“…and on the third day, he rose again.”
Last week was both a triumph and a disappointment for UKIP. On the one hand, they secured almost 4 million votes in the General Election, a performance almost unsurpassed for a third party in the UK. On the other, the inequities of the electoral system meant that those votes only translated into a single seat. More problematically still, that seat was Clacton, and not Thanet South.
Prior to the election, Nigel Farage had been very clear: failure to win Thanet South would mean that he would step down, since he could not credible lead a party with parliamentary representation if he himself did not have a seat. This was repeated several times, enough to confirm that it was not a slip of the tongue, but a definite personal policy. It reflected both his public confidence about the party’s breakthrough in the election and his long-running dislike of running a political party.
Those with longer memories will recall 2010, when Farage stepped down as leader to contest Buckingham, citing an inability to do both jobs at the same time. His failure and that of his replacement, Lord Pearson, brought him quickly back into the fold. But even before that, Farage had long resisted the pressure to take over the leadership, preferring instead the libero role of media terrier and back-stage influencer: his election in 1999 to the European Parliament has long provided him with an alternative power and resource base.
Thus, no one should have been surprised that Farage followed through on May 8th, stepping down almost within the hour of being beaten into second place in Thanet.
More surprising was the jujitsu move of announcing that he would take the summer to rest and relax, before considering whether to stand again in a leadership contest in the autumn. I’ll admit that I kicked myself a bit at this point, for not seeing this as a way around his commitment to resign. It all made sense, in that even if there weren’t the seats, there were the votes and with the unexpected arrival of a Tory single-party government, a referendum on the EU was also now on the cards. In short, the prefect situation for Farage, bar that one small problem of his absence from Parliament.
Through the weekend there has been discussion of who might take over. Suzanne Evans had been proposed as interim leader, and was one of a handful of potential candidates. Perhaps tellingly, none of them made a big push to sell themselves, either to the media or to the party. Douglas Carswell – once again, the only UKIP MP – popped up to remind everyone that he had absolutely no interest in the job. Evans herself talked about the strength in depth of the possible candidates. But nothing comparable to Labour’s exertions, or even the LibDems.
Now, today, the big(ger) twist.
The party’s NEC released a statement saying:
“As promised Nigel Farage tendered his official resignation as leader of UKIP to the NEC. This offer was unanimously rejected by the NEC members who produced overwhelmingly evidence that the UKIP membership did not want Nigel to go.
“The NEC also concluded that UKIP’s general election campaign had been a great success. We have fought a positive campaign with a very good manifesto and despite relentless, negative attacks and anastonishing last minute swing to the Conservatives over fear of the SNP, that in these circumstances, 4 million votes was an extraordinary achievement.
“On that basis Mr Farage withdrew his resignation and will remain leader of UKIP. In addition the NEC recognised that the referendum campaign has already begun this week and we need our best team to fight that campaign led by Nigel. He has therefore been persuaded by the NEC to withdraw his resignation and remains leader of UKIP.”
Typos (and a curiosity about what that ‘evidence’ might be) aside, the statement is very telling about the situation of the party right now.
Firstly, it calls into question the values that UKIP has fought on, of being different to other parties. It looks like a slippery way out of the situation: the NEC refusing his resignation, Farage changing his mind, expediency over principle. It is a gift to political opponents.
Secondly, it highlights the lack of options open to the party. Without Farage, they still lack anyone who is able to replace him. For all the growth in membership and the efforts to build more of a senior team (at least in terms of spokesmen), Farage remains indelibly linked to the party’s image. One might have imagined him taking a more independent role in the referendum campaign, but the party would have struggled enormously without him. The failure to get anyone apart from the one man who has been vociferous about not wanting to lead the party into the Commons means that will only continue.
Thirdly, it exposes the fragility more generally of the party. About a year ago, I wrote a piece wondering whether UKIP could survive 2015: the likely lack of representation, the absence of opportunities for making a mark. I’ve come back to this several times since, but today I find myself closer to sticking with that view than for a long while.
Momentum is a precious thing in politics, as much as it exists at all. The period since 2013 has been incredibly strong for UKIP, but without the bodies in Parliament to show for it, that momentum will be hard to maintain. Farage’s media charms cannot and will not last forever. Even the EU referendum risks pigeonholing the party back into its old form as a single-issue party, something it’s tried hard to combat. If Cameron does draw things out, then matters become even worse, as everyone struggles to interest the public in the details of a renegotiation.
Nothing last forever, and today’s events are only likely to make matters more difficult for both Farage and UKIP.
The post Nigel ‘Jesus’ Farage appeared first on Ideas on Europe.
A UK in-out referendum will soon be upon us. How the rest of the EU responds will be crucial to shaping the outcome in the UK and shaping the future of Europe.
The UK’s 2015 general election has been one of the most spectacular in the country’s modern history. Defying the polls, David Cameron managed to increase the number of Conservative MPs to secure a small majority in the House of Commons.
It means the UK and EU will soon face a make or break moment that many in both have quietly dreaded: a UK in-out referendum.
To borrow from US President Lyndon Johnson, the EU now has to decide whether it wants the UK inside the EU tent pissing out, or outside the EU tent pissing in.
European ThinkingFor Cameron, the referendum is a commitment he made personally in January 2013 and which carries almost universal support in his Conservative Party. The question is no longer if but when the vote is held.
Whatever date Cameron goes for we can expect a tsunami of analysis and debate about what a Brexit would mean for the UK. This will add to the plethora of existing research on the subject.
But as I’ve argued before, this overlooks the equally big question of what a referendum and/or Brexit could mean for the EU. Understanding the EU’s reaction will also be crucial if we are to understand whether the UK can secure a renegotiation and remain a member.
Like it or not, Europe will soon witness the people of one of its largest states debating whether or not to quit the leading organisation of pan-European cooperation and unity. This is not an insignificant development for the EU, European geopolitics, the states of Europe, or how we study European politics and integration.
That might sound an obvious statement to make. It’s one you’ll find is raised over dinners in Brussels or coffee in Berlin. There has certainly been no shortage of informal chat about what a Brexit could mean for the EU.
But discussion quickly turns to what a Brexit might mean for the UK. The implications for the EU are pushed to the side. There have been only a couple of reports – SWP, DGAP, ECFR, Bertelssmann, Open Europe – analysing what such a big event could mean for the EU. Each ranges in size and focus.
Hopes and FearsIn Britain it is hoped an open debate about Europe can lance the festering political boil Europe has become. It could provide a fresh start for everyone. A successful vote could also break Europe’s fear of referendums. It could show that the citizenry of member states can and should be engaged directly in discussing the future of the EU and their member state’s part in it.
However, a UK referendum could trigger calls for similar referendums elsewhere. Britain is not the only country to have a difficult relationship with the EU. Granted it is the one where an out vote is a distinct possibility. Nevertheless, some fear the UK is about to trigger a domino effect that brings chaos through more referendums. The outcome would be a slow weakening and unravelling of the union.
Forever AwkwardEven if the UK votes to stay in the EU, the issue of Europe in British politics is unlikely to be settled. Rather than cleanse British politics of a poisonous debate, the vote could merely be a placebo. The European question in British politics has long been about more than to be or not to be in Europe. It weaves its way into many of the problems and issues shaping the UK today. They are unlikely to go away whether the decision is to stay or leave.
Whether in or out the UK will therefore remain, as Stephen George once described it, ‘an awkward partner’. The rest of Europe should expect continued sniping and difficult times. So would it not be better then to banish Britain altogether to the outside of the EU tent?
Awkward QuestionsThe rest of the EU will play a central role in deciding whether Britain stays or goes. Those in the UK who seek a withdrawal would be served by an EU that is instead obstructionist, refusing to countenance much by way of renegotiation. This would be a ‘passive expulsion’, the EU doing little to keep Britain in because the members quietly want it to up and leave of its own accord.
In deciding whether to try to keep or let Britain go the rest of the EU will have to face three issues about a Brexit:
First, what could be the economic costs for the EU of the various possible trading relationships that would follow a Brexit? A UK on the outside would be the EU’s biggest trading partner. Would any special deal be offered to the UK, or would this risk complicating relations with other non-EU states to say nothing of compromising the single market?
Second, how would UK-EU relations on matters of security and defence be managed? Britain might have recently become more withdrawn from the world, but it retains a considerable punch. The UK will not be quitting NATO.
Third, who would benefit from the political changes to the EU brought about by a British exit? Or would there be little benefit? Would the damage hit everyone by triggering a series of changes that weaken the idea and direction of European integration?
Searching for answersThe search is now on to decide what position the EU will take. Central to this will be the position of Germany. Others should not be overlooked. Cameron has often made the mistake of assuming all decisions are made in Berlin. That overplays Germany’s power, if only because any such decisions are made with a view to wider European politics and not simply bilateral relations with the UK.
In September 2014 the DGAP published a report (edited by myself and Almut Möller) made up of 26 views of a Brexit written by people from research institutions and universities from sixteen EU member states, nine non-EU countries, and a view from the EU’s institutions in Brussels.
Its conclusions were clear: while there is sympathy for some of the UK’s frustrations at the EU, there is equally a great deal of frustration at the UK’s attitude towards the EU and other member states. As the Dutch contribution put it, Britain suffers from a sense of ‘narcissistic victimization’ – of believing only it suffers from the EU’s failing and only it knows the way forward.
The report does not make for optimistic reading for a UK government hoping the rest of the EU will offer it much by way of a renegotiation to sell in a referendum. Yet there is some hope because the report shows the rest of the EU has not yet fully grasped where a Brexit may take them. Perhaps then Britain and the rest of the EU still have time to realise that a Brexit is not in the interests of either side.
The post Brexit: Europe’s Awkward Questions about its Awkward Partner appeared first on Ideas on Europe.
Infrastructure has quite suddenly become the new mantra of governments around the world. Europeans and Americans are waking to the modernisation of their crumbling roads, sewerage and water systems as ways of reviving flagging economies, but in Asia infrastructure is the key to a new era of progress and prosperity.
For vibrant as Asia undoubtedly is, it still has leaden feet. It’s not hard to understand the region’s preoccupation with infrastructural development when stuck in, say, Jakarta’s or Manila’s endlessly gridlocked traffic jams. Outside the cities, rural life in much of Asia contends with road and rail communications so poor that economic development risks being seriously handicapped for many years to come.
The contrast between backward Asia and the go-getting image of ‘Asia Rising’ is stark, and the implications are inescapable. Unless Asia’s teeming mega-cities and largely undeveloped rural communities can resolve their transport and mobility problems, they are liable to start slipping backwards in terms of global economic competitiveness.
The politics of infrastructural investment are a hot topic in Asia. From India to China, and including all the smaller nations in between, the region’s transport and information-related needs by 2020 have been estimated at a gigantic $8 trillion by the Asian Development Bank. How to mobilise such an amount, and where and how to spend it were that sort of money to be available, are burning questions.
That’s why so much attention is being focused on the Beijing-backed project of an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and also on a parallel project that has received no attention at all in most parts of the world, but is potentially a highly significant geopolitical game-changer. Plans are afoot to set up an Islamic Infrastructure Investment Bank (IIIB), probably to be headquartered in Jakarta as capital of the world’s largest Muslim nation.
High hopes are now pinned on both. The aim of the AIIB is to mobilise much more investment capital than the World Bank and its development arm, the International Finance Corporation, have so far contributed in Asia. Its supporters and propagandists say that in only a few years its capitalisation should double from $500 billion to $1 trillion.
The birth of the AIIB, no one should be in any doubt, reflects China’s undisguised impatience with Western-dominated global institutions, rules and standards that many developing countries see as skewed to favour America and Europe. The origins of the IIIB are very different, yet perhaps equally capable of catalysing change in the international banking system.
The IIIB is to be an off-shoot of the Islamic Development Bank that has been based in Jeddah for the last 40 years, and whose chief shareholders along with its Saudi Arabian hosts are Nigeria, Iran and Libya, with Malaysia and Indonesia holding smaller stakes. Although the IIIB will start with a capital base of only $1 billion, an important element of the project will be to further develop Sharia banking that adheres to Islamic principles on lending, and then harness that growing sector of financial services to Asia’s hunger for infrastructure. Once the IIIB is up and running in Jakarta, it will evidently operate in tandem with financial institutions in the Malaysian capital Kuala Lumpur, where Sharia-compliant bank assets stand at $170 billion against Jakarta’s $21 billion.
The uncertainties and unanswered questions surrounding both these proposed multilateral lending bodies are legion. To begin with, who will call the shots on the AIIB’s structure and development? China is clearly in the lead, but with almost 60 countries around the world now signed up as founding members, can Beijing claim ownership and retain sweeping executive powers? Unsurprisingly, China refused Taiwan’s candidacy, but that doesn’t mean its own role will forever go unchallenged.
And where will the AIIB be based? Hong Kong seems out of the running because the democracy protests there have irritated Beijing. Singapore is actively lobbying to play host, and its sophisticated banking industry is an undeniable lure. Even more important than location is the wider issue of lending criteria. Both the AIIB and the IIIB will have to deal with extremely sensitive political choices about priorities in the financing queue. This is already apparent at the embryonic Shanghai-based New Development Bank – better known as the BRICS bank. Launched two years ago in New Delhi by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, it is already grappling with its founders’ very different development needs.
Asian nations, too, are disparate. The ten countries in the almost 50-year-old Association of South-East Asian Nations – Asean – range from tiny, rich Singapore to sprawling Indonesia. Its fast-growing population of 250m may eventually even challenge China economically, but first, like so much of Asia, it must tackle daunting infrastructural weaknesses.
IMAGE CREDITS: CC / FLICKR – november-13
The post Europe’s infrastructure needs – and ambitions – are dwarfed by Asia’s appeared first on Europe’s World.
EU Finance Ministers will meet on 12 May 2015 in Brussels to discuss ongoing work on the proposed European fund for strategic investments, the Commission's in-depth reviews of macroeconomic imbalances in the member states, as well as implementation of structural reforms.