Foreign Policy Blogs

On November 14, the Mekong River Commission (MRC) praised China’s “emergency water release” earlier this year with helping alleviate a severe drought in the Mekong River Basin. In a statement by Pham Tuan Phan, the chief executive officer of MRC, Phan said the water release from China’s Jinghong Reservoir in China’s southwest province of Yunnan “shows the positive impact of China’s cooperation on the drought management.”

The statement follows the release of an MRC report published in late October, produced with the cooperation with China’s Ministry of Water Resources. The MRC was established in 1995 as an intergovernmental organisation to work with the governments of Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and Viet Nam “to jointly manage the shared water resources and the sustainable development of the Mekong River.”

However, some experts are calling the praise by the MRC unjustified. The Cambodian Ministry of Water Resources stated, at the time of the water release, that it was unlikely to have much of an impact. Ian Thomas, a former technical adviser at the MRC, called last week’s report was “a stinking pile of codswallop”, believing it did little to address the critically low water levels in Cambodia’s Tonle Sap, saying “Cambodia is the real loser”, although conceding it did help remove salt from the delta in Vietnam.

Experts have also downplayed the perception that China’s water release was altruistic, with Thomas saying it was necessary for the dam to properly function, and Brian Beyler of the Stimson Center calling the move “perfectly crafted public relations”, adding it “was not unique and undeserved of praise”. Beyler also criticized the water release as a one-off, arguing consistent releases would do more to alleviate drought and allow for “farmers and downstream governments to prepare and make prudent decisions”.

In downstream Vietnam, authorities are particularly concerned over agriculture in the Mekong Delta and its reliance on upstream water supplies. The latest El Nino weather patterns caused the rainy season to begin late and finish early in 2015, with average rainfall across the river basin down by between 20 to 50% and salt water intrusion increasing some 6-9 miles inland. Some experts claimed as much as 50% of the 2.2 million hectares (5.4 million acres) of arable land in the delta had been hit by salinization due to the drought.

The situation became so grave last March, that Hanoi was forced to send a formal request to Beijing requesting for the release of more water from one one of China’s hydropower stations. Fortunately for Hanoi, Beijing granted their request, but to be in a position of dependency cannot be comforting for the Vietnamese, especially if the next request comes during a period of conflict over South China Sea (East Sea) claims.

The post The Alarming Dependency of Downstream Mekong River Countries appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

On the campaign trail, President-Elect Trump’s virulent rhetoric linked the prospect of terrorism to Muslim immigration. Banning Muslims from entering the country, then compelling American Muslims to register with the government, emerged as campaign policy proposals. Concurrently, the Trump campaign fed a strain of intolerance and extremism domestically that has now been further empowered by his victory and his appointment of advisors known for their own inflammatory views.

Extremism is on the rise in America—in its electorate and potentially in its government. At the same time, combatting extremism abroad remains a policy priority. How do these facts relate?

A November 15 forum at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) marked the release of Turning Point, a report commissioned by CSIS to outline “a new comprehensive strategy for combating violent extremism” (CVE).

The word “new” meant that no truly comprehensive strategy had yet been identified and implemented. The word “comprehensive” proposed a marriage between America’s “hard power” capabilities for CVE—its military and intelligence capacity—and the “soft power” of U.S. cultural and economic influence. The CSIS Commission on Countering Violent Extremism is chaired by former Secretary of Defense and CIA Director Leon Panetta and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, both men of deep experience at the highest levels of government who are familiar both with the use of force and its limits.

Trump’s surprise victory colored the Commission’s presentation of its findings. Hillary Clinton’s tenure as Secretary of State included actions that pointed to some receptivity to soft power. She implemented a Quadrennial Development Review modeled on the Defense Department’s Quadrennial Defense Review and aimed at targeting America’s development funding to unstable regions that might otherwise foster terrorism.

Trump, by contrast, pledged to “bomb the hell out of ISIS” while claiming a secret plan to defeat it—a commitment to hard power that was as bellicose as it was vague.

With a growing global population of Muslims under 30, and martyrdom as a recruitment tool, demographics point to the limitations of a hard power solution to extremism. CSIS Senior Advisor and former Deputy National Security Advisor Juan Zarate put it bluntly: “you can’t kill your way out of this problem”.

Instead, the Commission’s plan would degrade the power that distortions of Islam and other extremist ideologies hold over individuals, particularly youth. It proposes a long-term battle for the hearts and minds of those susceptible to extremist ideologies that will draw on America’s hard power and soft power resources.

Some recommendations in Turning Point reflect the U.S. government’s proven ability to project hard power. One recommendation would have the U.S. build a new international force capability to “quickly dislodge terrorist groups that control territory, avert and respond to immediate threats, (and) weaken violent extremists’ projection of strength”.

So long as ISIS or groups like to aim to wrest and hold territory from sovereign states, a military-led solution to extremism is vital. Other recommendations—directing $1B in new funding to CVE and appointing a new White House assistant to the president for CVE—speak to government’s ability to direct money and personnel at problems. They are also measurable outcomes.

Recommendations covering the soft power side of the battle express ideals rather than concrete actions. Calling for “Expanding CVE models”, the Commission asks America and partner nations “to enlarge the CVE ecosystem, creating flexible platforms for funding, implementing, and replicating proven efforts to address the ideologies, narratives, and manifestations of violent extremism”. Governments are not expected to create the solutions; rather, government funding should catalyze private sector and philanthropic funding of CVE activities by NGOs.

Embedded here are two realizations: first, we do not really know what successful CVE solutions will look like; second, government is not the forum in which to create them. Commissioners recognize the role that social media plays in changing the CVE landscape—both threat and response. Those most susceptible to extremist ideology are “digital natives”, in the words of Commissioner Farah Pandith. Social media networks are manipulated to foment extremism and should be used as CVE platforms.

Direct government involvement in battles of religious ideology, however, gets tricky. Commissioner Mohamed Magid, Imam of the All Dulles Muslim Society, acknowledged that Muslim communities must communicate the true values of the faith, and maintained that “government should not be active in religion”. That is an American value.

It is also a political reality that free governments can share ideas but they cannot impose them. Think of a strong public library system: a local government can and should build it, but it cannot tell its people when to go and what to read.

Soft power has been denigrated in part because its tools and outcomes are less quantifiable than its hard power counterparts. Then hard power fell on hard times. The Iraq War—America’s most recent exercise in hard power—has not yet produced its promised promotion of democracy in the Middle East. President Obama embraced aspects of hard power – particularly the use of drones – but his overall foreign policy recognized the limits of force as a policy tool.

The biggest obstacle to America’s use of soft power against extremism is the recent emergence of extremism in America. The Commission recommends that “The United States should put human rights at the center of CVE, ensuring that its engagement with domestic and foreign actors advances the rule of law, dignity and accountability”. It certainly should. To do this, however, America must first put human rights front and center at home.

The 2016 election exposed the degree to which racism, sexism, xenophobia and homophobia still plague America. To have any credibility on the issue abroad, America must steadfastly protect the human rights of its own citizens. We must take the plank out of our own eye first. That done, America has power to spare in helping others do so abroad.

“When all you have is a hammer”, the saying goes, “all problems become nails.” The bad news is the CVE represents a complex array of problems. The good news is America has more tools in hand to fight it than it has been using. Time to pick them up.

The post Fighting Extremism in the Trump Age appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Frustrated anti-government protesters flooded the streets of Caracas, Venezuela in October 2016. (Rodrigo Abd/AP)

This summer I wrote about the economic and political struggles in Venezuela. Unfortunately the country’s situation has not greatly improved since, and recent events have shown the frustration and discontent with President Nicolas Maduro’s leadership. Nevertheless, each side has made some recent concessions which offer hope.

Opposition parties began a petition in May asking for a recall election which could remove Maduro from power. Yet such an action would only take place with the approval of Venezuela’s supreme court, which is controlled by Maduro.

In the last few weeks this dispute reached a boiling point. In late October, the country’s supreme court suspended the recall election petition, a move derided by the U.S. State Department and the Organization of American States. Venezuelan lawmakers announced that this decision amounted to Maduro staging a coup. Outraged, they vowed to put the president on trial themselves.

Despite growing opposition, some protests rose up in support of the government. Days after the court decision a legislative session was disrupted by hundreds of pro-government protesters who muscled their way onto the floor yelling “Congress will fall!”

Though symbolic, this action was easily dwarfed by the tens of thousands of Venezuelans who subsequently took to the streets of Caracas and other cities demanding Maduro’s removal from power. Opposition leaders termed the demonstrations of outrage “the takeover of Venezuela.”

Polls indicate as much as 80% of Venezuelans want him removed from office, tired of the stagnating economy, food shortages, and significant health care deficiencies. Victoria Rodriguez of Caracas, a recent high school graduate, told the Associated Press she hoped to vote to cast her first vote to support recalling Maduro. Rodriguez further lamented her “emptying country,” noting that 15 of her 25 classmates have left Venezuela since graduation, which is just one reflection of the country’s hardships.

After the court decision to suspend the recall intensified the political crisis, various interests have attempted to broker a resolution. Representatives of Vatican City tried to organize talks between Maduro’s government and the opposition but with limited success. Some common ground was reached by Nov. 14, 2016, as both sides agreed to cooperate to address the food and medicine shortages. However some anti-government activists characterized these developments as a ploy by Maduro to divert attention from the main issue: reinstating the recall referendum. Opposition protests were called off when the Vatican-backed talks began with the understanding that a recall vote would be on the table.

Despite the mistrust, both sides have made some concessions. On Nov. 15 the opposition consented to the resignation of 3 legislators the government accused of committing fraud. Maduro commended the move, stating “The process begins for the National Assembly to respect the Supreme Court, respect the Constitution.”

As reconciliation talks continued, three days later the government released Rosmit Mantilla, a politician who had been imprisoned on suspicion of fomenting violent protests against Maduro in 2014. Mantilla had been a key figure in the opposition-controlled congress. While encouraged by the government releasing Mantilla as a first step, Amnesty International expressed the opinion of many opposition supporters in saying, “He should have never been made to spend a second behind bars. The Venezuelan authorities must now build on this positive step and release all imprisoned activists and political leaders whose only ‘crime’ was to disagree with the government.”

As long as Maduro controls Venezuela’s court system, it seems unlikely the government will agree to a recall election. Therefore the opposition may be better served focusing on ensuring that the government provides the resources and support services needed by so many Venezuelans. With the support of outside groups, they should demand that the government provide these services. If it fails or refuses, anti-government groups will be in a better position to demand political change. They have shown a willingness to reconcile, now it is the government’s turn. Presently, this is the best chance for the country’s recovery.

The post Venezuela’s Struggles Continue as Government and Opposition Clash appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

(Associated Press)

Not long ago, a war of words between the Singaporean Ambassador to China, Stanley Loh, and the chief editor of Global Times, Hu Xijin, broke out. The incident provided a rare opportunity to observe the characteristics of the two countries’ thinking and logic in recent years.

The fuse of the polemic was a relatively small, technical issue with limited relation with international pattern, yet the story must begin from here. Earlier this year in July, Laos, as the rotating presidency of ASEAN, submitted a request to Iran, the rotating presidency of the 17th Non-Aligned Movement Summit. It hoped to revise the ‘Southeast Asia’ paragraph of the draft Final Outcome Document, stating the increasingly serious concern of some leaders and ministers to the South China Sea situation.

However, the new rotating presidency and China’s ally Venezuela rejected the amendment. Thus, ASEAN wrote to the Foreign Affairs Minister of Venezuela, stating ‘ASEAN expressed reservations about the existing paragraph on the South China Sea issue and said that it could not reflect the ASEAN position and hoped that the General Assembly would record the attitude of ASEAN and the earlier request for revision of that paragraph by way of an annex.’.

Nevertheless, Global Times published a report on the summit with a title ‘the Non-Aligned Movement summit closed, Singapore highlighted the South China Sea arbitration regardless of opposition’. Singaporean ambassador to China accused that the report was not true, yet the editor of Global Times, Hu Xijin insisted that the report was true, and expressed dissatisfaction with Singapore’s foreign policies.

To break down the debate, Global Times’ reported that Singapore has made a request on the Non-Aligned Movement summit for the strengthening of the South China Sea paragraph on the Outcome Document for its own interests when ‘many countries’ expressed opposition, reflecting that the South China Sea arbitration was ‘not popular’ in the international community.

Secondly, Singapore has challenged the authority of the rotating presidency Venezuela, delaying the progress of conference, making many member states feeling uneasy, hence showing a disrespect for international rules. It is particularly noteworthy that Hu Xijin said that the Global Times has made these reports based on the information provided by the ‘informed sources’ who attended the summit, insisting that the report was not fabricated. This position was confirmed by the spokesman of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (who said ‘the truth is very clear’). It seems that these reports are not without official involvement.

Of course, the biggest message behind the report is not within these details. In fact, the main reason behind China’s discontent is how Singapore openly sided with the United States to put pressure on China over the South China Sea issue. Aside from Global Times’ usual style of writing which includes all kinds of negative, subjective and emotional words, it seems that it also decontextualized the details into a large framework of established view, and the main audience for the polemic is not international readers but the Chinese domestic readers.

Although Singapore is also a Chinese-majority country, its official routine is the opposite of China. Singaporean Ambassador to China, Stanley Loh, made his counterargument based on the following points. Firstly, he pointed out that ‘Emphasizing the South China Sea issue’ is not Singapore’s claim but the consensus of the ASEAN Summit. It is reckless for China to specifically single out Singapore for the collective decision of ASEAN. Besides, there were only a few non-Southeast Asian countries that opposed this on the summit, quite the opposite with what Global Times described.

Singapore also stressed that is its common practice for countries of the relevant region to make their own decisions on the amendments to the draft outcome document of the Non-Aligned Movement Summit. Thus, the request of Singapore on behalf of ASEAN countries was not unusual. Yet it was rare this time that Venezuela rejected the collective request of the ASEAN due to the pressure of a few ‘extraterritorial countries’, hinting that the Global Times report is an accusation made by the offender itself.

Thirdly, Singapore stressed that its ‘consistent position’ on the South China Sea issue had not changed. That was, it hoped to enhance mutual understanding with China on this matter and jointly promote China-Singapore relations development, etc. It also made a sarcastic statement that Global Times’ “escalation of issues” is simply a misread of Singapore’s response.

From this, we could see that Singapore is mechanically describing facts, emphasizing the fact on documents and legal details, and to avoid making any political statements in order to win the moral high ground of reason. The target audience is domestic readers, the ASEAN member states, and the international community.

However, Singapore has indeed avoided answering Beijing’s most concerned question: Singapore does hold certain attitude on the controversial South China Sea issue and actively support the United States in keeping its force in this region. Diplomatic issues like the South China Dispute is simply impossible to be solved by a game of word. We can expect that similar cases would come one after another in the coming days.

The post Singapore vs. Global Times: Analysis of Two Logics appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

The results of the US presidential election are expected to mark a substantial shift in American foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region. Since 2011, President Obama has inaugurated a critical recalibration phase of Washington’s primary interest over the region, considered as the natural epicenter of American economic, diplomatic and strategic interest.

The “rebalance to Asia” strategy is one of the most distinctive hallmark of the Obama administration, marked by the determination and the commitment of Washington to reaffirm its role in the region over the years.

Echoing his historic speech to the Australian Parliament, President Obama has renewed American engagement in the region during his state visit to Laos to attend the U.S-ASEAN Summit. Back in 2012, the beginning of the America’s Pacific Century was saluted by former Secretary of State Clinton as the most critical opportunity to ensure the peace and prosperity.

During this time the American political elites have faced a wide range of challenges that have prevented the Obama administration to fully achieve the pursuit of a new form of Manifest Destiny in the region.           The new direction represented by the Rebalance to Asia strategy, has embodied a marked shift in the U.S. foreign policy, becoming a critical tool to establish a solid baseline for deepening the level of economic, political and military cooperation with critical regional actors and allies

This has been featured through the establishment of a very comprehensive agenda that encompasses the following priorities:

1. the protection and the expansion of the free flow of the trade and commerce;
2. the  promotion of economic integration and liberalization in the region;
3.  the strengthening of Washington’s critical strategic cooperation with allies and new partners  based on safe and secure lines of communication(SLOCs);
4. and the increase of the stability in the region in response to the emergence of non-traditional threats, undermining the regional security architecture.

Obama’s Asia-Pacific great strategy has indeed been characterized by an audacious attempt to foster a new phase of positive relations with China during a time in which the daunting shadow of Beijing’s presence, rising as a hegemonic and revisionist power has posed a serious challenge to the fragile regional balance.

China’s aggressive military posture and willingness to defend its strategic interest has originated countless deadlocks with Japan, Taiwan and a large number of ASEAN nations, diffident about the real nature of China’s peaceful rise.

Through these eight years, Beijing has remained a formidable challenger of Washington’s determination to design the contours of regional order based on the freedom of navigation and overflight and the respect of international law.

Chinese political elites have perceived the launching of Rebalance to Asia strategy as a clear attempt to contain and or even undermine their rightful leading role and core interest the in the region. More relevant, China’s statecraft tradition and Confucian political vision do not recognize the universality of western values considered as the most fundamental pillars of Washington-oriented international order.

In the last two decades China has strived to frame a new and comprehensive political, economic and strategy vision able to project its role and interest in the global scenario.

Chinese political elites have increasingly pushed forward an alternative narrative of regional and international order that has emerged alongside Beijing’s maritime expansion in the South China Sea or with the establishment of the alternative to western-oriented trans-regional financial and infrastructural institutions and initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the One Belt and One Road.

While China and the U.S. have welcomed a new proactive engagement based on the framework of a new type of Great Power relations, characterized by reciprocal respect and recognition of national interest, the perspective of a phase of distension in the China-US relations remain uncertain.

Beijing’s remains wary of Washington’s presence in the Asia-Pacific, de facto pursuing a strategy aiming to overshadow the fulfillment of the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation.

In addition, China’s restless desire to pursue a more dynamic role in the region through the expansion and the modernization of its military and power projections capabilities is the direct consequence of Beijing’s priority to protect its national maritime interest in East China and South China Sea and still represent the most enduring source of confrontation with Washington and a large number of Pacific nations.

Despite the increasing number of challenges to regional balance, China’s emergence as a great power has represented the most critical element of recalibration of Washington’s foreign policy in the region.

Beijing’s maritime assertiveness has flamed tensions but it has also provided a valuable opportunity for the Obama administration to establish the dialogue and the basis for forthcoming strategic cooperation with regional partners such as India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore Taiwan, Vietnam and also the Philippines, recently shifted from Washington’s to Beijing’s orbit.

The United States have managed to foster the consolidation of security cooperation with Japan through the revision of the U.S.-Japan Defense guidelines that have notably improved the strategic contribution of Tokyo alongside its historical ally. Washington and Tokyo have established a new and critical Alliance Coordination Mechanism and Bilateral Planning Mechanism to better respond to the emergence of a wide range of threats.

The Obama administration has put additional efforts to encourage a closer partnership between Japan and South Korea vis-à-vis the nuclear threat represented by the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic ambitions. Washington’s has assisted Seoul in the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence battery as the ultimate deterrent against Pyongyang, despite China’s opposition that considers THAAD as an attempt to undermine China’s strategic interest.

As regards the DPRK, Washington has relied on a “strategic patience” strategy, aiming to the resumption of the negotiations with Pyongyang while stressing the priority of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula as a prior condition to any concession to Kim’s regime. The Obama administration has tried to foster a wider engagement of Beijing, considered as a critical actor in enforcing economic sanctions against the DPRK.

Despite Sino-North Korean relations have significantly cooled since Kim Jong-un rose to the leadership, Beijing’s opposition to any change in the status quo, including the collapse of the DPRK has convinced the CCP leadership that a full recalibration of North Korea’s policy could lead to an uncertain outcome.

Beijing’s marked level of dissatisfaction toward South Korea’s more assertive strategic initiatives such as the deployment of the THAAD has represented a daunting impasse in South Korea’s relations with China. Beijing’s limited results to curb North Korea’s restless military assertiveness has indeed affected Seoul’s decision to curtail the relations with China in favor of a broader strategic partnership with Washington.

Undoubtedly, the severe security environment constantly affected by Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear threats has provided the Obama administration with the opportunity not only to amend the ties between Japan and South Korea, particularly as regards the legacy of the Imperial Japan occupation of the Korean peninsula during the first half of the 20th century, but it has laid the foundation for a stronger strategic trilateral cooperation.

Despite the Obama administration’s efforts to design a new vision and engagement, able to reframe Washington’s role and interest in the Asia-Pacific region, limited results have been achieved. Beijing’s land reclamation, infrastructure building in the South China Sea and military presence in the East China Sea in defiance of the U.S. pledge to ensure the freedom of navigation continues to undermine Washington’s credibility with its allies.

Moreover, the Obama administration’s address to the United Nation to join the efforts to force North Korea to comply with the UN Security Council resolutions has produced no tangible results. Last September Pyongyang successfully completed its 4th nuclear test, escalating the chance of military confrontation in the Korean peninsula.

Nevertheless, the United States remains and will remain committed to the Asia Pacific region and the legacy of the Obama administration could represent the very starting point for a wider pivot, whose success mostly would depend on the willingness and ability of the new incoming administration to follow and implement the path already marked.

The post Obama’s Uncertain Legacy to the Asia-Pacific Region appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

In much the same way that many Western countries look set to abandon decades-old liberal consensus by electing populist parties or xenophobic leaders à la Trump in a raft of upcoming elections, Eastern European nations appear to be pivoting away from Brussels. Earlier this week, the media trumpeted that both Moldova and Bulgaria voted pro-Russian populist presidents into power, just weeks after Moscow’s shadow loomed large over Montenegro’s own elections. But is that really the case?

According to the narrative, in Bulgaria, center-right Prime Minister Boyko Borisov resigned this week after pro-Russian socialist candidate Rumen Radev romped to victory. Things played out in a similar vein in the second round of Moldova’s presidential election, which saw another Russia-friendly socialist, Igor Dodon, take the majority of the popular vote.

Both candidates ostensibly ran on a pro-Kremlin ticket, promising to seek closer ties with Moscow at the expense of the EU. These results came after Milo Djukanovic’s Montenegrin Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) was last month left severely weakened after a mixed coalition of pro-Russian and pro-Serbian parties destroyed his majority, prompting Djukanovic to stand down after more than 25 years in power.

Moldova’s Dodon campaigned on an anti-EU platform, intent on scrapping Chisinau’s Association Agreement with the EU, just four months after it came into force. After the win, Dodon promised to push for early parliamentary elections next year to force out the current government, which is in favor of closer EU integration. Radev too promised to prevent Bulgaria from becoming a dumping ground for refugees. He vowed to push for an end to international sanctions against Russia.

Both candidates framed their campaigns around a rejection of NATO, and both expressed their delight at the election of Donald Trump in the US, suggesting that the businessman’s win could help bring about a rapprochement with Moscow.

While these events appear to confirm Russia’s growing influence along Europe’s periphery, evidence suggests that this so-called pro-Moscow stance adopted by candidates in Moldova and Bulgaria is not what it seems. Despite heavy use of the EU versus Russia antinomy in both countries’ presidential races, the elections in both Moldova and Bulgaria were largely focused on national politics, not international affairs.

In Moldova, a state run by powerful oligarchs, political candidates serve their interests, not geopolitical preferences. As was the case during Montenegro’s October election, the Russia-EU debate was used in both Bulgaria and Moldova to distract voters tired of the widespread institutionalized corruption that has plagued their governments for years.

The fact remains that both Radev and Dodon tiptoed a fine line by never explicitly settling on one option and remaining sufficiently ambiguous in order to play the debate for political gain. Radev, for instance, opined at times that there was “no alternative” to the EU and NATO but that this didn’t preclude good relations with Moscow. And soon after his election, Dodon said he won’t scrap the country’s Association Agreement, insisting he only wants better ties to Russia.

The reasoning behind these about-faces is simple: Bulgaria is the EU’s poorest country in per capita output, and Moldova has long been ranked as the poorest country in Europe. Both state are aware that turning their back on the EU means the end for financial injections from Brussels. After all, Moldova received €561 million from 2007-2013 and will be receiving even more in 2014-2017. And back in September, Bulgaria was awarded €108 million in emergency funding to stem the influx of migrants.

It thus appears that their anti-EU stance amounts to little more than a cynical ploy designed to coax the EU into delivering more financial aid, while at the same time winning the approval of voters who would like to see closer relations with Russia.

In Montenegro, Djukanovic pursed a similar strategy to stay in power, positioning himself as the only candidate in the country’s recent election that could deliver closer EU integration and full NATO membership, all the while avoiding discussion of his checkered record of alleged corruption and shady dealings. As well as being a useful propaganda tool, playing the anti-Russia card might help Djukanovic extract financial or procedural advantages from EU institutions. Djukanovic has even been accused of staging a clumsy coup during the country’s elections – which his administration chose to blame on “pro-Russian nationalists”—as a way to swing international opinion in his favor.

This is just another of example of Eastern European leaders being more than wise to the fact that using Moscow and the EU as boons in their political strategies is useful politically and financially alike. Far from having strong ideological persuasions one way or the other, Eastern Europe’s leaders are more than happy to exploit the cultural divide inside their countries for short-term political gain.

While headlines paint a picture that suggests half of Eastern Europe is embracing Moscow while the other half prepares to defend itself in the face of Russian aggression, the reality is different. Instead of moving their countries either closer to the EU or Russia, the region’s leaders will likely continue to do what suits them best—walk the fine line between Europe and Russia without burning bridges, allowing them to ultimately benefit from relations with both powers.

The post Eastern Europe’s Duplicitous Tango with Moscow and Brussels appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

A new documentary series about the Cold War called Cold War Armageddon is currently being broadcast at a time when a new Cold War may emerge between the United States and Russia. The Clinton campaign pulled no punches in linking hacks to the DNC and within the U.S. Government to Russia, even claiming that President-elect Trump is directly tied to Putin himself.

While the claims about Mr.Trump’s Russia connection have quieted down since the end of the election, the espionage era of the 1980s seems to have reasserted itself to some degree in recent years. With Edward Snowden taking refuge in Russia and the Obama administration being linked to hacking even close allies, including Chancellor Merkel’s private phone, Cold War era politics seem to be familiar once again, but with a lot better gadgets.

In the series Cold War Armageddon, the evolution of the conflict between Americans and Soviets are described in great detail, with a keen focus on the effects the Cold War had on allies of the two superpowers. Intense competition in a global chess match, marked by deadly neutron bombs and mutual assured destruction also showed how leaders were measured and deliberate in their responses to their opponents. SALT I and SALT II treaty talks enabled a reduction in the most deadly of human weaponry in the late Cold War period. These treaty agreements gave rise to further agreements, capping the nuclear threat up until recently.

At the end of October 2016, news reports of the new Satan rocket, the next generation of rockets was revealed. The RS-28 Sarmat, or the Satan II is able to wipe out an area the size of France or Texas and is a further development of the multiple warhead systems that pushed logical minds to the peace table at the time. An accident with such a weapon was likely to happen, evidence of which has come out since the Cold War of several close calls during that era.

While the new Cold War may be more present as a cyber-threat as opposed to a tank melee in the near future, the goals and desired results of U.S. and Russian foreign policy abroad in places like Syria have more commonalities than differences it seems. While Ukraine remains a tense standoff that receives a lot less attention than it deserves, the fight against a common enemy may likely take place initially before the resumption of any Cold War rhetoric in 2017. Measured responses by leaders is extremely important, even more so, the decision to mire a country in a foreign conflict zone must be taken with great contemplation.

Using US-Russia relations as a way to push votes in one or another direction or simply trying to prove who the biggest kid on the block is will likely increase the chances of a more intense Cold War, but will also hinder any agreed upon solutions to other international problems.

The pre-Cold War era may be a better lesson for great powers in 2017, as the Americans, British and Soviets liberated millions of people from genocide and fought against tyranny in Europe. In 2016, that act of simple humanity is difficult to achieve. That is a good place to start new talks between the U.S. and Russia.

The post Are Cold War Politics Back? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Donald Trump and Xi Jinping. (Associated Press)

Despite Chinese Ambassador to the U.S. Cui Tiankai’s comments during an interview with CNN on Tuesday, in which he stated “we take no sides,” outside the Chinese leadership, the Chinese have indeed been taking sides.

In a survey of 3,300 respondents in China conducted by the state-owned newspaper Global Times in March, some 54% preferred Donald Trump over Hillary Clinton. Another poll in May conducted of 24,449 people by the Chinese language Phoenix TV website showed 61.5% supported Trump, with only 7.8% favoring Clinton.

Perhaps behind Trump’s initial popularity among Chinese were his isolationist foreign policy views—unlikely to stand in the way of a rising China. During an interview with The Economist in 2015, Trump brushed aside China’s construction of airstrips on reefs in the South China Sea, calling them: “very far away” and “already built.” Also, his perceived status among Chinese as a successful businessman may have also helped explain his popularity even after a number of anti-China statements, as he was seen a more pragmatic dealmaker on trade issues “election talk is just election talk,” than as an ardent human rights advocate and defense hawk like Hillary.

Yet while many Chinese distrust Hillary as an aggressive hawk, and may be happy she lost the election, other Chinese may now be rethinking their earlier support for a Donald Trump presidency as fears over a trade war grow in recent days.

One of those concerned is Chinese President Xi Jinping, who spoke with Trump on Monday to congratulate the new leader. According to the Financial Times, during the conversation Xi emphasized that cooperation between the two countries was the “only correct choice.” 

Some pundits believe Xi was advising and warning Trump to back down on his campaign rhetoric, accusing China of “raping” the U.S. and promising to impose a 45% tariff on Chinese imports. Trump has also promised to abandon the Paris climate change agreement ratified in September by U.S. President Barack Obama and Xi.

In recent days, president-elect Trump has attempted to soften some of his earlier campaign rhetoric, and may yet issue new statements to calm Beijing’s nerves. Yet the often extreme and contradictory positions taken on some issues, and his relative inexperience as a politician and diplomat have created uncertainty over his governance. In a Pew Center survey released on October 5, some 37% of those Chinese polled expressed confidence in Hillary “to do the right thing regarding world affairs”—compared to 22% expressing confidence in Trump.

To the Chinese, Hillary Clinton was the devil they know. Now Beijing and the Chinese, financial markets, and geopolitical pundits must all adjust to this new uncertainty and hope for the best.

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(REUTERS/Gretchen Ertl)

Could President Trump’s inaugural speech have a passage on foreign policy that runs something like the following?

“… U.S. foreign policy is action taken in the name of the American people as a whole. That’s why we all want so badly for it to show America as we see it.

I’ve said my Presidency is about taking back our country, about putting it first and making it great again. Overall, the way to do that is to focus again on our amazing Declaration of Independence.

We are caught up in our arguments, but we all agree that this nation was founded on rights, and on government dedicated to serve those rights. Those principles define the nation; we take our country back when we put them back above the arguments. When we observe them, when we do what we must to defend our freedom, when we make every effort to show our deepest nature, then we are as great as America is meant to be.

So every foreign policy action must trace back to how it fits our founding principles. I will judge our foreign policy options on that basis, and I will decide, and explain our actions, in those terms.

We will not all agree on every measure: we might hate each others’ interpretation of the Declaration. But we can remind ourselves that we agree on the principles; our differences are about interpretations and means, not ends.”

Anyone might be tempted to imagine more, but if only this much is expressed, it would be a first step in building common ground. Setting the Declaration as policy criterion would also promote coherence in foreign policy, across issues and over time. Even as our doctrines and world conditions evolve, and as our politics ebb and flow, the undercurrent of America’s nature will be clear.

This language would set the terms in which we address the world in a way that keeps the basic commitment of America’s founding in view. Its implied images, whether of deep friendship, of acceptable conduct toward us, or of hostility to be resisted, fit the broad patterns of our values throughout history.

Moreover, President Trump could say these words without compromising candidate Trump’s themes. Some specific ideas may become indicators of priority rather than concrete proposals. But the greatest force of his mandate comes from a general sentiment, for old-fashioned ideas of right and good to take priority. This language, in reminding everyone of America’s underlying consensus, carries that sentiment.

President-elect Trump could also use this criterion to manage the tangled masses of expertise that will be thrown at him. He need not be expert in the field; he could take the role of questioner in chief, requiring every proposal to include an accounting of how it fulfills or supports America’s founding tenets. He wouldn’t need to ingest the nuances of our deceptively simple creed: competing proposals will have to present their interpretations, and those nuances, to him.

Language like this would tender the prospect of real public discourse. Re-voicing the basis of our founding will also remind everyone of the deep appeal of America’s nature. It’s worth hoping for.

The post Something To Hope For In An Inauguration Speech? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

(CNN Politics)

For Hillary Clinton supporters the inevitable arrival to Washington, D.C. of the man many of them see as a real-world Darth Vader feels like the tense wait prior to the landfall of a Category 5 hurricane. Liberal prognosticators, pundits and minority communities strain for any information that could provide fidelity on the trajectory of the terrifying tempest. They speculate on its likely impact on their lives and ask themselves, “Should we stay in place hoping for the best or should we get the hell out the way fearing the worst?”

Beyond U.S. borders, leaders of multilateral institutions like the United Nations, security alliances like NATO, clutch trading partners like Mexico and China are also gazing beyond the horizon nervously anticipation the storm surge and squalls that might be coming their way.

But will Trump really be the devastating hurricane that will reorder big chunks of the American and global economic and security architectures or will his impact on the status quo be more like a reshuffling of card decks via a dramatic flipping over of the entire table?

Predicting Trump’s decision-making on major foreign policy issues especially will make hurricane forecasting seem like kinder-garden math in comparison—far more abstract art than blue print interpretation. The reason for this is that like his recently vanquished democratic opponent Hillary Clinton, Mr. Trump appears to maintain “both a public and a private position” on key issues.

For example, consider his public opinion on the United Nations. In March of 2016, the then republican front-runner blasted the United Nations ideological orientation before a powerful pro-Israel lobby group. He tongue lashed the U.N system stating that, “The United Nations is not a friend of democracy…. It’s not a friend to freedom. It’s not a friend even to the United States of America, where as we all know, it has its home. And it surely isn’t a friend to Israel.”

But in 2005 he sung a far different tune about the world’s premier conflict resolution body and leader of international climate change resiliency. The occasion was his testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee where he was invited to testify as a commercial development expert regarding out-of-control renovation costs of the U.N. headquarters. In his testimony, Trump the business man remarked:

“I have to start by saying I’m a big fan, a very big fan, of the United Nations and all it stands for,” Trump told  the senators. “I can’t speak as to what’s been happening over the last number of years, because it certainly hasn’t been good, but the concept of the United Nations and the fact that the United Nations is in New York is very important to me and very important to the world, as far as I am concerned. So I am a big fan.”

So on how many other policy matters does Trump maintain a public and private positions? It might be far more than his supporters could have ever imagined. Consider that just after meeting with President Obama two days after his epic electoral victory Trump roll backed his proposal for a total repeal of Obama Care stating that there are parts of Obama’s flagship domestic accomplishment that he really likes.

He has also quietly defanged his proposal to deport 11 million undocumented people residing in the U.S. It is insightful that his First 100 Days manifesto only discusses removing the more than 2 million criminal illegal immigrants from the country and applying penalties for people trying to reenter illegally. There is no mention of a “deportation force” or much feared draconian proposals that continue to cause millions of undocumented residents considerable angst.

Further, Trump has also recently suggested that he would revise his Muslim ban so that it targets people from countries “linked to terrorism” rather using their Islamic faith as a disqualifying criterion. So are the post-election shifts in tone and substance of flagship policy propositions a harbinger of what is to come? That is hard to know, however, what is certain is that the political Right’s change candidate has already begun to defang the most controversial of his policy proposals.

Lastly, it might be premature to say that Hurricane Trump won’t be packing a big punch, however, I think it’s safe to take the shutters down—almost.

The post Will the Real Donald Trump Please Stand up appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

President-elect Donald Trump’s surprise victory places each of his foreign policy pronouncements under renewed scrutiny. His erratic campaign leaves many wondering where rhetoric will become reality. Foreign policy is no exception.

In Asia—the subject of the Obama Administration’s controversial “pivot” policy—the president-elect is already doing some pivoting of his own. South Korea was a specific target of Trump’s criticism during the campaign. America, he argued, has borne the cost and responsibility of protecting its allies for too long, and should no longer foot the bill for Seoul’s defense. Earlier this year, Trump rattled South Koreans by suggesting withdrawal of U.S. troops stationed there and bi-lateral U.S. talks with North Korea were both possibilities.

As president-elect, however, Trump has changed course. In a phone call with South Korean President Park Geun-hye just two days after the U.S. election, he said U.S. commitment to the South Korea alliance would continue if not grow in his administration.

A portion of presidential campaign rhetoric always dissolves on election night. Given Trump’s general penchant for extreme rhetoric, is he likely to walk back other campaign statements on international affairs? What does Trump’s South Korea reversal signal about the future development of his foreign policy?

Campaign reversals are nothing new, even reversals relating to South Korea. Trump’s turnaround repeats in short form a Democratic chapter in U.S.-South Korea relations. In The Two Koreas—a one-volume history of U.S.-South Korean relations following the Korean War—former Washington Post correspondent Don Oberdorfer recalls the slow death of President Jimmy Carter’s own troop withdrawal policy.

Carter pledged, early in his campaign, to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea. Troop withdrawals had occurred after the Korean War reached a stalemate in 1953. U.S. failure in Vietnam provided a motivation for Carter to want to reduce American troop presence in Asia, but the 38th Parallel remained the most volatile Cold War flashpoint after a divided Germany.

President Carter’s policy emerged as campaign desire to make an immediate mark on pre-existing policy. In Oberdorfer’s telling, Carter’s top aides were reluctant about the form and substance of his withdrawal policy from the start. Once on the record, however, Carter was driven to pursue the policy for its own sake, and after dividing his staff and straining bi-lateral relations, he ultimately settled for a small draw-down in U.S. personnel (roughly 3,000 overall) on the Korean Peninsula. Most tellingly, when Oberdorfer questioned Carter and several of his senior aides about the policy years later, each was unable to articulate why it was conceived and then pursued so doggedly.

Oberdorfer concludes:

“In his haste and lack of finesse, an inexperienced president had transformed a general impulse to reduce U.S. military forces in South Korea into a highly controversial policy with which he was personally, and negatively, identified. Many of the American diplomatic and military officials dealing with the issue were not opposed to substantial reductions if pursued in a well-planned fashion, but they were horrified by the peremptory and damaging way the issue was pursued by the Carter White House. By refusing to heed or even hear the objections until he finally was backed into a corner, Carter undermined his own position.”

This is merely an arcane, if interesting, history lesson but for the fact that the above paragraph describes many fears about President-elect Trump’s foreign policy. He is certainly an inexperienced president – having never held an elective office—and acting with a lack of finesse was a campaign trademark. To those fearing damage—direct and collateral—from Trump’s foreign policy impulses, his about-face on South Korea was a sign that he distinguishes between ephemeral campaign rhetoric—however blunt—and nuanced realities of policy.

Where this leaves Trump on other key security issues, however, is a question the foreign policy establishment is scrambling to answer. How will Trump balance his critical statements about America’s obligations to NATO with his seeming support for Putin’s Russia? Will he be as eager for wholesale change in the U.S.-led fight against ISIS as he suggested during the campaign? In short, where will Trump stick to his hardline rhetoric, and where will be open to change?

Try as they might, no one can see around the corner into a Trump presidency. The capacity for course correction in policy he has displayed may cause some to exhale. The Carter example, however, demonstrates how easily individual political ambitions (regardless of party) can damage U.S. alliance relationships.

Will the president-elect acknowledge this reality? Time will tell. As a candidate, Trump took notions of ‘plain speaking’ politics to extremes that offended large segments of the electorate. As president, America’s well being depends on his turning over a new leaf. We can only hope more ‘pivots’ are to come.

The post What Does Trump’s “Pivot” Back To South Korea Mean For His Foreign Policy? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

“That men do not learn very much from the lessons of history is the most important of all the lesson of history.” Aldous Huxley

The Islamic world, more specifically the Middle East, is suffering from political vertigo—a state of profound disorientation. With raging wars, crumbling economies, collapsing states, and the spreading of violent extremism, the Middle East has a new normal with an unprecedented danger of multifaceted nature. The most dangerous—and arguably the least understood—is the Sunni-Shia divide.

In recent years, toxic polemics disseminated mainly by scheming politicians, ultra-conservative clerics loyal to Saudi Arabia and Iran made the dreaded full-blown Sunni-Shia civil war across the Muslim world a matter of time. And while the situation is very volatile in countries such as Lebanon, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia (and nuclear Pakistan), Iraq, Syria, and Yemen are already burning.

Shortly after the invasion of Iraq, think tanks and pundits of neocon persuasion started to stir the pot on Sunni-Shia sectarianism. But it wasn’t till 2004 after King Abdullah of Jordan (and later Hosni Mubarak of Egypt) pushed the strategically manufactured threat that the Iran-led “Shia crescent” is hell bent to take over the Sunni world found traction. The Crescenters have become the conduits of a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The Sunni-Shia schism has intensified due to the Shia crescent paranoia that eclipsed the broad-based uprising against repression, regional power politics, and global geopolitical rivalries.

Ever since Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi overthrew a democratically elected government and ultimately turned Egypt into the standard-bearer of oppression and economic nightmare, Middle East political power vacuum was inevitable. And since Turkey has been in the fringes of Middle East politics, that cleared the space for either Saudi Arabia or Iran to step up to the role; hence the Saudi Iranian cold war.

When nations are suspicious of each other they overreact in gauging the other’s intention and objective. So, they demonize one another and eventually allow the situation to escalate beyond their control.

There is not a single verse in the Qur’an that unequivocally highlights how political power should be attained. The sectarian divide between Sunnis and Shi’is is a political divide that started upon the death of Prophet Muhammad since he has not left specifics on who should succeed him in leading the Ummah or the Muslim nation and how that individual might be deposed.

The Sunnis contend it is based on individual’s piety and the consensus of the ummah. The Shia on the other hand believe in a doctrine of Divinely ordained succession. Leading the ummah is an exclusive privilege reserved for the noble offspring of Prophet Muhammad.

Contrary to the Sunni who reject the concept of collective piety, the Shia consider the offspring of the Prophet beyond pious. They are considered infallibles and as such are granted the authority to interpret God’s message—in the Shia tradition it is the Qur’an and the moral authority of the Prophet’s direct lineage—and the custodians of Imam-ship or moral leadership.

Prophet Muhammad taught one brand of Islam or to “hold on tight to the rope of Allah” and to not cause division. Prophet Muhammad unified all false deities being worshiped by polytheists into one God and unified the faithful to become part of one ummah.

Nowadays Muslims are divided by sectarian identities—Sunnis, Shi’is, Sufis, etc. or by schools of thought or theology as in Malikis, Hanafis, Shafi’is, Hanbalis, Ja’faris, etc. The Prophet was neither Sunni nor Shi’i. He was not a hyphenated faithful; he was simply a Muslim.

Based on Pew world demographic trend, by 2050 the world population is likely to grow to 9 billion people. One third of that is projected to be Muslims. With growing trend of Sunni-Shia divide, social unrests, foreign interventions, civil wars, and extremism, the future does not look bleak; it looks horrific.

In their own special ways, both Iran and Saudi Arabia became incubators of intra-Muslim hate narratives. Anyone who listens to the hate narrative of one side would think the other is a belligerent paganist.

Over the years while there were periods of bloodshed, Muslims of Sunni and Shia sects have coexisted, intermarried, and even shared political power much more than sectarian Muslims like to acknowledge. Today, takfiris on both sides are quick to declare each other apostates.

In order to break the current trend a few things must happen. Independent-minded Muslims willing to reach across the sectarian divide must start empathetic discourse. And it is much easier for Muslims in the diaspora to spearhead such effort since they are already compelled into interdependence for civil rights representation, sharing mosques and places of worship to name a few.

Intellectual and religious scholars and sermon-givers (khateebs), especially among Sunnis, must earnestly talk about the battle of Karbala, what took place and who was to blame. After all, the massacre that took place and Imam al-Hussein’s wrongful killing is not merely a Shia tragedy; it is an Islamic tragedy and arguably the darkest moment in the Islamic history. Regardless of one’s faith, we as human-beings are hardwired to seek the truth. It is the Divine will that inspires the hearts, unless that inner truth-seeking light is deliberately blocked.

Iran and Saudi Arabia should negotiate a strategic collaboration to put out sporadically blazing fires across the region. Though both would not have any problem understanding how that is in its nation’s best interest, neither one is likely to reach out to the other. Here is where Turkey should take the lead. It can play a significant role in pulling the two sides together by appointing a seasoned representative for this critical diplomatic initiative. Iran is Turkey’s second trading partner.

Poisonous political rivalry that proclaims the other a perpetual enemy must be stopped. And each should suspend its support of proxy wars, armed militias, etc.

All three—Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey—have strategic interest in solving the bloody conundrum that is the Syrian Civil War and help prevent the next genocide. However, this would require leaders that are not handicapped by sectarian mentality and strategic myopia.

Economic and political marginalization of Shia minority communities in Sunni dominated countries is perhaps the oldest dirty secret in Islamic history. It is the repression that most politicians, religious scholars and intellectuals opted to ignore or worse remain apathetic to. And this proves profound moral inconsistency. As a ‘Sunni Muslim’ I confess this with sense of profound shame. We must change our attitude before it is too late.

Criticizing Sunnis who would condemn oppression in Syria and turn a blind eye to the oppression in Bahrain, and the Shi’is who would condemn oppression in Bahrain and ignore the one in Syria, Mehdi Hassan made this appeal: “Our concern, our empathy, our compassion has to be universal. It cannot be selective. It cannot be self-serving”.

It is incumbent upon each Muslim to question the political and strategic judgment of Saudi Arabia and Iran, neither which is ordained by God. Whose interest are they really guarding, and whose ‘religion’ are they really preserving?

I am afraid the seeds of hate that both countries have sown and the hostile environment that they have cultivated will find its way into Saudi Arabia and Iran. The current trajectory will only benefit war profiteers and extremists. So, it is existentially critical to raise a new generation of Sunni and Shia who could think beyond their biases and love beyond their differences.

The post Sunni-Shia, or Saudi-Iran Discord? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

(REUTERS/Gleb Garanich)

Former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili has resigned as governor of Ukraine’s Black Sea region of Odessa last Monday. The decision may symbolize the increasingly anti-reformist environment in Ukraine and the likely failure of promises spearheaded during the 2014 Euromaidan.

In his resignation speech, Saakashvili unabashedly accused the acting President Petro Poroshenko of backing criminal clans in Odessa and across the entire country. He also made shocking parallels by highlighting similarities between Poroshenko and former president Viktor Yanukovich, as he stated both are equally corrupt and “rob the country”. He went further and accused Poroshenko in dishonesty and sabotaging reforms in Odessa.

Saakashvili has also stated that “the last straw that broke patience” were income declarations of Ukrainian officials that were made public last week. The declarations pinpointed to large income discrepancies among major governmental officials and allegedly highlighted possible involvement in various corrupt schemes.

His claims were not groundless as Poroshenko’s declaration depicted him one of the richest man in the country along with closest political allies. Shockingly, many wealthy Ukrainian officials with millions of dollars in declarations are still seeking for social benefits from the Ukrainian state and the West for financial assistance.

The resignation speech and loud accusations came as no surprise to many reformists in Ukraine. Saakashvili has been constantly accusing the Kiev’s leadership in corruption and lack of commitment to serious reforms in the country during his ruling as a governor.

His efforts and those of the team of public affairs professionals that he brought all the way from Georgia, as well as Western educated Ukrainian and Russian nationals, were not sufficient to carry out successful reforms in Odessa.

The failure is not an isolated case but a tendency. Earlier this year Aivaras Abromavicius, the Lithuanian-born former minister of economy of Ukraine, also resigned from his position while accused the Ukrainian central leadership in corruption.

The anti-reformist sentiments have been on the rise throughout the year with central authorities posing the most of obstacles. Attacks on anti-corruptions activists are now happening with a threatening regularity. Furthermore, Saakashvili’s well-known outspokenness could have made him a target for many loyal to Poroshenko politicians who resists the course of changes.

Despite pledging for reforms and the European future made during the 2014 Euromaidan, the current reforms’ trend is going backward. The Ukrainian central authorities appear as the force unwilling to undertake serious and sweeping structural reforms. As they might affect special business and power interests or those of clans and power groups that they represent.

In effect, structural mismanagement and cronyism still dominate the country’s political system with Saakashvili’s resignation meaning that things are not going to improve at any time soon.

The country’s population still dwells in deep poverty, whereas, sufficient economic growth looms somewhere beyond horizon.

Saakashvili has realized that despite Western-backed revolution and unilateral support from all Western leaders, changing situation in Ukraine takes more steps than simply acknowledging the necessity. Overall, transforming situation in Ukraine appears as a much harder task than it was in Georgia during his reign.

Criminal clans are deeply connected with the local authorities. Thus, there is no real separation between businesses and government. Furthermore, the political structure is still heavily centralized and even governor’s chair is not enough to successfully utilize the reform’s path.

However, Saakashvili is not prepared to give up. His reforms in Georgia elevated the country’s key sectors to the completely new level and were remarkably successful. By depicting his resignation as a personal defeat by ‘black’ forces in Kiev he is hoping to continue struggle against the central authorities by joining ranks of the political opposition.

Overall, the resignation is a warning sign for Poroshenko who is still trying to project his country as moving away from troubled past and embrace the European future. As reforms are gradually dying out and key-reformists keep resigning or disappearing, it becomes clear that the Euromaidan fell short of its promises but rather replaced one oligarch with another.

The post What Saakashvili’s Resignation Means for Ukraine’s Future? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Asia Bibi was accused of blasphemy after rowing with two Muslim women in her village in Punjab in 2009. (Reuters/Mohsin Raza)

I have previously written about the archaic blasphemy laws of Pakistan and its consequences. One such consequence was the murder of Punjab Governor Salman Taseer (whose son was later kidnapped, and escaped years later); and another, was the extrajudicial killing of the Minister of Minorities, Shahbaz Bhatti. Both were killed for defending Asia Bibi.

In my previous post, I talk about how blasphemy laws have no place in Islam and how they are used in Pakistan as a political ploy to gain power, and a personal tool to usurp neighboring lands of minorities. This is what happened to Asia—she was a berry-picker who dared to drink out of the same cup as her fellow berry-pickers. Outraged, they accused her of uttering blasphemous statements about the Prophet; statements so blasphemous that her lawyers dared not repeat them in court, lest they be tried for the same crime.

In 2009, Asia was convicted of blasphemy and sentenced to death by hanging. It was her case that Mr. Taseer was serving as a mediator for—he had sought to get her a Presidential Pardon, whilst Shahbaz Bhatti sought to eliminate the blasphemy laws through the legislature. The irony is that they were dubbed blasphemers for doing so, both killed by civilians in an act of protecting Islam’s honor.

Taseer was shot by his own bodyguard, Mumtaz Qadri, a murderer who admitted to the crime, and was hailed by masses as Islam’s savior. The story goes that Taseer’s wife went from lawyer to lawyer, pleading for someone to take her case to prosecute Qadri, but was turned away out of fear. The judge who, two years later, sentenced Qadri to death, has had to flee the country after repeated death threats following his verdict.

Protesters greeted Qadri with rose petals as he was driven off from the courthouse to the jail. In March this year, five years after the first trial and after a superior court too found Qadri guilty of murder, Qadri was hung to death for the murder of Salman Taseer. 10,000 protesters blocked the Capital for days.

But what of Asia Bibi? She never did get that pardon; her case was an open one in the High Court when Taseer attempted it. After his assassination, no one braved that stance again. Her final appeal to the Supreme Court was scheduled to be heard earlier this October, but has been postponed, as one of the three judges on the bench recused himself for a conflict just days before the hearing. Although his conflict is legitimate, there is speculation that he was threatened.

150 clerics have petitioned the government to hang Asia. Hundreds of thousands have signed online petitions to save her. Meanwhile, Asia sits in solitary confinement, as although no one has been sentenced and hung in Pakistan in a blasphemy case, many have been killed by cellmates in their search for atonement. Talking to The Guardian, Asia’s husband said: “If Asia is acquitted we will never be able to return to our previous life, as my wife has been labelled an infidel and an infidel doesn’t deserve to survive in a society full of hatred,” he said. “Too many want her dead and have put a bounty on her head.”

While Asia waits for a new judge to be appointed, the problem persists. Day after day, a member of the minority community is persecuted for blasphemy and either publicly ridiculed, beaten, or prosecuted. Human Rights Watch reported that in 2014, 17 people were on death row with another 19 serving life sentences under blasphemy laws; all from the a minority community.

The Center for Research and Security Studies in  Islamabad reported 60 cases of blasphemy related extrajudicial killings between the years of 1990 and 2014. That’s more than two people killed outside of the justice system a year—and these are cases that are reported; scores of others remain unreported for fear of further bloodshed.

Although the likes of Bhatti and Taseer have been moving to change the legislation that allows such cases to exist, the problem will not end there. The 150 clerics that are demanding Asia be hung are part of the problem, and therefore, must be part of the solution. Until the masses are continually led to believe that the honor of Islam is theirs to protect, legislation will not solve extrajudicial killing.

So while Asia waits for her justice, the government needs to take multiple measures—it needs to amend the legislation, yes, but it also needs to regulate the preachers and ensure what they are professing is not hatred in the garb of religion.

The post The Blasphemy Behind Blasphemy in Pakistan appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Chinese fishing boats are bound together with ropes to thwart an attempt by South Korean coast guard ships to stop their alleged illegal fishing in the Yellow Sea off the coast of South Korea (AFP/GETTY)

Waters are heating up again in Asia, as Chinese fisherman came under fire last Tuesday some 92 kilometers (57 miles) southwest of South Korea’s Socheong Island. The incident took place near the Northern Limit Line (NLL) maritime border with North Korea, and within 5.5 kilometers (3.4 miles) of South Korea’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ).  

The warning shots came from four M60 machine guns of the South Korean Coast Guard, in an attempt to crack down on illegal fishing by the Chinese boats. According to reports in South Korean media, the Coast Guard fired shots at the sky and in the sea to ward off a group of 30 Chinese fishing ships attempting to rescue two 98-ton Chinese vessels seized by South Korean speedboats.

Despite repeated warnings to back off, some of the Chinese boats attempted to ram a 3,000-ton Coast Guard patrol ship, and shots were fired toward the ships’ hulls in response. After some 600-700 warning shots were fired by the Coast Guard during a 45-minute standoff, the Chinese fishing vessels finally sailed away, and the two vessels and 20 Chinese crew were transferred to Incheon.

The conflict follows months of escalating violence and marked South Korea’s first significant use of combative force since last month’s authorization by South Korea’s Ministry of Public Safety and Security to use martial force (including ramming). Seoul approved the authorization following the sinking of a 4.5-ton Coast Guard speed boat by two 100-ton Chinese fishing boats early last month.  

The ramming of the South Korean Coast Guard boat came days after three Chinese fishermen died in a fire, which broke out in their steering room after the South Korean Coast Guard threw flash grenades. The Chinese fishing boat had refused to stop while illegally fishing in Korea’s EEZ without a permit. Previous incidents have led to chases and escalating violence against Chinese fishermen, who frequently resist capture by using hacksaws and knives.  

And the potential for further violence grows as the number of Chinese boats fishing in South Korea’s EEZ and near the NLL expands, exceeding some 100,000 for the first time last year. As of September, 50,022 Chinese boats have been detected so far this year, with few detained.  Chinese media outlets refer to the fishermen as “Those who desperately need to make a living”. Yet these same fishermen are likely responsible for significant overfishing which has driven them into the EEZ waters of other nations.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has plenty enough on his plate, from a shrinking economy and laid-off workers from state-owned enterprises, so is unlikely to rein in the fishermen – especially after Seoul’s plans to deploy a U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery in South Korea next year. And demonstrations by tens of thousands of South Koreans in Seoul demanding the resignation of President Park Geun-hye over a corruption row are sure to distract the South Korean government and people. All of which could suggest more violent confrontations between Chinese fishing boats and the South Korean Coast Guard in the near future.

The post Seoul’s Aggressive Plan to Combat Illegal Fishing appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

President Rodrigo Duterte and People’s Republic of China President Xi Jinping shake hands prior to their bilateral meetings at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on October 20. (King Rodriguez/PPD)

Diplomatic relations between the People’s Republic of China and the Philippines have been especially sour ever since China claimed Scarborough Shoal in 2012. But now, Philippines’ President Rodrigo Duterte is exploring a new bilateral relationship with China, effectively conceding that territorial issue in the interests of setting a more independent foreign policy course in the region, much to the consternation of the United State, which regards Duterte as a loose cannon.

Duterte, for his part, has long distrusted Washington for a variety of reasons, and sees China as a bargaining chip in his contest of wills with the U.S. and local elites opposed to his rule.

Duterte selected China as the destination of his first state visit. This symbolic move received a warm welcome from China, as the Chinese ambassador to the Philippines, Zhao Jianhua implied, “The Clouds are fading away. The sun is rising over the horizon, and will shine beautifully on the new chapter of bilateral relations.” To make this even clearer, Beijing offered the Filipino delegation a $9 billion loan during the course of its recent visit.

Duterte’s four-day state visit held a full schedule. Mr. Duterte held meetings on separate occasions with President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Keqiang, and the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. He also attended the opening ceremony of the China-Philippines Economic Trade Forum together with Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli.

Is Mr. Duterte trying to end the alliance with America? Not necessarily. Although he has insulted American officials on multiple occasions, including telling President Obama to “Go to Hell”, and calling him a “son of a whore”, it is unlikely that he will abandon this longtime defense ally, a nation that also has longstanding economic ties to the country and is home to a large population of Filipino expatriates.

As Duterte’s Foreign Secretary Perfecto Yasay noted, “The president, on many occasions, has said categorically that he will only have one military alliance, and our only ally in that respect is the United States”. Officials such as Yasay have often found themselves trying to walk back their boss’s remarks since he took office.

“Only China can help us,” Duterte said during an interview with Xinhua News. And he truly believes that mending relationships with China is the right choice for his country. As much as it is about flexibility and breaking with the past, the animosity he feels towards the United States is real.

“We want to talk about friendship, we want to talk about cooperation, and most of all, we want to talk about business.”

The United States remains the largest source of foreign investment for the Philippines. With a total net flow of investment of $4.2 billion, U.S. investment to Philippines dwarfed the number from China ($0.05 billion) from 2005 to July 2016. Currently, this Southeast Asian country receives around $170 million aid from Washington annually. Yet this figure is nothing close to what U.S. has fund its strategic alliances elsewhere: Egypt and Pakistan each receives annual funding of $1.5 billion each.

This October, the U.S., the EU, and other Western investors put projects on hold in reactions to Duterte’s controversial “war on drugs”, in which killed more than 3,500 suspects within months. Several investment and trade missions from the U.S. and the EU were aborted, meaning there will hardly be any new business deals made in the near future.

The economic future for the Philippines is not promising under such circumstances. Unwilling to temper his campaign—modelled after his mayoral policies in Davao City that sharply reduced the crime rate while imposing draconian punishments on offenders—Mr. Duterte has good reasons to turn to China, one of the largest business partners for other ASEAN countries and one which is not going to harry him with diplomatic protests or human rights inquiries over his “war on drugs”.

While Beijing of course expects its payments to have real returns and not mere “goodwill” value, and also knows it too does not benefit from the island nation’s instability in the long run, the breaches in Manila’s Western diplomatic relations are too good opportunities to ignore.

Together with more than 200 business representatives, Mr. Duterte is hoping to boost Philippines economy with help from China and so far he has not been disappointed. China has promised to bring Philippines on board to its “one belt, one road” economic development project in Southeast Asia. Specifically, this visit to Beijing will bring 13 trade agreements with China, with total worth of $31.5 billion, back to Manila. Agreements of these trade deals included foreign direct investments on infrastructure, expanding Chinese tourism in the Philippines, and lifting previous import restrictions on the country’s agricultural and fishing products.

“There is no sense fighting over a body of water. It is better to talk than war.”

Relations, never very warm, worsened between the two countries after Beijing took claim of the Scarborough Shoal. Not only sending regular patrols in the troubled water, Beijing has also been building artificial islands for military purposes. The former president, Benigno Aquino III, allowed for a large U.S. military presence in his country expecting to counter China’s aggressive behaviors and to eliminate domestic insurgents. He brought the Scarborough Shoal case to the international tribunal at the Hague during his presidency, which ruled in favor of Philippines this July. In retaliation, Beijing put a ban on importing Philippine’s agricultural products, now lifted with the warming of ties under Aquino’s successor, Duterte.

Territorial claims over South China Sea. (Wall Street Journal)

Ironically, the Chinese government also warned its citizens to not travel to Philippines for its “unstable political environment”, a warning it is apparently less worried over now despite the rising body count in the “war on drugs” and continued disturbances by domestic insurgents, including the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf.

Unlike his processors, Mr. Duterte does not believe that U.S. will be the solution for the geopolitical disputes. Personal histories of him make quite clear he distrusts the U.S. for historical, personal, and political reasons. Historic, over the US’s colonial rule of his homeland, and then support for the Ferdinand Marcos dictatorship as well as the Vietnam and Iraq wars. Personal, in his negative experiences with U.S. nationals over the years and suspicion that the Americans went out of their way to protect their own at his and Davao City’s expense.

But political, perhaps, is the most influential one. As a man outside the islands’ traditional power structure for much of his career, he sees—reasonably so—people like the Aquinos, Marcoses, and the top police or army brass as aloof bureaucrats who long ignored the intercommunal violence plaguing the country while currying American patronage. In his interview with the Hong Kong-based Phoenix TV, he told the host that he and his cabinet are not optimistic about the U.S. to keep collective defense obligations. He is also considering abolishing the joint-military exercise in South China Sea with the US, indicating such actions would only “further provoke China” and “there is no need to intensify the situation”.

In response, Beijing rolled out red carpet. Chinese spokesperson Hua Chunying commented, “Duterte would make his policy in the best interests of his country and its people”.

Despite the friendly gestures he has made to China, Duterte knows where to draw the line of this negotiation. He reiterated that there is no bargaining room on the sovereignty of the disputed islands. “We will not give up anything there … You can only negotiate to prevent a war”, he told Al Jazeera in an interview before to his China visit.

However, Mr. Duterte still plans to set back the Hague ruling and start to build mutual trust on joint development of the natural resources in the region with China. Some small but significant progress was seen after the dialogue opened up. Discussion of bilateral fishery cooperation in the South China Sea is taking place and Beijing publicly announced its willingness to make arrangements to strengthen this partnership.

President Duterte has, for all his bombast against his allies, be savvy enough to send an olive branch to China to try and soften the tension between these two Asian neighbors as well while trying to shift course away from the U.S. For him, it is better to solve an Asian geopolitical problem with “no foreign forces”, only “an Asian neighbor to another”.

The post Rodrigo Duterte’s Pivot to China appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Members of the minority Yazidi sect in Iraq are demanding protection from the ISIS militants. (Reuters)

Anyone who has turned on a television news program over the last few months has likely been irritated by the non-stop mind numbing partisan bias broadcast by professional news organisations. The severe lack of any information on policy and general news in a time of deep political change globally adds to the further disservice to viewers and readers of modern journalism.

The real tragedy is that what could be considered the worst human rights abuse in the last few years has been taking place, with full knowledge of the atrocities being committed, and neither candidate has taken to openly discuss this issue in any detail.

Nadia Murad has been given a lot of attention by the UN in recent weeks. Nadia is a Yazidi survivor of ISIS. After escaping from her captors, she has chosen to become a voice to the world to help liberate her people, especially women and girls that are currently facing terrible violence.

 Cases of rape against Yazidi and other minority groups committed by ISIS are documented in horrific detail. Two cases that stood out in recent reports was a girl of nine years of age being subject to repeated rapes daily.. Another story that emerged in U.S. media was of a survivor who chose to light herself on fire so she would no longer be subject to rape, either by dying or by making herself so unappealing that they would avoid her or execute her.

In the process of liberating Mosul from ISIS, accounts of Yazidi girls being moved early on to Syria have been reported. Minorities being used as human shields have been also been  reported in several cases. While the U.S. Government had spent years doing the bare minimum to stop the genocide, the presidential campaigns—focusing often on women—have said little to nothing about helping these abused and tortured women. It could not simply be because it is 2016.

Fighting for recognition as human beings that deserve freedom from rape and torture has met a lot of resistance despite the world knowing almost everything about what has been occurring. Nadia Murad visited Canada recently to bolster an opposition party motion to help 300 rescued Yazidi girls be brought to Canada.

Despite the current government of Canada knowing full well of the atrocities and bringing in between 25,000 to 30,000 refugees on their own dime, it was estimated that they only brought in three Yazidi.

The appearance of Nadia Murad and months of pushing from local charity and action groups to save minorities in the region embarrassed the government to a sufficient degree that they finally accepted to help the first 300 girls. They were saved by Canadian organizations without any proper support.

Although the opposition parties and Canadian organizations have pushed to help Yazidis, it has been extremely difficult to get governments to even acknowledge the atrocities. At the end of the U.S. election, the president that addresses and handles this issue appropriately will have been the best choice.

A perpetuation of the status quo is a continuation of entrenching a society that does not see preventing genocide as a priority. That is the real choice for this current generation, and the best determinant of an issue that is worth a vote.

The post Nadia Murad, Genocide and the Post U.S. Election appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Hillary Clinton speaking at a rally in Des Moines in January 2016. (Wikimedia)

As the election season comes to a close, most polls indicate a relatively clear picture. Her latest email scandal notwithstanding, Hillary Clinton is very likely to emerge victorious and give Democrats a third presidential election win in a row. A campaign that has mostly oscillated between agonizing and ghastly has left virtually no room for any discussion of the candidates’ policies. Time to take a look at how Hillary Clinton might deal with climate change.

A glance at global developments reveals improving prospects. In many respects, last year’s Paris climate agreement is a success. Key player such as India, China, and the EU—as well as the U.S.—have ratified the treaty. Prices for wind and solar continue to drop, while 2015 saw renewables overtake coal as the world’s largest source of power capacity. Globally, deforestation rates appear to be slowing down. Last month, countries arrived at an agreement to phase out extremely climate-damaging hydrofluorocarbons.

Domestic politics reveal a different picture, however. Republicans will almost certainly retain control over the House, and perhaps even the Senate. While President Obama began his first term with Congress firmly under Democratic control, Clinton faces perpetual deadlock on almost all legislative initiatives.

Gridlock will have a particular effect on climate policy. Recent findings suggest that there is more polarization among the U.S public on climate change than on a perennially divisive issues such as abortion and gay marriage. Rather than a debate focussed on substance, climate change has become subject to identity politics and tribalism. The position you take on climate change is a significant part of what it means to be a Liberal or a Conservative today. Ideology is what motivates action.

As a result, there is virtually no appetite within the GOP for any initiative on climate change. In fact, the party is currently supporting a candidate who regards it as a Chinese hoax. Donald Trump has also vouched he would renege on the Paris agreement.

Such outlandishness is not confined to the Republican nominee, however. Many in the party continue to doubt the most basic facts about climate change. When Sen. Jim Inhofe of Oklahoma brought a snowball into the Senate as evidence against climate change, it was more a reflection of Republican positions than a caricature. In its stance, the GOP is somewhat of a unique case as the only major conservative party to reject climate change outright.

To that effect, realistic prospects for meaningful climate change legislation are strikingly low. Clinton is therefore likely to resort to the same sorts of measures the Obama administration grew increasingly fond of: executive orders. These can be quite effective in the short term. By contrast to legislation, executive orders can be implemented more quickly. To some extent, they also circumvent the multiple occasions in a legislative process on which lobbyists can influence the nature of a particular law.

The Obama administration’s signature executive order on climate change is the Clean Power Plan (CPP). It would require existing coal-fired power plants to reduce their emissions by 30 percent from their 2005 levels. Republicans have fought the CPP tooth and nail. The CPP has also faced legal challenges. In February, the Supreme Court issued a stay on the CPP, questioning whether the plan would require the Environmental Protection Agency to overstep its mandate. If the CPP survives, Clinton will support its implementation.

In terms of legislative initiatives, the Democratic nominee actually has some far-reaching policy ideas. Clinton has proposed to generate a third of electricity from renewable sources by 2027. By contrast, President Obama has suggested a figure of only 20 percent by 2030. In addition, Clinton wants to install 500 million solar panels by 2020, a significant increase over current installations. The campaign has also revealed a program called the Clean Energy Challenge, which would provide grants to states, cities, and communities to the tune of $60 billion over ten years. This is the backbone of her plan to make America “the world’s clean energy superpower”.

At least in policy terms, the Clinton campaign seems to take the issue seriously. Clinton’s rhetoric reflects as much. At an energy conference in 2014, she referred to climate change as “the most consequential, urgent, sweeping collection of challenges” facing the United States. Confronted with a hostile Congress, it is unclear to what extent Clinton can implement any of these policies. Yet, she has suggested she will not wait for congressional approval that will never come.

There are also other avenues to pursue. After an initial refusal to commit herself, Clinton has recently shifted towards opposing the Keystone XL pipeline, an issue of particular salience among environmentalists. She has also become somewhat more critical of fracking, a method to extract natural gas that has led the U.S. to become the hub of the shale gas revolution. Clinton has proposed a range of conditions that would severely limit the number of sites at which the environmentally questionable procedure could be practiced.

The more aggressive stance on climate and sustainable energy issues suggests that Bernie Sanders’ success in the primaries—particularly on climate issues—has driven Clinton to the left. Compared to her first presidential run in 2008, she appears to have shifted her positions on a number of issues, including the federal minimum wage, trade, and Wall Street reform.

The same is true for climate and energy. However, the line of demarcation between her and Sanders remains clear. Leaked Clinton campaign emails suggest, for example, that the pursuit of a carbon tax policy was dropped after polling revealed its unpopularity.

A Democratic transition will likely leave a large chunk of the existing bureaucracy in place. One minor measure could be to give the Special Envoy for Climate Change cabinet status. Currently a position within the State Department, such a move could elevate climate change to a matter of national concern, at least within White House.

Where does this leave us? The immediate takeaway is that meaningful action is very unlikely. With legislative action not in the cards, a Clinton presidency will be confined to making a difference on the margins. While her campaign’s white papers indicate high ambitions in policy terms, political reality will not allow her the space to put those plans into action.

Clinton’s executive power is therefore limited to symbolic action falling short of what would be necessary to turn around U.S. climate policy. What matters more than the White House now are the results of down-ballot contests. If somehow Democrats were to capture the House, the calculation would change considerably.

In the event of divided government, climate change solutions will be left mostly to the market to figure out. In the sense that climate change is the result of a market failure itself, such policy status is dangerous. It also puts the U.S. at a disadvantage.

On the one hand, America is at the forefront of technological and business model innovation. Companies like Tesla and Solar City are developing cutting-edge products in the sustainable transport and battery storage sectors. On the other hand, policy innovation is at an all-time low, at least at the federal level. It is largely up to states like California to show what good policy can do.

Against this background, it remains extremely unlikely that Hillary Clinton can make U.S. climate policy great again. In a sense, this chimes with the general assessment of a Clinton presidency: evolution, not revolution.

The post Climate Change: What Would Hillary Clinton Do? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

North Korea’s provocative behavior has reached a new and unprecedented level after its last successful nuclear test on September 9th. In the last year, a new and dreadful level of activity has characterized Pyongyang’s provocations with two nuclear tests, an intercontinental ballistic test and countless submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) tests.

Since Kim Jong-un succeeded to its father in 2012, Pyongyang has consistently accelerated the acquisition of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities in order to fulfil the pursuit of the status of Nuclear Power Nation, as reaffirmed during last Korean Workers Party Congress in May.

While the U.S. and China strongly demand the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, the end of the North Korean nuclear program and the resume of the Sixth Party Talks, there are evident signals that Pyongyang is determined to increase its military provocations as shown by the recent failed Musudan missile test on October 16th, recently reported by the United States Strategic Command.

Yet, the fast-paced level of technical sophistication in the acquisition, potential miniaturization and range-expansion of the nuclear warheads remains the biggest threats to South Korea and Japan, considered as primary targets. The U.N. Security Council remains adamant in condemning any additional transgressions of the nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, deploring all the grave violations of the previous resolutions against North Korea.

Despite the efforts of the international community to implement the economic sanctions against North Korea, Pyongyang remains determined to pursue the acquisition of nuclear weapons as main tool for regime survival, threatening the fragile balance in the Korean peninsula. The two Koreas remain technically at war, despite an armistice the 1953’s armistice, which ensured de facto the cessation of the hostilities.

Japan and South Korea are the most strategically valuable U.S. allies in the region, but also the most exposed to the threat of military retaliation from Pyongyang. While Obama Administration has emphasized its commitment in preventing Pyongyang’s full acquisition of military and nuclear capabilities, concerns over the limited results achieved by the strategic patience approach has surely affected Japan and South Korea’s perception of Washington’s recalibrating role in the region.

Earlier this year, President Park responded to Pyongyang’s escalating missile and nuclear threat with a new and more hawkish policy towards North Korea, characterized by abandoning the path of dialogue and negotiation while relying more and more on a robust deterrence and defense capabilities such as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system.

Japan under Abe Administration has increasingly responded to the severe shifts in the regional and international scenario, embarking on a wide reform of its security posture that fostered a debate over the opportunity for marked amendments of Japan’s post-war Constitution.

Currently, Japan is expanding its engagement in promoting a new and more pragmatic role aside Washington through a proactive contribution to peace, while abiding by the commitment of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

On August 3rd, North Korea fired an intermediate-range Rodong missile that fell in the Sea of Japan, 250 km from the coast and within Japan’s Economic Exclusive Zone. Japan’s concern about the surrounding security environment and the threat posed by Pyongyang’s dreadful provocations has certainly affected the decision of Japan’s political elites to accommodate unresolved issues with South Korea in favor of a closer strategic engagement.

Japan and South Korea recognize the pivotal role of Washington as a military patron and strong supporter of a more dynamic strategic trilateral pact, able to expand the level of cooperation between Japan and South Korea. Yet, for long time their relations have been strained by a large number of tensions such as territorial disputes and the heavy legacy of the atrocities committed by the Imperial Army during the occupation of Korea.

For these reasons Seoul and Tokyo have never managed to establish a shared framework for bilateral military cooperation. Yet, North Korea’s growing military capabilities and its slow but unrelenting desire to acquire a more threatening nuclear weapon arsenal have persuaded Japan and South Korea to increase the level of pressure on Pyongyang.

Japan and South Korea have recognized the importance of establishing a new framework for regional cooperation and dialogue as stressed by South Korean Ministry of Defense.

Recently, Seoul has announced its willingness to establish with Tokyo a new framework for intelligence-sharing cooperation while increasing the exchange of data on North Korea’s nuclear and missile activities as part of the trilateral pact signed in 2014.

This could be the first step in resuming the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) proposed in 2012 through the mediation of Washington and later cancelled.

A deal following the model of the GSOMIA, not only would represent a critical breakthrough in the relations between Japan and South Korea, but it would also provide a critical tool to expand the exchange of intelligence about Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile capabilities, cyber-security and other unconventional threats.

Japan and South Korea have made important progress in solving the issue of the comfort women, ultimate legacy of Japan’s 1910-1945 colonial rule. Seoul traditionally reluctant to engage with Japan has moved to a more pragmatic position as highlighted by South Korean Defense Minister Han Min-Koo on October 14.

Moreover, once the deal is approved, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces could be deployed in supporting activities of the U.S. troops as in patrolling operations, but also assisting Washington in the event of an armed conflict, fulfilling the right of the collective Self-Defense.

The perception of Pyongyang’s nuclear threat has been one of the most critical elements of alteration of the strategic balance in the region. In the last few months, North Korea missile tests have accelerated the decision of Seoul to deploy the THAAD system creating a diplomatic fracture in the renewed entente with China.

Japan has also announced the upgrading of its missile defense capabilities in the aftermath of Pyongyang’s recent nuclear test and following the example of South Korea, it might decide to acquire a THAAD or Aegis Ashore system to boost its deterrence capabilities.

Indeed, fostering the creation of a solid trilateral security cooperation would represent an important asset for Washington’s regional strategic agenda, but also a critical starting point for the expansion of a proactive security engagement across the Asia-Pacific region at the expenses of Beijing.

While China agrees on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, the emergence of a strong trilateral security cooperation pact would seriously compromise Beijing’s influence and strategic interest not only in the Korean peninsula but also in the whole region, alimenting a new phase of harsh confrontation with Washington and its allies.

For Japan, the growing perception of isolation and vulnerability vis-à-vis the North Korea’s threat, still characterized by a vibrant anti-Japanese sentiment and the fast-paced China’s military modernization, has represented a critical element for the success of the ambitious Abe Administration’s security agenda.

While a part of the society still opposes to a marked departure from Japan’s reluctant realism, the renewed military engagement pursued by Tokyo could be seen as one pillar of an integrated strategy of cooperation with Washington and Seoul, dramatically concerned about the evolution of the security scenario in the Korean peninsula.

Of course much depends on the willingness of the future administration to resume and expand the strategic commitments in the region that have characterized Obama Administration’s agenda.

Both Japan and South Korea political elites remain wary over the possibility of abandonment in lieu of the presidential candidate Donald Trump’s grand strategy, calling for a disengagement of the U.S. military presence from the region.

In Seoul, policymakers of the ruling Saenuri party have openly discussed not only the development of an indigenous nuclear weapon program, but also of the possibility of pre-emptive strikes on North Korean facilities, jeopardizing Obama Administration’s vision for a denuclearized Korean peninsula.

Boosting deterrence has become one of the most critical issues within South Korean government and plans for developing a nuclear submarine as the ultimate tool to deter Pyongyang’s nuclear threat, have been taken into serious consideration.

Facing nuclear annihilation as often stressed by North Korean bellicose rhetoric, South Korean political elites and defense officials have shown interest in designing plans for the elimination of the North Korean leadership with surgical strikes as ultimate solution to the dreadful nuclear threat represented by Pyongyang.

An unprecedented strategic cooperation between Japan and South Korea is the direct consequence of a phase of recalibration of Washington’s engagement in the Asia-Pacific region as the end of Obama Administration approaches.

In dealing with Pyongyang, very limited results have been obtained in persuading its recalcitrant leadership to comply with norms and regulations of the international community, leaving Japan and South Korea in a difficult position to respond effectively to the emerging nuclear crisis fuelled by North Korea’s threatening behavior.

A strong security cooperation could be a critical tool for both countries to address the emerging strategic issues on the regional scenario. Yet its success might depend also on next administration’s decision to follow the path marked by President Obama towards the fulfillment of Washington’s Pacific Century, rather than embracing a new strategic orientation.

The post Japan and South Korea: Towards a Closer Security Cooperation appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

He drafted something in 1776.

In 2016, “I can’t wait for this election to be over” has become an American mantra. But the “cultural civil war […] will not go away”  Our polarized political camps have long demeaned each other; the ever-rising rancor alienates everyday citizens and exacerbates social dysfunction. We risk portraying a free society as unsustainable, at a time when our political system is losing ground to “state-directed corporatism that seems to be delivering much higher growth and much better leaders.”

America must break the vicious cycle of politics. The first step is for Americans to find instinctive grounds for common trust. In foreign policy, a nation acts as a singular entity; citizens feel their identity reflected, or tainted, in this national conduct. Today our discourse projects our dysfunction, to the world and to ourselves. Reversing the extension of internal politics into foreign policy will soften the divisions and project our values.

During the Cold War, the nonpartisan doctrine of containing the USSR filtered the effect of political differences. Regardless of partisan issues, the basic mission of foreign policy stood. Even debate over the mission revolved around Containment’s theme. It was a reasonable theme: Soviet ideology called for our demise, they could destroy us physically, and they opposed our interests in every way. It offered the contrasting image of America’s virtues. Now U.S. policy has no filter and offers no such image.

When you are lost, your best response is to trace back to first reference points.

In post-modernity’s global swirl, new channels of communication voice so many views, and cite so many rationales, to so many whose horizons were highly limited until very recently, that sense itself is difficult to establish. Orientation cannot come from organization charts, or any multi-point written rubric. Any static roadmap risks sudden obsolescence. Rather, orientation needs a first reference point and an adaptive process to check bearings by it.

America has that reference point, in the written creed of the Declaration of Independence. “Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” verges on cliche. But having created a nation on abstract principle, eschewing ethnicity, tradition, or church, the creed is substantive and revolutionary. Stipulating that government exists to secure those rights both supports the ideal by confining rulers to this role, and shows that the creed is realistic as well as idealistic.

These terms define the nation, committing us to foster and protect freedom’s conditions in our life, and to observe the creed in our choices. Keeping that commitment is essential to America’s legitimacy—the core of national interest.

A “zero-based” focus on that principle can generate a process to carry it into policy. As people animate any decision process and policy institution, it is through people, embedded in institutional practice, that America’s creed can become policy doctrine.

The best way to effect this animation will be to charge the corps of U.S. diplomats to know the terms, nuances, and applications of the Declaration’s founding creed. The State Department has a seat at all the interagency processes on international relations, and is not defined by particular sectors, as are, for example, Agriculture or Labor.

Our diplomats are in position to inject America’s principles into policy formation. Given deep fluency in America’s founding tenets and their implications, diplomats also can deploy the worldly knowledge gained from their foreign postings, not as the voice of foreigners’ interests, but as professionals, expert in projection of America’s nature.

A professional body, expert in the principles of the Declaration, under the authority of the nation’s elected leaders, should be formed as a parallel to the professional body of military experts. Rigorous steeping in the art of applying our abstract principles will require a thoughtfully constructed training regimen. The regimen must also impart an education in diplomatic practice, economics, history, international relations, cultures, and military affairs. Formation must also ground the diplomat in the realities of American life.

Successfully implemented, it will create an institution that all Americans can trust to represent our values. This should ease the political outsider’s alienation, and offer basic guidance to the policy insider. It will portray America’s values to the world, and showcase the value of rights.

The post On Foreign Policy, and Fixing Political Dysfunction appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.