons2Remain/status/1059017651605909504 Before commenting on the Reasons2Remain campaign page, please read our new Rules of Engagement: Rules.Reasons2Remain.com********************************************► Watch Jon Danzig's 50-minute video: 'Can Britain Stop Brexit?' Go to CanBritainStopBrexit.com********************************************• To follow and support Reasons2Remain just ‘like’ the page, and please invite all your friends to like the page. ********************************************• Please recommend Reasons2Remain in the reviews section. Here's the link: facebook.com/Reasons2Remain/reviews/********************************************• Follow Reasons2Remain on Twitter: twitter.com/reasons2remain and Instagram: instagram.com/reasons2remain/********************************************• Explore our unique Reasons2Remain gallery of over 1,000 graphics and articles: reasons2remain.co.uk********************************************• Reasons2Remain is an entirely unfunded community campaign, unaffiliated with any other group or political party, and is run entirely by volunteers. If you'd like to help, please send us a private message.********************************************• © Reasons2Remain 2018. All our articles and graphics are the copyright of Reasons2Remain. We only allow sharing using the Facebook share button. Any other use requires our advance permission in writing.#STOPBREXIT #EXITBREXIT #PEOPLESVOTE #FINALSAY

Posted by Reasons2Remain on Sunday, 4 November 2018

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A Euro-American Union: Reflections on an Academic Marriage

Anne-Marie Slaughter

In December of 1993, Andrew Moravcsik published ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community’ in the pages of the Journal of Common Market Studies, giving rise to the Liberal Intergovernmentalist theory of European integration. This month, the journal marks the 25th anniversary of the publication of Moravcsik’s article with a special issue, “Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Its Critics,” devoted to assessing the legacy of Liberal Intergovernmentalism and its continued relevance in today’s crisis-ridden EU. 

Here, Anne-Marie Slaughter, President and CEO of New America and Bert G. Kerstetter ’66 University Professor Emerita of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, reflects on her twenty-five year intellectual dialogue with, and marriage to, Andrew Moravcsik. 

*  *  *  *  *

The twenty-fifth anniversary of Liberal Intergovernmentalism happens to be Andy’s and my 25th wedding anniversary. It is thus time to celebrate many types of cross-fertilization. Andy has influenced my thinking in so many ways for so many years that sometimes I’m no longer sure how to disentangle where his thinking leaves off and mine begins. Yet we also remain strongly and occasionally even stridently at odds, with what he would call my legalism clashing sharply with what I would call his cynicism. Our differences are shaped by our disciplines as much as by our personalities and intellects, but I learn from him even in dissent.

Andy and I met in the fall of 1985, when I was a pre-doc at Oxford but on a Ford Fellowship at what was still then the Center for International Affairs at Harvard (now the Weatherhead Center). I remember this impossibly tall man standing in – filling up – the doorway of my small office, handing out a flyer to a party that he and his housemates were giving on Orchard Street. Three years later, as my first marriage ended, I went to Paris for a conference, stayed with Andy, and fell madly in love. We became a couple in early 1990, just after I became an assistant professor at the University of Chicago law school.

Anne-Marie Slaughter and Andrew Moravcsik

My name then was still Anne-Marie Burley. Andy would go to EU conferences and expand his theory of intergovernmentalism, and some graduate student not yet in on the latest gossip would innocently ask him whether he had read Burley and Mattli (1993) on the supranational-functionalist character of the European Court of Justice.  Thus we cut our academic teeth on opposite sides of an ongoing debate. But it was no accident that we were both studying Europe; we are both half-European (a Hungarian father on his side and a Belgian mother on mine), and share a culture, mindset, and sensibility that has shaped us deeply.

As a lawyer and an Oxford D.Phil schooled in the tradition of Hedley Bull’s The Anarchical Society, I was grappling with what the late Professor Thomas Franck used to refer to as the “existential question” that every international lawyer must face: whether and how law shapes politics. Walter Mattli and I elaborated the ways in which the European Court of Justice deployed law as both a mask and a shield for politics. Andy, by contrast, was taking on the sacred cows of European federalism, stripping away visions of peace and unity to uncover bedrock economic interests.

Will Phelan’s (2018) account of European legal integration in this issue revives that debate. Phelan essentially argues that Andy was persuaded by his wife that legal integration was driven by more neo-functionalist factors, but that he shouldn’t have been! In Phelan’s account, a true liberal intergovernmentalist explanation of legal integration would focus on the member states’ deliberate choice of a treaty enforcement system that would prohibit the kind of inter-state retaliation for violations and the invocation of safeguard mechanisms to excuse violations that characterize so many international treaties. To avoid this tit-for-tat, Phelan argues, the member states sought purely judicial enforcement through both national and supranational courts.

Phelan’s argument is novel and persuasive; indeed, he makes a real contribution to a fuller understanding of the member state and judicial motives. But what he cannot explain is exactly the dimension of the EC legal system that Walter Mattli and I focused on most – the ECJ’s decision to validate and actively encourage the use of the preliminary ruling procedure by individual litigants.  The ECJ could perfectly well have narrowed the reach of the Treaty of Rome’s Article 177 just as they narrowed the reach of 173, thereby reserving treaty enforcement to domestic courts but only with regard to cases brought by member states.

Such a decision would have accomplished the goal of substituting a domestic enforcement system for an inter-state retaliation system, but would have left decisions as to when and how to enforce the treaty in the hands of state lawyers, a far more predictable and controllable outcome. Phelan shows that some state lawyers and at least one prominent ECJ judge supported this step. Yet Mattli and I emphasize the innovation of encouraging individual litigants and their lawyers to bring as many cases as possible to enforce European law, as well as the active courting of national judges to hear those cases and refer questions of European law to the ECJ. With that step, EU law became truly like national law, invoked and upheld in accordance with the self-interest and civic commitments of both litigants and judges.

In the end, Phelan’s liberal intergovernmentalist account can co-exist with Mattli’s and my account. Indeed, fitting these two arguments together is a microcosm of the way I now think of Andy’s and my work fitting together more generally. Of course states have power; Mattli and I explicitly described the ways in which the Court as a whole and individual judges responded to increasing Member State concerns about “judicial activism” in the late 1970s and 1980s (Burley and Mattli 1993: 71). But so too do institutions and the individuals who operate them, animated by interests and ideals.

From 1990 to 1994 Andy and I lived mostly in Chicago, very happy years of cohabitation and collaboration, even though Andy was actually teaching at Harvard. Above all, we had no children! We would work at either end of our living room, an arrangement that continued in our joint study to this day. The difference is that then we had time to read and respond to each other’s work.

Andy began working on what I still think is his most important work: a liberal theory of international relations. He read stacks of books of classical liberal philosophy and political theory and derived a theory of international politics from the bottom up, starting with individuals and groups in society, moving up to governments, and finally to international institutions. I was writing what would become “Law among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine” (Burley 1992). The Berlin Wall had come down, history had ended – – although of course we were too sophisticated to believe that – – and I was convinced that in fact liberal states were bound together in different ways, and follow different rules, than non-liberal states.

Over the next two decades I came to realize, however, that the networks, more than the states they bind together, were the real story, and that a bottom-up view of global politics opened up an entire field of network design and opportunities for foreign policy webcraft (Slaughter 2017). Still, Andy’s theory, together with Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye’s (1977) work documenting networks among the complexly interdependent OECD states, helped provide a foundation for my work.

*  *  *  *  *

To return to our personal narrative, Andy and I moved to Harvard in 1994, and later to Princeton, where Andy continues to teach. We had our first son in 1996; our second on the first day of 1999. My memories of those years are of Andy typing away furiously on the manuscript that became The Choice for Europe, typically with Edward strapped to his chest in a Baby Bjorn.

We no longer had time to read each other’s work and comment painstakingly on drafts; our days were filled with logistics and the daily scorecard of joint parenting. We have both documented our odyssey as the parents of a child who seemingly overnight became a determined teenager heading firmly in the wrong direction (Slaughter 2012; Moravcsik 2015). Andy became the lead parent; I came home from Washington; we both found ourselves making choices that we did not expect but do not regret. Our story as a couple may well have more practical impact, surprisingly to us, than any of our academic work.

And in the end, Andy has perhaps influenced me perhaps most as the father of our children. He parents the way he researches and writes: with intensity, passion, and rigor. His highest accolade, which our sons have picked up, is “serious.” When Andy says someone is serious, he means committed, deep and disciplined about a work or project, whether it’s a matter of vocation or avocation. When Andy goes to hear an opera, he spends weeks in advance listening to and watching videos of earlier performances to prepare himself.

Above all, Andy is deeply committed to a set of intellectual, artistic, and moral principles, perhaps best captured by the German idea of a “gebildeter Mann,” an educated man, but equally important, a cultured man. Knowledge is sterile without culture, the highest expression of the human spirit. Indeed, at some level, the love of learning and the exploration of the endless realms of the imagination merge.

This wonderful issue is the best possible tribute to not only to the ideas and knowledge, but also to the standards and attitudes that Andy has transmitted to his students. It is a celebration of thirty years of scholarship and teaching. And it is the perfect prelude to Andy’s next act.

References

Burley, Anne-Marie (1992). ‘Law among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine’, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 92, No. 8, pp. 1907-1996.

Burley, Anne-Marie, and Walter Mattli (1993). ‘Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration’, International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 41–76.

Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye (1977).  Power and Interdependence:  World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little Brown).

Moravcsik, Andrew (2015). ‘Why I Put My Wife’s Career First’, The Atlantic (October).

Phelan, William (2018). ‘European Legal Integration: Towards a More Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies, https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12782.

Slaughter, Anne-Marie (2012) “Why Women Still Can’t Have It All,” The Atlantic (July/August).

Slaughter, Anne-Marie (2017).  The Chessboard and The Web: Strategies of Connection in A Networked World (New Haven: Yale University Press).

The post A Euro-American Union: Reflections on an Academic Marriage appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

It’s a mark of the quality of the public Brexit debate that the title of this post could refer to pretty much any aspect of the negotiations to date: the mixture of ignorance, indifference and confusion has produced more than its fair share of mistimings and incorrect sequencings.

But today I’d like indulge in my own piece of (partial) mistiming, following a very useful discussion yesterday while giving evidence to the Exiting the EU Committee in Parliament.

The session was focused on the process and practice of ratifying the Withdrawal Agreement, but discussion also strayed into the transition and the movement to the future relationship from that transition.

As all the witnesses underlined, when transition ends (whenever that might be), it ends with a cliff edge, unless an agreement is in place to maintain some form of formal EU-UK cooperation. In that respect, it’s like 29 March 2020, but with the added complication that we currently don’t have a mechanism to extend transition as we can Article 50.

The question that arose was one of how one might square that cliff edge with the difficulty/impossibility (depending on how you feel about it) of concluding a comprehensive future relationship treaty of a kind that’s never been attempted before.

Part of the answer might lie in provisional implementation, which would allow a substantial amount of the contents to be in operation during the (likely lengthy) ratification process. The CETA example gives an indication of how that worked in a potentially-not-dissimilar case.

But that still leaves the complexity of drawing up and signing a single text. As CETA underlined, that single text contains everything and someone in the process might take exception, as Wallonia demonstrated in ratification.

So I’d like to try out some ideas here about how one could break up that single text into multiple ones, to help reduce the cross-linkage that delayed CETA approval and to potentially allow for a more stable move from transition to the end-state future relationship.

The architecture of this multiple-text would be relatively simple, in theory.

At its core would be a framework treaty. This would provide for a general structure of interactions between the EU and UK, including a management/dialogue process as well as a dispute settlement mechanism. Logically, these could be the same as those used in the transition period. In substantive policy terms, you’d also have the maintenance of the transition provisions, but with a mechanism for their suspension as new, sectoral agreements could be reached.

Those sectoral agreement would form the second element, and could be constructed as narrowly or as broadly as required, with negotiation and implementation running at variable speeds.

The merits of this approach would be multiple.

Firstly, it would move transition off the Article 50 basis to the proper one (Arts.207, 217, etc), thus removing a major legal headache for the EU and so providing much more stability for both parties.

Secondly, given the broad acceptance of the transition model to all parties now, the securing of the framework text might be simpler than engaging in to detailed modelling of the end-state future relationship, especially when some parties still aren’t sure what they want that end-state to be.

Thirdly, the framework text would not have to be a complete translation of transition into a new text: if parties could agree within those negotiations that they would end participation in specific areas, then that could already be included, allowing everyone to show that it wasn’t simply a holding exercise. Fisheries and agriculture might be obvious examples of this.

Fourthly, by push substantive changes out to sectoral agreements, it would be possible to avoid progress in one area getting held up by delays in another. So security cooperation could be fast-tracked, while arguments about services continue.

Fifthly, this arrangement would avoid some of the problems of the Swiss model, where multiple treaties were agreed simultaneously and are cross-linked. The EU doesn’t like this, since it’s complex and fiddly. In this proposal, the framework would be the single master document, and could impose conditions on what happens in the case of violation of any sectoral text (e.g. recourse to dispute resolution, or revision to transition provisions). The framework could also create a streamlined ratification process for the sectoral texts, to reduce ratification delays.

But problems would remain.

The central one is the framework document still remains a big and daunting document, and ratification would need to be in place by the end of transition, to ensure it was fully effective. That might be possible, because it’s more about can-kicking than making final decisions on the end-state, but equally that can-kicking might be cause for concern for some parties.

Much would depend on local political conditions around the negotiations. If parties (and particularly the UK) remain at the high level of politicisation on the subject, then the holding pattern that this approach would suggest might not be an option, especially if transition itself had to be extended to allow for ratification to be completed.

However, in the absence of clear consensus about what the end-state should be, thinking about ways to avoid falling off the cliff edge might be of interest.

And this brings us back to getting ahead of ourselves.

All of this clearly depends on an agreement being reached on Article 50 and the Withdrawal Agreement. That said, there are also the active discussions on the Political Declaration, where parties might usefully begin to think about where they’re heading, and how.

Too often in Brexit, decisions have been taken by default or in haste, because we’ve not had the capacity or willingness to raise our eyes from the immediate challenges that surround us.

In those cases, and in this case, that means making less-than-optimal choices. So maybe we can try to change how we do things.

The post Getting ahead of ourselves appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

As it stands, the United Kingdom is due to leave the EU on 29 March 2019 (as a consequence of invoking Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union on 29 March 2017 by the UK government), when the period for negotiating a withdrawal agreement will end unless an extension is agreed. The so-called “Great Repeal Bill” (which would repeal the European Communities Act of 1972 and converge in UK law all enactments previously in force under EU law), subsequently renamed the European Union (Withdrawal) bill,  was introduced to the House of Commons on 13 July 2017 and became law in June 2018.

This Act inter alia legislates for formal incorporation of up to 20,000 pieces of EU law onto the UK by:

– conversion of directly applicable EU Regulations into the UK law

– preservation of laws that have been made in the UK in order to implement its obligations imposed onto the UK as a consequence of its EU membership, and

– continuing to make available in the UK those rights enshrined in the EU treaties, that are relied upon directly in court

One of the areas of a particular regulatory concern in this regard is the situation with EU standards, or more precisely – EU Harmonised Standards, which set benchmarks for the safety and quality of products and services across multiple sectors —from energy and healthcare to transport — to protect consumers and facilitate cross-border trade.

As stated on the DG GROWTH website,

“A harmonised standard is a European standard developed by a recognised European Standards Organisation: CEN, CENELEC, or ETSI. It is created following a request from the European Commission to one of these organisations. Manufacturers, other economic operators, or conformity assessment bodies can use harmonised standards to demonstrate that products, services, or processes comply with relevant EU legislation.

The references of harmonised standards must be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. The purpose of this website is to provide access to the latest lists of references of harmonised standards and other European standards published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU)”[1].

There are currently 33 areas for regulating production of goods and performance of services in the EU covered by Harmonised Standards approach.

And whereas the above-mentioned European Union (Withdrawal) bill may preserve those EU standards applicable in the UK, it will not necessarily be reciprocal for British standards being valid or accepted throughout the EU after the 29 March 2017, as the UK will become a so-called ‘third country’ overnight.

In the subsequent chapters we will analyze various approaches and scenarios and will attempt to make suggestions as how to achieve a workable modus operandi.

[1] http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/european-standards/harmonised-standards_en

 

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Many people, including politicians and journalists, don’t understand the difference between ‘free trade’ and ‘frictionless trade’. This has caused a huge misunderstanding across the country, leading to the mess we are now in.

In summary, ‘free trade’ means that goods (sometimes only some goods) can be exported and imported between countries without tariffs – hence the phrase, ‘free trade’ or ‘tariff free’.

But those goods, even though tariff free, still have to go through customs and are subject to checks, often causing many delays.

And even though it’s called ‘free trade’ there are other barriers as well as customs – such as regulations, restrictions, strict compliances and complicated documentation, which hold things up. (See the graphic for some examples).

So, for example, a Canada-style trade agreement between the UK and the EU – so coveted by ardent Brexiters – could give us tariff-free trade, but it wouldn’t give us frictionless trade with the EU, which is vital to so many of our manufacturers.

(BMW UK imports around 90% of its parts from the EU to enable it to manufacture the Mini in the UK. If we no longer have frictionless trade with the EU, says BMW, it would destroy their just-in-time manufacturing process, meaning they would be ‘forced’ to move their Mini factory to Holland).

‘Frictionless trade’ means that goods, as well as being tariff free, go through customs without any checks. In fact, it means that for trade between those countries, there aren’t any customs or borders. 

Furthermore, with ‘frictionless trade’ there is a ‘level playing field’ between countries for the movement of goods – removing many of the barriers that exist with ‘free trade’ only.

That makes exports and imports between those countries super-efficient, leading to streamlined delivery of products, and of course, increased profits and more successful national economies.

But frictionless, although making international trade simpler and more easy, is more difficult to establish than just free trade. It means that countries have to enter what is known as a ‘customs union’ to enable borderless trade to take place between them.

Countries in a customs union agree a common external tariff for imports from non-member countries. The tariff revenue may then be shared between members, with the possibility that the country that collects the duty retaining a share (between 20 and 25% in the European customs union) to cover the additional administration costs associated with border trade.

A ‘customs union’ cannot just be based on trust. If countries agree to flatten their borders, then those countries need to agree rules, terms and conditions. And they need to agree on a mutually acceptable court to intervene if those rules are breached.

That’s so the process of sending goods between each other is not abused, for example, to export substandard or dangerous goods, or exporting goods that are banned, to another country in the customs union.

Agreeing those rules is fiendishly complicated, which is why it can take many years, sometimes decades, before countries can agree on the strict and comprehensive terms and conditions to enable them to open-up their borders to other countries for the purposes of trade.

But there’s more. For frictionless trade to function most fully and most successfully, it needs what are called the ‘four freedoms’ – free movement of goods, services, capital and people.

These ‘four freedoms’ represent the cornerstones of the EU’s Single Market, helping the EU to become the world’s largest and most successful trading bloc.

Although it would be technically possible to implement just some and not all the ‘four freedoms’, the success of the EU has been to conjoin all these freedoms into a single market, so that they work seamlessly together.

Studies show that the EU’s gross domestic product (GDP) has grown by several percentage points thanks to the Single Market and its four freedoms. This is hardly surprising, when one considers that two-thirds of all goods produced in the EU are exported to another EU country.

THE UK COULDN’T FUNCTION WITHOUT THE ‘4 FREEDOMS’

To try and understand how the EU couldn’t fully function without all four freedoms, imagine how our own union of the United Kingdom also couldn’t fully function without these four freedoms.

The UK currently benefits from two single markets. Our country’s single market. And our continent’s single market. They both operate in the same way and on the same principles.

Free movement of people, goods, services and capital between the three countries of England, Scotland, Wales and the province of Northern Ireland form the basis of our union of the United Kingdom.

It’s our single market. Just like the EU’s Single Market, it’s the glue that keeps us together.

Enabling people, goods, services and money to move without borders or restrictions across England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland is what makes us a functioning unity. It’s helped to make the UK one of the world’s richest and most successful countries, with common standards, values and history.

Free movement of people, goods, services and capital work together. They cannot be separated without causing discord and disorder across our nation.

Mess with just one of the four freedoms and our union of the UK would come undone. Not only business and employment would be affected, but peace and stability would be put at risk if we could not have the freedom to move, to do business, to trade, to send money and to work, without friction, across and between our four member ‘states’ of the UK.

It’s the same with the EU. The EU functions as a cohesive single market of 28 countries, just as the UK functions as a cohesive single market of four ‘countries’.

The EU Single Market is the glue that keeps European nations together. It has helped to make Europe the richest and most successful continent on the planet, with common standards, values and history.

The UK’s Single Market, and the EU’s Single Market, both represent significant achievements. They work.

But here’s one vital difference.

Frictionless trade between the four members of the UK is vital to our smooth functioning as a nation. But doing business with each other doesn’t make the UK significantly richer.

To do that, we need the UK to export our goods and services (and we export far more services than goods).

Doing frictionless trade with other EU countries makes Britain richer. Easy exports and imports with the EU bring us prosperity.

If we lose borderless, lowest-cost trade with our most important customers and suppliers right on our doorstop, Britain – and Britons – will be poorer.

Our frictionless exports to the rest of Europe bring us wealth. Yes, exports to countries outside the EU also bring us wealth.

But we need BOTH. And ONLY in the EU do we have both.

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On BBC’s Andrew Marr Show, Labour’s Shadow Brexit Secretary, Sir Keir Starmer, claimed that Britain could be in the EU Customs Union and still be free to negotiate its own trade agreements with other countries around the world.

This goes against the founding principles of the EU and everything that EU leaders have been saying from the start is impossible. (Article continues below the video.)

Andrew Marr asked Sir Keir:

“Have you spoken to a single senior figure inside the EU – anyone in any authority who has told you this is a runner?”

Sir Keir answered, “Yes.” But when Mr Marr asked him, “Who?”, he answered:

“I’m not going to disclose confidential meetings.”

This shouldn’t be kept confidential. If Sir Keir really believes that Labour could achieve a trade agreement with the EU that, frankly, goes against the very essence of what the European Union is all about, then he should be completely open about it.

As Mr Marr pointed out to Sir Keir, Article 3 of the Founding Treaty of the European Union clearly states that the EU shall have “exclusive competence” in its Customs Union.

Earlier this month, the EU’s Chief Brexit negotiator, Michel Barnier, asserted that allowing Britain to be in its Customs Union whilst at the same time entering into its own trade agreements with other countries would, “run counter to the very foundations of our Single Market of Europe.”

He added it would mean the UK could apply “lower tariffs” than the EU, thereby competing head on with the Single Market.  Asserted Mr Barnier:

“We believe this would create a serious risk of trade flows going elsewhere, to the detriment of our companies.”

Countries in a customs union agree a common external tariff for imports from non-member countries. The tariff revenue may then be shared between members, with the possibility that the country that collects the duty retaining a share (between 20 and 25% in the European customs union) to cover the additional administration costs associated with border trade.

But Sir Keir insisted:

“I would not have surfaced this as a Labour Party position if I hadn’t had the assurance that this was a negotiation that could be had.”

A negotiation had with who? Sir Keir refuses to say.

Clearly not with Mr Barnier, or the EU Council President, Donald Tusk.

Immediately after the referendum Mr Tusk warned that the Brexit negotiations would, “stick unconditionally to the Treaty rules and fundamental values.”

He added:

“There will be no compromises in this regard.”

Sir Keir’s proposal seems more, classic, cake-and-eat-it fantasy: promising to the British electorate a Brexit that simply cannot be delivered.

EU law expert, Professor Steve Peers commented:

“The UK could negotiate trade deals about services and non-tariff barriers, but not tariffs.”

However, being able to negotiate tariffs outside of the EU appears to be what Sir Keir is proposing.

I contacted Sir Keir to ask him:

“Can you please clarify if you meant that the UK could be in the EU Customs Union whilst also independently negotiating its own tariffs with other countries across the world?”

I pointed out to Sir Keir’s office:

“On the face of it, it seems as if Sir Keir is claiming that the UK could be in the EU Customs Union but at the same time negotiate its own tariff arrangements with other countries, which would go against EU rules. We look forward to clarification.”

But his office simply wrote back to say,

“Keir’s comments were consistent with what Jeremy Corbyn set out in his Brexit speech earlier this year when he said:

‘We have long argued that a customs union is a viable option for the final deal. So Labour would seek to negotiate a new comprehensive UK-EU customs union to ensure that there are no tariffs with Europe and to help avoid any need for a hard border in Northern Ireland.

‘But we are also clear that the option of a new UK customs union with the EU would need to ensure the UK has a say in future trade deals.’

But that simply explains The Labour Party’s Brexit policy; it does not explain how this policy could ever be achieved, or who in the EU would support such an arrangement.

A spokesperson for the Liberal Democrats told me,

“Labour’s proposal is like something out of ‘Alice in Wonderland’. It is just fantasy.

“No-deal or any deal, Brexit will take a sledgehammer to the UK economy. Labour must wake up to that. Sadly, Jeremy Corbyn opposition to Brexit is as absent now as it was during the referendum campaign.

“Liberal Democrats demand better.”

Liberal Democrats say they are, “united in fighting Brexit and giving the people the final say, including the option to remain in the EU.”

International trade expert, Jason J Hunter commented:

“The issue is that Keir Starmer has no evidence to back up his claim, refuses to provide anything at all, and he is contradicted by the facts and treaties.

“He’s like a one-man fantasist.”

Mr Hunter added that, in any event, it could take up to ten years for the UK to complete negotiations to be in the EU Customs Union. He added:

“In the meantime, companies are moving out of the UK and jobs are being lost. By the time we’ve got a worse deal than we already had, we won’t have much to export anyway.”

Sir Keir has proposed that any Brexit agreement would have to pass ‘six tests’ before Labour could support it:

① Does it ensure a strong and collaborative future relationship with the EU?

② Does it deliver the “exact same benefits” as we currently have as members of the Single Market and Customs Union?

③ Does it ensure the fair management of migration in the interests of the economy and communities?

④ Does it defend rights and protections and prevent a race to the bottom?

⑤ Does it protect national security and our capacity to tackle cross-border crime?

⑥ Does it deliver for all regions and nations of the UK?

All well and good, but anyone who knows anything about the EU (and one would hope Sir Keir does) must realise that the sum of the six tests can only be achieved by the UK remaining a full member of the EU.

This is not, however, Labour’s plan or policy as it has specifically ruled out the UK accepting ‘free movement of people’ – a strict pre-requisite for being in the EU’s Single Market.

Before the referendum, Theresa May said:

“It is not clear why other EU member states would give Britain a better deal than they themselves enjoy.”

But now, after the referendum, that’s precisely what both the Tory government and the Labour opposition are expecting the EU to offer us: a better deal than they themselves enjoy.

It’s all fantasy.

It’s time that the Tories and Labour were honest with the electorate.

No Brexit is better than any Brexit. Only continued full EU membership can offer us “the exact same benefits” as we have now as a member.

Once that’s fully realised and understood, there’s only one path that can and should be taken. #StopBrexit. That’s what needs to be done.

It doesn’t matter how it’s done. A people’s vote. A general election. Or politicians simply being truthful with us at last and admitting that Brexit will destroy our country.

What matters is that it is done, and done soon. Britain is now perilously close to the cliff edge.

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
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Labour's fantasy Brexit

→ Keir Starmer proposes ‘fairyland’ Customs Union – Please shareLABOUR’S FANTASY BREXIT (Video: 6 minutes)On BBC’s Andrew Marr Show last Sunday, Labour’s Shadow Brexit Secretary, Sir Keir Starmer, claimed that Britain could be in the EU Customs Union and still be free to negotiate its own trade agreements with other countries around the world.This goes against the founding principles of the EU and everything that EU leaders have been saying from the start is impossible. Andrew Marr asked Sir Keir, “Have you spoken to a single senior figure inside the EU – anyone in any authority who has told you this is a runner?”Sir Keir answered, “Yes.” But when Mr Marr asked him, “Who?”, he answered, “I’m not going to disclose confidential meetings.”This shouldn’t be kept confidential. If Sir Keir really believes that Labour could achieve a trade agreement with the EU that, frankly, goes against the very essence of what the European Union is all about, then he should be completely open about it.As Mr Marr pointed out to Sir Keir, Article 3 of the Founding Treaty of the European Union clearly states that the EU shall have “exclusive competence” in its Customs Union.Earlier this month, the EU’s Chief Brexit negotiator, Michel Barnier, asserted that allowing Britain to be in its Customs Union whilst at the same time entering into its own trade agreements with other countries would “run counter to the very foundations of our Single Market of Europe.”He added it would mean the UK could apply “lower tariffs” than the EU, thereby competing head on with the EU. “We believe this would create a serious risk of trade flows going elsewhere, to the detriment of our companies,” said Mr Barnier.But Sir Keir insisted, “I would not have surfaced this as a Labour Party position if I hadn’t had the assurance that this was a negotiation that could be had.”A negotiation had with who? Sir Keir refuses to say.Clearly not with Mr Barnier, or the EU Council President, Donald Tusk.Immediately after the referendum Mr Tusk warned that the Brexit negotiations would, “stick unconditionally to the Treaty rules and fundamental values.”He added, “There will be no compromises in this regard.”Sir Keir’s proposal seems more, classic, cake-and-eat-it fantasy: promising to the British electorate a Brexit that simply cannot be delivered.EU law expert, Professor Steve Peers commented, “The UK could negotiate trade deals about services and non-tariff barriers, but not tariffs.”However, being able to negotiate tariffs outside of the EU appears to be what Sir Keir is proposing. I contacted Sir Keir to ask him, “Can you please clarify if you meant that the UK could be in the EU Customs Union whilst also independently negotiating its own tariffs with other countries across the world?”I pointed out to Sir Keir’s office, “On the face of it, it seems as if Sir Keir is claiming that the UK could be in the EU Customs Union but at the same time negotiate its own tariff arrangements with other countries, which would go against EU rules. We look forward to clarification.”But his office simply wrote back to say, “Keir’s comments were consistent with what Jeremy Corbyn set out in his Brexit speech earlier this year when he said:“We have long argued that a customs union is a viable option for the final deal. So Labour would seek to negotiate a new comprehensive UK-EU customs union to ensure that there are no tariffs with Europe and to help avoid any need for a hard border in Northern Ireland. “But we are also clear that the option of a new UK customs union with the EU would need to ensure the UK has a say in future trade deals.” [Source: https://labour.org.uk/press/jeremy-corbyn-full-speech-britain-brexit/]But that simply explains The Labour Party's Brexit policy; it does not explain how this policy could ever be achieved, or who in the EU would support such an arrangement.A spokesperson for the Liberal Democrats told Reasons2Remain, “Labour’s proposal is like something out of ‘Alice in Wonderland’. It is just fantasy.”He added, “No-deal or any deal, Brexit will take a sledgehammer to the UK economy. Labour must wake up to that. Sadly, Jeremy Corbyn opposition to Brexit is as absent now as it was during the referendum campaign. “Liberal Democrats demand better. Only the Liberal Democrats are united in fighting Brexit and giving the people the final say, including the option to remain in the EU.”International trade expert, Jason J Hunter commented, “The issue is that Keir Starmer has no evidence to back up his claim, refuses to provide anything at all, and he is contradicted by the facts and treaties.“He's like a one-man fantasist.”Mr Hunter added that, in any event, it could take up to ten years for the UK to complete negotiations to be in the EU Customs Union.“In the meantime, companies are moving out of the UK and jobs are being lost. By the time we've got a worse deal than we already had, we won't have much to export anyway.”Sir Keir has proposed that any Brexit agreement would have to pass ‘six tests’ before Labour could support it:① Does it ensure a strong and collaborative future relationship with the EU? ② Does it deliver the “exact same benefits” as we currently have as members of the Single Market and Customs Union? ③ Does it ensure the fair management of migration in the interests of the economy and communities? ④ Does it defend rights and protections and prevent a race to the bottom? ⑤ Does it protect national security and our capacity to tackle cross-border crime? ⑥ Does it deliver for all regions and nations of the UK?All well and good, but anyone who knows anything about the EU (and one would hope Sir Keir does) must realise that the sum of the six tests can only be achieved by the UK remaining a full member of the EU. This is not, however, Labour’s plan or policy as it has specifically ruled out the UK accepting ‘free movement of people’ – a strict pre-requisite for being in the EU’s Single Market.Before the referendum, Theresa May said, “It is not clear why other EU member states would give Britain a better deal than they themselves enjoy.”But now, after the referendum, that’s precisely what both the Tory government and the Labour opposition are expecting the EU to offer us: a better deal than they themselves enjoy.It’s all fantasy. It’s time that the Tories and Labour were honest with the electorate. No Brexit is better than any Brexit. Only continued full EU membership can offer us “the exact same benefits” as we have now as a member. Once that’s fully realised and understood, there’s only one path that can and should be taken. #StopBrexit. It doesn’t matter how it’s done. A people’s vote. A general election. Or politicians simply being truthful with us at last and admitting that Brexit will destroy our country.What matters is that it is done, and done soon. Britain is now perilously close to the cliff edge. • Words and video production by Jon Danzig• Please re-Tweet, and follow Reasons2Remain on Twitter:twitter.com/Reasons2Remain/status/1055799923420119041• This video is now available on the Reasons2Remain YouTube channel: https://youtu.be/8FPrqG07oDw Before commenting on the Reasons2Remain campaign page, please read our new Rules of Engagement: Rules.Reasons2Remain.com********************************************► Watch Jon Danzig's 50-minute video: 'Can Britain Stop Brexit?' Go to CanBritainStopBrexit.com********************************************• To follow and support Reasons2Remain just ‘like’ the page, and please invite all your friends to like the page. ********************************************• Please recommend Reasons2Remain in the reviews section. Here's the link: facebook.com/Reasons2Remain/reviews/********************************************• Follow Reasons2Remain on Twitter: twitter.com/reasons2remain and Instagram: instagram.com/reasons2remain/********************************************• Explore our unique Reasons2Remain gallery of over 1,000 graphics and articles: reasons2remain.co.uk********************************************• Reasons2Remain is an entirely unfunded community campaign, unaffiliated with any other group or political party, and is run entirely by volunteers. If you'd like to help, please send us a private message.********************************************• © Reasons2Remain 2018. All our articles and graphics are the copyright of Reasons2Remain. We only allow sharing using the Facebook share button. Any other use requires our advance permission in writing.#STOPBREXIT #EXITBREXIT #PEOPLESVOTE #FINALSAY

Posted by Reasons2Remain on Friday, 26 October 2018

The post Labour’s fantasy Brexit appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

In the interesting times that have been unfolding since the EU referendum, Britain is seeing the emergence of a new identity. A new cultural-political identity is being forged by British Europeans who feel a strong affiliation with the continent by virtue of background or cultural affinity. It’s an identity that’s growing out of a sense of rupture and the loss of something that was previously held securely, linked to a determination to preserve something valuable for the future.

Such British Europeans – or we, for I am definitely one – could be called New Europeans. But perhaps that’s a term a bit too fixed for this identity-in-the-making, and we could more accurately be described as ‘Emerging Europeans’ – people aspiring to become New Europeans who, with all the uncertainty about Britain’s future relationship with Europe, are not sure what form(s) this evolving identity might take.

One clear expression of this new identity can be found in the many new campaign groups and grassroots organisations that have sprung up since 2016 with the aim of stopping Brexit or putting more checks into the political process of leaving the EU. Campaigning Remainers have clear goals and tribal affiliations, so much so that the adoption of symbols and branding – the EU colours and flag on T-shirts and berets – has been rapid and straightforward. But since their goals are time-limited (assuming the Brexit negotiations will eventually lead to some conclusions) these particular political identities are necessarily time-limited.

Emerging Europeans, meanwhile, tend to be looking for resources and connections beyond the policies and politics of Brexit, a looser, less tangible set of characteristics and values deep and positive enough to underpin a sense of belonging that will endure for the rest of their lives and potentially for generations to come. The historical story that defines this identity, while in the recent past, is already clear: a piece of political expediency executed amid some long-standing party politics, a hasty referendum and an unexpected result.

(Comparisons with the identities of peoples formed by what were, from their point of view, sudden catastrophes such as Palestinian nationalism, while limited, can be instructive here: the resulting identity is about more than a yearning for recovery; it is forged by a sense of loss. In this sense, Emerging Europeans are perhaps more determinedly, consciously European than they were before the Catastrophe of the Referendum.)

But while its origins are clear, the future form of this emerging identity is obscure, and the search for constructive ways of developing this fragile new identity is on. Various ways of preserving European citizenship are under discussion – at a recent conference held by New Europeans, academics raised the possibility of legal challenges to the unprecedented stripping of 65 million people of their European citizenship, while a European Citizens Initiative is slowly gathering endorsements. But the former would involve breaking new legal ground, and the latter is a long way off the million signatures needed to get considered by the European Commission, so these measures may be more aspirational than anything else.

In any case, Emerging Europeans will need a broader set of cultural resources to sustain their connection with the continent. For some of us, this will involve physically visiting our European neighbours, with all the experiential pleasures and challenges that only travel can bring. For others, it’s likely to be more about maintaining cultural links, with a possible resurgence of initiatives such as town twinning and old-fashioned cultural exchanges, along with the emergence of new professional networks and interest-group associations. In the years to come, the next stage of the European project will usher in a host of other ways of being European that currently lie beyond the visible horizon.

Join the discussion about Britain’s evolving relationship with Europe on Facebook here and find out more about Alex Klaushofer’s book project here.

The post Emerging Europeans – a new post-Brexit identity appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

This post first appeared at the EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy Blog 

 

Introduction

From May to July 2016, the Commission put forward a wide-ranging European Asylum package, which included the establishment of a European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA). The Council and the European Parliament reached a partial agreement on 28 June 2017 on twelve chapters of the Regulation on the future EUAA with the exception of Chapter 1 (“The European Union Agency for Asylum”), Chapter 3 (“Country information and guidance”), Chapter 5 (“Monitoring”), and Chapter 9 (“Organization of the Agency”). President Juncker announced in his speech on the 2018 State of the Union made on 12 September, the Commission’s intention to “further develop the European Asylum Agency to make sure that Member States get more European support in processing asylum seekers in line with the Geneva Convention”. On the same day, the Commission that welcomes the agreement concluded by the legislators released an amended proposal containing only targeted amendments reinforcing the operational tasks of the EUAA. This blog post analyzes the key novelties tabled in both 2016 and 2018 Commission proposals, and critically assesses what changes they will bring about to EASO’s current mandate in comparison with the mandate of the European Border and Coast Guard following Regulation 2016/1624 of 14 September 2016.

The Agency’s Monitoring Role

The European Border and Coast Guard agency determines a technical and operational strategy for European integrated border management, to which the Member States should conform to (article 3 Regulation 2016/1624). Although the EUAA is not mandated to set out a comprehensive strategy of asylum in a similar manner, the agency, through guidance on the situation in third countries of origin, will “ensure greater convergence and address disparities in the assessment of applications for international protection” (Proposal for a EUAA, COM(2016) 271 final, 04.05.2016, p. 7). The EUAA will “develop a common analysis on the situation in specific countries of origin and guidance notes to assist Member States in the assessment of relevant applications” (article 10(1) partial agreement EUAA). Importantly, as soon as the EUAA’s Management Board endorses the guidance notes, the Member States should take them into account when examining applications for international protection, without prejudice to their competence for deciding on individual applications (article 10(2a) partial agreement on the EUAA referred above).

The new monitoring role of the EUAA will also indirectly contribute to shape a common strategy of asylum in the EU. A key difference between EASO and the future EUAA will be its monitoring role in order to guarantee that the national authorities are sufficiently prepared to manage exceptional and sudden pressure in their asylum system. Should the EUAA’s information analysis raise serious concerns regarding the functioning or preparedness of a Member State’s asylum or reception systems, the agency, on its own initiative or at the request of the European Commission, may initiate a monitoring exercise (article 14(2) partial agreement EUAA).

The Member State concerned will receive the findings of the monitoring exercise and the draft recommendations of the EUAA’s Executive Director on the basis of which it should provide for comments. Taking Member State’s comments into account, the EUAA’s Management Board will, by a decision of two-thirds of its members, adopt those recommendations (article 14(3a) partial agreement EUAA). As with the EBCG’s vulnerability assessments (article 13 Regulation 2016/1624), the future EUAA will be conferred a recommendatory power in order to put forward measures to be adopted by the national authorities. Nevertheless, Member States will still maintain indirect control of the EUAA’s recommendations (see here) through the enhanced majority that is required in the Management Board.

Whereas the Commission did not initially propose that the EUAA’s Executive Director should be able to appoint experts from the staff of the agency to be deployed as liaison officers in Member States, the provisional text agreed on 28 June 2017 indicates that liaison officers “shall foster cooperation and dialogue between the Agency and the Member States’ authorities responsible for asylum and immigration and other relevant services” (article 14a(3) partial agreement EUAA). Like the EBCG’s liaison officers, they will facilitate the monitoring role of the agency by reporting regularly to the Executive Director on the situation of asylum in the Member States and their capacity to manage their asylum and reception systems effectively (article 14a(3) partial agreement EUAA).

 

The EUAA will thus be in charge of monitoring “the operational and technical application of the CEAS in order to prevent or identify possible shortcomings in the asylum and reception systems of Member States and to assess their capacity and preparedness to manage situations of disproportionate pressure so as to enhance the efficiency of those systems” (article 13(1) partial agreement EUAA). With this aim, the agency will namely assess the national procedures for international protection, staff available and reception conditions (i.e. infrastructure, equipment or financial resources) on the basis of the information provided by the Member State concerned and by relevant intergovernmental organisations or bodies, as well as by means of analysis on the situation of asylum and on-site visits that the agency may undertake (article 13 (3) and (4) partial agreement EUAA). This new monitoring task of the EUAA could so ultimately contribute to the effective and harmonised implementation of the CEAS by the Member States (see, here, here and here).

The Agency’s Expanded Operational Mandate

The EUAA will be in charge of organising and coordinating the appropriate operational support at the request of the Member States or upon the initiative of the agency in cases where the national asylum and reception systems are subject to exceptional pressure.

Following the lead of the EBCG’s Rapid Reaction Pool, an asylum reserve pool of a minimum of 500 persons should be made available by the Member States for their immediate deployment and should assist those national authorities subject to extraordinary migratory pressure (article 19A(6) partial agreement EUAA).

Moreover, the future Regulation on the EUAA details the functions of the agency in the recently established hotspots. Upon the request of a Member State facing an exceptional and sudden migratory pressure, the EUAA’s Executive Director should draw up a comprehensive reinforcement package consisting of various activities coordinated by the relevant Union agencies, and deploy Asylum Support Teams (ASTs) as part of migration management support teams (article 21(1) partial agreement EUAA). In 2018, the European Commission proposed to further expand, upon the request of a concerned Member State, the scope for the use of the migration management support teams to any situation and not necessarily limited to circumstances of extraordinary migratory pressure (new article 21, COM(2018) 633 final).

The Agency’s Competence to Intervene

Another important novelty that the EUAA will bring is the possibility of making an emergency intervention. This will happen if the functioning of the CEAS is jeopardized due to:

• the insufficient action of a Member State to address the disproportionate pressure on the asylum and reception systems in a Member State (article 22(1) partial agreement EUAA) or
• the refusal of the competent national authorities to request or accept assistance from the EUAA (article 22(1) partial agreement EUAA) or
• the unwillingness of a Member State to comply with the Commission’s recommendations to implement an action plan intended to address serious shortcomings identified during a monitoring assessment (article 14(3a) partial agreement EUAA).

The procedure set out in article 19(1) of the EBCG Regulation regarding situations at the external borders requiring urgent action will be, to a more limited extent, replicated for the EUAA. The proposal for a Regulation on an EUAA originally stated that the Commission would be the EU institution in charge of adopting a decision by means of an implementing act to be taken by the agency in order to support the Member State concerned. However, the provisional text finally states that the Council should be the authority responsible for adopting such an implementing act like it is the case for the EBCG (article 22 partial agreement EUAA).

Three days after the Council adopts its implementing act, the EUAA’s Executive Director will draw up an Operational Plan and determine the details of the practical implementation of the Council’s decision (article 22(2) partial agreement EUAA). Subsequently, the Member State concerned will have three days to reach an agreement with the Executive Director on the Operational Plan and will immediately cooperate with the agency to facilitate the practical execution of the measures put forward (article 22(4) partial agreement EUAA).

The Agency’s Role in Examining Asylum Applications

Another novelty in comparison to the EASO will be the involvement of the EUAA in the examination of international protection applications. Several provisions of the EUAA mention that the agency will assist or facilitate the Member States in examining the applications of international protection submitted to their asylum systems. Alongside the operational and technical assistance that the EUAA should provide to Member States upon their request, the agency will facilitate the examination of applications for international protection (article 16(2)(b) partial agreement EUAA) submitted to the competent national authorities. In this regard, the Asylum Support Teams (ASTs) “should support Member States with operational and technical measures, including (…) by knowledge of the handling and management of asylum cases, as well as by assisting national authorities competent for the examination of applications for international protection and by assisting with relocation or transfer of applicants or beneficiaries of international protection” (recital 16 partial agreement EUAA).

The European Commission’s proposal tabled on September 2018 mainly centers on expanding the EUAA’s role in the administrative procedure for international protection. Specifically, the new Article 16a states that the EUAA’s asylum support teams should, among other measures, identify any needs for special procedural guarantees, carry out the admissibility and substantive interview, assess the evidence, and prepare decisions on applications for international protection. This means that, upon the request of a Member State, the future EUAA will be able to draft decisions on asylum applications. However, the text of the Regulation highlights that the decisions on individual applications for asylum remain the Member States’ sole responsibility (Article 16a).

Assessing the extent of the Agency’s power to examine asylum applications

Recital 46 of the Commission proposal repeats that “the competence to take decisions by Member States’ asylum authorities on individual applications for international protection remains with Member States”. The Commission, both in 2016 and 2018, clearly establishes that the future EUAA cannot be conferred decision-making powers.

The question to be answered is whether the EUAA will be able to jointly process applications for international protection, and if it cannot, to what extent the agency may support the processing of asylum applications. In 2013, the Commission adopted a study in which the concept of “joint processing” was defined as “an arrangement under which all asylum claims within the EU are processed jointly by an EU authority assuming responsibility for both preparation and decision on all cases, as well as subsequent distribution of recognized beneficiaries of international protection and return of those not in need of protection” (p. 114). This study put forward four options that progressively move from supporting the Member States in processing asylum applications through an agency such as EASO/EUAA, to designing a centralized EU authority with decision-making powers and responsible for all asylum processing.

Currently, the Member States remain exclusively competent to adopt decisions concerning the admissibility and applications for international protection. The next level of European integration would entail the introduction of a mechanism of joint processing in situations where a Member State is subject to an extraordinary number of asylum applications. Joint processing teams of EASO would be deployed and make recommendations on asylum cases to the requesting Member State, which would continue to have exclusive decision-making powers.

The ASTs of EASO deployed in the Greek hotspots are in practice already adopting recommendations on the admissibility of the international protection applications. These recommendations are in fact largely accepted by the Greek Asylum Service’s officials when adopting a decision (see here, here and here). Precisely, the future EUAA, upon the request of a concerned Member State, will formally be conferred the power to facilitate the examination of applications for international protection. Actually, the envisaged EEUA Regulation provides a legal basis to the practice that the EASO has already developed in Greece as acknowledged by the European Ombusdman in its decision on a complaint about EASO’s role in that Member State.

However, the future EUAA will be far from deciding, in first instance and in appeal, every asylum application within the EU. Instead, the European Commission has opted to reinforce the operational tasks of EASO and maintain the Member States as the exclusive decision-making authorities. Centralizing the asylum decision-making process would ensure a full harmonization of the national procedures and foster a consistent evaluation of protection needs. Nevertheless, this option demands a “major institutional transformation” and “substantial resources” that can only be envisioned in the long-term.

There are also doubts as to whether article 78(2) TFEU is a sufficient legal basis for conferring the power to exclusively adopt binding decisions on all asylum claims to a EU authority. Pursuant article 78(2)(d) TFEU, the EU shall ensure: “(…) common procedures for the granting and withdrawing of uniform asylum or subsidiary protection status”. The 2013 Commission’s study on the feasibility of joint processing of asylum applications in the EU considers that article 78(2) TFEU, read together with articles 78(1) and 80 TFEU, represents an adequate legal basis and opens up the possibility for a completely harmonized EU-based approach for joint processing of asylum applications within the EU. Tsourdiunderlines however that a EU-level processing scenario in which decisions would be entirely undertaken by a EU authority instead of the Member States is legally impossible under article 78(2)(e) TFEU “which envisages that ‘a Member State’ is ultimately responsible for the examination of an application” that is the legal basis if the Dublin regulation.

Conclusion

Although the European Commission keeps referring to a fully-fledged agency for asylum matters in the EU, the EUAA will neither be conferred decision-making powers regarding asylum applications, nor executive or enforcement tasks on the ground. As is the case with the EBCG that did not establish a European Border Guard for managing the European external borders (see here, here, here or here), the future EUAA will rather be given an assisting role in the examination of applications of international protection by Member States (see here). The EUAA will be far from processing and deciding asylum applications made in the EU. Instead, the future Regulation on the EUAA opts for reinforcing the operational tasks of the agency and maintaining the Member States as the exclusive decision-making authorities. This should be de jure the situation in the future but once again one will have to check what will happen de facto.

The post From EASO to the European Agency for Asylum: “Business as Usual?” appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Debate on 2021-27 budget is underway

The EU Commission wants to have agreement on the guidelines for the budgetary framework period 2021-27 by the planned summit in Romania on May 9th2019, based on proposals it made in May this year. Although agreement that early is unlikely, the debate on this issue of fundamental importance is underway and hardly anyone is paying attention. It is true that the EU budget at close to 1% of GDP is small in relation to total public expenditure at all tiers of government, of 40-50% of GDP, and that it is smaller in relative terms than most people in the EU think it is. However, the absolute amount of money is large at about €1trn proposed over the period 2021-27 and the image of the EU amongst voters is and will be affected by where the money goes.

As argued in by last blog, the priorities for spending need radically changing from the priorities of the early 1990s when the present structure of the budget was established under Jacques Delors, in line with present day priorities like migration and climate change.

 

Commission links budgetary compliance to rule of law

Another issue which the Commission rightly emphasized in a whole new and separate section of its proposals is ensuring that the money goes where it is intended and thus the link between spending and the rule of law. While the Commission has to authorise spending, its administration and thus ensuring that the funds are spent as intended is mainly in the hands of national and local tiers of government, with the courts taking a role if there are allegations of fraud or corruption. Because of justified concerns of embezzlement by organized crime,  the southern regions of Italy have received less than would otherwise have been their due over decades. However, Italy has been consistently characterised by a judiciary whose actions may have sometimes been controversial but have virtually always been independent of the government of the day. For example, during Silvio Berlusconi’s long periods as head of government over 20 years he was continually been in conflict with the courts.

The separation of powers between executive, parliament and judiciary is a fundamental precondition of the rule of law and of democratic institutions as developed over the last 250 years. Amongst the Copenhagen Criteria laid down at the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993, future members  were required to respect the rule of law and under the detailed Conditions for Membership, Chapter 23 on the Judiciary and Fundamental Rights made clear that this required an independent judiciary, since the rule of law must apply to all, including government. But even if the Criteria were met at the time that new members acceded, there was no guarantee that they would continue to be met. And indeed there has recently been a row-back over the Criteria, especially in Poland and Hungary regarding the independence of the judiciary (for example in Poland judges have been made to retire earlier than under previous rules to make way for government appointees). Such backsliding seems of most concern amongst new member states but there should also be no complacency about actual and possible developments in older member states.

The introduction to the section of the May 2nd, 2018 budget framework proposals on Sound Financial Management and the Rule of Law does not pull its punches in linking the two, stating that: “Only an independent judiciary and legal certainty in all member states can ultimately guarantee that money from the EU budget is sufficiently protected”.

 

Murder of journalists investigating corruption and misuse of EU funds

The link between ensuring EU money is spent as intended and the rule of law was tragically illustrated by the murder in February 2018 of the Slovak journalist Jan Koviak, together with his girl-friend, who had been investigating corruption involving the governing party Smer and links between crime in Slovakia and the Calabrian organised crime group N’drangheta, which among other things appears to have been passing on advice on how to embezzle EU agricultural funds. More recently a TV presenter in Bulgaria who had investigated fraudulent use of EU funds was killed on October 6th, although in this case it is possible that the killing was not linked to her work. On October 16th, 2017, the leading independent journalist, who had alleged corruption at a high level in the Maltese government, Daphne Caruana Galizia, was killed. While her work was not specifically concerned with EU funds, if the level of corruption is as serious as she alleged, it would certainly warrant a high degree of concern as to whether the use of EU funds in Malta is or will be free from misuse.

 

Budget debate is central to the future of the EU

The issue the Commission is highlighting is therefore a serious one with concerns not limited to the countries mentioned above. There is little chance that the proposal will be adopted as it stands, given that all member states have to agree to the budgetary framework and some will feel it is directed at them. On the other hand the budget also has to be agreed by member states which are not keen on continuing to hand over large net payments to countries which they do not think share their view of the EU’s values. Agreeing the next budgetary framework is therefore likely to be difficult both for this reason and because there will be big differences on the priorities for the new budgetary period. A long stand-off is probable and a crisis with no budget agreed, or only one to carry on essential administrative spending, is possible. Although non-administrative budget expenditure is not essential to the EU’s functioning it does indicate its objectives and values. The coming debate is therefore crucial to the EU’s future. It is also crucial that be an open debate. @

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The European Union consists of 28 member states. All treaty changes or enlargement of the EU require the unanimous consent of every single member, however large or small.

The Union of the United Kingdom consists of four member states: England, Scotland, Wales and the province of Northern Ireland.

In the referendum, two of them voted to remain in the EU: Scotland and Northern Ireland. Yet the UK government is going ahead with Brexit, without the unanimous consent of all the UK’s member states.

That couldn’t happen in the European Union, where all member states of the EU, however large or small, each have an equal vote and a veto on new treaties.

• If the UK was run on the same democratic principles as the EU, then the UK could not leave the European Union without the unanimous agreement of all its four members: England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

But in the 2016 EU referendum, the democratic wishes of Scotland and Northern Ireland were ignored by the UK government, splitting the United Kingdom in two.

Similarly, Gibraltar – a British Overseas Territory which also had a vote in the EU referendum and chose by 96% to Remain in the EU – saw their objections to Brexit ignored.

Why offer Gibraltar a vote in the first place if their vote basically – and literally – counted for nothing?

• Even though Northern Ireland voted for Remain, one party – the pro-Brexit DUP – is being allowed to dictate what future relationship the province will have with the EU (and therefore the entire UK’s relationship with the EU).

That’s because it’s only the DUP that’s keeping the Tories in power, following last year’s general election, in which the Conservatives saw their majority wiped out.

• Theresa May called for a snap general election last year as she said she needed a bigger mandate to push through her brand of Brexit.

But even though she lost her mandate entirely, she’s still going ahead with her hard Brexit plans, as if the general election had never taken place.

• The EU’s remaining 27 member states will have a greater say and vote on the final Brexit deal than the devolved areas of the UK and the overseas territory of Gibraltar, who are being given no say.

Even the European Parliament will have a more meaningful vote on Brexit than our Parliament in Westminster. The European Parliament can withhold consent to the final Brexit agreement, thereby giving it a veto.

• Theresa May has never wanted our Parliament to have a meaningful vote on Brexit – that’s why the issue had to be dragged through the courts, when she tried to pass Brexit by bypassing Parliament (something she’s continued to attempt to do, despite the High and Supreme Courts damning rulings against her).

Nonetheless, Parliament will only have the power to accept or reject the Brexit deal on offer. If Parliament rejects the deal, the government would have to propose a new plan – but Parliament would not have the power to amend such a plan, unless the Speaker of the House decided otherwise.

• Brexiters claim that the EU is ‘undemocratic’.

But in reality, the EU is more democratic than our system in the UK, where we still have an unelected second chamber; where the wishes of devolved UK states can be ignored, and where we still have an antiquated voting system of first-past-the-post (MEPs are voted to the European Parliament using a system of proportional representation).

• Brexiters tell us that the EU is run by faceless bureaucrats.

But the truth is that all EU laws can only be passed by the democratically elected European Parliament, in concert with the Council of Ministers, that comprise the ministers of democratically elected governments of EU member states.

The European Commission is the servant of the EU, and not its master. The European Parliament elects the Commission President, must democratically approve each Commissioner, and has the power to dismiss the entire Commission.

(If that isn’t democratic, I don’t know what is.)

• Brexiters claim that if the EU doesn’t like the result of a referendum, it just calls for another referendum ‘until it gets the result it wants’. But this is entirely untrue.

The EU has no power to call for a referendum in a member state, let alone to call for another referendum if they ‘don’t like the result’. Only a national government, with the consent of their parliament, can call for a referendum or subsequent referendums.

Furthermore, there is nothing undemocratic about having another vote. That’s precisely what democracy is about.

• For example, France and Ireland voted in favour of the Maastricht Treaty. But Denmark did not.

The Danish government subsequently negotiated four significant concessions to the Treaty on Economic and Monetary Union, Union Citizenship, Justice and Home Affairs and Common Defence.

Consequently, Denmark, with the democratic consent of Denmark’s Parliament, presented these new concessions to the Danish electorate in a second referendum. In this second referendum, the Danes voted in favour of the Treaty, based on the concessions negotiated.

• Similarly, Ireland voted against the Treaty of Lisbon. The Irish government then negotiated significant concessions to the Treaty, and with the consent of Ireland’s parliament, held another referendum, in which Ireland voted in favour of the Treaty based on the amendments negotiated.

None of this was undemocratic. It was democracy at work.

Does anyone really think that the citizens of Ireland, or Denmark, both proud and independent peoples, could be ‘forced’ to vote in a way they didn’t want?

• Just after the referendum, Brexiters mocked that a region of Belgium, called Wallonia, had the power to block the new free trade agreement between Canada and the EU.

But that shows how Belgium, a country only a tenth the size of the UK, has a better democracy than ours.

Unlike in the UK, under Belgium’s constitution, regional parliaments such as the one governing Wallonia, must give their unanimous agreement before Belgium, as an EU member state, can give its consent to any EU Treaty.

The regions of Belgium have much more democratic power than our devolved parliaments of the UK. That’s how Wallonia came to block the EU-Canada agreement, called Ceta.

Eventually, Wallonia sought and received assurances about the Ceta deal, and lifted their objections, so the EU-Canada free trade agreement could go ahead, which it did.

The EU-Canada trade agreement, incidentally, is calculated to be worth an estimated £1.3bn a year to Britain – but of course only whilst we are an EU member.

During 2016, whilst the parliaments of Belgium and all the other EU countries were democratically considering Ceta, the UK’s international trade secretary, Liam Fox, had to apologise to MPs for not allowing our Parliament to have a debate on the Ceta deal.

• There’s something else that makes Belgium arguably more democratically accountable than the UK.

Since 1894 voting in Belgium’s elections has been compulsory. Everyone must vote.

Contrast Belgium’s system of compulsory voting with what happened in Britain’s referendum, where around 20 million people who could vote, didn’t vote.

That included around 13 million who registered to vote but didn’t, and a further estimated 7 million who could have registered to vote, but didn’t.

What a difference 20 million voters could have made to the EU referendum result if it had been compulsory for them to vote.

Polls indicate that those 13 million who registered to vote but didn’t would have supported Remain 2-to-1.

So, in summary:

• The Tory government is going ahead with Brexit, without the unanimous consent of all the UK’s four member states, and without the consent of our overseas territory, the state of Gibraltar.
  
• Only a minority of the electorate voted for Leave, just 37% – the majority either voted for Remain or didn’t vote.  In most referendums around the world non-voters do count, and a  ‘super majority’ is required before change can take place. (Just 37% of members would not be enough to change the constitution of most political parties.  Just 37% of the electorate wasn’t enough to give Scotland its own assembly in a 1979 referendum, even though the ‘Yes’ vote won. Just 37% of MPs would not be enough to call for an early General Election. Just 37% of a trade union’s members – under the law – would not be enough to call for strike action.)
• Many people directly affected by the outcome of the referendum were denied a vote: Britons who’d lived abroad for more than 15 years (even though the Tory manifesto promised them a vote) and citizens from the rest of the EU who had made Britain their home, in many cases for decades.
• Although Northern Ireland voted for Remain, just one small Northern Ireland party, the pro-Brexit DUP, is being allowed to have the final say on the province’s (and therefore the UK’s) future relationship with the EU, because that party is keeping Mrs May and her Tories in office.
• The government has refused to give Parliament a vote on whether Britain should leave the EU, saying the decision was already made by the referendum. Yet, the Supreme Court ruled that only Parliament could make the decision, as the EU referendum was advisory only. This is now a legal challenge against the government. See A50challenge.uk
• The Tory government plans to use ancient Henry VIII powers to prevent Parliament from having a say on which EU laws and protections should be kept, amended or scrapped after Brexit.
• The Tory government does not want our Parliament to have a proper vote on the final Brexit deal – there will be no option for Parliament to reject Brexit if it doesn’t like the deal. Parliament will be able to reject the deal, in which case Britain could end up leaving the EU without any deal.
• The Leave campaign had to rely on lies to win. All the reasons to leave the EU were based on misinformation, mistruths and false promises. (Yes, all of them).
• Evidence is now emerging of alleged fraud, and criminal acts by Vote Leave, Cambridge Analytica, and Aggregate IQ: illegal overspending, psychologically profiling and targeting people with online ads, based on masses of stolen data. All this could have illegally swung the referendum vote in favour of Leave – especially as the margin for Leave was wafer thin.
• Lawyers are consequently calling for the Brexit vote to be declared void for irregularity, but the government has shown no interest.
• Unlike in other democracies that have held second referendums, the government is refusing the give us, ‘the people’, a second say on Brexit, even though nobody knew anything about the final and finer details of Brexit in the referendum (and we still don’t know).

So, which has the better system of democracy: the EU or the UK?

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• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes

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• Join the discussions about this article on Facebook and Twitter:

As @Jon_Danzig writes in his blog today, ‘If the UK was run on the same democratic principles as the #EU, then we couldn't do #Brexit without the agreement of England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.’ Please widely share his in-depth report #FinalSay https://t.co/Mw8y3Va7K7

— Reasons2Remain #FBPE (@Reasons2Remain) October 21, 2018

 

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