European Council

The EU's Political and Security Committee has appointed Kauko Aaltomaa, a high-ranking official in the Finnish Ministry of Interior, as new Head of the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS). He will take up his duties on 1 October 2017.

EUPOL COPPS is a part of wider EU efforts in support of Palestinian state building in the context of working towards a comprehensive resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on a two-state solution. EUPOL COPPS has been assisting the Palestinian Authority in building the institutions of a future state of Palestine in the areas of policing and criminal justice since January 2006. Through its contribution to security and justice sector reform, the mission supports efforts to increase the security of the Palestinian population and to reinforce the rule of law. EUPOL COPPS's current mandate runs until 30 June 2018. The headquarters of the mission are located in Ramallah.

Kauko Aaltomaa succeeds Rodolphe Mauget (of French nationality) who had held the post since 17 February 2015.

The Council has transposed into legal acts the provisions of United Nations Security Council resolution 2374 (2017), which allows sanctions to be imposed on those actively stymieing progress in implementing the agreement on peace and reconciliation in Mali, signed in 2015.

The targeted individuals and entities will be designated, where appropriate, by the United Nations Security Council or Sanctions Committee as being responsible for or complicit in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security or stability of Mali.

In particular, that may cover engaging in hostilities in violation of the agreement on peace and reconciliation in Mali or in attacks against the Malian institutions and security and defence forces as well as against international presences, including United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission (MINUSMA) peacekeepers, the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel) joint force, European Union missions and French forces.

It also includes obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Mali, engaging in human rights abuses, and the use or recruitment of children by armed groups or armed forces in the context of the conflict in Mali.

Sanctions against designated parties will include restrictions on admission of targeted individuals (ban on entry to the European Union) and the freezing of assets in the EU belonging to the targeted individuals or entities, in addition to prohibiting persons or entities established within the EU from making funds available to them.

The provisions can be found in full in the legal acts which will be published in the Official Journal on 29 September 2017. The legal acts were adopted by written procedure.

I feel cautiously optimistic about the constructive and more realistic tone of the Prime Minister's speech in Florence and of our discussion today. This shows that the philosophy of "having a cake and eating it" is finally coming to an end, or at least I hope so. And that's good news. But of course no-one will ever tell me that Brexit is a good thing because, as I have always said, in fact Brexit is only about damage control, and I didn't change my opinion.

As you know, we will discuss our future relations with the United Kingdom once there is so-called "sufficient progress". The two sides are working hard at it. But if you asked me and if today Member States asked me, I would say there is no "sufficient progress" yet. But we will work on it.

On 25 September, the Council adopted a regulation establishing a European fund for sustainable development (EFSD). The fund will be setup on 28 September.   

The EFSD is the main instrument for the implementation of the European external investment plan (EIP) which supports investments in African and neighbourhood countries. The main objective of the plan is to contribute to the achievement of Sustainable Development Goals of the Agenda 2030 through boosting jobs and growth, while addressing the root causes of migration.

With an initial budget of 3 350 million euros, the fund is intended to trigger up to 44 billion euro of investments. This amount could be doubled if member states and other donors match EU contributions. The fund will contribute to financing projects in a wide range of sectors, such as energy, transport, social infrastructure, digital economy, sustainable use of natural resources, agriculture and local services. 

The EFSD will encourage the private sector to invest in countries or sectors where it otherwise would not do so, such as fragile or conflict-affected countries. Similarly to the European Fund for Strategic Investment that will support investments within the EU, the fund will offer guarantees and support the use of blending mechanisms to support more risky projects. It will operate as a "one-stop shop", receiving financing proposals from financial institutions and public or private investors and delivering a wide range of financial support to eligible investments. 

The Parliament adopted the text on 6 July. The regulation will be published in the Official Journal on 27 September. On 28 September, the EFSD strategic board will hold its first meeting to discuss the overall strategy and investment priorities for the fund.  

Tuesday 26 September 2017
09.00 Meeting with Brexit EU Chief Negotiator Michel Barnier
London
(local time)
12.30 Meeting with Prime Minister Theresa May

Thursday 28 September 2017
13.30 Phone call with Eurogroup President Jeroen Dijsselbloem
Tallinn
(local time)
21.00 Informal dinner with EU Heads of State or Government

Friday 29 September 2017
Tallinn Digital Summit
(local time)
10.00 Meeting with Prime Minister of Bulgaria Boyko Borissov
11.00 Arrival and welcome by Prime Minister Jüri Ratas at the Tallinn Creative Hub
11.10 Meeting with Prime Minister of Croatia Andrej Plenković
11.30 Meeting with President of Estonia Kersti Kaljulaid
12.00 Opening address by President Kersti Kaljulaid
12.30 Session 1: working lunch on the Future of Governments
15.00 Family photo
15.15 Meeting with German Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel
15.45 Session 2 on the Future of Economy and Society
18.15 Press conference

Prime Minister Ratas has asked me to chair our dinner ahead of the Tallinn Digital Summit, which is why I am writing to you.

On 29 June 2016, a few days after the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom, we decided to begin a reflection on the future of a European Union of 27 Member States. The first meeting devoted to this, in September 2016, resulted in the Bratislava roadmap. We agreed to focus our attention on the issues of most immediate concern to our citizens: migration, security as well as economic and social matters. We further developed this agenda in Malta and in Brussels this year, leading to the Rome declaration, which outlined a more comprehensive vision for the years to come.

In parallel, we set out to deliver on this agenda also during our regular European Councils. We managed to sort out several issues, which is why the situation in Europe is better today and we can look to the future with more optimism. On migration, we focused first on the Eastern Mediterranean Route, then the Central Mediterranean Route, regaining control of our external borders and bringing down the number of irregular migrants and deaths at sea. On security, we continued to strengthen our instruments against terrorism and made important progress on European defence, including in cooperation with NATO. On the economic front we embarked on a reorientation of our trade policy so that negative effects of globalisation are mitigated. We are maintaining high ambitions in terms of market opening (trade agreements with Canada and Japan) while strengthening the robustness of our response to unfair trading practices.

On each of these issues, we still have important and hard work ahead of us. We need to consolidate our external migration policy, improve our capacity for returns and reach durable solutions on a reformed asylum system. We must continue to strengthen European defence, in the first instance by launching the Permanent Structured Cooperation in December. Equally, we need to continue to improve our economic base, including through the digital single market (Tallinn summit), while ensuring that it is socially balanced (Gothenburg summit in November).

We must also decide on the further development of the Euro. There is no silver bullet to complete the Economic and Monetary Union once and for all. But I am convinced that we have the obligation to improve the functioning of the EMU and strengthen it step by step. Our priority should be to complete the Banking Union in line with the agreed roadmap so that the euro area is strengthened structurally. This means that we have to prepare a common backstop to the Banking Union, to advance further risk reduction and pave the way for a European deposit insurance scheme. We should also enhance Europe's capacity to act, which could involve developing the ESM towards a European Monetary Fund. A number of ideas on governance and budgetary resources specific to the euro area have been introduced, on which much more discussion will be needed. In order to advance this agenda I will call a Euro Summit in December in an inclusive format. Concrete decisions on these issues should be taken at the European Council by June next year at the latest.

At the same time, we should continue to develop the international role of the Union, in our neighbourhood as well as at the global level. In the October European Council I suggest that we discuss our reaction to developments in relations with Turkey, and in May next year I propose, in agreement with Prime Minister Borisov, that we gather in Bulgaria for a Western Balkans summit. Trade will also remain an important priority for our work.

Looking beyond these immediate priorities, we have a big task in front of us when it comes to the next multiannual EU budget. This discussion, which will shape our policies for the years to come, will start in earnest once we have concluded the agreement on the UK's withdrawal. It will be an important item on our agenda until we reach consensus in time for the entry of the new Multiannual Financial Framework in 2021.

We cannot deal with, let alone decide on, all these questions in Tallinn. But I do think that this meeting will be a good opportunity to discuss how we approach this debate, particularly given the many interesting voices we have recently heard on substance, method as well as objectives. I will be seeking your guidance with a view to deciding, after our discussion, how to organise the work of the European Council in this respect. In order to ensure an open, frank and informal exchange on these issues, there will be no texts on the table, and no written conclusions will be drawn from our discussion.

Finally, we should all be aware that Brexit remains one of the main tasks for us. This will be the subject of our next meeting at 27 in October, on the basis of Article 50.

The Council has closed the excessive deficit procedure for Greece. It confirmed that the country's deficit is now below 3% of GDP, the EU's reference value for government deficits. 

On 25 September 2017, the Council repealed its 2009 decision on the existence of an excessive deficit. 

"After many years of severe difficulties, Greece's finances are in much better shape. Today's decision is therefore welcome", said Toomas Tõniste, minister for finance of Estonia, which currently holds the Council presidency. "We are now in the last year of the financial support programme, and progress is being made to enable Greece to again raise money on the financial markets at sustainable rates." 

From a deficit of 15.1% of GDP reached in 2009, Greece's fiscal balance has steadily improved, turning into a 0.7% of GDP surplus in 2016. Although a small deficit is projected for 2017, the fiscal outlook is expected to improve again thereafter. Greece's debt-to-GDP ratio peaked at 179.0% in 2016 and is expected to decrease over the coming years. 

In the light of this, the Council found that Greece fulfils the conditions for closing the excessive deficit procedure. 

Greece will now be subject to the preventive arm of the EU's fiscal rulebook, the Stability and Growth Pact. Monitoring will continue until August 2018 under its macroeconomic adjustment programme, and post-programme monitoring will follow. The Greek authorities have committed to maintaining a primary surplus of 3.5% of GDP until 2022 and a fiscal trajectory after that that is consistent with EU fiscal requirements.

When the excessive deficit procedure was opened in April 2009, the Council called on Greece to correct its deficit by 2010. 

In February 2010 the Council stepped up the procedure, having found that Greece had not taken effective action. It set out a timetable of measures to be taken and extended the deadline for correction to 2012. 

However, the deterioration of its financial situation led the Greek government to request financial support. In May 2010 the Eurogroup agreed on the provision of bilateral loans from the other eurozone member states, in conjunction with assistance from the IMF. A loan facility agreement was signed and the deadline for correcting the deficit was extended to 2014. Since March 2012, eurozone support has taken the form of loans from the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). 

In December 2012, the Council granted Greece a further two years to correct its deficit. It set a new deadline of 2016 and relaxed the annual adjustment path previously set. This followed an agreement between the Greek government and the 'troika' of international creditors (Commission, European Central Bank and IMF) on the disbursement of further tranches of financial assistance. Despite having taken effective action, Greece again faced a worsening economic scenario and a deteriorating outlook for its public finances. 

In July 2015 Greece requested further financial assistance, this time from the European Stability Mechanism that meanwhile had been established to take over from the EFSF. Agreement was reached on the provision of up to €86 billion in loans. A third macroeconomic adjustment programme started the following month and is scheduled to run until 20 August 2018. Its main aim is to secure for Greece a return to sustainable economic growth. And under the excessive deficit procedure, the Council issued a recommendation setting out a new timetable of measures to be taken. It extended the deadline for correcting the deficit by a further year, to 2017. 

Greece's general government balance has steadily improved since the peak reached in 2009. The deficit declined to 5.9% of GDP in 2015 (3.2% of GDP if the net impact of financial sector support is excluded) and turned into a 0.7% of GDP surplus in 2016. The deficit reduction was driven broadly equally by expenditure restraint and fiscal consolidation. 

Taking into account measures agreed under the third macroeconomic adjustment programme, the Commission in its spring 2017 economic forecast projects a 1.2% of GDP deficit for 2017. Based on a no-policy-change scenario, it projects a surplus of 0.6% of GDP for 2018. Measures outlined in Greece's 2018-21 fiscal strategy are expected to improve the fiscal outturn for 2018 and the medium term. Thus the deficit is set to remain below the 3% of GDP reference value over the forecast horizon. 

In the light of this data, the Council concluded that Greece's deficit has been corrected. 

The decision was taken without discussion at a meeting of the General Affairs Council.

The Council has added 9 persons and 4 entities - including the state-owned Foreign Trade Bank (FTB) - to the lists of those subject to an asset freeze and  travel restrictions, transposing part of the new sanctions imposed by UN Security Council resolution 2371 (2017).

This resolution was adopted on 5 August 2017 in response to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)'s ongoing nuclear-weapon and ballistic missile-development activities, in violation and flagrant disregard of previous UN Security Council resolutions.

The decision brings the total number of persons under restrictive measures against the DPRK to 62 persons and 50 entities as listed by the UN. In addition, 41 persons and 7 entities are designated by the EU autonomously.

The Council will work on the swift transposition of the other sanctions included in UN security Council resolution 2371.

The EU has implemented all UN Security Council resolutions adopted in response to the DPRK's nuclear programmes and nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes. In addition, the EU has also imposed autonomous restrictive measures against the DPRK, complementing and reinforcing the UN sanctions regime.

The legal acts were adopted by written procedure. They will be published in the Official Journal of 11 August.

On 17 July 2017, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2017/1341[1] implementing Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP.

The Decision amends the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures as set out in Annex I to Decision 2013/255/CFSP, adding 16 persons to the list.

The Candidate Countries the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, Montenegro*, Serbia* and Albania*, the EFTA countries Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova align themselves with this Decision.

They will ensure that their national policies conform to this Council Decision.

The European Union takes note of this commitment and welcomes it.

[1] Published on 18.7.2017 in the Official Journal of the European Union n°L 185, p. 56.

*The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

On 10 July 2017, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2017/1245[1] implementing Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP. 

The Decision amends the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures as set out in the Annex I to Decision 2013/255/CFSP. 

The Candidate Countries the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, Montenegro*, Serbia* and Albania*, the EFTA countries Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova align themselves with this Decision. 

They will ensure that their national policies conform to this Council Decision.

The European Union takes note of this commitment and welcomes it.

[1] Published on 11.7.2017 in the Official Journal of the European Union n°. L 178, p. 13.

*The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

10 years ago, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), which established a framework for the rights, dignity and well-being of indigenous peoples. 

Since then, there has been a rising recognition and understanding of the challenges faced by indigenous peoples. These positive trends have been enforced by the enhanced cooperation and partnerships between states, civil society at large and indigenous peoples. Such partnerships have benefitted from the fact that indigenous peoples are standing up for their rights, to end all forms of discrimination and to speak up against human rights violations and abuses. 

While they only make up less than five percent of the world's population, they account for 15 percent of the poorest people around the world. Indigenous peoples are also often among the first victims when human rights situations worsen. 

The EU has a range of polices in place to support the rights of indigenous peoples as set out in the UNDRIP, from human rights, to development and financing instruments. The EU's bilateral cooperation with many countries places a strong emphasis on indigenous peoples' participation at local and national levels in the countries they live. The EU is also taking action to fight violence against indigenous peoples and human rights defenders, especially when they are protecting lands and natural resources. Through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, the EU supports indigenous human rights defenders at risk in getting out of harm's way. 

This commitment to prevent and protect against threats and violence was reiterated by the EU Council conclusions on Indigenous Peoples adopted on 15 May this year. 

The EU will continue to stand by indigenous peoples in combatting discrimination and inequality. This is why the EU also is deeply committed to indigenous peoples' inclusion in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development where we will apply a rights based approach to development - encompassing all human rights so that no one is left behind. The EU's contribution to it will be guided by the new European Consensus for Development. 

The EU looks forward to continue our dialogues with indigenous peoples at all levels of EU cooperation to maximise the impacts of our actions. We will work with all partners, starting from indigenous peoples themselves, to ensure that the international community's commitments to UNDRIP continue in the coming years.

The Council has adopted a decision authorising a stabilisation action in the central regions of Mali, in the Mopti and Segou governorates. In response to the invitation from the Malian authorities, the European Union (EU) will deploy a team of experts to support Malian national plans and policies, in order to counter the growing insecurity and to re-establish and expand the civilian administration in these regions. The action's primary objective is to help consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and gender equality by strengthening general governance in this region for the benefit of the local communities.

The EU stabilisation team will be responsible for advising the Malian authorities in Mopti and Segou on governance-related issues, and supporting the planning and implementation by the Malian authorities of activities aimed at reinstating the civilian administration and basic services in the region. The team will be able also to support an enhanced dialogue between the Malian authorities and the local communities.

The stabilisation team will consist of 10 people and will have a budget of €3.25 million for an initial operating phase of one year. It will be based within the EU Delegation in Mali and will operate in Bamako, Mopti and Segou. This action will complement those of the EU Delegation in Mali and the CSDP missions deployed there (EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUTM Mali), and is part of the EU's integrated approach in Mali. The stabilisation team will also work in close cooperation with other international actors in the region, particularly the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

This stabilisation action is decided by the Council on the basis of Article 28 of the Treaty on European Union, which states that 'where the international situation requires operational action by the Union, the Council shall adopt the necessary decisions. They shall lay down their objectives, scope, the means to be made available to the Union, if necessary their duration, and the conditions for their implementation.' This is the first time that a Council decision has been decided in that context. The decision was adopted by the Council by written procedure.

The European Union and its Member States deeply regret the decision of the Venezuelan authorities to go ahead with the election of a Constituent Assembly on 30 July. 

The election of the Constituent Assembly has durably worsened the crisis in Venezuela. It risks undermining other legitimate institutions foreseen by the Constitution such as the National Assembly. The circumstances under which the election took place raise further doubts about the ability of the Constituent Assembly to effectively represent all components of the Venezuelan population. To all those who oppose serious negotiations, it has given an excuse to further drive conflict and use power unchecked. In addition, the legal attributions of the Constituent Assembly are unclear. 

The European Union and its Member States therefore cannot recognise the Constituent Assembly as they have concerns over its effective representativeness and legitimacy and call on the government of President Nicolas Maduro to take urgent measures to rectify the course of events. In particular, the effective installation of the Constituent Assembly should be suspended and the attributions of all institutions foreseen by the Constitution should be explicitly recognised. 

Further confidence-building measures, such as the release of all jailed political opponents, are also needed. In this respect, the EU and its Member States are deeply concerned by the news that Leopoldo López and Antonio Ledezma have been taken away from house arrest and ask for clarifications about their whereabouts. 

By taking this stand, the European Union and its Member States solemnly appeal to all those in Venezuela who have the democratic mandate to govern, to legislate and to administer law: they all need to exercise their respective responsibilities and negotiate a way forward. Negotiation, to be successful, needs compromise, and guarantees. It also needs the full respect for the constitutional rights and mandates of all legitimate State institutions, especially of the National Assembly, but also the Supreme Court and the Attorney General. 

The European Union and its Member States also welcome and encourage the offers of countries in the region and other international actors to accompany and facilitate such negotiations. They are ready to actively support all efforts towards this objective. 

In this context, they recall the four points identified in the 2016 dialogue and reiterated in the letter from Vatican Secretary of State Parolin, i.e. (i) an electoral calendar; (ii) opening of a humanitarian channel (iii) liberation of imprisoned opponents; and (iv) respect for the National Assembly. 

They call on all parties to refrain from violence, including through unidentified groups of armed civilians, and ask the authorities to ensure full respect for all human rights. 

The European Union stands ready to assist on all issues which could alleviate the everyday situation of the Venezuelan people. 

The European Union and its Member States are ready to gradually step up their response in case democratic principles are further undermined and the Venezuelan Constitution is not respected. 

On 28 June 2017, the Council adopted Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1148[1]. The Council Decision extends the existing restrictive measures until 31 January 2018.

The Candidate Countries Montenegro* and Albania*, and the EFTA country Norway, member of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine align themselves with this Council Decision.

They will ensure that their national policies conform to this Council Decision.

The European Union takes note of this commitment and welcomes it.

 [1] Published on 29.06.2017 in the Official Journal of the European Union no. L166, p. 35.

 * Montenegro and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

On 19 June 2017, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2017/1087 [1]. 

The Council Decision extends the restrictive measures until 23 June 2018. 

The Candidate Countries Montenegro* and Albania*, and the EFTA country Norway, member of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine and Georgia align themselves with this Declaration. 

They will ensure that their national policies conform to this Council Decision. 

The European Union takes note of this commitment and welcomes it.

 [1] Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1087 of 19 June 2017 concerning restrictive measures in response to the illegal annexation of  Crimea and Sevastopol (OJ L 156, 20.6.2017, p. 24). 

*Montenegro and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

The EU has added 3 Russian nationals and 3 companies involved in the transfer of gas turbines to Crimea to the list of persons subject to restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence. 

The EU has not recognised the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by the Russian Federation. As part of its non-recognition policy, the Council has prohibited the supply of key equipment for infrastructure projects in Crimea and Sevastopol in important sectors, including gas turbines in the energy sector. Establishing an independent power supply for Crimea and Sevastopol supports their separation from Ukraine, and undermines the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Gas turbines are a substantial element in the development of new power plants. 

The 3 persons have been added to the sanctions list for their responsibility in supplying Crimea with gas turbines from Russia. The turbines were originally sold by Siemens for use in the territory of the Russian Federation. The subsequent transfer of the turbines to Crimea was in breach of contractual provisions covering the original sale by Siemens. The companies placed under sanctions are the contracting party which purchased gas turbines and is responsible for the transfer, the current owner of the gas turbines, and a company specialising in control and communication systems for power plants, including in Sevastopol and Simferopol.  

These sanctions consist of an asset freeze and a travel ban which will now apply to a total of 153 persons and 40 entities. The measures were introduced in March 2014 and were last extended in March 2017 until 15 September 2017. 

The legal acts, including the names of the persons and the statements of reasons for listing them, are available in the EU Official Journal of 4 August 2017. The Council adopted these legal acts by written procedure.  

Link to official journal 

Other EU measures in place in response to the Ukraine crisis include:   

• economic sanctions targeting specific sectors of the  Russian economy, currently in place until 31 January 2018; 
• restrictive measures in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol, limited to the territory of Crimea and Sevastopol, currently in place until 23 June 2018.

The Council has received 27 proposals by the member states, related to 23 cities, to host  the EU agencies currently based in the UK. There have been 19 offers to host the European Medicines Agency (EMA) and 8 for the European Banking Authority (EBA). All offers are available on the website of the European Council.

The two agencies will need to be relocated in the context of the UK's withdrawal from the EU. The future locations need to be decided by common agreement of the EU27 member states. On 22 June 2017, in the margins of the European Council (Article 50), the EU27 leaders endorsed a specific procedure for this decision. The first step was the submission of offers by the member states by 31 July 2017. 

These are the cities proposed to host the EMA, as on 1 August 2017:

• Amsterdam (The Netherlands)
• Athens (Greece)
• Barcelona (Spain)
• Bonn (Germany)
• Bratislava (Slovakia)
• Brussels (Belgium)
• Bucharest (Romania)
• Copenhagen (Denmark)
• Dublin (Ireland)
• Helsinki (Finland)
• Lille (France)
• Milan (Italy)
• Porto (Portugal)
• Sofia (Bulgaria)
• Stockholm (Sweden)
• Malta (Malta)
• Vienna (Austria)
• Warsaw (Poland)
• Zagreb (Croatia)

The European Medicines Agency (EMA) is responsible for the scientific evaluation, supervision and safety monitoring of medicines in the EU. The EMA is essential to the functioning of the single market for medicines in the EU.

These are the cities proposed to host the EBA, as on 1 August 2017:  

• Brussels (Belgium)
• Dublin (Ireland)
• Frankfurt (Germany)
• Paris (France)
• Prague (Czech Republic)
• Luxembourg-City (Luxembourg)
• Vienna (Austria)
• Warsaw (Poland)

 The European Banking Authority (EBA) works to ensure effective and consistent prudential regulation and supervision across the European banking sector. Among other tasks, the EBA assesses risks and vulnerabilities in the EU banking sector through regular risk assessment reports and EU-wide stress tests.

The applications will be assessed on the basis of six criteria agreed by the 27 member states: 

• guarantees that the agency will be operational when the UK leaves the EU
• accessibility of the location
• schools for the children of the staff
• access to the labour market and health care for the employees' families 
• business continuity
• geographical spread

The Commission will publish an assessment of the offers based on the agreed criteria by 30 September 2017. Ministers will have a political discussion based on the Commission's assessment in October 2017 in the margins of the General Affairs Council (Art. 50).

The decision will be taken in the margins of the General Affairs Council (Art.50) in November 2017 by a vote of the 27 ministers. All offers will be submitted to the vote unless they are withdrawn by the countries concerned. The vote will consist of successive voting rounds as needed, with the votes cast by secret ballot and each of the 27 member states having the same number of votes.

The year 2016 will go down in European history as a time of striving to maintain the political, systemic, and social unity of the European Union as a community of countries, people, and values. It was a time of uncertainty and highly visible failures. But it was also a year marked by real achievements.

Above all, the United Kingdom's vote in June to exit the EU stands out as a bitter disappointment. And yet  a new pan-European consensus on the protection the EU's external borders, together with the conclusion of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada, warrants cautious optimism.

Most of the problems the EU has been grappling with for some time now have not been fully resolved. The migration crisis, tensions with Russia over Ukraine, and other external and internal security threats continue to test our unity and efficiency - and will continue to do so in the year ahead.

What we know from 2016 is that great change lies ahead - disconcerting, still unidentified, but nonetheless clearly palpable change. Indeed, the type of change that has been happening, and will happen in the future, is baffling political forecasters. It has been a long time since reality made such a cruel mockery of pundits and pollsters' predictions, even in the short-term context of upcoming elections or referenda. Politics has become as unpredictable as the weather in Brussels. And as with weather forecasts, if any predictions proved correct, it was the pessimistic ones.

The political tectonic shifts (and what else can one call the sudden drift of a huge island away from the continent?) now occurring are not just aftershocks of the financial crisis. Their source and essence are deeper than the anger of unemployed youth or the dissatisfaction with stagnant economic growth among European and American middle classes, although no sensible person would downplay these sentiments. But we all feel that these tremors may signal a more profound change: the end of an era, which in Europe could be called the Era of Great Stabilisation.

It is an era that has lasted 70 years, based on three pillars: an international order, in which the domination of the West commanded respect for rules and agreements, and which has protected Europe against global conflict; liberal democracy; and the relative prosperity of European societies.

The widespread anticipation of change should not frighten or, still less, paralyze us. As historians know all too well, it is stability, rather than crisis, that is transitional and short-lived. And, just as it is beyond our power to prevent crises, as they are inevitable by nature, it is not in our interest to cling to the status quo, as stabilisation sooner or later enters a phase of stagnation, when expectation of change becomes universal. This does not necessarily lead to catastrophe. But it may.

Everything depends on our collective ability to navigate stormy seas. The first prerequisite is to maintain the EU's basic unity. I will repeat this like a mantra: an internally broken EU will be incapable of rising to any of the challenges it faces, as will its member countries, including the largest.

The foundations of European solidarity remain fragile, and the real tests lie ahead. Without solidarity, Europe will have no influence over the direction of future changes, becoming their victim rather than their co-author. In order to avoid this bleak scenario, we must once again seek what connects us, what we have in common, what we are ready to defend with full determination, equal to that demonstrated by our opponents. We must once again define our territory, not geographically, but in a civilizational, cultural and perhaps even symbolical sense.

What we are observing today is that people, nations, and states are discovering the power of myth and simplification. This may foreshadow a politics, which is more brutal, rather closer to nature than to culture. The most important thing will be to distinguish accurately between what is shallow and unimportant in European tradition and what is lasting, valuable, and unique - what the historian Jacob Burckhardt called the freedom of spirit.

It is precisely in culture and freedom, where we will rediscover the essence of Europe. In politics this should mean that we must be prepared for change, on the condition that it does not restrict freedom as a core value. Before we overhaul the EU's structure, before we start solving fundamental dilemmas about the extent of integration, we must all agree that we want to carry the ideal of Europe as a continent of freedom from the past and into the future.

Today's world is full of barbarians, for whom freedom and culture, as we understand them, have become main targets of attack. Europeans will be able to overcome their current challenges only when we agree that we will not compromise in this confrontation. Symptoms of barbarity are around us, among us and within us. If we give in to external pressure and internal weakness, the coming changes may thwart Europe's most important political invention: the power of majority, the rule of law, and limited government, which only together guarantee human freedom and civil rights. This is why we must bravely and consistently defy those who stand up against our freedoms, whether from within or without.

https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/europes-values-are-its-best-defense-by-donald-tusk-2017-01?barrier=accessyef

On 26 July, the Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper) agreed on a mandate for negotiations on a draft directive covering entry and residence conditions for highly qualified  workers coming from third countries (blue card directive). Based on this mandate, the Council presidency will start negotiations with the European Parliament. 

"The purpose of the Blue Card is to attract highly qualified workers to Europe. The number of specialists and economic transformers in the world is limited and the competition for them is strong. Making them choose Europe will strengthen our competitiveness and contribute to economic growth", said Andres Anvelt, minister of interior of Estonia, which currently holds the Council presidency. "A common European residence and work permit that will facilitate and make conditions more flexible is necessary if we want to compete with the American green card or the Canadian point system”,  minister Anvelt added.

The reform of the blue card directive aims at making it more attractive for highly qualified workers from third countries to come to work in the EU. It will also aim to improve their mobility between jobs in different member states. It would replace the existing blue card directive, harmonising further conditions of entry and residence and improving the situation of highly qualified workers by the following means: 

• providing more inclusive admission criteria, including by reducing the salary threshold that member states can set for the admission of third-country nationals and establishing that member states may apply a lower minimum salary rule also to recent graduates, as well as by reducing the minimum length of the work contract to six months
• making the procedures faster, in particular by introducing the possibility to apply simplified procedures for recognised employers
• establishing that member states may allow EU blue card holders to engage in parallel in self-employed activities or professional activities other than their main activity
• facilitating intra-EU mobility, including by reducing the minimum period of legal residence in the first member state
• extending its scope to include non-EU family members of EU citizens and in certain cases, also beneficiaries of international protection  

The European Commission presented the proposal for a new blue card directive in June 2016 as part of the EU's efforts to develop a comprehensive migration policy, including in the area of legal migration. 

The President of the European Council, Donald Tusk received the letters of credentials of the following Ambassadors:

H.E. Mr Rigoberto GAUTO, Ambassador, Head of Mission of the Republic of Paraguay to the European Union
H.E. Ms Gaitri Issar KUMAR, Ambassador, Head of Mission of the Republic of India to the European Union
H.E. Mr Nestor Gabriele BELLAVITE, Ambassador, Head of Mission of Plurinational State of Bolivia to the European Union