European Union

A bit of a quiet week this week: British politicians are launching their manifestos, Macron’s naming his first administration, Trump’s Trump.

Rather than get sucking into the usual hot-take approach, I want to step back and think about the notion of awkwardness in the EU.

The UK is, famously, the ‘awkward partner’ (in George’s phrase) and so much of our understanding of awkwardness is coloured by that British experience.

However, this does tend to blind us to all the other awkward partners that are out there: it’s one of the reasons that some commentators think the EU will be much more efficient and effective post-Brexit, and one of the reasons they will be wrong.

The prompt for this is that nice M. Macron, the new liberal hope. Like those other liberal hopes, Obama and Blair, he arrives with great expectations on his shoulders, expectations that are likely not to be met.

In part that’s because politicians have less agency than most people suppose: even American or French presidents still have to answer to someone and have limits on their powers, as The Donald has been discovering this week.

But it’s also because their views are not always in line with their colleagues/partners/counterparts. And Emmanuel Macron is very much a case in point. For all that he brings new vigour and potential to the Elysée, he also comes with a set of policies that sit somewhat askew with the priorities of Berlin or Brussels.

The case for treaty reform is a good demonstration of this. Macron has sensibly talked up the need for French domestic reforms as an essential part of making the Eurozone work better, with changes to EU bodies running in parallel. However, the presentation of this as ‘unblocking’ treaty reform is – at best – disingenuous, given the deep lack of interest from German ministers to get drawn into another round of negotiations that might end up either putting them in a tricky position on debt mutualisation or resulting in cosmestic changes.

Likewise, it’s been instructive to watch EU officials first greet Macron as the saviour of France/Europe from Marine Le Pen and then to worry about ideas such as ‘buy European’ preferences.

Put differently, Macron might be a liberal hope, but he’s also very much in line with previous French leaders.

And so back to awkwardness.

France’s role in the European integration process has been one marked as much by strife as by leadership: consider de Gaulle and his empty chair, Mitterrand worrying about German unification, Chirac chiding the new member states, Hollande doing…well, not much.

The reason that France has done as well as it has been that even as it pushes for domestic advantage, it also talks up European cooperation, pushing and proposing all the time, engaging and interacting with other members. The Franco-German relationship is the strongest expression of this, but it’s also true in other dealings, as French politicians and officials try to set the tone.

And even France is not that exceptional in its approach: a quick cast around the rest of the Union will find not-dissimilar models, as countries seek to defend their interests while wrapped in a cloak of participation.

One might see this as evidence of the duplicity of European integration: saying one thing, meaning another. But if it’s true of the EU, then it’s also true of all other political systems. Wherever you look there is misdirection and considered presentation.

This is not to excuse such behaviour, but rather to remind that it is endemic. At the very least, we need to be reminded that it exists and that just because the squeaky wheel has been oiled (or taken off, in the UK’s case), that does not mean that all problems have been solved. The EEC had issues before the UK arrived, and the EU will have them once it’s left: what matters is that we keep thinking about who’s using who to their advantage.

The post How to be awkward in the European Union appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

On 18 May the Council adopted conclusions on security and defence in the context of the EU Global Strategy. The conclusions take note of progress in strengthening cooperation in the area of security and defence, and provide guidance for further work. The areas covered include:

 - Improving CSDP crisis management structures, in particular the ongoing work leading to the establishment of a military planning and conduct capability (MPCC) within the EU military staff (part of the EEAS) which will assume command of non-executive military CSDP missions (currently: EUTM Somalia, EUTM RCA, EUTM Mali), as agreed on 6 March 2017;

 - Strengthening CSDP cooperation with partner countries, with the aim to adopt a more strategic approach to Common and Security Defence Policy partnerships, in view of enhancing cooperation, with a focus on partner countries that share EU values, including the respect for international law, and are able and willing to contribute to CSDP missions and operations;

 - Capacity building for security and development (CBSD), in order to fully cover all the requirements needed to support partner countries in preventing and managing crises on their own;

 - Developing civilian capabilities and enhancing the responsiveness of civilian crisis management, including the possible creation of a core responsiveness capacity;

 - Reinforcing military rapid response, including EU battlegroups, with a view to developing further their modularity in a pragmatic way and to adapt as necessary the financing arrangements;

 - Deepening European defence cooperation, taking stock and providing guidance on the way forward on

•  an inclusive permanent structured cooperation (PESCO), which would allow those member states who are willing and able to collaborate further in the area of security and defence and which would, in turn, help generate new collaborative efforts, cooperation and projects.
• the possibility of a voluntary coordinated annual review on defence (CARD), which would be a process aimed at offering a better overview at EU level of defence spending, national investment and defence research efforts. This would support member states in delivering capabilities to tackle existing and future strategic trends and challenges, and actively promote enhance defence cooperation among member states.
• the European Defence Action Plan of the European Commission, which foresees new financial tools for capability development and defence cooperation in support of the European defence industry and technological innovation. 

Background 

On 14 November 2016, the Council adopted conclusions on implementing the EU global strategy in the area of security and defence. These conclusions set out the level of ambition in the form of the main goals the EU and its member states will aim to achieve in the area of security and defence. The Council set out three strategic priorities: responding to external conflicts and crises, building the capacities of partners, and protecting the European Union and its citizens. Progress was noted and further guidance provided through the Council's conclusions on 6 March 2017. 

The implementation plan on security and defence was presented by the High Representative, acting also in her roles as Vice-President of the European Commission and Head of the European Defence Agency, to member states. It is part of the follow-up to the EU global strategy on foreign and security policy, which was presented by the High Representative to the European Council on 28 June. The Council adopted conclusions on the global strategy on 17 October 2016. 

The implementation of the EU global strategy also includes further work on building resilience and an integrated approach to conflicts and crises, strengthening the nexus between internal and external policies, updating existing or preparing new regional and thematic strategies and stepping up public diplomacy efforts. 

Makhlouf v Council
External relations
The General Court confirms that the fund-freezing measures imposed on Rami Makhlouf, cousin of Bashar al-Assad, must be maintained for the period 20162017

https://tvnewsroom.consilium.europa.eu/uploads/council-images/thumbs/uploads/council-images/remote/http_7e18a1c646f5450b9d6d-a75424f262e53e74f9539145894f4378.r8.cf3.rackcdn.com/684f1dac-3b9b-11e7-bfd0-bc764e093073_1.41_thumb_169_1495093261_1495093262_129_97shar_c1.jpg

The Informal Meeting of the Energy Minister takes place on 18 May 2017, in Valletta, Malta.

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When examining photos of the victims of the chemical attack in Idlib province in Syria, it is striking to note the similarities with those of Iranian soldiers and civilians during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980 to 1988, and of thousands of Kurds in northern Iraq in 1988.

Chemicals used by Iraq during the 1980s had four purposes: to terrify the target population directly and indirectly; to drive people from sites that the government or armed groups sought to depopulate; to cause a large number of casualties without destroying buildings and facilities; and to deny the enemy of territory or routes of attacks.

It is possible that Syria’s President, Bashar al-Assad, and his closest circle have learned two lessons from Iraq’s use of chemical weapons.

First, Iraq’s chemical weapons had decisive military and psychological effects that resulted in Iran’s leaders suing for peace. This would probably not have happened if Saddam Hussein had not had access to chemical weapons.

In 1982 Iran’s leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, pledged “Even if the Security Council orders, we will not make peace. Even if the whole world gathers, we will not make peace. Peace with the criminal [Saddam] is a crime against Islam.” But he had to break his word by July 1988, when Iran announced it would accept the United Nations Security Council’s call for a ceasefire.

“Chemicals used by ruthless leaders can be very effective in suppressing uprisings by unprotected militias and their supportive civilians”

When the president of the Iranian Parliament, Hashemi Rafsanjani, was asked why Iran had done so, he said that “the chemical weapons that Iraq used in bombing Shalamcheh were among the advanced weapons that even the Germans had not developed during World War II. […] Under these conditions, Iraq could make Tabriz, Esfahan, and even Tehran the targets of its chemical attacks in which case, like the tragedy in the town of Halabcheh [Halabja], all the people would die.”

Second, chemicals used by ruthless leaders can be very effective in suppressing uprisings by unprotected militias and their supportive civilians. An example of this is the Kurds, who were Iran’s allies throughout the Iran-Iraq War. In the 1980s, the Kurdish militia was able to occupy large parts of northern Iraq while the country’s focus was on Iran

But in early 1988 Saddam Hussein’s ruthless cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid ‒ nicknamed Chemical Ali ‒ was sent to northern Iraq to crush the Kurds with chemical weapons. Within three days the Kurdish fighters and leaders had fled to Turkey and Iran. By September 1988, thousands of Kurds had been killed and injured by chemicals.

It is likely that chemicals weapons will be used in the future for both internal and external purposes. As long as Assad remains in power in Syria, his military will use chemical weapons internally for the purposes stated above. But Assad is unlikely to use chemicals for external purposes against Israel, for example, because the country is well prepared to defend itself.

In Libya, the situation is somewhat similar: some of the militia leaders controlling the various territories or cities probably have access to caches of chemical weapons and, if so, would employ them for internal reasons such as reducing the strength of competing militias, settling scores between different ethnic groups, and/or bringing about international intervention.

Further afield, it is unclear how North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, might deploy chemical weapons, but it is probable that the weapons would be used for external purposes, possibly to harm and terrorise South Korea or Japan. As the American troops are well equipped to defend themselves from chemicals, it is doubtful that North Korea would attack them.

“Until the UN Security Council can actually end violence resulting from the use of weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons are likely to be used in the future”

And beyond recognised states and governments, we will probably see limited use of chemicals by the self-styled Islamic State (Daesh) and other well-organised international terrorist groups. To date, Daesh has not been effective using chemicals such as chlorine and mustard gas. Chlorine can be acquired by terrorists who capture urban areas with water treatment plants, but, except for terrorising civilians, chlorine is an inefficient chemical weapon and so not of high concern. Mustard gas might be found in leftover depots from Saddam’s chemical warfare programme, but will be mostly deteriorated or difficult to access.

The situation would change if Daesh or its other terrorist organisations were somehow able to acquire nerve agents. However, while Daesh might be able to recruit, or capture, chemical scientists, it would probably find it difficult to put them to work due to a lack of proper precursors and equipment.

While the world has an efficient body, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), that can investigate real or alleged uses of chemical weapons, the major issue with chemical warfare is that it is up to the UN Security Council to decide on how to handle transgressors of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

As has been demonstrated numerous times since the Assad government first used chemical weapons in 2013, the Security Council has been unable to stop Assad from ordering one chemical attack after another because of vetoes wielded by Russia. Were North Korea to launch a chemical attack, the Security Council would probably again be blocked by one or more vetoes by its permanent members.

Until the parties of the CWC are able to work together to reform the Security Council so that it can actually end violence resulting from the use of weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons are likely to be used in the future – with serious consequences.

IMAGE CREDIT: Golden Brown/Bigstock

The post Today’s chemical warfare is history repeating itself appeared first on Europe’s World.

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Talks between Athens’ euro area creditors and the International Monetary Fund have seen officials grapple with economic forecasts stretching decades into the future.

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Good evening. I have come to you today, to the President of the proud Republic of France, with a simple message: Europe needs your energy, your imagination, your courage. And when I say Europe, I am not thinking about the institutions or bureaucracy, but about millions of Europeans, who see your victory as a sign of hope. Hope for a Europe that protects, for a Europe that wins, for a Europe that looks to the future. I am talking about the French and Belgians, Poles and Germans, the Irish and the Greeks. Because from all the European states I hear voices of those who are regaining their faith in the European Union.

A strong EU, capable of being sovereign in relation to the external world, capable of protecting its values, culture and economic interests, capable of protecting its external border, is the best, and perhaps the only guarantee of national and state sovereignty and independence. We both believe that for rational and responsible patriots, there is no alternative to a united and sovereign Europe.

Words such as security, protection, dignity and pride must return to our political dictionary. There is no reason why, in public debate, extremists and populists should have a monopoly on these terms. Today they are cynically taking advantage of social fears and uncertainty, building their own model of security on prejudice, authoritarianism and organised hatred. Our response must be clear and decisive. And you are the best proof that this is possible, Mister President. Thank you.

Plenary sessions : MEPs welcomed the unity of the 27 Member States and the EU institutions with regard to Brexit and also called for a reform of the EU to benefit all its citizens.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Plenary sessions : MEPs welcomed the unity of the 27 Member States and the EU institutions with regard to Brexit and also called for a reform of the EU to benefit all its citizens.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Plenary sessions : MEPs have approved new rules that will allow users to enjoy their online film subscriptions when travelling in the EU the same way they do at home.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Plenary sessions : MEPs have approved new rules that will allow users to enjoy their online film subscriptions when travelling in the EU the same way they do at home.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

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Donald TUSK, President of the European Council, visits Emmanuel MACRON, President France, on 17 May 2017 in Paris. Donald TUSK, Président du Conseil européen, visite Emmanuel MACRON, Président de la République française, le 17 mai 2017 à Paris.

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On 21 March 2017, the Council adopted Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/496[1]. The Council Decision extends the existing restrictive measures until 22 March 2018. The measures in question are an assets freeze and a prohibition from making funds available regarding 15 individuals considered as responsible for the misappropriation of Egyptian State funds before 2011. 

The Candidate Countries Montenegro*, Serbia* and Albania*, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova align themselves with this Council Decision. 

They will ensure that their national policies conform to this Council Decision. 

The European Union takes note of this commitment and welcomes it. 

 [1] Published on 22.03.2017 in the Official Journal of the European Union no. L76, p. 22. 
*Montenegro, Serbia and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

Plenary sessions : “A strong and united Europe is an absolutely fundamental pillar of a strong and effective United Nations," said António Guterres, addressing MEPs in Strasbourg on 17 May. The Portueguese UN Secretary-General, the first European one since Austria’s Kurt Waldheim in the early 1980s, said global challenges such as the multiplication of conflicts, a human rights violations, climate change and globalisation required the EU and the UN to work together.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Plenary sessions : “A strong and united Europe is an absolutely fundamental pillar of a strong and effective United Nations," said António Guterres, addressing MEPs in Strasbourg on 17 May. The Portueguese UN Secretary-General, the first European one since Austria’s Kurt Waldheim in the early 1980s, said global challenges such as the multiplication of conflicts, a human rights violations, climate change and globalisation required the EU and the UN to work together.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

AMENDMENTS 1 - 289 - Draft report Corruption and human rights in third countries
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

AMENDMENTS 1 - 199 - Draft report Report on the 2016 Commission Report on Turkey
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Plenary sessions : MEPs objected on Wednesday to EU Commission plans to authorise imports of products made from genetically modified maize and cotton which are herbicide-resistant.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Plenary sessions : MEPs objected on Wednesday to EU Commission plans to authorise imports of products made from genetically modified maize and cotton which are herbicide-resistant.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Plenary sessions : MEPs again reject as inadequate by 392 votes to 80, with 207 abstentions, a narrow list of countries at risk of money laundering.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP