European Union

Tag: Sharp VigilanceSharp Fence

The Council adopted conclusions on addressing the risks of famine. The conclusions note that humanitarian needs have been unprecedented in 2017. They include numerous chronic food security crises, with four countries facing an alarming risk of famine: Yemen, north-east Nigeria, Somalia and South Sudan, where overall about 20 million people at risk of starvation. 

The conclusions recall that the EU and its member states collectively have provided more than EUR 1.2 billion this year alone for humanitarian assistance in the four countries at risk of famine and call on all traditional and emerging donors for further efforts to be made. The Council notes however that funding is only part of the solution. These crises are man-made, with their roots lying in conflict, and they require political solutions going beyond humanitarian assistance.

The Council adopted a crisis management concept for a new civilian CSDP mission in Iraq. 

The mission will focus on assisting the Iraqi authorities in the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Iraqi security strategy. EU experts will provide advice and assistance in priority work areas responding to the needs of the relevant authorities. 

The national security strategy aims at building state institutions capable of consolidating security, peace and preventing conflicts under the rule of law, and outlines a number of threats to national security, including terrorism, corruption, political instability and ethnic and sectarian polarisation. 

In response to a request from the Iraqi authorities for support in the civilian security sector reform area, and in line with the Council conclusions on Iraq of 19 June, the EU agreed to prepare a civilian CSDP mission in Baghdad.  The adoption of a crisis management concept is the first step to launch a new CSDP mission, after which preparations to deploy begin. 

The Council adopted conclusions on the EU priorities at the UN and at the 72nd UN General Assembly. 

The key EU priority will be to uphold, strengthen and reform the UN and the rules based global order. For the 72nd UNGA, the EU will focus on a stronger global governance, on peace and conflict prevention and on an enduring agenda for transformation. Gender equality and women's empowerment as well as women, peace and security will be mainstreamed into all three priority areas. 

The 17th of July marks the date of the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998. This day is dedicated to celebrating the developments and achievements of international criminal justice institutions and to remind us that we need to continue working, at both national and international levels, to ensure that the perpetrators of the most serious crimes are brought to justice and held to account.

On this occasion, the European Union and its Member States reaffirm their full support to the International Criminal Court and to the strengthening of an international criminal justice system committed to deter the commission of crimes, to fight impunity and to ensure the protection of the victims' rights.

Justice is one of the core elements towards reconciliation and sustainable peace. Without justice, the most heinous crimes go unpunished, victims are unable to obtain redress and peace remains an elusive goal, since impunity generates more hatred, leading to acts of revenge and more suffering.

The European Union is one of the main donors in support of justice sector reform worldwide, strengthening law enforcement and justice institutions, promoting independent and impartial justice, and supporting access to justice for all. Since 2000, we have committed €37 million in direct support of the International Criminal Court.

The European Union has been also supporting transitional justice initiatives and international justice mechanisms related to specific countries. In the case of Syria, the EU has recently allocated funding amounting to €1,5 million to the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in Syria. The EU calls on the international community to support to the Mechanism, including through adequate financial means, to ensure that it would be able to start work as soon as possible and fulfil its mandate, in line with the principles of universality and at the highest level of professionalism.

The European Union will continue to fully support multilateral global governance, based on international law, human rights and strong international institutions. In this regard, we remain committed to advance our fight against impunity, and to promote the universal ratification of the Rome Statute.

Brexit is both a boon and a bane to the teaching and study of British and European politics. In this piece written with Alex Boyle, a politics student at the University of Liverpool, we set out the five ways in which Brexit is central to the study and teaching of both. 

As a student learning the politics of Europe and the UK and as a teacher trying to keep his lecture notes up to date while writing and editing two books on Brexit, Brexit poses for both of us a mix of difficulties and opportunities in our work. With it set to be the defining issue for Britain and one of the most unique challenges to ever face the EU, understanding Brexit is not something any student or teacher of politics can easily hide from.

Granted, by its very nature the study and teaching of politics is about crises and a topic in a perpetual state of flux. As we all know, politics textbooks have a short shelf life. The often slow process of publishing journal articles means many articles reflect the world and knowledge from a few years before publication. Lecture notes can be adapted, sometimes in response to events on the day. Changing reading lists and course structures, however, require time and sometimes higher approval.

Successfully combining Brexit into the study or teaching of British and European politics depends on keeping five things in mind.

Brexit Means Britain

Whether you’re studying or teaching British politics in the UK or on the other side of the world, understanding Brexit means understanding the contemporary UK. As both Eurosceptics and pro-Europeans agree, the issue of Europe is a defining issue for Britain because it reaches into almost every corner of the country’s political life. As Andrew Gamble argued back i03:

The reason why the issue of Europe has been so persistent and so divisive is that there is a lot at stake. For the future of British politics, there is no more important issue, involving as it does a reassessment of British identity, security and political economy, and a judgement about the relative priority to be given to Europe as opposed to other relationships, particularly those with America. Such choices occur rather rarely but when they do they often trigger political realignments which can constitute major turning points in the life of parties and states.

Learning and teaching the origins of a referendum whose result will have such profound implications and the longer history of the UK’s relationship with Europe is, therefore, a solid foundation for understanding not only Brexit but also the development of the modern British political system. As we discuss further below, Brexit opens up an extensive range of topics in UK politics.

The breadth of Brexit as a topic, therefore, offers students of British and European politics a chance to find that elusive ingredient to scoring a high mark: teaching their teacher something new. Synthesising the many different topics and approaches to Brexit allows both students and teachers a chance to escape the silos that too often structure academia. For the teacher, this is a topic where students can do some of the legwork of drawing in new ideas. Many might think of PhD students as the key here. The inevitable flood of PhD students working on Brexit will indeed fill in many of the gaps. But undergraduates, and not least those from elsewhere in the EU and the wider world, can offer much-needed ideas and reports on what Brexit means elsewhere and in other fields.

The Case Study of Brexit Britain

Brexit adds to Britain’s place as one of the best and most fascinating national case studies for social sciences. Britain’s politics have often made it a go-to place for many teachers and students on a wealth of topics. For pollsters and psephologists the UK’s multiple electoral systems have turned it into an electoral laboratory. Britain’s ongoing constitutional reforms and the resilience of its Westminster majoritarian model fuel endless debates amongst constitutional and legal scholars and those engaged in comparative politics. For those studying political economy the UK’s pursuit of Thatcherism, neoliberalism more broadly and austerity have left it a key case study. Historians and scholars of war and international relations find a country that has gone from being the world’s superpower to one that still delivers (or at least tries to) a military kick and leads the world in soft-power. How Britain has confronted (or not) its religious, racial and security tensions and histories fascinates those in countries around the world who face similar challenges. The very unity and identity of the United Kingdom makes it a must for any student of nationalism. The list is a long one.

Granted, other states have faced many of the same challenges as the UK, and it always pays to be wary of the biases that can arise from the study of the UK. Students and teachers should always ask how comparable the UK’s experiences are to those in the rest of Europe or the world. For example, was Trump’s election ‘Brexit plus, plus, plus’ as he predicted it would be? Was it a reflection of wider trends in European, Western and international politics? Or was it a reflection of a combination factors peculiar to the UK? Nevertheless, the UK still offers a wealth of easily accessible literature, data and examples backed up by a long history of studies that can be drawn on as a starting point. Brexit itself is fast turning into one of the most researched and data rich topics available.

Europe’s Brexit

It would now be unwise to teach or study Brexit or the EU without also trying to understand the other. Brexit already tells us something important about the nature of the EU. It has changed the politics of the continent to which Britain is forever bound and which shapes Britain more than any other part of the world.

That might all sound trite. Yet too often debates in Britain about Brexit are myopic ones based on an assumption that Brexit is about Britain. Some elsewhere in the remaining EU might like to try and ignore the unsettling fact that one of the largest and leading European states voted democratically to quit Europe’s predominant organisation for politics, economics, society and non-traditional security.

What Brexit means for Europe and what a changed EU means for the UK are fast becoming central issues to studying Brexit, the UK and European politics. For those in the UK studying and teaching British and European politics, studying the EU remains a central plank to understanding not just how the rest of the EU works and is responding to and debating Brexit, but how Britain will continue to live with a continent and political union that it is forever closely connected to. For students from elsewhere in Europe Brexit allows them the chance to examine their national debates about Britain as part of debates about a changing EU.

Theorising Brexit

Brexit is testing many of the theories and models we teach and learn in British politics, European studies and many other courses. We can use Brexit to apply such theories as those of structure versus agency or more nuanced theories of international relations such as constructivism versus neoclassical realism. Economists are wrestling with what Brexit means for their theories of how trade works. It has certainly tested models used by pollsters and psephologists to understand how the British people – and voters further afield – vote.

Too often ‘theory’ is a word that bores or scares many students and even some teachers. It can seem abstract, distant or an irrelevant addition thrown in at the start of an essay or journal article in the hope of ticking a box required for a decent mark or publication. This ignores how theoretical approaches can help make sense of the uncertainty and information overload that surrounds Brexit.

It’s very easy as teachers or students to be drawn into the daily and hourly developments of Brexit. Reading and following so many fast-changing developments can leave us feeling weary and without a sense of the bigger picture into which to fit developments. One thing theory can do is help narrow down the focus for our studies. For example, we could use theories of bureaucratic politics to understand how institutions will shape Brexit or constructivism to analyse the ideas that underpin it. We then have the opportunity to assess these theories, models and other new ideas in real-time as Brexit unfolds.

Generation Brexit 

Another example of a theoretically grounded attempt to analyse Brexit is to see this political and social split within British society as a generational phenomenon, as argued by Jackson-Preece and Dunin-Wąsowicz. This generational divide manifested itself again in the 2017 General Election, which proved that young people are an important political constituency and that older generations, including most politicians, have ignored them since the Brexit vote.

The LSE’s recently launched Generation Brexit social media and research project, which explores Brexit from a sociological perspective, can aid the study or teaching of British and European politics in the shadow of Brexit. This trailblazing project is currently crowdsourcing a millennial cohort vision for the future of UK – EU relations. It invites those aged under 35 from across the UK and Europe to debate, decide and draft a policy proposal that will be sent both the United Kingdom and the European Union Parliaments, and the respective negotiating teams.

Generation Brexit translates research findings into impactful and policy-relevant arguments that can be utilised to the study and teaching of Brexit. Unlike other Brexit-related engagement campaigns, this initiative targets millennials in the UK and in Europe alike. The pan-European dimension captures the reality of the Brexit negotiations, their contingency on both UK and EU27 politics. It also underscores the necessity of establishing a mutually beneficial relationship for the future, built on shared ideas from the millennial cohort of current voters, many of whom are teachers students of UK and EU politics.

Crystal Ball Gazing

All teachers and students of British and European politics will have faced questions from friends, family and strangers as to why Brexit happened and what might happen next. Speculation on a topic such as this is to be expected, not least when Brexit could turn out to be what historians term a critical juncture for the UK and the rest of Europe.

Academics are often told to be wary of crystal ball gazing. That can be left to think tanks and the media. It does mean, however, that unexpected developments or ones we wish to avoid can catch us out. Until the Brexit vote happened, contemplating Brexit or the withdrawal of any member state from the EU was something of a taboo topic for many in the field of European politics. It means there has been a scramble to understand and analyse such topics as European disintegration.

That leaves us with a lack of relevant and rigorously research literature. A lot of literature, including some of the journal articles, rushed out in response, will be conjecture. Due to the polarising nature of Brexit, for both students and teachers the task of being able to critically think and analyse this literature will be an important challenge for avoiding the inherent bias in many people’s work.

And what of the future? Is Brexit a here today and gone tomorrow topic? If it turns out to be a critical juncture then generations of students and teachers of British and European politics will examine the topic, to say nothing of living with its consequences. But even if Brexit is reversed, the experience will have been a significant one in the politics of the UK and the EU, and one that will have cast a light on so much of British and European politics.

This post first appeared on the LSE’s Brexit blog.

Dr Tim Oliver is an Associate at LSE IDEAS, a Teaching Fellow at UCL and Director of Research at Brexit Analytics.

Alex Booth is a history and politics graduate, University of Liverpool.

The post Brexit is a fascinating case study for students and teachers of UK and EU politics appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Place:        Europa building, Brussels
Chair(s):    Federica Mogherini, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 

All times are approximate and subject to change

from 08.30
Arrivals (live streaming) 

+/- 09.45 (time to be confirmed)
Doorstep by High Representative Federica Mogherini 

+/- 10.00    
Beginning of meeting
Roundtable
Adoption of the agenda
Approval of A items 

Implementation of the EU Global Strategy
North Korea
Libya
Any other business                  

+-/ 13.30    
Welcome by the High Representative Federica Mogherini of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi, and the Director-General of the International Organisation for Migration William Lacy Swing (doorstep)

Working lunch on migration 

+/- 15.30
Press conference (live streaming)

The next AFET meetings are scheduled to take place in Brussels, room JAN2Q2:

- Wednesday, 30 August 2017, 09:00-12:30, and 15:00-18:30
- Thursday, 31 August 2017, 09:00-12:30

Further information
Information for visitors
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Place:
Justus Lipsius building, Brussels

Chairs:
Tarmo Tamm, Minister of Rural Affairs and Siim Kiisler, Minister of Environment

All times are approximate and subject to change

Monday 17 July

+/- 09.45
Doorstep by Minister Tamm

+/- 09.25
Doorstep by Minister Kiisler

+/- 10.00
Beginning of the meeting (Roundtable) 
Adoption of the agenda 
Adoption non-legislative of A items
Adoption of legislative A items (live streaming)

+/- 10.15    
Presidency work programme (live streaming)

+/- 10.35
Fishing opportunities for 2018

+/- 11.50
Any other business: 
- antimicrobial resistance (live streaming)
- African swine fever (live streaming)
- symposium on the future of food (live streaming)
- food origin labelling (live streaming)
- dual quality of foodstuffs

+/- 15.05
Organic farming (live streaming)

+/- 16.35
Future of the common agricultural policy
Implementation of May 2015 Council conclusions on simplifications
Any other business:
- meeting of the extended Visegrad group
- reflection paper on the future of the EU finances 
- conference on GMO-free agriculture
- AU-EU conference on "Making sustainable agriculture a future for youth in Africa"

+/- 19.25
Press conference (live streaming)

Tuesday 18 July

+/- time to be confirmed  
Doorstep by Minister Tamm

+/- 10.00
Beginning of the meeting (Roundtable)
Trade-related agricultural issues
Any other business: 
- trade practices of third countries vis-à-vis EU member states

+/- 11.50
Wine grape varieties and their synonyms on labels

+/- 12.20
Any other business:
- drought in Portugal and Spain and Belgium
- farmland trade in the EU

The President of the European Council, Donald Tusk received the letters of credentials of the following Ambassadors:

H.E. Mr Abu Sufian Bin Haji Ali, Ambassador, Head of Mission of Brunei Darussalam to the European Union
H.E. Mr Manasvi Srisodapol, Ambassador, Head of Mission of the Kingdom of Thailand to the European Union
H.E. Mr Ata Oveznepesovich Serdarov, Ambassador, Head of Mission of Turkmenistan to the European Union
H.E. Mr Mohamed Issa Hamad Abushahab, Ambassador, Head of Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the European Union
H.E. Mr Richard Zacharie Akplogan, Ambassador, Head of Mission of the Republic of Benin to the European Union
H.E. Mr Sibusisiwe Mngomezulu, Ambassador, Head of Mission of  the Kingdom of Swaziland to the European Union
H.E. Ms Rhoda Jackson, Ambassador, Head of Mission of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas to the European Union

On 17 July, the Council adopted a decision to conclude, on behalf of the EU, the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol that will ensure the protection of the climate from the powerful greenhouse gases hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). With this decision, the EU is ready for formal ratification, and has signalled its continued determination to lead global efforts to tackle climate change.

The purpose of the Kigali Amendment, agreed on 15 October 2016,  is to achieve a global reduction in the consumption and production of HFCs. Although greenhouse gases do not damage the ozone layer, their release into the atmosphere contributes to climate change and they have a significant impact on global warming.

Taking swift action to cut HFC emissions is essential. The implementation of this Amendment is expected to prevent warming of up to 0.5° Celsius by the end of the century, thus making a positive contribution to reaching the targets of the Paris agreement.

"HFCs are thousands of times more harmful to the climate than carbon dioxide. I very much welcome today's decision to be among the first to ratify the Kigali amendment to cut these greenhouse gases and continue our unwavering commitment to tackling climate change. This is an issue where international cooperation is crucial. Taking the Montreal Protocol as a model, the EU is ready to make sure this amendment is also a success."

Siim Kiisler, Minister of the Environment of the Republic of Estonia

HFCs can be found in equipment and products used in our daily lives such as fridges, air conditioners, foams and aerosol sprays. They were introduced as an alternative to ozone depleting substances, mainly hydrochlorofluorocarbons. 

Implementation at EU level 

The Kigali Amendment sets out a number of steps to be taken by the parties to the Montreal Protocol, in accordance with their economic and social development, to gradually reduce the use of HFCs. The EU member states, like other developed countries, are required to start the first reductions in 2019.  

However, the EU has taken early action and is at the forefront of compliance. The regulation adopted in 2014 on fluorinated greenhouse gases enabled the EU to already begin phasing down HFCs in 2015. This regulation will have to be reviewed to comply with the Kigali Amendment beyond 2030. 

Until then, the current EU legislation can still apply. In fact, it not only fulfils the Montreal Protocol obligations, but also provides for a stricter phase-down schedule compared with the measures to be in place under the new amendment. 

Timeline & next steps

On 2 February 2017, the Commission submitted a proposal for a Council decision to authorise the conclusion of the Kigali Amendment. The Council agreed to conclude the Amendment and start the ratification process on 11 May 2017. Subsequently, the European Parliament gave its formal consent during its plenary on 5 July. 

Today's Council decision enters into force immediately after its adoption. The EU has now to formally deposit the declaration of competence together with the instrument of ratification of the Kigali amendment at the United Nations. 

Member states are currently following their respective ratification processes considering that they also need to obtain approval from their national parliaments. 

The Amendment will enter into force on 1 January 2019 upon ratification by at least 20 states or regional economic integration organisations that are parties to the Montreal Protocol. If this threshold is not reached by then, the Amendment will enter into force on the 90th day following the date on which this condition has been finally fulfilled. 

Background - Kigali Amendment & Montreal Protocol 

The EU and its member states are long-standing advocates of climate protection. They are parties to the Vienna Convention for the protection of the ozone layer, the Montreal Protocol to phase out the production and consumption of ozone depleting substances and they had approved its four previous amendments to include in its regulatory scope other non-ozone depleting chemicals which cause climate change.

All 197 parties, including the EU and its member states, have been remarkably committed to the implementation of the Montreal Protocol since its agreement in 1987 and as a result, the recovery of the ozone layer is underway and is forecast to have been completed by the middle of this century. 

In light of this success, the Protocol has been amended a fifth time to reduce HFCs. This Amendment was adopted at the 28th Meeting of the Parties from 10 to 15 October 2016 held in Kigali (Rwanda).

Under its provisions, developed countries will be the first to start the phase-down process in 2019. Measures are more flexible for others. For most developing countries, the first step to reduce the production and consumption of these greenhouse gases begins in 2029 while for the remaining developing parties the first step is only set for 2032.

On 17 July, the Council adopted a decision[1] accepting on behalf of the European Union an amendment to the 1999 Gothenburg Protocol to reduce emissions of air pollutants globally. The EU is now ready to formally accept the amendment. 

The amendment strengthens the provisions set out in the original text of the protocol and its annexes with the aim of enhancing in the long term the protection of human health and the environment from transboundary air pollution. 

"Each year, 700 thousand people die in Europe due to air pollution. It affects us all regardless of borders. With the revised Gothenburg Protocol, the emissions of air pollutants will decrease, improving the air we breathe every day. The EU is on track thanks to our new ambitious National Emission Ceilings directive. Today, I am delighted we are reconfirming our international commitments."

Siim Kiisler, Minister of the Environment of the Republic of Estonia

The amendment establishes more rigorous national emission reduction commitments for the four main air pollutants: sulphur (mainly sulphur dioxide), nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds (VOC), other than methane and ammonia. These emission limits are set for each country per pollutant and apply from 2020 onwards. 

A fifth pollutant - fine particulate matter - is covered for the first time. The revised protocol introduces clear emission reduction commitments for it, too. 

The amendment takes a step forward by incorporating black carbon as a particulate matter component. These short-lived particles are major contributors to global warming due to their heat-trapping power, which is immense compared to that of carbon dioxide. 

In addition, the revised protocol updates the emission limit values (emission standards) for different air pollution sources: stationary (e.g. factories and processing plants) and mobile (e.g. vehicles, non-road mobile machines and agricultural and forestry tractors). New standards are introduced on the content of non-methane VOC's in products. 

The amendment also completes the reporting obligation of the parties regarding the emissions of air pollutants as well as the progress made in the fields of technology and research. 

EU emission reduction commitments and implementation 

Under the revised protocol, the EU is set to reduce its emissions for 2020 as follows: sulphur dioxide - 59%, nitrogen oxides - 42%, ammonia - 6%, volatile organic compounds - 28%, and fine particulate matter - 22%. 

Currently, the main instruments used by the EU to implement the Gothenburg Protocol are the National Emission Ceilings (NEC) and the Medium Combustion Plants directives. 

The revised NEC directive, adopted in 2016, has already been aligned with the amended protocol by integrating the new international rules into EU law and by matching the emission reduction commitments for each member state from 2020 to 2029. 

In the revised NEC directive, the EU established more ambitious reductions from 2030 onwards. The EU reduction targets are the following: sulphur dioxide - 79%, nitrogen oxides  - 63%, ammonia - 19%, volatile organic compounds - 40%, and fine particulate matter - 49%.  

Context and next steps at EU level 

The Commission presented a proposal for a Council decision to accept the amendment as part of the 'Clean Air Programme for Europe' on 20 December 2013. 

However, negotiations at EU level have been on hold since then in view of the revision of the NEC directive. Following the directive's adoption on 8 December 2016, the Council agreed on the decision on 25 April 2017 and the European Parliament gave its consent during its plenary on 5 July 2017. 

Today's decision enters into force immediately after its adoption. The EU now needs to officially deposit the instrument of acceptance of the amendment with the United Nations. Member states are also taking the necessary steps to obtain final approval from national parliaments to ratify it. 

The amendment will enter into force on the 90th day after its ratification by two thirds of the parties. 

Background - Gothenburg Protocol & LRTAP Convention 

The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) is the main international framework to tackle air pollution. 51 countries from the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) region are parties to the convention, including all EU member states. 

Over the last 30 years, 8 protocols have broadened the scope of the convention to incorporate stricter emission rules for air pollutants, the eighth being the 1999 Gothenburg Protocol. The EU approved that protocol in June 2003.

In 2012, following lengthy negotiations initiated in 2007, an agreement to amend the Gothenburg Protocol was reached during the 30th session of the LRTAP Convention. With the exception of the revised annex I, which entered into force on 5 June 2013, all other amended provisions required prior acceptance from parties.

[1] Denmark voted against this Council decision. However, it will accept the protocol on behalf of the country to maintain the EU's overall air-quality objectives. See statement

Monday 17 July 2017
10.00 Presentation of letters of credentials of ambassadors
14.00 Meeting with Dragan Čović, member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Good afternoon. I am pleased to welcome President Vučić to Brussels today. And I was happy to congratulate him personally on his election.

Let me start by recalling that the European Union's support to the European perspective of the Western Balkans is unequivocal. This was unanimously confirmed by leaders at the European Council in March. As to the pace of the accession process, it will depend on your advances in the reform agenda.

One example of how the European Union and Serbia have cooperated to tackle a common challenge is irregular migration. Let me thank you for your support then and today. I hope that the European Union can continue to count on Serbia, just as Serbia can continue counting on the EU to provide the necessary support.

Let me also commend you for your personal commitment to the stability and security of the region, a region which remains the European Union's strategic priority. Within your first 50 days in office, you have met almost all your neighbours and regional partners. I encourage you to keep up this work. Your role is absolutely unique.

After a rather turbulent start to the year, today Serbia engages in dialogue - talking to, not at, each other - and I welcome your continued commitment to the Pristina-Belgrade Dialogue and your readiness to pursue, domestically and with Kosovo counterparts, a further reflection on future relations.

For me, the end-game of the Dialogue and Serbia's reform efforts is full membership of Serbia in the EU. This is what we promised in Thessaloniki and what we are ready to deliver. You have reiterated lately that Serbia has made its geostrategic choice, and that there is no turning back. We expect your choice will guide your actions.

Finally, I encouraged President Vučić to pursue reforms to strengthen the rule of law with the same vigour and consistency as progress on the economy. A strong and robust rule of law is the ultimate signal that you are ready to enter the EU. Thank you. 

Delegations

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw the United States from the Paris agreement on climate change provided the backdrop for the 8th Clean Energy Ministerial (CEM), held this year in Beijing.

The summit saw China stepping closer to a global leadership role on climate action, joining forces with the European Union and 24 ministers from around the world to reaffirm its commitment to the climate accords. China also played host to the second Mission Innovation (MI) forum, held in June 2017: a group of 22 countries and the European Commission, all of whom have agreed to double their clean energy research and development budgets over five years.

It is good news that these two summits will continue to be hosted together, as this improves the prospects of them linking up their processes to cover the entire innovation value chain, from upstream research (MI) to market uptake (CEM), in a consistent and streamlined way. MI is essentially driven by public sector investment and hopes to engage the private sector on ‘upstream’ innovation (such as in labs and demonstration sites). CEM, meanwhile, aims to get innovations ‘into the field’.

After the summit, the EU’s Competitiveness Council had just called on the Commission to develop a full industrial strategy. The strategy is to be presented to heads of government in Spring 2018. This is a good idea.

“Europe has its strengths in industrial innovation”

Over the years working in innovation and energy policy, I have become convinced that what we call ‘mission-driven innovation’ is only possible with clear strategic leadership and tangible goals. And this is what is missing in the EU at the moment.

Europe has its strengths in industrial innovation: it has one of best educated workforces in the world; European organisations have been responsible for around a fifth of all clean-tech-related patents in the last fifteen years (the largest share in the world); the EU’s research and development programmes, like Horizon 2020, are some of the best publicly-funded schemes in the world; Europe has an enviable record of setting global regulatory standards.

But we have to admit that there are weaknesses too. Europe may still be the largest global investor in renewable energy but investment levels are now falling. And the ‘deployment deficit’ continues to be an issue: there is no shortage of ideas but too many innovations get caught in the ‘valley of death’, never reaching deployment or even demonstration at scale.  Industrial carbon capture and storage is a good example here. Partly because of this, Europe now finds itself under increasing competition from other global regions, many of which are now very active members of both the CEM and MI.

To take an example, 50,000 European jobs in renewable energy ‒ mainly in solar power ‒ were lost in 2014 alone. This is partly down to local deployment rates for solar and wind technologies still being too slow. For nearly a decade, Europe has been a net importer of solar components, mainly from China. And 2015 was the first year that a European company was beaten to the top spot on the global table for wind energy deployment by capacity, with Chinese manufacturer Goldwind overtaking Vestas. Volkswagen, BMW and Renault’s market share in the global electric vehicle market may be strong for now, but they are vulnerable to slower vehicle sales in their home markets compared with global rates. Again, this is connected to the limited roll-out of European charging infrastructure.

“If we get the next steps right, we could unleash another wave of home-grown, low-carbon innovation”

So, what should the Commission’s next steps be in creating an Entrepreneurial Union?  The first must be mapping the ‘innovation landscape’ in Europe. Where do the most promising technologies stand in the innovation and investment cycle, and which EU policies currently support them? After that, we need to understand the bottlenecks, in order to prescribe specific remedies.

A recent study I was involved in tried to do this for the Energy Union, examining 11 low-carbon technologies, from hydrogen fuels to smart distribution grids, and found that only two (onshore wind and biomass) were benefitting from strong EU leadership at deployment stage.

Next year the MI summit will take place in Europe, alongside the European Clean Energy Industrial Competitiveness Forum. These two events can help kick-start discussions on what needs to be done more strategically, and how the EU can support leading clean energy actors. MI will be a good chance to showcase the progress that has been made in setting up European investment platforms (involving national, regional and local authorities, entrepreneurs, project managers, innovators, investors, companies, research centres and universities) with the aim of covering the entire innovation value chain, from upstream research to market uptake.

Likewise, Horizon 2020 could become an essential catalyst for mission-oriented industrial innovation. And this, in turn, should inform the design of the forthcoming EU innovation programme under the next Multiannual Financial Framework.

If we can get these next steps right, we could unleash another wave of home-grown, low-carbon innovation. An exciting prospect.

IMAGE CREDIT: digitalista/Bigstock

The post A real industrial strategy for Europe could unleash the low-carbon innovations we need appeared first on Europe’s World.

It is with deep sadness that we have learned of the death of Liu Xiaobo, the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize laureate and one of the most prominent human rights defenders in China. We send our most sincere condolences and respect to his wife, Ms Liu Xia, his family and friends.

Liu Xiaobo was one of the authors of Charter 08, calling for peaceful democratic reform and rule of law in China. His personal intervention during the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 saved hundreds, if not thousands, of lives.

We consistently expressed our opposition to his conviction and asked for his release. Most recently, we urged the Chinese authorities to respect his wish to receive medical care in Germany. Unfortunately these calls were not heeded.

At this time, we appeal to the Chinese authorities to allow his wife, Ms Liu Xia and his family to bury Liu Xiaobo at a place and in a manner of their choosing, and to allow them to grieve in peace. We call on the authorities to remove all restrictions on the movement and communications of his family members and allow Ms Liu Xia and her brother Mr Liu Hui to leave China, if they wish to do so.

We reiterate the European Union's call for all prisoners of conscience in China to be released.

OPINION on addressing shrinking civil society space in developing countries
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Francisco Assis

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

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EU Ministers of Agriculture and Fisheries meet on 17 and 18 July 2017 in Brussels to focus on the work programme of the Estonian presidency, fishing opportunities for 2018, trade, the future CAP, organic farming, and simplification.

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BASF Grenzach v ECHA
Research, information, education, statistics
The President of the General Court dismisses BASF Grenzach's application for interim measures regarding triclosan, a preservative for cosmetic products