European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Nikolina Šajn.

As the current rules on the EU common agricultural policy (CAP) are set to expire at the end of 2027, the European Commission is proposing new CAP rules that would apply during the next multiannual financial framework (MFF). The proposal is part of the Commission’s two-fold attempt to make the overall EU budget (i.e. the MFF) more flexible, with a smaller number of programmes and, at the same time, to take account of the criticism of the current CAP rules, which have been a target of farmer protests almost from the beginning of their application. According to the proposals, the CAP would no longer have a separate budget but would be integrated into the new national and regional partnerships (NRP) fund (‘NRPF’). The NRPF would include a ringfenced budget only for some CAP measures, while the remainder would have to be covered from the part of the fund that Member States would have to use for other areas, as well.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL

2025/0241(COD) – Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the conditions for the implementation of the Union support to the Common Agriculture Policy for the period from 2028 to 2034 – COM(2025) 560, 16 July 2025.

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule:

2025/0241(COD)

Read the complete briefing on ‘Regulation on the common agricultural policy for the period 2028 to 2034‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Steven Blaakman.

Migration management is one of the European Union’s priorities. The geopolitical context has significantly changed, which has also affected the EU’s migration and asylum management. With the support of the EU, Member States need to be able to rapidly and effectively respond to developments in migratory flows. The European Commission has proposed significantly increasing EU funding for asylum and migration policies in the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework.

The aim of the proposed regulation is to contribute to the efficient management of migration flows and asylum, including by providing support for the implementation, strengthening and development of the pact on migration and asylum, and the common system of temporary protection for displaced persons in the event of a mass influx.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL

2025/0540(COD) – Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Union support for asylum, migration and integration for the period from 2028 to 2034, COM(2025) 540, 16 July 2025

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule: 2025/0540(COD)

Read the complete briefing on ‘Union support for asylum, migration and integration‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Piotr Bąkowski.

International Anti-Corruption Day is marked every year on 9 December, to raise awareness of the negative effects of corruption on all areas of life. While difficult to measure, corruption entails not only economic but also social and political costs. International and EU anti-corruption efforts have translated into a multi-layered policy and legal framework. The European Parliament has called repeatedly for strengthened EU anti-corruption rules.

Background Why an International Anti-Corruption Day?

On 31 October 2003, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and designated 9 December as International Anti-Corruption Day, to raise awareness of corruption and of the role of the convention in combating and preventing it. The 2025 edition of International Anti-Corruption Day, dubbed Uniting with Youth Against Corruption: Shaping Tomorrow’s Integrity builds on the campaign launched on International Anti-Corruption Day 2024. It thus continues to place young people at the heart of anti-corruption efforts as ‘guardians of integrity’, empowering them to ‘strengthen accountability, uphold integrity and help build corruption-resilient institutions’.

Cost and prevalence of corruption

While corruption is difficult to measure, it is known to be costly, in economic but also in political and social terms. It hampers growth and the distribution of benefits across populations, by undermining trust in public institutions, weakening the state’s capacity to perform its core functions and hindering public and private investment. In 2016, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated the yearly cost of bribery alone at between US$1.5 trillion and US$2 trillion (around 2 % of global gross domestic product – GDP). For the EU, the 2016 EPRS cost of non-Europe report found that corruption costs the EU economy between €179 billion and €990 billion per year, representing up to 6 % of EU GDP. A 2023 update found that that further EU action to tackle the corruption risk could generate up to €58.5 billion per year by 2032.

Moreover, corruption facilitates the infiltration of organised crime networks in all sectors of society, including politics and law enforcement. According to Europol, corruption is ’embedded in the very DNA of crime’, not only as a criminal act in itself, but also as an enabler and catalyst for serious and organised crime.

The 2024 Transparency International (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) reveals that little progress has been made in reducing perceived corruption levels across the world, with the global average rate unchanged for 13 years in a row (43 out of 100 points, with 100 meaning perceived as the least corrupt). No country is exempt from corruption. According to TI, anti-corruption efforts have stalled in Europe too: even though western Europe and the EU still register the best scores (averaging 64 out of 100), their average has dropped for the second consecutive year. Significant differences persist within the EU: while six EU countries are in the top 10, seven score less than 50 out of 100). TI’s 2021 Global Corruption Barometer, dedicated to the EU, shows that 62 % of respondents consider government corruption to be a big problem in their country, while 30 % pay a bribe or use a personal connection to access public services. Recent Eurobarometer surveys on perception of corruption by EU citizens and businesses show a similar picture: 69 % of citizens believe that corruption is still widespread in their country. Similarly, a large share of EU businesses (63 %) point to widespread corruption; and 78 % agree that excessively close links between business and politics in their country lead to corruption.

Global response to corruption International framework

The very first international anti-corruption instrument was adopted in 1997. With the Anti-Bribery Convention, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) introduced a legally binding obligation to criminalise bribery, focusing on the ‘supply side’ of bribery transactions. There are 45 parties to the convention, and in 2021, they agreed on a new Anti-Bribery Recommendation, designed to reinforce prevention, detection and investigation of foreign bribery.

In 1999, the Council of Europe (CoE) adopted the Civil Law Convention on Corruption and the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. The Criminal Law Convention aims at the coordinated criminalisation of a large number of corrupt practices and better international cooperation in the prosecution of corruption offences. The Civil Law Convention was the first attempt to define common international rules in the field of civil law and corruption, providing effective remedies for persons having suffered damage as a result of corruption.

The above-mentioned 2003 UN Convention against Corruption is the only universal legally binding instrument addressing corruption cooperation, asset recovery, and technical assistance and information exchange. The convention requires state parties to establish as criminal offences many different forms of corruption, such as bribery, trading in influence, abuse of functions, and various acts of corruption in the private sector. At present, 192 states have joined the convention and committed to its obligations.

EU action

All EU Member States are party to the UNCAC and the CoE conventions, and are bound by corresponding standards. However, the EU has sought to coordinate and support Member States’ efforts. As part of its anti-corruption policy, the EU has adopted several instruments, including legislation on corruption in the private sector, on public procurement rules, on anti-money-laundering efforts and on whistleblower protection. Protection of the EU budget, including against corruption, is governed by the 2017 Directive on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests (PIF Directive) and falls within the competence of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). The EU has also sought to address corruption outside its territory through its external action and international trade tools, such as trade agreements and human rights dialogues. In 2023, the European Commission presented an anti-corruption package aiming to reform the EU’s anti-corruption legislative and policy framework and to update the EU sanctions toolbox to include corruption, as advocated by Parliament. In December 2025, the European Parliament and the Council reached a provisional agreement on the EU anti-corruption directive, the core element of the package.

European Parliament position

The European Parliament has addressed corruption, both within the EU and in the context of external policies, in numerous resolutions and reports. Most recently, it examined the planned dissolution of key anti-corruption structures in Slovakia. Earlier, the Parliament looked into systemic challenges to the rule of law and deficiencies in the fight against corruption across the EU, focusing for instance on measures to prevent corruption and the misuse of national and EU funds. Moreover, it has addressed corruption in its own ranks, as illustrated by its December 2022, February 2023 and July 2023 resolutions seeking to strengthen transparency, accountability and integrity in the EU institutions. Parliament has called repeatedly either for legislative amendments to extend the scope of the current EU global human rights sanctions regime to cover corruption, or for a new sanctions regime to address serious acts of corruption. In February 2022, Parliament adopted recommendations on corruption and human rights, calling for an EU global anti-corruption strategy, enhanced support for anti-corruption capacity-building, and a strengthened EU anti-corruption framework.

This is an update of a publication from December 2023.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘International Anti-Corruption Day‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tarja Laaninen with Joris Bol.

Almost all young people in the European Union use the internet daily and are much more likely to participate in social network activities than the total population. Social media platforms have also become young people’s top source for information on political and social issues: in a Flash Eurobarometer survey in 2025, 65 % of respondents aged between 15 and 24 said social media was their main source of information.

Some EU Member States are considering laws banning social media use for under 15-year-olds and calling for a pan-European digital age of majority. An EU-funded pan-European knowledge platform has developed a theoretical framework – the 4C model (content, contact, conduct and contract) –to inform understanding of the ways in which online platforms may pose a threat to young people, including disinformation, hate speech and violent content, or access to harmful communities.

In her State of the Union speech in September 2025, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that she will commission a panel of experts to advise her on the best approach for Europe concerning social media, by the end of the year. In her key priorities for the following year, she lists an action plan against cyberbullying, expected in early 2026, as well as a digital fairness act, which could further address topics such as addictive design, dark patterns, and in-app purchases. A full evaluation and review of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD) will also take place in 2026, paying particular attention to the regulation of influencers and the protection of minors.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Youth and social media‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Pieter Baert.

Amid growing concerns about wealth concentration and fiscal strain, debates on the taxation of ultra-high-net-worth individuals have intensified in (international) taxation forums. The European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Tax Matters (FISC) is due to hold a public hearing on this topic on 11 December 2025.

Rethinking taxation – From income to assets

As governments across the EU are facing mounting expenditure pressures – including increased demands for defence – the debate over taxing ultra-high-net-worth individuals has gained additional momentum both in the EU and globally. This has prompted governments to pay renewed attention to the balance between taxing income and taxing assets.

A degree of progressivity is built into most EU Member States’ personal income tax systems, with higher rates applied to higher income brackets, although top rates have generally declined in recent years. Against this backdrop, the debate increasingly extends beyond labour-based personal income taxation to a wider range of fiscal instruments, including capital gains, property, gift, inheritance and wealth taxes. Most EU Member States’ tax systems tax capital income separately from labour income, and at more beneficial rates. In many jurisdictions, income from dividends and capital gains is indeed taxed more lightly, a practice commonly justified by the aim of promoting investment and acknowledging the higher risk and greater mobility associated with capital. However, such preferential treatment may weaken both horizontal and vertical equity within the tax system.

Rather than increasing taxes on the transfer of wealth (inheritances), on income derived from wealth (such as dividends), or on realised capital gains, the concept of a recurrent net wealth tax – levied annually on an individual’s total assets minus debt – has drawn renewed scrutiny, including from the IMF, the OECD and the European Commission. Supporters argue that a net wealth tax offers substantial revenue potential and can help strengthen social cohesion by narrowing wealth disparities within the EU (see Figure 1). Additionally, unlike conventional capital gains taxes, which generally are only triggered upon the realisation of gains, a net wealth tax can effectively capture the taxation of unrealised capital gains, thereby minimising avoidance through deferral strategies.

Figure 1 – Share of net personal wealth (total assets minus debt) held by top 1 %, EU, 2003/2013/2023

At the same time, several potential drawbacks to a wealth tax have been identified. These include the risk of fiscal flight, with (highly mobile) individuals relocating, the potential for reduced investment and the risk of tax base or scope creep, where the tax may, over time, cover a wider segment of the population than initially intended. Other issues are liquidity, as there may be cases where affected taxpayers may struggle to pay the tax without liquidating assets, and how to account for capital losses within such a tax.

Net wealth taxes are not a novel concept. In 1990, 12 OECD countries, including several in Europe, had such taxes in place. However, over the following decades, many of these wealth taxes were gradually phased out and replaced with narrower alternatives, such as (recurrent) taxes focused exclusively on residential property. While the reasons for these changes vary, a common challenge tended to be the limited and often declining revenue generated by wealth taxes, which typically accounted for a very small share of overall tax revenue, combined with sizeable administrative costs. The limited revenue was often attributed to factors such as the tax’s design as well as taxpayers’ ability to avoid the tax by moving their assets abroad. However, differences between countries in wealth concentration and varying fiscal burdens on high incomes mean that the feasibility, revenue potential, and likely behavioural responses to a net wealth tax could vary substantially across Member States.

Today, Spain is the only EU Member State with a net wealth tax (Impuesto sobre el Patrimonio). While regional variations may exist, a general exemption of €700 000 per person applies (plus an additional exemption for the primary residence up to €300 000), with progressive tax rates ranging from 0.2 % to 3.5 %. Additionally, Spain introduced an additional temporary tax on large fortunes (Impuesto temporal de Solidaridad de las Grandes Fortunas), targeting individuals with wealth above €3 million. The taxes raised €2.2 billion in total in 2023.

G20 developments

At the request of the Brazilian presidency of the G20, Professor Gabriel Zucman – head of the EU Tax Observatory – presented a blueprint for a coordinated minimum effective taxation standard for ultra-high-net-worth individuals at the G20 Finance Ministers meeting in Rio in July 2024. Under the proposal, individuals with more than US$1 billion in wealth would be required to pay at least 2 % of their wealth in taxes each year (if they already pay an amount equal to that via income tax, they would consequently not pay additional taxes under the proposal). The 2 % rate would act as an international norm between participating countries, and countries would remain free to design their own tax systems on how to achieve this. Such an approach would require international coordination to establish a common methodology for measuring wealth, including for hard-to-value assets such as unlisted equity or art.

Zucman maintained that this was possible, referring to the (rapid) progress achieved under the landmark OECD Two-Pillars agreement, which included a minimum corporate tax on multinationals. Next to a minimum tax, Zucman puts forward alternative measures that can be introduced more quickly and without the need for (extensive) international coordination, such as anti-abuse provisions to prevent the avoidance of dividend taxation by using holding companies and raising the top statutory marginal tax rates on income.

In November 2024, the G20 leaders announced they would seek cooperation to ensure that ultra-high-net-worth individuals are taxed effectively, possibly by ‘exchanging best practices, encouraging debates around tax principles, and devising anti-avoidance mechanisms, including addressing potentially harmful tax practices’, and encouraged the OECD’s Inclusive Framework to consider working on this.

The European Commission has launched a study on the effectiveness of wealth-related taxes targeting ultra-high-net-worth individuals in both EU and non-EU countries. It is expected to be published by the end of 2025.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Taxation of ultra-high-net-worth individuals‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clément Evroux.

CONTEXT

According to Eurostat, EU research and development expenditure relative to GDP stood at 2.26 % in 2023, while in comparison it stood respectively at 3.59 % in the United States, and 2.56 % in China (2022). In his 2024 report on the future of European Competitiveness, Mario Draghi identified this gap as one of the root causes of the EU’s lack of competitiveness. Against this backdrop, the proposed 10th EU framework programme for research and innovation should help to preserve EU research and innovation ecosystem excellence in producing world-class scientific knowledge, while improving the capacity to exploit such knowledge, in particular by scaling-up innovative technologies and solutions. While the programme’s architecture is apparently a continuation of the current 2021-2027 Horizon Europe programme, the creation of a European competitiveness fund creates a specific set of rules and governance that will apply to a substantial part of Horizon collaborative research activities.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL

2025/0543(COD) – Proposal for a regulation

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule:2025/0543(COD) Horizon Europe framework programme for research and innovation 2028–2034

Read the complete briefing on ‘Horizon Europe 2028-2034: 10th EU research and innovation framework programme‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ivana Katsarova.

Energy drinks, widely marketed as performance-enhancing products, contain high levels of caffeine, sugar and stimulants such as taurine and guarana. Rising and excessive consumption among adolescents has raised public health concerns linked to acute cardiovascular effects, sleep disruption and gastrointestinal issues. Although the global energy drink market is expanding rapidly, these beverages still represent a small share of the EU non-alcoholic drinks market. European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) consumption data indicate that adolescents are the age group with the highest consumption of energy drinks, with some of them being high chronic users.

At EU level, no product-specific legislation exists. However, Regulation (EU) 1169/2011 requires a mandatory high-caffeine warning label. Industry bodies such as UNESDA (representing the non-alcoholic beverages sector) and Energy Drinks Europe apply voluntary marketing restrictions, particularly concerning children. National rules vary widely. Several EU countries – including Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria – have introduced bans on sales to minors, while others rely on voluntary retail measures.

Outside the EU, diverse regulatory models exist, from strict bans to voluntary guidelines. The European Commission considers EFSA’s 2015 scientific opinion on the safety of caffeine sufficient and sees no need for additional EU-level action at this stage.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Energy drinks consumption in minors: EU and national approaches‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

In 2025, the EU adopted new rules on driving licences with the aim of reducing the number of accidents on EU roads. The rules introduce:

• digital EU driving licences that can be accessed on mobile phones and used throughout the EU;
• an EU-wide accompanied driving scheme for 17-year‑old drivers;
• an EU-wide probationary period of at least two years for new drivers.

In addition, the rules harmonise a number of aspects:

a. Validity

Driving licences will be valid for 15 years for motorcycles and cars. EU countries can reduce this period to 10 years if the licence can be used as a national ID. Truck and bus licences need to be renewed every five years. EU countries can shorten the validity of driving licences of drivers who are 65 years or older.

b. Physical and mental fitness to drive

Before their first licence, a driver has to pass a medical and eyesight check. For car and motorcycle licences, EU countries can decide to replace the medical check with a self-assessment.

In terms of driving under the influence of alcohol, EU countries must have stricter rules or sanctions for novice drivers than for experienced drivers. They can also decide to have a zero-tolerance policy on alcohol and drugs (i.e. banning consumption for all drivers).

c. Licences from non-EU countries

Licences from non-EU countries with road safety standards similar to the EU’s can be exchanged for a licence that is valid throughout the EU. Together with EU countries, the Commission will decide to which non-EU countries this applies.

d. Licences in EU countries of citizenship

The new rules also allow citizens living abroad to get their first category B (passenger car) licence in their EU country of citizenship. This applies if the EU country they live in does not provide interpretation or translation in the citizen’s EU language for the practical or theoretical tests.

e. New driving test requirements

Theory and practical tests must place more emphasis on the safety of vulnerable road users, such as children, pedestrians, cyclists and users of e-scooters. Drivers will also have to learn about:

• distraction risks and the safety consequences of phone usage while driving;
• blind spot risks and the safe opening of doors;
• driving in snow and slippery conditions;
• advanced driving assistance systems (such as lane centring) and other automated technologies;
• environmental aspects of vehicle use;
• charging of electric vehicles.

f. Driving alternative fuel vehicles

The new rules allow a person with a category B licence to drive vehicles powered by alternative energy sources, such as electricity, hydrogen or biofuels (including emergency vehicles) up to a weight of 4.25 tonnes (instead of 3.5 tonnes). This is because those vehicles are often heavier, for example because of the weight of batteries.

g. Minimum age

The EU can lower the minimum age for getting a licence to 15 years (for heavy quadricycles or vehicles under 2.5 tonnes and with a maximum speed of 45 km/h) only within their territory and after securing the agreement of the Commission.

The minimum age to get a truck licence has been lowered from 21 to 18 years, and for a bus driving licence from 24 to 21 years, if the applicant has a certificate of professional competence. EU countries can allow 17-year-olds to drive a truck or van on their territory (only if accompanied by an experienced driver).

EU countries have until November 2028 to incorporate these rules into their national laws. Rules will start applying from November 2029 at the latest.

Cross-border driving bans

The EU has also adopted new rules to ensure that serious road traffic offenders are held responsible throughout the EU. EU countries will have to inform each other of driving offences and recognise driving bans in specific circumstances. The rules apply to driving bans imposed because of:

• drink-driving or driving under the influence of drugs;
• excessive speeding;
• infringing road traffic regulations and causing death or serious injuries to others.

When an EU country imposes a ban of at least three months, and the driver has exhausted all courses of action against that decision, the EU country where the driver’s licence was issued will be notified.

The EU country that issued the licence will then notify the driver – when possible – within 20 working days and will decide whether to impose a driving ban that applies across the EU.

In certain cases, for example if the driver’s right to be heard in court was not complied with, or speeding did not exceed 50km/h, the EU country that issued the licence can decide to exempt the driver and not implement a ban.

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Written by Marcin Szczepański.

A series of recent economic and geopolitical shocks have led to rising fragmentation of global trade, whereby countries tend to boost economic ties with those sharing similar political values, economic policies and security interests. While a broad retreat from globalisation is not taking place, there are some signs of reconfiguration of supply chains along geopolitical lines.

This is likely to have pronounced effects for EU economy due to its openness and high level of integration into global value chains. The full consequences are unclear at this point and firms’ responses vary, but mitigating the changing trade environment leads to heightened costs, stronger regional flows of goods and priority for measures that could reduce uncertainty.

The EU’s policy focus is on de-risking supply chains, boosting their resilience and creating opportunities through access to global markets. Increasing domestic production and access to inputs as well as diversifying supplies is coupled with supporting multilateralism and targeted partnerships. Many experts, as well as the European Parliament, see the unrealised potential of the single market, easier access to finance, stimulating innovation and digitalisation, as ways forward.

Managing global trade fragmentation is a complex process full of risks and opportunities, which requires crosscutting policy action and a strategic approach. The EU is striving to find a balance between trade openness and the necessary economic security measures. Furthermore, while proposed and launched solutions require a medium to long-term time horizon to deliver, geopolitical developments often happen swiftly, further complicating matters.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU supply chains in the era of trade fragmentation: Impacts, policies and current debate‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marie Lecerf.

The EU and its Member States have signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and use its definition of disability as a common reference at EU level. There is no other harmonised definition of disability in the EU.

The introduction of the Global Activity Limitation Instrument indicator (GALI) in most of Eurostat’s social and economic surveys offers the opportunity to have a clearer assessment of disability in the EU than before. It confirms that in 2024 the prevalence of disability was higher among female, older and less educated respondents.

The EU combats all forms of discrimination alongside and in support of its Member States. To improve the situation of people with disabilities, it has introduced a series of initiatives, programmes and strategies over a number of decades. The European Parliament has been highly active in the bid to end all forms of discrimination against people with disabilities, since the early 1980s.

In 1997, Article 13 of the Treaty establishing the European Community on the human right not to suffer discrimination on grounds, in particular, of disability, paved the way for a genuine disability policy. The first step in this regard was the adoption of a 2001-2006 action programme to combat discrimination. Later, the 2010-2020 European disability strategy sought to enable people with disabilities to exercise their rights and participate fully in society and the economy.

The 2021-2030 strategy, incorporating lessons learned from its predecessor, seeks to ensure that all persons with disabilities in the EU, regardless of their sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, age or sexual orientation: enjoy their human rights; have equal access to participation in society and the economy; can decide where, how and with whom they live; can move freely in the EU regardless of their support needs; and no longer experience discrimination.

This is a further update of a briefing, the first edition of which was published in November 2021.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding EU policies for people with disabilities‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Laurence Amand-Eeckhout.

Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) infection remains a major public health challenge across the EU and the world. There is a broad consensus at European and international level that, to achieve the goal of ending AIDS as a public-health threat by 2030, efforts must be scaled up on prevention, education, providing widespread testing access, early diagnosis, and access to both preventive and curative care for all, without discrimination.

Background

By attacking the immune system, HIV weakens the body’s defence against other infections and diseases. The most advanced stage of HIV infection is AIDS (acquired immune deficiency syndrome). Found in a variety of an infected person’s body fluids, including blood, semen, vaginal secretions and breast milk, HIV can be transmitted through sex, blood transfusion, the sharing of contaminated needles, and between mother and child during pregnancy, childbirth and breastfeeding. It is not, however, spread by kissing, hugging, shaking hands, or sharing personal objects, food or water. Anyone at high risk of getting HIV can take pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) medicine to prevent or at least reduce the risk of HIV infection.

People diagnosed with HIV and treated early can now expect to live for a normal or almost normal lifespan. Infections can be treated to prevent progression to AIDS, by decreasing viral load in an infected body (antiretroviral therapy, ‘ART’). However, ART does not cure HIV infection, and no vaccine exists.

The United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) is leading the global effort to end the AIDS epidemic by 2030, as part of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted in 2015 (Goal 3.3).

World AIDS Day, proclaimed by the United Nations in 1988, is marked every year on 1 December. This year’s theme ‘Overcoming disruption, transforming the AIDS response‘ highlights that after decades of progress, the HIV response stands at a crossroads. Severe funding cuts are disrupting life-saving prevention services and many communities face heightened risks and vulnerabilities, threatening decades of progress.

Facts and figures

UNAIDS data show that, in 2024, 1.3 million people worldwide contracted HIV (compared to 3.4 million people in 1996), 40.8 million people were living with HIV (39.4 million adults – aged 15 or older – and 1.4 million children), and 630 000 people died of AIDS-related illnesses.

According to the 2025 report on ‘HIV/AIDS surveillance in Europe’ (2024 data), published on 27 November 2025 jointly by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2.6 million people have been reported with HIV in the WHO European region (made up of 53 countries covering a vast geographical region from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean), including over678 000 people in the EU/European Economic Area (EEA). In the EU/EEA specifically, over 24 000 people were newly diagnosed with HIV in 2024, representing a slight 5.7 % decrease compared to 2023 (over 25 000), resulting in a rate of 5.3 per 100 000 people.

In addition, about 1 in 14 people living with HIV in the EU/EEA are still unaware of their status, which contributes to late diagnosis, worse health outcomes, and the continued transmission of HIV. Across the EU/EEA, almost half (48.0 %) of HIV diagnoses are made late, leading to higher morbidity and an increased risk of AIDS-related death.

EU action

Under Article 168 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, Member States are responsible for their own healthcare policies and systems. However, the EU can play a supporting role and add value to national action. EU action focuses on prevention and support for people living with HIV. Projects funded under the EU4Health programme (e.g. CORE and European testing week) aim at reducing inequalities and provide support for vulnerable groups (including migrants), such as easier access to information, testing, and community-based services. The EU drugs strategy seeks to ensure a high level of health protection, including measures to reduce drug-related infectious diseases such as HIV. The European Commission is expected to present a new drugs strategy on 3 December 2025. Since the early years of the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s, the EU has invested significantly in research. Horizon Europe supports projects ranging from basic research to the development and testing of new treatments and vaccines. The European Medicines Agency (EMA) contributes to the global HIV response through scientific evaluation, supervision and monitoring of medicine safety. This includes support to help Member States to achieve the UN SDG Goal 3.3 target. In that context, the Commission facilitates the exchange of best practice through the Health Security Committee and dedicated networks on the EU Health Policy Platform.

The ECDC provides Member States with guidance, for example on preventing HIV transmission through substances of human origin and among people who inject drugs. It also publishes reports summarising progress. In its November 2025 report, the ECDC notes that although progress has been made towards achieving UN SDG 3.3 to end AIDS as a public threat by 2030, the EU/EEA remains off track for some targets, notably those related to prevention, testing and treatment. While the number of HIV infections and HIV-related deaths have declined over the last decade, current trends indicate that stronger efforts in prevention, testing and treatment are needed to reach the 2025 and 2030 incidence and mortality targets. Many countries lacked data for some monitoring indicators, making comprehensive assessment difficult.

As highlighted in its 2022 global health strategy, on the world stage the EU supports the Global Fund in its efforts against HIV, malaria and tuberculosis. Since 2002, the Commission has disbursed €3.5 billion to the Global Fund and has pledged €715 million for 2023-2025, complementing contributions from the EU Member States. The Global Fund’s Eighth Replenishment Summit took place on 21 November 2025 in Johannesburg (South Africa). Partners around the world pledged US$11.34 billion for 2026-2028; the European Commission and some countries have yet to pledge.

European Parliament position

Parliament has played a leading role in promoting stronger and coordinated HIV/AIDS policies, advocating for comprehensive prevention, a strong human‑rights based approach and the reduction of inequalities in access to HIV services inside and outside the EU. This commitment was reflected in its May 2021 resolution on accelerating progress and tackling inequalities towards ending AIDS as a public health threat by 2030. In its December 2023 resolution on non-communicable diseases, Parliament called for further research into the development of vaccines and innovative treatment options against HIV, and for Member States to step up efforts to ensure timely testing, diagnosis and access to high quality care, including for vulnerable groups. Throughout the current legislative term, Members have submitted several written questions to the Commission, notably on fighting HIV and AIDS, on restriction of USAID funding for health programmes and, more recently, on the Commission contribution to the 2025 global fund replenishment.

To mark World AIDS Day 2025, the Vice-President of the European Parliament, Victor Negrescu (S&D, Romania), is organising a high-level conference on 10 December 2025 entitled ‘EU at a crossroads: lifespan and gender equity in the HIV response’.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Combating HIV/AIDS: Progress and EU action‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by David Kemp.

The ability of generative AI (‘GenAI’) to generate plausible text, images, music and computer code in response to human prompts is impressive. GenAI promises huge productivity gains in many domains, and large amounts of financial and political capital are staked on its success. Nevertheless, the current generation of models exhibit well-publicised weaknesses that might not simply disappear by using more data and processing power or smarter training. This paper looks at those limitations, and the lower-profile alternative approaches to AI that could overcome them and even provide the EU with a competitive advantage.

Since the unveiling of ChatGPT in 2022, we have witnessed what many commentators consider to be the most rapid adoption of new technology in recent times in virtually all segments of society. One cannot fail to be impressed by the speed at which it can produce outputs that some say can be ‘PhD-level’.

At the same time, there is growing awareness that these algorithms often produce plausible but demonstrably false outputs (‘hallucinations‘) or outputs that are inconsistent with logic, maths or ‘how the real world works’; they regurgitate problematic biases present in their training data and cannot provide a reliable explanation of how the outputs were derived. ‘GenAI-optimists’ believe that accuracy and tractability will emerge through scaling up the data and processing power available and adding external (human or automated) processes to fine-tune the models. ‘GenAI-pessimists’, on the other hand, point to the fact that finding solutions to the above problems is slowing down, strongly suggesting that the approach is reaching its limits. In addition, the very high energy and resource consumption of the infrastructure necessary for training and running these ‘brute force’, data-driven applications is putting pressure on already stretched supplies. Given the several trillions of private and public capital invested, now and over the next few years, in the geopolitically strategic race for an ‘all-purpose’ artificial general intelligence (AGI), it is worth asking where GenAI’s limits lie and what other approaches might be explored to put Europe at the forefront of AI innovation.

Potential impacts and developments

GenAI models, in essence, generate a multi-dimensional map of statistical relationships in the training data between ‘tokens‘ – digital representations of linguistic, graphical, musical or other data. The models can then be prompted to produce new combinations of text, images, music, etc. that are consistent with those relationships. In contrast to traditional statistical regression analysis, these models contain billions of parameters and make almost no assumptions about the form of the relationships between tokens. This gives GenAI its enormous advantage in finding the subtle, multivariate patterns that allow it to output plausible text, code, music, images, etc. in response to prompts.

The flip side of this underlying design, however, is that GenAI (like traditional statistical regression) is prone to mistaking ‘noise’ in the training sample for meaningful patterns and producing bizarre results when it is applied to data outside the training set. In addition, pure GenAI trades transparency of ‘reasoning’ for power: a printout of the billion-parameter map of relationships provides no explanation. This is a problem for the required ‘human in the loop’: how can one have confidence in the result if no one knows exactly how it was reached?

Clearly, these design weaknesses limit mission-critical uses of AI. Scaling GenAI does not appear to eliminate these problems, all the while adding additional problems linked to resource usage. Ideally, we would make the most of the powerful pattern detection that GenAI offers, and overcome some of the limitations of a purely data-driven approach. This requires boostingresearch into ‘hybrid’ approaches which, like the human brain, leverage GenAI’s pattern extraction and matching abilities using built-in, explicit models of efficient reasoning strategies and the real world, as well as strategies formaintaining and developingthose models. These approaches provide a reality check to improve the reliability of GenAI’s probabilistic outputs. They are also more efficient (algorithmically and energetically) as they directly encode readily available, fundamental knowledge rather than requiring everything to be extracted by brute force from the data. Finally, the use of explicit representations and strategies allows their reasoning to be inspected.

Neuro-symbolic approaches, such as IBM’s neuro-symbolic concept learner, combine GenAI with explicit rules for symbolic reasoning (for logic, abstraction and generalisation) to enhance reasoning and explainability. Embodied AI – such as Meta’s Habitat – involves training agents in virtual or physical environments where they are designed to learn through perception, action and feedback, promoting causal learning and the development of sensorimotor intelligence. Cognitive architectures, such as Soar, ACT-R and OpenCog, include explicit models of human cognitive processes, integrating perception, memory, learning, planning and reasoning in a modular way. This enables continuity of learning, goal-directed behaviour and long-term memory. World model learning approaches such as DeepMind’s MuZero, Ha & Schmidhuber’s world model agents and DreamerV3 focus on training agents to derive compact, predictive models of their environment to support causal reasoning, generalisation and efficient planning. Finally, it must be underlined that, regardless of the underlying technology, the pursuit of artificial general intelligence is not necessarily the most efficient route to useful applications. Artificial specific intelligence (AI approaches focused on a specific domain, such as the Nobel prize-winning, protein-folding algorithm, AlphaFold2) gives more reliable and transparent results by combining the subtle pattern detection at which GenAI excels with explicitly encoded, domain-specific knowledge.

Anticipatory policymaking

The reliability issues mentioned above call into question GenAI’s ability to deliver the ‘trustworthy and human centric AI … pivotal for economic growth and … [preserve] the fundamental rights and principles that underpin our societies’, as promised in the AI continent action plan. Most AI initiatives from the European Commission have so far concentrated on the implementation of GenAI rather than on research and development of alternative and complementary AI approaches. The €700 million flagship GenAI4EU programme, for example, states its aim as being to ‘integrate generativeArtificial Intelligence (AI) in Europe’s strategic sectors, and keep their competitive edge’. Consequently, most of the calls for projects focus on applying GenAI in particular sectors and providing the data and computing power it needs. The pursuit of artificial general intelligence has attracted an enormous amount of political and economic interest, potentially to the detriment of equally interesting and possibly more efficient and effective alternatives, including those mentioned above.

To best serve the EU’s goals of competitivity and innovation in AI, EU policy and funding could be targeted more directly to support the wholevalue chain of alternative and complementary approaches to GenAI.It is also important to actively further domain-specific AI (artificial specific intelligence)applications alongside GenAI. This can be achieved through proactively promoting such projects for existing funding programmes and by policy guidance in the next multiannual financial framework and the Competitiveness Fund for Digital Leadership.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘What if generative AI is reaching its limits?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

The key moments of the November II 2025 plenary session included the adoption of the 2026 EU budget and a debate on the EU position on the proposed plan and EU engagement towards a just and lasting peace for Ukraine. Members also debated statements on the EU response to Russian and Belarusian violations of EU airspace and infrastructure sabotage and on tackling China’s export restrictions. Members debated Parliament’s statement marking the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women and exchanged views with the Commission on the outcome of the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Brazil (COP30). Further debates were held on the Democracy Shield, the digital package, sustainable aviation and maritime fuel, citizens’ right to make cash payments, and fishing opportunities for 2026. Debates were also held on the 30th anniversary of the Barcelona Process marking its development into today’s Pact for the Mediterranean, the war in Sudan, and the political situation in Myanmar.

2026 EU budget

Parliament’s negotiators reached a provisional agreement on next year’s budget on 15 November, which reflects Parliament’s priorities, particularly increased funding for competitiveness, research and defence initiatives. The budget for the year sets commitment appropriations at €192.77 billion and payments at €190.1 billion. Following the Council’s approval, Members considered and adopted the agreed text. The vote on the 2026 EU budget concludes the budgetary procedure for 2026, and enabled Parliament’s President to sign the budget into law immediately.

European defence industry programme (EDIP)

Seeking to strengthen Europe’s defence industry, and guarantee reliable access to defence equipment when needed, Members debated and adopted a provisional agreement reached with the Council on the European defence industry programme (EDIP). The negotiators succeeded in maintaining the €1.5 billion budget for 2025 to 2027, including €300 million to support Ukraine. The agreement on EDIP also sets a 35 % limit on non-EU components, and excludes suppliers who pose a risk to EU security, a key Parliament priority.

Defence of democracy package

Members debated and adopted two reports from the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) on new lobbying rules, including a proposed directive setting harmonised transparency requirements, as part of a package aimed at tackling covert foreign influence. The vote sets Parliament’s position for negotiations on addressing third-country interference in democratic processes.

Stronger role for Europol to fight migrant smuggling and human trafficking

Migrant smugglers are responsible for over 90 % of irregular external EU border crossings. And migrants smuggled this way are at higher risk of falling victim to trafficking in human beings. Members debated and adopted an agreement reached with the Council on a proposal to strengthen Europol’s role in combating migrant smuggling and trafficking. The agreement would establish a permanent European Centre against Migrant Smuggling within Europol. It also introduces greater information-sharing in immigration operations and strengthens biometric data processing capabilities through additional staff and funding.

InvestEU

Members debated and adopted an agreement reached between the Committees on Budgets (BUDG) and Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) negotiators and the Council to amend and simplify the InvestEU Regulation. The changes would mobilise a further €55 billion in investment through InvestEU, the EU’s public-private risk-sharing instrument, supporting greater competitiveness and innovation.

Toy safety regulation

Parliament adopted an interinstitutional agreement at second reading on the proposed new toy safety regulation. Following negotiations between the co-legislators, the revised proposal strengthens customs checks on imported toys and requires that safety assessments of digitally connected toys consider risks to children, including their mental health. It also bans additional harmful chemicals in toys.

EU strategy and cooperation in the Arctic

Competition between global powers for influence in the Arctic region is contributing to a growing sense of instability. Members debated and adopted a report from Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), calling for a security-oriented strategy in the Arctic. The report recommends deeper partnerships with Arctic countries – and supports future EU enlargement prospects and increased EU funding for the region.

Digital safety for minors

Parliament debated and adopted an IMCO report, recommending measures to address the growing problem of children bypassing uneven age-verification in the EU to access adult content online. The own-initiative report on digital safety for minors warns of the risks of addiction, mental health problems and exposure to illegal content, and calls for stronger enforcement of the Digital Services Act (DSA), for the expected digital fairness act to close legislative gaps in online child safety, and for an EU-wide digital age limit.

European disabilities strategy

People with disabilities still face disadvantages in income, access to jobs, inclusive education, housing and healthcare. Parliament debated and adopted a report from the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, aimed at addressing these disadvantages in the remaining years of the European disability strategy. The report also highlights the situation of women and girls with disabilities, who face multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination and violence.

Subsidiarity, proportionality and the role of national parliaments in the EU

The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, which ensure the EU only acts where appropriate and where national governments cannot, is fundamental to the EU legislative process. Members adopted a report from the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) calling for improved definition and application of subsidiarity and proportionality and extending the deadline for national parliaments in the Member States to engage in the EU legislative process.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Plenary round-up – November II 2025‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Astrid Worum and Ralf Drachenberg.

After ‘constructive discussions’ in Geneva on 23 November between representatives of the US, Ukraine, France, Germany and the UK to ‘update and refine’ the 28-point Russia–Ukraine peace plan proposed by US President Donald Trump, the President of the European Council, António Costa, called an informal meeting of EU leaders to take stock of the latest developments. The aim was to draw on the ‘new momentum for peace negotiations’ by carrying out ‘additional work’ on major issues left unresolved. EU leaders stressed that the solution should be just and lasting, and expressed their readiness to support the process by working closely with Ukraine, the US and NATO. While reiterating their commitment to provide Ukraine with all the diplomatic, military, economic and financial support it needs, they also insisted that issues concerning the EU directly, such as sanctions and immobilised assets, required an EU decision and its full involvement.

General

Since the COVID crisis, videoconferences have become a useful tool for EU leaders to convene at short notice to discuss urgent developments, and were used most recently in February and August 2025). However, for this meeting about half of the EU leaders were physically present in the same location, Luanda (Angola), while the other half were connected remotely, making it the first fully hybrid European Council meeting.

The meeting was a ‘meeting of the 27 EU leaders with the President of the European Commission’ and did not include the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, as is often the case when EU Heads of State or Government meet in the videoconference format. However, Costa briefed the European Parliament’s Conference of Presidents (Parliament’s President and political group leaders) on the discussions at the informal EU leaders’ meeting, as he had done on 10 November for the 23 October 2025 European Council meeting.

Background US 28-point Russia-Ukraine peace plan

The US 28-point Russia-Ukraine peace plan leaked on 20 November – which the White House claimed was the result of a month of work between US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and US special envoy Steve Witkoff, ‘along with input from both Ukrainians and Russians’ – is considered by many observers to be too favourable to Russia. On the sidelines of the G20 summit in Johannesburg, 12 leaders – from Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the UK, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Poland, Spain and the Netherlands – as well as the European Council and Commission Presidents, adopted a statement expressing support for the ‘US efforts to bring peace in Ukraine’, but also concern at certain aspects of the draft. The statement notably underlines that ‘the initial draft of the 28-point plan includes important elements that will be essential for a just and lasting peace’, but that this ‘draft is a basis, which will require additional work’.

Concerns mainly relate to four points: i) territorial concessions; ii) limitation of Ukrainian military capacities; iii) sanctions and post-war reparations; and iv) NATO-related provisions.

Firstly, the statement recalls the principle that borders cannot be changed by force, representing a rebuke to the 28-point plan, which envisages significant territorial concessions from Ukraine to Russia, notably Donetsk.

Secondly, the proposal to limit Ukraine’s armed forces to 600 000 personnel ‘would leave Ukraine vulnerable to future attack’. EU leaders have only recently reiterated that ‘a Ukraine that is capable of defending itself effectively is seen as an integral part of any future security guarantees’; the provisions of the US plan are vague on security guarantees from the US and other Western allies – a point which Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has repeatedly demanded as a condition for peace.

Thirdly, the statement stresses that ‘elements relating to the EU and NATO would need the consent’ of their respective members. Thus, the proposals cannot prejudice decisions relating to EU sanctions and the use of immobilised Russian assets, which are largely held in Europe, notably by Euroclear, and which EU leaders are considering using for Ukraine’s reconstruction. Even if the details are vague, the US plan seeks to unblock immobilised assets and place them into two investment funds, one for Ukraine and the other for Russia. The US would benefit economically from both funds, while the EU would be called on to pay €100 billion for Ukraine’s reconstruction.  

Fourthly, the US plan includes a ban on NATO membership for Ukraine, which is a matter for consensus between NATO members – not a decision for third parties, such as Russia – and for which there is no precedent. In that context, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz expressed scepticism that an agreement could be reached on the US plan in time for the deadline set by President Trump, and also rejected the re-integration of Russia into the G8, stating that ‘among the six current G7 members who are not the US, there is no willingness to readmit Russia’. Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez called for a revision of the plan, stressing that ‘Ukrainians and Europeans must feel fully represented in any peace plan’, which affects the entire European security architecture.

Even if President Trump later said that the US 28-point plan was not ‘his final offer’, considerable pressure was put on Ukraine to accept the plan by Thanksgiving – 27 November. In a video address, President Zelenskyy told the Ukrainian people that ‘Ukraine may find itself facing a very difficult choice: Either loss of dignity, or the risk of losing a key partner. Either a difficult 28 points, or an extremely difficult winter.’ Russia indicated that the US plan was a potential basis for a peace agreement, and warned that, if Ukraine were to turn it down, Russian forces would advance further.

European counter-proposal

In that context, a group of countries led by France, Germany and the UK submitted a counter- proposal. While taking the US plan as a basis, it amends the draft on key points: i) the timing of territorial discussions, with a ceasefire to be reached first and the current front line to be set as the basis for any future discussions on territory; ii) on security guarantees, the counter-proposal envisages a NATO Article 5-like US security guarantee for Ukraine; iii) regarding Ukrainian sovereignty (which implies the right to choose alliances and make choices on its armed forces), the language on restrictions to NATO membership are softened and the number of personnel increased to 800 000 in peacetime; and iv) references to territorial concessions and recognition of occupation are removed, with European allies strongly rejecting the idea that Ukraine should be required to give up land by force. Russia, whose core demands were included in the US plan, rejected the counter-proposal.

Geneva meeting on 23 November

The Geneva meeting on 23 November, which gathered together national security advisers from the US and Ukraine, as well as France, Germany and the UK, drew up an ‘updated and refined peace plan’. The heads of cabinet of the European Commission and European Council presidents, Bjoern Seibert and Pedro Lourtie, also attended. After the meeting, Secretary of State Rubio praised the ‘tremendous amount of progress’ made in Geneva. Having spoken with Zelenskyy ahead of the EU leaders’ summit, Finnish President Alexander Stubb described the Geneva negotiations as a ‘step forward’, but cautioned that ‘major issues remain to be resolved’, adding that decisions falling under the EU or NATO’s remit would be discussed ‘in a separate track’.

The informal meeting of EU leaders on 24 November

Emphasising the ‘new momentum for peace negotiations’, President Costa convened a special meeting of EU leaders on the sidelines of the EU-Africa Summit in Luanda, Angola, to take stock of the latest developments. The purpose was to discuss the state of play as well as ‘major issues, which still remain to be resolved’, to develop the peace plan into a sustainable solution. The meeting took place in a hybrid format, with 15 EU leaders attending in person, including Chancellor Merz, the Irish Taoiseach, Micheál Martin, the prime ministers of Croatia, Andrej Plenković, Poland, Donald Tusk, Slovakia, Robert Fico, and Spain, Pedro Sánchez, and Presidents Costa and von der Leyen, while other EU leaders joined by videoconference. Since the meeting was an informal one, no conclusions were adopted, but Costa and von der Leyen held a joint press conference afterwards outlining the main discussion points.

In his report after the meeting, Costa stressed that ‘peace cannot be a temporary truce, it must be a lasting solution’. Thus, while commending ‘the efforts of Presidents Zelenskyy and Trump and their teams’ and welcoming the ‘progress achieved [in Geneva] on several issues’, EU leaders underlined that ‘some issues remain to be resolved’.

EU leaders conveyed two central messages. Firstly, ‘the issues that concern directly the EU, such as sanctions, enlargement or immobilised assets, require the full involvement and decision by the EU’. Thus, certain points included in the draft peace plan cannot be decided by third parties in a peace treaty, but will need to be discussed in a separate framework. At the same time, they expressed their readiness to support the process by working closely with Ukraine, the US and NATO. Secondly, EU leaders reiterated the EU’s commitment to providing ‘President Zelenskyy with all the support he needs’ – diplomatic, military, economic and, in particular, financial support. On the latter point, Costa recalled the commitment made at the 23 October meeting, stressing that ‘we will [deliver] at the December European Council’, and said that ‘Ukraine has chosen Europe, and Europe will stand by Ukraine’. Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėdastressed the ‘need for the EU to actively participate in the discussions on the future of Ukraine, and also to keep pressuring Russia – the only side responsible for this unjust war’.

EU leaders also set three ‘core principles’ outlined by von der Leyen regarding the substance of a future peace deal, which is also ‘about the security of the entire [European] continent, now and in the future’. Firstly, Ukraine’s territory and sovereignty must be respected. Secondly, only Ukraine as a sovereign country can make decisions regarding its armed forces, and the choice of their destiny is in their own hands. Thirdly, Europe is central to Ukraine’s future. As Romanian President Nicușor Dan emphasised at the EU-27 meeting, ‘there is a direct link between the security of Ukraine and that of the Republic of Moldova and the region as a whole, and the current peace talks need to take this aspect into consideration’. Likewise, Bulgarian Prime Minister Rosen Jeliazkov emphasised that ‘the security of Ukraine is essential for EU security – close coordination between the US, the EU and Ukraine, and reliable long-term guarantees for Ukraine’s future, are key’.

Mirroring the principles set by EU leaders, in their joint statement on the same day, the chairs of the foreign affairs committees of 20 European countries’ parliaments emphasised that a just and lasting peace cannot be achieved by yielding to the aggressor; instead, it must be grounded in international law and respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty. On 26 November, the European Parliament held a debate on the proposed plan and the EU’s engagement for a just and lasting peace for Ukraine, with von der Leyen outlining again the core principles of the EU’s position in favour of a sustainable peace. These principles – together with the full involvement of EU and NATO members on decisions concerning them – also reflect the main lines set in the statement adopted by G20 and European partners, as well as the amendments made in the counter-proposal to the 28-point plan. They also served as a ‘solid basis’ for the 25 November videoconference call of leaders of the countries comprising the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ supporting Ukraine, whose co-chairs, French President Emmanuel Macron and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, issued a strong statement after the meeting.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the informal EU leaders’ meeting of 24 November 2025‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Citizens called on the European Union to take action to ensure the release and safe return of Europeans detained by Israel for their participation in the Gaza-bound Global Sumud Flotilla. Many citizens wrote to the President of the European Parliament on this subject from October 2025 onwards. They asked her to take the necessary action to guarantee that European citizens are protected and receive full consular assistance.

We replied to citizens who took the time to write to the President:

English

The European Parliament has been closely monitoring the situation and has been in contact with the relevant national authorities. However, the responsibility to provide consular assistance to citizens of the European Union (EU) lies with individual EU countries.

Opening the Parliament’s sitting on 6 October 2025, President Metsola spoke of the need to ‘finally bring about an end to the intergenerational cycle of bloodshed, terror and violence’ in the Middle East.

The President welcomed the agreement on the first phase of the Gaza peace deal and called for the deal to now be respected and implemented.

The protection and wellbeing of Members of the European Parliament, anywhere in the world, is and will always be of the utmost priority for this Parliament. Please see the Parliament Spokesperson’s June statement on this.

The European Parliament adopted a resolution in September 2025 on the situation in Gaza. Moreover, on 7 October 2025, the European Parliament held a debate on the EU’s role in supporting the recent peace efforts for Gaza and a two-state solution.

French

Le Parlement européen suit la situation de près et est en contact avec les autorités nationales compétentes. Toutefois, la responsabilité de fournir une assistance consulaire aux citoyens de l’Union européenne incombe aux différents États membres.

Lors de l’ouverture de la séance du Parlement le 6 octobre 2025, la Présidente Roberta Metsola a souligné la nécessité d’«enfin mettre un terme au cycle intergénérationnel d’effusions de sang, de terreur et de violence» au Moyen-Orient.

La Présidente a accueilli favorablement l’accord sur la première phase du plan de paix pour Gaza et a demandé son respect et sa mise en œuvre.

La protection et le bien-être des députés au Parlement européen, partout dans le monde, sont et seront toujours la priorité absolue de ce Parlement. Veuillez consulter la déclaration de la porte-parole du Parlement à ce sujet.

Le Parlement européen a adopté en septembre 2025 une résolution sur la situation à Gaza. En outre, le 7 octobre 2025, il a tenu un débat sur le rôle de l’UE dans le soutien aux efforts de paix en faveur de Gaza et une solution fondée sur la coexistence de deux États.

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Written by Tristan Marcelin.

Following Mario Draghi’s report on the future of European competitiveness, the EU has started proposing ways to simplify EU laws governing the digital space. The goal is to reduce administrative burdens on companies. However, simplifying EU digital laws may not be sufficient to boost innovation, and thus competitiveness.

EU competitiveness as a new priority Future of European competitiveness

Following a request by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, Mario Draghi – former European Central Bank President – drafted a report in 2024 on the future of European competitiveness. In his report, Draghi suggests, among other things, increasing EU digitalisation and the development of advanced technologies to boost EU competitiveness. The report notes that the EU should develop its connectivity, computing infrastructures, and electronics value chain, as all three are essential for EU citizens and businesses. It also suggests a number of ways to strengthen EU governance, including by simplifying rules. It warns that ‘excessive regulatory and administrative burden can hinder the ease of doing business in the EU and the competitiveness of EU companies’. The unclear overlaps between the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) are given as an example.

New EU political priorities

Since the publication of the Draghi report, the European political landscape has changed. In 2024, a new legislative term started in the European Parliament, and a new College of Commissioners was appointed for the European Commission. The Commission’s new leadership chose competitiveness as one of its 2024‑2029 priorities, and laid down objectives including ‘making business easier’ and ‘boosting productivity with digital tech diffusion’ to achieve this goal. Both objectives follow Mario Draghi’s recommendations. The latter appears even more relevant in 2025, as this year’s Nobel prize in economic sciences was awarded to three economists for showing ‘how new technology can drive sustained growth’.

From strategic objectives to concrete proposals Digital simplification on the Council’s agenda

In a June 2025 document, the Polish Presidency of the Council noted its priority of simplifying digital regulations, listing the initiatives it undertook. The current Danish Presidency aims for a similar priority. The Danish programme notes that ‘the Presidency will place focus on regulatory simplification and better regulation in the EU to ease daily operations for businesses and other stakeholders’. Under Denmark’s Presidency, the Council defined its position on a Commission proposal, known as the ‘omnibus IV‘ simplification package, to reduce administrative burdens for small and medium-sized enterprises and small mid-cap enterprises (SMCs). The proposal includes modifications to the GDPR: SMCs would no longer need, under certain conditions, to maintain records of activities involving the processing of personal data.

Forthcoming proposal for a digital omnibus

An omnibus dedicated to the EU digital rulebook is reportedly expected for 19 November 2025. The call for evidence, published by the Commission on 16 September 2025, hints at an omnibus focusing notably on simplifying data legislation, cybersecurity incident reporting obligations, and the smooth application of AI Act rules. The forthcoming omnibus is aimed at reducing ‘the administrative costs for compliance for businesses, administrations and citizens in the European Union in application of several regulations of the Union’s digital acquis without compromising the objectives of the underlying rules’. It follows a period of intense political discussions over a pause or simplification of parts of the AI Act, owing to its difficult transposition into technical guidance and standards, and its interplay with other rules.

Burden of a fragmented EU digital rulebook Fragmented EU digital rulebook

The EU digital rulebook is composed of several pieces of legislation that all have different purposes and scopes. Among the horizontal digital laws, (i) several are related to data, while (ii) others focus on specific digital activities. The first include the GDPR, which has created rights for EU citizens over their data. Further laws such as the Data Act and the Data Governance Act set rules for private, public and non-personal data. The second include laws creating obligations for certain types of digital activities, such as the Digital Markets Act for practices relating to digital markets, the Digital Services Act for digital services, and the AI Act for AI systems and models. It also includes technical and organisational cybersecurity obligations relating to software, hardware and entities, such as the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) and the NIS 2 Directive. In addition to the horizontal digital laws, sectoral laws may apply. For instance, in 2024, experts divided the 154 EU ‘information security’ and ‘cybersecurity’ policies (including non-legislative texts) into eight policy areas including energy, economic, education, and security and justice.

Administrative burden on companies

The administrative tasks companies must undertake to comply with EU laws depend on their activities. Companies handling personal data must comply with GDPR rules. Once enforced, companies distributing and manufacturing devices might need to comply with the CRA, and those providing general-purpose AI (GPAI) might need to comply with the AI Act. A company could need to comply with all three. However, each law has different deadlines, reporting procedures and authorities. The GDPR and the CRA are enforced at Member State level, while the exclusive power to enforce GPAI rules rests with the Commission. If a company provided high-risk AI systems instead of GPAI, enforcement would be at the national level. The GDPR, CRA and AI Act thus all rely on different enforcers. Depending on the law and its implementation, Member States may have added requirements on top of the initial EU law – this is known as ‘gold plating‘. The Draghi report associates it with a loss in competitiveness, mentioning the GDPR as an example: its enforcement is uneven among the Member States, limiting cross-border innovation.

Beyond simplifying the EU digital rulebook

While simplifying the EU digital rulebook is a first step, it is unlikely to be sufficient to boost EU innovation, and thus competitiveness. In 2024, Anu Bradford – known for theorising the Brussels effect, whereby the EU’s regulatory power influences other regions – published a research paper, ‘The False Choice Between Digital Regulation and Innovation’. As reported by the Oxford Institute for Ethics in AI, she ‘noted that there was very little technological regulation in Europe before 2010, at the time when the likes of Meta and Google have been founded. This suggests that regulation was not the major obstacle preventing the rise of similar companies in Europe.’ Experts often mention the absence of a digital single market and of a unified capital market in Europe as one of the root causes of the EU’s technological gap.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Simplifying EU digital laws for competitiveness‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Issam Hallak.

The EU is facing the challenge of mobilising massive investments required to meet its strategic priorities and must find effective ways to finance them. In response, the European Commission published the savings and investments union (SIU) action plan on 19 March 2025, designed to channel EU savings into productive investments. This briefing presents an overview of the plan.

The SIU was launched in the context of the Draghi and Letta reports, which set out recommendations for strengthening the EU’s single market and competitiveness. Announced in the Commission’s Competitiveness Compass (the January 2025 roadmap to restore and boost the EU’s economic dynamism), it places strong importance on mobilising private financing for key EU priorities such as innovation, digitalisation, defence and the green transition. The SIU seeks to further integrate the EU’s financial system and make its capital markets more attractive to investors.

The SIU is structured around four work strands. The first focuses on the demand side – savers and investors – promoting effective savings instruments that link citizens’ savings with productive investments. The second targets the supply side by expanding financing options for firms. The remaining two strands aim to strengthen market infrastructure and advance supervisory convergence, which could, in specific areas, evolve towards a single supervisory framework. Key proposals include amendments to securitisation rules (ongoing), revised rules and products for supplementary pensions, and measures to improve financial market infrastructure. The SIU has received support from the European Parliament through its September 2025 resolution on EU competitiveness, which also makes some remarks and offers further directions for action.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Savings and investments union: Overview and state of play‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Martina Prpic, Ioannis Stefanou, Ingeborg Odink.

Adopted in 1989, the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) was the first international instrument to explicitly recognise children as human beings with innate rights. As of 2025, it has been ratified by 196 countries, including all EU Member States, and it has become the landmark treaty on children’s rights, outlining universal standards for the care, treatment, survival, development, protection and participation of all children.

The promotion and protection of children’s rights is one of the key objectives embedded in Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Moreover, Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU recognises that children are entitled to ‘protection and care as is necessary for their well-being’. The same article recognises that the child’s best interests should be the primary consideration for public authorities and private institutions.

Over the years, the EU has moved from a sectoral approach towards a more coherent policy approach. Whereas initially, children’s rights were developed in relation to specific areas – such as the free movement of persons – since 2000 the EU has taken a more coordinated line. The European Parliament has been especially vocal in advocating for children. This briefing offers an overview of the most relevant actions at European level to address and promote children’s rights before looking at upcoming challenges.

This briefing is an update of a 2022 briefing written by Rosamund Shreeves.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Children’s rights in the EU in the light of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Pieter Baert.

Achieving ambitious climate objectives while supporting robust economic growth and safeguarding tax revenue requires simple and well-targeted tax incentives that encourage sustainable investment. The European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Tax Matters (FISC) is due to hold a public hearing on this topic on 20 November 2025.

Clean industrial deal – tax recommendations

Launched in February 2025, the clean industrial deal is a package of wide-ranging actions aimed at ensuring that decarbonisation is a driver of economic growth for the European economy. Next to concrete action to lower energy prices, the European Commission published a (non-binding) recommendation to guide Member States when introducing and designing tax incentives to support the clean industrial deal objectives.

Firstly, the Commission recommends that Member States allow companies to deduct investment in green technology from their taxable income more quickly (‘accelerated depreciation‘), or even immediately (‘full or immediate expensing’). By enabling companies to deduct the cost of the asset faster – rather than spreading the cost evenly over time – accelerated depreciation effectively raises the after-tax rate of return on investment and helps mitigate distortions caused by inflation. While this incentive does not ultimately increase the nominal value of deductions, it does enhance their real value by allowing firms to claim them earlier, thereby improving businesses’ cash flow.

FranceInvestment in renewable energy equipment or energy-saving technologies can be depreciated at 2, 2.5 or 3 times the normal rate.Germany75 % of costs on electric company vehicles acquired after 30 June 2025 and before 1 January 2028 can be deducted in their first year.IrelandThe Accelerated Capital Allowance (ACA) scheme allows companies to deduct the full cost of investment in energy-efficient equipment in the year of purchase, rather than over the standard eight-year period.SpainSince 2023, Spain allows companies to apply accelerated depreciation for new electric and hydrogen company vehicles, at twice the standard depreciation rate. This also applies to investment in new electric vehicle charging infrastructure, both normal and high-power.

Accelerated depreciation for green assets – Member State examples (non-exhaustive)

Secondly, the Commission recommends that Member States, where feasible, use cost-effective and targeted tax credits for investment that creates sufficient manufacturing capacity in clean technologies, supports industrial decarbonisation, or strengthens the EU’s strategic resilience (for example, the production of a net-zero product where the EU is currently highly dependent on a single third country). The Commission notes that empirical evidence generally ranks input-based tax credits – for example, those covering R&D costs for green investment – higher than income-based credits, such as patent boxes, arguing that the former are more cost-effective in stimulating additional investment.

Action on these recommendations should be combined with other policy measures, such as the phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies, whether provided through tax expenditure or direct grants.

The Council welcomed the Commission’s recommendations, but underlined the need for flexibility, allowing Member States to adapt tax incentives to their specific fiscal contexts and budgets.

Revision of the Energy Taxation Directive

The proposal to revise the Energy Taxation Directive (ETD) remains the only unfinished file in the Commission’s ‘fit for 55‘ package, tabled in 2021, aiming to reduce emissions by 55 % by 2030.

The ETD lays down EU-wide minimum excise duty rates on motor/heating fuels and electricity. Member States are free to set their own tax rates as long as they respect the ETD’s minimum rates. The Commission’s proposal aims to update the directive – unchanged since 2003 – to bring it into line with the EU’s climate objectives and modern green technology, while maintaining Member States’ capacity to raise tax revenue. While reducing greenhouse gas emissions and preserving tax revenues are not inherently contradictory objectives, concern is growing about potential long-term future revenue erosion for national budgets, as excise duties on fossil fuels decline with the green transition.

Some of the proposal’s key provisions to revise the ETD include:

• Shifting from volume- to energy content-based taxation: Minimum rates would no longer be expressed per litre or kilogram, but rather per gigajoule of energy content, removing the existing tax bias against low-energy-content biofuels.
• Environmental ranking of minimum rates: A new structure would tax energy products according to their environmental performance, ensuring that electricity is always taxed at the lowest rate and fossil fuels at the highest.
• Gradual rate increases: Minimum rates for certain energy products, such as natural gas, would rise by one-tenth each year over a ten-year transitional period, to balance social costs, climate objectives, and fiscal stability.
• Annual indexation: Minimum rates would be automatically adjusted each year to preserve their real value over time and prevent erosion through inflation.
• Phasing out exemptions and reductions: The proposal removes several existing tax advantages, including the mandatory exemptions currently granted to maritime and aviation fuels.

Over the four years of negotiation, reaching the required unanimous support in the Council has proven difficult, aggravated by the energy cost crisis following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and rising concerns about the resilience of European industry. Several Council presidencies have tried to break the impasse by proposing prolonged transitional periods and the possibility for Member States to provide total or partial exemptions for certain sectors and services, or the installation of an ’emergency brake’ on the increase in taxation rates when countries are faced with a sudden increase in energy prices.

The Danish Council Presidency had invited ministers to reach a general approach on the proposal on 13 November 2025, but a number of Member States expressed reservations about the proposed compromise text. Consultation on the file (2021/0213(CNS)) in the European Parliament continues.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Encouraging clean investment: The role of tax incentives‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ioannis Stefanou and Maria Margarita Mentzelopoulou.

Child sexual exploitation and sexual abuse are among the worst forms of violence against children and know no borders. The rise in these crimes is exacerbated by the use of digital technology. Harmonised national laws and international cooperation are essential to improve prevention and protect victims.

Background

The European Day for the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, an initiative of the Council of Europe, is observed every 18 November to highlight the importance of preventing child sexual exploitation and abuse. The 2025 edition focuses on strengthening the protection of children against sexual exploitation and sexual abuse through evidence-based policymaking. At the EU level, in 2020 the European Commission launched a strategy for a more effective fight against child sexual abuse. Similarly, child sexual exploitation is a priority in the fight against serious and organised crime within the context of the 2020‑2025 EU security union strategy and the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT).

According to a 2024 UNICEF report, one in five girls and women and one in seven boys and men alive today globally have experienced sexual violence as children, while in Europe one in five children is estimated to be a victim of sexual violence, with 70-85 % knowing their abuser. Child sexual abuse and exploitation are increasingly occurring online. In 2024, the United States’ National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) received 20.5 million reports of suspected child sexual exploitation.

International and EU efforts to combat child sexual abuse International legal framework

The 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child laid the foundation for an international framework to combat child sexual abuse and exploitation. In 2007, the Council of Europe adopted the Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (CETS No 201), or ‘Lanzarote Convention‘. This was the first international instrument to categorise different forms of child sexual abuse as criminal offences. It entered into force on 1 July 2010 and has since been ratified by all EU Member States.

EU legal framework

The main EU legal instrument to combat sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children, as well as child pornography, is Directive 2011/93/EU (the Combating Child Sexual Abuse Directive), which criminalises various forms of child sexual abuse and exploitation, harmonises laws across the EU, and sets minimum sanctions. Article 25 requires the removal of websites containing or disseminating child sexual abuse material and allows blocking access where needed, helping combat online child sexual exploitation and abuse. Directive 2012/29/EU (the 2012 Victims’ Rights Directive) complements this framework with a child-sensitive approach prioritising the best interests of the child. The 2021 EU strategy on the rights of the child offers a policy framework to combat violence against children and protect them from all forms of abuse.

Recent developments

On 6 February 2024, as part of the EU strategy to more effectively combat child sexual abuse, the Commission proposed a revision of the 2011 Combating Child Sexual Abuse Directive. The updated rules would broaden the definitions of offences to include new forms of online child sexual abuse, introduce higher penalties, and establish more specific requirements for the prevention of offences and the provision of assistance to victims. Additionally, minimum statutes of limitation would be set to enable victims to seek justice more effectively. The Commission has also launched the revision of the Victims’ Rights Directive. On 23 April 2024, it adopted a recommendation on integrated child protection systems – a key deliverable under the children’s rights strategy to better protect children from violence.

Work has also continued on the 2022 legislative proposal that would require providers of online communication services to detect, report and remove child sexual abuse material. The proposal includes the establishment of an EU centre to prevent and combat child sexual abuse. Pending agreement in the Council of the EU (the Council), the European Parliament and the Council have agreed to extend the 2021 interim regulation, which temporarily exempts providers from electronic data protection rules, to allow for voluntary detection, reporting and removal. Furthermore, the Commission has launched a public consultation on an action plan to address cyberbullying, with a focus on minors.

International cooperation through EU agencies, initiatives and networks

Various EU agencies, such as Europol, support law enforcement cooperation among Member States to combat online sexual exploitation and abuse of children within the EU and globally. One example is the Stop Child Abuse – Trace an Object initiative, designed to help trace the origin of objects linked to criminal investigations. In addition, the European Commission has adopted the Decision to formally launch the Network for the Prevention of Child Sexual Abuse at the end of 2025.

Eurojust supports judicial cooperation among Member States for the cross-border prosecution of perpetrators. The Commission funds several initiatives and networks, including the Better Internet for Kids (BIK) portal, which raises awareness of risks, and INHOPE, a network of hotlines combating online child sexual abuse material. The WePROTECT Global Alliance develops political and practical solutions to protect children online and prevent online sexual abuse and long-term harm. The Internet Watch Foundation provides a hotline for reporting online sexual abuse content globally. ChildSafetyON brings together children’s rights organisations to end child sexual abuse and exploitation in the EU, as does the European Child Sexual Abuse Legislation Advocacy Group (ECLAG).

European Parliament position
In June 2025, Parliament adopted its position on the revision of the Combating Sexual Abuse Directive, proposing to increase maximum penalties for several offences and remove limitation periods. Since its first assessment in 2017 on implementation, Parliament and its Children’s Rights Coordinator have repeatedly called for full transposition of the directive and action in key areas. In November 2023, Parliament adopted its position on the proposed regulation to prevent and combat child sexual abuse; negotiations with the Council are ongoing. Moreover, a report from the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) on the protection of minors online is planned to be voted in the plenary of 25 November 2025. In addition, a draft report from the Committee on Culture and Education (CULT) is expected to be voted in committee in April 2026.
Parliament has also demanded better child protection and victim support and a greater focus on prevention and awareness raising; stressed that information and communications technology companies and online platforms should take some responsibility in the fight against child sexual abuse material; and called for more national investment in digital education. Parliament has welcomed Europol’s prevention and awareness-raising work, and supported the establishment of an EU centre to prevent and counter child sexual abuse.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘European Day for the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.