European Union

The Council has transposed into legal acts the provisions of United Nations Security Council resolution 2374 (2017), which allows sanctions to be imposed on those actively stymieing progress in implementing the agreement on peace and reconciliation in Mali, signed in 2015.

The targeted individuals and entities will be designated, where appropriate, by the United Nations Security Council or Sanctions Committee as being responsible for or complicit in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security or stability of Mali.

In particular, that may cover engaging in hostilities in violation of the agreement on peace and reconciliation in Mali or in attacks against the Malian institutions and security and defence forces as well as against international presences, including United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission (MINUSMA) peacekeepers, the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel) joint force, European Union missions and French forces.

It also includes obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Mali, engaging in human rights abuses, and the use or recruitment of children by armed groups or armed forces in the context of the conflict in Mali.

Sanctions against designated parties will include restrictions on admission of targeted individuals (ban on entry to the European Union) and the freezing of assets in the EU belonging to the targeted individuals or entities, in addition to prohibiting persons or entities established within the EU from making funds available to them.

The provisions can be found in full in the legal acts which will be published in the Official Journal on 29 September 2017. The legal acts were adopted by written procedure.

AMENDMENTS 1 - 232 - Draft report Recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the EEAS on the Eastern Partnership, in the run-up to the November 2017 Summit
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

I feel cautiously optimistic about the constructive and more realistic tone of the Prime Minister's speech in Florence and of our discussion today. This shows that the philosophy of "having a cake and eating it" is finally coming to an end, or at least I hope so. And that's good news. But of course no-one will ever tell me that Brexit is a good thing because, as I have always said, in fact Brexit is only about damage control, and I didn't change my opinion.

As you know, we will discuss our future relations with the United Kingdom once there is so-called "sufficient progress". The two sides are working hard at it. But if you asked me and if today Member States asked me, I would say there is no "sufficient progress" yet. But we will work on it.

will take place on Wednesday 11 October, 9:00-12:30 and 14:30-18:30 and Thursday 12 October, 9:00-12:30 in Brussels.

Organisations or interest groups who wish to apply for access to the European Parliament will find the relevant information below.

Further information
watch the meeting live
Access rights for interest group representatives
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Review by the Court of Auditors of the management system of cases brought before the Court of Justice and General Court of the European Union

Length of video : 153'
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Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Publication resulting from the UACES 2017 PhD and ECR Conference

Although little evidence supports the existence of welfare tourism, the EU’s Court of Justice has increasingly adopted this economic rationale in its rulings, writes Charles O’Sullivan. He argues that the court, having departed from its original legal test for social assistance claims in several decisions, is bowing to political pressure on access to welfare support.

Jobcenter Berlin Mitte, Manfred Wassmann, CC-BY-SA-2.0

The ‘welfare tourist’, despite a lack of evidence to support its existence, is considered to be a migrant who moves to another state with the specific intention of taking advantage of its more generous welfare system. The European Parliamentary Research Service however believed that the current invocation of this category of migrants has little to do with them.

Rather, it is the economically-inactive generally as well as the current rules supporting free movement that critics oppose, despite EU law mandating that EU citizens do not become an ‘undue burden’ on the national social assistance system. Yet the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has begun to utilise this language both directly and indirectly within its own judgements in recent years with greater frequency.

The ‘Undue Burden’ in Directive 2004/38/EC

Directive 2004/38/EC regulates the right to residence and social assistance for EU citizens regardless of their economic activity. The right to move and reside freely is contained in Articles 6, 7 and 16 of the directive, and outlining the conditions applied to residence in a host state for less than three months, between three months and five years and over five years, respectively.

Article 7 in particular makes clear that those resident in a Member State between three months and five years cannot become an ‘undue burden’, and must ensure that they possess adequate financial resources and health insurance. Where they are capable of being deemed as such, they may lose their right to reside and, in some circumstances, can be removed on this basis. Article 14 does underline that an EU citizen cannot automatically be deemed an undue burden and removed simply by attempting to access the national social assistance system.

The Brey Test

It was not until the Brey case that the CJEU specifically adopted a set of criteria a Member State should apply to the economically-inactive making a social assistance claim who does not retain worker status. The court made clear that, before a social assistance claim is refused, the relevant welfare authority within a Member State must consider:  if it is merely a temporary difficulty; the applicant’s length of residence; any relevant personal circumstances; the amount that would be paid to them; and how many others would be in the same position (Paras 64 and 78).

For a small subset of individuals, this would have granted them a presumptive right to access social assistance, albeit one which was still a very limited right and one which would place their residency in a degree of jeopardy. It was still possible for such persons to be considered an undue burden once they had been granted access and their limited period of access had elapsed.

Dano as ‘Evidence of Welfare Tourism’

A short time later, the decision in Dano confirmed that the court had significantly reassessed the Brey decision and was adopting the ‘welfare tourist’ as a specific exception to this rule. The case involved a Romanian national who, along with her son, lived with and was cared for by her sister in Germany. She was subsequently refused a social assistance payment which as a secondary purpose facilitated access to the labour market and argued that this was discriminatory under EU law as EU citizens were not entitled to it.

Rather than focusing on this question, the CJEU emphasised that Ms Dano had no intention of working, and was a ‘fairly blatant’ example of welfare tourism. Very little was made of the fact that she had been resident in Germany for some time, had been granted an unrestricted right to residence, and was already in receipt of other social assistance payments. Nor did the court consider that she was low-skilled, and had a low level of spoken and written German comprehension. Due to her lack of economic activity, the court distinguished it from the criteria set out in Brey as well as overruling the German authorities by saying that she would no longer have a right of residence under EU law.

Subtle Restatement in Alimanovic

In Alimanovic, the German state sought to clarify whether or not it had acted justly in cutting off a Swedish jobseeker from the same broad category of payment at issue in Dano once the applicant’s statutory entitlement had elapsed. In finding in favour of the German authorities, the CJEU held that, whilst Ms Alimanovic would not herself constitute an undue burden on the state, to limit a Member State’s authority in this area could lead to unreasonable demands being made on its welfare system (Para 62).

The applicant’s surrounding personal circumstances were again not considered, and the court made several mentions of the Dano decision before concluding that Brey was not applicable, despite it being unlikely that her continued receipt of this payment would be more than temporary. The broader argument concerning the sanctity of the national welfare system and need to limit the access of others to social assistance, a tacit reference to welfare tourism, superseded her personal circumstances.

Limited Rights for All?

The most recent and perhaps the most worrying continuation of this trend took place in Commission v UK, which dealt with social security for the economically-active, a statutory right. Yet the CJEU allowed conditions not present in the rules governing access to social security, but included in Directive 2004/38/EC, could be applied by Member States in order to protect the financial security of their welfare systems and to verify entitlements (Para 80).

In justifying this approach, the CJEU invoked both Dano and Brey, and signalled that further changes targeted directly and indirectly at the spectre of welfare tourism remain all too present in this area. From this we can see that economic arguments are now being adopted as a general rule in all areas of EU welfare law due to external political pressures from, as well as within, the Member States.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Student Forum or UACES.

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Shortlink for this article: bit.ly/2ypwR6U

Charles O’Sullivan | @oscharles
Maynooth University

Charles O’Sullivan is PhD Candidate in Law at Maynooth University. His research focuses on access to social welfare in Ireland for different types of migrants under EU and Irish law.
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The post The Spectre of the ‘Welfare Tourist’ within the Judgements of the CJEU appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

AMENDMENTS 1 - 199 - Draft report Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World 2016 and the European Union’s policy on the matter
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

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EU Ministers of Foreign and European Affairs meet in Brussels on 25 September 2017 to discuss in an EU 27 format the state of play of Brexit negotiations and the annotated draft agenda for October's European Council (Art.50).

Download this video here.

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EU Ministers of Foreign and European Affairs meet in Brussels on 25 September 2017 to start the preparation of the October European Council and to discuss the Commission's letter of intent on its work programme for 2018.

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Two years later, we look back on how the EU migration crisis unfolded through 2015, and how the EU developed its response. This is the "inside story", as told by key witnesses from the Council of the EU and the European Commission. It is an attempt to explain the complexities of one of the biggest crises the EU is experiencing. It covers 9 months of crisis in 2015, and is available in 24 EU languages.  

Download this video here.

On 25 September, the Council adopted a regulation establishing a European fund for sustainable development (EFSD). The fund will be setup on 28 September.   

The EFSD is the main instrument for the implementation of the European external investment plan (EIP) which supports investments in African and neighbourhood countries. The main objective of the plan is to contribute to the achievement of Sustainable Development Goals of the Agenda 2030 through boosting jobs and growth, while addressing the root causes of migration.

With an initial budget of 3 350 million euros, the fund is intended to trigger up to 44 billion euro of investments. This amount could be doubled if member states and other donors match EU contributions. The fund will contribute to financing projects in a wide range of sectors, such as energy, transport, social infrastructure, digital economy, sustainable use of natural resources, agriculture and local services. 

The EFSD will encourage the private sector to invest in countries or sectors where it otherwise would not do so, such as fragile or conflict-affected countries. Similarly to the European Fund for Strategic Investment that will support investments within the EU, the fund will offer guarantees and support the use of blending mechanisms to support more risky projects. It will operate as a "one-stop shop", receiving financing proposals from financial institutions and public or private investors and delivering a wide range of financial support to eligible investments. 

The Parliament adopted the text on 6 July. The regulation will be published in the Official Journal on 27 September. On 28 September, the EFSD strategic board will hold its first meeting to discuss the overall strategy and investment priorities for the fund.  

Committee and political group meetings, Brussels

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Tuesday 26 September 2017
09.00 Meeting with Brexit EU Chief Negotiator Michel Barnier
London
(local time)
12.30 Meeting with Prime Minister Theresa May

Thursday 28 September 2017
13.30 Phone call with Eurogroup President Jeroen Dijsselbloem
Tallinn
(local time)
21.00 Informal dinner with EU Heads of State or Government

Friday 29 September 2017
Tallinn Digital Summit
(local time)
10.00 Meeting with Prime Minister of Bulgaria Boyko Borissov
11.00 Arrival and welcome by Prime Minister Jüri Ratas at the Tallinn Creative Hub
11.10 Meeting with Prime Minister of Croatia Andrej Plenković
11.30 Meeting with President of Estonia Kersti Kaljulaid
12.00 Opening address by President Kersti Kaljulaid
12.30 Session 1: working lunch on the Future of Governments
15.00 Family photo
15.15 Meeting with German Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel
15.45 Session 2 on the Future of Economy and Society
18.15 Press conference

The European Union (EU) referendum result has led to the unfolding of a domestic constitutional drama in the United Kingdom, which on its current trajectory could lead to its break-up. This is the first of two blog posts which maps the initial trajectory by considering the roles of the key institutional actors in the drama so far. The second post  will consider the impact of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, published in July 2017 and to be debated by the UK Parliament in Autumn 2017, on this constitutional drama.

Setting the scene

Within the framework of the current devolution settlement, the UK’s withdrawal from the EU will mean that Scotland also leaves, despite 62% of the Scottish electorate voting to ‘remain’. However, EU law is embedded within Scotland’s devolved constitutional landscape – the devolved administrations are required to honour the obligations of EU law – and a UK withdrawal from the EU will have direct and significant impacts on the devolution settlement as currently designed.

This sets the scene for a constitutional drama which has been slowly unfolding since 24 June 2016.

Act 1

Enter – the Scottish Government

The referendum result has prompted calls from Scotland’s First Minister to ‘take all possible steps and explore all options to give effect to how people in Scotland voted.’ Short of a second independence referendum which, if successful, would allow Scotland to become an EU Member State in its own right, consideration, as promised, has been given to whether Scotland could remain in the EU without seeking independence in two position papers: Scotland a European Nation and Scotland’s Place in Europe.

Although legally feasible, implementation of the plan set out in these papers would require a high level of political will and legal creativity at both the UK and the EU level. However, the UK Prime Minister has not so far shown any signs of willingness to permit Scotland to negotiate a differentiated position as part of the Brexit negotiations.

Act 2

Enter – The UK Government

The UK Government’s reaction to its counterpart’s calls from Holyrood to respect the decision of Scottish voters to remain in the EU has been muted. Aptly summarised under the title of the ‘May Doctrine’ the UK Government is said to be proceeding on the basis of two assumptions: first, that a certain course of action, namely Brexit – however vaguely defined in its specifics – is irresistible. Second, that the UK executive alone has direct responsibility for the implementation, delineation and definition of Brexit (Blick, 2016).

The ‘May Doctrine’ is clearly enunciated in Theresa May’s Brexit speech, given on 17 January 2017, in which the Prime Minister made it clear that there would be no accommodation of Scotland’s desire for a differentiated relationship with the EU. Doubts were also cast in this speech, and in the government’s subsequent White Paper, over the future remit of the Scottish Parliament. It is often assumed that those powers currently exercised by the EU which fall within devolved competence will be repatriated to the Scottish legislature. In her speech, Theresa May instead suggested instead that it would be left to the UK Parliament (with no mention of the devolved administrations) to decide on any future changes to the law. This position has been confirmed in the publication of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill; a preliminary overview of which can be found here (for more detail on the devolution aspect see blog post 2).

Despite much rhetoric to the contrary the UK government’s position on Brexit expounded to date appears to diminish rather than value the devolved constitutional landscape of the UK and the voices of the administrations within that. There is no legal means by which those voices can be taken into account and a flawed intergovernmental talking shop (the Joint Ministeral Committee) is apparently not providing a meaningful forum for genuine discussions based on mutual trust and respect. With the stakes so high, this is a sorry situation indeed, and in all likelihood, a constitutional collision course in the making.

Act 3

Enter – The Supreme Court

The Supreme Court has taken the place of the third actor in this constitutional drama. In R (on the application of Miller and Dos Santos) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5 the Court was asked whether the UK Government had the power to give formal notice of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU (to ‘trigger article 50 TEU’) without prior parliamentary authorisation through a legislative Act. The outcome of the case in respect of this question is well known: namely that an Act of Parliament is required to authorise ministers to give notice of the decision of the UK to withdraw from the EU. However, the Court was also asked to examine the role of the Sewel Convention which provides that the UK Parliament will not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters without the consent of the Scottish Parliament. Given that the decision to leave the EU directly impinges on a considerable part of the work of the Scottish Parliament and Scottish government on issues ranging from agriculture and fisheries, environmental protection to higher education and research, the argument was led that the UK Parliament required the consent of the Scottish Parliament before it could trigger Article 50 TEU.

The Supreme Court unanimously held that the Sewel Convention effectively restates a constitutional convention rather than a legally binding obligation. The Court did not reach a conclusive decision on whether consent was required as a matter of convention but did decide that the devolved legislatures lack the legal power to block the triggering of Article 50 TEU.

The decision of the Court in this respect may well contribute to the heightening of tensions within our current constitutional drama as the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill will be subject to approval by the Scottish Parliament through a legislative consent motion. Both the Welsh and Scottish governments have indicated their refusal of consent following the publication of the Bill (see blog post 2).

Act 4

Enter – The UK Parliament

The Supreme Court’s decision in Miller has been described as simply putting ‘the Brexit ball firmly back in the [UK] parliament’s court.’ Only it, through the adoption of a statute – and not the UK Government – could allow Article 50 TEU to be triggered and both the House of Commons and the House of Lords agreed to give the Prime Minister the power to trigger Article 50 TEU. The UK’s notification of withdrawal was sent on 29 March 2017. The UK Parliament will have a significant role to play in relation to the EU (Withdrawal) Bill and will be required to adopt a raft of additional legislation (yet to be drafted) within an extremely short timescale.

Final Curtain?

All eyes are now back on the Houses of Parliament as the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill makes its way through the legislative process. The disappointing outcome of June’s general election which returned a ‘hung’ parliament has seemingly emboldened some (government and opposition) MPs to question the government’s stance on Brexit. At the same time, the Scottish government’s position has been seriously weakened by the loss of many of its MPs in the election.

The Bill itself may result in fundamental changes being made to the devolution settlement and given that devolution has embedded itself increasingly into the fabric of the UK constitution over its almost 20 year history, it seems unconscionable that it might be at breaking point – but on the basis of performances given thus far in the drama, it is, at least when viewed from North of the Border.

This blog post is a shortened version of a longer piece
which appeared as M. Fletcher and R. Zahn,
‘Brexit, the UK and Scotland: the story so far:
A constitutional drama in four acts’
in G. Hassan and R. Gunson, Scotland, the UK and Brexit:
A Guide to the Future, Luath Publishing, Edinburgh, 2017

The post Brexit, Scotland, and the Kingdom: a constitutional drama in four acts appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

AMENDMENTS 200 - 357 - Draft report Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World 2016 and the European Union’s policy on the matter
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Prime Minister Ratas has asked me to chair our dinner ahead of the Tallinn Digital Summit, which is why I am writing to you.

On 29 June 2016, a few days after the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom, we decided to begin a reflection on the future of a European Union of 27 Member States. The first meeting devoted to this, in September 2016, resulted in the Bratislava roadmap. We agreed to focus our attention on the issues of most immediate concern to our citizens: migration, security as well as economic and social matters. We further developed this agenda in Malta and in Brussels this year, leading to the Rome declaration, which outlined a more comprehensive vision for the years to come.

In parallel, we set out to deliver on this agenda also during our regular European Councils. We managed to sort out several issues, which is why the situation in Europe is better today and we can look to the future with more optimism. On migration, we focused first on the Eastern Mediterranean Route, then the Central Mediterranean Route, regaining control of our external borders and bringing down the number of irregular migrants and deaths at sea. On security, we continued to strengthen our instruments against terrorism and made important progress on European defence, including in cooperation with NATO. On the economic front we embarked on a reorientation of our trade policy so that negative effects of globalisation are mitigated. We are maintaining high ambitions in terms of market opening (trade agreements with Canada and Japan) while strengthening the robustness of our response to unfair trading practices.

On each of these issues, we still have important and hard work ahead of us. We need to consolidate our external migration policy, improve our capacity for returns and reach durable solutions on a reformed asylum system. We must continue to strengthen European defence, in the first instance by launching the Permanent Structured Cooperation in December. Equally, we need to continue to improve our economic base, including through the digital single market (Tallinn summit), while ensuring that it is socially balanced (Gothenburg summit in November).

We must also decide on the further development of the Euro. There is no silver bullet to complete the Economic and Monetary Union once and for all. But I am convinced that we have the obligation to improve the functioning of the EMU and strengthen it step by step. Our priority should be to complete the Banking Union in line with the agreed roadmap so that the euro area is strengthened structurally. This means that we have to prepare a common backstop to the Banking Union, to advance further risk reduction and pave the way for a European deposit insurance scheme. We should also enhance Europe's capacity to act, which could involve developing the ESM towards a European Monetary Fund. A number of ideas on governance and budgetary resources specific to the euro area have been introduced, on which much more discussion will be needed. In order to advance this agenda I will call a Euro Summit in December in an inclusive format. Concrete decisions on these issues should be taken at the European Council by June next year at the latest.

At the same time, we should continue to develop the international role of the Union, in our neighbourhood as well as at the global level. In the October European Council I suggest that we discuss our reaction to developments in relations with Turkey, and in May next year I propose, in agreement with Prime Minister Borisov, that we gather in Bulgaria for a Western Balkans summit. Trade will also remain an important priority for our work.

Looking beyond these immediate priorities, we have a big task in front of us when it comes to the next multiannual EU budget. This discussion, which will shape our policies for the years to come, will start in earnest once we have concluded the agreement on the UK's withdrawal. It will be an important item on our agenda until we reach consensus in time for the entry of the new Multiannual Financial Framework in 2021.

We cannot deal with, let alone decide on, all these questions in Tallinn. But I do think that this meeting will be a good opportunity to discuss how we approach this debate, particularly given the many interesting voices we have recently heard on substance, method as well as objectives. I will be seeking your guidance with a view to deciding, after our discussion, how to organise the work of the European Council in this respect. In order to ensure an open, frank and informal exchange on these issues, there will be no texts on the table, and no written conclusions will be drawn from our discussion.

Finally, we should all be aware that Brexit remains one of the main tasks for us. This will be the subject of our next meeting at 27 in October, on the basis of Article 50.

The Council has closed the excessive deficit procedure for Greece. It confirmed that the country's deficit is now below 3% of GDP, the EU's reference value for government deficits. 

On 25 September 2017, the Council repealed its 2009 decision on the existence of an excessive deficit. 

"After many years of severe difficulties, Greece's finances are in much better shape. Today's decision is therefore welcome", said Toomas Tõniste, minister for finance of Estonia, which currently holds the Council presidency. "We are now in the last year of the financial support programme, and progress is being made to enable Greece to again raise money on the financial markets at sustainable rates." 

From a deficit of 15.1% of GDP reached in 2009, Greece's fiscal balance has steadily improved, turning into a 0.7% of GDP surplus in 2016. Although a small deficit is projected for 2017, the fiscal outlook is expected to improve again thereafter. Greece's debt-to-GDP ratio peaked at 179.0% in 2016 and is expected to decrease over the coming years. 

In the light of this, the Council found that Greece fulfils the conditions for closing the excessive deficit procedure. 

Greece will now be subject to the preventive arm of the EU's fiscal rulebook, the Stability and Growth Pact. Monitoring will continue until August 2018 under its macroeconomic adjustment programme, and post-programme monitoring will follow. The Greek authorities have committed to maintaining a primary surplus of 3.5% of GDP until 2022 and a fiscal trajectory after that that is consistent with EU fiscal requirements.

When the excessive deficit procedure was opened in April 2009, the Council called on Greece to correct its deficit by 2010. 

In February 2010 the Council stepped up the procedure, having found that Greece had not taken effective action. It set out a timetable of measures to be taken and extended the deadline for correction to 2012. 

However, the deterioration of its financial situation led the Greek government to request financial support. In May 2010 the Eurogroup agreed on the provision of bilateral loans from the other eurozone member states, in conjunction with assistance from the IMF. A loan facility agreement was signed and the deadline for correcting the deficit was extended to 2014. Since March 2012, eurozone support has taken the form of loans from the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). 

In December 2012, the Council granted Greece a further two years to correct its deficit. It set a new deadline of 2016 and relaxed the annual adjustment path previously set. This followed an agreement between the Greek government and the 'troika' of international creditors (Commission, European Central Bank and IMF) on the disbursement of further tranches of financial assistance. Despite having taken effective action, Greece again faced a worsening economic scenario and a deteriorating outlook for its public finances. 

In July 2015 Greece requested further financial assistance, this time from the European Stability Mechanism that meanwhile had been established to take over from the EFSF. Agreement was reached on the provision of up to €86 billion in loans. A third macroeconomic adjustment programme started the following month and is scheduled to run until 20 August 2018. Its main aim is to secure for Greece a return to sustainable economic growth. And under the excessive deficit procedure, the Council issued a recommendation setting out a new timetable of measures to be taken. It extended the deadline for correcting the deficit by a further year, to 2017. 

Greece's general government balance has steadily improved since the peak reached in 2009. The deficit declined to 5.9% of GDP in 2015 (3.2% of GDP if the net impact of financial sector support is excluded) and turned into a 0.7% of GDP surplus in 2016. The deficit reduction was driven broadly equally by expenditure restraint and fiscal consolidation. 

Taking into account measures agreed under the third macroeconomic adjustment programme, the Commission in its spring 2017 economic forecast projects a 1.2% of GDP deficit for 2017. Based on a no-policy-change scenario, it projects a surplus of 0.6% of GDP for 2018. Measures outlined in Greece's 2018-21 fiscal strategy are expected to improve the fiscal outturn for 2018 and the medium term. Thus the deficit is set to remain below the 3% of GDP reference value over the forecast horizon. 

In the light of this data, the Council concluded that Greece's deficit has been corrected. 

The decision was taken without discussion at a meeting of the General Affairs Council.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP