Diplomacy & Crisis News

Military and financial assistance from the United States and the West is the main reason why Ukraine has been able to defend itself for so long against Russian aggression.

A U.S.-led international coalition comprised of over forty countries has provided over $100 billion worth of military aid to Ukraine.

In exchange, the Ukrainian military has been able to hold, and in many instances defeat, the Russian forces for over 1,000 days, while seriously diminishing the conventional capabilities of the Russian military in the process.

Military Aid to Ukraine

In terms of military aid, the United States is by far the single most important supporter of Ukraine. With over $62 billion worth of security aid packages, the United States has provided the Ukrainian military with key weapon systems and support capabilities.

Just to name a few important transfers, the United States has provided Ukraine with M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), MGM-140 Army Tactical Ballistic Systems (ATACMS), MIM-104 Patriot air defense batteries, M1 Abrams main battle tanks, M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, M-777 155mm towed howitzers, M109 Paladin 155mm self-propelled howitzers, T-72B main battle tanks, National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS), FIM-192 Stinger shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, over 4 million artillery munitions, and more than 500 million small arms bullets and grenades. These are just some of the weapon systems and capabilities provided to Ukraine.

As the manufacturing country, the United States has also authorized other countries to provide Ukraine with F-16 Fighting Falcon fighter jets.

In terms of transferring these weapon systems to Ukraine, the United States has been doing it in two different ways: Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) packages and Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) packages.

PDA packages draw from the Pentagon’s existing stocks to provide immediate relief and capabilities to the Ukrainian forces. Of course, the U.S. military has been providing weapon systems from its reserves in order not to jeopardize its global deterrence posture. But even these older weapon systems are effective against the Russian military.

USAI packages provide the Pentagon with money to buy brand-new capabilities for the Ukrainian military. Although these weapon systems are new, it can take years before they are delivered to the Ukrainian military.

The United States and its allies have also been looking for alternative methods of funding Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression.

Alternatives Methods of Funding

On Tuesday, the United States sent Kyiv the first tranche of loans generated solely from profits from seized frozen Russian assets. According to Kyiv, the first loan was worth $1 billion and it will go toward ensuring Ukraine can survive Russian aggression. Japan will also be sending $3 billion generated from seized frozen Russian assets. Earlier in December, the United States announced that it would be allocating approximately $20 billion from seized frozen Russian assets to Ukraine.

Since the war began on February 24, 2022, there has been international pressure to seize Russian assets from all over the world and give them to Ukraine to defend itself. Although it took more than 1,000 days, the United States and its partners are now moving in the right direction. For example, the Group of Seven, under the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration Loans initiative, will provide approximately $50 billion to Ukraine in 2025 from the profits generated from seized frozen Russian assets; the funds will go toward helping the Ukrainian military, as well as providing important financial relief to the Ukrainian government.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image: Shutterstock.

As Western powers continue to provide and approve Ukraine’s use of advanced weaponry against Russia, the veracity of Vladimir Putin’s deterrent threats against such provocations is increasingly called into question. 

Throughout the war, each step up the escalation ladder taken by the West—whether supplying Ukraine with fighter jets, long-range missiles, and, most recently, $20 billion in aid funded by seized Russian assets—was preceded by warnings of dire consequences from Moscow. However, no retaliation against the United States or its NATO partners has resulted. Now, this anticlimactic pattern has led many, including President-elect Donald Trump’s designated envoy to Ukraine-Russia, to believe that Putin’s nuclear threats are more bluff than bluster, arguing that the United States should “lean in” to challenge Russia rather than back down. Now, many contend that the unexpected fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria dealt a blow to Russia’s geopolitical standing, fueling more calls to capitalize on Moscow’s weakened position.

Yet, assuming limited risk or expected advantage in continuing escalation against Russia is dangerously flawed. This hardline approach misreads and oversimplifies the dynamics of escalation and overlooks Russia's increasing conventional military capabilities.

Contrary to the bravado on display, crisis escalation is non-linear and inherently unpredictable. Despite the analytic investment by scholars to study its dynamics, our grasp of escalation games remains limited, at best, while our understanding of nuclear escalation is virtually non-existent. Not only are there no standard units of measurement to gauge and evaluate the mechanics that underpin escalation, but also, the rules are not governed by simple cause-and-effect frameworks, fixed interests, or stable perceptions. In continuously adaptive feedback, the context, stakes, and calculations evolve with each new development and maneuver.

Likewise, the difficulties inherent in interpreting signals add another layer of complexity to understanding escalation. For instance, the assertion that Putin is bluffing wrongly conflates rhetoric with policy and behavior. Most likely, Moscow’s deterrent threats directed toward the West serve as tools of coercive diplomacy—signals meant to manage escalation from spiraling out of control—rather than represent triggers of an imminent military response. Still, to cross a so-called “red line” doesn’t necessarily nullify the threat or confirm the bluff. Indeed, repeated provocations could aggravate and intensify Russia’s threat perceptions, gradually building deferred pressure among decision-makers in Moscow. Eventually, this could lead to a tipping point, where Russia might act decisively to reaffirm its credibility.

Needless to say, Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine on February 24, 2022, was itself a dramatic act of escalation. It was marked by many instances of its warnings going unheeded by the United States and NATO until it provoked a response. In effect, what held true in the past may not hold true in the future—and assuming otherwise invites miscalculation.

Certainly, escalation doesn’t necessarily mean recklessness. Sometimes, it’s a rational choice in militarized crises. In such cases, meeting specific criteria can justify advancing the escalation ladder. First, the stakes must be vital enough to warrant the risks. Second, escalation must be controllable or manageable to ensure strategic advantage, a position referred to as “escalation dominance.” Finally, diplomacy must be exhausted or unviable at that juncture of the crisis to render escalation a last resort.

However, last month’s approval by Western powers for Ukraine to launch long-range strikes inside Russia—through American-supplied ATACMS, British-supplied Storm Shadow missiles, and French-supplied SCALPs—disregarded these principles. Such provocations prompted Russia to rattle its nuclear saber, revising its nuclear doctrine to expand the conditions for deployment.

No doubt, the odds of Russia resorting to nuclear weapons are slim—but slim odds are still far from an impossibility. With the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, Russia’s modern warheads include “dial-to-yield” technology, enabling adjustable explosive power to be reduced down to a fraction of its potential. This makes tactical nukes more suitable for limited battlefield engagements or demonstrating resolve. Hence, even a trivial probability warrants caution.

Paradoxically, overconfidence in the stability of the “nuclear taboo” has emboldened the provocative actions that prompted Russia’s nuclear threats—behavior the taboo is meant to prevent. Indeed, many Western policymakers and pundits alike dismiss any risk of nuclear use by Russia, categorizing it as suicidal. However, this argument fails to connect the premise to its conclusion logically.

For starters, Ukraine doesn’t possess nuclear weapons. Moreover, while unlikely, Russia’s use of a tactical nuke in Ukraine is still more plausible than a U.S. retaliation through direct war, especially in response to nuclear use against a third country. Such a scenario would compel any American president to confront the stark reality of nuclear escalation and the grave risks of direct conflict with Russia. Thus, assumptions about the existential risk to Putin’s survival in response to nuclear use overestimate NATO’s ability to credibly deter Russia on behalf of a non-treaty partner. In fact, NATO has no extended deterrence over Ukraine and has ruled out direct defense of the country, having refrained from deploying its own ground forces.

Of course, Russia isn’t likely to go nuclear so long as it’s not losing the war. But even if nuclear fears are overstated, to rely on its improbability to justify further escalation precariously overlooks Russia’s formidable conventional power. Indeed, Western hardliners fail to grasp that Moscow still has ample room to turn up the dial and escalate below the nuclear threshold. Moreover, this stratum of high-tech conventional capability only grows more dynamic and potent, with no clear countermeasures on the horizon.

Undoubtedly, Russia's November 21 debut of its “Oreshnik” missile, which targeted a weapons factory in the central Ukrainian city of Dnipro, was a powerful display of its developing conventional forces. An intermediate-range hypersonic ballistic missile with multiple reentry targeting capabilities is reported to exceed speeds of Mach 10, bypassing any air defense system. Putin regards this weapon system as a versatile tool, enabling flexible and calibrated responses against Western escalation and allowing Russia to avoid the troubles of going nuclear.

“Oreshnik is not a weapon of mass destruction,” Putin declared on November 28, adding that if deployed “several missiles at once, in a cluster, their single strike will be comparable to the use of nuclear weapons.” On December 10, he emphasized that “what we need now is not to improve the nuclear doctrine, but to advance the Oreshnik,” claiming that with enough of these advanced systems, Russia would be “on the brink of virtually no need to use nuclear weapons.” Now entering mass production, with plans to potentially forward-deploy the weapon to Belarus in 2025, Russia has signaled its intent to rely on this system more extensively.

Contrary to its intended purpose, escalation by Western powers hasn’t degraded Russia’s military. Instead, the war of attrition intensified and prolonged by Western aid, has worked to transform Russia’s massive latent power into tangible military strength. Today, Moscow has a range of tools to intensify and expand the war within Ukraine and beyond, if necessary. This toolkit includes advanced development in hypersonic missile technology, precision-guided munitions, anti-missile defense, armored vehicles and tanks, and drone, cyber, and electronic warfare.

Apart from its advanced technological expertise, Russia’s vast reserves of critical minerals, energy resources, and industrial metals provide the raw materials necessary to sustain large-scale weapons production, which hasn’t yet reached its potential output. In a war where artillery remains “King of the Battlefield,” Russia produces artillery shells three times faster—and at a quarter of the cost—compared to American and European NATO members combined. To boot, Russia’s strategic partnerships with states like China, Iran, and North Korea have bolstered its access to key military ingredients, such as machine tools and microelectronics, in addition to combat-ready weapons like drones and artillery. This ensures its ability to sustain a high-intensity war even longer.

By all metrics, Russia’s war-making capacity has grown stronger, whereas Ukraine’s has progressively weakened. This vulnerability stems from the cascading risks inherent in a protracted war of attrition. It’s no surprise that Russia’s strategy centers on grinding down Ukraine’s military at a favorable casualty-exchange ratio while hindering it from replenishing and reproducing the quality of its forces. Since the war’s onset, Ukraine’s military has been forced to rev its engines and run on all cylinders. This relentless pressure and tempo have left its military with no auxiliary capacity to regulate its intensity or manage escalation within what it’s able to sustain organizationally. Over time, institutional breakdown or capitulation becomes a more plausible scenario for Ukraine than for Russia. 

Today, Washington is urging Kyiv to address its critical shortages in manpower and lower the conscription age to eighteen as Russian military advances accelerate on the ground.

Equally important, Moscow’s capacity for conventional escalation is matched by its willingness to act. Despite talk in Western capitals about Moscow’s reluctance to enforce its threats, Russia has instead managed its escalation with calibration, minimizing overexposure and mitigating risks of overreach and overheating. Against evolving and emerging threats, Russia has expanded its political aims, intensified its firepower, and further mobilized troops to correspond with changes in goals and strategy. But its will to fight stems from the balance of resolve in Ukraine, where Russia’s stakes outweigh those of NATO. Again, it’s not a coincidence that Western commitment to Ukraine remains distant, limited to support from afar rather than direct defense.

Yet, despite clear evidence of Russia’s resolve, the United States and Europe remain entrenched in outdated assumptions that still underestimate it. To the detriment of their own coercive strategies, Western policymakers consistently fail to recognize, let alone accept, that Russia’s willpower is not driven by imperial ambition but by the conviction that NATO’s deepening relationship with Ukraine—and the endeavor to incorporate it into the alliance—constitutes a threat to its national security. History has repeatedly shown that when a state perceives its security threatened, its resolve hardens.

Today, Russia’s conventional escalation in Ukraine could still intensify in two major ways. First, the range of military targets could expand further. While this has already included Ukraine’s critical infrastructure—such as energy, electricity, and communications—the intensity of attacks could still be ramped up significantly. Likewise, its crosshairs could shift toward Ukraine’s command-and-control and government institutions. Second, Moscow could expand its war aims further. Beyond the four regions annexed in 2022 and Crimea in 2014, Russia could seek to grab more territory, such as Odesa and Kharkiv.

For NATO, the premise of escalation began with the aim to overburden Russia’s invasion, pressuring it to abandon its military objectives and withdraw from Ukraine. Today, escalation aims to coerce Moscow into accepting Western-favored terms for a negotiated settlement.

This strategy—coercive bargaining—is destined to fail on the merits of an inconvenient truth: the West doesn’t hold escalation dominance against Russia. To coerce without advantage is a recipe for diminished coercive power in return.

As such, Donald Trump’s return to the White House provides an opportunity for a course correction in Ukraine. Further escalation, however, must be avoided. To seek to gain or apply leverage is a perilous gamble in this case and will unlikely extract a better deal in the future. Prone to backfire, it’ll force upward pressure on the Kremlin to respond in kind and grant Russia the pretext to flex its conventional muscle even further. As a result, Ukraine’s eroding position on the battlefield—and thus, at the negotiating table—will be accelerated.

For the sake of Ukraine’s people, the practical and moral course is to shift toward a policy of accommodation with Russia, abandoning unproductive attempts to negotiate from an unattainable position of strength. Neither escalation nor time is on Ukraine’s side. The new administration must understand the intransigence of this reality, recognize Russia’s security concerns, and seriously engage with its terms for ending its war on Ukraine.

The pill will surely be a bitter one to swallow now, but its bitterness will only grow with time.

Ramzy Mardini is an associate at the Pearson Institute for the Study and Resolution of Global Conflicts at the University of Chicago. He is also a research affiliate at the Center for International Security & Cooperation at Stanford University.

Image: Seneline / Shutterstock.com. 

What America, China, and middle powers stand to gain and lose.

Economists have drawn the wrong lessons from the failures of the 1930s.

Christmas came early for the Polish Air Force, as its first two Lockheed Martin F-35A “Husarz” fighters arrived at Ebbing Air National Guard Base (ANGB), Arkansas, on Monday. The pair of fighters will be used to train Polish pilots on the fifth-generation stealth fighters as part of the Foreign Military Sales Program.

Poland is one of several NATO members that announced plans to adopt the F-35 Lightning II, which is produced in three variants. Warsaw’s aircraft will be the conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) F-35A model. Following a longstanding tradition with the Polish Air Force, the warplanes will receive a domestic moniker—in this case, Husarz (Polish for “Hussar”).

The Winged Cavalry

Selected by a public competition, the designation honors the historic Polish Winged Hussars, a famed sixteenth and seventeenth-century cavalry unit. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth’s elite unit was originally formed in 1503, with many of its members coming from the Polish nobility. The Winged Hussars received their name from the colorful and elaborate uniforms that incorporated military influences from the Byzantine Empire and the Mongol cavalry initially, and later from the Balkans, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire.

The cavalry troopers wore a metal zischägge, or “lobster-tail” helmet, and highly adorned armor that consisted of a cuirass (breastplate), spaulders over the shoulders, a bevor around the neck, and arm braces. Most notably, and unique to the hussars, the troopers wore a pair of wings that arched from the end of the saddles to over their heads and fluttered in the wind.

The cavalry unit participated in numerous engagements and helped Poland and her allies win more than sixteen major battles during the commonwealth’s “Golden Age,” which saw conflicts with Ottoman and Russian forces. The Winged Hussars, led by King Jan Sobieski, have been credited with helping break the Ottoman siege of Vienna in September 1693, ending Turkish expansion into Europe.

Protecting Europe’s Flank

The Polish Air Force officially received its first F-35 at a ceremony at Lockheed Martin’s facility in Fort Worth, Texas, in August. Warsaw’s program of record is for thirty-two of the fifth-generation fighters, part of a $4.6 billion deal signed in 2020. It also included training and simulators, as well as a logistic support package for the aircraft.

The fleet of F-35 Husarz fighters will begin to arrive in Poland in 2026, but the first two fighters are instead heading to Ebbing ANGB for the aforementioned training.

“The arrival of Poland’s first F-35s is a significant milestone for our state, the nation and our allies who will train on this fifth-generation fighter at Ebbing Air National Guard Base,” said Brigadier General Chad Bridges, Arkansas adjutant general.

“I’m extremely proud of the whole team in the 188th Wing and the staffs at Razorback Range and Fort Chaffee Joint Maneuver Training Center for the planning and work that has resulted in the sound of freedom returning to the River Valley,” Bridges added. “They’ve partnered with the active-duty Air Force to go from concept to jets being parked on the ramp in a compressed timeframe. We are thankful for the dedicated teamwork of those in Fort Smith, Sebastian County, our entire congressional delegation and state elected officials who have moved mountains to make this mission possible in Arkansas.”

According to the Arkansas National Guard Public Affairs Office, “Ebbing ANGB will also host F-35 pilots from Finland, Germany, Switzerland and Singapore in the coming years.”

Replacing Legacy Soviet Aircraft

Deliveries of Poland’s nearly three dozen F-35s will continue through 2030, allowing Warsaw to phase out its Cold War-era Mikoyan MiG-29 (NATO reporting name “Fulcrum”) fighters. In July, it was reported that Warsaw would likely send the remaining MiG-29s to Ukraine as it receives the F-35s.

The F-35 isn’t the first Western-made fighter to be adopted by the NATO member state. The Polish Air Force also operates the F-16 Fighting Falcon, which is locally designated the “Jastrzab” (Polish for “Hawk”).

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites, with over 3,200 published pieces and over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image: Mike Mareen / Shutterstock.com. 

Air power is probably the most important aspect of a modern conflict. Whoever controls the skies can control the ground and seas.

In the Ukrainian conflict, neither side has been able to wrestle control of the skies and establish air superiority. And although it is not surprising that the Ukrainian Air Force is having trouble with this—since it lacks the advanced aircraft and numbers of its adversary—it is quite a surprise for the Russian Aerospace Forces.

In an attempt to replenish its significant losses and bolster its air power, the Russian Aerospace Forces are receiving a new batch of Su-57 Felon and Su-34 Fullback fighter jets.

More Fighter Jets

The Russian Aerospace Forces will be getting more Su-57 Felon and Su-34 Fullback fighter jets. Moscow touts the Su-57 Felon as a fifth-generation stealth fighter jet, though Western analysts doubt its stealth capabilities. The Su-34 Fullback is a fighter-bomber aircraft designed to take out strategic targets on land and sea.

“Aerospace enterprises within Rostec are steadily supplying aviation equipment to the troops. The Su-57 and Su-34 aircraft delivered today will soon take their place in active service,” Rostec CEO Sergey Chemezov said.

“The Su-34 is valued by pilots for its high technical and combat characteristics. The Su-57, often referred to as the ‘king of the skies,’ has demonstrated its status as a fifth-generation fighter in prolonged combat conditions. It can effectively engage a wide range of targets using precision-guided weapons while maintaining low visibility against advanced air defense systems,” the Rostec CEO added.

Actually, the Su-57 Felon hasn’t “demonstrated its status as a fifth-generation fighter in prolonged combat conditions.” Yes, the Russian Aerospace Forces have used Su-57 Felons to conduct long-range strikes against Ukrainian urban centers and critical infrastructure. However, Moscow has been very careful not to allow its most advanced fighter jet too close into the fighting out of fear that it will be shot down by Ukraine’s Western air defense batteries. In other words, the Su-57 Felon has participated in combat but not to the extent necessary to determine its actual combat capabilities against comparable Western aircraft.

“The Su-57 and Su-34 are among the best in their class,” said Vadim Badekha, the head of UAC which is itself part of Rostec.

“They address critical tasks while showcasing superior maneuverability and combat performance. Our production teams continue to work diligently to fulfill the state defense order, and we are committed to enhancing wages and expanding corporate social programs,” the Russian aerospace official added.

The Russian Aerospace Forces have taken serious losses in the Ukrainian conflict. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense puts the number of Russian fixed-wing aircraft losses at approximately 369. The Oryx open-source intelligence analysis website comes up with a lower number, 134. (Oryx relies on visual evidence that is published on social media.) The actual number is probably somewhere in between the two estimates. In terms of the Su-57 and Su-34, the Russian Aerospace Forces have lost thirty-seven Su-34s and one Su-57, which was destroyed on the ground after a Ukrainian long-range drone attack.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image: vaalaa / Shutterstock.com

The historical significance of the M1 Garand can't be overstated. It was the first semi-automatic military rifle to be employed as a standard shoulder weapon, a point that was quite notable at the time. While movies and video games may suggest that the average German or Soviet soldier carried a submachine gun—respectively the MP40 or PPSh-41—the truth is that throughout World War II, most infantrymen were armed with a bolt action rifle that featured a magazine of just five rounds.

Those rifles were slightly shorter in length than the rifles that had been carried in the trenches of World War I, but the technology was otherwise not improved.

The U.S. infantryman by comparison was equipped with the M1 Garand, which in addition to being semi-automatic—offering a higher rate of fire—held eight rounds. As it was fed by en bloc clips, it was also quicker to reload than the bolt-action rifles. And for the record, while video games suggest it wasn't possible to "top off" the M1 Garand, operators could eject a partially expended clip and put in a full one.

An Innovative Firearm

A common misconception is that the M1 Garand was the first successful semi-automatic rifle, if not the first actual auto-loading rifle. Both are incorrect. The latter distinction of the first auto-loader goes to the Mannlicher Model 85, which was the first rifle to employ the recoil to load the next cartridge into the chamber. However, it was far from "successful," as it often jammed and fouled quickly—the latter due to the black powder ammunition of the era.

John Browning's Remington Model 8 earns the distinction of being the first proven semi-automatic rifle and was noted for being reliable and accurate. Yet, the Model 8 was also complex in design and not ideally suited to military use.

Following World War I, various militaries continued to work on the auto-loading concept including the United States, which in the 1930s sought to develop a simple, accurate, and rugged semi-automatic rifle. Several rifles were tested, but Canadian-born John C. Garand's design won out.

Noted firearms expert Ian Hogg described the operation of the M1 Garand in his book Guns and How They Work, writing:

"Originally developed in .276in caliber, it was changed to .30in due to ammunition availability. Operation of the Garand was by a gas piston below the barrel which drove an operating rod. This, by means of a cam, rotated the bolt to unlock it, and thrust it back to open the breach and eject the spent case. A return spring around the piston rod then pulled the rod and bolt back, stripping a round from the magazine and chambering it before rotating to lock it. A hammer, cocked by the returning bolt, was then released by the trigger to strike a firing pin inside the bolt."

Though Hogg's explanation is complex, the operation was fairly straightforward: The M1 Garand proved to be well-suited to coming conflict.

Yes, Patton Loved It

No reporting on the M1 Garand's historical significance would be complete without looking into the praise offered to the firearm by General George S. Patton. "Old Blood and Guts" is often quoted as saying "In my opinion, the M-1 Rifle is the greatest battle implement ever devised."

Now to set the record straight, Patton actually wrote those words in a letter to Major General Levin H. Campbell, Jr., the U.S. War Department's chief of ordnance.

The letter also went on to state, "However, my admiration for Ordnance products does not stop with the M-1 rifle. Our machine guns, mortars, artillery, and tanks are without equal on the battlefields of the world. In the hands of the unconquerable veterans now composing our armies, the utter destruction of the armed forces of our enemies is certain."

Patton's reason for writing the letter to Campbell is unclear, but there is a simple explanation.

Despite the myth that Patton was some kind of military leader who played by his own rules (like too many movie police detectives); the truth is that he was a career military officer who rose through the ranks not only for his leadership skills but also understanding how to "play the game." You don't become a four-star general by being a troublemaker and certainly not by making enemies among the other generals.

Had Patton been discussing military hardware with General Henry "Hap" Arnold, chief of the U.S. Army Air Forces, Old Blood and Guts might have praised the B-17 Flying Fortress instead.

So was Patton just kissing butt or did he really see the M1 Garand as a super weapon? Well, it was probably somewhere in the middle.

The M1 Garand Was Also Quickly Outdated

The timing of Patton's letter to Campbell is also notable as he wrote it in January 1945, by which time his soldiers would have certainly encountered the German StG44—the world's first assault rifle. History doesn't note whether Patton personally handled the German-made firearm, but it is fair to suggest that the StG44 was the future, not the M1 Garand.

Therefore we should accept that Patton's praise of the M1 Garand was piled on a bit thick, yet, there is no denying that the rifle certainly arrived at just the right time. It was developed in the 1930s, even as the United States was hell-bent on staying out of another European conflict (let alone a world war that would see its troops sent to the Pacific).

Much like a lot of the military hardware of World War II—everything from the M1 Garand to the M4 Sherman tank to the B-17 Flying Fortress bomber to the U.S. Navy's Iowa-class battleships—what was cutting-edge at the start of the war was a bit antiquated by the time the dust settled. The M1 Garand provided greater firepower to the infantryman than the bolt action rifles, but the German military responded with its own semi-automatic rifle, the K43/G43, as well as the aforementioned StG44. That latter firearm was studied by the Soviet Red Army and even if not copied directly, it certainly was reviewed during the development of the AK-47.

The United States missed the memo on assault rifles, however, and continued to employ the M1 Garand in the Korean War. Production of the M1 Garand was restarted to meet the demand, and in total more than five million were produced. The United States military then began the development of the M14, which was essentially an evolutionary step forward in battle rifle design, before changing course and adopting the AR15/M16.

The M1: Respected, Loved, and Collected

Today, the M1 Garand remains an especially sought-after rifle—in part because those movies, TV shows, and video games have reminded contemporary shooters that this was the firearm that the Greatest Generation carried to win World War II and save democracy.

Yet, there was a time when it wasn't all that popular.

In the years after World War II, the vast majority of GIs, Marines, and other servicemembers who returned to civilian life probably saw little need for a semi-automatic rifle. Hunters preferred bolt-action rifles that could be fitted with a scope, and that fact at least partially explains the move to "sporterize" military surplus rifles in the decades after the war.

It was only as time passed that there was renewed interest in all things World War II. The latest wave certainly began with the release of films like Saving Private Ryan in 1997, followed by HBO's Band of Brothers in 2001. Video games then introduced a new generation to the World War II firearm, while also offering some now commonly-believed myths—notably that you'd hear that infamous "ping" sound when the en bloc clip was ejected from the receiver!

Likewise, though some communities, notably New York City, have a ban on the M1 Garand, it is legal in many states where AR15s and other modern sporting rifles are now illegal to own. Interestingly, the rationale for the Big Apple's ban is based on the fact that the M-5 Bayonet attaches to the gas cylinder lock screw. Any semi-auto rifle with a "bayonet mount" is defined as an "assault weapon" in New York City and subsequently banned.

Today, shooters continue to praise the M1 Garand because it is fairly easy to maintain—as long as you're careful, otherwise, you could end up with "Garand thumb"—while it remains an accurate range gun that can handle all types of weather. It shoots as well in the sweltering summer as it does in the freezing winter.

The interest in the M1 Garand has driven up the prices considerably, however.

It has also presented a few issues along the way—notably, vintage M1 Garands, which are now upwards of eighty years old, shouldn't be used with some modern ammunition. The issue is that modern hunting .30/06 loads, those with 180-grain or heavier bullets and slower-burning propellants, will produce pressures that exceed what the M1 Garand was designed to handle. Shooters are therefore advised to be cautious in what rounds they use with their old rifles.

Yet, with proper ammunition, a well-maintained M1 Garand should operate as well today as it did when it was carried by those of the Greatest Generation during World War II.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

On Friday, December 20, Lockheed Martin announced that it had signed a deal with the United States Department of Defense (DoD) for full-rate production of Lot 18 of the Air Force’s F-35A, the Marine Corps’ F-35B, and the Navy’s F-35C variants of the F-35 Lightning II fifth-generation warplane. 

Beyond the American order, thirty-nine F-35As and seven F-35Bs will be sent to U.S. allies, courtesy of concomitant foreign military sales deals. Interestingly, The Defense Post reports that “Undisclosed program partners will receive 15 F-35As and one F-35B aircraft.” The production of Lot 18 is anticipated to be completed by June 2027.

This is an interesting development, considering how much Lockheed’s F-35 program has fallen into controversy since it was first unveiled in 2006 (the program had been in development since at least 1995).

Three Key Points About the F-35 Program

First, the F-35 has struggled to meet its agreed-upon timelines and Lockheed has, throughout the twenty-year-long course of the program, rarely delivered the quantity of F-35s without going beyond its allotted budget.

Second, the rapid development and deployment of cheaper unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has called into question the efficacy of paying for the vaunted F-35. And this second point is key, as the incoming president, Donald J. Trump, is a month from taking office. Trump is taking advice from tech leaders such as Elon Musk and the biotech billionaire Vivek Ramaswamy, both of whom have expressed deep skepticism as to the utility of this manned, fifth-generation warplane.

These individuals surrounding Trump believe that unmanned systems are superior and will only become more essential to the modern battlefield, especially in light of the advances in things like artificial intelligence (AI), cloud computing, and quantum computing. When all is said and done, the F-35 program is projected to cost U.S. taxpayers more than $2 trillion over the course of its lifetime. Could that money have been better spent on unmanned autonomous or semi-autonomous systems?

Oh, and Trump himself has long been a critic of the F-35 program.

On December 12, 2016, as he was transitioning to become president for the first time, Trump famously tweeted that, “The F-35 program and cost is out of control. Billions of dollars can and will be saved on military (and other) purchases after January 20th.”

So, the Pentagon is clearly pushing through what might end up being its last tranche of purchases for the F-35 (at least until Trump and his team of advisors get a good look under the hood of the program that many believe has been spinning out of control).

Third, there remains a bit of argument within America’s defense aerospace community as to whether the F-35 or the F-22A Raptor was the right plane for the U.S. government to favor. Sure, the F-35 is a multirole warplane (meaning it does both air-to-air combat as well as air-to-ground attack and surveillance missions) whereas the F-22 is just an air superiority fighter.

Yet, in the age of renewed great power competition, the F-22 might be more important than the F-35 (at least for the Air Force). Further, the F-22 is clearly more advanced than the F-35. 

Is the F-35 Even the Best Fifth-Generation Bird?

Key allies, like Britain and Israel, are prevented from purchasing the F-22 not only because the production line was prematurely canceled, but because the F-22 contains such supposedly advanced technologies that if they were shared even with U.S. allies it would weaken U.S. national security.

If there were no real differences technologically then why do the Pentagon and Congress still refuse to make the F-22 an exportable program whereas the F-35 is an exportable system? 

Nevertheless, the Pentagon will be getting forty-eight F-35As for the Air Force, sixteen F-35Bs and five F-35Cs for the Marines, and the Navy will be getting fourteen F-35Cs. Most of the work for Lockheed will occur in California and Texas. After this tranche, though, Trump and his team might push to cancel the program. 

Losing the F-35 But Gaining a Sixth-Generation Plane? 

What’s more, the Air Force appears dead set on getting its sixth-generation Next-Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program to replace the fifth-generation birds they have. The Navy is also keen on getting its sixth-generation F/A-XX plane.

Both services are understandably hitting stiff resistance from a Congress that is increasingly skeptical of investing gobs of tax dollars on sixth-generation warplanes that will only marginally enhance the capabilities of the current fleet of fifth-generation warplanes in service to both the Navy and Air Force.

But, should the incoming forty-seventh president follow through on his threats to cancel or seriously curb future production of the F-35, it might free up the Air Force and/or Navy to reinvest in their respective sixth-generation planes. One thing is clear, though, this might be the last tranche of F-35s until the incoming Trump administration can figure out what, precisely, it seeks to do.

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, The American Spectator, to the National Interest. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Shutterstock.

Of all the government boondoggles, the United States Navy’s Zumwalt-class destroyer might be the silliest waste of money ever. After years of avoiding having to make the hard call on the failed Zumwalt-class (e.g., mothballing these boats), the Navy has kicked the can down the road again. 

This time, the Pentagon has concocted a scheme that might prove to be utterly useless: arming the Zumwalts with hypersonic cruise missiles that the Navy has been developing to counter China in the Indo-Pacific. 

Now, there are some people lamenting the fact that the Zumwalt never went into full production and more units were never bought. And their reason is, frankly, ridiculous. 

According to these sources, now that the Navy has figured out what to do with these boats after twenty years of being totally unable to use them, the Pentagon is retrofitting them by removing their primary guns and replacing them with hypersonic cruise missile launchers. 

They want to turn the Zumwalt class into a hypersonic missile carrier.

Some of you are salivating at that. I know. It’s what we’ve always wanted. Indeed, it’s what America needs, right? 

The Russians—yes, the Russians—are beating us in hypersonic weapons technology. They have long-range and shorter-range hypersonic ballistic missiles in their arsenal that they have used already in combat. China, too, is working on increasingly complicated hypersonic weapons platforms. 

In fact, some of the technological advances China enjoyed over the last few years with its hypersonic weapons development are downright scary. For instance, China successfully experimented with beaming sixth-generation (6G) communications into one of their hypersonic glide vehicles as it was reentering the atmosphere using a laser to enhance Chinese control over the vehicle. 

So, yeah, America needs to up its game in the hypersonic domain.

Lipstick on a Pig

But the idea that the Zumwalt-class destroyers, given all their chronic problems and failures, can live up to the hype that surrounded them when they were first sold to the American people is ridiculous. One can only put so much lipstick on a pig, after all. And why is the Navy even entertaining notions of placing hypersonic cruise missile launchers on the Zumwalts?

It's because the much-ballyhooed main guns for the Zumwalt-class destroyers that were originally planned to be installed didn’t work. Originally, the Navy had planned for the Zumwalts to feature the Advanced Gun System (AGS) that would fire specialized “Long Range Land Attack Projectile” (LRLAP) ammunition.

Designed to be highly precise but useable only on the Zumwalts, the Navy realized that at a cost of $800,000 per round made the LRLAP munitions impractical. It’s just too bad that the Pentagon figured this out after it had committed to the AGS. Without the LRLAP munitions, the AGS was rendered useless. 

So, the Navy had to go back to the drawing board for what the Zumwalts would fire.

A Monumental Waste

Hence, the introduction of hypersonic missile launchers. And while some of you reading this might be inclined to congratulate the Navy for taking one of its greatest failures, the Zumwalt-class destroyer, and trying to make it a success story, remember that the ship itself is an expensive claptrap. Not only are the main guns for the Zumwalt a failure, but the destroyers are notorious for their relatively weak armor and their chronic engine woes. 

Let’s get this straight. The Navy spent $8 billion per unit on the Zumwalt-class destroyer (which has been billed as the world’s largest destroyer), equaling about $24 billion in all. This new destroyer was to be revolutionary. Instead, it is an evolutionary dead-end (an expensive one at that). Its guns don’t work. Its armor is dangerously weak. And its engines are subpar. That doesn’t sound like a warship. Placing hypersonic weapons onboard will not overcome the inherent flaws of this expensive, useless warship. 

The Navy should be taken to task for wasting the kind of money it has on this failed warship and the boats themselves should be mothballed before they wind out getting their crews killed in combat. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, The American Spectator, to the National Interest. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image:  Lukas Prosch / Shutterstock.com

Earlier this month, the Lithuanian Defence Materiel Agency under the Ministry of National Defence (DMA) announced it signed a contract with KNDS Deutschland for forty-four Leopard 2A8 main battle tanks (MBTs) to equip a Lithuanian Army armored unit. Valued at €950 million ($988 million), this is the largest defense deal ever made by this Baltic nation and NATO member.

“The agreement on Leopard acquisition is the largest contract Lithuania has ever signed. It is a pivotal stage of modernizing our armed forces and strengthening the regional security,” Minister of National Defence Dovil Šakalien said in a statement. “The new tanks will facilitate integration and interoperability of [the] Lithuanian and German militaries.”

Lithuania, which shares a border with the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad as well as a border with Russian ally Belarus, will become the first nation to acquire the German-made MBT as part of Germany’s Common Procurement Agreement, which has aimed to improve Europe’s common defense capabilities. 

Lithuania will receive the most advanced version of the Leopard 2. The MBT is equipped with the Rafael-designed Trophy APS (active protection system) and a better all-around (360-degree) awareness system. The upgraded variant also features the newest generation of passive multi-layer composite modular armor, which is made up of steel, tungsten, composite filler, and even ceramics.

The Leopard In The Crosshairs

The 28A model is equipped with a three-man turret containing the main 120mm L55 smoothbore gun manufactured by Rheinmetall AG. This is an improved iteration of the L44 gun that previous models of the Leopard 2 hosted. The L55 is over a meter longer than its predecessor, giving it higher muzzle velocities. It has greater accuracy, range, and penetration and can fire a wide array of ordnance, including APFSDS (Armor-Piercing Fin-Stabilized Discarding Sabot), HEAT (High-Explosive Anti-Tank), and multipurpose ammunition.

The overall layout of the modernized tanks is similar to other models. They are powered by an upgraded 1,600 hp engine that allows the Leopard 2A8 to reach speeds of over seventy kilometers per hour (forty-four miles per hour).

Well Above 2 Percent

During a recent visit to Germany, Šakalien had further pledged that Vilnius would remain committed to hosting a Bundeswehr military brigade near the border of Belarus, Breaking Defense reported.

Last week, Lithuania also passed its 2025 state budget, which will allocate 4 percent of its GDP (gross domestic product) to defense—double NATO’s 2 percent defense expenditure guidelines.

“We’ve essentially budgeted 4 percent of GDP for defence, but some of that money has to be borrowed,” said Lithuanian president Gitanas Nauseda.

NATO Ammo Plant to be Built in Lithuania

Earlier this month, the German-based Rheinmetall also announced it had begun construction of an artillery ammunition plant in the Lithuanian city of Baisogala, in the center of the country. The plant is on track to begin producing 155mm rounds—the NATO standard ordnance for weapons, including the M777 towed howitzer and numerous self-propelled artillery platforms—by the middle of 2026. Tens of thousands of artillery shells will be manufactured annually.

The facility will not only bring around 150 jobs to the Lithuanian city but also help NATO replenish its stockpiles of the much-needed 155mm ordnance.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites, with over 3,200 published pieces and over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image: Arnoldas Vitkus / Shutterstock.com. 

Est-il raisonnable d'espérer des « sages de la rue de Montpensier » qu'ils retoquent tout ou partie de la loi réformant les retraites ? Le Conseil constitutionnel demeure une instance essentiellement politique, qui n'a que très peu souvent la volonté de se confronter aux pouvoirs. / Droit, France, (...) / Droit, France, Politique, Retraites - 2023/04

Les coups de menton de l'exécutif et les brutalités policières témoignent de la fébrilité du pouvoir français. Et pour cause : la contestation de la réforme des retraites porte en germe celle de l'ordre social soutenu par le gouvernement. / Politique, Démocratie, France, Mouvement de contestation, (...) / Politique, Démocratie, France, Mouvement de contestation, Retraites, Syndicalisme - 2023/04

En janvier, la publication de l'édition allemande d'une bande dessinée française de Dominique Grange et Jacques Tardi, « Élise et les nouveaux partisans » (Delcourt, Paris, 2021), était annulée en raison de l'expression « apartheid israélien » utilisée dans la postface de l'œuvre. Loin d'être isolé, ce (...) / Allemagne, Extrême droite, Racisme, Israël, Art, Société - 2023/04

The war in Ukraine has offered an excellent opportunity to assess the capabilities of Western weapon systems in a state-on-state war.  

Although the United States has been the main supporter of the Ukrainian military, dozens of other countries have sent Kyiv weapon systems. And one of those weapon systems is performing quite well in the fighting.  

The Dutch YPR-756 

With a name similar to that of a Star Wars robot, the YPR-756 is a reliable infantry fighting vehicle that can perform on the modern battlefield. Made for the Dutch military and now in service with the Ukrainian forces, the YPR-756 is an unusual but honest infantry fighting vehicle.  

The Dutch military first introduced the YPR-765 in 1977 as a replacement for the French-made AMX-VCI light tank. Soon, it became the Dutch military’s main infantry fighting vehicle designed to support maneuver warfare on European fields in the event of a conflict with Russia. 

It has a crew of three (commander, gunner, and driver) and can carry up to seven fully-equipped mechanized infantrymen.  

The YPR-756 is relatively fast and can achieve speeds of about thirty-eight miles per hour, or sixty-one kilometers per hour, and has an operational range of around 300 miles, or 490 kilometers. 

In terms of weapons systems, the Dutch-made infantry fighting vehicle packs a 25mm autocannon and a 7.62mm machine gun. The armored vehicle can also be fitted with additional weapon systems, including 120mm mortar and M2 0.5 caliber heavy machine guns, and sensors depending on the battlefield requirements.  

As far as mission sets go, the YPR-765 is mainly designed to transport mechanized infantry into the fight and cover them with its weapons. However, it can also conduct armored reconnaissance and medical transport.  

Fighting In Ukraine  

Over the summer, the Dutch government announced another transfer of YPR-756 infantry fighting vehicles to Ukraine. 

“These types of armored vehicles are very important for Ukraine. They are agile, can move troops quickly, and can be deployed in exploratory, offensive,e and defensive roles,” Dutch Defense Minister Kajsa Ollongren had said about the transfer of the infantry fighting vehicles to the Ukrainian military.  

The Netherlands has transferred over 350 YPR-756s to the Ukrainian military and helped it defend against Russian aggression. The Netherlands will likely send additional infantry fighting vehicles to Kyiv down the line since it has a remaining inventory of approximately 1,500 YPR-756s.  

The fighting in Ukraine has shown the great value of infantry fighting vehicles on the modern battlefield. They offer protection, mobility, and firepower to mechanized infantry and are ideal for maneuver warfare. The Ukrainian military has been using infantry fighting vehicles profusely, and they have made a difference in Kyiv’s offensive operations. Although infantry fighting vehicles can’t carry as many troops as armored personnel carriers, they can use their weapon systems and sensors to better support a dismounted infantry assault.  

In addition, with the right training and weapon systems (and luck), infantry fighting vehicles can even take on main battle tanks. 

 Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image Credit: M.J.J. de Vaan / Shutterstock.com

Other Russian clients may conclude that they can’t rely on Moscow.

The West should not let Tbilisi slip back into Russia’s orbit.

Since early August, the Ukrainian military has occupied a salient inside Russia, in the Kursk Oblast.

Now, the Russian military is trying to eradicate that salient by throwing thousands of Russian and North Korean troops at it.

The Ukrainian Salient inside Russia

“Russia’s counter-offensive against the Ukrainian-occupied salient in Kursk oblast continues with tactical gains in territorial control observed in the last week,” the British Military Intelligence assessed in a recent estimate of the war.

The Russian forces have been making steady progress, slowly pushing back the Ukrainian units. The Ukrainian offensive took the Russian leadership by surprise and managed to capture hundreds of square miles and scores of settlements before the lines solidified.

“In the north-western corner of the salient, Russian forces have advanced up to 4km south-east along a front of approximately 4km, contesting the village of Kruglen’koe. In the south-eastern corner of the salient, Russian forces have advanced west approximately 2km from the town of Plekhovo and remain near the outskirts of Makhnovka, approximately 3km to the north,” the British Military Intelligence added.

In many ways, the Ukrainian military has achieved its objective of distracting the Russian forces and forcing the Kremlin to commit elite units to the salient in Kursk, diverting them from the fighting inside Ukraine.

“Ukrainian forces control approximately 480 sq km of Russian territory, down from approximately 510 sq km a week ago, and a high point of 800-900 sq km in August 2024. The recent loss of territory is likely due to Russian counterattacks being led by Naval Infantry, Airborne (VDV) forces and troops from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” the British Military Intelligence stated.

The war in Ukraine is the largest conflict on European soil since the end of World War II. That is a fact both in terms of troops engaged, resources spent, and casualties suffered.

“Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk, in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, is the first time since the Second World War that foreign troops have occupied Russian territory,” the British Military Intelligence added.

“Russia will almost certainly continue carrying out limited attacks to reduce the amount of territory in Kursk oblast under Ukrainian control,” the British Military Intelligence concluded.

But progress hasn’t come cheap for the Russian forces.

Russian Casualties

The Russian military, paramilitary units, and pro-Russian separatist forces keep taking extremely heavy casualties. For example, over the past twenty-four hours, the Russian forces took almost 2,000 losses. In addition to these manpower casualties, the Russian forces lost approximately sixty-seven tactical vehicles and fuel trucks, fifty-five unmanned aerial systems, twenty-nine artillery pieces and multiple launch rocket systems, fifteen infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, six main battle tanks, two pieces of special equipment, and one cruise missile.

Overall, the Russian forces have suffered over 775,000 personnel killed or wounded in over 1,000 days of fighting. Despite the extremely heavy losses, the Russian military is persisting with its attritional strategy. And, notwithstanding the casualty rate, the strategy seems to be working for a Kremlin devoid of quality troops and officers who can fight a more modern type of warfare.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image: kibri_ho / Shutterstock.com

“I don’t want no teenage queen/I just want my M14…”

My fellow military film buffs will instantly recognize those two lines as part of a classic running cadence from the boot camp sequence of Stanley Kubrick’s iconic 1987 Vietnam War film “Full Metal Jacket.”

Though not quite as famous or controversial as either the M16/M4/AR-15 series or Avtomat Kalashnikova, i.e., the AK-47 platform and its variants, the M14 is a plenty famous and historically significant military rifle. Some experts thought it was an overweight, overpowered, and overrated hunk of junk, while others thought it was a wonderfully accurate, reliable, hard-hitting weapon that never should’ve been replaced by the “Plastic Fantastic” M16 to fight the Vietnam War. Overall, the positive assessments of the M14 seem to far outweigh the negative ones.

Where It Began: Replacing a Legend

That legend began with the M1 Garand, a rifle that had served American GIs so faithful during both World War II and the Korean War and was praised by no less than General George Smith Patton Jr. himself as “the greatest battle implement ever devised.” But as superb as the Garand truly was, it did have one glaring weakness: the “M-1 ping,” i.e., the rifle would eject its empty stripper clip with a loud “ping!” which sent a pretty strong auditory clue to Axis troops that the American GI’s weapon was empty.

The M14, with its detachable 20-round box magazine, eliminated that problem, and as a major bonus, provided a 150 percent increase in ammunition capacity over the WWII-era weapon. The M14 was designed in 1954 and officially became the standard-issue rifle for the U.S. Armed Forces from 1959 to 1964, with over 1 million units produced over that relatively short span of time. The weapon was (and still is) a gas-operated 7.62x51mm NATO (.308 caliber) rifle, capable of both semiautomatic and fully automatic fire, with the following specifications.

• Cyclic rate of fire (full-auto mode): 700-750 rounds
• Muzzle velocity: 2,800 feet per second
• Maximum effective range: 500 yards
• Maximum overall range: 3,275 yards
• Overall length: 44.14 inches
• Barrel length: 22 inches
• Empty weight: 9.2 pounds
• Weight with fully loaded magazine:10.7 pounds

Proving Her Mettle: The M-14 in Combat

The M14 soon established a reputation for ruggedness and superb accuracy. Two perceived problems for general-issue infantry usage in the jungles of Vietnam were the heavy weight and lack of controllability during full-auto fire, especially compared to the M16, which could carry more rounds in a more lightweight and lower-recoiling platform. 

However, for elite SpecOps units like the Navy SEALs, those aforementioned concerns aren’t as pressing. As noted by the Navy SEALs webpage: 

“Navy SEALs started using modified M14s as sniper rifles as early as Vietnam. They have used them in Afghanistan and Iraq, primarily as designated marksman and sniper rifles. Navy SEALs keep the M14 in inventory due to its excellent accuracy, effectiveness at long range, and strong takedown capabilities of the 7.62mm round.”

The SEALs’ M14s certainly haven’t remained frozen in time (Vietnam vintage, that is). Their latest and greatest iteration is the Mk 14 Mod 0 Enhanced Battle Rifle (EBR), which is manufactured by Smith Enterprise Inc. (headquartered in Tempe, Arizona) and has the following fancy features:

• An 18-inch barrel
• A telescopic stock
• A pistol grip for improved ergonomics
• New front sights
• A folding bipod
• A set of Picatinny rails around the barrel allows for the mounting of various accessories such as scopes, torches, laser pointing systems, etc.
• Lighter materials (the EBR is constructed from lightweight aircraft alloy)

In addition, during the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993, U.S. Army Delta Force sniper Sergeant First Class Randy Shughart used an M14 for his heroic actions that would earn him a posthumous Medal of Honor.

Where Are They Now?

Besides the SEALs, the M14 is also reportedly still issued by the Hellenic (Greek Navy). Meanwhile, semiauto-only variants remain extremely popular with civilian shooters, particularly the semiauto-only Springfield Armory M1A, which, in its most basic, no-frills version, carries an MSRP of MSRP $1,770.00-$1,875.00.

About the Author: Christian D. Orr

Christian D. Orr is a Senior Defense Editor for National Security Journal (NSJ). He is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch, The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security, and Simple Flying. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS).

Image: ShapikMedia / Shutterstock.com

Iran’s Simorgh missile, officially known as a Space Launch Vehicle (SLV), represents a key element of Iran’s (growing) space and ballistic missile programs. The missile is named after the mythical Persian bird known for its strength and benevolence, Simorgh is a two-stage, liquid-fueled rocket designed primarily to place satellites into low-Earth orbit (LEO). 

Yet, its development has sparked consternation among the international community, which fears that Iran may be using their supposedly civilian nuclear weapons program as little more than a cover for their ballistic missile program. And that ballistic missile program is, of course, the cornerstone undergirding their nuclear weapons program.

Back in 2010, the cartoonish former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad authorized the creation of the Simorgh, also known as Safir-2. Officially, the Simorgh rocket is meant to place Iranian satellites in orbits around the Earth. 

It has a length of about eighty-nine feet and can place a 551-pound satellite into an orbit as high as 310 miles away. The missile has had varying degrees of success since its inception in 2010. Of the seven official missions it was sent on, three were unsuccessful, though four is more than half, so technically this missile has been a success. 

The Context

Western economic sanctions have specifically targeted the Simorgh and the components that make the missile up. So, the Iranians have struggled to get this system to its full potential in the last fourteen years. Nevertheless, the Islamic Republic possesses the industrial capabilities to build such machines. 

Anyway, the Simorgh rocket is not a vehicle for peaceful exploration or civilian satellite operations. It is very much a dual-use system, meaning that it can have both civilian as well as military applications. Even in the realm of satellites, having a satellite in the attic and a bomb in the basement helps the Iranian nuclear weapons program. Satellites will help Iran’s military have greater over-the-horizon attack capabilities and would help Iran to better target distant targets. 

And let’s just say that this was a civilian project. The lessons learned from the use of the Simorgh rocket could easily be applied to an actual intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). According to the publication Iran Primer, “It would take a handful of years” to “transform its Simorgh into an ICBM” and “would not likely become operational before 2023 or 2024.” The cited article was written in 2021, so the suspenseful music should be playing in your head right now.

Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Threat

While there are real debates about how advanced the Iranian nuclear weapons program is, even if the Iranians do have some rudimentary warheads, they lack the miniaturization technology needed to mount these weapons atop ICBMs, such as the Simorgh or an actual ICBM. 

At the same time, though, the collapse of the Assad Regime in Syria and the subsequent withdrawal of Russian forces from Syria means that Iran is on the strategic backfoot when it comes to its shadow war with Israel and the United States. Now, Tehran will need to expedite the development of its nuclear weapons arsenal and the subsequent delivery systems, including miniaturization technology. 

Iran’s Simorgh, though, would be more akin to an inter-range ballistic missile (IRBM) than an ICBM. The farthest many experts believe the Simorgh could reach is Europe. The United States would remain insulated from the Simorgh. The Middle East has been completely destabilized. Iran now finds itself on the back foot, with the U.S.-Israeli coalition riding high after Assad’s ouster. Tehran will next seek to expand its nuclear weapons capabilities, which, in turn, would bring about the ire of much of the rest of the world. 

America is on notice, but it has not noticed. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is available for purchase wherever books are sold. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

Valued at $725 million, the latest package of U.S. military aid to Ukraine includes air defense weapons, munitions for multiple rocket launch systems and artillery, anti-tank weapons, and unmanned aerial systems.  

Specifically, the latest package of security assistance includes munitions for National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS); FIM-92 Stinger missiles shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (c-UAS) munitions, ammunition for the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and M270 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), 155mm and 105mm artillery shells, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), non-persistent land mines, Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missiles for anti-tank roles, FGM-148 Javelin and AT-4 anti-tank weapons, small arms and ammunition, demolitions equipment and munitions, equipment to protect critical national infrastructure, spare parts, ancillary equipment, services, training, and transportation. 

The Russian military has been making gains over the past few months, and the Ukrainian forces are desperate for all the help they can get. 

In addition, the U.S., France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Norway, the Czech Republic, and the United Kingdom have provided important military aid. Dozens of other countries have sent billions of dollars worth of weapon systems and munitions to Kyiv’s aid.  

This is the 71st package of military aid to Ukraine since August 2021, a few months before the large-scale Russian invasion. To this date, the U.S. has provided approximately $64.1 billion in military aid to Ukraine. 

This amounts to about $22 billion per year and is quite a small sum for the impact it has on the ground. With this military aid, the Ukrainian forces have managed to severely degrade the capabilities of the Russian military, killing and wounding almost 800,000 men and destroying tens of thousands of heavy weapon systems. 

In a way, the U.S., which spends more than $800 billion on its defense every year, is getting a bargain out of its support of Ukraine.   

“Russian aggression still poses a threat to Ukrainian sovereignty. The Ukrainians have demonstrated and expressed the will to continue to fight. And as Secretary Austin has said many times, Ukraine matters not only to European security but to U.S. and international security,” Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Major General Pat Ryder said in a press briefing.  

“So, we will continue to consult with our Ukrainian partners. We'll continue to consult with our allies and partners around the world in terms of what Ukraine needs to defend itself. And so, we will continue to support them in their fight,” Ryder added.  

It remains to be seen whether the new administration will continue to support Ukraine in its defense against Russian aggression. It is a noble cause with strategic benefits, a rare combination.  

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

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