Marchés publics opaques, procédures d'exception, risques environnementaux : l'Expo2027 prévue à Belgrade reproduit des mécanismes déjà observés dans d'autres grands projets d'infrastructure en Serbie. Entretien.
- Articles / Belgrade Waterfront, Courrier des Balkans, Vucic, Serbie, Economie, Environnement, PolitiqueDu Hung Viet (left), President of the Eleventh Review Conference for the NPT 2026, chairs the closing session of the NPT Review Conference (27 April-22 May). Credit: UN Photo/Loey Felipe
By Naureen Hossain
UNITED NATIONS, Jun 15 2026 (IPS)
On principle, the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is an issue that unites the international community. But for a select few states, these principles came with conditions and a refusal to compromise on their security strategy.
The Eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) concluded on May 22, 2026 without member states reaching consensus on a final outcome document. It was the culmination of four weeks of extensive debates starting on April 27, along with the special meetings, consultations and briefings that preceded the conference.
Compared to earlier editions shared before and during the conference, the final draft weakened much of the language surrounding the obligations of nuclear states, including those that related to disarmament efforts. Yet even with these concessions, for the third time in a row after 2015 and 2022, the NPT parties failed to adopt an outcome document.
At the closing session of the conference, Do Hung Viet, President of the NPT Conference and the UN Permanent Representative of Vietnam, remarked that the collective threat posed by nuclear weapons requires a collective response. He warned that in 2031, the NPT would pass 20 years without an outcome. It was the responsibility of state parties, he said, to uphold the NPT until Article VI, which calls for parties to pursue disarmament measures in good faith, could be implemented, and they needed to bolster the treaty as a tool to address modern threats.
Following the closing of the conference, Viet told reporters that the current state of the international environment requires “urgent action” in the face of recent tensions. Although the conference could not reach consensus, Viet attempted to find some positives in the proceedings, in that the engagement “highlights the value of the NPT and multilateralism as a whole”. Yet he expressed concern for the health of the treaty going forward as it related to state parties’ commitments.
Izumi Nakamitsu, UN Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, added that if parties to the NPT wanted to prevent a “further decrease of confidence” in the nuclear nonproliferation regime, then they “need to visibly make a commitment” through measurable steps.
She remarked that the international community at large needed to take lessons from the proceedings, starting with the acceleration of disarmament commitments under existing treaties. There were also increased calls for a “strengthening of the review process”, or enhancing accountability and transparency measures over the implementation of countries’ commitments to the NPT.
“Nonproliferation and disarmament are two sides of the same coin, and it is simply wrong for nuclear weapons states to assume that nonproliferation obligations will be just adhered to without nuclear weapons states’ commitment and implementation of disarmament commitments under Article 6,” said Nakamitsu.
Susi Snyder (left), ICAN Director of Programmes, and Seth Shelden (right), ICAN’s UN Liaison, at a press briefing held on the final day of the NPT 2026 Review Conference. Credit: Naureen Hossain/IPS
Parties to the NPT, including nuclear-armed states, repeatedly acknowledged the NPT as a “cornerstone” for multilateral diplomacy and the nuclear disarmament regime. However, when it came to other nuclear treaties, such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), such acknowledgements were scarce. The final outcome draft makes a limited few references to these treaties but does not elaborate on the disarmament requirements outlined in them.
The final outcome document draft was noteworthy for its references to the humanitarian and environmental impacts of nuclear testing for the first time in the context of the NPT Review Conference. Experts from the International Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) noted that this was possible thanks to the advocacy efforts of civil society and of the communities impacted by nuclear weapons use and testing.
In particular, the draft “recognise[s] the growing calls for assistance to the people and communities affected by nuclear weapons use and explosive nuclear testing and for environmental remediation following nuclear weapons use and explosive nuclear testing” and “welcome[s] efforts already undertaken in this regard”.
The draft also included a call for member states to “take concrete measures to raise awareness of the public, including through education, on all topics relating to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation” by sharing the experiences of peoples and communities affected by nuclear weapons use and testing.
Recognition of the NPT stood in contradiction to the actions and statements made by nuclear-armed states. These states, which include the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, all maintain positions that contradict the principles of the NPT and broader efforts toward disarmament. These states have openly made plans to expand their nuclear arsenals and weave in the salience of nuclear weapons into their security strategy by justifying it through concepts of ‘extended nuclear deterrence’ and nuclear sharing with other countries considering their own nuclear expansion. Two members of the Security Council are engaged in separate, active conflicts that have only exacerbated geopolitical tensions, while also dredging up anxieties around nuclear weapons as a security strategy. With seemingly no end in sight to these conflicts, those anxieties have only deepened, and has shaped global and regional security policies for years to come.
For a civil society group like ICAN, the lack of outcome for the NPT is emblematic of increasing risks of proliferation among nuclear-armed states and their allies.
“There is a reason why the countries that claim protection from nuclear weapons are afraid of discussion of what these weapons actually do to people and the environment. They simply don’t want people to know the true extent of the horror and cruelty nuclear weapons wreak, because acknowledging these harms will eliminate any credible legitimacy for retaining nuclear weapons,” said Susi Snyder, ICAN’s Director of Programmes.
What will it take, therefore, for these countries to reverse their positions? Snyder told Inter Press Service that “increasing the stigmatisation” of nuclear weapons would be one such tactic. Reinforcing the nuclear taboo by raising awareness among the populations of these countries is critical for them to recognise the complete destruction that a nuclear weapon would bring about, and the impact this would have on targeted communities and on themselves. Snyder noted the literal cost of proliferation, claiming that in 2024 nuclear-armed states spent over USD 3000 per second on their arsenals.
Finally, security doctrines built on the theory of nuclear deterrence need to be challenged. Seth Shelden, the UN liaison for ICAN, noted that if nuclear weapons can be seen as useless from a military perspective and unsustainable from a policy perspective, nuclear-armed states would reevaluate their positions. “Nuclear weapons are irrational. Nuclear deterrence is a fable. And all technology is abandoned once it is seen as no longer useful,” Shelden said.
Though the 2026 NPT Review Conference ended without consensus, member states still have other avenues to pursue the nuclear disarmament agenda, both within and outside the NPT process. There still remain specific nuclear weapon-free zone agreements among countries and treaties like the CTBT and the TPNW which also contain legally binding obligations for their signatories. Snyder confirmed that the TPNW will host its first review conference at the end of this year. Meanwhile, the NPT remains in its current form and state parties recognise its obligations and safeguards on the nuclear regime.
In 2024, the UN General Assembly pushed to establish an independent scientific panel on the effects of a potential nuclear war, whose panellists will present their findings in 2027.
Galvanising the world public opinion on the nuclear regime is critical to restoring faith in the nuclear regime. Otherwise, Nakamitsu warned, the world is in “the trajectory of a very dangerous path.
“Let’s get back to a path that is more sustainable peace rather than creating arms race dynamics.”
Note: This article is brought to you by IPS Noram in collaboration with INPS Japan and Soka Gakkai International in consultative status with ECOSOC.
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By Robin Frisch
ALGIERS, Algeria, Jun 15 2026 (IPS)
The German government, along with a number of other countries, are currently organising flights to evacuate travellers and influencers stranded in the Gulf states. For many citizens of other nationalities, however, there is no such assistance. They remain stuck in precarious situations, marked by exploitation and insecurity.
Robin Frisch
The war in the Middle East demonstrates with brutal clarity that the Gulf states’ economic model is built on the systematic vulnerability of migrant workers. More than half of the region’s workforce are from abroad. Millions of people come from the Philippines, India, Bangladesh and African countries to work in the Gulf states — often for many years. Their biggest fears stem from the dangerous security situation, massive loss of income and total uncertainty about whether or not they will even be able to remain in their host country. Returning to their home country, on the other hand, is out of the question. In Nepal and Jordan, remittances from the Gulf states alone account for eight per cent of gross domestic product. Many emerging economies depend not only on oil and gas from the Gulf region, but also on jobs.A system based on exploitation
The fact that these migrant workers cannot be evacuated is due to structural reasons. In the Gulf monarchies, the kafala system binds migrant workers to a kafil, or sponsor. This modern form of servitude gives employers virtually unlimited control over their workforce. The Gulf model only functions because workers are permanently kept in temporary employment. They are imported, but not integrated. Their rights remain limited, social security is minimal and political participation not permitted. This arrangement is not a shortcoming but a prerequisite for maximum flexibility and low costs.
The fact that the Gulf states’ economic model is reaching its limits is also increasingly the subject of current debate. In a much-discussed New York Times essay, Richard Florida explains that the economic model in Dubai and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is actually exacerbating the crisis. His question – ‘Could this be the end of Dubai?’ – can certainly be answered in the affirmative, at least from a social perspective. The Gulf states have all failed to provide a social safety net for their millions of workers. The mere import of workers, and complete absence of integration or social security, signal the end of the Dubai model. For decades, the Gulf states have profited from permanently keeping their workers in temporary employment. This model may be economically efficient, but it is structurally vulnerable.
The current war is acting as a stress test for this system. And it has shown that there are no institutional mechanisms in place to protect migrant workers. While citizens are being evacuated, millions of migrant workers are left behind. While supply chains are being secured, there remains a lack of the most basic protection for those who keep those chains running. Nobody is taking responsibility — it is just being passed from pillar to post, between countries of origin, employers and governments.
An International Labour Organization (ILO) study showed that social security, if it exists at all, only ever applies to formal employment contracts. In almost all the Gulf states, these regulations place the burden on the employee. Health insurance is mandatory and must be purchased privately. Not one Gulf state has a functioning system of unemployment insurance. Saudi Arabia is the only state that provides social security coverage for workers from certain countries of origin. This model of temporary migration appears to be so successful that even the current crisis will not change it. It is not in the interests of the Gulf states to provide social security as they derive no benefit from it themselves.
Not a single Gulf country has ratified the landmark ILO Convention 189 on decent work for domestic workers, though Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have at least made slight improvements to their national legislation and acknowledge the problems. In Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman, union activity is not strictly prohibited, and trade unions are working to better integrate migrant workers. However, the crisis caused by the war is now so dire that the extent to which the situation has improved for domestic workers seems of secondary importance. Whether through trade unions, government measures or employer obligations, what matters is that the situation for migrant workers in the Gulf states is fundamentally improved. Reforms will achieve little. It is time for systemic change.
Developing a social safety net
The executive secretary of the Arab Trade Union Confederation, Hind Benammar, has criticised the kafala system, but at the same time advocates for channels of communication to be opened with Saudi Arabia. Such diplomatic efforts are important now as they can help initiate reforms and resolve conflicts between governments. But the fundamental problem remains: How can working conditions be improved in the long term, and what form might an effective social security net take?
The victims of Iranian attacks in Dubai and the UAE were almost all migrant workers. In Dubai, there were even alarming social media posts about labour migrants being imprisoned. The strict internet censorship in these countries complicates the situation, as members of migrant communities are often unable to openly discuss the conditions on the ground. The fact that in this situation, it is the migrant networks – not governments – that are picking up the slack is not a sign of resilience but systematic failure.
One of the few organisations that are actually helping migrant workers at the moment is the International Domestic Workers Federation (IDWF). The IDWF organises emergency accommodation and coordinates aid, thereby effectively replacing government safety nets. Social security only exists where it is improvised. The millions of jobs as cleaners, nannies and nurses are primarily carried out by women. Domestic workers are often not even allowed to leave their workplaces, let alone move freely in public spaces. The social isolation of these workers is reminiscent of the pandemic. Here, too, they had nobody to rely on except for their own communities.
When governments, employers and insurances fail to provide assistance, communities must step into the breach. The IDWF approaches the embassies of workers’ countries of origin, calls for repatriation flights to be organised and provides its members with individual-level safeguards. They make contact with domestic workers through community leaders. These individuals, who together play a role similar to that of a works council, provide information about the situation, offer support in emergencies and organise training sessions on issues such as mental health, which is becoming increasingly important in light of the severe social isolation. In some of the Gulf states, this work has been criminalised, and several community leaders have even been detained. For domestic workers, but also for those in the construction and transportation sectors, this is a matter of sheer survival. For the most part, however, the Gulf states have no established trade union tradition. In the Gulf monarchies, policy-making is controlled by a handful of powerful men.
Over the last few years, Qatar and Saudi Arabia have sought to make financial contributions to the ILO. But the Gulf states will not be able to simply buy themselves a clean slate. Ambet Yuson, general secretary of the six-million-member Building and Wood Workers’ International (BWI), has condemned the fact that Saudi Arabia’s reforms by no means signify an abolition of the kafala system, claiming they are in fact little more than rebranding. In Saudi Arabia, stadiums for the 2034 World Cup are currently being built, but the construction sector also lacks a basic social safety net. It would be disastrous if the mistakes made in Qatar were to be repeated here. There, too, the kafala system resulted in exploitation, as any worker who lost their job found it nigh on impossible to switch to a new sponsor. Recruitment practices and indebtedness in the home country further exacerbate this dependence.
Thus, the war has not only exposed a crisis — it has marked a boundary. A model that consistently shifts risks onto legally marginalised workers will only remain stable provided no shocks occur. As soon as they do, it becomes clear that there is no social security because uncertainty is an inherent part of the system. The Gulf crisis shows just how important it is to develop the social safety net that the trade unions are advocating for. The much-discussed question of reforms does not go far enough. The real problem is structural. Yet this does not automatically result in systemic change. On the contrary: reactions so far suggest that the cost of the crisis will, in fact, continue to be shifted onto migrant workers.
Change will therefore not come from the Gulf states alone. Here, external and transnational levers are crucial. Countries of origin must enforce stronger protection mechanisms and binding social security agreements; international organisations such as the ILO must strengthen minimum standards; and European countries must take responsibility, for instance by regulating recruitment practices, supply chains and labour standards.
Robin Frisch is the head of the regional trade union project in the MENA region and of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation’s office in Algeria.
Source: International Politics and Society, published by the Global and European Policy Unit of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Hiroshimastrasse 28, D-10785 Berlin.
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Il manquait un musée à Pristina et au Kosovo : celui qui raconte l'expulsion massive par trains de près d'un demi-million d'Albanais du Kosovo pendant la guerre de 1999. Un petit musée installé dans un wagon comble ce manque et permet d'écouter les témoignages de ceux qui ont vécu cet exode forcé.
- Articles / Histoire, Kosovo, Courrier des Balkans, Bombardements OTANLa fermeture du détroit d’Ormuz a mis en lumière l’importance stratégique des points de passages maritimes et a montré que leur blocage peut avoir des répercussions sur les marchés mondiaux. Cependant, ce détroit n’est pas un cas isolé : d’autres détroits et canaux jouent également un rôle déterminant dans la fluidité des échanges internationaux. Toutefois, ces passages stratégiques sont exposés à divers risques, qu’ils soient géopolitiques, tels que des tensions, des conflits et des rivalités entre États, ou climatiques, susceptibles d’interrompre la circulation maritime.
Quelles sont les normes juridiques auxquelles sont soumis ces détroits et canaux ? En quoi leur fermeture peut-elle perturber les échanges mondiaux ? Quelles sont les vulnérabilités de ces points de passages stratégiques ? Au-delà du détroit d’Ormuz, quelles pourraient être les conséquences d’un blocage d’un autre point de passage sur l’économie mondiale ?
Julia Tasse, directrice de recherche à l’IRIS et responsable du programme Océan, décrypte ces enjeux dans cette nouvelle Chronique Océan.
L’article Points de passage stratégique en mer : quels scénarios et quels risques pour 2026 ? est apparu en premier sur IRIS.
Participants at a Climate and Health Capacity Building Workshop. Credit: Friday Phiri
By Friday Phiri
BONN, Jun 12 2026 (IPS)
Africa contributes the least to global greenhouse gas emissions, yet it faces some of the world’s most severe climate-related health impacts. Several realities define the continent’s climate and health landscape – increased infectious diseases, air pollution, death, disruption and pressure on health systems through heatwaves, floods, droughts and storms.
Changing temperatures and, more significantly, rainfall patterns are expanding the geographical range and transmission dynamics of climate-sensitive diseases such as Malaria, Dengue fever, Cholera and other vector- and water-borne diseases.
Climate-induced droughts, floods, and changing rainfall patterns are reducing agricultural productivity and threatening food systems. This increases hunger, undernutrition, stunting among children, and vulnerability to disease. According to archive.uneca.org, malnutrition remains one of the largest climate-sensitive health risks across Africa.
Thus, as African climate negotiators intensify preparations for the 64th sessions of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies (SB64), a clear message is emerging from Bonn: climate action without health action is no longer an option.
Over two critical days of engagement, African negotiators, health experts, technical institutions, and young climate leaders came together to strengthen Africa’s negotiating positions and place health firmly at the centre of the continent’s climate agenda.
The Climate and Health Capacity Building Workshop supported by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), and the African Group of Negotiators (AGN) Lead Coordinators Meeting collectively noted the growing recognition that climate change is not only an environmental challenge but also one of Africa’s most pressing public health threats.
For AGN Chair, Nana Dr Antwi-Boasiako Amoah, the connection is clear, and the required measures are equally urgent.
“Health is the human face of the climate crisis,” he told negotiators and partners during the opening of the capacity building workshop in Bonn. “If climate negotiations are ultimately about protecting people, then health must remain at the centre of our efforts.”
Chair of AGN, Nana Dr Antwi-Boasiako Amoah, with Dr Lynn Wagner of IISD at the Climate and Health Capacity Building Workshop. Credit: Friday Phiri
Building a Stronger African Climate and Health Voice
Building on the launch of the first-ever African Negotiators Climate and Health Curriculum in 2025, by Amref Health Africa, the climate and health capacity-building workshop brought together representatives from WHO-AFRO, Africa CDC, Amref Health Africa, the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), technical experts, and young negotiators to deepen understanding of climate-health linkages and identify strategic entry points across negotiation tracks.
Participants examined ways to strengthen Africa’s position on adaptation indicators, climate-resilient health systems, early warning systems, health infrastructure, preparedness for climate-related emergencies, and financing mechanisms that can support health adaptation efforts.
“Following the adoption of the Belém Adaptation indicators and the ongoing discussions under the Baku Adaptation Roadmap, Africa has a unique opportunity to shape how adaptation is measured, financed and implemented globally,” said the AGN Chair. “We must ensure that health indicators under the global goal on adaptation are meaningful, context-specific, and responsive to Africa’s realities. We must also continue pushing for adaptation finance that enables African countries to build climate-resilient health systems, strengthen early warning systems, protect health infrastructure, and enhance preparedness for climate-related health emergencies.”
The emphasis on institutional coordination reflected a growing understanding that advancing Africa’s climate and health agenda will require sustained collaboration between negotiators, public health institutions, technical partners, and civil society.
And the WHO-Africa Regional Team Lead on Climate Change, Health and Environment pledged coordinated stakeholder support for the climate and health agenda.
“At the WHO-Regional office, we have developed Africa-specific policy and implementation frameworks in support of an Africa-wide coordinated climate and health agenda. Together with the Africa CDC and Amref Health Africa, we have offered and continue to provide technical support for the continent’s climate and health agenda. As we head to the African COP next year, we pledge continued support to the AGN, as Africa’s voice in climate negotiations, to ensure that climate and health are not left behind.”
Meanwhile, IISD Senior Director for Tracking Progress Programme, Lynn Wagner, noted the need for coordinated climate action, pointing out that “isolated action is no longer tenable as the global community faces multiple and interconnected environmental and sustainable development crises.”
IISD has been supporting the Friends of Climate and Health initiative aimed at fostering international collaboration on climate change and health.
Unity and Coordination Ahead of Critical Negotiations
While health featured prominently in discussions, the AGN Lead Coordinators’ Meeting reinforced a broader strategic priority; maintaining a unified African voice theme across all negotiating streams.
Convening lead coordinators for the various thematic streams, the meeting focused on aligning positions ahead of what is expected to be a pivotal negotiating session, ahead of COP31 in November and, ultimately, COP32 next year.
Drawing on priorities established during the AGN Strategy Meeting in Accra earlier in March this year, lead coordinators reviewed progress in implementing elements of the African Common Platform and assessed emerging issues across the negotiation tracks.
The AGN Chair called for discipline, commitment, and coordinated action.
“Our strength lies in our unity and our ability to speak with one voice,” he said, reminding negotiators that Africa’s influence in the negotiations depends on collective preparation and strategic coordination.
The discussions intensified the interconnected nature of many agenda items. Climate finance remains Africa’s foremost priority, but increasingly, negotiators are recognising how finance decisions affect the various thematic outcomes, particularly, adaptation, which has been Africa’s main agenda over the years.
Health, Finance and the Road to COP32
A recurring theme across both meetings was the need to translate recognition of climate-related health risks into tangible climate finance support for African countries.
Negotiators emphasised the importance of securing adaptation finance that enables countries to build climate-resilient health systems, strengthen disease surveillance and early warning systems, protect health infrastructure, and improve preparedness for climate-related emergencies, as espoused in the Belem Climate and Health Action Plan launched at COP30.
“Health is already recognised within the investment frameworks and result areas of major climate finance mechanisms, such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD),” said David Kaluba, a Climate Finance Lead Negotiator. “However, the challenge is not only the availability of financing windows, but the limited pipeline of country-driven health-focused proposals and investment demand. Most countries have yet to fully integrate health priorities into their national climate plans (NDCs), financing strategies, and project pipelines, resulting in significant underutilisation of available climate finance opportunities for health system resilience, adaptation, and loss and damage responses.”
Kaluba therefore notes the need to generate sufficient country-level demand through evidence generation, development of bankable climate and health investment pipelines, and strengthening of institutional capacity to access and absorb available financing.
A Defining Opportunity for Africa
For many participants, this work extends beyond SB64. It forms part of a broader trajectory towards COP31 and ultimately COP32, significantly viewed as more than a diplomatic milestone.
It represents an opportunity for the continent to shape the global climate agenda around African realities and priorities, including climate and health.
As negotiations intensify, African countries are seeking to ensure that climate action delivers meaningful benefits for people on the ground, and health offers a powerful lens through which to frame that ambition.
Therefore, as formal negotiations begin on 8th June, one message is clear: protecting the climate ultimately means protecting human health. And for Africa, this principle is becoming an increasingly powerful driver of its engagement in the global climate process.
The author is the Climate Change and Health Advocacy Lead at Amref Health Africa.
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Deux mois après l’ouverture des discussions entre Washington et Téhéran, la perspective d’un nouvel accord sur le nucléaire iranien reste incertaine. Les négociations semblent dans l’impasse et aucun des deux camps ne semble disposé à faire les concessions nécessaires pour parvenir à un compromis. Parallèlement, les positions de Washington et Tel-Aviv paraissent moins alignées qu’au début du conflit. L’enlisement de la situation et l’absence de progrès diplomatiques contribuent à renforcer les divergences entre les deux alliés et impacter l’évolution des négociations avec l’Iran. Où en sont les négociations entre les États-Unis et l’Iran et quels sont les principaux obstacles à leur avancée ? Les divergences entre les États-Unis et Israël peuvent-elles peser sur l’avenir des négociations ? Enfin, quelles conditions permettraient de relancer les négociations et un accord est-il encore en mesure de limiter les capacités nucléaires de l’Iran ? Le point avec Jacques Audibert, ancien directeur politique du Quai d’Orsay, responsable des négociations avec l’Iran de 2009 à 2014, ancien conseiller diplomatique de François Hollande, et membre du Conseil d’administration de l’IRIS.
Après deux mois de négociations entre l’Iran et les États-Unis, marquées par de nombreux blocages, quel bilan d’étape peut-on tirer ? Au vu des pertes subies parmi les dirigeants iraniens et des remaniements erratiques au sein du département d’État depuis le retour de Donald Trump, pensez-vous qu’il y a suffisamment de compétences des deux côtés pour parvenir à un compromis efficient ?
Le premier constat est qu’il n’y a malheureusement pas réellement de bilan d’étape, parce que la course n’a pas vraiment commencé. Les véritables négociations ne semblent pas encore engagées. Après deux mois, aucun progrès tangible n’est observable. Il y a eu des phases d’apaisement, des phases d’échanges plus positives, puis des phases de montée des tensions, comme actuellement, avec des échanges de tirs susceptibles de s’intensifier. Cette dynamique devrait toutefois se poursuivre sous la forme d’un conflit d’intensité moyenne : des moments d’apaisement devraient alterner avec des moments de tension, y compris avec des épisodes de frappes comme aujourd’hui. L’essentiel étant que des négociations s’ouvrent et se poursuivent. Or rien ne l’indique aujourd’hui.
Quant aux capacités des parties à négocier, tant du côté iranien qu’américain, il s’agit d’un des problèmes majeurs actuels. Si les deux parties ont intérêt à avancer vers une négociation et qu’aucune ne semble la rejeter totalement, aucun progrès n’est enregistré.
Côté iranien, les dirigeants ont été décimés. Plusieurs factions doivent se coordonner pour élaborer une position commune. Cela suppose des échanges internes et des négociations entre acteurs iraniens, ce qui paraît difficile sous la menace de frappes potentiellement mortelles menées par les États-Unis ou Israël. Les autorités iraniennes sont donc désorganisées et confrontées à leurs propres modes de fonctionnement institutionnels, qui rendent difficile l’adoption d’une position unifiée. Le Guide, les Gardiens de la révolution, le gouvernement et le Majlis n’ont pas nécessairement les mêmes approches.
Côté américain, il existe davantage d’unité de position, mais celle-ci est dictée par un président dont la capacité diplomatique de négociation semble limitée. Sa grammaire est celle qui a fonctionné dans la politique intérieure américaine : invectives, positions unilatérales pouvant aller jusqu’à l’injure, revirements ou affirmations éloignées de la réalité. Ces méthodes ne fonctionnent pas dans une négociation internationale. Par ailleurs, les outils de négociation mobilisés par Washington ne semblent pas suffisamment élaborés. Les interlocuteurs apparaissent surtout comme chargés de répéter rapidement les positions présidentielles. Rien ne laisse penser qu’une véritable équipe de négociation comparable à celle qui avait travaillé à l’obtention de l’accord de Vienne sur le nucléaire iranien (JCPOA) du 14 juillet 2015 soit aujourd’hui constituée.
Des deux côtés, les capacités de négociation apparaissent donc faibles. Cela explique l’absence de progrès, sur fond de conflit d’intensité moyenne alternant phases de tension et d’accalmie. La période actuelle correspond plutôt à une phase d’intensification.
L’imposition d’un cessez-le-feu au Liban comme condition à un accord par l’Iran et la pression, assez vaine à ce jour, mise par Donald Trump sur Netanyahou pour stopper l’escalade, ne révèlent-elles pas une perte de contrôle des États-Unis sur les négociations au profit de l’Iran et des orientations désormais différentes entre Washington et Tel Aviv.
Les orientations de Washington et de Tel-Aviv semblent effectivement en train de diverger. Au moment de l’attaque de fin février, les États-Unis ont été convaincus par Israël qu’une frappe très forte visant à décapiter l’exécutif iranien conduirait à un succès rapide. Les résultats observés montrent que cela n’a pas produit les effets attendus. Depuis, les positions tendent à s’éloigner. Benyamin Netanyahou souhaite poursuivre le combat contre l’Iran et utilise pour cela la poursuite de l’affrontement avec le principal proxy iranien au Liban, le Hezbollah. Les frappes dans le sud du Liban se poursuivent donc. Les conséquences éventuelles sur les négociations ne semblent pas constituer une préoccupation majeure pour Israël, et il est même possible que le fait que cela ait un effet négatif sur les négociations lui convienne, puisqu’il continue de poursuivre l’idée d’éradiquer le pouvoir iranien et la capacité iranienne à combattre, ce qui ne paraît pas réaliste.
Pour autant, il ne semble pas que les États-Unis aient perdu le contrôle des négociations au profit de l’Iran. Les deux parties apparaissent surtout incapables de négocier efficacement. Aucune ne prend réellement l’avantage sur l’autre. Les deux auraient intérêt à parvenir à un accord, mais les exigences restent actuellement trop élevées de part et d’autre. Cette situation est classique au début d’un processus de négociation. Il faut ensuite commencer à construire des compromis, parfois sous forme chronologique : distinguer les problèmes selon leur degré d’urgence, traiter certains sujets immédiatement, d’autres à moyen terme et d’autres encore à plus long terme.
Dans ce conflit, la réouverture du détroit et la fin du blocus des ports iraniens constituent des intérêts communs. La question devient alors celle des contreparties possibles et, surtout, de l’ouverture immédiate de négociations crédibles sur le nucléaire. Aujourd’hui, les Iraniens ne semblent pas prêts à avancer sur ce sujet, mais une position affichée aujourd’hui peut évoluer demain. C’est précisément le principe d’une négociation : faire évoluer les lignes jusqu’à identifier une ouverture possible. Pour l’instant, cela ne semble pas se produire.
Face à ces négociations qui semblent s’enliser, comment la situation pourrait-elle se débloquer selon vous ? Compte tenu des capacités d’enrichissement acquises par l’Iran, un accord pourrait-il réellement empêcher ce pays d’avancer sur l’acquisition de l’arme nucléaire ?
Un déblocage relativement rapide pourrait intervenir si un compromis était trouvé sur un séquençage des problèmes.
Dans un premier temps, les sujets considérés comme urgents devraient être traités : pérennisation du cessez-le-feu, rétablissement de la circulation dans le détroit d’Ormuz, probablement en échange d’une levée partielle des sanctions ou d’un dégel des avoirs iraniens.
En parallèle, il faudrait engager immédiatement des négociations sur le sujet central : le nucléaire. Une solution sur ce dossier ne pourra pas être trouvée rapidement. Lors des précédentes négociations, cinq années avaient été nécessaires. Trouver un compromis sur le nucléaire est indispensable, mais cela demande du temps. Le sujet comprend plusieurs dimensions, notamment la vérification des engagements des différentes parties, en particulier ceux de l’Iran. Ces mécanismes sont extrêmement techniques et nécessitent de longs mois de travail. Il faudrait donc commencer immédiatement ce travail, avec un engagement des Iraniens à geler leurs activités. Rien ne garantit toutefois qu’un tel engagement puisse être obtenu.
L’ensemble se déroule dans un contexte marqué par une certaine irrationalité. Après l’opération américaine menée avec Israël en juin 2025, il avait été affirmé que l’ensemble du dispositif nucléaire iranien avait été « obliterated », c’est-à-dire totalement annihilé. Ce n’est manifestement pas le cas. Aujourd’hui, le résultat réel des frappes sur les capacités nucléaires iraniennes reste inconnu. Il n’est pas possible de savoir quelles installations dissimulées subsistent, ce qu’il est advenu du stock d’uranium enrichi — notamment les fameux quatre cents kilos — ni dans quelle mesure les capacités iraniennes de production et d’utilisation de centrifugeuses ont progressé. Pendant les années qui ont suivi le retrait américain de l’accord en 2018, les Iraniens n’étaient plus soumis aux obligations prévues par celui-ci et ont ainsi pu poursuivre leurs activités de recherche et de progression des capacités sans les mêmes contraintes.
L’article Iran/États-Unis : des négociations sont-elles vraiment possibles ? est apparu en premier sur IRIS.
International institutions promote policy coherence as crucial to the effective and fair implementation of global sustainability agendas, though the evidence for its benefits is slim. We present here the first systematic cross-country dataset on the consequences of national government efforts to promote policy coherence for vulnerable groups in society. We confirm that coherence is perceived to be beneficial for most groups. However, we find vulnerable groups are largely perceived to bear the brunt of incoherence, while traditionally powerful groups benefit from it in some cases. Based on these findings, we argue that coherence can play an important role in reducing inequality and ensuring countries “Leave No One Behind” in implementing climate and development goals.
By CIVICUS
Jun 12 2026 (IPS)
CIVICUS discusses Botswana’s decriminalisation of same-sex relations with Faith Gunda, a Botswana-based law student and human rights defender, a member of the CIVICUS Protest Lab and co-founder of Sisterhood Chain International, a solidarity initiative that supports grassroots groups and amplifies young women’s voices.
Faith Gunda
In March, Botswana formally removed colonial-era provisions that criminalised same-sex relations from its penal code, marking the culmination of over a decade of sustained civil society activism. This reform aligned the law with landmark constitutional rulings from 2019 and 2021, making Botswana a progressive leader on a continent where 31 countries still criminalise same-sex relations. However, significant challenges remain. Social attitudes lag behind legal progress, and conservative religious groups are mobilising against LGBTQI+ rights as a critical marriage equality case comes to the High Court in July.What does repeal mean for LGBTQI+ people?
The formal repeal is symbolic, but symbols matter because they tell people whether they belong. For years, criminal provisions sent a message to LGBTQI+ people in Botswana: you are criminals. Even after the courts ruled these provisions unconstitutional in 2019, they remained on the books, a constant reminder that the state saw their identities as a threat. Their removal aligns written law with constitutional values of dignity, equality, liberty and privacy. But more importantly, it says that LGBTQI+ people are not criminals.
This changes everything for young people. When the law no longer criminalises your identity, it has positive impacts on mental health, belonging and civic participation. It lets LGBTQI+ people report violence, seek healthcare and live openly without fear. People can breathe a little easier. They can imagine futures they couldn’t before.
This progress didn’t come from above. It came from years of relentless advocacy by LGBTQI+ activists, LGBTQI+ organisations such as Lesbians, Gays and Bisexuals of Botswana and everyday people willing to risk everything to challenge entrenched stigma. The formal repeal is not the end of a struggle. It’s a foundation for the next phase. The work continues.
Why did it take so long to remove provisions courts declared unconstitutional?
Legal victories and political change don’t move at the same pace. The courts were clear in 2019 that the law was unconstitutional. But court rulings cannot implement themselves. Colonial-era laws remain embedded in statute books because removing them takes political will and politicians fear backlash. For six years, LGBTQI+ people lived with a law the courts had already called unjust.
What finally made change happen was sustained pressure. Civil society organisations, human rights defenders and lawyers refused to let this go. The Court of Appeal upheld the judgment in 2021, and activists kept speaking up, organising and demanding implementation. In March, the law finally changed. So, this is the lesson: court rulings matter, but it’s sustained civic action that turns them into real protection.
What barriers remain, and what comes next?
Decriminalisation isn’t the same as equality, but it’s the foundation for it. Real equality means marriage rights, family recognition and anti-discrimination protections. The marriage equality case due to be heard in court in July will test whether constitutional protections reach beyond private intimacy into full citizenship and whether same-sex couples can access the dignity and legal recognition marriage provides.
But legal barriers are only a part of the story. Social barriers persist too, including stigma in families, healthcare systems, schools and workplaces. Legal reform creates protection, but it cannot instantly change rooted attitudes. Young people in Botswana increasingly believe everyone should be able to live authentically without fear. They are organising, speaking openly, refusing the silence previous generations endured. This generational shift is becoming the most powerful driver of change.
The journey is not linear, but the direction is undeniable. Meaningful reform takes continuous civic engagement. This means activists documenting and defending civic space, grassroots organisations amplifying youth leadership and people refusing to accept anything less than full humanity.
Is Botswana an example for Africa?
Botswana’s progress shouldn’t be romanticised. The country still faces social conservatism and discrimination, and its gains will be vulnerable unless they are continuously defended. But it offers a model to follow.
Botswana stands out on the continent because it succeeded through civic advocacy, constitutionalism and judicial independence. This matters all the more now, when several African governments are passing harsher anti-LGBTQI+ laws and dismissing these rights as ‘un-African’, even though the laws banning same-sex relations were colonial imports.
Botswana’s path challenges that narrative. It shows that African constitutional democracies can interpret dignity, equality and liberty inclusively, without abandoning local legal traditions. For human rights defenders across the region, Botswana is proof that civic engagement, sustained advocacy and strategic litigation can produce meaningful change even in difficult political climates.
CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.
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Botswana: criminalisation of same-sex relations off the books CIVICUS Lens 21.May.2026
Gender rights: rollback and resistance CIVICUS | State of Civil Society Report 2026
Namibia: LGBTQI+ rights victory amid regression CIVICUS Lens 05.Jul.2024
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An aerial view of a beach with a ferris wheel, Ain Dubai, Bluewaters, Dubai, UAE. Credit: Unsplash/Nelemson Guevarra
By Maximilian Malawista
UNITED NATIONS, Jun 12 2026 (IPS)
The global ocean economy continues its expansion, with ocean-related trade reaching USD 2.5 trillion as of 2025. Ocean services now make up the majority of the ocean trade, accounting for 58.9 percent of the composition, up from 47.8 percent in 2020.
Ocean services alone are now valued at USD 1.44 trillion dollars, an increase of USD 1.2 trillion since 2020; a rate greater than the entire global ocean trade in 2020. While 2020 was a year filled with disruptions, economies contracting, and consumer smoothing, this number is an increase of USD 476 billion dollars since 2015, a 49.5 percent growth from 2015, where the ocean services trade generated USD 961 billion.
“The ocean economy is expanding rapidly across sectors such as aquaculture, tourism, and shipping. While this growth is vital for food security, employment, and economic development, it’s increasingly constrained by the declining health of the ocean,” said Rafael González Quiroz, co-director of the United Nations ‘Third World Ocean Assessment’ and director of Spain’s Oceanographic center of Gijón (IEO-CSIC), during a press briefing held on World Ocean Day (June 8).
The UN World Ocean Assessment is a global integrated assessment of the world’s ocean following environmental, economic and social aspects, with interdisciplinary inputs from more than 650 experts to provide scientific basis for the consideration of ocean issues by governments and policy makers, among other stakeholders involved in the regulation and protection of the ocean.
Quiroz’s assessment reflect the broader expansion and changes within the ocean economy, where services have an increasingly dominant role in the global ocean economy. The strongest example of such is the recovery of marine and coastal tourism, which has turned sharply since the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic.
Credit: IPS/Maximilian Malawista
Today, marine and coastal tourism now accounts for 32 percent of global ocean trade, up from 16 percent in 2020. 32 percent representing USD 785 billion, over half of all ocean services trade. Maritime freight transport remains the second highest, at roughly USD 487 billion or 20 percent of total ocean trade. Quiroz emphasized that a “sustainable ocean economy can only exist if it’s built upon a healthy and resilient ocean”.
One of the key challenges highlighted during the briefing was marine pollution, especially plastics. Within global plastics trade, only 10 percent of all plastics are recycled. 52 million tonnes of such plastic waste every year enters the ocean, which the United Nations states is affecting at least 4,000 marine species.
In response, the international community has spent the past six years working on negotiating a “global plastics treaty”, an agreement which would put a ceiling on plastic production, and limit the USD 1.1 trillion dollar industry, ensuring waste management standards, recycling requirements, and creating market space for sustainable alternatives.
Achieving this may require changes to global trade incentives. UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD) finds that “the key barrier is an uneven national and trade policy field.”
According to UNCTAD, tariffs on plastics have fallen from 34 percent to 7.2 percent over the past 3 decades, giving plastic producers a larger incentive to keep making more plastic. While plastic tariffs have decreased, alternatives to plastics like bamboo, natural fibers, paper, and seaweed have had tariffs double to the rate of 14.4 percent. As a result of such tariffs, conventional plastics remain the cheaper option for manufacturers.
However, recent volatility in the energy markets stemming from the current Strait of Hormuz crisis has increased the cost of plastic production. Reports from UNCTAD show that because plastics are approximately 98 percent derived from fossil fuels, the cost of plastic prices has risen 70-80 percent in the European markets. This market shock could open the door for sustainable alternatives, giving real reason for companies to develop products free of polyethylene resin and other plastics, further developing the sustainable alternatives industry.
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Droughts are slow-onset disasters with severe environmental, economic, and social consequences, disproportionately affecting regions with limited resources and institutional capacity, which is further exacerbated by climate change and land use change. Key challenges to effective drought resilience include socioeconomic disparities, fragmented policies, financial constraints, and governance weaknesses. To address these gaps, this study develops indicators for assessing drought preparedness and resilience across different economic contexts. A review of 16 national drought and water policies produced a framework comprising 12 global targets, 45 sub-targets, and 129 indicators aligned with existing international frameworks. Indicators are organized into four thematic focus areas: (i) Fundamental Needs & Agricultural Resilience, (ii) Proactive Monitoring & Crisis Response, (iii) Ecosystem & Resource Sustainability, and (iv) Institutional Strengthening & Financial Resilience. The framework is designed to standardize best practices, improve cooperation, and guide resilience-building across diverse contexts while distilling shared dimensions of preparedness and resilience. The analysis emphasizes the role of SMART (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-bound) indicators in proactive drought management, where governance, leadership, and evidence-based policymaking are as critical as financial and technological resources. It recommends flexible measurement tools and institutionalized assessment mechanisms to track progress and refine strategies, enabling a shift from reactive crisis response to long-term resilience, strengthening accountability and enhancing global drought preparedness.
Le nouveau pacte européen sur la migration entre en vigueur ce 12 juin. Au programme : détentions prolongées, y compris pour les mineurs étrangers non accompagnés et les familles avec mineurs.
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