Foreign Policy Blogs

The main conference room inside South Korea’s National Assembly Building. (Wikimedia Commons)

The four-party system resurrected under the post-impeachment climate complicates the parties’ political calculus of carrying the ‘torch’ of participatory democracy. The political maelstrom is expected to turn more volatile with a possibility of an expedited presidential election cycle. Yet, the journey to permanently end ‘imperial presidency’ continues.

Out of the blame game over President Park Geun-Hye’s bizarre plummet to political perdition, the party in power, Saenuri, gave reluctant birth to the Barun party, pioneered by the anti-Park clique. The newly formed centrist-right party’s quest to establish their party label as the reformist representation of the conservative camp adds a third-way zest to the South Korean party system.

The People’s party entered the National Assembly during the 2016 parliamentary election by riding the increasing tide of conservative ‘dislodgers’ who were at the time dissatisfied with Park’s queenish management of party politics. Since then, the third major party has so far successfully walked a tight-rope, with considerable bargaining power independent of its mother party, the most long-established in the liberal camp, the Minjoo party. Barun’s abrupt parting with the dead-duck leader Park Guen Hye is expected to further boost 2016’s People’s party-led swing voter movement. This time, however, it is fueled by the explosive and anger-based Candlelight Revolution.

After seven weekly vigil-like mass protests, in one of which as many as two million people participated in one day, the National Assembly obeyed the ‘rhyme’ of the people’ participatory democracy. President Park was impeached for her part in a corruption case on December 6, 2016 by a 234–56 margin. The exposure of Park’s synchronization of national governance with her own household management infuriated especially young people with little money, but also their parents, drawing them onto the streets to exercise their civil and constitutional right to protest.

On the one hand, the success of the so-called Candlelight Revolution displayed the strength of participatory democracy in South Korea. Peaceful street demonstrations employing nonviolent, orderly and even artistic ways of communication intrinsically demanded democracy (pluralistic equality) at face value and civil and constitutional justice in eradicating corruption.

On the other hand, it created an impending lapse in high-level policy management and destabilized politics by setting the clock forward for this year’s presidential election cycle. The constitutional court now has up to six months (from December 6, 2016) to come up with the final decision (allegedly, the court will reach its decision by March 13, 2017). Once the ruling is reached, the presidential election must be held with the following two months.

The glory of participatory democracy shines only when pluralistic equality is maintained. Still, the parties are vigilant not to miss the post-impeachment opportunities to herd angry swing voters. The liberal camp, especially the Minjoo party, is eager to carry the torch of the Candlelight Revolution to win the presidential election based on a strategic claim of ‘regime change’. In coping with the legitimacy crisis, the disintegrated conservative camp in contrast seeks ‘constitutional-reforms’ to ‘imperial presidency’, seen as a post-1987 political malfunction, as a catalyst to form a grand coalition, a ‘big tent’, across centrist parties and what is now the façade of the ancien regime, Saenuri.

Former UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon’s recent return has lifted the curtain on this dramatic framing war between the liberals and conservatives. Although having never officially expressed his interest in running for the presidency, during his return speech at Incheon airport on January 12, 2017, Ban called for ‘political change’ based on an ‘inclusive integration’ of Korean society.

Ban, a 50-year veteran diplomat yet a novice in South Korea’s domestic politics, lacks a firm support base that can mobilize resources and collective action on his behalf. Still, his experience as a networked global leader, preparedness in security issues, and relative socio-economic progressiveness compared to other presidential candidates are centrist strengths. These strengths have so far made him one of the top two presidential candidates.

In differentiating his candidacy from that of Ban, the Minjoo party’s Moon Jae-In, the leading presidential candidate in the liberal camp and the former chief of staff to the Ro Moo-hyun administration, emphasizes that, unlike Ban, his competency as a candidate has already been verified. Indeed, Ban’s candidacy will come under great scrutiny both from the public and the parties. Despite this hurdle, once Ban officially declares that he will roll the dice, it is highly probable that he will be the pivot for the conservatives’ grand coalition (Ban dropped out of the race on February 1, 2017, and it seems like there is no one to challenge Moon’s monopoly at this point in time).

In the aftermath of the Candlelight Revolution, the Korean people’s demands for constitutionally restructuring the post-1987 five-year-term presidency framework have heightened. Although parties’ and presidential candidates’ stance on this political hot potato differ with respect to how and when, no one disagrees over the urgency of implementing relevant remedies.

South Korea’s ‘winners-take-all’ majoritarian party system, leveraged by an ‘imperial’ president’s power, has been long criticized by many minority party leaders and even by faction leaders within the party in power. Pundits have blamed the predominant political culture in the country, under which the hegemony of the predominant regionalist party has a firm grip on the control of both the executive and the legislature. This prevents opposition parties from functioning effectively, and causes extreme legislative gridlock and filibuster.

Reforming such defects of the majoritarian party system was one of the core campaign agendas of the left-centrist DJP coalition in 1998, which helped liberal presidential candidate Kim Dae-Jung to win the election. Nevertheless, the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s DJP coalition was short-lived, leaving the impression that the coalition peddled the promise just to win the election.

Recently, optimism has been growing among Korean political scientists that South Korea’s party politics is ready to embrace Lijphart’s consociational democracy model. Indeed, analyzing through the lens of Sartori’s theoretical framework, South Korea’s relatively narrow spectrum of political cleavages, thus, more centripetal tendencies could render politics a multi-party-system-based ‘moderate pluralism’.

In theory, the new system might allow the grand coalition government and opposition parties to play the two-party system accountability game (since voters would easily figure out which of the two blocs is responsible for failures/successes), with more political voices represented (since cross-party deliberation is inevitable in forming a pre-election coalition, unlike in the two-party system where the two ‘catch-all’ parties simply do marketing to peddle their programmatic agendas to median voters). Such an experimental institutional design, however, needs to resolve the innate agency dilemma between elites and the people, and also come up with proper institutional devices to decentralize the current presidential power.

With regard to the latter challenge, the National Assembly’s Special Committee on Constitutional Reform is already examining whether the German-style semi-presidential system, the U.S.-style four-year-term presidency, or the U.K.-style cabinet system is best suited to reflect the country’s political reality. Nevertheless, ways to institutionalize the political solutions that narrow down the deliberation gap between elites and the people, as well as across the people, must also be taken into consideration.

The significance of the Candlelight Revolution’s success lies in the fact that the ‘rhythm (Hannah Arendt’s term)’ of participatory democracy, although unofficially, made the National Assembly accountable to the people. It is therefore important now to transform this unnatural rhythm into recurring, refined, and self-disciplined participatory institutional mechanisms in order to both ethically and functionally enhance elites’ accountability to the people. Direct-democracy tools like public referenda and popular initiatives such as are already widely practiced in advanced democracies are no doubt great examples of such mechanisms. Still more innovative political thoughts and experiments are pressing to preclude the agency dilemma, especially concerning the case in which the face value of democracy is lost in translation between undisciplined participatory democracy and polarized party politics.

The post Post-impeachment Consensus Calls for a New Political System in South Korea appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

(Katie Park / NPR)

Last week, Trump’s Secretary of State nominee, Rex Tillerson, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “We’re going to have to send China a clear signal that first, the island-building stops, and second, your access to those islands is also not going to be allowed.” The following day, I attended meetings at universities and government-affiliated think tanks in Beijing as part of a delegation of American graduate students studying the South China Sea conflict.

During these meetings, there was a spirited discussion of the Chinese and American perspectives among our delegation of American scholars and the Chinese scholars and government officials who generously hosted us. We sparred on issues like the meaning of the Nine Dash Line, the implications of American freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs), and the validity of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arbitration ruling, which had declared that China held no legitimate “historical rights” to the sea and its land features.

But in our meetings following Tillerson’s hearing, we abruptly found ourselves in agreement with our Chinese colleagues: Tillerson’s threat to attack Chinese forces in the South China Sea was ludicrously outside the mainstream of the foreign policy establishments on all sides. It is great if America’s chief diplomat can bring feuding parties into agreement, but ideally it shouldn’t be about how wrong he is.

And make no mistake: an armed attack is what Tillerson threatened. China has transformed rocks and reefs into massive military bases with airports, harbors, and housing for troops. Unless the Pentagon has a major announcement pending about force-field technology, denying China’s “access to those islands” means firing upon the ships and aircraft that supply them. It is a disproportionate escalation of force that few if any strategists or defense planners would advocate, because China would certainly respond to any such attack with force, as any nation would.

China views the South China Sea as its sovereign territory. This belief permeates not only the highest echelons of government but the entire population. The Chinese mindset, from peasant to party secretary, is shaped by a collective memory of the “Century of Humiliation,” during which foreign powers are perceived to have preyed on the dying Qing Empire, carving out semi-colonial concessions all over China.

The Communist Party derives its legitimacy from its restoration of China’s global status and, most of all, from its uncompromising defense of Chinese territorial integrity. The Chinese leadership views potential loss of territory in Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, and the South China Sea all as existential threats. Would the Chinese people rise up and overthrow their government over its failure to defend previously uninhabitable rocks in the South China Sea? From a strategic perspective, it does not matter because Beijing has no intention of finding out.

In short, there is no bluff to call here: the Chinese are willing to kill and die for these rocks; Americans are not.

Nevertheless, Tillerson’s bellicosity on the South China Seas dispute is in-line with an emerging alt-right foreign policy consensus of extreme dovishness towards Russia and extreme hawkishness towards China. It is based not on reality but rather on a worldview that has been crafted to uphold the preconceived preferences of its standard-bearer, Donald Trump.

But here in reality, the truth is far more complicated. Though China has violated international laws and norms with its occupation of land-features (the Philippines v. China arbitration case concluded that they cannot rightly be called islands), so have American partners, like the Philippines and Vietnam. Despite this fact, while sovereignty is the central issue for China and America puts the highest premium on the maintenance of global norms like freedom of navigation and innocent passage, most other claimants are chiefly concerned with less lofty issues like fishing and hydrocarbon exploration rights.

What makes Tillerson’s proposed call of their non-bluff even more absurd is that the U.S. position in the South China Sea has never been weaker. Our chief ally, the Philippines, has elected an openly pro-Beijing, anti-Washington demagogue, and Duterte regularly repudiates the United States in public statements. His policy in the South China Sea has been to tacitly cede ground on sovereignty in exchange for fishing rights. Vietnam, another important American partner, is enjoying very close relations with the present administration in Beijing and thus unprecedentedly unwilling to push back against China on the issue.

By far our biggest prospect for curbing Chinese expansionism in the South China Sea was through greater cooperation between all of the non-China claimaints, namely the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan, and Indonesia. The now-dead Trans-Pacific Partnership was the centerpiece of that approach. Its failure is utterly baffling to our partners in the region, and they view it as an indication that we are prepared to surrender the region to China. Truly, our position has never been weaker, nor our allies less confident in our support.

Still, there are policies we can pursue that will reinforce our commitment to both a peaceful resolution of the sovereignty disputes based in international law and the internationally-recognized right of freedom of navigation for both commercial and naval vessels. We should continue to conduct FONOPs to demonstrate concretely our rejection of China’s expansive and unsupported territorial claims. We should reiterate in unequivocal terms our commitment to the security of our allies. And we should ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, so that we do not appear to be hypocrites when we demand its enforcement.

We will soon find out whether Secretary Tillerson plans to pursue this radical reinvention of American Pacific strategy, or was merely completely ignorant of the state-of-play of the dispute due to a poor briefing before his hearing. Either suggests that surprises and upheavals maybe ahead for American diplomacy.

Ultimately, America’s top diplomat should know intuitively that when he makes outrageous threats on which America is obviously unwilling to follow through, he weakens his own credibility not only on this issue but also on every other. If Rex Tillerson is unable to comprehend that most obvious law of diplomacy, the quality of his briefings will be the least of our worries.

Nathan Kohlenberg is a Security Fellow at the Truman National Security Project, and a student of Strategic Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He is a contributor to a book on the South China Sea dispute to be published by the SAIS Conflict Management Department in April. Views expressed are his own. 

The post On the South China Sea, Tillerson Suggests Going All In on a Losing Hand appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Donald Trump’s election as President signals, in Walter Russell Mead’s term, a “Jacksonian protest”, of nativist sentiment and mistrust of elites. Meanwhile, similar sentiments are rising in other nations, so that Greg Ip discerns an ideological conflict of globalism against nationalism. A world of nationalists rejecting globalism seems also to reject the liberal order that has kept peace and prosperity. Many worry that it could slide into economic decline, international suspicion, and war. Many fear for the global condition of rights and the rule of law.

The United States can forestall such consequences, and more, and not in spite of American nationalism. We remain the most powerful nation in the world. We can promote the global spread of individual rights by deploying that power, pointedly and coherently, to embody America’s national essence.

For this to occur, American politics would have to reach some degree of consensus. which looks highly improbable today. However, that very national essence offers the best logical base on which to build a moral center.

The American nation was founded on an abstract article of faith, that all persons have inherent rights. The signers of the Declaration of Independence divorced their ethnic ties, and ignored other markers of identity in favor of this principle; the bulk of the document argues that Britain had violated it. The principle, and the corollary that governments exist to secure the unalienable rights and so must have the consent of the governed, make up America’s founding creed.

The United States’ legitimacy rests on our validation of that creed. To embody it successfully, then, is the core of our national interest. That interest corresponds to our unusual, not to say exceptional, nationalism.

This unusual nationalism lays down a simple dual mandate for our leaders: to protect the freedom we enjoy and its essential conditions, on the one hand; and to express our creed in our conduct, on the other. Any political outcome that meets those demands fulfills the mandate. No particular ‘isms’ need be served, no current commitments or interests require our compliance unless this mandate does, and it is particularly open to new and even radical ideas, if they fit our purpose.

Henry Nau argues that America’s is an “International Nationalism”, citing a plethora of actions throughout our history. And we are accustomed to the idea that America did act in its nature in promulgating the post-World War II liberal world order.

But our founding on principle does not automatically tie us to the current liberal world order, or any particular mechanism or policy, or role in world affairs. Future embodiment of our creed probably will not come through familiar channels.

As Michael Mazarr says, ‘doubling down” on current mechanisms may only exacerbate their failings. Ip calls for globalists to recognize their neglect of peoples’ nationalistic needs. Mead notes how Wilsonians and Hamiltonians assume their views of American interest demand intervention abroad. Some of those fuel the Jacksonian protest, and may be unnecessary. Walter McDougall sees a century-old “civic religion” of intervention that weakens our grasp of our basic values.

Any President, including President Trump, could set policy to express America’s creed. In this case, a transactional President and a Secretary of State with a deal-making history will benefit if day to day diplomacy sets America’s creed as the backdrop to their initiatives. It could start—though certainly would not end—with a Presidential pronouncement that that creed indeed defines his deepest purpose. Working level policy guidance to this effect, and a formative regimen steeping U.S. diplomats in our creed, could cement the statement into a norm.

Administration opponents can help American conduct voice our principles, with or without Presidential action, by declaring the creed as their own ultimate purpose. Followed up sincerely, this casts disagreements with the administration as differences over interpretation or policy execution, while implying the common fundamental ends.

Either step seems unlikely. Only nuanced public discourse on the creed will keep the inevitable political posturing from reducing our creed to one more claim of partisan rhetoric. And the best ways to express our nationality may point toward novel and risky channels. But only by understanding the creed as America’s basic source of values will we build a base for our national moral narrative.

As of this writing the administration’s rapid measures to fulfill campaign promises unsettles many; it also reinforces the partisan divisions of political discourse. Once the immediate actions and reactions have played out, the question is whether anyone will focus on America’s fundamental nature.

The post A Take on American Nationalism appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

The new president of Gambia, Adama Barrow (center, waiving), after being sworn in from exile in Senegal on Jan. 19, 2017. Barrow returned to Gambia a week later, and hopes to launch a new democracy. (Sergey Ponomarev/New York Times)

Gambia may be the smallest country in mainland Africa, but it has received a big spotlight recently after a historic presidential election and transfer of power. After suffering under the harsh, authoritarian rule of Yahya Jammeh for 23 years, Gambians ousted him in an open election in December 2016. Winning opposition leader Adama Barrow took office as president last week. Many are hoping what happened in Gambia is a signal that the days of other long-ruling African dictators could be numbered.

The story is remarkable. Yahya Jammeh took power in a 1994 coup in the tiny West African nation of Gambia, a small sliver of land bordering the Gambia River that is completely surrounded by Senegal (with a small outlet to the Atlantic ocean).

Throughout his tyrannical reign, he jailed journalists and political opponents and led a series of witch hunts—he thought that some critical of his regime were actual witches. Jammeh inspired such fear that thousands fled to neighboring countries, and some even thought he was monitoring their communications from abroad. Concerned for their safety, many citizens would not even speak of Jammeh in public, and a Gambian newspaper even reported he hid poisonous gas pellets in the country’s state house before leaving. (However after a comprehensive search, none were found.)

Leading up to the December 2016 election, Gambia’s multiple opposition parties decided enough was enough. They pooled resources and unified behind one candidate, Adama Barrow. As he was called during the campaign, “no drama Adama” promised democratic reforms and an end to Jammeh’s tyranny. In a shocking result, Barrow actually won. Jammeh agreed to peacefully step down, and Gambians celebrated the dawn of a new era.

Except a few days later, Jammeh changed his mind. He claimed the election results fraudulent and threatened to use the army to maintain his hold on power. Fearing a violent reprisal, many Gambians fled the country. Barrow left for Senegal, and was sworn in as president in exile.

The situation seemed bleak. Then, in another unexpected turn of events, the regional trading bloc Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervened, sending in negotiators and a military force to ensure the transition of power took place.

In a surprise equal to that of the election result, it worked: without any violence, Jammeh accepted defeat and fled to Equatorial Guinea (along with a cargo plane filled with luxury cars and other results of his fleecing of Gambia’s economy). The ECOWAS troops did not face any notable resistance, but are expected to remain for a few months to ensure the transition remains peaceful. On January 26, Barrow returned to Gambia—as did many of his countrymen who had fled post-election—to a hero’s welcome.

ECOWAS has been hailed for its role in convincing Jammeh to relent, and peacefully step down. The group took action from the get-go, establishing a negotiating team immediately after the election in December. This team featured several presidents of countries in the region, including two who had directly experienced violent political change and military intervention: Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (ECOWAS Chairwoman) of Liberia, and Ernest Bai Koroma of Sierra Leone. Their influence proved critical. Paulin Maurice Toupane, a researcher with the Institute for Security Studies in Senegal, points out:

“It helped very much that those regional actors presented a united front and a common understanding of the situation—that Barrow was the victor and Jammeh must go. It meant they could speak as one voice and also helped them to earn the support of international bodies like the UN and [African Union] as well.“

Outside of Gambia, many others took notice in the hopes that what happened there could be repeated in other nearby dictatorships (7 of 10 longest-serving rulers are in Africa). The hashtag #LessonsFromGambia took hold across the continent, with Twitter posts like “Time is up for dictators in Africa #LessonsfromGambia” and “If regional blocks in #Africa take the same lead as #ECOWAS did in #Gambia, dictatorships will become a thing of the past.”

But, of course, it’s not that simple. Just because a peaceful transition took place in Gambia doesn’t mean the same principles would work elsewhere. For one, Jammeh was considered a delusional outsider with few political allies. Also the ECOWAS military force outnumbered Gambia’s army 7 to 1, a situation unlikely to occur in other areas. And Barrow faces many challenges in rebuilding the economy and fulfilling the people’s trust.

Nevertheless the success in Gambia should not be understated. After decades of tyranny, a democracy seems to be taking root. Whether this is the start of a movement that will topple other dictators remains to be seen. But if it happened once, there is good reason for hope.

The post Gambia Offers Hope for African Democracy appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

(alkhaleejonline.net)

In 2004, Jordan’s King Abdullah II used the term “crescent” to warn against the expansion of Iranian influence in the Middle East. This was later picked up by then Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak who said, in an interview with Al-Arabiya, that Shias in Iraq and across the Middle East “are more loyal to Iran… not to the countries they are living in.”

However, what King Abdullah II had meant was the possible disruption of the balance of power in the region. He never used the word “Shia” in a sectarian sense; he was rather referring to the political alignments and violent bloodshed that might result from such divides.

Lately, the same kind of “alarm” has being sounded by the Chief of Staff of the Jordanian Army, General Mamoud Freihat, who highlighted the dangers of an “Iranian Belt” which could create a territorial link between Iran and Lebanon via Iraq and Syria. In a recent interview with BBC Arabic, Freihat expressed Jordan’s concerns about the possible establishment of a “land belt,” or contiguous territory, between Iran and Lebanon.

Martin van Creveld, a distinguished military historian, once noted: “In the future, war will not be waged by armies but by groups whom today we call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits and robbers, but who will undoubtedly hit upon more formal titles to describe themselves.” Since that statement was written, the Middle East has indeed seen a huge proliferation of proxy wars, stemming from various non-state actors.

Sunnis in the Middle East look at what is happening (especially in Mosul in Iraq, and Aleppo and Raqqa in Syria) as a strategic war designed by Iran to secure a “Shia corridor” or an “imperial bridge” in the region. They also point to the “demographic change” being “engineered” to transfer the Sunnis out of their areas, whether in Syria or Iraq. To Shias, it is nothing but a battle against terrorism.

The “Shia crescent” brings the violence of the Sunni-Shia battles into our daily lives in new, unsettling ways, as if such terms (the crescent, corridors, the bridge, and so forth) are becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. But measuring the phenomenon hardly tells us whether there is truth about its reality.

Those of us who take regional peace seriously face some important questions, among which is whether the policy findings emerging from statistical research still apply: that as national incomes increase, the risk of war declines. However, the Sunni-Shia divide predates the rise of nation-states or when conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran started to surface. Thus, if fundamental policy differences among capable nations arise, then warfare over ideology or religion can also be resurrected.

Maybe this is what King Abdullah II meant around a decade ago: that even if traditional geopolitical competition still plays a role, one has to take into account a significant and fluctuating number of non-state actors, motivated by various ideological or religious causes, mutating into new hybrid threats, and frequently shifting alliances among them.

But is war not a quintessential undertaking of the nation-state? Indeed, the relationship between the two was expressed in Professor Charles Tilly’s famous line, “War made the state, and the state made war.”

The two primary regional powers (Saudi Arabia and Iran) continue to project their geopolitical influence using their interpretations of Islam as instruments of foreign policy. The danger thus lies in the politicization of sectarian identities: such as picturing groups, like the Alawites in Syria and Zaydis in Yemen, to be orienting into the Iranian orbit and/or the Shia establishment, although these “new” Shia were previously considered heretics by Sunnis and most Shias themselves.

The Arab world has already decided to characterize Iraq, for instance, as an Iranian client-state; the Shia constituents as Iranian proxies; and the Alawites and Houthis as subsets of Shia. Whether Iran has influence over the region, such classifications and simplistic narration are ironically becoming instruments serving the continuation of wars. In fact, the “crescent” is helped by the way the Arab world has historically treated the Shia communities as threats to the regimes, not as citizens with national identity, natural rights and responsibilities.

The post The ‘Shia Crescent’ and Middle East Geopolitics appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

North Korea claims to be close to test an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) as recently reported by the official KCNA news agency. During his annual New Year’s address Kim Jong-un expressed the country’s renewed ambition to foster its nuclear defense capabilities through the forthcoming acquisition of ICBM capabilities.

A North Korean ICBM would represent an additional fracture in the delicate regional security balance, not to mention a direct threat to the continental U.S.—potentially exposed to a direct nuclear strike.

Washington remains extremely vigilant about the threat represented by Pyongyang’s nuclear and ballistic defense program. As stressed by former Defense Secretary Ash Carter, the U.S. is ready to intercept and neutralize any missile “if it were coming towards our territory or the territory of our friends and allies.” South Korea and Japan have expressed their concern over their neighbor’s continuously provocative behavior, calling for stronger sanctions in response to a plausible ICBM test.

Pyongyang could decide to conduct a new ballistic test in the early weeks of the new administration to gauge President Trump’s response. According to U.S. intelligence, the intensification of the activities near North Korea’s Chamjin missile factory could be linked to an incoming ballistic test. Furthermore, Pyongyang has previously conducted ballistic tests during the early months of President Obama’s first and second terms.

While Pyongyang’s harsh confrontation with Washington and its allies has often been characterized by inflamed tones and warmongering propaganda, a successful ICBM test could have dramatic consequences, triggering a major crisis in the peninsula.

Although Trump has expressed his suspicions about Pyongyang’s real ability to reach such a relevant milestone, last year North Korea conducted 25 ballistic missile tests and five nuclear tests, threatening the peace of the region. North Korea’s ballistic arsenal is fully equipped with several Musudan (Hwasong-10) intermediate-range ballistic missiles, increasing its ability to strike Japan and the U.S. territory of Guam.

North Korea’s nuclear and military provocations have been condemned by the international community unanimously. Nevertheless, the imposition of new UN sanctions have not produced the expected result to bring back Pyongyang to the negotiating table.

Although the regime may be close to test a new ballistic test, the acquisition of a fully operative ICBM able to strike the continental U.S. would require several years to be completed. Many experts believe that North Korea will be able to produce an ICBM by 2020 and also has acquired enough plutonium to build ten warheads.

In recent years, North Korea’s leadership has resorted to the celebration of the country’s nuclear power status to prevent any shift in the Korean peninsula while maintaining the centrality of the divine right of the Kim family unchallenged. As it appeared evident during Obama administration, North Korea leadership has shown no intention of giving up its nuclear program—its best bargaining chip—in exchange for energy, food aid and other economic benefits.

Pyongyang has relied on the nuclear program to engage Washington and even explore the possibilities of a full normalization of relations as in the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework. The sudden rise of Kim Jong-un to the highest ranks of the KWP and as “Great Successor of the revolutionary cause of the Juche” and his later ascension to power marked a critical acceleration of nuclear and ballistic activities.

Since then, Pyongyang has maintained a strong priority on the acquisition of nuclear and missile capabilities, as a fundamental consecration of North Korea’s nuclear power status, already enshrined in its 2012-revised Constitution. Moreover, the North Korea elites strongly emphasize its manifest destiny as a nuclear power nation and consider the expansion of its nuclear capabilities the most efficient way to demand the universal recognition of its new status.

During his campaign, President Trump has several times questioned Washington’s security commitment overseas, stressing his willingness to withdraw American troops from South Korea while encouraging Japan to acquire nuclear weapons to enhance its deterrence. Trump’s election has indeed raised questions about the future of American pivot to Asia inaugurated by his eminent predecessor.

Nevertheless, the Trump administration will be extensively engaged to address North Korea’s nuclear assertiveness, reassuring critical allies such as Japan and South Korea about Washington’s commitment to upholding regional security and the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

Like the previous administration, Trump will be facing a difficult decision in defining the contours not only of the Korean Peninsula’s strategic balance, but also in renovating Washington’s commitment in the Asia-Pacific region, constantly exposed to fundamental changes in the security dynamics.

The Trump administration has already expressed its willingness to support critical strategic initiatives such as the THAAD while upholding the existing security alliance between Washington and Seoul, as stressed by US national security advisor Michael Flynn during a recent meeting with his South Korean counterpart Kim Kwang-jin.

This approach follows the footsteps of the Obama administration, whose “strategic patience” strategy has been strongly contested by Republicans who see it as the wrong approach to induce Pyongyang to abandon its dreadful intents as a precondition to return to the negotiating table.

Under the previous administration, Washington has maintained a solid commitment in opposing North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, calling for a wider support from the international community, and particularly from China as a critical player, in demanding Pyongyang to comply with UN security resolutions.

A nuclear-armed North Korea remains a direct threat to Beijing’s core strategic interest and Chinese elites have already experienced frustration given their inability to persuade the former ally to restrain its nuclear ambitions.

The Obama administration has sought a closer cooperation with Beijing in imposing additional costs on Pyongyang for its belligerent activities, encouraging China to play a more effective role in implementing UN Security Council decisions against the North Korea.

Contrastingly, the Trump administration has already caused created frictions with Beijing, questioning the longstanding “One China Policy”, while considering more confronting strategies to challenge China’s presence in the South China Sea as stressed by the incoming Secretary of State Rex Tillerson.

Mr.Trump’s harsh remarks over China’s economic policies have indeed raised questions about the future of Sino-U.S. relations and how this is going to affect the recalibration of Washington’s foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region.

Despite the initial criticisms, China remains a critical partner in ensuring the fulfillment of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Yet, Trump’s remarks over China and his threats to launch a trade war against Beijing could alienate Beijing’s desire to cooperate in dealing with the North Korea.

The Trump administration could have to confront as a serious crisis on the Korean Peninsula even before defying the new engagement strategy and the characteristic of its commitment in the region.

Strengthening the level of engagement with its close allies and defying a common and joint strategy to address the North Korean issue would be a valuable tool to mitigate the risk of a dangerous crisis in the Korean Peninsula.

Moreover, without a joint effort with Beijing in deterring Pyongyang through a marked increase of the economic and diplomatic pressure, little or virtually no results can be achieved on this issue.

The Trump administration might consider the implementation of partnerships and practices, inaugurated by the previous Administration rather than complying with his initial proclaims.

Despite the rising tensions, a renewed entente with Beijing is critical to deal with the North Korea’s nuclear program, whose spillover effects caused by Pyongyang’s nuclear and ballistic activities remains the most immediate threat to Washington’s security regional architecture and strategic interest.

Yet, it remains difficult to predict how the new administration will be able to define a new strategy without the contribution of Beijing in defusing such a dreadful scenario.

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Founding members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). (China.org.cn)

The previous Obama Administration has long been opposed to joining the Beijing-led development bank initiative called the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). U.S. concerns over the bank include transparent procurement, environmental and social safeguards, good governance, and additionality—given the existing and wide-ranging operations of the World Bank, International Finance Corporation (IFC), Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).

Despite U.S. objections and concerns, China’s $100 billion initiative seems determined in its quest for respectability and prominence. Now it appears that the U.S. will be one of the few major countries (along with Japan) not to back Beijing’s initiative. The Financial Times recently reported around 25 African, European and South American countries are due to join the bank this year, which was founded in January 2016 by 57 shareholder countries. Among the founding members are Singapore, Britain, Australia, France, Germany and Spain.

Following Chinese President Xi Jinping’s comments at the World Economic Forum in Davos, it would seem to some that Beijing has superseded Washington in pushing forward a liberal, globalized order. Beijing is also using the AIIB to further its efforts at soft power. Jin Liqun, the Chinese president of the AIIB recently argued, “China needs to do something that can help it be recognized as a responsible leader.”

In light of the “America First” inauguration speech by U.S. President Donald Trump, and inflammatory rhetoric from his cabinet nominees toward China, it is highly unlikely the new Trump Administration will join any Beijing-led initiative.

Critics say in refusing to join, the U.S. will forfeit any say in how the AIIB is run, including any input on environmental safeguards, transparency on potential corruption. Hopefully, other responsible founding shareholder countries should be able to impose, monitor and enforce protective measures. In addition, some of the AIIB’s nine current projects involve co-financing arrangements with other multilateral banks such as the World Bank, which has its own set of rules to deter unfair play and abuses.

Yet other multilateral banks, such as the World Bank, have been faulted in the past for their association with environmentally questionable and potentially corrupt projects. Despite this potential, and with or without U.S. membership, the AIIB still deserves a chance to offer a new alternative and prove itself to be a viable development finance institution.

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For several places around the world, 2017 could be a watershed year, as various territorial disputes threaten to boil over amidst a climate of global uncertainty.

Much like fights over territory itself, the concept of territory has disputed roots. It is not uncommon to associate ‘territory’ with ‘terra’ as in terra firma (or terroir to wine connoisseurs). However, some scholars suggests an alternative root—‘terror’. Here, territory belongs to those who are able to instill fear such that those living within its boundaries are obliged to respect the laws and norms of their respective rulers. This is the very core of the Hobbesian concept of sovereignty and gets to the heart of territorial disputes. At the moment, fear may be the more useful concept when evaluating contested territories—fear present in governments, policy makers, and businesses.

More acutely, potentially significant shifts in policy from the incoming Trump administration have created significant ambiguity in the role the United States may play in these disputes. Other challenges have also served to fan the flames in several specific hot spots. Any such shift, from recent elections or other sources, will likely have follow-on effects as states, NGOs, and other actors alter their own positions in response. Below are five territorial disputes that may be exacerbated over the next year.

China claims large portions of the South China Sea. To bolster its position, the Chinese government has built artificial islands to turn a dispute about the ocean into one about land. This was investigated by an international tribunal in the Hague during the summer of 2016. Since then, Washington has taken a relatively cautious approach. However, during a Senate hearing on January 12th, U.S. Secretary of State nominee Rex Tillerson, made it clear that he believes the Chinese stance to be unacceptable. “You’re going to have to send China a clear signal that, first, the island-building stops, and second, your access to those islands is also not going to be allowed,” he told senators.

Although the official Chinese response was to downplay the significance of this statement, its state run media interpreted Tillerson’s comments more aggressively. An estimated $5 trillion in trade travels through the South China Sea, meaning even a slight disruption can have profound effects on economies and investors across the globe.

The United States has long maintained that it acts as an honest broker in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While this was view has not always been shared by all parties, U.S. policy has remained predictable and stable for nearly 30 years. The incoming Trump administration appears to be signaling a clear and vocal shift.

Since the early 1990’s, the U.S. has generally viewed Israeli settlements as a barrier to furthering the peace process. Furthermore, U.S. policy on retaining its embassy in Tel Aviv, rather than Jerusalem is nearly as old as Israel itself. This may change abruptly with the appointment of David Friedman as U.S. ambassador to Israel. In the past he appears to have diverged from U.S. policy on both issues. It is unclear if this signals a shift in actual policy or if there is simply a stronger voice in the incoming administration to do so. Either way, it is likely to increase uncertainty for Israeli and Palestinian governments, NGOs, and investors approaching key questions in their respective portfolios.

Since Russia’s 2014 intervention in Ukraine, global reaction has been near universal condemnation: the EU, US, and others began sanctions soon thereafter. These may have contributed to both the decline in the value of the ruble and Russia’s poor financial performance over the last two years.

On January 15th, 2017 Donald Trump signaled a willingness to lift sanctions in exchange for a nuclear arms deal between the U.S. and Russia. In recent years Russia has been among the three largest oil producing nations. However, sanctions have made it difficult for Moscow to benefit from oil exports; lifting sanctions would likely reverse this. Perhaps more importantly is the exchange of sanctions for a nuclear arms deal, which would further entrench Russia’s territorial claims in Crimea.

In August 2007, a Russian submarine descended nearly four kilometers (2.5 miles) under the Arctic to plant a flag on the seafloor. As many investors are no doubt aware, the claim is not only a way to gain access to the potentially vast natural resources under the ocean; rather it also has the potential to determine control of shipping lanes as Arctic ice melts.

Since 2015 Russia has attempted to legitimize this claim through UN recognition. However, it was not until August of 2016 that the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf began its evaluation. It is important to note that U.S., Canada, Norway, and Denmark have also made claims in the region.

Russian claims, however, are larger and are more developed than those of other nations. While the UN Law of the Sea governs many of these disputes, the U.S. is the only claimant that is not party to the treaty. Interestingly, the U.S. Department of Defense has urged the Senate to adopt the treaty, so that the U.S. can gain at seat at the table on Arctic (and other) deliberations. With a nearly unprecedented number of former generals set to play civilian roles in the Trump administration, such a shift is perhaps more likely than in years past.

Contested since the inception of India and Pakistan, Kashmir has long been a disputed territory. This turbulent history saw the addition of another sorry chapter in 2016, as unrest increased during the past year. One reason was the death of Burhan Muzaffar Wani—the leader of the Hizbul Mujahideen militant group—during an encounter with Indian military forces: protests erupted in the aftermath of the incident in July. Successive skirmishes have since led to a cycle of protest and violence leaving the territory in an especially volatile position as 2017 begins.

This article was originally published by Global Risk Insights and written by Barton Edgerton.

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(ZeroHedge)

China makes a big show of its presumed status as a strong, confident, rising world power. China’s stubborn refusal to allow its own citizens unrestricted access to news and information, however, reveals not strength nor confidence but weakness and fear. Now, China’s authoritarian rulers have again revealed their weakness and fear by censoring the inauguration of U.S. president Donald J. Trump and cracking down on censorship circumvention tools for Chinese internet users.

News outlets in China were ordered to “downplay” the U.S. inauguration, and to publish only reports from central state media. Live streaming of the inauguration on Chinese websites was forbidden. “All regions, all websites must strictly implement the above requests,” read the government’s official censorship instructions, “Any violating websites and the responsible network and information departments will be seriously held accountable.”

Domestic English-language as well as Chinese-language media coverage of the inauguration was censored: “Wasn’t allowed to discuss Trump today on my radio show, he’s now an official 敏感话题 [sensitive topic],” Elyse Ribbons, the American host of an English-language radio show in Beijing, wrote on Twitter, “Chinese leadership still trying to figure him out (sigh).”

(What’s On Weibo)

Meanwhile—even as Chinese dictator Xi Jinping touted himself as a “champion of globalization” in contrast to “protectionist” Trump—Beijing announced a “nationwide campaign against unauthorized internet connections, including virtual private network (VPN) services” that allow users to bypass the government’s internet censorship system, known as the “Great Firewall of China.” In double-speak typical of the Beijing dictatorship, the announcement from China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology said that the crackdown was aimed to “strengthen cyberspace information security management” and cited an “urgent need to regulate disorderly development” of the internet in China.

What Beijing considers “disorderly” is, of course, what the democratic world considers “normal.”

When Xi recently appeared and spoke at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, China-happy Western business media hailed his speech as a “robust defense of globalization” and a “full-throated defense of free trade.” Just as it violates the basic human rights of free expression and press freedom, however, China’s strict censorship of the internet hurts Western businesses in China, blocks internet market access, and hampers the free flow of information that is indispensable to free trade. While it serves an authoritarian purpose for China’s one-party state, the “Great Firewall” also serves a protectionist purpose for China’s crony capitalists.

“Rarely is authoritarianism a signal of strength,” writes China analyst J. Michael Cole, “Instead, it stems from fear, paranoia, and panic.” Despite their posturing to the contrary, China’s rulers are clearly afraid of the power of information.

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As the third largest country in NATO, and the only Muslim-majority member of the alliance, Turkey used to occupy a key role in the organization.

But that was before President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s single-minded pursuit of power by any means became unquenchable. Like many other autocrats before him, Erdogan understands that playing world powers against each other in a continuous geopolitical game of chicken is the most efficient way of securing his stay in power.

Over the past couple of years, Turkey has transformed into a completely different country. While Ankara was never a shining beacon of democracy—other than being held up by every Western leader as a poster child of the successful merging of Islam with the precepts of liberal democracies—its autocratic shift is nothing short of extraordinary. Turkey is not just a discordant note jarring the West’s political symphony, it has left the theater altogether.

But with the West in desperate need of regional counterweights to cope with the Middle East’s unending instability, for how long can Erdogan’s game last?

The refugee crisis and the July coup attempt were the turning points in Turkey’s thinning alliance with the West. Last year, in return for a commitment to improve its sea and land border controls to deal with the influx of refugees, the EU promised incentives relating to visa-free travel for Turkish citizens and a speeding up of accession talks. While the Turkish measures had a positive effect on dealing with the issue, the political reforms demanded by Brussels stalled, incensing European leaders and pushing the European Parliament to pass a motion demanding the freezing of accession talks.

The July 2016 coup and ensuing purges of army personnel, journalists, judges, professors and dissidents drove the final nail in the coffin. Many observers are now openly questioning whether the country’s autocratic government still meets NATO’s requirements for democracy and rule of law or whether Turkey will quit NATO.

Astonishingly, Erdogan stuck to his playbook and upped the ante: instead of mending fences with the West, he started making overtures towards the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Established in 1996, the SCO is a political, military and economic group comprising Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. With observer status granted to Iran, Mongolia, Belarus and Afghanistan, and both India and Pakistan set to join in 2017, this is a powerful and influential group that is seen as a vehicle to project Russian and Chinese security interests.

But that did not stop Erdogan from hinting that he would be interested in joining the organization. In November 2016, he told reporters: “[Turkey] shouldn’t say, ‘I’m for the EU no matter what.’ … For example, why shouldn’t Turkey be part of the Shanghai Five [SCO]?”

Just a year earlier, Russia and Turkey were teetering on the brink of war. The shooting of a Russian jet by Turkish forces had led to a range of retaliation measures by Vladimir Putin—from sanctions to an increased deployment of troops in the region. However, the troubles in Syria have seen a new entente develop between the two powers. The fall of Aleppo saw Turkey and Russia negotiate the evacuation of rebel groups, side-lining the U.S. and NATO in the process and creating a “Turkey-friendly” region in northern Syria.

It is no surprise that both China and Russia now support Turkey’s potential SCO membership. Not only would Ankara turn out to be a powerful ally in a strategically vital region of the world, but stronger ties with Turkey would also mean huge economic benefits for Moscow.

Turkey is an important energy hub between Eurasia and Europe, and was elected to chair the SCO’s Energy Club in 2016 despite not being a full member of the alliance. A deputy SCO representative for Turkey hinted at the growing relationship by stating “This is how Russians view Ankara’s membership in the SCO.” With Russia thus holding a particularly positive view of Ankara, Russian experts are justifiably betting on Turkey to continue its shift towards the East.

So what does all this mean for the future of NATO and the region? If Erdogan continues to play his games, NATO stands to lose its second largest military power as well as one of its key airbases. Consequently, as uncertainty about Turkey’s reliability as an ally in the region intensifies, NATO powers are beginning to establish new regional alliances that could serve the same purpose without having to deal with Erdogan’s erratic behavior.

The UK has already opened a new military base in Bahrain, in a marked reversal of its long-held policy of not permanently deploying forces east of Suez. Prime Minister Theresa May told the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman that she is looking to make a “more enduring commitment to the security of the Gulf” and pledging to invest more than £3 billion in the region.

And while continued political instability in Turkey has prompted the country’s economy to take a nosedive, pushing the government to peddle conspiracy theories that place the onus on Gulenists and other foreign enemies, the Gulf’s economies are rallying as oil prices inch back up. Saudi Arabia has shown to be quite receptive to new international partnerships since the government published its Vision 2030 in April 2016. Aimed at reforming the country’s economy by reducing dependency on oil, the Kingdom has been eager to attract foreign investments and lift the private sector. One the main topics of conversation when May came to the Gulf was how Britain could get in on the changes, and with a “hard Brexit” looming, Saudi’s reform initiative, Britain’s attempt to reach out for new markets coincide at a time when strong partnerships in a volatile region are more important than ever. As Turkey retreats into xenophobia, the West’s other key regional partnerships look to be restored.

If the arc of history bends towards justice, in Turkey it is now coming full circle. After almost a century of marching in lockstep with the secular ideas of Ataturk and the Kemalists, Erdogan is taking a hammer to the entire edifice. And with the West financially and morally weakened, it seems that nothing could prevent this from happening. It is time to find new allies in the region.

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A bank teller distributes newly minted cash in Caracas, Venezuela on Jan. 16, 2017. A currency crisis is one challenge to stability in the troubled South American nation. (Miguel Gutierrez/European Pressphoto Agency)

Here is an update on Venezuela and its struggling economy. Sadly, the country’s woes continue and solutions have been few.

Governments in India and Venezuela may have little in common. Yet, in an effort to stem Venezuela’s economic crisis, its President Nicolas Maduro seems to be borrowing a page from Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s playbook. The goal is to root out corruption. Whether or not it will be effective is the great unknown.

I wrote previously wrote about how Modi shocked the economic world and his citizens by invalidating India’s two most common bank notes in November 2016. It was a bold move meant to expose corruption based on the exploitation of cash currency.

Just a month later, Maduro did virtually the same thing in Venezuela. He outlawed the 100-bolivar note—the most circulated in the country—with little warning and to the shock of Venezuelan citizens. Long lines at banks and non-functioning ATMs became commonplace.

Yet, the chaos surpassed what happened in India. Because of a delay in printing and delivery of newer bills and banks refusing to exchange the old, defunct bills for new ones, 3/4 of cash in circulation became worthless overnight and led to mass looting, general disorder, and panic.

Maduro had pledged to introduce new bank notes in larger denominations to address Venezuela’s crippling hyperinflation, and make it easier for citizens to buy and sell goods in the largely cash-based economy (just like in India). Removing the 100-bolivar bill was supposed reduce the influence of organized crime, who Maduro claimed was hoarding the cash.

The transition, however, appears to have been handled poorly. After the backlash and unrest following Maduro’s first announcement of the plan in December, he postponed the currency changes to February to give banks more time to prepare (Maduro blamed the delay on his political enemies). The government announced that new currency would be available on January 16. Nevertheless, some banks still had not received the new notes by then, or got a very limited amount and ran out by the end of the day.

And then there is the oil industry. Venezuela’s state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) has long been accused of harboring corrupt practices and mismanagement. I wrote about its impropriety last July and referenced a U.S. Justice Department investigation into PDVSA’s shady business dealings.

On January 10, two U.S.-based energy executives pleaded guilty to corruption charges for trying to secure contracts by bribing PDVSA officials. In total, eight American and Venezuelan conspirators have been exposed for corrupt practices in PDVSA dealings by the Justice Department probe, and all have pleaded guilty.

Perhaps as a response to the developments described above, in the last two weeks Maduro has moved to solidify his grip on power. On January 12 the government arrested several prominent opposition leaders, claiming they were neutralizing terrorists and coup-plotters. Maduro also claims his opponents are colluding with the United States to bring down his regime.

At the same time Henrique Capriles, previously an opposition candidate in two presidential elections, announced his belief that the government intended to ban him from holding political office based on unsubstantiated accusations of malfeasance.

On January 14 Maduro oversaw a vast military exercise focused on practicing urban defense and safeguarding oil refineries. Maduro claims Venezuela is under threat of “imperialist invasion” going after its oil reserves. Critics labeled him delusional and “pathetic,” and unwilling to address the very real problems facing country.

Unfortunately for Venezuelans and those with interests in the country, not much has improved. Maduro seems to be actively restricting political freedoms. While his currency moves may yet have positive impact, the rollout of new bills has caused more upheaval. And the corrupt oil industry has made it difficult for the people to benefit from the country’s natural resources wealth, which is significant.

If Venezuela is to regain stability, internal and external support for an open political system and economic transparency are essential. The more attention paid to Venezuela’s situation from those who can have a real impact—such as the U.S. Justice Department work—the better chance the people will have of seeing improvement of their quality of life.

The post Venezuela’s Challenges Drag On appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Putin presents Tillerson with a Russian medal at an award ceremony in 2012 in St Petersburg. (AP)

As President Trump advocates frequently for a better national relationship with Russia—via his Twitter account, among other channels. Thus, it is worth taking a deeper dive into one area that could prove a sticking point: energy, which greatly affects Russia’s economy.

Part of the design of the economic sanctions imposed after the Russian annexation of Crimea was to weaken the country’s energy export market. However, the layer of unpredictability that Mr. Trump presents to policymaking, even after the intelligence briefing on Russia’s involvement in the election, leaves analysts alarmed.

Trump’s policies are currently more speculation than anything. His cabinet nominees during the Senate confirmation hearings have broken away from his campaign promises, and he has not yet ruled out reversing economic sanctions on Russia. Trump’s strange admiration of U.S.’ established foe, Russian President Putin, has many foreign policy experts—as well as Republican Congress members—scratching their heads.

Observed through the prism of geopolitics, the energy industry leads to rather interesting partnerships and conflicts. There is no doubt that the global nature of energy markets makes it necessary for leaders to be diplomatic with other nations. It is widely known that Rex Tillerson, the CEO of ExxonMobil and nominee for secretary of state, has deep ties in Russia (He was awarded Russia’s Order of Friendship in 2013). This begs the question if conflicts of interest will remain even after he sells his stakes in the company.

Tillerson’s relationship in Russia stretches decades. His first successful deal in Russia was negotiated with Putin for the $17 billion Sakhalin-1 project in 1997, during the Yeltsin regime, which consists of three oil and gas field on sub-Arctic Sakhalin Island. It is operated by Exxon Neftegas Limited, a subsidiary of ExxonMobil and produces about 200,000 barrels of oil per day.

Tillerson has also previously expressed his skepticism with regard to the sanctions imposed on Russia. Indeed, the sanctions just so happened to stall a massive investment framework that Tillerson had negotiated. The Wall Street Journal reported in 2011 that Tillerson worked on a $500 billion Arctic oil contract between ExxonMobil, the Kremlin, and the Russian state-owned Rosneft oil company.

At Exxon’s 2014 annual meeting, Mr. Tillerson said: “We do not support sanctions, generally, because we don’t find them to be effective unless they are very well implemented comprehensibly, and that’s a very hard thing to do.” That statement was made before the Obama administration leveled new sanctions against nine Russian entities, restricted access to two properties in the U.S. and removed Russian individuals.

How will the new secretary of state and President handle U.S.-Russia relations going forward?

Despite Mr. Trump’s current efforts to rekindle a collegial relationship with Russia, natural gas could lead to conflicts during the potential reconciliation efforts. Natural gas exports provide a major stream of revenues for Russia’s economy and any further jolt will affect its already struggling finances.

Today, about 30% of the world’s consumed gas is traded internationally. Russia is a dominant supplier of natural gas to Europe, which is something many European nations have been working to move away from (it is important, however, to note that Germany has moved forward with the Nord-Stream 2 pipeline). Russia’s proven natural gas reserves, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) data, are the largest in the world with nearly 1,688 trillion cubic feet (tcf)—compared to Iran’s 1,201 tcf and Qatar’s 866 tcf.

However, as experienced in 2006 and 2009 in Eastern Europe, Russia can limit the amount it exports despite contracts, during times of turmoil and turn off the figurative spigot. This background threat further stimulated the desire for those nations to search for alternative sources in order to reduce their reliance on Russian gas.

The LNG market could provide a solution. Indeed, it eliminates the need for sprawling pipeline networks and reduces energy reliance on Russia.

LNG is natural gas that undergoes a liquefaction process at specially constructed plants, is loaded on special tankers and shipped to regasification terminals where the new energy feedstock can be distributed to consumers. The global market for LNG increased about 7% per year between 2000-2012, according to Ernst and Young. LNG export capacity is forecast to increase by 45% between 2015 and 2021, 90% of which would originate from the U.S. and Australia, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA).

The American LNG industry is in its infancy stages but, as noted by the IEA forecast, is predicted to grow and increase market competition. Advocates believe Trump will expedite the current permitting and approval process where about 30 applications are pending (there is 1 operating export terminal in Louisiana—Sabine Pass—and others in the Gulf Coast and Maryland under construction).

The EIA states that by 2020, the U.S. is set to become the world’s third-largest LNG producer, after Australia and Qatar. This is where the rub with Russia could start, granted it would take years to develop a large industry. Indeed,  the U.S. increased natural gas supply on the international market would cut into Russia’s market share.

In the past, it was thought that increasing consumption of natural gas in Europe would mean greater reliance on Russia. However, LNG loosens those constraints. And having the U.S. as a reliable trading partner could cement that expansion, as the new natural gas could also serve as a baseload power supply with the large amount of renewables being integrated across Europe to counter the currently accompanying intermittency. Thus far, the U.S. has exported to Spain and Portugal with companies capable of establishing floating LNG terminals in other European markets, as regasification terminals are costly and are long-term construction projects.

Russia does have LNG plans of its own, but its gas export business will continue to be pipeline dominant, limiting its flexibility. Today there are over 30 global markets for LNG, and possibly doubling by 2030. There is one large LNG project operating in Sakhalin, led by Gazprom, and construction is underway for a massive LNG facility, Yamal, potentially with a price tag of $27 billion, helped with funding from the Chinese. Even then, Russia still may need to discount their gas price to meet rising competition. 

To be transported, as noted, LNG needs a specially designed ship. Thus, as demand has grown, LNG has added a new dimension to the maritime industry. Maritime shipping is vital for trade and the global economy. More than 50,000 ships are in operation around the world, trading across waterways and carrying 90% of all goods, commodities, and products, according to the International Maritime Organization. The new vessels enable LNG to be transported across large swaths of ocean to buyers. Of course, being able to transform the gas to a liquid eliminates the constraint of needing a pipeline for transit to specific points.

With LNG being shipped out from the Sabine Pass facility in Louisiana, the new expansion of the Panama Canal, completed in 2016 after many delays, can facilitate those vessels and offer competitive prices enabling efficient transit to Asian markets. Indeed the old Panama Canal locks were too small for these vessels.

The route provides the ability for a shipment from the Gulf Coast to Japan to be reduced from the current 34 days to 20. In fact, the Panama Canal Authority instituted separate tolls for LNG vessels in order to promote route attractiveness.

Avoiding any need for canals, Europe, and potentially the west coast of Africa in the future, is a natural fit for LNG shipments leaving the Gulf Coast and Maryland.

All and all, with the increased natural gas demand and new sources of production, U.S. industry could cut into Russia’s economic lifeline, potentially impeding bridging the sought after closer national ties.

The post Energy Could Keep U.S.-Russia Ties On Ice appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Over the next year, a new and serious threat against the United States’ west coast may emerge. North Korea has announced its intention to develop a nuclear capable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that would be able to hit the mainland of the United States. North Korea is known to have theatre-wide nuclear missiles capable of hitting targets in South Korea, Japan and China. The possibility of reaching mainland United States may become a reality as early as 2017.

Negotiations to push China into taking action against North Korea or taking direct diplomatic or military action against Pyongyang are possible options. Nevertheless, a solid line of defense against ICBMs must also be put in place in an era where nuclear weapons are being sought by smaller countries.

The United States and NATO often focused on air defenses that are very effective in small areas of conflict. They were designed against a hypothetical Soviet mass armor and air assault on a region or even a single battlefield. The Soviet and Russian doctrine differed in their development, as the trauma of being invaded during WII prompted a culture of missile defense that remains to this day.

Medium range weapons like the SA-3 and SA-8 gave rise to more modern systems like the SA-15 TOR medium range system. These systems could be used in smaller theaters of war, and currently focus on shooting down aircraft as well as medium range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.

Longer range systems like the SA-2 and SA-4 were substituted by the S-300 and S-400 system, as well as the SA-11 and SA-17—also known as Buk. The Buk missile system gained notoriety after being used to shoot Malaysia airlines MH17 over eastern Ukraine. Finally, an Anti-Ballistic Missile shield (ABM) system is currently operational around Moscow to defend the city against ICBM strikes.

Russian A2/AD Range: August 2016. (Institute for the Study of War)

NATO and their allies have been lacking in the development of a proper ABM system. Only in recent years has there been a big push to develop an effective system against ICBM attacks.

More modern ICBM types like the Russian SS-27 Topol-M are capable of carrying multiple warheads and hitting several targets upon re-entry into the atmosphere. Systems used by the U.S. and NATO like the Patriot missile system were not very effective in the 1991 Gulf War, despite claims that it was able to stop SCUD missile attacks from Iraq on Israel and Allied bases in the Gulf. Israel’s Iron Dome has had success shooting down small artillery rockets on a limited scale and its Arrow system is designed to intercept theatre wide ballistic missiles, but has yet to be tested in battle.

The basis for U.S. defense against a North Korean missile attack could be developed from successful technology coming from its allies, but Washington has been slow to develop a system that could properly defend against a serious ICBM threat. While development may have to take place, a system like Moscow’s ABM ring or a return to the policy that motivated an innovative “Star Wars”-type program may be in the cards. With new techniques to shoot down satellites being successfully developed by countries like China, a new solution will have to be quickly devise to keep up with technological developments.

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Six U.S. ambassadors published an open letter to the United States Congress on January 17 admonishing the disintegration of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP). They wrote that “walking away from TPP may be seen by future generations as the moment America chose to cede leadership to others in this part of the world and accept a diminished role.”

But the TPP had many cybersecurity holes. Its death, quickened when Vietnam’s Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc pulled out after Donald Trump’s presidential election, has global benefits.

Since the purpose of the TPP was the free flow and enhancement of trade, commerce took priority over security.

Regarding Internet governance, the TPP allowed for many loopholes in user safety, digital privacy, preservation of intellectual property, and government surveillance.

The TPP recommended a coordinated defense against fraud and identity theft that included electronic authentication, consumer protection law, and unspecified punishment for cyber espionage. However, the TPP undermined those security methods by also suggesting all Parties exchange information about user protection. Exchanging information about user protection undermines that protection because collaborating on malware mitigation adds vulnerabilities by exposing those holes. For example, sharing how a hacker damaged a company weakens that company.

Ross Schulman, senior policy counsel at New America’s Open Technology Institute, told FPA that if the defense against fraud and identity theft was “done while still respecting the privacy of users, and limits the transmission of that information, the two are not incompatible.” However, the TPP report did not specify how the Parties plan to reconcile defense and privacy.

The TPP’s emphasis on sharing raised questions about privacy. Transparency “of technical regulations” could provide more oversight to make sure the Internet is not overly regulated through censoring public content or secretly monitoring private online usage. On the other hand, the TPP Parties hoped to “share best practices,” which could weaken data protection and confidentiality. Also, nothing can “prevent law enforcement authorities from requiring… unencrypted communications,” which invalidates encrypting any messages in the first place.

Paul Tiao, a partner at Hunton & Williams and an expert in cybersecurity law, told FPA that there was merit in companies warning each other about cyber threats because that strengthens security for all. Tiao pointed out that “the fault line concerns sharing information about breaches” because of the reputational, legal, and fiscal implications of disclosing such information. Complicating this further, the TPP did not specify what information should be shared and how much, so each country could have participated to whatever extent it desired.

Sharing these ideas may have created added communications regulations. The TPP members believe intellectual property rights benefit business and vaguely encouraged all Parties to draft regulations to protect those rights. According to Schulman, “the TPP, as many international treaties have done over the years, has gone altogether too far in favor of expanding controls on freedom of communication in the name of intellectual property.”

Accessibility was important to the TPP. The report promised “that no condition is imposed on access to and use of public communications networks and services” except to “protect the technical integrity of public telecommunications networks or services.” That exception would have made an open Internet more confusing to maintain, since the provision gives telecommunications services the capacity to interpret at will what constitutes protection of technical integrity.

Internet Service Providers (ISPs) serve under Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and has the ability to disable websites. The TPP Parties wanted “a rich and accessible public domain,” but also any restriction done “in good faith” will not make an ISP liable. Jeremy Malcolm, a senior analyst at a nonprofit organization advocating for digital freedoms, Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), points to Title 47 of the US Code for a country-specific example of ISPs’ independent power under the “Good Samaritan” clause. Title 47 places trust in actions done with good intentions, but as Malcolm told the FPA, “Good faith is not a hard test to satisfy.”

The post The Global Security Benefits of TPP’s Death appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Pro-China groups protest Tsai Ing-wen visit in San Francisco (China News)

On January 12-14, pro-China propaganda groups linked to the Chinese government issued a statement and staged a protest against Taiwan president Tsai Ing-wen’s stopovers in the United States en route to and from official visits to diplomatic allies in Latin America. Tsai stopped in Houston on her outbound journey January 7 and arrived in San Francisco on her return journey January 13, angering China.

A joint statement issued January 12 by pro-China groups in the San Francisco Bay Area parroted Chinese government propaganda in its condemnation of Tsai and her U.S. stopovers: “As overseas Chinese, we firmly believe the peaceful reunification of China is an inevitable and irresistible trend. We advise Tsai Ing-wen to recognize the international situation and give up the unrealistic ‘Taiwan independence’ attempts as early as possible…. We will keep a close eye on her secessionist activities and attempts, and firmly oppose the ‘two Chinas’ and ‘Taiwan independence’.”

On January 14, pro-China demonstrators gathered outside Tsai’s hotel near San Francisco International Airport, waving red Chinese flags and shouting “One China, oppose Taiwan independence.” The protest received little attention in U.S. media but was widely reported in state-run mainland Chinese media as evidence of “overseas Chinese” support for Beijing’s “one-China” policy. While a brief mention at Reuters estimated the crowd at just over a hundred including supporters of Tsai, state-run China Daily claimed that 500 showed up to protest against Tsai’s visit and made no mention of Tsai’s supporters (See also China News, China Overseas Network, China Youth Network, China Radio International, Observer Network, Sina News).

Pro-China groups protest Tsai Ing-wen visit in San Francisco (China News)

Pro-China groups leading the protest included “Chinese for Peaceful Unification-Northern California” (北加州中國和平統一促進會 or 北加州中国和平统一促进会, CPU-NC). CPU-NC’s activities in the Bay Area and its links to the Chinese government have been noted previously at Foreign Policy Blogs. Organizing the protest for CPU-NC was Zou Zhiqiang (鄒志强 or 邹志强, aka Fred Tzou), a realtor in Fremont, California. Zou’s presence at the January 14 protest outside Tsai’s hotel was prominently noted in Chinese media. “Domestically, [Tsai] promotes ‘cultural Taiwan independence’, said Zou to China Daily, “Internationally, she is willing to be used by the U.S. and Japan like a chess piece.”

The Committee to Promote the Reunification of China-San Francisco Bay Area (舊金山灣區中國統一促進會 or 旧金山湾区中国统一促进会, CPRC-SF), likewise noted previously at Foreign Policy Blogs, was also among the protest organizers. Like CPU-NC, CPRC-SF has an extensive record of pro-China activities in the Bay Area, contacts with Chinese government officials, and a close working relationship with the Chinese consulate-general in San Francisco (See also U.S.-China Press, Jan. 11, Jan 12).

These groups, as further noted at Foreign Policy Blogs, are only two of more than 30 such groups currently operating in cities and regions across the United States and some 200 operating in 90 countries around the world. All are overseas chapters of the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification in Beijing, a nominally “non-governmental” organization run entirely by Chinese Communist Party officials; and all work closely with China’s embassies and consulates abroad. The chief purpose of these organizations is asserting mainland Chinese territorial claims and undermining international support for Taiwan.

Given its established patterns of behavior, the Chinese consulate-general in San Francisco seems likely to have been involved with its allied groups in orchestrating these protests against the Taiwanese president’s visit to the Bay Area.

The post Pro-China Groups Protest Taiwan President’s U.S. Visit appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

(Bulent Kilic/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images)

 “ISIS is like a mushroom. It was able to grow here, in Iraq, because there is a fertile environment. It didn’t just come from nowhere.”

This is what an Iraqi activist told me, with an edge of anger and passion in her voice, when I was in Iraq late last year. She went on to explain that in her opinion ISIS could not be—and should not be—eradicated through bombs and fighting. Instead, Iraq desperately needed to embark on a national program of reconciliation and reform.

To be honest, this jarred. I had heard harrowing stories of the systematic cruelty ISIS meted out to the civilian population. I had seen the destruction it left in its wake, from flattened villages to burning oil fields that coated everything, including the faces of children, in a black film.

But her words were a vital reminder of the deep-seated nature of Iraq’s challenges, that atrocities had been committed by all sides, and the need to acknowledge and address the layers of grievance.

Over the last two weeks, the fierce battle to retake Mosul from ISIS has intensified. Over 140,000 civilians have fled their homes since the latest phase of the military operation began last October. So far the Iraqi army, the Kurdish Peshmerga, their international backers, and assorted militias have avoided mass civilian casualties. But as the army enters the dense residential areas of Mosul, families face impossible choices, as they are trapped between warring parties.

The media and political narrative about Iraq tends to be dominated by ISIS, but Iraq’s challenges do not begin and end with Mosul. Even before the current offensive, three million people had been uprooted from their homes. Across the country, there is a mosaic of displacement. Sectarian conflict and identity politics drive people from their homes just as ISIS does, and the experience of displacement can in turn reinforce sectarianism. There are communities unable to return home because they are perceived to be the ‘wrong’ sect, tribe or religion. There are people in need across the board, and this is why Oxfam is supporting people who have returned to or stayed in their homes, as well as those who have fled violence.

Whenever I travel to war zones, I ask our local staff about mixed marriages. It tends to be a good conversation starter and a good, if highly anecdotal, bellwether of inter-communal relations. One of Oxfam’s engineers told me that he was the result of a mixed Sunni-Shia marriage and his wife was Kurdish, but that mixed marriages were increasingly rare. Perhaps even more revealingly, he told me he could never work for the government, whether it was the Kurdish Regional Government, the central government in Baghdad or local authorities because he would always be considered to be ‘from the other side’.

One of the symptoms of this deep-seated sectarianism is the proliferation of local militia groups along communal lines. As young men return home, they are being enlisted by tribal leaders. I spoke to one such young man who was guarding a water plant that had been destroyed by ISIS and subsequently repaired by Oxfam. When I asked him why he had joined the militia, he shrugged as if it was obvious. “This is what we need to do to protect our home,” he said. One security consultant I met wryly described these young men as “Neighborhood Watch with guns”.

While these militias provide a source of employment, and in some instances a degree of protection, they may also put communities at risk and breed instability in the long term. A couple of women in their early twenties, from the same town, told me that when it came to jobs for young men, the choice boiled down to joining the local militia or the local police force—and the distinction between the two can be blurred.

The Iraqi army, the Kurdish Peshmerga and a range of militias have joined international backers like the U.S. and Britain in a marriage of convenience to counter ISIS. Once their common enemy is pushed back, there is a risk that the various Iraqi forces could clash amongst themselves or another dangerous group could emerge if underlying grievances in this oil-rich country are left to fester.

This is why it is crucial to plan beyond the short-term military strategy and, however difficult, work to create a new environment in which ISIS or its successor cannot mushroom.

Maya Mailer is Head of Humanitarian Policy and Campaigns at Oxfam. She recently returned from Iraq, where Oxfam has been supporting families who have fled ISIS since 2014 including as a result of the recent conflict in Mosul.

This blog was first published on independent.co.uk and reappears here with kind permission. 

The post The Day after ISIS in Iraq appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

The United States is the country with the most overseas military bases in the world by a large margin. It has bases in 30 countries, followed by the United Kingdom, which has bases in half as many countries. In Germany, the U.S. has no less than 38 military bases, the most controversial being Ramstein Air Base—the U.S.’ largest military base on foreign soil.

In 2013, a team of German journalists broke the story that the U.S. was conducting its “war on terror” from Germany, including drone warfare in parts of Africa. Germans were outraged that their government allowed this to happen on their soil.

It was not until the revelations of a U.S. Air Force drone pilot in 2014 that it was confirmed that the drone war would not be possible without Germany. The German Green Party called on to the government to take action against U.S. drone strikes, “it is shameful that the German government simply closes its eyes to violations of international law on German territory,” said foreign policy spokesperson for the Green Party, Omid Nouripour. As tensions mounted, President Obama was forced to address the issue during a visit to Berlin. “We do not use Germany as a launching point for unmanned drones […] as part of our counterterrorism activities” he said.

The deployment of U.S. troops in Germany has been regulated since the 1950s through NATO Status of Forces Agreement. Under NATO’s SOFA, the German government could petition the closure of a base, or the cessation of activities it considers a violation of international law. However, jurisdiction lies with the U.S. on such matters. Alternatively, the German government could terminate the Status of Forces Agreement altogether, but this would open a huge political debate and create detrimental tensions between the two allies.

In the summer of 2016, thousands of German citizens stood outside of Ramstein Air Base to protest drone strikes conducted from there. Participating in the protest, former German Finance Minister, Oskar Lafontaine, said the German government’s silence on the use of drones was “schizophrenic”—while showing generosity towards refugees, Germany was supporting the U.S. wars by way of this base.

Around the same time, the U.S. Office of National Intelligence released a report stating 473 “counterterrorism strikes” had taken place, killing 2,372-2,581 combatants and 64-116 non-combatants since 2009. The Bureau of Investigative Journalists compiled their own statistics and their conservative estimates point towards 504 total strikes, killing between 2,745 and 4,333 of which between 380 and 801 were civilians. The difference between the two reports is staggering.

Ramstein is not the first base to get this sort of bad publicity—an analogous situation occurred in the Shamsi base in the Pakistani province of Balochistan. After Navy Seals found and shot Bin Laden within Pakistan’s borders, local authorities asked the U.S. to vacate the Shamsi Airfield. Supposedly angered, the Pakistani officials said they would no longer allow the U.S. to conduct operations out of the base, as it breached Pakistan’s sovereignty. Although official stories varied, it was later uncovered that the base had been leased to the United Arab Emirates since 1992, and thereafter, sublet to the U.S. by the UAE in 2001.

All this is to say that the use of bases on foreign soil by the U.S. have not been sans mystery. While the founder of the German Green Party sues his own government for answers on why Germany was being used as the staging ground for drone strikes, the U.S. continues to operate from these outposts without much apprehension.

During his inaugural speech in January 2009, President Obama inspired many with these words: “And so to all other peoples and governments who are watching today, from the grandest capitals to the small village where my father was born: know that America is a friend of each nation and every man, woman, and child who seeks a future of peace and dignity, and we are ready to lead once more.” As he leaves office, he reminded us in his final address just this month that “we are all created equal, endowed by our creator with certain unalienable rights, among them life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”

As we brace for an unsure tenure under a leader we cannot begin to understand, we must remember that we did not hold the outgoing leadership accountable. We did not hold them to account for the hundreds that were killed from spaces that we do not own, in countries we do not give answers to. We did not hold them to account for the mystery that shrouds this war that the Obama administration vowed to end, and yet, in some ways increased. With an unpredictable leader coming into power in the next days, we the people, need to be more vigilant about asking questions and demanding answers.

The post Of Drones and Overseas Military Bases: The New Face of the War on Terror appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

By Prarthana Kashinath

The 21st century will certainly go down in history as the beginning of an epoch that transformed the world from a unipolar to a multipolar global structure, where amongst other poles, China conspicuously sticks out its flag, closely followed by India. Consequently, the most extrusive transatlantic challenge for the predominant United States will be China—with its burgeoning economy, tenacious and ever-expanding military and navy, and territorial claims in and around its border.

Ever since 1972, when Nixon paid its first official visit to China, until 2016 under Obama’s presidency, the U.S. policy towards China has been accommodative. For instance, in 1979, the United States under Carter backed the ‘One-China Policy’, pursuant to which it ended the diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, shut down all its bases there, and recognized the People’s Republic of China as the sole authority in order to enhance its relationship with China.

The U.S. also opened up imports from China on such massive scale, that China’s foreign exchange coffers are now overflowing and has catapulted China as an economic superpower, even surpassing the United States in 2014, as estimated by the International Monetary Fund, in GDP terms.

However, the 2016 United States presidential election with Trump’s victory marks a watershed moment in the Sino-American relations. On many aspects, he is an aberration, considering that he is a novice in politics and diplomacy, but has a brash, native business intelligence. Notwithstanding the narcissistic ,sexist,racist and xenophobic undertones of the election campaign, Trump nevertheless won the electoral college. His election maybe signaled the shattering of the status quo and the banausic Washington establishment.

The United States has expressed discomfiture with China’s rise under Obama. Indeed, his “pivot to Asia” policy was aimed at “rebalancing” China. With Trump taking over the Presidential office, it appears likely that there will be a complete reversal of policy accommodation towards China.

China owes its extensive economic growth to its aggressive manufacturing and export industry. The United States has been a core consumer of cheap Chinese goods. As a consequence, U.S. trade deficit with China has increased manifold, and China has become the holder of  a substantial share of U.S. public debt. Trump has vouched to impose heavy import tariffs to reverse this trend. He has constantly chastised China for currency manipulation and violations of intellectual property rights. Trump holds China responsible for loss of factory and manufacturing jobs in the United States.

With Trump pulling out of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, he is all the more pressured to take up and negotiate trade issues bilaterally with all U.S. partners including China. While the world contemplated the extent to which Trump may adhere to his election pitch, he made it real by appointing Peter Navarro—a long-time critic of China—as head of the newly created White House National Trade Council.

Trump recently struck China’s most sensitive emotional chord, by calling into question the One-China policy and establishing direct contact with the Taiwan president, the first of such contacts since 1979. It is hard to know if this move was strategically contrived or just reckless.

If Trump’s China policy is mostly motivated by mercantilism and the need to seek trade concessions, then he has certainly gotten China’s attention by playing the Taiwan card. Trump is also miffed about China not doing enough to assist and bring North Korea to the negotiating table.

In this backdrop, it becomes crucial to assess the impact of Trump on India, particularly while looking at it through the prism of Sino-American relationship. If Trump wants to take his China policy, as underscored in the election campaign, to its logical conclusion, it will serve him best if he capitalizes on and galvanizes strategic ties with India.

Trump has been vocal about his interest in India—from recording advertisement campaigns in Hindi, to appointing Indian-Americans to the top echelons of government. Inter alia, Trump pulling out of the TPP and a possible bonhomie between Putin and Trump also works in India’s favor.

However, on the trade and economic front, what works best in the interest of the United States will be detrimental to India. Like China, India is an outsourcing destination for the U.S. India will also be negatively affected by the U.S. currency and trade war with China, by the potential immigration policy of Trump, and the likely interest rate hikes.

In this broad framework of probable U.S. policy toward China and India, New Delhi stands in an advantageous position. Trump perceives China as hostile, and India as an opportunity. He is likely to undertake measures to neutralize China and distract it from geographical forages in the Asia-Pacific region, thus leveraging India’s geostrategic status and also boosting Indo-U.S. congeniality.

As United States attempts to isolate China, there is also the likelihood that China may reach out to India, to negotiate with the United States in ‘regional’ interest. If that is the case, it will be an opportunity for India and China to break the ice and kick-start a new diplomatic relationship.

This will open the doors for India to commence negotiations with China on several outstanding and far- reaching issues, like membership into the Nuclear Suppliers Group, border issues, United Nations Security Council reforms, Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Therefore, Trump’s election looks like a win-win for India.

Prarthana Kashinath is an Indian lawyer at the Karnataka High Court.

The post How Trump will Impact the Indian and Chinese Geopolitical Chessboard? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

With the New Year terrorist attack in Istanbul now being claimed by the Islamic State (IS), it is clear that Turkey has suffered yet more blowback from its earlier tolerance of the Middle East’s most vicious terrorist network. The rampage, suspected to have been carried out by a Central Asian extremist, happened at an upmarket nightclub and killed at least 39 people, including 16 foreign citizens. The Turkish news agency Anadolu has reported that Saudi Arabian, Moroccan, Lebanese and Libyan nationals were among the foreign victims, who were overwhelmingly from Muslim majority countries.

The latest attack highlights a continuing trend towards political instability for Turkey, which saw an attempted military coup last summer and suffers from an ongoing civil war with its Kurdish minority on top of the spread of political violence from Syria and Iraq into its towns and cities.The strike also fits in with the typical pattern of IS attacks in Turkey, which have mostly struck at soft targets in crowded civilian areas. In retaliation the Turkish armed forces said that they had carried out a number of air raids and also shelled IS targets near al-Bab, a Sunni Arab settlement in Syria where the Turkish armed forces and rebel proxies are presently battling the jihadist group.

The current Turkish struggle with IS is a complete reversal from the early years of the Syrian civil war, when Turkey leant heavy support to the armed opposition against Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad. However this policy was something which contributed much to the eventual rise of Islamic State, especially once it seized control of a number of strategic border crossing areas where arms, aid and foreign fighters could reach the Syrian half of its self-declared ‘caliphate’.

Turkey has long denied supporting hardline Islamist factions in Syria but many of the fighters it allowed to cross into Syria quickly joined Islamic fundamentalist groups like IS. At the same time it and other terrorist groups took the opportunity to establish a rear base in Turkey, with networks of sleeper cells, recruiters and safe houses. This gave IS the infrastructure it needed to launch repeated terrorist attacks when it decided that the time had come to turn on its Turkish hosts.

It is important to note that IS directed acts of terrorism in Turkey have long predated Operation Euphrates Shield, Ankara’s military intervention against the group in Syria which only began in August last year. IS carried out a string of devastating attacks in Turkey in 2015 and 2016 at Suruc, Ankara and Istanbul, and has claimed responsibility for bombings and shootings as far back as 2013.

That year, the group threatened Turkey with suicide bombings in Ankara if it didn’t reopen border posts it had shut to cut back on the amount of men and material reaching IS controlled areas of Syria. Despite repeated provocations however, Ankara only intervened military against the group when it became concerned about countering increasing Kurdish power in northern Syria. There were repeated accusations that Turkey preferred to allow the existence of an IS presence along its border with Syria as a way of splitting the territory under the control of Syria’s Kurds into two cantonments and preventing a second Kurdish entity from emerging to join the one in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Indeed it was Turkish inaction in the face of an IS onslaught against the Syrian Kurdish border town of Kobane in 2014-15 which ultimately proved to be the spark that led the military wing of the banned Kurdish PKK movement to return to violence. Following the Suruc massacre of students in a suicide bombing by a Turkish Kurd with links to IS, Ankara’s failure to fully implement an agreed upon peace deal came back to haunt it.

Despite a two year ceasefire between Kurdish militants and the state, good relations were poisoned by events in Syria, which convinced Turkey’s suspicious Kurds that Ankara had never truly intended to allow them the political autonomy they desired. Deep suspicions that President Erdoğan’s political ambitions would lead him to try and undermine the Kurds’ political representatives also helped relight the Kurdish conflict inside Turkey itself. But the contrast between Turkish treatment of hardline Islamist terrorist groups and the mainly secular leftist Kurdish fighters in Syria made conflict in Turkey much more certain.

Nonetheless by the end of 2017 IS itself will probably have been eliminated as a territorial entity, as offensives against it in Syria and Iraq by Turkey, Iran, the West, Russia and the Kurdish, Syrian and Iraqi authorities all combine to take its remaining urban strongholds. But IS has demonstrated an organizational ability to survive without a territorial base during its earlier incarnations, before it had spread from Iraq to other Middle Eastern nations. There are clear signs its cells in Turkey may manage the same during 2017.

The return to war with the Kurds and the military intervention into Syria last year meant that Turkey’s security services suddenly found themselves facing multiplying threats during a period when their effectiveness was in decline. This stemmed from the failed coup of last summer, which saw a huge purge begun of anyone suspected of ties to the Gülenist movement who were blamed for mounting it.

This purge has unsurprisingly weakened Turkey’s military, police and intelligence services. Simultaneously the high profile slaying of the Russian ambassador to Turkey by an off-duty policeman in Ankara indicates that some Turkish units may have been infiltrated at a low level by hardline Islamist sympathizers. Sadly therefore Turkey has probably not seen the last attack by IS militants on its soil this year, as the group’s leaders have called for more such outrages abroad in order to offset the loss of prestige the gradual collapse of its ‘caliphate’ in Syria and Iraq has caused it.

Nonetheless the fact that IS is being driven underground in Syria and Iraq will probably reduce the numbers of international militants keen to act out on the group’s orders, and limit the reach of its local fighters more closely to attacks on Syrian and Iraqi targets. Turkey may yet reach the end of this year in a better position to end the group’s operations against it than it began the year in.

This post originally appeared on the Informed Comment blog and reappears here with kind permission.

The post Turkey’s Syrian Blowback appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Sand can be seen spilling from a newly dredged channel in this view of Vietnamese-held Ladd Reef, in the Spratly Island group in the South China Sea. (Reuters)

Satellite images released last month by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMIT), run by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), reveal antiaircraft and antimissile systems now installed on all seven of China’s artificial islands. Geng Shuang, a spokesman for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, claims the artificial islands are part of “China’s inherent territories” on which it was normal to deploy “defense facilities,” while strangely confessing “nor do I know whether there are such systems on the ground as is suggested.” 

The deployment of the missile systems follows Xi Jinping’s September 2015 visit to the U.S., during which he assured President Obama that Beijing did not intend to pursue militarization of the Spratly Islands.

While China has drawn most of the international media’s attention in the South China Sea, Vietnam has also been busy conducting dredging work on Ladd Reef in the Spratly Island chain. Ladd Reef, claimed by Beijing and Taipei but controlled by Hanoi, is completely submerged during high tide, though boasts a lighthouse containing housing for a small group of Vietnamese soldiers. Satellite imagery taken late last year by U.S. company Planet Labs shows several vessels in a newly dug channel between a lagoon and the sea, and appears to suggest dredging efforts in advance of extensive construction.

The Spratly Island chain, all of which is claimed by China, Taiwan and Vietnam, comprises some 14 islands, islets and cays and more than 100 reefs. Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines also claim some of the land features. Vietnam occupies 21 features, comprising 6 islands (Spratly Island, Southwest Cay, Sin Cowe Island, Sand Cay, Namyit Island, Amboyna Cay), and such prominent reefs as West Reef, Pearson Reef, Lansdowne Reef, Grierson Reef, Cornwallis South Reef and Central Reef.

In recent months, Hanoi has been actively fortifying its key holdings in the Spratlys, including the construction of a runway, tunnels and bunkers in an effort to defend its territory against China’s growing aggression. Last November, the AMIT confirmed the progress Hanoi has made on Spratly Island with Vietnam’s sole runway in the South China Sea. The runway will soon benefit from an extension to 4,000 feet—capable of accommodating most of Vietnam’s air force planes except for its Antonov An-26 transport planes, and any future P-3 Orion anti-submarine patrol aircraft (to track China’s submarines) Hanoi may purchase from the U.S.

Hanoi has already taken delivery on five of the six Russian-made Kilo-class submarines worth $2.6 billion it ordered since 2009 for deployment at Cam Ranh Bay. The diesel-electric subs operate with near silence and armed with shorter-range torpedoes and sea-skimming anti-ship missiles with a range of 188 miles.

And back in August, diplomats and military officers told Reuters Vietnam had placed rocket launchers on five bases in the Spratly Islands, pointing them toward Chinese facilities. The rocket launchers are believed to be part of Vietnam’s “Extra” rocket artillery system recently acquired from Israel. The rockets have a range of 150km (93 miles) and carry 150kg (330 pounds) warheads that can attack multiple targets simultaneously.

Vietnam is but one country in the region beefing up its military muscle—spending on arms rose 5.4% from 2014 to 2015 across Asia compared with 1% worldwide, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

While some South China Sea watchers, such as Greg Poling at CSIS in Washington, hesitate to speculate the activity on Ladd Reef is no more than a channel for supply ships or fishing boats, others are more skeptical. Trevor Hollingsbee, a retired naval intelligence analyst with Britain’s defense ministry, believes the imagery reveals Hanoi’s attempt to “fix any vulnerabilities” and that “in this environment, Vietnam’s strategic mistrust is total […] and they are rapidly improving their defenses.”

In a regular press briefing held last month, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang responded to a question on the satellite images of Ladd Reef, saying “China exerts indisputable sovereignty over the Nansha (Spratly) Islands, Riji Jiao (Ladd Reef) included, and the adjacent waters. China urges relevant countries to respect China’s sovereignty and rights and interests, stop illegal occupation and construction, and refrain from taking any action that may complicate the situation. It is hoped that they can work together with China for peace and stability of the South China Sea.” Later in the briefing, he referred to China’s historical rights and interests in the South China Sea as “assets handed down from our ancestors.”

Whatever the changes on Ladd Reef ultimately prove to be, the U.S. State Department was quick to condemn any action. Anna Richey-Allen, a spokesperson at State, acknowledged the reports and encouraged restraint, saying, “We’ve consistently warned that reclamation and militarisation in contested areas of the South China Sea will risk driving a destabilizing and escalatory trend,” while adding, “We encourage all claimants to take steps to lower tensions and peacefully resolve differences.”

However, for all the criticism from the U.S. and China over Vietnam’s land reclamation efforts, the changes are relatively modest compared to those recently undertaken by China. According to the website of the AMTI, which tracks land reclamation efforts in the South China Sea, Vietnam has added about 120 acres (49 hectares) of land in recent years. The 120 acres which Vietnam has added represents about 3.75% of the 3,200 acres China has added since 2013.

No matter how minor this latest action proves to be, this tit-for-tat land reclamation and militarization of the South China Sea is proving devastating to the fragile marine ecosystem and threatening to spiral out of control. Some littoral states in the region are counting on the U.S. naval presence to preserve peace and prosperity in the East and South China Seas, yet fret over isolationist talk from Washington or the recent inflammatory rhetoric from President-elect Trump surrounding Taiwan, China’s trade practices and the One China policy, and the threatening responses from Beijing.

Hanoi may have drawn comfort from the call between U.S. President-elect Trump and Vietnamese premier Nguyen Xuan Phuc in December, during which Trump “asserted his wish to cooperate with Vietnam to accelerate the relationship between the two countries,” according to Vietnam’s government news website.

Yet much will depend not on the President-elect’s words but on the inaugurated U.S. president’s foreign policy actions once in office. With much of Asia questioning the new U.S. president’s eventual military commitment to the region, the waters of the South China Sea could start heating up again with more militarization of the islands and reefs as Southeast Asian nations like Vietnam hedge their bets.

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