One might have expected British Prime Minister David Cameron, the host of last week’s anti-corruption summit in London, to have been a bit more cautious when speaking of the “fantastically corrupt” countries whose leaders were his guests. Cameron’s comments about Nigeria and Afghanistan were caught on tape as he described them—to the Queen, no less—as “possibly the two most corrupt countries in the world.”
Muhammadu Buhari, the Nigerian president, was shocked and embarrassed according to media and staff reports, but declined to ask for an apology, pointedly stressing that he would rather see recovered the many tangible assets hidden away by his countrymen in the UK.
For all the diplomatic drama—since, not to be outdone, Queen Elizabeth was caught on tape insulting the Chinese too—the anti-corruption summit moved forward with representatives of some 40 nations present and with Buhari delivering the keynote address. A final twist occurred when The Economist reported there had been speculation that Cameron’s indiscretion was actually intentional, designed to stir up additional media interest in the otherwise staid summit talks.
International cooperation in the fight against corruption
By most accounts, the summit was a good first step toward international cooperation on transparency and toward cobbling together a coordinated effort to target secretive tax havens and offshore financial arrangements tied to illegal activities. Of the 40 attending nations, ten are EU members.
These European participants are now looking to shut down the anonymous shell companies used for money laundering by developing registers of the true business owners involved. While Ireland will consider it, France, the U.K. and the Netherlands have pledged to make those registries public—albeit some of the U.K.’s overseas territories, like the British Virgin Islands, will not be forced to come clean.
Additionally, five EU nations pledged to increase transparency on corporate tax compliance, while the summit further addressed corruption in negotiating and awarding EU public contracts, protections for whistleblowers, and seizure penalties.
However, the fact that U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry managed to shift attention away from America’s notoriously secretive states of Delaware, Nevada or South Dakota prompted many to argue that the West is more interested in pointing fingers at developing countries than addressing its own shortfalls. Looking ahead, participants agreed to hold a forum next year on asset recovery, one that will focus on assistance for challenged nations such as the “fantastically corrupt” Nigeria.
Nigeria and the culture of corruption
For his part, Buhari’s remarks referred to corruption as a “hydra-headed monster” that cannot be reined in without a coordinated effort. He detailed how four different Nigerian agencies are pursuing corruption investigations in a bid to respect his campaign promises from 2015. Buhari also addressed human rights issues in Nigeria’s fight against corruption, as well as the problem of oil theft, estimated at 150,000 barrels a day. The extent of Nigeria’s problem is reflected by data provided in the annual Transparency International index, which ranked the nation at 136 of the 168 countries evaluated.
Buhari, however, has so far failed to deliver on his lofty campaign promises to root out Nigeria’s endemic corruption. After a remarkably slow start to his term, which saw the country running without an appointed cabinet between May and November 2015, Buhari came under fire for using international aid money earmarked for cracking down on Boko Haram to fund a witch hunt against opposition politicians.
Indeed, according to reports, the nascent anti-corruption campaign has been targeting political enemies of the regime, raising fears that Buhari, a former military dictator in the 80s, is returning to his autocratic ways.
Beyond the shining example Buhari set for the wider region showing that democratic transitions can indeed be possible in Sub-Saharan Africa, Nigerians are not faring any better.
The president who once claimed he could singlehandedly stabilize world oil prices is being sapped by a period of high inflation that has driven food prices higher, while the inefficient power grid and infrastructure are dragging down the embattled Nigerian economy. Improving just the grid would boost the country’s economy by a whopping 14%, but the process is stalled because of rent seeking and graft.
What’s most troubling though is the vicious circle of corruption in Nigerian society: the elites who avail themselves of the country’s assets cause the very suffering that they are then supposed to alleviate. The poverty rate among rural households has grown to some 80 % on the back of tumbling oil prices in an economy that has failed to properly diversify.
The ongoing conflicts with Boko Haram in the northeast—itself fueling, and fueled by, Nigeria’s corruption—and the unrest from Biafrans in the south contribute to the nation’s climate of instability.
Everything considered, Nigeria is one of the most revealing examples of the pitfalls of corruption, the way it warps and drags down the entire economic potential of a nation.
When coupled with incompetent leadership, the only hope for Nigerians would be for this year’s anti-corruption summit to yield practical results. A list of individuals hiding wealth in London’s ridiculously overpriced property market and laundering corruption proceeds through the U.K.’s overseas territories would be a good start, both for Nigeria and David Cameron.
The post Cameron’s Anti-Corruption Summit: A First Step in a Long Road appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.
Written by Loïc Burton
On March 22, terror struck Brussels with a twin blast at Zaventem Airport and the Maelbeek metro station, claiming the lives of 32 people and injuring over 300. The attacks claimed by ISIS came only a few days after a suicide bombing killed five and injured 36 in Istanbul—the fourth suicide bombing in Turkey in 2016.
The latest bombings have reheated the debate within the EU about tighter border controls—possibly foreshadowing the eventual breakdown of the Schengen Agreement. In addition, the attacks have hardened Europe’s determination to combat terrorism at home, with increased monitoring of ISIS fighters returning from the Middle East and improved intelligence sharing between EU members, and abroad, whether through ramping up aircraft deployments in the coalition against the Islamic State or by supplying weapons to local actors.
Experts have argued that ISIS’s increased activity abroad is a sign of weakness rather than strength. As the so-called caliphate begins to crumble—ISIS is thought to have lost around 20% of its territory in Syria and over 40% in Iraq since its peak expansion in August 2014—the group is allocating efforts and resources toward large-scale terrorist attacks abroad in order to influence the strategic calculations of the coalition member countries at a reduced cost.
Since ISIS’s “winner’s message” of “remaining and expanding” sounds increasingly hollow, this tactical shift is one way to catch global headlines and retain its legitimacy and ability to recruit.
Although the increased operational tempo of terrorist attacks is the manifestation of the group’s faltering, the ISIS underlying ideology is not expected to wither away anytime soon. Jonathan Schanzer, a former terrorism finance analyst at the Treasury Department, argues that “defeating the formal military presence of a terrorist group will not significantly mitigate the threat of lone wolf or small independent cells that are based in the West.”
In its heartland, ISIS is definitely in retreat. According to Pentagon officials, U.S. airstrikes have killed over 25,000 Islamic State fighters and deprived the group of millions of dollars in revenue. Financially debilitated, it has halved salaries of its civil servants and is releasing hostages for sums as low as $500.
Indeed, ISIS has not scored a significant victory since taking Palmyra in May 2015. The ancient city was recaptured by the Syrian regime, supported by Russian airstrikes, on March 27, 2016, reducing ISIS’s ability to threaten Syria’s coastal regions.
In Iraq, after retaking Tikrit in March 2015 and Ramadi in December, the government in Baghdad declared on March 24 the beginning of operations to retake Mosul. The offensive to regain Iraq’s second largest city will not be easy.
After some initial success reclaiming nearby villages, progress in the military campaign was stalled. More sober prognostics have now replaced the once optimistic talks of pushing ISIS out of Mosul by the end of the year—military analysts estimate that there is little prospect of an assault on the city before 2017.
With about 10,000 fighters and almost two years to erect a multilayered defense, a force of at least 40,000 would be needed to overcome the group, according to estimates. Indeed, the current under-strength Iraqi division supported by U.S. military advisers looks woefully inadequate for the task.
Moreover, because of ethno-religious tensions, Kurdish Peshmerga seem uninterested in helping take a city that would never be part of an independent Kurdistan while Shi‘a-dominated militias—instrumental in retaking Tikrit—will probably be kept away for fears of sectarian reprisals following the conquest of the Sunni-majority city.
An important factor in the battle for Mosul is America’s involvement. The Pentagon wants to go beyond air strikes and the current deployment of military advisers and introduce additional special forces. However, this goes against Obama’s “no boots on the ground” pledge—although an increasingly tenuous promise, it rules out the deployment on the scale necessary to retake Mosul.
After attempting to train local forces—leading to the disastrous $500 million train-and-equip program for Syrian moderates that yielded little to no results—and bombing oil production facilities under Operation Tidal Wave II, the U.S. is now focusing on a leadership decapitation campaign, using special forces on the ground. In March, American forces killed Haji Iman, ISIS’s second-in-command, as well as Abu Omar al-Shishanim, the group’s “war minister.”
Secretary of Defense Ash Carter explained current U.S. strategy: “we are systematically eliminating ISIL’s cabinet,” in order to “hamper the ability for them to conduct operations inside and outside of Iraq and Syria.” Although the leadership is capable of regenerating itself and operating on the ground, taking out leaders reduces the group’s ability to conduct terrorist attacks abroad as they require a more sophisticated network and superior coordination.
Talks of a new training program—allegedly more narrowly focused—and Obama’s decision to add 250 military personnel to the 50 already on the ground in Syria are the latest development in the U.S. effort to capitalize on the momentum in the campaign against the Islamic State. It remains to be seen whether or not these new policies achieve the desired outcome.
Recommended Readings
Max Fisher, “The Brussels attack is Europe’s new reality,” Vox (Mar. 22, 2016).
Eric Schmitt and Alissa J. Rubin “ISIS Spreading in Europe, U.S. Intelligence Chief Warns,”
The New York Times (Apr. 25, 2016).
“The last battle,” The Economist (Apr. 16, 2016).
The post The Rise of ISIS: Great Decisions Spring Updates appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.
Cette recension est issue de Politique étrangère (1/2016). Jean-Loup Samaan propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de William McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse: the History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 2015, 256 pages).
En l’espace de deux ans, l’État islamique (EI) a généré une abondante littérature. Cet ouvrage propose de mettre en lumière une dimension peu ou mal comprise de l’organisation : sa rhétorique apocalyptique. McCants prend soin de souligner la particularité tant idéologique qu’opératoire de l’EI : le groupe est en effet le premier acteur depuis la chute de l’Empire ottoman à prétendre au statut de califat.
Il en ressort plusieurs clés de compréhension de l’EI. Tout d’abord, si l’EI est bien un descendant d’Al-Qaïda en Irak, sa stratégie s’en est dès le début distanciée. Ainsi, rappelle l’auteur, Ben Laden et Zawahiri ne proclamèrent jamais un califat qui devait, à leurs yeux, n’advenir qu’une fois les musulmans rassemblés contre l’impérialisme occidental. De plus, les attaques visant directement des musulmans en Irak et Syrie étaient jugées contre-productives par les leaders d’Al-Qaïda. L’EI, pour sa part, n’hésite pas à conquérir ses territoires par une campagne de terreur, et non de séduction, des populations.
Cela nous conduit à un phénomène particulièrement intéressant vers 2013-2014. L’émergence de l’EI et son ralliement par de nombreux djihadistes d’Al-Qaïda ont été entourés de débats internes et de controverses relayés par les réseaux sociaux, comme jamais cela n’avait été le cas dans l’histoire du terrorisme islamiste. Alors qu’Al-Qaïda prenait soin de contrôler les dissensions internes, les allégeances à Daech et les critiques à l’égard des autres mouvements (Jabhat Al-Nusra notamment) furent largement diffusées et discutées sur la toile. Il s’agit là aussi d’une dimension fondamentale de l’EI : son attention méticuleuse apportée à la propagande de masse.
Pour autant, le succès médiatique de cette campagne de l’EI et le flux sans précédent de combattants à ses côtés ne peuvent se comprendre sans la rhétorique apocalyptique qui l’entoure. McCants détaille celle-ci, en montrant comme la proclamation du califat, les références à « Rome », ou encore la mention de la ville syrienne de « Dabiq », sont autant d’éléments s’appuyant sur une croyance en la fin des temps annoncée dans les textes sacrés. L’auteur souligne comment cette eschatologie de l’EI émerge à la suite des révolutions arabes, qui ont elles-mêmes engendré de nombreuses théories populaires sur la fin des temps.
Dans le même temps, McCants souligne bien aussi la lecture cursive des textes sacrés par les idéologues de l’EI. Les crimes infligés et leur mise en scène sont ainsi justifiés par des références contestables à des hadiths tandis que toute contradiction possible est écartée – notamment sur l’interdiction de fumer qui ne trouve tout simplement aucun fondement dans le corpus religieux. Parce que ce messianisme s’ancre dans une lecture biaisée de l’islam, le discours de l’EI attire des masses de jeunes enclins à se sacrifier pour des idées, ou autrement fascinés par la symbolique apocalyptique.
Au-delà, la grande question qui subsiste à la fin de l’ouvrage est celle de la rationalité de l’EI : comment concilier la foi en une fin des temps islamique et la rationalité que suppose l’exercice du pouvoir sur des territoires ? La question est un défi tant pour l’organisation elle-même – qui cherche à préserver ses conquêtes – que pour la France et ses alliés – qui cherchent à détruire le groupe.
Jean-Loup Samaan
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