European Union

For the first time in centuries, Eurasia is again becoming the most dynamic region in the world.

After five centuries of what could be called ‘the Atlantic Era’, a shift towards the East has been happening steadily over the last few decades. But recently momentum is speeding up and tectonic shifts are occurring. Three important current trends are emerging in the region.

First, economic growth is returning to Europe. Its GDP growth surpassed that of the United States in the first quarter of 2017.

Second, the elections of this year have fended off the feared rise of anti-European populist parties in the Netherlands and France. There is something of a ‘backlash against the 2016 backlash’. Although the Netherlands does not have a new government yet, Geert Wilders’ anti-immigrant PVV did not become the largest party, as polls had predicted. In France liberals have come to power.

Third, the external environment is also conducive to more European unity: remaining tensions in the East and the Brexit and Donald Trump’s erratic policy in the West are pushing Europe, in the words of the German chancellor Angela Merkel, to “take fate into its own hands”.

“China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is estimated to be the largest foreign investment drive by any country in history”

After the German elections in September, European politics can stabilise and we can expect these three drivers to lead to new momentum for European initiative and a more unified European Union. Risks remain though, as Europe’s momentum is fragile. Although the populists did not win, their share of the vote did increase and the elections in both the Netherlands and France dealt a heavy blow to traditional ruling parties. With fractured parliaments and new parties, the ability to govern might become a problem in the future.

The second trend concerns China’s vast economic diplomacy. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is estimated to be the largest foreign investment drive by any country in history, including America’s post-Second World War Marshall Plan. The initiative includes investments from Central Asia to South Asia and Eastern Europe.

What has been particularly notable over the last year, however, is the speed at which China’s investments are shaping the traditional American influence sphere. Since US withdrawal from the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal, China is spearheading economic integration in the Asia-Pacific. Under President Rodrigo Duterte, the Philippines is drawing closer to China. South Korea’s new President Jae-in Moon is also aligning his country closer to China, and the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has also responded positively to cooperation under the BRI.

The main emerging challenge here is that as China becomes so deeply involved financially in other countries it risks being entangled in local politics. It will be increasingly unable to remain neutral, especially in countries with relatively weak states and strong sectarian differences. This could produce problems. Controversy has already emerged in countries ranging from Zambia to Pakistan and Sri Lanka over China’s investments, and we can expect this to intensify as the country builds its own global financial architecture.

A third (not much noted) trend is the emergence of an active Indian foreign policy. Coming from a relatively isolationist policy, the government of Narendra Modi has become very active with state visits to places like Spain, Belgium and Kazakhstan. Especially notable is India’s policy in its direct environment. The country is developing the Iranian port of Chabahar, which is linked to Afghanistan and competes with the Pakistani harbour of Gwadar (in which China is involved).

India’s ties are also increasing with the Gulf nations. Together with Japan, India is investing in Africa and the country is developing projects throughout South-East Asia. Drawing the lines between these projects shows a strategy to connect a horizontal line along Asia’s southern coastal region. Put differently, it could make the Indian Ocean truly India’s Ocean. A challenge to this trend will be the growing competition with China in the region.

“Shifting economic and political realities also means greater volatility and potential for conflict. Strong mechanisms of diplomacy are required”

So what do these trends amount to? On the one hand, we see a more vigorous EU, and on the other, Asian giants reaching out. Could this lead to increasing Euro-Asian cooperation? I think so. European Council President Donald Tusk described the recent meeting between the EU and China as the most productive ever.

Geopolitics brings Europe and Asia closer together and so does economics. Take, for example, the recent announcement of cooperation between Chinese search-engine Baidu and German manufacturing company Bosch in the field of artificial intelligence for self-driving cars. We might see more of this type of cooperation in the future.

While American companies currently dominate the global online market, in the future the internet will enter the physical world, from cars to homes, the streets and even our bodies. These are domains in which many countries in Europe and Asia traditionally excel. Indeed, with Germany’s Industrie 4.0 and China’s ‘Internet Plus’ policies, these countries are preparing for the transition. Perhaps these countries will be the winners of the next wave of technological innovation and increase cooperation among them.

The fact that Eurasia is again becoming the most dynamic region in the world does not only imply opportunities. Shifting economic and political realities also means greater volatility and potential for conflict. Strong mechanisms of diplomacy are required. Just as the Concert of Europe did in the 19th century after the Napoleonic Wars, a ‘Concert of Eurasia’ could prevent conflict in the future. A strong Europe could play a central role in this.

In the early centuries of the Common Era, there were two powerful empires on the Eurasian plain: the Roman Empire and the Han dynasty. Although contact was limited, the Roman Empire was known as ‘Daqin’ in China. ‘Qin’ refers to the dynasty that unified China and ‘da’ means ‘great’. It suggests the Han saw the European Romans as their equals. Such a situation might again emerge in the future.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC/Flickr – UN Geneva

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[This post was originally published in the Atlantic Community.]

 

Saturday, July 8th, 2017 marked the first anniversary of the Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of NATO. The signing of this joint declaration between the EU and the Atlantic Alliance called for a new era of their relationship. But is the Joint Declaration really such a milestone that everybody in Brussels talks about? Or, is it just another act of nothing?

Even in the area of security and defense, cooperation has become an unavoidable issue in the last twenty-five years. States in Europe have not only recognized the need for closer collaboration, but have also come to realize that there is no alternative. Recent events, such as the Ukraine crisis and the renewed disputes with Russia, the refugee crisis, and the emergence of hybrid warfare as well as terrorist attacks in European capitals, have illustrated that one security organization alone is not able to solve such issues. The changing international order and the developments along Europe’s borders call for more cooperative approaches to peace and security.

 

 

With the EU-NATO Joint Declaration, another stone was laid to build a basis for cooperation. One year has passed since the signing. The main questions are now:

1. What is the Joint Declaration comprised of?
2. What has been implemented so far?
3. What is the outlook for the future of EU-NATO relationship?

The EU-NATO Joint Declaration and the subsequent Implementation Plan are based on seven areas of cooperation: hybrid threats, operational cooperation, cyber security and defense, defense capabilities, defense industry and research, exercises, and defense and security capacity-building. The 42 articles within these areas of cooperation further propose actions and approaches to foster cooperation.

Yet, while these proposals sound promising and let one think that the EU-NATO cooperation has moved from “desirable” to “possible,” one important question remains: What has been achieved so far? Of course, their cooperation cannot be expected to have become the goody-goody among inter-organizational relations in security and defense only one year after signing this declaration. But the current “European defense momentum” should be used effectively and wisely, and should be translated into closer cooperation over the Atlantic. Fruitful grounds for doing so are hybrid warfare and cyber security. These fairly new security threats can trigger cooperation through using each organization’s own strength – for example, cooperation in hybrid warfare , in which each can make use of their strength and expertise, could become a good point of departure and a potential for a spill-over effect to other areas of cooperation, such as cyber security and defense capabilities.

Still, one has to be realistic and down to earth in terms of EU-NATO cooperation in general. Since signing the Joint Declaration, one major concern remains: Both organizations could take the easy way out and rest on their laurels. As pointed out by a NATO official, both organizations have to deliver now. Concrete and substantive deliverables are urgently needed. Just ticking the boxes of carrying out meetings and seminars is not enough. The “joint” is still missing from their actions and both have to work towards a sense of togetherness on both the operational and strategic levels in order to find solutions to current security threats on Europe’s eastern and southern borders.

Overall, the atmosphere between the two organizations and their staff has improved over the last months and weeks. Exchanges have become more regular, and issues of EU-NATO cooperation more frequently find their way on the organizations’ agendas. The future for their relationship looks promising, albeit full of obstacles and challenges, and a lot of work still needs to be done. The EU and NATO find themselves in the “friend zone” and should work towards more strategic partners with a sense of togetherness.

Areas of cooperation that seem to be most fruitful for joint actions are cyber security and hybrid warfare, as well as counter-terrorism and maritime security. Efforts in the Gulf of Aden and in Mediterranean Sea have illustrated that cooperation on the operational level is possible. Now it is time to translate the will to cooperate to other theatres. Crises in the Ukraine and Libya demand joint action because of the complex nature of these enduring conflicts. Neither organization is fully equipped to deal with these issues. However, questions still remain. Who will make the first move? Who dares to actually start cooperating on both the operational and strategic level? The implementation of the Joint Declaration and the 42 proposals remains to be seen.

 

Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters is a PhD Candidate and Teaching Assistant at the University of Kent.

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On 19 July 2016, the EU and Kuwait signed a Cooperation Arrangement which aims to increase the number of exchanges between officials and promote regular political dialogue and concrete cooperation initiatives.

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AMENDMENTS 1 - 33 - Draft opinion General budget of the European Union for the financial year 2018 - all sections
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

(revised translation)

Yesterday I asked President Andrzej Duda for an urgent meeting to discuss the political crisis in Poland and its dangerous consequences for our country's standing on the world stage. It is our shared responsibility to prevent a black scenario that could ultimately lead to the marginalisation of Poland in Europe.

We have a difference of opinion on the proposals put forward by the ruling party. It is my belief that its most recent actions go against European values and standards and risk damaging our reputation. They transport us - in the political sense - in time and space: backwards and eastwards. The President most certainly thinks otherwise. But not even the deepest differences can absolve us from our duty to work together for the good and safety of our country.

The European Union is not just about money and procedures. It is first and foremost about values and high standards for public life. That is why such a wave of criticism towards the government is currently on the rise across Europe and the entire West. It has been a long time since Poland was in the centre of attention so much, and even longer since this attention was so negative. We can stop this dangerous tendency, but it will require dialogue, a readiness to engage in talks and swift decisions that are positive for the people of Poland.

Bringing the courts under the control of the governing party in the manner proposed by the Law and Justice Party (PiS) will ruin the already tarnished public opinion about Polish democracy. We must therefore find a solution which will be accepted by the Poles, the parliamentary majority and the opposition, the President and the European Union. I know this is hard. It will require concessions, mutual respect and a little bit of trust. Hard, yet not impossible. But there is very little time left.

The situation, also in the international dimension, is really serious. And that is why we need serious measures and serious partners. Please try your best, Mr President.

Declaration of the High Representative Federica Mogherini on behalf of the EU on the situation in Venezuela ahead of the election for the Constituent Assembly on 30 July 2017

The escalation of political tension and violence in Venezuela has already claimed too many lives and caused countless injuries in the almost daily demonstrations. It is high time to put an end to the violence. The numerous reports of human rights violations, excessive use of force, massive detentions and trials of civilians by military courts are of concern. The EU expects the Venezuelan authorities to respect the Constitution and the rule of law and to ensure that fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to peaceful demonstration, are guaranteed.

Respect for the National Assembly as the legitimate legislative body and the independence of the Attorney General, who should be able to act in an unfettered way, without fear of intimidation or threat, are crucial to preserve the confidence of the citizens in the State and in the judicial system.  

All public authorities and all political actors should live up to their responsibilities. The people of Venezuela are living in very difficult conditions, with severe shortages of food and medicines. Commonly agreed solutions are needed urgently to alleviate the plight of the people.  

The convening of a Constituent Assembly is disputed within Venezuelan society and therefore risks further polarizing the country and heightening the risk of confrontation. As with the transfer of Leopoldo López from prison to house arrest, the Government should consider urgent confidence-building measures before July 30th, aimed at de-escalating tensions and fostering better conditions for the resumption of efforts towards a peaceful negotiated solution.  

The EU calls upon the Government and the opposition to reopen channels of dialogue and restart serious political negotiations in the interest of the country as a whole. 

In this context, the EU encourages and stands ready to support in every way possible the creation of a regional "group of friends", accepted by the government and the opposition, to help the endeavours of political actors in Venezuela to find a peaceful, democratic and inclusive solution to the crisis in the country. In doing so, it will not be possible to dispense with the four essential conditions for any successful understanding: respect for the separation of powers, release of jailed political opponents, external cooperation to address the most urgent needs of the population, a clear calendar for the elections which are constitutionally due, so that the Venezuelan people can express their will through free, direct and universal suffrage.

The EU reiterates its readiness to cooperate with the Venezuelan authorities to ensure assistance, protection and security of all European citizens in Venezuela.

A delegation of the EP's Security and Defence Subcommittee, led by its chair Anna Fotyga (ECR, PL), assessed the security situation in the Mediterranean on visit to Italy, 17-19 July (please see link below).
Further information
Press statement
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Tuesday 25 July 2017
11.30 Presentation of letters of credentials of ambassadors

 Thursday 27 July 2017
11.30 Meeting with Prime Minister of Slovakia Robert Fico

Governments around the world are trying to strike a balance between climate policy and energy policy. This is difficult due to tension between the oil sector and the renewable energy sector, which has created a dualism between climate commitment and energy policies because national energy policies accommodate both fossil fuels and renewable energies. The tension within the different energy sectors is evident in Denmark, and it has implications for Danish climate targets especially in terms of its 2030 targets of 50 percent renewable energies and the long-term goal of low-carbon economy by 2050.

Denmark has traditionally been highlighted as an environmental forerunner[i], especially in green technology and wind-power, yet the current government’s policies are not enabling this transition from fossil fuel to renewable energies. The government’s climate and energy policies are inconsistent, simultaneously promoting the green technology sector through an export strategy whilst supporting the national oil industry through a new investment strategy.

Denmark is on course to achieve its 2020 EU climate and energy target for renewable energies, which is 30 percent and according to the 2017 national energy forecast[ii] Denmark will go beyond the target reaching 40 percent in 2020. The 2017 Energy Forecast is doubtful about reaching the targeted 50 percent for renewable energies for electricity in 2030. Importantly the European Environmental Agency has published a similar forecast for the whole of the EU, which only demonstrates the difficulties in implementing climate targets and changing energy production. The 2017 Energy Forecast argues this is partly due to lack of investment in renewable energies, i.e. wind-power, and conversion of existing power-plants. A further factor is predicted increase in energy consumption due to Apple and Facebook datacentres, which will lead to increased demand for mainly coal because of stagnated investment in renewable energies[iii].

According to DR news, the initial two datacentres (Facebook and Apple) will increase demand for electricity by 10 percent[iv] (the news report came before Apple announced it is building a second datacentre). Without investment in renewable energies, this increase in demand for energy will be supplied by fossil fuels, thereby negating Danish climate change commitments. However, Apple will invest in wind-power to produce electricity for its two datacentres[v]. A decision which is welcomed by the Danish government. According to Greenpeace Denmark, Apple’s investment in wind-power might not have negative effect on Danish renewable energies and climate target as the company apparently will rely on its own energy production[vi]. Thus, the problems with increased energy demand highlighted by the 2017 Energy Forecast might not be so big, but it is still unclear if Facebook will use the national energy grid or like Apple build its own power supply.

This year the government has shown a renewed commitment to fossil fuel. In January, the government signed a new deal with Danish Underground Consortium (DUC) represented by A.P. Møller-Mærsk to continue to obtain oil from the North Sea, including rebuilding the Thyra area. In the beginning of July, the government published its new strategy for investment in North Sea oil and gas[vii]. Denmark has been an oil producer for the past 40 years, and has been independent of imports, which has provided the country with high level of energy security. The government aims to continue to extract oil and gas from the North Sea thereby protecting energy security, tax revenue (despite a rebate for the DUC) and local jobs[viii].  A press release from Lars Christian Lilleholt, Minister for Energy, Utilities and Climate, stated that “in the future Denmark must have a strong and competitive energy sector with competences in both oil/gas and renewable energies”.[ix] Indeed the minister does not see a contradiction in the North Sea strategy and the 2050 goal of becoming a zero-carbon economy[x].

The dualism in energy investment, which favours both fossil fuels and renewable energies, does not enable green energy transition. It is important to remember that Denmark is not only a successful wind-power energy producer, it is also an oil producing country and the tension between these two energy sectors will increase as part of the green transition. This tension is not unique to Denmark indeed it is present in the overall climate debate. Importantly, Denmark is often mentioned as a forerunner in wind-power[xi], and the Danish fossil fuel story is frequently ignored. Yet the fossil fuel sector continues to play an important role for the national energy policy, which cast doubt on whether Denmark will reach its 2030 climate targets and eventually become a zero-carbon economy by 2050.

 

 

[i] Dyrhauge, H. (2017). “Denmark: a wind powered forerunner” in A Guide to EU Renewable Energy Policy: Comparing Europeanization and Domestic Policy Change in EU Member States. Edited by Israel Solorio, and Helge Jörgens, Edward Elgar publishing.

[ii] https://ens.dk/sites/ens.dk/files/widgets/multi_campaign/files/bf2017_hovedpublikation_13_mar_final_0.pdf

[iii] Ibid page 9

[iv] http://www.dr.dk/nyheder/penge/klimaraadet-datacentre-tvinger-danmark-til-investere-mere-i-sol-og-vind

[v] http://www.dr.dk/nyheder/viden/naturvidenskab/4-grunde-til-apple-bygger-endnu-et-datacenter-i-danmark

[vi] http://www.dr.dk/nyheder/indland/greenpeace-facebook-og-google-boer-foelge-apples-groenne-planer

[vii] https://ens.dk/sites/ens.dk/files/OlieGas/nordsoestrategi.pdf

[viii] Ibid page 3

[ix] http://efkm.dk/aktuelt/nyheder/nyheder-2017/juli-2017/ny-strategi-for-olie-og-gas-i-nordsoeen/

[x] http://www.dr.dk/nyheder/penge/minister-danmark-skal-vaere-et-foerende-olie-og-gasland

[xi] Dyrhauge, H. (2017). “Denmark: a wind powered forerunner” in A Guide to EU Renewable Energy Policy: Comparing Europeanization and Domestic Policy Change in EU Member States. Edited by Israel Solorio, and Helge Jörgens, Edward Elgar publishing.

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The European Parliament is in recess over the summer holidays from 24 July 2017 to 20 August 2017.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Badica and Kardiam v Council
External relations
The General Court upholds the decision freezing the funds of the Badica and Kardiam companies in the Central African ‘conflict diamonds’ case

Today, UK in a Changing Europe publishes its report on “The Cost of No Deal“, to which I’ve contributed. Here I consider some of the wider ramifications.

There is one than one way that the Article 50 process might fail to reach an agreement and it is useful to consider each of these in turn, since they each carry quite varied political and reputational costs and benefits.

The most obvious path is that by late 2018 it becomes clear that there has not been much progress on substantive negotiations under Article 50 and that no amount of extension to the two-year period that ends in March 2019 will unblock this. By mutual agreement, both sides let the clock run out and the UK leaves at the end of the period.

Much will turn here on who did what and who blocked what. For both the UK and the EU, there will be considerable political and popular fall-out – all the more given that the start of the negotiations in summer 2017 appears to be relatively constructive – so there will be a strong desire to paint the other side as the spanner in the works.

The UK is unlikely to come out of such a battle of framing well: on the experience to date, it has been much less clear about its desired outcomes or its detailed positions, so the EU will be able to point to its much more public and visible approach as one of being transparent from the start. If the UK had problems with any of these points, then it had two years to make that clear.

Even if provisional agreement is reached on some issues – citizens’ rights, for example – everything is more than likely to lapse in the absence of an overall agreement, so those who thought they might miss the chaos of a ‘no deal’ outcome would also be sucked back in, raising questions about whether either side will make unilateral commitments.

More importantly, the absence of an agreed set of terms for withdrawal will leave the UK with a long list of uncertainties (discussed elsewhere) that will consume the very large majority of governmental and parliamentary business for some years to come, potentially enlivened with cases brought before international courts for compensation.

The failure to secure an agreement will also complicate international trade deals with third parties, who will be uncertain not only about the UK’s legal position, but also about whether it is a desirable negotiating partner: again the shadow of Article 50 will be long and will condition much thinking by others about how much British negotiators can be moved in their preferences.

However, the mutual impasse scenario is one that still leaves a fig-leaf of decency for the UK, since it requires the EU also to become implicated in the decision to run out the clock. It is not hard to imagine the political and media debate in such a situation, where ‘Brussels’ is to blame in large part: only if there has been a substantial organisation of soft- and anti-Brexiteers politically and a swing in public opinion in a similar direction will that translate into further problems for the government of the day. This is not to suggest it will be an easy option, but rather one that is highly fraught and uncertain, with no one response holding the upper hand.

By contrast, if Article 50 ends without agreement because of a unilateral British decision to remove itself from negotiations – maybe even to declare a unilateral and immediate withdrawal from the EU – then all of the costs and problems outlined above will be very much stronger.

In this situation, the uncertainties of the UK’s legal position would be much magnified, raising internal political debate about what might happen next. Of course, for this to come about, there would have to have been some governmental and parliamentary debate, and possibly a vote on the course of action, but given the current make-up of the House of Commons it is hard to see how any majority might operate with any stability or durability. In any case, the pressure from all sectors of business, citizens and others would consume the government to provide some clarity about the status of law and regulation. In addition, third parties might consider that a UK which up-ended its membership of the EU in such a manner might not be one with which to conclude any new treaty commitment.

This is perhaps the key point to take from any consideration of the political and reputational aspects: Brexit is not just about the EU. How the UK acts now and through the rest of the process, whatever the outcome, matters.

This breaks down into three basic elements.

Firstly, the British political system has already been thrown about by Brexit, which is likely to be the defining political event of this period. The choices made by the Conservative party, and Theresa May in particular, have put the country on a track that requires a satisfactory conclusion (i.e. a deal). Without it, there will be further profound dislocations in the party political system and more widespread discontent with the failure of the establishment. Since the UK would be in a position of being outside the EU, the current oppositional views to the government – softening or aborting Brexit all together – would no longer be viable, leaving all sides in a policy cul-de-sac.

Secondly, the EU would still be there. This basic truism is often forgotten in the British debate, but in the absence of a deal, it is inconceivable that there would be no dealings between the UK and the EU. If nothing else, the British Prime Minister and ministers will regularly bump EU counterparts at NATO, UN, G7, WTO and many other meetings: the EU has always been part of a bigger framework. As such, while it might be tempting to blame each other for a failure to agree a deal, this might in turn poison other relationships.

Finally, failure to agree will also compromise what little debate there is about the future path of the UK. The EU referendum did nothing more than conclude that the UK didn’t want to be a member of the EU; it did not set out a clear alternative path. If Article 50 does not produce that path, then the country is likely to find itself in an extended period of dislocation, short on friends, lacking in credibility as an international partner, and generally low on options.

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At the end of 2015 the number of refugees worldwide stood at 65 million. There has never been more. Most people flee from their home countries to neighbouring ones, with Iraqis and Syrians seeking refuge in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey; the efforts of these host countries in accommodating refugees cannot be adequately appreciated. It is hard to imagine the views of people in these countries when we in Europe claim that our continent is ‘full’.

When discussing refugees arriving in Europe, people often speak of a ‘river’ or ‘stream’ of refugees; sometimes  even a ‘wave’, or a ‘tsunami’. This imagery transforms those who arrive into an indistinct mass; it deprives them of their individuality. It creates the impression of being faced with a natural disaster. But this situation is anything but a natural disaster. It was caused by humans, and the wars which forced so many from their homes. Only humans can alleviate it.

Cologne has been at the centre of public debate about refugee accommodation, notably in the light of the 2015 New Year’s Eve attacks against hundreds of girls and women by men predominantly from North Africa. Our city has, however, upheld its welcoming culture, and a wealth of initiatives continue to encourage the integration of those residents awarded refugee status, now numbering more than one percent of the city’s population.

“If integration works once, it increases the chances that it will be successful again”

Cologne has just over one million inhabitants, and our population grows by several thousand each year. Over the past two years nearly 14,000 refugees have arrived in Cologne, as well as several hundred children and teenagers who were travelling alone. Some weeks we had to take in 400 people who arrived without prior warning. It goes without saying that these arrivals constituted an immense challenge. First, we had to find safe accommodation, food and clothing. Next, language courses had to be organised, as well as school and kindergarten places.

But I believe that, thanks to a joint effort with our city’s associations and organisations, we have managed it quite well. We have set up approximately 180 preparatory classes, and about half of arrivals are housed in adequate living spaces.

We only succeeded in this endeavour because we started to create the appropriate framework conditions for hosting refugees many years ago. Over the past two decades committees have been set up to establish a collective consensus on integration measures. We worked to ensure adequate public funding from the State of North Rhine-Westphalia and the German federal government in Berlin. We established guidelines for the provision of accommodation and a roundtable to create societal consensus on issues involving refugees. We established a clear common understanding: it is worthwhile investing in all people, even if they do not have the chance of being granted permanent residency.

All of these actions have been helpful in mobilising civic power. A considerable number of Cologne citizens have volunteered to help, including many church members. Among the volunteers were those who had arrived in Cologne as refugees or so-called ‘guest workers’ – something I was particularly pleased about. They were integrated; now they help integrate others. What this demonstrates is that if integration works once, it increases the chances that it will be successful again.

For a city that grows every year the procurement of housing alone poses a challenge. Our financial resources are limited. The coffers of German local authorities are not plentiful, and this applies in particular to Cologne. We need billions of euros to invest in the creation of housing and other infrastructure to keep up with our growing population, but we do not command the necessary financial resources.

From the start, we in Cologne have aimed to house refugees throughout the city, rather than confining them to accommodation outside the city gates. But living space is limited, so we have had to resort to offering places in container villages, sports halls and old hotels. Nevertheless, it is our priority to move as many refugee families as possible into regular flats, and avoid ‘ghettoisation’. Having refugees live among us allows us to get to know each other and engage in everyday interactions, which is the best way to prevent segregation, envy and resentment. This is evident from the lack of support for right-wing populists – of which, unfortunately, there are quite a few across Germany – in areas with a large migrant population.

If 14,000 people from a completely different cultural background suddenly come to live in Cologne, whether temporarily or permanently, existing residents will experience the stress of a new situation. But we must never forget: our stress is insignificant compared to the stress of those who were forced to flee. 14,000 refugees is a lot of people, but for a city of one million this amounts to a mere 1.3%. Look at this another way: imagine 80 people sitting together in a restaurant when one more person enters. He or she will be sure to find a place.

Of course we must face the negative side: the appalling New Year’s Eve attacks, which remain unsolved. This is a bitter fact, not least for the female victims. Some of the perpetrators had fled from their countries. But they were a tiny minority of all refugees. And it is never right to blame a group as a whole for crimes committed by a few wrongdoers. The Cologne attacks have polarised the discussion on hosting refugees in Germany, and provided a platform for those who oppose it. But the influx of refugees over the past few years has neither changed the security situation, nor our willingness to welcome them in Cologne.

“Europe is first and foremost a continent of cities”

It is my conviction that refugees are an asset to us, even in an economic sense. In Germany refugees are often divided in the qualified ones that we want to keep, and the less qualified that we do not. I believe this to be wrong. In my opinion, each and every one can help us; we can provide education and training to everybody. Germany has an ageing population and will soon suffer from a shortage of skilled workers. This is another reason why we cannot afford to marginalise migrants.

We must also consider that most refugees have lost everything: their relatives, their homes, their communities. But they have not lost their skills and knowledge. They have undertaken a journey into the unknown to improve living conditions for themselves and their children.

The European Union has not yet been able to create the necessary solidarity between its member states to handle the arrival of refugees properly, and this lack of solidarity has driven the EU into a deep crisis.

We, the cities, cannot sit back and wait for this to be resolved. Europe is first and foremost a continent of cities. We have to give constructive answers each day to deal with people’s concerns and problems. The Social Affairs Forum of EUROCITIES – a network of major European cities- recently launched a ‘Solidarity Cities’ initiative. It is a model for progress and a sign of hope that European solidarity will grow from the ground upwards.

IMAGE CREDIT: strassenstriche.net

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Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

The European Parliament is in recess over the summer holidays from 24 July 2017 to 20 August 2017.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

The European Parliament is in recess over the summer holidays from 24 July 2017 to 20 August 2017.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

The European Parliament is in recess over the summer holidays from 24 July 2017 to 20 August 2017.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

The European Parliament is in recess over the summer holidays from 24 July 2017 to 20 August 2017.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

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Activities of Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

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On 19 July 2017, the Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper) endorsed, on behalf of the Council, a mandate for negotiations on a regulation regarding the qualification standards, status and  protection granted to refugees and persons eligible for subsidiary protection. On the basis of this mandate, the presidency will start negotiations with the European Parliament as soon as possible.

"The reform of the common European asylum system is a fundamental part of our comprehensive migration policy and therefore of utmost importance for Europe. Besides achieving equal rights and obligations for asylum seekers and beneficiaries of international protection across Europe, this will also reduce secondary movements and help those genuinely in need of protection. The actual amount of social payments will still be in the hands of each member state”, said Andres Anvelt, minister of interior of Estonia, following today's agreement on qualification and protection standards. “I also want to pay tribute to the Maltese presidency for their huge work on this file”, added Minister Anvelt.

EU ambassadors endorsed the text of the mandate on the understanding that the parts relating to other files of the common European asylum system (CEAS) reform will be revisited once there is agreement on those proposals. 

The main objectives of this draft regulation are: 

• ensuring that member states will apply common criteria for the identification of persons genuinely in need of international protection
• ensuring the same common set of rights is available for those persons in all member states

 Once the regulation is adopted, all applicants should be equally treated in all EU member states, therefore helping avoid secondary movements. 

The draft regulation defines the standards for qualification both for refugee status and for subsidiary protection. It also lays down the elements to be taken into account in the assessment of an application. 

The draft regulation details the protection granted to beneficiaries, including the duration of the permits and their rights in relation to access to employment, education, social security, healthcare, accommodation and integration measures. It limits the right to reside of beneficiaries of international protection to the member state which granted them the protection. 

The draft regulation also includes specific elements to take account of the situation of minors, in particular unaccompanied minors. 

Background 

Following its Communication of 6 April 2016 on the reform of the common European asylum system, the Commission presented in May and in July seven legislative proposals, including the above-mentioned proposal, with a view to: 

• improving the functioning of CEAS by eliminating differing treatment of asylum seekers and varying recognition rates among member states;
• reducing secondary movements and contributing to a fairer distribution among the member states of the responsibility to offer protection to those in need.