European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Anna Flynn.

Years later, we are all still experiencing the consequences of COVID‑19, with EU countries yet to fully recover from the severe economic downturn that followed the 2020 coronavirus outbreak. As a response, the Next Generation EU (NGEU) instrument was established. It has a strong focus on the green and digital transitions – key priorities backed by the European Parliament. The total budget is €806.9 billion, financed through EU borrowing, the Emissions Trading System (ETS), and the Brexit Adjustment Reserve (BAR). 

While the Council established the NGEU, Parliament co-legislated the rules for its implementation, adopting the regulation on the NGEU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) in February 2021. The RRF distributes 90 % of the NGEU funds to Member States, financing reforms and investments specified in separate national recovery and resilience plans (NRRPs). Parliament has called for ensuring that the RRF is managed transparently, that it stimulates progress in the green, digital and energy sectors, and supports children, young people and women. Parliament demands that respect for the rule of law is among the key prerequisites for receiving funding.

Implementation of the RRF enters its final year in 2026, with the deadline for payment execution in December 2026. In June 2025, the Commission underlined that Member States should streamline the NRRPs (for example, through removing targets that won’t be met) and subsequently redirecting the funds.

The European Commission is required to update Parliament on the state of play of the RRF and present regular reports. In the latest annual report (for 1 September 2024 to 31 August 2025), the Commission outlined that, although the application of RRF projects needs to accelerate; significant progress was made during this period. The Commission noted that 37 % of the 6 985 milestones and targets agreed in the NRRPs had been met (at the time of the report).

To ensure it receives timely and detailed information, and to enable an exchange of views with other institutions, Parliament insisted on a bi-monthly meeting between Members of its Committees on Economic and Monetary Affairs and on Budgets, and appropriate Commission representatives. In addition, Parliament set up a special RRF working group, to discuss the quality of NRRP measures and maintain oversight of overall progress.

Since 2022, Members have looked very closely at RRF expenditure through the annual budgetary discharge procedure. RRF-related issues (which are generally prominent in the work of Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT)) were included in the report granting budgetary discharge to the European Commission in May 2025. In the adopted report, the CONT committee outlined its concern about outstanding debt from borrowing. This was only projected to increase through continued borrowing – some of which would be for the RRF. Notably, the discharge procedure applies only to RRF grants, as the RRF loans do not come under the jurisdiction of parliamentary scrutiny.

In July 2025, the Commission unveiled its proposal for the EU’s long-term budget for the 2028-2034 period. Within this, there is €149.3  billion (0.11 % of the EU’s GNI) set aside to repay the debt from NGEU grants.

Parliament’s powers fall broadly into six, often overlapping, domains: law-making, the budget, scrutiny of the executive, external relations, and, to a lesser extent, constitutional affairs and agenda-setting.

Links

• Recovery and Resilience Facility: Annual Report 2025
• Economic Outlook Quarterly: final year for the implementation for the recovery plans
• EU Budget 2028-2034: Overview of the Commission’s proposal
• The European Parliament’s oversight powers: Tools to scrutinise the European Commission
• Discharge for 2023 budget: European Commission
• RRF under way: Cybersecurity measures

Written by Clare Ferguson with Sara Raja.

Extreme heat, flooding and drought are no longer distant warnings of climate change. They are becoming part of everyday life. Across Europe, measures to cut emissions, from electric vehicles to renewable energy, are already visible on our streets and in our homes. Many of these initiatives are driven and funded by the European Union, but they represent only part of a much broader effort. The European Parliament is helping shape EU climate action for the benefit of citizens, the economy and the environment.

Parliament is focused on ensuring that EU climate objectives are translated into effective action. A central element of this work has been Parliament’s role in negotiations to amend the European Climate Law to include a binding intermediate greenhouse gas emissions reduction target for 2040. By shaping this amendment, Parliament has sought to strengthen the legal pathway between the 2030 target and climate neutrality by 2050, while ensuring that the target remains grounded in scientific evidence and accompanied by clear monitoring and review mechanisms.

Parliament has also called for the energy union to be aligned with developments in EU climate and energy policy, underlining the need to boost energy infrastructure, particularly cross-border interconnections.

Since 2022, Russia’s war on Ukraine has had a massive impact on the EU energy landscape. Parliament approved the REPowerEU plan, seeking to improve EU energy security, end the EU’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels and make further advances in tackling the climate emergency. This initiative raised key ‘fit for 55’ targets set in the Energy Efficiency Directive (EED) and the Renewable Energy Directive (RED).

The ‘fit for 55‘ package is a set of laws aligning existing climate rules with the European Climate Law objectives. In its role as co-legislator, Parliament has played an important role in shaping these laws. It supported vulnerable citizens and companies through the Social Climate Fund while approving an update to the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) reducing the amount of emission allowances. Parliament has also played a role in strengthening and simplifying the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) Regulation and addressing CO2 emission standards for cars and vans. Mindful of the need to provide alternatives to traditional transport fuels, Members successfully pushed for an earlier roll-out of electric charging and hydrogen refuelling infrastructure on EU roads. Parliament also negotiated more ambitious targets on renewables, carbon sinks and deforestation and land use.

The European Green Deal, approved by Parliament in 2020, seeks to tackle the challenges of climate change and environmental degradation by cutting emissions and achieving climate neutrality by 2050.

Only a year after the approval of the Green Deal, it became clear that the existing policy framework was not sufficient to reach its goals. As co-legislator, Parliament therefore contributed to raising the 2030 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction target from 40 % to a net 55 % compared with 1990 levels. Although this increase was not as high as Parliament wanted, Parliament succeeded in including the ambition of delivering negative emissions after 2050 and establishing an independent, inter-disciplinary scientific advisory panel. The Parliament and Council reached an agreement on the European Climate Law at the end of June 2021.

These actions illustrate how the European Parliament continues to shape and strengthen EU climate legislation, moving from setting targets to ensuring their effective implementation for the benefit of citizens, the economy and the environment.

Further reading:

• Amending the European Climate Law: Setting an emissions reduction target for 2040
• Future of the energy union
• EU energy infrastructure: Boosting energy security
• Revised Energy Efficiency Directive
• Renewable Energy Directive
• Fit for 55 package
• Review of the EU ETS: ‘Fit for 55’ package
• Social climate fund: ‘Fit for 55’ package
• Simplifying and strengthening CBAM
• CO2 emission standards for new cars and vans: ‘Fit for 55’ package
• Revision of the LULUCF Regulation: Strengthening the role of the land use, land-use change and forestry sector in climate action
• The European Parliament declares climate emergency
• European climate law

Written by Mar Negreiro.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is changing the way we look for information online. Search engines increasingly offer AI-generated answers that keep users on their platforms instead of redirecting them to external websites, and many are now using generative AI tools as search engines. This convergence has intensified competition between traditional search engines and generative AI platforms. At the same time, experts warn that such reliance may lead to informational dependency and a decline in users’ cognitive skills.

AI is shifting online search results

The transformation from traditional web search to an AI-driven model is becoming mainstream. Google, which accounts for about 90 % of the online search engines market, has added an ‘AI Overviews’ feature – an automated search-summary tool – to its search engine. The overview uses Google’s Gemini AI models to answer users’ queries based on sources selected by Google. According to a market analysis, about 60 % of informational search queries in Google now trigger the overview as the top search result. Google’s AI Overview competes against AI platforms like ChatGPT and Perplexity, as users increasingly use AI chatbots to search for information. Similarly, Microsoft has introduced its Copilot generative AI to its search engine, Bing. However, Microsoft Bing accounts for just around 4 % of the online search engine market.

According to experts, users are less likely to click on links when Google’s AI summary is provided. They also believe that users are now structuring search queries differently and are increasingly using natural language in voice commands. AI answers are the latest feature of search engines, after voice and image queries.

Main emerging challenges Lower traffic and less revenues to publishers

Trade associations representing publishers’ interests claim that AI overviews cause a drop of up to 25 % in publishers’ traffic, or even up to 50 % according to a digital marketing company. A network of digital marketing companies reports that 58 % of Google searches now end without the user visiting a single link. Reduced traffic translates into fewer ad impressions and a subsequent loss of revenue for content creators. In response, a coalition of publishers has filed a formal antitrust complaint with the European Commission against Google, accusing its ‘AI Overviews’ of diverting traffic and revenue from them. An alliance of German media and digital industry NGOs, associations and organisations has filed a formal complaint in Germany. A third case launched in the UK confirms Google has strategic market status in search services, including AI overviews and AI mode, the latter being its AI chatbot launched to compete against other chatbots.

The plaintiffs believe AI overviews are increasingly monetised through integrated advertisements, while Google extracts content from third-party websites without offering direct compensation or opt-out options, and without obtaining prior consent. They claim this has implications for media diversity, freedom of opinion and democratic discourse. Representatives of publishers’ interests claim they cannot opt out from appearing in the overviews without also being suppressed from the regular search listing.

Difficulties in the training of AI models

Tools like Google’s AI Overviews rely on two components: a large-language model (LLM) and a system able to retrieve information. Both need data, the first to learn to use human language and the second to retrieve documented information to answer users’ requests. Users and businesses may have grown accustomed to their data being collected and used for search results or targeted advertising, but the same may not be true for AI training. Complaints in the United States (US) point to an update of Google’s privacy policy, adding that the company may use publicly accessible information to train its AI tools. In fact, training LLMs with data publicly available on the web may raise copyright issues. Similarly, there is a case against Meta for not respecting the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) when collecting data to train their model, as users were not asked for prior consent to their data being collected for this purpose. However, recently proposed amendments to the GDPR might clarify that processing personal data for AI training may be permissible. Stakeholders are challenging Google. For instance, Cloudfare, a global platform and network of data centres that maintain websites and applications, is supporting a consortium of publishers to collectively block AI crawlers from collecting content for training unless companies pay for the content.

Threat to the open web

Until recently, Google drove online traffic in the open web, the public, interconnected network of websites and online services used for browsing, shopping and consuming news. Thus, Google has helped users find information by crawling and indexing web pages and ranking them based on a number of criteria. This is changing now, as users are offered generative AI-based responses and conversations and increasingly stop clicking and driving online traffic. Google has admitted that the open web is in rapid decline, referring to open-web display advertising. However, many believe this decline is much broader, as AI-driven search poses an unprecedented threat to the open web. In addition, users are increasingly using chatbots to conduct online searches, further reducing the number of users who access websites from search engines.

Risks for information quality, critical thinking and digital inclusion

AI-generated searches may include incorrect or biased information. Research suggests that AI could produce ‘chat chambers‘ that reinforce the misinformation it hallucinates. Thus, 27 % of US adults do not trust AI-generated search results. Concerns around AI-generated misinformation are high, with the likelihood of chatbots repeating false information nearly doubling from 18 % in August 2024 to 35 % in August 2025. In addition, higher confidence in generative AI is associated with less critical thinking, according to research. It could also widen the digital divide, as young users are more AI-literate than older ones, but young students are increasingly dependent on AI use in classwork, risking lower creative thinking.

Next steps

Google’s AI Overviews are already available in over 200 countries worldwide. However, within the EU, rollout has been slower. In early 2025, the feature launched in only a few Member States; by October 2025 it was available in all except France. The delay was due to regulatory reasons. It is to be seen if Google is fully complying with key EU level legislation, including the Digital Services Act (DSA), the Digital Markets Act (DMA), EU copyright rules and the AI Act. The Commission is currently assessing Google’s use of AI summaries at the top of its search results, given their potential to significantly disrupt the relationship between Google and the open web by reducing traffic to external websites. Moreover, AI integration now goes far beyond overviews and chatbots. AI tools are increasingly embedded in operating systems, core apps and hardware ecosystems. As a result, AI has become a driving force for digital services, with further automation expected through the integration of Agentic AI or virtual assistants – systems designed to make decisions with minimal human oversight. Google, alongside other big tech companies, such as OpenAI, Microsoft and NVIDIA, is developing such systems as the next step towards automated online search, without any human involvement and replacing online search engines like Google Search. There is also a risk that AI agents could themselves become ‘gatekeepers’, as defined by the DMA, acting independently and creating new questions around oversight and accountability.

Read the complete ‘At a Glance note’ on ‘Search engines in times of Artificial Intelligence‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Anna Flynn.

On 18 December 2025, International Migrants Day was marked, honouring the contribution and value of migrants.

This commemoration follows a year of notable reforms.

For example, in November 2025, the Commission adopted the EU’s first annual Asylum and Migration Report. The report outlined that there has been a 35 % reduction in illegal border crossings between July 2024 and June 2025 – but challenges remain.

In parallel, the Council agreed on the proposed Annual Solidarity Pool for migration. The pool ensures that Member States that are under migratory pressure may be assisted by other Member States, for example, through financial aid and facilitating relocation. This will be evaluated based on population size and GDP. Parliament has no formal role in its implementation, but has nevertheless supported the scheme.

In the same month, Parliament voted in favour of a law establishing the European Centre Against Migrant Smuggling within the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol). This will protect victims by increasing information sharing and providing a range of support to Member States.

Underpinning all of this is the new pact for migration and asylum – this became law at the end of 2024, and will apply in full from June 2026. The pact has 10 separate but interconnected legislative acts.

Some of the Commission’s proposals that complement the pact have been criticised.

In April 2025, the first, formal EU list outlining safe countries of origin was announced. This means that asylum applicants from countries that are deemed safe (according to this list) will generally not be considered eligible for international protection. It is mandatory for Member States to abide by this list, but they are also permitted to keep or create their own national lists.

Various human rights organisations, civil society, and other stakeholders condemn this. There are questions about the transparency of how these lists are compiled, as well as the repercussions for individuals who are migrating from a safe country of origin but do need protection. However, Parliament’s Civil Liberties Committee endorsed this list on 3 December 2025 as a way to better manage migration.

In March 2025, to further build upon the migration and asylum pact, the Commission proposed a common approach to returns for citizens illegally residing in a Member State. Part of this is the creation of return hubs – centres in safe non-EU countries that people may be sent to if they cannot legally reside in the EU. A mutual recognition of returns is also proposed, allowing Member States to recognise and apply return decisions made by another Member State.

The Council’s position on the regulation was finalised on 8 December 2025, so this will now be negotiated with Parliament.

Looking ahead, 2025 marked the start of decisions on how the pact will be financed over the coming years. In July, the Commission’s unveiled its proposal for the EU’s long-term budget for 2028-2034. This included information on how migration policies are to be financed during this period.

A proposed €12 billion (in 2025 prices) is to be allocated for migration policy. This is similar to the current budget for 2021-2027, where around €12.6 billion in 2025 prices has been dedicated to this.

One aspect that differs, however, is that this money will be allocated through national plans crafted by each Member State. Members of the European Parliament have highlighted their concern about how this will impact their capacity for oversight and scrutiny in this area.

Overall, the current and future budgets reflect the increasing importance of migration as a political issue.

Links to EPRS publications

• International Migrants Day: 18 December 2025
• Union support for asylum, migration and integration
• Stronger role for Europol to fight migrant smuggling and human trafficking
• European Parliament Plenary Session November I 2025
• The first annual Asylum and Migration Report and the Annual Solidarity Pool
• ‘Safe country of origin’ concept in EU asylum law
• Planned revision of the EU Return Directive
• Implementation of the EU pact on migration and asylum

Written by Anna Flynn.

Parliament has, on many occasions, supported the EU’s active role in ocean governance. the Commission adopted the European Ocean Pact in June 2025. It serves as a non-legislative framework for all ocean-related policies, covering a wide range of issues such as research, maritime security, ocean health, coastal communities, and more.

A proposal for an EU ocean act is expected by 2027.

Notably, throughout 2025, Parliament gave its consent to a number of fisheries agreements with third countries. An important example is the protocol with Greenland. Moreover, the approved EU-Côte d’Ivoire agreement is significant for the EU’s tuna fleet.

Since July 2025, citizens have written to the President of the European Parliament to call for higher standards and stronger regulation of EU fishing practices outside the Union. In response, EPRS highlighted that the EU’s agreements with third countries promote local sustainability, conservation and development.

For instance, in the agreement with Guinea-Bissau, €4.5 million is allocated to the country’s fishing sector – namely towards control and surveillance capacities, as well as for communities in the region. Moreover, the agreement with Cabo Verde is viewed by the Parliament’s Committee on Fisheries as balanced; due to the fact that the EU’s financial contributions are higher than the cost of the access rights.

In July 2025, Parliament adopted a text agreed with the Council on improving the EU’s measures tackling third countries’ unsustainable practices concerning shared fish stocks. These are stocks that are not limited to the waters of a single country. This means that there is now clarity on exactly what actions are subject to EU penalties.

Beyond fisheries, in 2025, the Parliament also adopted its position on the Commission’s proposed directive on the high seas.

This directive integrates the UN’s High Seas Treaty into EU legislation. The treaty protects marine biodiversity beyond country’s borders. No nation has jurisdiction over nearly two thirds of the ocean, and the high seas make up a large part of this.

Parliament’s report amends the proposal by suggesting that Member States need to publish their actions in the high seas (related to biodiversity). The objective of this is to improve transparency. However, MEPs also called for greater flexibility in reporting.

In the same week, Parliament also adopted a provisional agreement on expanding the European Maritime Safety Agency’s (EMSA) mandate. The aim of the proposed regulation is to strengthen EMSA’s ability to tackle security risks by broadening its remit. For example. the agreement introduces a flexibility mechanism so that the agency can undertake additional tasks for the Commission and Member States.

Post-2027, there is no separate fund outlined for the common fisheries policy (CFP). Currently, there is a European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF) for the 2021-2027 period – but in July 2025, the Commission proposed merging this with other policies, such as agriculture. This means that there would be no specific, allocated sum of money for this sector. The CFP encompasses ‘conservation of marine biological resources’ – one of only five areas in which the EU has exclusive competence.

Links to EPRS publications

• Plenary round-up – November I 2025
• Protecting marine biodiversity in the high seas
• Revision of the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) founding regulation
• Conditions for EU support to the CFP (2028-2034 programming period)
• Sustainable fishing outside the European Union – answering citizens’ concerns
• EU-Côte d’Ivoire fisheries agreement
• EU fisheries agreement with Greenland: Conclusion of a new protocol (2025-2030)
• Measures against countries that do not cooperate on shared fish stocks
• The European ocean pact
• EU fisheries agreement with Guinea-Bissau
• EU fisheries agreement with Cabo Verde: Conclusion of a new protocol (2024-2029)

Written by Anna Flynn.

The EU strongly condemned Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine on 24 February 2022. By July 2025, the civilian death toll in Ukraine had exceeded 13 800, according to the UN. Now, nearly four years later, the EU has provided €187.3 billion in support for Ukraine, and this response marks the Union’s largest civil protection operation to date.

EPRS notes that ‘the ongoing attack has reverberated beyond Ukraine’s borders, affecting food security, energy prices and inflation both in the EU and beyond’. The European Parliament labelled Russia’s war ‘the most outrageous act of aggression conducted by the political leadership of a given country in Europe since 1945.’ The  EU’s response  has been structured along three axes: political, economic and military support for Ukraine; isolation and containment of Russia; and enhancement of EU and EU neighbours’ resilience.

Parliament’s extraordinary meeting of 1 March 2022, at which it adopted a resolution unequivocally condemning Russia’s aggression and setting the direction for EU action, was one of the first international gatherings that Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, attended. Parliament’s President, Roberta Metsola, was the first EU leader to visit Kyiv, on 1 April 2022. In September 2025, Metsola officially opened a permanent European Parliament liaison office in Kyiv. 

Since the start of the war, Parliament has dealt with multiple legislative files of paramount importance for Ukraine and adopted numerous non-legislative resolutions on aspects of EU support for the country; including several rounds of macro-financial assistance, the Act in support of ammunition production (ASAP); and the Ukraine Facility, which earmarks €50 billion for Ukraine’s reconstruction from 2024 to 2027.

Parliament has also unwaveringly supported Ukraine’s EU membership aspirations, advocating successfully in June 2022 for Ukraine to be granted candidate country status, and in December 2023 for Member States to start accession negotiations. During EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Association Committee meetings, Members and their Ukrainian counterparts have discussed parliamentary follow-up of Ukraine’s official accession request. Accession negotiations have not properly started due to lack of required unanimity in the Council. However, in April 2025, Parliament called for the acceleration of the screening process that would allow these discussions to begin.

Moreover, Parliament has used its powers to advocate a tougher policy of containment towards Russia. A huge discussion has centred around the possibility of the EU using immobilised Russian assets (of the Central Bank of Russia) to finance Ukraine’s reconstruction. This money has been frozen since the war began. The European Parliament has repeatedly called for the assets (amounting to around €300 billion) to be used. However, it is a divisive issue due to potential economic, legal, and reputational consequences. On 12 December 2025, the Council adopted a regulation indefinitely prohibiting the transfer of any of the assets.

On 19 December 2025, the European Council approved a €90 billion loan to support Ukraine in 2026 and 2027. Without this, Ukraine was expected to run out of funds in early 2026. Instead of using Russian assets, this loan is financed through EU borrowing secured on the ‘headroom’ in the EU’s budget.

Parliament also supports the EU’s sanctions against Russia. The Council recently adopted its 19th comprehensive package of sanctions, containing 69 additional listings. This constitutes companies now subject to asset freezes (that will also be ineligible for further disbursement of funds), as well as individuals who now face travel bans.

Parliament is therefore employing its budgetary, agenda-setting, external action and law-making powers to mobilise solid EU support for Ukraine’s defence against Russia’s aggression, and to ensure that the EU honours its pledges.

Links

• Financing Ukraine in 2026 and 2027
• State of play: EU support to Ukraine
• Ukraine’s future in the EU
• Examples of Parliament’s impact: 2019 to 2024
• Act in support of ammunition production

Written by Maria Niestadt.

Influencer marketing has become a significant part of the digital economy. Influencers allow brands to reach highly targeted audiences, and their endorsements are often perceived as more authentic than direct advertising. Some consumer groups – such as younger consumers and those with lower financial literacy, lower income, or consumers who follow trends closely – are particularly receptive to this type of marketing.

The fast growth of this sector has exposed several problematic practices and regulatory challenges in the EU. Many influencers do not clearly disclose the commercial intent behind their posts, while others manipulate visibility by buying fake followers, likes or plays to inflate their perceived influence and to make more profit. Additional concerns include reinforcing unrealistic beauty standards, promoting harmful or illegal products, accelerating the spread of false and misleading claims, and exploiting kidfluencers for financial gain.

At EU level, laws relevant to influencer marketing exist but are fragmented across consumer protection, digital and audiovisual media regulation. Hidden advertising and misleading commercial practices are already prohibited, yet the responsibilities of different actors in the influencer marketing value chain are not always clear. Some EU Member States, such as France and Spain, have complemented these EU laws with national legislation, and many have issued guidance to help influencers and companies understand their legal obligations.

The European Commission has signalled its intention to address misleading influencer marketing practices in the forthcoming digital fairness act. The European Parliament and Council will play a central role in shaping this legislation once the proposal is published.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Regulating influencer marketing in the European Union‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

The key debate of the last plenary session of 2025 was on the preparation of the European Council meeting of 18-19 December 2025, particularly the need to support Ukraine, the EU’s strategic autonomy, and transatlantic relations. Members condemned the terrorist attack on the Hanukkah celebrations in Sydney and expressed solidarity with the victims and their families. Several debates were held following Commission presentations of its political and legislative initiatives, such as the European affordable housing plan, EU cardiovascular health plan, the 2030 consumer agenda, the automotive and power grids packages, and plans to tackle rising energy prices through robust infrastructure. Further debates on external policy covered recent developments in Palestine and Lebanon, the deepening democratic crisis in Georgia, and the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Dayton–Paris Peace Agreement.

Members also debated Commission statements on: the need to tackle drug trafficking; breeders’ protests following a lumpy-skin-disease outbreak in France; the geopolitical situation’s impact on access to medicines; preventing sexual harassment in public institutions; Belarusian hybrid attacks against Lithuania; pro-Russian espionage in the European Parliament; and the global rise in violence against humanitarian workers and journalists.

Sakharov Prize

President Roberta Metsola awarded the 2025 Sakharov prize to representatives of Andrzej Poczobut, of Belarus, and Mzia Amaglobeli, of Georgia, journalists fighting for democracy in their home countries. Both journalists were jailed for defending freedom of expression and democracy, and Parliament called for their immediate release. The Sakharov Prize is the EU’s highest tribute to human rights work, recognising those that have made an outstanding contribution to protecting freedom of thought.

EU defence investment

Amid rising geopolitical pressure, the EU aims to redirect budget resources to defence through the ReArm Europe plan/Readiness 2030 initiative. Members debated and approved a provisional agreement amending five programmes’ regulations to facilitate defence funding. The amendments concern the scope of the Digital Europe programme, European Defence Fund, Connecting Europe Facility, strategic technologies for Europe platform (STEP) and Horizon Europe. They also cover funding for dual-use defence technologies and infrastructure across these programmes. The amendments also aim at supporting defence research and development and strengthening European value chains. The agreement extends the EDF to Ukraine, allowing Ukrainian entities to participate in collaborative defence research and development.

Military mobility

Military mobility – the ability to move troops, weapons and equipment quickly and efficiently across the EU – is essential for European security and defence and for EU support to Ukraine. Parliament debated and adopted a joint own-initiative report from the Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE) and Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN), calling for a significantly increased budget for military mobility. The report recognises the urgent need to improve military mobility in the EU, including for fast deployment of troops and military equipment to the EU’s eastern flank.

Common agricultural policy simplification agreement

Members considered and adopted a provisional agreement on amendments to the common agricultural policy (CAP). The agreement aims to simplify CAP requirements for farmers, including on ‘good agricultural and environmental conditions of land’ (GAECs), by exempting farms partially certified as organic from certain GAECs and providing farmers with additional support for compliance with some GAEC requirements. It increases the maximum payment amount for small farmers and includes new support for small-farm business development. The agreement advises Member States to avoid conducting more than one on-the-spot check per year on the same farm.

Compulsory licensing of patents for crisis management

Innovation is a top EU priority, and Members adopted at second reading a provisional agreement on a compulsory patent licensing scheme. The scheme aims at facilitating rapid use of patents during crises while preserving innovation incentives through patent protection. Parliament’s negotiators succeeded in excluding crises relating to semiconductors, gas supply security and defence-related products from the scope, as well as maintaining the confidentiality of protected knowledge, and lowering maximum fines and penalties.

Implementation of the rule of law conditionality regime

The Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation allows the EU to suspend or reduce funds to Member States that violate the rule of law in a way that directly threatens the Union’s financial interests. Members are concerned that the mechanism has only been triggered once to date, against Hungary in December 2022. Parliament debated and adopted an own-initiative report assessing the regulation’s implementation. The joint report from the Committees on Budget (BUDG) and Budgetary Control (CONT) calls for improvements to increase transparency through a public portal tracking breaches, a simpler complaint procedure, and a stronger role for parliamentary scrutiny.

Citizens’ Initiative – ‘My voice, my choice: For safe and accessible abortion’

Parliament debated and adopted a resolution drafted by the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) regarding the EU’s plans to follow up on the European Citizens’ Initiative, ‘My voice, my choice: for safe and accessible abortion’. The initiative proposes creating an EU-funded, voluntary opt-in system to support EU countries that offer safe and legal abortion services to people from EU countries where access is limited. Members condemned anti-gender movements that seek to undermine equality and human rights, and called on Member States to reform their abortion laws and policies in line with international human rights standards.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Two decisions to enter into interinstitutional negotiations – from the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL), on the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers (EGF): support to workers affected by imminent job displacement in enterprises undergoing restructuring; and from the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), on the application for the electronic submission of travel data (‘EU Digital Travel application’), use of digital travel credentials – were approved. Two other decisions, from the LIBE committee on the application of the ‘safe third country’ concept and the establishment of a list of safe countries of origin at Union level, were approved by vote.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Plenary round-up – December II 2025‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Steven Blaakman.

Drawing attention to migrants’ human rights and highlighting their contribution to society, International Migrants’ Day is observed every year on 18 December. The day was designated by the United Nations General Assembly on 4 December 2000 in response to growing migration numbers around the world.

Context

Migration has been a constant throughout history, with people moving in search of new opportunities or protection. On 1 January 2024, 29.0 million people (6.4 %) of the 449.3 million people living in the EU were non-EU citizens. In 2023, 4.4 million migrants from non-EU ountries arrived in the EU. In 2024, most first-residence permits were given for reasons of employment (32 %), family (27 %) and
education (16 %). Some also arrive looking for international protection: in 2024, 911 960 first-time asylum applicants arrived in the EU.

Migration management in the EU

The EU and EU countries share competence in migration policy. In recent years, the priority accorded to migration management has been eflected in the EU budget, with €22.7 billion allocated to migration and border policy from 2021 to 2027. Acknowledging that the EU needed to move away from ad hoc solutions and put in place a predictable and reliable migration management system, the European Commission put forward a new pact on migration and asylum in 2020. The pact combines key EU policies on migration, asylum and border management and was adopted in spring 2024. In addition, the Commission has initiated reforms to the EU’s legal migration policy by proposing a skills and talent package, intended to attract and retain highly skilled third-country nationals, and by creating the EU Talent Pool, which will match employers in the EU with jobseekers from non-EU countries. The objective is to help address critical labour shortages across Europe and to offer a response to the demographic situation in the EU of an ageing population. Research confirms that legal migration channels are a viable way to mitigate the problem of a declining EU workforce.

Honouring the contributions of migrants and respecting their rights

International Migrants Day is about honouring the contributions of migrants and highlighting the increasingly complex environment in which migration occurs. The European Commission asserts that legal migration and resettlement benefit migrants as well as EU countries.

The EU action plan on integration and inclusion addresses barriers to migrants’ education, access to the labour market and housing. Progress on practical action to support integration in areas such as health, housing and employment can be checked in the Commission’s progress tracker

European Parliament position

The European Parliament has for years advocated a humane, solidarity-based and common approach to migration. In its resolution of 25 November 2021, taking into consideration that total labour supply in the euro area was projected to fall by 13 % (20 million people) between 2019 and 2070, Parliament encouraged the development of adequate legal economic migration channels.

Parliament’s adoption of the new pact on migration and asylum, to be applied from mid-2026, confirmed its willingness to take ‘an important step, to a common European asylum and migration policy that is well functioning and long-term’.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘International Migrants’ Day: 18 December 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Sara Raja.

One of the European Parliament’s most important priorities is to ensure all EU policy promotes respect for people’s fundamental freedoms and human rights. Parliament has therefore awarded its Sakharov Prize to individuals and organisations making a remarkable effort to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms since 1988. Previous laureates include Nelson Mandela, Alexei Navalny and Malala Yousafzai.

This year, the Parliament awards its Sakharov Prize to individuals who show great personal courage in defending these freedoms and rights: Andrzej Poczobut of Belarus and Mzia Amaglobeli of Georgia, journalists who have fought for democracy in their respective countries. Both have been imprisoned for standing up for freedom of expression and democratic values. The Sakharov Prize award ceremony takes place during Parliament’s December plenary session.

The award is named in honour of Andrei Sakharov, the eminent Soviet nuclear physicist, dissident, human rights advocate and recipient of the 1975 Nobel Peace Prize. Indeed, several of the laureates have gone on to win the Nobel Peace Prize –including María Corina Machado, Denis Mukwege and Nadia Murad.

Parliament’s political groups and individual Members (at least 40) nominate the candidates at a joint meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Development Committee and the Human Rights Subcommittee each September. The Parliament publishes a shortlist of three candidates in October and the Conference of Presidents selects the winner. Parliament then awards the prize at a plenary session at the end of the year. The prize confers an endowment of €50 000 on the winner, and the Sakharov network supports laureates in their efforts to defend their cause. When awarding the Prize, Parliament, through the voice of its President, usually calls for jailed laureates’ release from prison. Parliament also uses all the means in its parliamentary diplomacy toolbox to protect laureates from state repression and to keep human rights defenders’ struggle in the spotlight.

The Sakharov Prize therefore has a long history, featuring many distinguished names in the struggle to protect human rights and freedoms for all. Since 2014, the European Parliamentary Research Service produces a paper on the laureates of each prize, the human rights situation and the Parliament’s position. These papers are available in several EU languages:

A concerning deterioration in the human rights situation In Venezuela and election irregularities under the Maduro regime led to María Corina Machado, leader of Venezuela’s democratic forces, and President-elect Edmundo González Urrutia winning the 2024 Sakharov Prize. The second time the prize has been awarded to Venezuela’s democratic opposition activists (the first time was in 2017), they represent all Venezuelans both inside and outside the country who are fighting to restore freedom and democracy.

In 2023, following the murder of Jina Mahsa Amini’s by Iran’s security forces for her refusal to wear a hijab, and repression of women’s rights protesters in Iran, Parliament awarded the 2023 Sakharov Prize to Jina Mahsa Amini and the Woman, Life, Freedom Movement in Iran in support of the protesters’ aspirations for a free, stable, inclusive and democratic country.

The brave people of Ukraine have fought hard and sacrificed a great deal to protect their country from Russia’s aggression. A number of individuals and organisations were awarded the 2022 Sakharov Prize in recognition of their resistance to Russian attack.

Political repression was already intensifying in Russia in 2021. To honour his courageous defence of human rights and democratic freedoms despite severe personal risk and his imprisonment for his anti‑corruption activism and criticism of the Kremlin, Parliament awarded the 2021 Sakharov Prize to opposition leader Alexey Navalny. Parliament strongly condemned Navalny’s murder in 2024 and underlined that the Russian Government and Vladimir Putin should personally bear criminal and political responsibility for the death of their most prominent opponent.

Following contested presidential election in Belarus and a severe crackdown on peaceful protests, Parliament awarded the 2020 Sakharov Prize to the democratic opposition in Belarus, represented by the Coordination Council, in tribute to their courage and determination to resist repression and advance democratic freedoms.

In 2019, in response to escalating repression against Uyghur minorities and civil society activists in China, the Parliament awarded the 2019 Sakharov Prize to Uyghur economics professor Ilham Tohti, in recognition of his advocacy for ethnic minority rights and peaceful dialogue. Tohti remains in prison in China, serving a life sentence.

Parliament awarded the 2018 Sakharov Prize to Ukrainian filmmaker Oleg Sentsov, imprisoned on politically motivated charges against the backdrop of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Parliament aimed to spotlight Sentsov’s plight and underscore broader concerns about political prisoners and human‑rights abuses in Russian‑controlled territories.

Amid a severe erosion of democratic institutions and repression of political freedoms in Venezuela, the European Parliament awarded the 2017 Sakharov Prize to the Democratic Opposition in Venezuela, notably the National Assembly and political prisoners, in support of their struggle for democratic transition, human rights and respect for fundamental freedoms.

The 2016 Sakharov Prize was awarded to Nadia Murad Basee Taha and Lamiya Aji Bashar to highlight the fate of their people, the Yazidis, one of the communities most affected, in proportion to their total population, by the violence committed by ISIL/Da’esh (or ‘Islamic State’), particularly during the conflict in Syria.

Saudi Arabian blogger, Raif Badawi was awarded the 2015 Sakharov Prize following his arrest and sentence to 10 years in prison, 1 000 lashes and a hefty fine for insulting Islam (his site hosted material criticising senior religious figures and a Saudi university). In his writings, Badawi advocates liberal Islam, freedom of thought and expression, and separation of state and religion.

Europe’s top human rights prize was awarded in 2014 to Dr Denis Mukwege, a gynaecologist from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in recognition for his perseverance and courage in his efforts to help rape survivors. A fervent advocate of women’s rights, Dr Mukwege has received many international awards, but has also been the target of death threats, and even a 2012 assassination attempt.

Any AI-generated content in this text has been reviewed by the author.

More information on the Sakharov Prize and the laureates:

• 30 Years of the Sakharov Prize: The European Parliament upholding freedom of thought
• Sakharov’s legacy on the centenary of his birth
• Laureates of the 2025 Sakharov Prize: Andrzej Poczobut and Mzia Amaglobeli, journalists fighting for democracy in Belarus and Georgia
• Sakharov Prize laureates in difficulty: Facing repression for defending human rights
• Laureates of the 2024 Sakharov Prize: María Corina Machado and Edmundo González Urrutia, fighting for democracy in Venezuela
• 2023 Sakharov Prize laureate: Jina Mahsa Amini and the Woman, Life, Freedom Movement in Iran
• 2022 Sakharov Prize laureate: The brave people of Ukraine
• 2021 Sakharov Prize laureate: Alexey Navalny
• 2020 Sakharov Prize laureate: The democratic opposition in Belarus
• 2019 Sakharov Prize laureate: Ilham Tohti
• Oleg Sentsov: The 2018 Sakharov Prize laureate
• The 2017 Sakharov Prize
• The Yazidis: An ongoing genocide
• The 2015 Sakharov Prize
• Sakharov Prize 2014: Tending the scars of sexual violence in DRCEuropean Parliament Sakharov Prize

Written by Clare Ferguson with Sara Raja.

Members gather on 15 December for the final plenary session of 2025. The agenda reflects ongoing geopolitical tensions, and addresses issues of defence, human rights, trade, energy and the environment. Parliament will also debate the preparation of the European Council meeting of 18‑19 December 2025.

The Sakharov Prize is the EU’s highest tribute to human rights work, recognising those that have made an outstanding contribution to protecting freedom of thought. On Tuesday, President Roberta Metsola is to award the prize to Andrzej Poczobut of Belarus and Mzia Amaglobeli of Georgia, journalists fighting for democracy in their home countries. Both journalists were jailed for defending freedom of expression and democracy.

Amid rising geopolitical pressures, the EU aims to redirect budget resources to defending the EU through the ReArm Europe plan/Readiness 2030 initiative. On Monday, Members are due to consider formal adoption of a provisional agreement amending five regulations on defence funding programmes. The amendments would expand the scope of the Digital Europe Programme (DEP), European Defence Fund (EDF), Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP) and Horizon Europe. The amendments increase funding for dual-use defence technologies and infrastructure across these programmes, and aim at supporting defence research and development and strengthening European value chains. The agreement extends the EDF to Ukraine, allowing Ukrainian entities to participate in EU collaborative defence research and development.

Military mobility – the ability to quickly and efficiently move troops, weapons and equipment across the EU – is essential for European security and defence and for EU support to Ukraine. On Tuesday, Parliament is scheduled to consider a joint report from the Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE) and Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) calling for a significantly increased budget for military mobility. The report recognises the urgent need to improve military mobility in the EU, including for fast deployment of troops and military equipment to the EU’s eastern flank.

The rule of law conditionality regulation allows the EU to suspend or reduce funds to Member States that violate the rule of law in a way that directly threatens the Union’s financial interests. Members are concerned that the mechanism has only been triggered once to date, against Hungary in December 2022. On Wednesday, Parliament is due to debate a report assessing the regulation’s implementation. The joint report from the Committees on Budget (BUDG) and Budgetary Control (CONT) calls for improvements to increase transparency through a public portal tracking breaches, a simpler complaint procedure, and a stronger role for parliamentary scrutiny.

Innovation is a top EU priority, and Members are expected to consider a provisional agreement on a compulsory patent licensing scheme on Tuesday. The scheme aims at facilitating rapid use of patents during crises while preserving innovation incentives through patent protection. Parliament’s negotiators have succeeded in excluding crises relating to semiconductors, gas supply security and defence-related products from the scope, as well as maintaining confidentiality of protected knowledge and lowering maximum fines and penalties.

On Monday, Parliament is scheduled to consider a provisional agreement on amendments to the common agricultural policy (CAP). The agreement aims to simplify CAP requirements for farmers, including good agricultural and environmental conditions of land (GAECs), by exempting farms partially certified as organic from certain GAECs and providing farmers with additional support for compliance with some GAECs. It would increase the maximum payment amount for small farmers and include new support for small farm business development. Under the agreement, Member States are advised to avoid conducting more than one on-the-spot check per year on the same farm.

Parliament is due to debate a motion for a resolution from the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) on Tuesday, regarding how the EU intends to follow up on the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘My voice, my choice: for safe and accessible abortion’. The initiative proposes creating an EU-funded, voluntary opt-in system to support EU countries that offer safe and legal abortion services to people from EU countries where access is limited. The FEMM motion for a resolution urges Member States to align their laws with international human rights standards, and highlights the EU’s responsibility to promote sexual and reproductive health and rights more broadly.

Quick links to all our publications for this plenary session:

• Laureates of the 2025 Sakharov Prize: Andrzej Poczobut and Mzia Amaglobeli, journalists fighting for democracy in Belarus and Georgia
• Enhancing EU defence investments
• Implementation of the rule of law conditionality regime
• CAP simplification agreement
• Military mobility
• European Citizens’ Initiative – ‘My voice, my choice: For safe and accessible abortion’
• EU compulsory licensing of patents for crisis management

Written by Gregor Erbach and Liselotte Jensen.

In the 10 years since the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the Parties to the agreement have achieved a lot of progress in response to climate change. A Loss and Damage Fund was established in 2022. Rules for international carbon trading have been established under Article 6 of the agreement. A new goal for climate finance was agreed in 2024. The COP30 climate conference in November 2025 adopted indicators for climate adaptation and agreed to triple adaptation finance.

The first global stocktake under the Paris Agreement in 2023 called for accelerating climate action, tripling renewable energy capacity, doubling the rate of energy efficiency improvements and transitioning away from fossil fuels. Building on the global stocktake, Parties submitted their third round of climate pledges in 2025, ahead of COP30. Full implementation of the pledges would lead to a global temperature increase of around 2.4°C, a large improvement compared to the 3.5°C increase projected before the Paris Agreement but still falling short of the agreement’s target to keep global warming well below 2°C and ideally 1.5°C. With global carbon emissions still rising, the 1.5°C target will only be achievable after a temporary overshoot. As every fraction of a degree of global warming will result in increasing damages, additional efforts will be needed to keep the overshoot as short and as close to 1.5°C as possible.

The current geopolitical situation hinders swift progress on collective climate action. The United States has decided to leave the Paris Agreement, a third of the Paris Agreement Parties failed to update their climate pledge, and a roadmap for phasing out fossil fuels was blocked at COP30. The EU, traditionally a leader in international climate policy, struggled to build strong coalitions to drive an ambitious outcome at COP30.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The Paris Agreement 10 years on‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Györgyi Mácsai and Nadejda Kresnichka-Nikolchova, Members’ Research Service (EPRS) with Raffaele Ventura, GlobalStat, EUI.

This infographic offers insight into the economic performance of nine countries from the Southern African Development Community (SADC-9) and the European Union (EU), examining the trade dynamics among them. Among the nine countries, DR Congo had the highest GDP growth in 2024 at 6.5%, followed by Angola at 4.4%. Since 2020, trade in services have recorded a steady increase, whereas the imports and exports of goods experienced rapid growth after the COVID-19 pandemic disruptions to revert to pre-2020 levels. The SADC-9 region’s main trading partner is China, accounting for 22.2% of total trade. The EU-27 is the second-largest partner, with a 16.3% share.

Read this ‘infographic’ on ‘Selected countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC): Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

EU imports of goods to SADC-9 countries EU exports of goods to SADC-9 countries Trade in goods (exports plus imports) Trade in goods, 2024, exports plus imports Top EU Member States trading with SADC-9 countries EU trade with SADC-9 countries Remittances received (% of GDP) FDI net inflows (% of GDP) Exchange rate (=€1) Inflation Budget surplus/deficit (% of GDP) Public gross debt (% of GDP) Female labour force participation rate
% of female population aged 15+ Total unemployment rate
Total, % of labour force GDP per capita (purchasing power parity1, international dollars, 1000s) Gross domestic product (GDP) annual growth (%)

Written by Nikolina Šajn.

As the current rules on the EU common agricultural policy (CAP) are set to expire at the end of 2027, the European Commission is proposing new CAP rules that would apply during the next multiannual financial framework (MFF). The proposal is part of the Commission’s two-fold attempt to make the overall EU budget (i.e. the MFF) more flexible, with a smaller number of programmes and, at the same time, to take account of the criticism of the current CAP rules, which have been a target of farmer protests almost from the beginning of their application. According to the proposals, the CAP would no longer have a separate budget but would be integrated into the new national and regional partnerships (NRP) fund (‘NRPF’). The NRPF would include a ringfenced budget only for some CAP measures, while the remainder would have to be covered from the part of the fund that Member States would have to use for other areas, as well.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL

2025/0241(COD) – Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the conditions for the implementation of the Union support to the Common Agriculture Policy for the period from 2028 to 2034 – COM(2025) 560, 16 July 2025.

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule:

2025/0241(COD)

Read the complete briefing on ‘Regulation on the common agricultural policy for the period 2028 to 2034‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Steven Blaakman.

Migration management is one of the European Union’s priorities. The geopolitical context has significantly changed, which has also affected the EU’s migration and asylum management. With the support of the EU, Member States need to be able to rapidly and effectively respond to developments in migratory flows. The European Commission has proposed significantly increasing EU funding for asylum and migration policies in the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework.

The aim of the proposed regulation is to contribute to the efficient management of migration flows and asylum, including by providing support for the implementation, strengthening and development of the pact on migration and asylum, and the common system of temporary protection for displaced persons in the event of a mass influx.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL

2025/0540(COD) – Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Union support for asylum, migration and integration for the period from 2028 to 2034, COM(2025) 540, 16 July 2025

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule: 2025/0540(COD)

Read the complete briefing on ‘Union support for asylum, migration and integration‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Piotr Bąkowski.

International Anti-Corruption Day is marked every year on 9 December, to raise awareness of the negative effects of corruption on all areas of life. While difficult to measure, corruption entails not only economic but also social and political costs. International and EU anti-corruption efforts have translated into a multi-layered policy and legal framework. The European Parliament has called repeatedly for strengthened EU anti-corruption rules.

Background Why an International Anti-Corruption Day?

On 31 October 2003, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and designated 9 December as International Anti-Corruption Day, to raise awareness of corruption and of the role of the convention in combating and preventing it. The 2025 edition of International Anti-Corruption Day, dubbed Uniting with Youth Against Corruption: Shaping Tomorrow’s Integrity builds on the campaign launched on International Anti-Corruption Day 2024. It thus continues to place young people at the heart of anti-corruption efforts as ‘guardians of integrity’, empowering them to ‘strengthen accountability, uphold integrity and help build corruption-resilient institutions’.

Cost and prevalence of corruption

While corruption is difficult to measure, it is known to be costly, in economic but also in political and social terms. It hampers growth and the distribution of benefits across populations, by undermining trust in public institutions, weakening the state’s capacity to perform its core functions and hindering public and private investment. In 2016, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated the yearly cost of bribery alone at between US$1.5 trillion and US$2 trillion (around 2 % of global gross domestic product – GDP). For the EU, the 2016 EPRS cost of non-Europe report found that corruption costs the EU economy between €179 billion and €990 billion per year, representing up to 6 % of EU GDP. A 2023 update found that that further EU action to tackle the corruption risk could generate up to €58.5 billion per year by 2032.

Moreover, corruption facilitates the infiltration of organised crime networks in all sectors of society, including politics and law enforcement. According to Europol, corruption is ’embedded in the very DNA of crime’, not only as a criminal act in itself, but also as an enabler and catalyst for serious and organised crime.

The 2024 Transparency International (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) reveals that little progress has been made in reducing perceived corruption levels across the world, with the global average rate unchanged for 13 years in a row (43 out of 100 points, with 100 meaning perceived as the least corrupt). No country is exempt from corruption. According to TI, anti-corruption efforts have stalled in Europe too: even though western Europe and the EU still register the best scores (averaging 64 out of 100), their average has dropped for the second consecutive year. Significant differences persist within the EU: while six EU countries are in the top 10, seven score less than 50 out of 100). TI’s 2021 Global Corruption Barometer, dedicated to the EU, shows that 62 % of respondents consider government corruption to be a big problem in their country, while 30 % pay a bribe or use a personal connection to access public services. Recent Eurobarometer surveys on perception of corruption by EU citizens and businesses show a similar picture: 69 % of citizens believe that corruption is still widespread in their country. Similarly, a large share of EU businesses (63 %) point to widespread corruption; and 78 % agree that excessively close links between business and politics in their country lead to corruption.

Global response to corruption International framework

The very first international anti-corruption instrument was adopted in 1997. With the Anti-Bribery Convention, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) introduced a legally binding obligation to criminalise bribery, focusing on the ‘supply side’ of bribery transactions. There are 45 parties to the convention, and in 2021, they agreed on a new Anti-Bribery Recommendation, designed to reinforce prevention, detection and investigation of foreign bribery.

In 1999, the Council of Europe (CoE) adopted the Civil Law Convention on Corruption and the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. The Criminal Law Convention aims at the coordinated criminalisation of a large number of corrupt practices and better international cooperation in the prosecution of corruption offences. The Civil Law Convention was the first attempt to define common international rules in the field of civil law and corruption, providing effective remedies for persons having suffered damage as a result of corruption.

The above-mentioned 2003 UN Convention against Corruption is the only universal legally binding instrument addressing corruption cooperation, asset recovery, and technical assistance and information exchange. The convention requires state parties to establish as criminal offences many different forms of corruption, such as bribery, trading in influence, abuse of functions, and various acts of corruption in the private sector. At present, 192 states have joined the convention and committed to its obligations.

EU action

All EU Member States are party to the UNCAC and the CoE conventions, and are bound by corresponding standards. However, the EU has sought to coordinate and support Member States’ efforts. As part of its anti-corruption policy, the EU has adopted several instruments, including legislation on corruption in the private sector, on public procurement rules, on anti-money-laundering efforts and on whistleblower protection. Protection of the EU budget, including against corruption, is governed by the 2017 Directive on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests (PIF Directive) and falls within the competence of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). The EU has also sought to address corruption outside its territory through its external action and international trade tools, such as trade agreements and human rights dialogues. In 2023, the European Commission presented an anti-corruption package aiming to reform the EU’s anti-corruption legislative and policy framework and to update the EU sanctions toolbox to include corruption, as advocated by Parliament. In December 2025, the European Parliament and the Council reached a provisional agreement on the EU anti-corruption directive, the core element of the package.

European Parliament position

The European Parliament has addressed corruption, both within the EU and in the context of external policies, in numerous resolutions and reports. Most recently, it examined the planned dissolution of key anti-corruption structures in Slovakia. Earlier, the Parliament looked into systemic challenges to the rule of law and deficiencies in the fight against corruption across the EU, focusing for instance on measures to prevent corruption and the misuse of national and EU funds. Moreover, it has addressed corruption in its own ranks, as illustrated by its December 2022, February 2023 and July 2023 resolutions seeking to strengthen transparency, accountability and integrity in the EU institutions. Parliament has called repeatedly either for legislative amendments to extend the scope of the current EU global human rights sanctions regime to cover corruption, or for a new sanctions regime to address serious acts of corruption. In February 2022, Parliament adopted recommendations on corruption and human rights, calling for an EU global anti-corruption strategy, enhanced support for anti-corruption capacity-building, and a strengthened EU anti-corruption framework.

This is an update of a publication from December 2023.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘International Anti-Corruption Day‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tarja Laaninen with Joris Bol.

Almost all young people in the European Union use the internet daily and are much more likely to participate in social network activities than the total population. Social media platforms have also become young people’s top source for information on political and social issues: in a Flash Eurobarometer survey in 2025, 65 % of respondents aged between 15 and 24 said social media was their main source of information.

Some EU Member States are considering laws banning social media use for under 15-year-olds and calling for a pan-European digital age of majority. An EU-funded pan-European knowledge platform has developed a theoretical framework – the 4C model (content, contact, conduct and contract) –to inform understanding of the ways in which online platforms may pose a threat to young people, including disinformation, hate speech and violent content, or access to harmful communities.

In her State of the Union speech in September 2025, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that she will commission a panel of experts to advise her on the best approach for Europe concerning social media, by the end of the year. In her key priorities for the following year, she lists an action plan against cyberbullying, expected in early 2026, as well as a digital fairness act, which could further address topics such as addictive design, dark patterns, and in-app purchases. A full evaluation and review of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD) will also take place in 2026, paying particular attention to the regulation of influencers and the protection of minors.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Youth and social media‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Pieter Baert.

Amid growing concerns about wealth concentration and fiscal strain, debates on the taxation of ultra-high-net-worth individuals have intensified in (international) taxation forums. The European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Tax Matters (FISC) is due to hold a public hearing on this topic on 11 December 2025.

Rethinking taxation – From income to assets

As governments across the EU are facing mounting expenditure pressures – including increased demands for defence – the debate over taxing ultra-high-net-worth individuals has gained additional momentum both in the EU and globally. This has prompted governments to pay renewed attention to the balance between taxing income and taxing assets.

A degree of progressivity is built into most EU Member States’ personal income tax systems, with higher rates applied to higher income brackets, although top rates have generally declined in recent years. Against this backdrop, the debate increasingly extends beyond labour-based personal income taxation to a wider range of fiscal instruments, including capital gains, property, gift, inheritance and wealth taxes. Most EU Member States’ tax systems tax capital income separately from labour income, and at more beneficial rates. In many jurisdictions, income from dividends and capital gains is indeed taxed more lightly, a practice commonly justified by the aim of promoting investment and acknowledging the higher risk and greater mobility associated with capital. However, such preferential treatment may weaken both horizontal and vertical equity within the tax system.

Rather than increasing taxes on the transfer of wealth (inheritances), on income derived from wealth (such as dividends), or on realised capital gains, the concept of a recurrent net wealth tax – levied annually on an individual’s total assets minus debt – has drawn renewed scrutiny, including from the IMF, the OECD and the European Commission. Supporters argue that a net wealth tax offers substantial revenue potential and can help strengthen social cohesion by narrowing wealth disparities within the EU (see Figure 1). Additionally, unlike conventional capital gains taxes, which generally are only triggered upon the realisation of gains, a net wealth tax can effectively capture the taxation of unrealised capital gains, thereby minimising avoidance through deferral strategies.

Figure 1 – Share of net personal wealth (total assets minus debt) held by top 1 %, EU, 2003/2013/2023

At the same time, several potential drawbacks to a wealth tax have been identified. These include the risk of fiscal flight, with (highly mobile) individuals relocating, the potential for reduced investment and the risk of tax base or scope creep, where the tax may, over time, cover a wider segment of the population than initially intended. Other issues are liquidity, as there may be cases where affected taxpayers may struggle to pay the tax without liquidating assets, and how to account for capital losses within such a tax.

Net wealth taxes are not a novel concept. In 1990, 12 OECD countries, including several in Europe, had such taxes in place. However, over the following decades, many of these wealth taxes were gradually phased out and replaced with narrower alternatives, such as (recurrent) taxes focused exclusively on residential property. While the reasons for these changes vary, a common challenge tended to be the limited and often declining revenue generated by wealth taxes, which typically accounted for a very small share of overall tax revenue, combined with sizeable administrative costs. The limited revenue was often attributed to factors such as the tax’s design as well as taxpayers’ ability to avoid the tax by moving their assets abroad. However, differences between countries in wealth concentration and varying fiscal burdens on high incomes mean that the feasibility, revenue potential, and likely behavioural responses to a net wealth tax could vary substantially across Member States.

Today, Spain is the only EU Member State with a net wealth tax (Impuesto sobre el Patrimonio). While regional variations may exist, a general exemption of €700 000 per person applies (plus an additional exemption for the primary residence up to €300 000), with progressive tax rates ranging from 0.2 % to 3.5 %. Additionally, Spain introduced an additional temporary tax on large fortunes (Impuesto temporal de Solidaridad de las Grandes Fortunas), targeting individuals with wealth above €3 million. The taxes raised €2.2 billion in total in 2023.

G20 developments

At the request of the Brazilian presidency of the G20, Professor Gabriel Zucman – head of the EU Tax Observatory – presented a blueprint for a coordinated minimum effective taxation standard for ultra-high-net-worth individuals at the G20 Finance Ministers meeting in Rio in July 2024. Under the proposal, individuals with more than US$1 billion in wealth would be required to pay at least 2 % of their wealth in taxes each year (if they already pay an amount equal to that via income tax, they would consequently not pay additional taxes under the proposal). The 2 % rate would act as an international norm between participating countries, and countries would remain free to design their own tax systems on how to achieve this. Such an approach would require international coordination to establish a common methodology for measuring wealth, including for hard-to-value assets such as unlisted equity or art.

Zucman maintained that this was possible, referring to the (rapid) progress achieved under the landmark OECD Two-Pillars agreement, which included a minimum corporate tax on multinationals. Next to a minimum tax, Zucman puts forward alternative measures that can be introduced more quickly and without the need for (extensive) international coordination, such as anti-abuse provisions to prevent the avoidance of dividend taxation by using holding companies and raising the top statutory marginal tax rates on income.

In November 2024, the G20 leaders announced they would seek cooperation to ensure that ultra-high-net-worth individuals are taxed effectively, possibly by ‘exchanging best practices, encouraging debates around tax principles, and devising anti-avoidance mechanisms, including addressing potentially harmful tax practices’, and encouraged the OECD’s Inclusive Framework to consider working on this.

The European Commission has launched a study on the effectiveness of wealth-related taxes targeting ultra-high-net-worth individuals in both EU and non-EU countries. It is expected to be published by the end of 2025.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Taxation of ultra-high-net-worth individuals‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clément Evroux.

CONTEXT

According to Eurostat, EU research and development expenditure relative to GDP stood at 2.26 % in 2023, while in comparison it stood respectively at 3.59 % in the United States, and 2.56 % in China (2022). In his 2024 report on the future of European Competitiveness, Mario Draghi identified this gap as one of the root causes of the EU’s lack of competitiveness. Against this backdrop, the proposed 10th EU framework programme for research and innovation should help to preserve EU research and innovation ecosystem excellence in producing world-class scientific knowledge, while improving the capacity to exploit such knowledge, in particular by scaling-up innovative technologies and solutions. While the programme’s architecture is apparently a continuation of the current 2021-2027 Horizon Europe programme, the creation of a European competitiveness fund creates a specific set of rules and governance that will apply to a substantial part of Horizon collaborative research activities.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL

2025/0543(COD) – Proposal for a regulation

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule:2025/0543(COD) Horizon Europe framework programme for research and innovation 2028–2034

Read the complete briefing on ‘Horizon Europe 2028-2034: 10th EU research and innovation framework programme‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ivana Katsarova.

Energy drinks, widely marketed as performance-enhancing products, contain high levels of caffeine, sugar and stimulants such as taurine and guarana. Rising and excessive consumption among adolescents has raised public health concerns linked to acute cardiovascular effects, sleep disruption and gastrointestinal issues. Although the global energy drink market is expanding rapidly, these beverages still represent a small share of the EU non-alcoholic drinks market. European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) consumption data indicate that adolescents are the age group with the highest consumption of energy drinks, with some of them being high chronic users.

At EU level, no product-specific legislation exists. However, Regulation (EU) 1169/2011 requires a mandatory high-caffeine warning label. Industry bodies such as UNESDA (representing the non-alcoholic beverages sector) and Energy Drinks Europe apply voluntary marketing restrictions, particularly concerning children. National rules vary widely. Several EU countries – including Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria – have introduced bans on sales to minors, while others rely on voluntary retail measures.

Outside the EU, diverse regulatory models exist, from strict bans to voluntary guidelines. The European Commission considers EFSA’s 2015 scientific opinion on the safety of caffeine sufficient and sees no need for additional EU-level action at this stage.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Energy drinks consumption in minors: EU and national approaches‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.